America's Strategy

IN WORLD POLITICS

The United States and the Balance of Power

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America's Strategy in World Politics

THE UNITED STATES AND THE BALANCE OF POWER

Introduction

ALMOST a quarter of a century has passed since that day in November, 1918, when fighting ceased in the war to end war. It is more than twenty years since President Wilson presented the statesmen of the world with a blueprint for a better international order, one that many people believed would bring peace and security. But the world is again in flames. Advanced technology has created bigger and better engines for mass murder; devastation and destruction is again the ultimate purpose to which the energy of nations is being geared, and human life is again being sacrificed on a large scale for the achievement of national purpose. Another world war is in full swing and the United States is once more an active participant.

We became a full belligerent as the result of Japanese attacks on our island possessions in the Pacific and a declaration of war by Germany and Italy. The form of the attack produced overnight a remarkable national unity and halted for a time the debate over isolation and intervention as the most desirable grand strategy for the United States. These two policies represented not only two different programs for the protection of the security and the interests of the United States, they also represented profound differences in ideological outlook and political sympathy. The isolationist position has always had a strong psychological and emotional appeal for broad sections of the population. The American state was created by people who had turned their backs on Europe and most of the immigrants who entered during the nineteenth century wanted to forget the Old World. But the wars and quarrels of that continent, which had disturbed them when they lived across the oceans, continued to disturb them here. European politics still frustrated their desire for freedom and release. A doctrine that tells Americans that they need not bother about Europe is an answer to this deep-seated desire. The most staunch adherents to the policy of intervention have been those who were inspired by

idealistic considerations. Some asked participation because they were pro-British; others because they believed that, in a period of ideological warfare, we had a moral obligation to support the people whose social and political structure most closely resembled our own. Many insisted that we should become belligerents in the war because only in that manner could we make good our failure of 1920 and present the post-war world with a system of collective security and durable peace.

Whatever may have been the motives that inspired people to prefer isolation or intervention as policies for the United States, these two programs have different power implications and it is with these implications and with their effect on the position of the United States that this study is concerned. Seen in this light, the two attitudes differed profoundly in their estimate of the relative importance of the balance of power in Europe and Asia for the security of the United States. Paralleling this divergence was a disagreement about the implications of the geographic location of the United States and of the principles that should guide us in our military and political strategy because of this location. The interventionists and the isolationists represented, from this point of view, two distinct geo-political schools of thought.

Those who asked intervention in terms of power considerations took the position that the first line of defense of the United States lies in the preservation of a balance of power in Europe and Asia. Without denying the fact that our geographic location provides certain obvious advantages in the matter of territorial security, they contended that this does not permit us to neglect balance of power considerations. We were not exempt from the necessity of considering policies which all other states in history have been forced to pursue in the interests of survival. In addition to the maintenance of an equilibrium in Europe and Asia, the interventionists saw a second line of defense in the Western Hemisphere. The isolationists, who were aware of the power implications of their program, felt on the other hand, that, because of our unique geographic location between two oceans, we could disinterest ourselves in the power struggle across the water and view with equanimity the possibility of the destruction of the balance of power in Europe and Asia. Our own inherent strength, together with the protection which the oceans afforded, made it not

only feasible but wise to adopt a defensive policy on this side of the water and to leave Europe and Asia to their own devices.

The debate on intervention versus isolation, as a debate on the principles of higher strategy that derive from our geographic location, did not begin with the outbreak of the Second World War. It is the oldest issue in American foreign policy, and whenever there has arisen a question of co-operation with a transoceanic power or the need for action in Europe and Asia, it has become a topic for discussion. When, in the early part of the nineteenth century, France contemplated the reconquest of the Spanish colonies with the aid of the Holy Alliance, Great Britain proposed that we join her in common action to oppose this plan. There was a long and bitter debate in which the proponents of independent and unilateral action finally won out. The Monroe Doctrine was an announcement of our intention to defend the hemisphere alone without a European ally.

Later in the century the issue was again debated in connection with our participation in European conferences such as the first and second Moroccan Conferences and the Berlin Conference, all of which dealt with political questions resulting from the struggles of the European powers in Africa. The problem did not present itself at the outset of the Spanish-American War but when, as the result of our victory, the question arose whether we should keep the Philippines, the opponents of retention argued that such a step would be unnatural and against the logic of our geographic position which demands that we should occupy no territories outside this hemisphere. The advocates of surrender lost the debate as far as public policy was concerned and the Philippines have been American territory for more than forty years, but this fact has not stopped the argument. During the whole period there has been objection to our participation in Far Eastern politics.

The First World War made the question once more a burning issue. In April, 1917, we became a full belligerent and the argument was temporarily suspended, but it is to be noted that once again the *fait accompli* by no means ended the debate. Objection to our participation continued during the whole period of the war. With the armistice, the debate entered a new phase and this time the isolationists won: the United States refused to become a member of the

League of Nations or to accept political commitments in Europe. But again the issue was not settled. In the post-war period the dispute continued in the form of a controversy over the degree to which the United States should participate in efforts to preserve order in Europe and Asia. The isolationist school remained the dominant influence in the formulation of our foreign policy largely because of its strategic position in the Senate, and our attitude remained one of aloofness and non-participation. Attempts by the interventionists to provide for co-operation with the League system were all voted down and neutrality legislation passed by Congress continued to express the isolationist philosophy right up to the outbreak of the Second World War.

The size of the geographic area in the New World necessary for the creation of an adequate system of defense gradually expanded in the minds of the isolationists. Originally it was the national domain; after the building of the Panama Canal it was extended to include the Caribbean littoral and finally the whole hemisphere. Both interventionists and isolationists made the protection of the New World part of their program, but they disagreed about its relative importance. For the former it represented a second line of defense to which we could withdraw if the policy of intervention in Europe and Asia failed. For the isolationists it represented the first line of defense, a maximum program toward which all energies were to be directed and beyond which no effort need go. Hemisphere defense through hemisphere isolation became the new streamlined version of the old isolationist position.

The United States has again become a participant in war and the old issue therefore takes on a new significance. It presents itself now as a problem, not of peace strategy, but of war strategy and war objectives. Shall we try to direct our war effort primarily at the protection of the Western Hemisphere, focused on the territorial waters of the New World, or shall we strike out and fight offensively across the oceans? Would it be possible for us to live an independent national life within the Western Hemisphere in case the German-Japanese Alliance should be able to crush all resistance in the Old World, or does our freedom and security demand the destruction of the great military empires now being fashioned in Europe and

Asia and the re-establishment of a balance of power? Is the world beyond the oceans one from which we can withdraw after victory as we did in 1918, or one whose fate is inescapably interwoven with our own? The Second World War presents the issue of intervention versus isolation in a new phase but it is basically the same question it has always been: shall we protect our interests by defense on this side of the water or by active participation in the lands across the oceans?

There have been numerous attempts to prove the validity of isolation or intervention as sound strategy by reference to precedent and appeal to the authority of the Founding Fathers. Both groups have made generous use of this debating device and our history has been sufficiently rich and varied to provide both parties with excellent arguments. But even if the past should favor one side more than the other, it would not follow that the side thus favored represents the wiser policy. Historical precedent and the voice of the Fathers can be used as a means to gain support for a doctrine but not as proof of its soundness. Not conformity with the past but workability in the present is the criterion of a sound policy. Not specially selected instances in the history of the United States, but the general experience of states should be made the guide for a program of action.

The basic power aspect of international relations has received but little attention in the United States, partly because of our assumed isolation behind protective ocean moats, partly because of certain religious elements in our national ideology. The author is fully aware of the fact that men are motivated by other desires than the urge for power and that power is not the only aspect of international relations. International as well as national affairs are influenced by love, hate, and charity, by moral indignation and the hope of material gain, by the moods and psychological abnormalities of rulers, and by the emotional afflictions of peoples. International society is, however, a society without a central authority to preserve law and order, and without an official agency to protect its members in the enjoyment of their rights. The result is that individual states must make the preservation and improvement of their power position a primary objective of their foreign policy. A sound foreign policy for the United States must accept this basic reality of international so-

ciety, and develop a grand strategy for both war and peace based on the implications of its geographic location in the world.

There is therefore need for a new approach to the question of isolation versus intervention. This volume is an attempt to provide such an approach. It projects the special problem of the United States against the general experience of states and the nature of international relations, and offers an analysis of the position of our country in terms of geography and power politics. It represents a geo-political study of the most basic issue of American foreign policy, one that is as old as the republic and that will remain a topic for discussion as long as the United States remains a free and independent country.

PART ONE

THE UNITED STATES AND THE BALANCE OF POWER

I. Power Politics and War

We both alike know that into the discussion of human affairs the question of justice only enters where the pressure of necessity is equal, and that the powerful exact what they can, and the weak grant what they must.

THUCYDIDES

WITHOUT mechanical power—the ability to move mass—there can be no technology. Without political power—the ability to move men—technology cannot serve a social purpose. All civilized life rests, therefore, in the last instance on power. Yet power has a bad name, and the use of power is often condemned. In the United States the word has a connotation of evil. That exercise of force is often necessary in the pursuit of worthy objectives is regretfully accepted, but that power should become an objective in itself, a goal for individual, social, or state action, is considered both undesirable and wicked, a condemnation which is unfortunate, because it hampers a sound understanding of one of the basic aspects of all social life.

Distrust of the moral character of power which echoes out of the Christian conscience has not prevented man from pursuing it with a whole-hearted devotion. Books with twelve easy lessons on how to become powerful are eternal best sellers, and the posts that carry power are sought as eagerly as those that carry only financial rewards. In the striving for positions of influence the struggle often becomes fierce and unrefined, and many a campaign for the presidency of a ladies' sewing circle or a Christian Endeavor Society has been embellished with all the Machiavellian tactics that the Florentine writer recommended for the conduct of princes.

Nature of Power

Human beings have invented a great variety of techniques designed to win friends and influence people. These different methods can be classified under four broad headings: persuasion, purchase, barter, and coercion, although this does not mean that every endeavor to make others do our bidding can be neatly pigeonholed into one of these categories. On the contrary it will be found that most successful policies are a judicious mixture of all four. The relative amount of each of the ingredients differs from case to case, from individual to individual, from community to community, and it is the community which defines what is acceptable and what is condemned. Where freedom and individual dignity are cherished, persuasion is more acceptable than coercion and the use of the latter is usually restricted as between individuals. The state alone, not the citizen, can legally coerce by means of the night stick, tear gas bomb, and sub-machine gun.

From an ethical point of view power can be considered only as a means to an end. It is, therefore, important that the use which is made of it should be constantly subjected to moral judgments, but to hope for a world that will operate without coercion and to decry man's desire to obtain power is an attempt to escape from reality into a world of dreams. Man creates society through co-operation, accommodation, and conflict, and all three are essential and integral parts of social life. He works together with others for common ends and creates the instruments of government for that very purpose. He accommodates himself to his fellows by shaping his conduct in conformity to common values and by accepting the normative pressure of custom and the rules of law. But he also accepts conflict for personal gain or impersonal ideal. Strife is one of the basic aspects of life and, as such, an element of all relations between individuals, groups, and states. A world without struggle would be a world in which life had ceased to exist. An orderly world is not a world in which there is no conflict, but one in which strife and struggle are led into political and legal channels away from the clash of arms; are transferred from the battlefield to the council chamber and the court room.

For groups as for individuals there are two forms of approach to desired objectives in case of opposition and conflict, direct action and "political action." The first means that the group acts directly upon the individuals whose co-operation is necessary to achieve the desired result. The second means that the group tries to achieve success through the use of the coercive power of the state. A great deal of modern economic life involves group struggle in the form of direct action: share croppers against landowners, farmers against milk distributors, industrial unions against trade unions, labor unions against employers, and industrial corporations among themselves. Many a western railroad and pipeline owes its present right-of-way not to a court decision but to the successful outcome of a bloody battle at strategic points between the forces of opposing companies.

An industrial dispute may start with a negotiation between an employer and a labor union. If negotiation fails, the parties may attempt mediation or accept arbitration. They may, on the other hand, refuse the peaceful solution and declare war in the form of a strike or a lockout. In that case the opponents will have tried all the possible methods of influencing each other's behavior, including persuasion, purchase, barter, and coercion. The strength of the group will obviously influence its choice of method, but it would be a mistake to assume that power is important only in the case of coercion. On the contrary, the fact that the labor union is powerful may make a test of strength unnecessary and successful negotiation that much easier.

The union and every other group is, therefore, forced to devote itself not merely to the pursuit of its objectives but also to the constant improvement of its strength. Any association, however simple its purpose, which depends for the realization of its objectives on the actions of other men or other groups becomes involved in the struggle for power and must make not only self-preservation but also improvement of its power position a primary objective of both internal and external policy.

Labor unions, like all groups operating within the state, have an alternative method to their objective. If the direct approach is too difficult, they can try an indirect route through the legislature and attempt to obtain the use of the law-making power of the state. It is

sometimes possible to achieve rewards for labor through legislative definitions of minimum standards which cannot possibly be obtained by direct action on employers. The Woman's Christian Temperance Union may act directly through persuasion and the picketing of saloons, or it can act indirectly through the "Eighteenth Amendment." It is to this technique in the national sphere that the term "political activity" is applied, the struggle for control of the government for the purpose of serving individual or group interest.

To the extent that private groups intend to work through government agencies they must add to their broad power objective the specific task of increasing political strength. For one particular kind of group, the political party, political power is the main object and *raison d'être*. It exists for the purpose of influencing public policy, and it can achieve its aim only by winning elections in competition with other political parties. The struggle for power is here so near the surface that it is easily visible, and everybody is, therefore, willing to agree that for the political party the improvement of its relative power position must be a constant endeavor. When the war chest is depleted more quickly than filled, when loyalty weakens, when organization and discipline deteriorate, the party will be on its way out, to be replaced by one of its competitors.

There are a great many instances when political action in the form of indirect pressure through the legislature is not possible. The group may be without political power because sex or property qualifications have disfranchised its members. The issue may be one in which the government cannot act because of constitutional restrictions, budget limitation, or lack of administrative agencies. In that case the group will have to choose between direct action and political activity of a special kind aimed at constitutional amendments, the extension of government power, changes in the distribution of authority, and the creation of new agencies. Political activity is then directed not at the use of the existing instruments of government but at their modification and the creation of new ones.

Groups which must operate within the power organization called the state must conduct their external policy within the limits of the permissible methods. In theory the state reserves to itself the legal monopoly of physical force, and only those forms of coercion which

are free from physical violence are permitted. There are obviously wide differences in the ability or willingness of different states to enforce this principle and great variations in the same state at different times, running all the way from "perfect order" to "complete anarchy." The government of the United States and its people have on the whole been rather lenient. Intramural gang warfare has long been tolerated as a by-product of the exuberance of urban life, and strong-arm methods have been accepted as necessary inspirational aids in city elections. The importance of physical violence in labor conflicts and in the "non-existent" class struggle is attested to by the existence of a flourishing armaments industry making tear gas bombs and other equipment and the availability of mercenary infantry for any union or employer who can afford the price. Law and fact in regard to the monopoly of violence seem to vary almost as much as law and fact in regard to other monopolies.

Order and governmental control are elements of the environment within which groups operate, and exert direct influence on their external policy. When there exists a strong government with wide powers, able to enforce its decisions, there will be effective limits on the forms which inter-group struggles can take. The indirect method through legislation will be as important as the method of direct action, and the struggle for power will not only be a struggle for direct power over groups but also a struggle for political power over government. When there is no government with wide authority and ability to enforce its decisions, there will be little restraint on the forms which inter-group conflict may take. It will then be useless to try to influence the government, and direct action must become the preferred approach until such time as the government has changed. Under those conditions the struggle for power will be primarily a struggle for direct power over other groups and only indirectly a struggle for power over the government above the groups.

Power in International Relations

In international society, as in other social groupings, there are observable the three basic processes of co-operation, accommodation, and opposition. Not only individuals and groups but also states main-

tain the three types of social relations. They have co-operated for common ends and created the instruments of international administration in the fields of communication and transportation without which modern international intercourse would be impossible. They have, through acceptance of common values, developed modes of accommodation by building out of custom and precedent a body of rules called international law. States have often obeyed these rules voluntarily and have been willing to adopt peaceful procedures for the settlement of disputes. But they have also accepted conflict and used coercion including war for the achievement of their national objectives.

The situation which characterizes the relations of groups within a state only in periods of crisis and breakdown of central authority is normal for the relations of states within the international society. It is the so-called sovereign independence of states, the absence of higher authority, and the freedom from external restraints that give to interstate relations their peculiar character of anarchy.

This historical state system consisting of sovereign independent units has been subject to two processes, conquest and confederation, which, if successful, might have changed its basic character. But neither process could ever achieve more than partial success. There have been strong and vigorous states which conquered their neighbors and enslaved the weak, but not even the gigantic empires of antiquity managed to absorb the states beyond their regional control and integrate them into simple hegemonic systems. Equally unsuccessful has been the process of the delegation of power from below. There have been confederations in all historical periods, but they were always partial and limited, partial in the sense that they included only a small number of states and limited in the sense that the interstate organizations were formed for specific and usually administrative purposes. Illustrations of international co-operation and limited confederation are many, but there has never been a case of the actual transfer of military power and political authority from individual states to the organs of an international community.

The essential difference between the international community and the national community as conditioning environments for group behavior is, therefore, the absence in the former of a governmental

organization capable of preserving order and enforcing law. The international community has never, in fact, guaranteed the member states either life, liberty, property, or the pursuit of happiness, whatever the paper provisions of international conventions may have stipulated. Each individual state has continued to depend for its very existence, as much as for the enjoyment of its rights and the protection of its interests, primarily on its own strength or that of its protectors.

Self-preservation used in connection with states has a special meaning. Because territory is an inherent part of a state, self-preservation means defending its control over territory; and, because independence is of the essence of the state, self-preservation also means fighting for independent status. This explains why the basic objective of the foreign policy of all states is the preservation of territorial integrity and political independence.

In addition to the primary task of survival, the foreign policy of states is directed at a great many specific objectives which can be classified in different ways. They are geographic, demographic, racial, ethnic, economic, social, and ideological in nature and include such items as: the acquisition of naval bases, the limitation of immigration, the assimilation of minorities, the search for access to raw materials, markets, and investment opportunities, the protection of the social order against disruptive alien forces, the encouragement of cultural relations, and the restriction of the trade in dangerous drugs.

The same two methods which are used in the national sphere for promoting group interests are used in the international sphere for promoting state interests. States may use the direct method, acting immediately upon other states; they may use such international organizations as exist; or they may devote their foreign policy to the creation of new instruments. The relative importance of each of these methods is, however, very different from that which prevails in the national sphere. The character of international society today makes direct power over other states far more useful than ability to influence international organizations.

At the time of the founding of the League of Nations and during its early history when it was still expected that the new organization

might develop into an important agency of international government, there were many struggles for control between the large and the small powers and competition between individual states for seats on the council and the important committees. It looked for a while as if the struggle for power on the battlefield might really be transformed into a struggle for power in the council room. But when it became clear that the council room was merely a place for deliberation and the League only a forum for debate, interest lagged. It was futile to try to control a government that had no power. The foreign ministers sent their assistant secretaries and finally even these stayed home. The edifice that was to house the parliament of nations became an expensive symbol of a forlorn hope.

Direct action from state to state has remained the normal and most prevalent form of approach. It represents the most characteristic expression of foreign policy. Absence of international government is responsible not only for the significance of direct action but for the fact that there is no community restraint on the methods used. In international society all forms of coercion are permissible, including wars of destruction. This means that the struggle for power is identical with the struggle for survival, and the improvement of the relative power position becomes the primary objective of the internal and the external policy of states. All else is secondary, because in the last instance only power can achieve the objectives of foreign policy. Power means survival, the ability to impose one's will on others, the capacity to dictate to those who are without power, and the possibility of forcing concessions from those with less power. Where the ultimate form of conflict is war, the struggle for power becomes a struggle for war power, a preparation for war.

The statesman who conducts foreign policy can concern himself with values of justice, fairness, and tolerance only to the extent that they contribute to or do not interfere with the power objective. They can be used instrumentally as moral justification for the power quest, but they must be discarded the moment their application brings weakness. The search for power is not made for the achievement of moral values; moral values are used to facilitate the attainment of power.

In this kind of a world states can survive only by constant devotion to power politics. Because power is in the last instance the power

to wage war, states have always devoted considerable effort to the building of military establishments. But the relative power of states depends not only on military forces but on many other factors—size of territory, nature of frontiers, size of population, absence or presence of raw materials, economic and technological development, financial strength, ethnic homogeneity, effective social integration, political stability, and national spirit. In the struggle for power these items become important secondary objectives. They have value in themselves, and they are means to power.

The power position of a state, however, depends not only on its own military strength but also on that of its potential enemies. This means that there is a second approach to power apart from the enlargement of one's own war equipment. Its purpose is to influence directly the power position of other states, to weaken some, to strengthen others. To achieve this aim, states are willing to use their military power not only for the protection of their own territory but also for the protection of the territory of others, not for any altruistic reasons but because the continued existence of the third state contributes to their own security.

Far back into antiquity goes the practice of strong states protecting small countries on their border against invasion from states beyond. This policy of protecting "buffer states" is a development and improvement on the old type of territorial defense by means of the creation of special frontier zones. When states have neighbors that are not weak but strong, it is the neighbor that represents the potential threat. Under such circumstances, nations have usually been willing to make an alliance with the country beyond the neighbor, to fight for the protection of that country's territory in exchange for a reciprocal obligation. But willingness to support other states has not been motivated solely by a desire for the security of a frontier or a zone of special strategic significance, but also by a desire to stop the expansion of some great state which after further growth might become a menace. The policy is then directed at the prevention of hegemony, a power position which would permit the domination of all within its reach.

Balance of Power

The reason for such a policy lies in the lessons of history. The number of cases in which a strong dynamic state has stopped expanding because of satiation or has set modest limits to its power aims has been very few indeed. The policy which aims to restrain growing states and is known as the balance of power policy has been part and parcel of the diplomacy of all successful states. Experience has shown that there is more safety in balanced power than in a declaration of good intention. To preserve the balance requires action not only against the neighbor that becomes too powerful but also against distant states. As a matter of fact, the best period for the application of this policy is before continued expansion makes the growing state a neighbor. A hegemony that has access to the sea can become a menace to far distant shores and the ever-increasing bombing range of modern aircraft is making air power almost as effective a threat as sea power against non-contiguous states.

It is obvious that a balance of power policy is in the first place a policy for the Great Powers. The small states, unless they can successfully combine together, can only be weights in a balance used by others. But although they are stakes rather than players, their interest in the outcome of the game is none the less great. A small state is a vacuum in a political high pressure area. It does not live because of its own strength but because nobody wants its territory or because its preservation as a buffer state or as a weight in the balance of power is of interest to a stronger nation. When the balance disappears, the small states usually disappear with it.

Since the Renaissance and the Reformation, the balance of power has been a favorite topic of speculation among the political philosophers of Europe. After Emperor and Pope had lost their function as keystones in the European political order, a search began for a new integrating principle. It was found in the "balance of power," which became the subject of learned discourses. The philosophers pointed out its relation to the law of nature and the harmony of the spheres and indicated that an equilibrium was not only inherently beautiful but full of practical and ethical implications. If all states were held

in check, no state could win a war; and, if no state could win a war, then no state would start a war or threaten war. Equilibrium is balanced power, and balanced power is neutralized power. A society in political equilibrium is a society in which force is useless and in which men will, therefore, live happily by the reign of law and devote themselves to the arts and graces.

To the men of learning it seemed obvious that states ought to pursue a balance of power policy; that the law of nature and Christian ethics both demand such a policy. States ought to direct their diplomacy not merely at counterbalancing specific threats to themselves but at establishing a balanced system for the whole of the international society. They ought to pursue a balance of power policy not merely to preserve their own relative power position but to preserve peace.

Statesmen have always been eager to accept from the theologian and the philosopher the correct formulation of the ethical precepts that should guide foreign policy, and since the seventeenth century all power politics has, therefore, been presented not as a crude attempt to survive in a tough world but as a noble endeavor aimed at the establishment of political equilibrium and the preservation of order.

Formulated in those terms the success has not been overwhelming. We might search for an explanation in the fact that the process is not guaranteed and that not all statesmen are good technicians, but it is perhaps safer to explain the result on the theory that they were not really interested in achieving a balance. There are not many instances in history which show great and powerful states creating alliances and organizations to limit their own strength. States are always engaged in curbing the force of some other state. The truth of the matter is that states are interested only in a balance which is in their favor. Not an equilibrium, but a generous margin is their objective. There is no real security in being just as strong as a potential enemy; there is security only in being a little stronger. There is no possibility of action if one's strength is fully checked; there is a chance for a positive foreign policy only if there is a margin of force which can be freely used. Whatever the theory and the rationalization, the practical objective is the constant improvement of the state's

own relative power position. The balance desired is the one which neutralizes other states, leaving the home state free to be the deciding force and the deciding voice.

It would seem that this objective does not require quite the accuracy in measuring which the search for a perfect equilibrium would require, but, even so, the task is full of difficulties. It is easy to balance mechanical forces because they can be measured, but there is no measuring stick for political power. Are two states balanced, is their power equal, is the relationship between the two sets of alliances in equilibrium? On that question there is usually profound disagreement. The relative power remains a purely subjective judgment. Each state always feels that the other one needs balancing. In so far as the power concerned is in the last instance a power to wage war, it might be assumed that the military men would know the answer, but theirs is an opinion equally subjective, even if a little more expert. The most learned generals have disagreed as often as the statesmen. The only objective test of relative strength is to fight the war and see who wins, but this is hardly a helpful guide to the state that wants to decide whether to fight or not.

The second difficulty lies in the fact that the elements contributing to strength are not static but dynamic; they do not stay put. A new economic development, a new raw material, a new weapon, a new martial spirit may produce the most profound inequality between states that only a few years before had been approximately equal. Besides, in a world of states of equal strength, what is there to prevent the combination of two of them against a third?

Another problem which sometimes appears is the discovery that the state selected to be the ally in the opposition to the growing power has already made a deal with the opponent, and the chance for a balance has been missed. Similar unfortunate results may flow from the fact that statesmen occasionally believe in the innocence of other statesmen. This permits some of them to achieve enormous expansion by the accretion of small additions of territory. The state of Lusitania announces that it has only one very limited aim, the incorporation of a little territory of the state of Mauritania after which the true balance will have been established, and it will never aspire to another square foot of land. The demand is so small, the

request so modest that it is obviously not worth fighting for. It will, of course, be discovered afterwards that there is still no perfect balance, that there is still need for an additional piece of territory. This even smaller piece is likewise not worth fighting for. It lies perhaps in a region outside the immediate interest of the state which must decide how to act, and so its annexation goes unopposed. It is by this process of gradual conquest that most of the successful hegemonies have been established.

An actual balance of power policy operates along several lines, boundary making, compensation, the creation of alliances, and varying degrees of intervention in wars, grading all the way from slight deviations from neutrality to full participation as an ally. Boundary making is important at the end of a war, and historically the Great Powers have always demanded to be heard at the peace settlement even if they had not participated in the conflict. Under the theory of compensation, states have permitted other states to grow provided they themselves obtained an equal accretion of strength and prestige. It was under this principle of compensation and in the name of the balance of power that the Treaty of Westphalia parceled out the small German principalities among Austria, Bavaria, Brandenburg, and Sweden; that Poland was divided four times; that Africa was carved up; and that plans were laid for the partition of China.

In addition to boundary making and compensation, nations have used systems of alliances to check the growth of a dynamic power. The least expensive and, therefore, the most preferable method would be for a state to encourage an alliance between third parties strong enough to ward off the danger. But this is seldom possible, and the state must be prepared to make its own positive contribution and become part of the alliance. The alliance may stipulate merely a limited contribution in the form of a fixed sum of money, a specific number of ships, or a defined number of soldiers. There is, however, little protection in such limitation. If the survival and continued independence of the ally is really important for the state's own security, its assistance may have to go far beyond the original promises. It will, in fact, have to be increased to whatever is necessary to assure victory and security.

The purpose of the alliance, like the purpose of all power politics,

is to achieve the necessary margin of safety in the field of action. But the margin of security for one is the margin of danger for the other, and alliance must, therefore, be met by counter-alliance and armament by counter-armament in an eternal competitive struggle for power. Thus it has been in all periods of history. One state successfully conquers adjacent territory and makes each new conquest the stepping stone for further expansion, each accretion of power the means for further enlargement. Power tends to grow and diffuse through wider areas, and the states in the vicinity have the choice between collective defense and ultimate absorption.

The weak states of the Tigris-Euphrates valley allied themselves against their stronger rivals and preserved their independence for centuries, until Hammurabi finally established the Babylonian Empire. A new and inconclusive struggle for power then emerged over a much wider area between the Egyptians, the Assyrians, the Hittites, and the Persians with the smaller states in the region being used as buffers and weights. The Greek city-states maintained a precarious balance by means of the Delian and Peloponnesian Leagues under the leadership of Athens and Sparta, but they failed to combine against the menace of Macedonia. Rome, the victorious, found no league to stem her vast expansion and defeated her enemies one by one. Had they known how to combine, Carthage, Egypt, and Macedonia might have preserved their independence far longer and confined Rome within the boundaries of Europe.

Modern European history begins with the struggle for power among the Italian city-states which was later transferred to the national states over an ever-widening area eventually including the whole world. When the House of Hapsburg under Charles V attained such vast domains that it threatened to become a menace to other states, these states combined to check its ascendancy. Similar was the fate of the hegemonic aspirations of Spain under Philip II, France under Louis XIV and Napoleon, and Germany under Kaiser Wilhelm II. The fate of Germany's new bid for European domination depends on the outcome of the Second World War.

In this endless story of struggling states, there have been short periods in which an approximation to balanced power prevailed, not because anybody wanted it or tried to achieve it, but because two

states or two sets of states were trying to upset it in different directions. Such a situation is inherently unstable because all parties are constantly attempting to destroy it, but while it lasts it brings mankind important benefits as the philosophers had promised. In an international society in which states are intent on preserving their independence, both against world conquest and against world government through federation, balanced power is the only approximation to order. When states are convinced that their strength is inadequate to enforce their will, they become peaceful and reasonable, they discover the benefits of conciliation and arbitration and plead in terms of law and justice instead of demanding in terms of force.

But a political equilibrium is neither a gift of the gods nor an inherently stable condition. It results from the active intervention of man, from the operation of political forces. States cannot afford to wait passively for the happy time when a miraculously achieved balance of power will bring peace and security. If they wish to survive, they must be willing to go to war to preserve a balance against the growing hegemonic power of the period. Balanced power may eventually reduce the prevalence of war, but force remains the most efficient instrument with which to check the expansion of states. Power politics has, therefore, added another reason for going to war to the long list already developed out of the inevitable conflict patterns of international intercourse. States must be ready to fight not only for the defense and the conquest of territory, for the protection and incorporation of nationals living across borders, for the preservation and acquisition of economic benefits, and for the defense and the propagation of national ideologies, but also for the preservation and improvement of their relative power positions.

It is, therefore, not surprising that international relations are conducted to the constant accompaniment of the drums of battle. There is a tendency to look upon peace as normal and war as abnormal, but this is because of an intellectual confusion resulting from emotional reactions to war. War is unpleasant, but it is an inherent part of state systems composed of sovereign independent units. To forget that reality because wars are unwelcome is to court disaster. War has been a constant phenomenon in international relations in all periods of history. There have been only a few years when the clash of arms

could not be heard somewhere in the world. The states of Europe were at war 75 per cent of the time in the seventeenth century, 50 per cent in the eighteenth century, and 25 per cent in the nineteenth century. It seems that the frequency of war is declining, but the effect of a struggle is more and more devastating and involves greater cost in human life and material destruction. The total effect of war on the life of nations has not decreased but increased notwithstanding the lengthening periods of peace.

The Nature of War

Power politics continues to demand readiness for war. Advancing civilization has brought about great changes in weapons and techniques, but the basic objective of war has not changed. The purpose is coercion of the enemy, destruction of his will to resist, and, finally, his surrender. To that end the defeat of his military forces is only one of the means, albeit perhaps the most important one. Under modern conditions military struggles are supplemented not only by political but also by economic and ideological warfare.

1. Military Warfare

Warfare at all times reflects the social, economic, and technological character of the groups engaged in the struggle. While the eighteenth century still fought wars for limited objectives by means of mercenary soldiers and a relatively small amount of matériel, the succeeding century turned to wars of annihilation involving an ever larger participation of the nation. The American and French Revolutions and the Prussian Revolt against Napoleon created the "national army" as the successor to the "king's army," and conscription made the man power of the nation the limit of its effectives. The Industrial Revolution developed a production technique able to clothe and arm large bodies of soldiers; steam engines and gasoline motors, railways and highways gave them mobility; and modern medicine saved them from death by contagious disease. The result was the modern mass army.

Conscription replaced the professional soldier fighting for pay,

ready to go anywhere, by an armed citizenry fighting for its country in an emergency. The change brought many advantages but also many drawbacks. Man power became cheaper and more abundant, but it needed a great deal more psychological training to overcome its natural preference for defensive action and a great deal more ideological preparation to transform it into an effective fighting force. A conscript army does not fight for pay but for a national purpose, and unless public opinion is educated to the strategic advantages of offensive action or inspired by a messianic ideology, the nation will offer the lives of its sons only for national defense. To the man in the street, national defense means defense against attack, and attack is identified with invasion. To the general public the logical place to stop invasion is at the border, and border defense is the form of warfare which it intuitively prefers. This attitude satisfies two contradictory psychological needs of the good citizen, the requirement that he refrain from aggression and the requirement that he display virility in the defense of his home.

This preference of the good man for dying on his own soil instead of abroad is a serious handicap to the democratic state. Most of the successful wars of history have been carried on in other peoples' territory. Prussian military philosophy demanded that the war be carried to the enemy, and that nation fared well under the doctrine. The Danish War was fought in Schleswig and on the Baltic; the Austrian War took place mostly in Bohemia; and the Franco-Prussian War wrought its destruction on French soil. The First World War was fought almost exclusively in enemy territory except for the minor Russian invasion of East Prussia in 1914. Germany ultimately lost the war, but she surrendered before invasion and managed to avoid the devastation of her territory, the visible token of military defeat. The present war is again being fought well beyond the borders except for aerial warfare and even in this phase of the military operations the recipient of a large percentage of British bombs is not Germany but the conquered border zone along the North Sea and the Atlantic. Fighting on Prussian soil has taken place only in periods of decline such as that during the battles which preceded the victorious campaign of Napoleon in 1806.

The history of France is equally instructive. In her great period

under Louis XIV she never fought at home. The wars of the French Revolution were carried on abroad as were the campaigns of Napoleon in Italy, the Netherlands, Spain, Germany, and finally Russia where over-extension of lines of communication combined with the winter climate became the cause of the Emperor's downfall. The last three great wars in which France participated were all fought on French soil. From the war of 1870 she recuperated; in the war of 1914 she was saved from defeat by her allies, but she never regained her resilience and remained permanently obsessed with a strategy of border defense and a search for security behind the Maginot line. The third war, again fought on French soil, ended the life of the republic.

Great Britain fought in the nineteenth century as she had fought before with a professional army; being primarily a sea power, she did not follow the continental practice of conscription. The First World War was the first time in her history that a large conscript army was used to fight abroad, and its enormous losses were not without influence on the growing popularity in the post-war period of new doctrines regarding the merits of defensive wars and wars of limited objectives. In regard to territorial defense, the history of Great Britain is even more suggestive than that of Germany or France. She has fought on all continents, in all types of territory, in all climates, and against all races and peoples, but since 1066 she has never fought a continental army at home. Her sea power has enabled her to transport her armies across the water and to keep out her enemies. For her European wars she wisely selected the battle fields across the Channel, and in her present struggle she has again preferred to meet the enemy abroad rather than at home. Her attempt to fight the present war on the continent according to the old pattern has been less successful, and her armies have been thrown out of Norway, Belgium, France, and Greece. The fact that they were defeated on other peoples' land was, however, clear gain. From the British point of view, the destruction of foreign towns and cities is much to be preferred to the destruction of the English countryside, and defeat of an expeditionary force is less fatal in its consequences and less dangerous to civilian morale than defeat of an army defending the border. The development of air power has brought war to

England herself for the first time in her history, and it may even neutralize her sea power long enough to permit the enemy to risk attempts at invasion. If the Channel can be crossed, the villages and towns of England will see a continental army for the first time in almost ten centuries. Her defense will have become border defense and the fact that she will then have to fight on her beaches and rocky shores instead of on the continent will be a symbol of her weakness if not a prologue to her defeat.

The lessons of history throw serious doubt on the wisdom of the instinctive answer of the good man regarding the way to conduct a war. Strategy teaches that there can be no victory without offensive action, that mere defense of a border can bring a stalemate but no decision. Only states of enormous size with border zones thinly populated and unimportant economically and industrially can afford to do their fighting on their own territory. Only in periods of weakness and decline have states fought at home. In periods of vitality and strength, they fight on other peoples' territory. This fact, well known to statesmen and military leaders, explains why governments dependent on conscript armies in the struggle for power between states must ever keep alive the martial spirit and foster the ideology of nationalism.

The increasing importance of equipment and supply makes it impossible for modern armies to live on the country or to depend for ammunition on what their supply columns can carry, but otherwise the basic character of land operations changed little until aviation in our own time made warfare three dimensional. Prolonged fighting involves effective integration of economic and military activity over three distinct zones, a zone of operations, a zone through which run the routes of supply, and a base area. The latter which was once a line of depots and supply bases is today co-extensive with the economic and industrial heart of the country. The routes of communication depend obviously on the zone of operation, on the location of the front. The movement of matériel along these routes sustains the fighting power of the military forces, and this dependence on an uninterrupted flow makes the rear of the army and the supply routes the most significant and most vital area to attack. The offensive tries to reach this zone either by a break through center, by means of direct assault on the front, or by single or double flanking movements

around the ends. Direct assault was traditionally the task of the infantry; the flanking movement, which requires mobility and speed, the task of the cavalry.

The last war saw the culmination of a trend foreshadowed earlier. Improvement of rifle fire and the concentration of fire-power through the use of machine guns gave the defensive a great advantage over the offensive. Cavalry lost much of its usefulness as a weapon for flanking movements, and infantry lost its power to assault entrenched positions. It became completely dependent on artillery and could gain ground only over territory prepared by long and intensive barrage. This meant that the attack usually halted at the limit of the firing range and had to wait until artillery was moved forward for the next advance. This procedure broke through the front only in the rarest instances and usually the lives lost were out of all proportion to the ground gained. The result was a stabilized front and a war of attrition. Tanks were used in the last war, but their tactical possibilities were not fully realized. Only a few astute military thinkers were sufficiently impressed with their striking force to predict the significance of mechanized warfare and to prophesy its future application.

Because of the apparent stalemate in terms of the tactics used, there was much discussion in the post-war period about the possibility of replacing the mass army with a small, highly trained, mobile corps. The Germans have fashioned out of dive-bombers, tanks, and motorized infantry a combination that has mobility as well as great striking power, but it does not replace the large conscript army. Its function is to serve as shock troops, to penetrate, infiltrate, flank, engulf, and gain ground for the mass to hold and consolidate. The mechanized mobile corps has become the great tactical unit for offensive operations, but large numbers of conscripts are still needed to provide the infantry divisions that must hold the conquered territory.

The present conflict has restored maneuver to war. The tank combines protection with mobility and great fire-power, and in conjunction with dive bombers provides a weapon of assault far superior to the former combination of infantry and artillery barrage. It has also, because of its speed, opened up possibilities for flanking operations on a scale unheard of in former wars. The Russian campaign of 1941 suggests that only an army equally well equipped with planes and

tanks can halt the thrust of modern mechanized divisions and then only if it can create a system of defense in depth. Depth in this case does not mean simply a number of parallel trenches for infantry protection as in the last war but defensive zones deep enough to make it possible to separate advanced tank forces from their supporting infantry.

But much more important than the full use of the inherent possibilities of the tank and the substitution of dive bombing for artillery barrage is the introduction of large scale air operations behind the fighting lines. Tanks and short range dive bombers used as thrusts against entrenched positions do not basically change the two-dimensional character of war. It is the operation of air power at points far distant from the actual battle line that has made warfare truly three-dimensional. The "front" in the technical sense of the term has now disappeared. In previous wars, two-dimensional wars, the front was a line behind which routes of supply lay in comparative safety. The protection of these routes, the problem of security, was the constant concern of the commander, but the solution of the problem was, at least in theory, comparatively simple. It meant preventing the line from breaking and the flanks from being turned. Under the new form of warfare land forces can no longer give security to the routes between the base zone and the zone of operations. Only air supremacy can guard those lines and guarantee the flow of material necessary for offensive or defensive operations.

The Industrial Revolution and the development of aviation have not only brought changes to land warfare; they have also created new problems in naval warfare. The objective of naval warfare is control of the seas, which implies control of maritime communications, freedom to use sea routes and ability to deny them to the enemy. Control of maritime routes can be achieved by the destruction of the enemy's fleet or by denying it access to vital areas either through blockade or through interception. To achieve command of the sea, states have usually tried to outbuild each other in ships of the line.

Sea power can contribute to the defeat of the enemy and his final surrender only in an indirect manner. It cannot invade a country, storm a fortress, or occupy territory; it can bombard a coast, but the effect is seldom conclusive. Fleets operate as an auxiliary to land

operations by moving armies and keeping them supplied and by preventing the enemy from doing the same. Navies also provide an instrument of economic strangulation by denying the enemy raw materials for his war industries and foodstuffs for his population.

The technical developments of the last hundred years have brought important changes in ship construction, naval tactics, and maritime geography. Steam navigation brought problems of fuel supply and a much greater dependence than formerly on naval bases; hence a new interest in *points d'appui* and distant naval stations. Fuel brought, on the other hand, a much greater mobility and freedom of action between the points of supply. Freedom from dependence on favorable winds meant freedom to navigate along great circle routes, the shortest distance between two points on the globe. Ports, formerly of great strategic significance, lost much of their importance while others took their place.

The invention of the submarine brought new problems in tactics and strategy. Submarines, in combination with mine fields, have made close blockade more difficult. They represent a three-dimensional element in naval warfare and permit even countries inferior in surface fleets to set up a counter-blockade. Because the battle line cannot by itself destroy the submarine danger, effective control of the seas no longer rests on battle fleet superiority alone. It requires the aid of large numbers of small flotilla craft.

The development of aviation has added another third-dimensional element to naval warfare and again created new problems of security and protection. Naval bases within the bombing radius of land-based enemy aircraft have lost much of their effectiveness. Fleets inferior in air power at the scene of battle have little chance of victory. The aerial torpedo is an extremely dangerous weapon even to battleships, and bombers can destroy much of the superstructure of protecting cruisers and destroyers. Fighters can shoot down observation planes and give to one fleet the advantage of a monopoly of aerial observation. Air power has also affected the use of the fleet as an instrument of economic strangulation. It facilitates commerce destruction in narrow seas by giving the submarine the benefit of aerial reconnaissance and by finishing off, by bombing in port, what has escaped in the coastal zone. It cannot reduce to any extent the effect of long distance

blockade, but this is possible in any case only under exceptional geographic circumstances.

Because the contribution of sea power to the final defeat of the enemy is indirect rather than direct, its relative importance varies in each period and in each war with the vulnerability to blockade of the opponent, the importance of overseas operations, and the significance of invasion. Economic and technical developments have produced conflicting trends in regard to the importance of blockade. Greater population density has made many countries dependent on imported foodstuffs from overseas and industrialization has created an increasing dependence on foreign raw materials. The new chemistry, on the other hand, combined with national planning and a policy of autarchy in preparation for war, has created possibilities for temporary self-sufficiency much greater than existed formerly. If the trend in regard to blockade is uncertain, the trend in regard to invasion is unmistakable. Modern expeditionary forces require large transports and special docking facilities, and the occupation of an enemy coast has become increasingly difficult in the face of mines, submarines, and aircraft. Control of the seas no longer assures ability to land an army; air superiority at the point of landing will decide the issue.

In certain other respects such as relative mobility there has also been a decline in the advantage of sea power over land power. Ever since the development of the sailing vessel, and particularly since the development of steam navigation, sea power has gained in relative speed. Transports could move considerably faster than armies could walk. With the development of railroads, highways, and motor transportation, the advantage has shifted to land power in certain continental zones with advanced systems of transportation. Aviation and the development of air transport of troops has made the discrepancy even greater. These shifts together with the difficulty of establishing air superiority from floating carriers in narrow seas that can be covered by land-based bombers, and the fact that air bases can be built much faster than naval bases, have brought about changes in the strategic advantage existing between sea power and land power particularly in inland and marginal seas.

But even more important than the effect of aerial warfare on mili-

tary and naval operations is the effect on the civilian population. The citizen no longer lives in comparative safety behind a front held by military forces. The war is no longer far away; it is fought all around him, over his garden, his back yard and the ruins of his home, and it kills with impartiality both civilian and soldier. Air bombardment has opened a direct road of attack on war industry and has created the means for direct assault on the morale of the population. Formerly the private citizen could not be reached except by blockade until after the destruction of the fighting forces of his country. In modern warfare, military action is accompanied by direct attacks on the civilian population and attempts to destroy by air bombardment its desire to continue the fight.

2. *Political Warfare*

Military warfare in all periods of history has been accompanied by political action. It was used in the first war, will be used in the last, and consists merely of the continuation and intensification of the struggle for power that preceded the outbreak of hostilities. Such action is directed at winning and keeping allies and the destruction of the alliances of the opponent. The object is to prevent collective action and to isolate the enemy and make him fight alone. The weapons are the same as those used in peace time: persuasion, purchase, barter, the threat of force, and actual force. There is available in addition a technique similar to that used to achieve the destruction of the internal unity of states. This attack will create doubt about the existence of a common interest among the members of the alliance, stimulate distrust about the war efforts of the partners, and heighten their existing differences and divergencies.

3. *Economic Warfare*

Modern wars can be fought successfully only on the basis of a rich supply of strategic raw materials and an enormous industrial output. Providing for a modern military establishment is not a function that can be performed by a few government arsenals. It demands the full participation of a national economy with high pro-

ductivity and extensive industrial equipment. Large steel production, an enormous machine and machine tool industry, a great output of aluminum, and a huge and well-diversified chemical industry are only the minimum requirements. As the weapons become increasingly more complex and are needed in larger and larger quantities, their mass production involves more and more technical difficulties, and the introduction of new types requires longer and longer preparation. Modern warfare with its heavy demands on industrial production consumes a very large percentage of the national income; in the present conflict this is more than 50 per cent.

Because of the sheer size of the economic effort involved, war preparation inevitably means increased government control of economic life, replacement of cost and profit considerations by considerations of military necessity, national planning and reallocation of productive capacity away from the satisfaction of consumer's wants toward the satisfaction of military needs. The war of today demands not only a disciplined military establishment but also a disciplined and well-integrated economy.

It is because of the importance of industrial productivity for sustained military activity that economic warfare has begun to play an increasingly important role in modern wars. The possibility of the use of economic weapons obviously rests on the lack of self-sufficiency of the modern state. The dependence of a particular state on the world economy is a rough indication of its vulnerability to economic attacks. The purpose of economic warfare viewed in terms of offensive action is to achieve the destruction of the national economy which sustains the military effort of the enemy. The purpose of economic strategy in terms of defensive action is to preserve the efficiency of the national economy.

Modern techniques have developed this type of warfare far beyond the simple devices of blockade and capture. War begins with the closing of the respective markets of the belligerents, embargoes on exports, and, if possible, attacks on the stability of the currency. But states are not limited merely to their own economy for weapons in the economic struggle. The embargo will be strengthened by measures designed to withhold the products of other states. Originally this was achieved mainly by means of actual blockades by naval

forces, but the modern development of economic strategy moves in the direction of forcing third states to participate directly in the economic struggle by means of economic pressure. The neutrals and half-neutrals will be enlisted, if possible, in the attempt to deprive the enemy of all possible imports and to reduce his ability to export and create foreign exchange. The methods are controlled corporations, blacklists, and other forms of intimidation of persons and business firms, the threat of closing the neutral's own export market, and, finally, the threat of military action. The defense against such attacks must inevitably be directed at the creation of a maximum self-sufficiency within the national boundaries or within the region of immediate military control, and at the creation of instruments of counter-pressure to be used against neutrals.

4. *Ideological Warfare*

With the increased participation of larger and larger parts of the national economy in the war effort, with the effect of blockade and aerial warfare on the civilian population, wars have changed from an activity of specialists to a common undertaking for the whole nation. The modern struggle demands the co-operation of the whole population in one united effort. It cannot be won except with the whole-hearted co-operation of both soldiers and civilians, and the latter must be as willing as the former to accept danger and sacrifice and to identify themselves with the national cause. The result of this development is that the conduct of the war becomes increasingly more complicated and the problem of effective integration for the national defense more and more difficult. The state has become vulnerable to new weapons. Psychological and ideological warfare have been added to the technique of economic strangulation, political maneuver, and military assault. Propaganda and counter-propaganda have been added to the arms with which the will to fight is undermined or strengthened.

Strength in war is the result of unity, of effective social integration, and attack on the national unity is the enemy's first approach. To destroy national cohesion, discipline, and collective morale is the basic purpose of the attack. It begins with an appeal to family, sec-

tional, and religious devotion, to all the loyalties that are attached to groups smaller than the nation. It follows with the encouragement of all potential trends to disintegration. The method is to heighten and intensify all social cleavages and conflicts of whatever kind, racial, ethnic, regional, economic, and ideological. There will be suggestions to labor and capital about the profiteering of the other, hints about the unequal sacrifices of rural and urban communities, intimations of favoritism to special regions in regard to war contracts and new industries, accusations of war mongering against special ethnic groups or classes, and attempts to get political parties to start a fight over war aims. If this form of attack is really successful, it transforms the nation from a strong unified force into a mass of mutually distrustful and fighting groups unable to make their war effort effective against the enemy.

Psychological warfare not only attacks the unity of a nation; it also attempts to destroy the individual's will to fight. The approach is along several lines: the creation of a sense of the futility of resistance and of the certainty of defeat; the development of apprehension; and the stimulation of anxiety and fear. Propaganda stresses military weakness and lack of preparedness and emphasizes the invincible strength of the opponent. Other tactics use the "war of nerves" and the "psychology of terror." They are based on the fact that group morale can be preserved in the face of danger only if the character of the danger is known and if there is confidence about the ability to meet it. To destroy morale, propaganda suggests the existence of secret weapons and creates uncertainty about the time, place, and form of future attacks. There is a frank use of terror in demonstration bombings of residential sections, in the showing of movies of irresistible armies, and in the constant threats against those who dare to resist.

Ideological warfare is also directed at the destruction of faith in the national purpose and confidence in the government. For the preservation of the national morale, it is absolutely imperative that the nation maintain an unshaken faith in the justice of its cause. In man's idealism lies both his strength and weakness as a fighter. He can be made to fight for his personal and social survival, but it is

easier to inspire him with a call to service for abstract values than with a promise of material gain. In terms of interests men divide; only in terms of the defense of a moral order can they unite. Because man loves peace, it is always the opponent who is the aggressor, and, because he prefers decency, it is always the enemy who fights unfairly and with cruel and dastardly means. National struggles inevitably become conflicts between good and evil, crusades against sin and the devil. Modern wars can be fought successfully only in an atmosphere of unreality and make-believe.

The psychological attack which uses man's desire for moral perfection is a propaganda which stresses the shortcomings of the nation and its past failure to live up to the professed standards of ethical conduct. It points out that the country has committed all the crimes of which it accuses its opponent, and that its present motives are far from pure. It has conquered land, exploited the vanquished, intervened in the affairs of others, sought power for power's sake, and misused its strength. The attack comes in the form of reminders of a far from blameless past, suggestions that no nation has a right to sit in judgment on another nation, and the counsel of moral perfection that only those who are without sin may cast the first stone. The nation which suffers from a feeling of guilt about its use of force in the past is at a great disadvantage compared to the nation which not only accepts the reality of force but affirms its creative value with no sense of shame or sin.

5. *Total War*

War in the twentieth century is total war, the combination and integration of military, political, economic, and ideological tactics into one great war effort. Contrary to popular opinion, total war was not an invention of the Germans but the result of a long process of historical development. Its most successful exponents in the First World War were the Allies who used with telling effect all the weapons that modern civilization makes available. They organized a gigantic military machine that fought battles on three continents. They skilfully detached Italy from the Triple Alliance, won the United States, forced Greece to co-operate, corralled thirty other

allies, and, as a final triumph, managed to enlist both the Arabs and the Jews. They forced the world to accept the blockade that finally brought about the economic strangulation of the Central Powers.

They used propaganda for the purpose of accentuating racial and ethnic differences in the Austro-Hungarian Empire and Turkey, regional differences in Germany, and class differences everywhere. They created distrust in the motives and methods of the imperial regimes. They informed the peoples of the central empires that fighting was useless, and they promised them peace and comfort if they would only throw over their existing governments and replace them by regimes identical to those of the democracies.

On the other hand, the German war effort, though it was not enough to bring victory in the last World War, scored triumphs in all fields of operations. The military resistance against the man power and economic resources of most of the world won the admiration of the experts. The submarine campaign created a counter-blockade against Great Britain that nearly brought disaster to the island empire. Germany won Turkey and Bulgaria as allies and made excellent use of social and ideological warfare. She aided the revolt in Ireland, provided the spark to the Communist Revolution by sending Lenin to Russia, and stimulated opposition to war among the ethnic minorities in the United States.

In the Second World War, Germany has added little if anything to the older procedures except improvements and refinements, but the Führer has made one important change in application, a difference in timing. In pre-Nazi practice war preparation included military, political, and economic preparation, but action inside the territory of the potential enemy did not extend beyond espionage by the military services and the diplomatic activities of the accredited representatives. The supplementary campaign of economic and ideological warfare did not begin until after the first shots had been fired. They followed, they did not precede, the military offensive. Modern Germany has reversed this process. The military campaign is the end, not the beginning of the struggle. The psychological assault precedes the war as the artillery barrage once preceded the infantry attack. For Clausewitz, war was the continuation of politics by other means.

For Hitler, peace is a prologue to war by other means. The result is that the distinctions between the war time and peace time forms of the power struggle have now been effaced completely. No state can think any longer of preparation for national defense merely in terms of preparation for a future conflict. The struggle is waged continuously. Total war is permanent war.

II. The United States in the Western Hemisphere

La Politique de toutes les puissances est dans leur géographie.

NAPOLEON

IN a world of international anarchy, foreign policy must aim above all at the improvement or at least the preservation of the relative power position of the state. Power is in the last instance the ability to wage successful war, and in geography lie the clues to the problems of military and political strategy. The territory of a state is the base from which it operates in time of war and the strategic position which it occupies during the temporary armistice called peace. Geography is the most fundamental factor in the foreign policy of states because it is the most permanent. Ministers come and ministers go, even dictators die, but mountain ranges stand unperturbed. George Washington, defending thirteen states with a ragged army, has been succeeded by Franklin D. Roosevelt with the resources of a continent at his command, but the Atlantic continues to separate Europe from the United States and the ports of the St. Lawrence River are still blocked by winter ice. Alexander I, Czar of all the Russias, bequeathed to Joseph Stalin, simple member of the Communist party, not only his power but his endless struggle for access to the sea, and Maginot and Clemenceau have inherited from Caesar and Louis XIV anxiety over the open German frontier.

The size of the national domain affects the relative strength of a state in the struggle for power. Natural resources influence population density and economic structure which define vulnerability to blockade. Location with reference to the Equator and to oceans and land masses determines nearness to centers of power, areas of con-

flict, and routes of communication; and location with reference to immediate neighbors defines position in regard to potential enemies and the basic problems of territorial security. Topography affects strength because of its influence on unity and internal coherence. Climate sets limits to agricultural production and conditions transportation and international trade. All descriptions of the power position of a state must, therefore, begin with an analysis of its geography.

The Land Masses of the World

Since the piercing of the Old and the New Worlds by the canals of Suez and Panama, the great land masses on the earth's surface consist of five continental islands. The three which lie in the Southern Hemisphere, Australia, South America, and Africa, are true islands which permit of circumnavigation. The two which are situated in the Northern Hemisphere, North America and Eurasia, although true islands in a geographic sense, function in terms of navigation as peninsulas because of the ice cap in the North Polar Sea. Of these two northern continents, Eurasia is by far the larger. Its area is more than two and one-half times that of North America and it contains ten times the population. Because the political power of the world is for the most part concentrated in the temperate zones, location with reference to the Equator will not only determine climate but also proximity to centers of power. Ocean currents, altitudes, and other modifying influences may alter the normal climatic conditions, but, in general, history is made in the temperate latitudes, and, because very little of the land mass of the Southern Hemisphere lies in this zone, history is made in the temperate latitudes of the Northern Hemisphere.

The fact that the greater land masses lie in the north and that the largest land areas that do exist in the Southern Hemisphere lie in the tropics has certain obvious implications. From an economic, political, and military point of view the northern half of the world will always be more important than the southern half, and relations between various continents of the northern half will have more influence on the history of the world than relations across the Equator on the same continent. The location of a state north or south of the Equator will, therefore, play a large part in determining the political

significance of that state, the nature of its international relations, and the problems of its foreign policy.

The Western Hemisphere is an island realm surrounded by the Atlantic, the Pacific, and the Arctic Oceans. It lies between the European and Asiatic ocean fronts of the Eurasian Continent and covers a huge area of about 15 million square miles. This great land mass consists of the two continents of North and South America separated by an American Mediterranean. The continent of North America has the form of an inverted triangle. Its coast lines flare out toward Alaska and Greenland with the result that the most northern outposts are nearest to Asia and Europe. The South American Continent is also shaped like an inverted triangle but placed far to the east of the northern land mass with the bulge of Brazil near the shoulder of Africa. In between these two continental masses lies the American Mediterranean, providing a transit zone between North and South America and between the Atlantic and the Pacific.

The United States occupies a unique position in the world. Her territory lies in the northern half of the globe, in the area of the great land masses, and is of continental dimensions with all that this implies in terms of economic strength. Fronting on two oceans, the United States has direct access to the most important trading arteries of the world. Her domain is situated between two clusters of dense population in Western Europe and Eastern Asia and, therefore, between the most important economic, political, and military zones.

The North American Continent

The continental domain of the United States is an area of about three million square miles between Canada and Mexico, rich in natural resources, with a national economy of great productivity and a population of one hundred thirty-five million. The location and direction of the Rocky Mountains makes the country primarily an area of Atlantic drainage, and variety in topography and climate gives to each section of the country a distinct economic character. The Northeast contains the centers of population and of industrial and commercial activity. The Middle West is essentially agricultural,

while the West largely accounts for the stock-raising and non-ferrous metal production of the country.

The section of the hemisphere nearest to Asia is the territory of Alaska. This peninsula, surrounded by the Arctic, the Bering Sea, and the Pacific, has an area of more than half a million square miles, greater than the surface of the Scandinavian countries and Finland. There is probably a hundred thousand square miles of grazing land, and the country is rich in water power and a great variety of minerals. It is a land of great potential possibilities, but its population of sixty thousand is bound to grow only very slowly. Climate, topography, and distance from areas of dense population and commercial activity will inevitably retard its development until resources nearer the industrial centers of the United States are exhausted.

The part of the Western Hemisphere nearest to Europe is the huge ice-covered island of Greenland which approaches Iceland and Spitzbergen. Except for a small area of about one hundred thousand square miles, an ice sheet covers the whole island. The North Atlantic Drift gives the southwest coast a warm climate and a heavy rainfall which permit the growth of a luxuriant vegetation during the summer months. The island produces two important raw materials in great abundance. Cryolite, which accounts for four-fifths of the exports, is mined at Ivigtut, and graphite is found on the west and southwest coasts. The island, except for climatological limitations, would be the natural vestibule for air approaches to this continent.

Between these two continental outposts and the United States lies the Dominion of Canada. It covers an area larger than the forty-eight states but has a population of only about twelve million, a fact largely explained by climate and topography which restrict the economic use of a large part of the area and leave much of it an arctic waste. The great geographic regions of the country are practically prolongations of those in the United States giving rise to similar economic specialization. The eastern section extends from the Atlantic to a little beyond Lake Superior, about halfway across the continent. The central region—the prairie country—rolls for nearly eight hundred miles * to the foothills of the Rocky Moun-

* Because of the growing importance of aviation, all distances are given in statute miles, even maritime distances which are usually expressed in sea miles.

tains. The western zone, mostly occupied by British Columbia, commences high up in the rugged mountain chains of the Rockies and the Selkirks, which parallel the seacoast, and reaches westward toward the Pacific. The West represents forestry, grazing and mining; the great prairie provinces, agriculture and particularly wheat growing; and the East, mining, industry, and commerce. An iron and steel industry has been started with mills in Ontario, operating on ore and coal both imported from the United States, and in Nova Scotia, operating with ore from Newfoundland. Of the principal energy resources only water power is in abundance in the industrial region.

The Canadian economy shows a great similarity to that of the United States. It is characterized by a high productivity per capita and a resulting high standard of living. Although much of the area will forever remain sparsely populated because of climatological and other geographic reasons, the development of natural resources has only begun, and Canada has a future of expansion ahead of her.

By far the greater part of the life of Canada clusters in a narrow belt from one to two hundred miles in width along the Canadian-American border, and of that more than 90 per cent of all that is vital and active is concentrated in the eastern half of the country in the provinces of Ontario and Quebec along the St. Lawrence River. Here is found the great bulk of Canada's population, her principal industrial, banking, and commercial centers, and her largest cities and chief ocean ports.

Tucked away under the protecting overhang of Labrador, across the Gulf of Saint Lawrence, lies Newfoundland, bare, rocky, exposed to the icy blast of winter, and half-hidden in fog in summer. It is a land of hardship and poverty on which lumbering, mining, and fishing provide a bare subsistence for a population of three hundred thousand. Unimportant economically, bankrupt financially, it is of consequence only because of its strategic location at the entrance gate of Canada.

The frontier between the United States and Canada was established long before the acquisition of Alaska, and between the Alaskan and American borders lies the corridor of British Columbia which provides access to the Pacific for western Canada through the Fraser and Skeena river valleys. This Canadian territory between the Straits

of Juan de Fuca and Dixon Entrance prevents direct overland access from the United States to her northern territory. The situation seems at first sight to resemble the Polish Corridor without the ethnic question. A more careful analysis, however, shows a basic difference. The Polish Corridor is a lowland containing old and well-established roads and railroads which maintain communication between East and West Prussia. British Columbia is highly mountainous and provides no easy route for north-south communication. Conquest or purchase cannot change these facts of topography. The State of Washington and Alaska have always communicated by sea and will undoubtedly continue to do so, at least in peace time.

While Canada is in many ways a northern extension of the type of society found in the United States, the lands below the Rio Grande represent a different world, the world of Latin America. It is perhaps unfortunate that the English and Latin speaking parts of the continent should both be called America, thereby unconsciously evoking an expectation of similarity which does not exist. Only if it is realized that the countries to the south are different from the United States in essential geographic features, in racial and ethnic composition, in economic life, and in social customs, ideology, and cultural tradition can we evaluate the significance of this area for our national life and estimate correctly the likelihood of an effective co-operation in a common policy of hemisphere defense.

The American Mediterranean

The Latin American world faces the United States across the Mexican land frontier and from beyond the American Mediterranean of which our country is itself the most important littoral state. The drainage area of the remaining coastal states and the islands along the eastern rim include a territory of almost two million square miles which contains approximately fifty million people. It consists of a large part of Mexico, of Central America, Colombia, Venezuela, and of the chain of islands stretching in a great arc from the east of Venezuela to the western end of Cuba which is one hundred fifty miles from Yucatan and seventy-five miles from Key West. East of Florida and the Greater Antilles lies a second island chain, the

Bahamas, which, like a line of closely spaced sentinels, stand guard before the entrance to the Mexican Gulf. Like its European counterpart, the American Mediterranean is divided into a western Mediterranean—the Gulf of Mexico—and an eastern Mediterranean—the Caribbean Sea. The distance from New Orleans to Trinidad is roughly comparable to that between Batum and Gibraltar, and the areas of the tributary coastal regions of the two seas are approximately equal.

The mountain ranges of Mexico and Central America provide an easier slope and broader coastal plains on the east than on the west and so facilitate an eastern orientation and flow of trade. Yucatan and the plains of Guatemala, Honduras, and Nicaragua face the Gulf and the Caribbean, and only in Panama does the greater part of the lowland region face the Pacific. Salvador is the only exclusively Pacific state in the region, and for her a connection with the railroads of Guatemala provides an Atlantic outlet. In Colombia the Andes range presses close to the Pacific and approaches the Caribbean at right angles in three parallel spurs, permitting an outflow to the eastern sea through the valleys of the Atrate and the Magdalena and their tributaries. Topography makes Venezuela, except for the depression of Lake Maracaibo, a land of Atlantic rather than Caribbean drainage, but climate and distribution of natural resources have made her economically a Caribbean state. The Orinoco valley is as yet of little significance, and the highlands of the Guianas are practically unexplored. Economic life is concentrated on the northern coast where the mountain range offers relief from the tropical heat and short railways connect with good harbors.

Mexico, although large in area compared to the Great Powers of Europe, is a small country compared to the United States, and, as in the case of Canada, her relative power position is not likely to change much. Shape, location, topography, aridity, and soil conditions preclude the development of great economic and military strength. Where the country is broad, from the United States border to the Tropic of Cancer, it is, except on the Gulf coast, a continuation of the desert and semi-desert region of southern California and Arizona and predestined, apart from mineral development, to a pastoral economy. There are several other regions with great varia-

tions in altitude, temperature, and rainfall, and, therefore, diverse economic possibilities, but topography has placed barriers against effective economic and political integration which railroads have only partially overcome. Even after the natural resources are much further developed than at present, the center of economic and military strength will remain on the high central plateau in the south. This region, which contains the capital and 40 per cent of the population, obtains access to the outside world through Tampico and Vera Cruz and the American-controlled Gulf of Mexico.

Mexico and the other states on the mainland have a large percentage of Indian population and are in general under-populated, while the island rim, with a very large percentage of Negro population, is, particularly in some of the Lesser Antilles, an area of high population density. At first sight the descendants of the plantation slaves seem to live in a tropical paradise. The broken line of green volcanic islands stretches in infinite variety of shape and contour through the blue sea. Palm-fringed beaches border gentle slopes rich in cultivation, and steep symmetrical cones reach for white clouds. Charming country roads, fringed with the color of many-hued flowers, ramble from village to village, past sugar plantations, banana groves, and citrus trees. But poverty lies next to the flowering swamp, and sickness scourges the mountain slopes. Yellow fever is under control, but hookworm and malaria aid the tropical sun in sapping the energy of a vitamin-starved population.

The countries of this Mediterranean world are similar in geological origin, geographic features, and in indigenous plant life and crops. They lie in the northern tropics and the eastern trade winds and at various altitudes show parallel climatic zones. The area is important not only as an exporter of tropical products but also because of great mineral wealth.

Its economic importance lies in the fact that it provides the United States with a tropical raw material zone, practically in her back yard, which, except for an inadequate and badly distributed labor supply, might produce many of the articles now imported from the Asiatic and African tropics. Its chief agricultural products, except sugar, do not compete with the agrarian products of the Middle West, and its minerals provide essential raw materials for our industrial East.

The strategic significance of the American Mediterranean derives not only from the fact that it lies between North and South America, but also from the fact that it lies between the Atlantic and Pacific, a significance enhanced but not created by the construction of the Panama Canal, as the relations between Panama and the Philippines in Spanish times testify. This passageway, completed in 1914, gives the United States the full benefit of her geographic location on two oceans. The canal, although outside the borders, is, none the less, an important link in our coastal navigation and has shortened the sailing distance between Atlantic and Pacific ports by eight thousand miles. Even more important is the fact that it shortened the route from the Pacific states to Europe and from the Atlantic states to Asia, where their respective products are in demand.

The South American Continent

The two states along the north coast of South America, Colombia and Venezuela, have been included as part of the American Mediterranean zone. From a strict geographic point of view, they are, of course, part of the southern continent, but from a geo-political point of view they belong to the intermediate world between the northern and southern continents. Geographic factors are responsible for the fact that these two countries maintain more intimate contact with the opposite coast of the middle sea, with North America, than with the rest of South America. A similar situation is observable in regard to the other Mediterranean seas. North Africa has been more intimately related with Europe than with the equatorial belt beyond the Sahara and Northern Australia is closer to Singapore than to Melbourne which lies on the other side of the broad Australian desert.

The barrier between North and South America is not the Caribbean Sea but the nature of the territory along the Equator. The mountain ranges which bend eastward from the Andes, separate the Amazon basin from the valleys of the Magdalena and the Orinoco and form the southern boundaries of the Guianas. Beyond this lies the enormous impenetrable jungle and tropical forest of the Amazon valley. The river and its tributaries offer an excellent system of

communications from west to east but they do not provide transportation for movements north and south. Not only are North and South America two separate continents instead of a single continent as is sometimes erroneously suggested, but the South American Continent itself does not function as a single continental mass in terms of overland communication.

South America beyond the Equator can be reached only by sea. This applies not only to the United States but also to the republics of Colombia and Venezuela, which lack adequate land communication with their southern neighbors. The main area of the southern continent will continue to function in American foreign policy not in terms of a continental neighbor but in terms of overseas territory. It is true that the original approach of the Spaniards was overland by a road which started in Cartagena and followed the Andean plateau and that a Pan-American highway is planned to follow the same general route, but under modern conditions this overland approach cannot possibly compete with maritime routes either in commercial or strategic significance.

The other geographic features which determine the relations between North and South America are the position of the great mountain chains and the eastward projection of the southern half of the continent. The meridian of New York is also the meridian of Valparaiso and cuts the southern continent far west of its center. The southern land mass not only has a main axis, the Andes, which runs north and south, but also a secondary axis formed by the Brazilian ranges. The direction of this massif is southwest and northeast which makes the continent broad in the north, that is, in the tropics, and narrow in the south, in the temperate zone. Moreover, its mass juts out far into the Atlantic toward West Africa, with the result that all points below Pernambuco are slightly nearer to Lisbon than to New York.

The Rocky Mountains, the Sierras, and the Andes make the whole hemisphere primarily an area of Atlantic drainage, with the main centers of economic, military, and political strength on the east coast. This means that the most important relations between North America and South America lie within the confines of the same ocean, the Atlantic. The building of the Panama Canal did not affect them.

It has given added significance to the littoral of the American Mediterranean including Colombia and Venezuela, and it has brought the west coast of South America closer to the United States than to any other power, but it shortened neither the route from New York to Buenos Aires, nor the distance from either place to Europe.

1. The West Coast of South America

Since the construction of the Panama Canal, the economic centers of the United States have been brought in close contact with the west coast of South America, for a long time one of the most isolated regions in the world. Not until the nineteenth century and the development of the guano and nitrate deposits was there anything approaching regular contact with Europe by way of the Strait of Magellan. The Canal brought a competitive advantage to the United States which is expressed in trade figures, but the fact remains that the economic and political possibilities of the region are severely restricted by geographic factors.

The west coast is the land of the Andes, except for Tibet, the highest mountain region in the world. It varies in width from one hundred to four hundred miles and is made up of parallel ranges with peaks up to twenty-five thousand feet and with few passes below fifteen thousand feet except in the south. Rising sharply from the coast, the massive, crenelated mountain wall reaches its crest in most places well within a hundred miles of the sea. The coastal valleys are extremely narrow except in a small area in Ecuador, northern Peru, and Chile, where the Central Valley is both the heart of the country and the center of its agriculture. The few rivers that do exist cannot serve navigation purposes and, with few exceptions in the extreme south, are inadequate even for the development of water power.

The nature of the mountain territory is responsible for a very low percentage of arable land in proportion to the total surface and creates such obstacles to the construction of effective means of communication that high freight rates must remain a retarding influence on all economic development, be it in agriculture, mining, or industry. This difficulty is further increased by the fact that on almost the

whole length of the coast there are no good harbors. It is true that aviation has been of great assistance to the region, but there are definite limits to its usefulness. Exploration has been facilitated, new regions made accessible, communication speeded up between cities, and capitals brought within a few days' travel from the United States, but aviation has so far not been able to solve the basic transportation problem which is moving bulk freight at low cost.

In this enormous mountain belt of about 5,000 miles in length, there is little land suited for settlement. Agriculture is restricted to the coastal valleys and to the depressions and plateaus between the ranges, and climate reduces even this relatively small area. The prevailing westerly winds bring heavy rainfall to southern Chile, and Ecuador lies in the tropical rain belt, but many parts of Peru, Chile, and Bolivia are barren or even desert. The coastal valleys of northern Chile and southern Peru are, therefore, entirely dependent on irrigation for the cultivation of their crops of sugar and cotton, and the development of irrigation is possible only within restricted limits. Even in the temperate climate of the Central Chilean Valley, between the coast range and the high cordillera, the normal rain supply must be supplemented by irrigation since the rain falls mostly in the winter.

Except for central and southern Chile, all of South America's west coast lies in the tropics. Only high up in the mountains is the climate suited for permanent settlement by white men, and then only as employers of native labor. On the plateaus of Ecuador, Peru, and Bolivia the Indian alone is sufficiently adjusted to the rarefied atmosphere to be able to do manual labor. The only region which contains the elements necessary for an agrarian economy based on white labor is Chile, and no other section holds promise of great agricultural development. Large parts of Chile have a temperate, mediterranean climate, and there is an area of land suitable for crops or pasturage of about twelve million acres, of which approximately two million are at present under cultivation. With further development of irrigation, she should be able to sustain a population at least as large as that of Italy.

Except in southern Chile, the west coast is poor in forest and

pasture land and will never equal the Argentine in animal husbandry. Sheep giving a fair weight of fleece are pastured in the highlands of Peru and Chile, and there has been a considerable development in sheep raising in southern Chile. In the high valleys of Peru and Bolivia are bred the llama, the beast of burden of high altitudes, and the related alpaca and the vicuña, the former famous for its long heavy wool and the latter for its silken coat. Chile has cattle ranches, but there is nothing here which compares with the huge grassland zone that is the basis of Argentine beef export.

If much of the top soil of the west coast is unproductive, the subsoil partly compensates by extraordinary richness. Only Ecuador is unimportant as a mineral producer. For the other republics, minerals represent the most important export and the greatest source of foreign exchange. Copper, with gold and silver as by-products, vanadium, tin, tungsten, lead, borax, bismuth, and nitrates flow from here to the industrial centers of the world. The great handicaps under which the mining industry operates are high transportation cost and lack of fuel. Peru produces oil in the north near the Ecuadorian boundary and also coal, of poor coking quality. Peru and Chile have created a light industry of consumers' goods with government aid and tariff protection, but everything conspires to postpone until an indefinite future the type of industrialization that is necessary for great military strength.

Distance and isolation, topography and climate all have contributed to discourage immigration from Europe, with the result that the growth of population has been much smaller than on the east coast. Ecuador has a population of two and a half millions, and Bolivia, with a half a million square miles of territory, has only about three million. She lost her access to the coast in the War of the Pacific (1879-1884), and although most of her products still move across the Andes to the western ocean, Bolivia is none the less orienting herself more and more in the direction of the Atlantic. Peru and Chile have respectively six and four million people most of whom remain employed in agriculture, notwithstanding the national importance of mining and the growth of small industry.

2. The East Coast of South America

The building of the Canal could not, of course, alter the location of the Atlantic drainage area which is the largest part of the South American Continent. Below Venezuela along the east coast lie the Guianas, vestiges of colonial days, possessions of the European powers, Great Britain, the Netherlands, and France. The Guiana colonies have been a disappointment to their owners. The coastal plains are unsuited for white settlement, and manual labor depends on imported Asiatics or on a Negro population ravaged by tropical disease. The colonies export chiefly sugar, cacao, and coffee, and contain valuable tropical forest resources in the interior, but these must await exploitation until transportation cost to the coast can be considerably lowered. From the Dutch and the British colonies come some gold and a small quantity of diamonds, and the important mineral bauxite, the aluminum ore, which goes mostly to the United States.

Beyond these European colonies lies the state of Brazil with forty-four million people and the largest area of any country in the Western Hemisphere, most of it unexplored wilderness. It consists of the Amazon basin in the north, the drainage area of the Paraná in the southern interior, and the highlands of the east. The Amazon drainage area is the greatest tropical forest zone in the world. It has a rainfall of seventy to one hundred inches, and a dense luxuriant vegetation which constantly threatens to engulf the plantations. Like all tropical forests the region has a limited economic value. Clearing is very expensive, soils are subject to excessive leaching and soon become deficient in plant food, and the area lacks an adequate labor supply with which to undertake large-scale plantation agriculture.

The future of Brazil lies neither in the Amazon basin nor in the interior provinces of Goyaz and Matto Grosso but on the eastern highland, near the Tropic of Capricorn, far beyond the bulge of Pernambuco and 5,500 miles from New York. The real heart of the country is the central section with the coffee state of São Paulo and the mineral state of Minas Geraes. Elevations up to four thousand feet reduce the heat and permit an economy based on white

labor, and valleys and contours are sufficiently gentle to permit cultivation without wasteful soil wash. These two states together with the small coastal states of Rio de Janeiro and Espirito Santo represent 12 per cent of the area of Brazil, but contain 40 per cent of the population and the center of her economic life and include the two great cities of Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo.

Enormous size and distribution over wide latitudes give Brazil different regional economies and a great variety of products. The north is tropical and exports sugar, cacao, and forest products; the south lies in the temperate zone and raises sheep, cattle, hogs, and wheat; while the central section of the highlands produces cotton and coffee. The potential resources are only partially developed and there is still room for considerable growth, even if the geographic limitations of the interior provinces are taken into consideration. Less than 5 per cent of the total area is at present under cultivation, and improved transportation should open great areas to westward expansion.

The agricultural resources of Brazil alone are greater than those of the whole of the west coast, but it is quite probable that the eastern highlands are less generously endowed with minerals than the Andes. However, there has never been a systematic geological survey of the country, and both Brazil and the outside world may yet be pleasantly surprised by the discovery of new resources. In the state of Minas Geraes lies the greatest body of high-grade iron ore in the world, estimated at twelve billion tons. Brazilian coal is scarce and not of good coking quality, but a new process has been designed for its use in the manufacture of pig iron and with the technical help of the United States steel industry and the financial help of the United States government, the country has begun the construction of a steel and iron industry designed for an output of half a million tons of pig iron a year. This will supplement the manufacture of consumers' goods flourishing behind tariff protection and form another step in the program for industrialization designed to reduce the dependence of its extractive economy on foreign markets.

Brazil is practically devoid of good roads outside the immediate vicinity of the large cities, and aside from a few short lines in the northeast the railroads are all concentrated in the states of São Paulo

and Minas Geraes. There is one cross-country line which connects São Paulo with Corumba on the Paraguay River and with the southeastern section of Bolivia, and a short line around the rapids of the Madeira River which provides an outlet to the Amazon basin for the northeastern section of Bolivia. The other international line is the road from São Paulo through the southern states, connecting with the Uruguayan railroad net and Montevideo.

Through the port of Santos and the harbor of Rio de Janeiro move the cotton and coffee crop which represent more than 50 per cent of the export of the country. Rio, a white city against blue hills, meeting the ocean across silver half-moon beaches, is the economic and political heart of an empire and the center of its social and cultural life. Through a federal government, its authority extends to the swamps and hills of the Matto Grosso and the Upper-Amazon tributaries near the Colombian borders, but the authority is a symbol rather than a fact. It will take a long time, even with the aid of modern techniques of transportation and communication, before the three million square miles of territory of the "Colossus of the South" become fully integrated into an effective economic and political unit.

To the west and southwest of the Brazilian highlands lies the large drainage area of the La Plata River system. It is smaller than the Amazon basin but larger than the Mississippi valley and contains a population of twenty million. At the river mouth in the position of New Orleans lies Buenos Aires. This drainage basin extends from the tropics in the north to the temperate zone at the mouth of the river and includes the eastern part of Bolivia, a large part of Paraguay, and the Matto Grosso section of Brazil.

Paraguay is the northernmost state lying entirely in the La Plata basin. She has a population of one million, largely Guarani Indians, a low economic and cultural level, and a tradition of dictatorship. West of the Paraguay River lies the Gran Chaco which extends into Argentina and Bolivia. Paraguay is a source of quebracho, the valuable tanning product, and her open savannas are well suited for cattle breeding. But large parts of the country are useless to man. They are inadequately drained and turn into swampland during the summer floods, while absence of springs and shortage of water make them

uninhabitable in winter. Only after the most prodigious expenditure of capital for drainage and water supply could this area be made into an agricultural region, a development not likely to come as long as there is plenty of better land available elsewhere in the drainage basin. The smallest political unit in the La Plata region is the state of Uruguay with a population of two million and seventy-two thousand square miles of land. Her economy is predominantly pastoral, and she exports cattle and sheep. Agriculture is developing only very slowly. There is an adequate railway net feeding Montevideo, the capital and principal port, and a standard of living of the population which is one of the highest in South America.

The rest of the La Plata drainage basin is occupied by the second largest state of the southern continent, Argentina. She is favored by topography and climate and is potentially one of the greatest food producing regions of the world. Her present population of thirteen million is only a small fraction of what her territory could sustain, the rate of population increase is high, and if immigration is ever resumed, she will again become one of the fastest growing countries in the world.

The northern tropical region of Argentina has products similar to those of Paraguay. To the south lies a region of 165,000 square miles suitable for the cultivation of cotton, as large an area as Georgia, Alabama, and North Carolina. The soil is rich, land cheap, labor costs low, and the yield twice that of the cotton lands of the United States. Further south lies the cattle and wheat region of the Pampas and beyond, the sheep country of Patagonia. The Pampas are an ideal grazing area with native grasses of great nutritive value and excellent land for alfalfa. Much of the grazing land is also suitable for crops and would bring a higher return per acre if it were under cultivation. At the present the most important products are wheat, alfalfa, and flax. The total area under plow is probably not more than thirty-five million acres or about 25 per cent of the land suitable for tillage, and possibilities of increased production lie not only in unused land, but also in an increase of the yield which is at present far below that of the United States and Western Europe.

Argentina, with the richest agricultural resources of the continent,

is least well provided with mineral resources. Her territory contains no iron, no coal, but considerable oil in the northwest and in Patagonia, and a fair supply of water power although not in the regions where it would be most useful. Unimportant quantities of gold, silver, copper, lead, tungsten, and zinc have been mined, and no large-scale mineral development is in sight. There is a probability that the eastern slopes of the Andes range contain as yet unexplored deposits, but the transportation problem is bound to retard development here as it does in the West.

Like all South American republics, Argentina is trying to achieve a certain diversification in her economic structure and to build with the protection of a high tariff at least a light industry to supplement her agrarian extractive economy. The country is, however, poorly endowed for industrialization, and her main function in world economy will have to remain that of an exporter of agricultural products, presumably to Europe and in direct competition with many of the products of the United States.

The low level of industrialization does not prevent the Argentine from cherishing imperial ambitions. The population of the Argentine is predominantly white, more white than that of the United States, and based largely on Spanish and Italian immigration. It lives in a temperate climate, and like the population of Chile displays energy, drive, and initiative. The immigrant origin of many of the people does not prevent a fervent patriotism, and the fact that the population is less than one-third as large as that of Brazil does not induce any false modesty toward the northern neighbor. In the city of the "Good Airs" lives a race of strong men. In their cosmopolitan city where the Latin exuberance of public buildings meets the functional starkness of warehouse and factory, they dream gracious dreams of an economic empire. In certain circles the whole of the La Plata drainage basin including the tributary zones in Uruguay, Brazil, Paraguay, and Bolivia is an area to which "manifest destiny" calls. The Argentinians are determined that their state shall be the most important political unit on the southern continent and fully the equal of the United States in the Western Hemisphere.

The Power Position of the United States

History has treated us kindly; geography has endowed us greatly; the opportunities have been well used; and the result is that our country is today the most important political unit in the New World. Geographic and strategic factors, raw materials and population density, economic structure and technological advancement all contribute to give the United States a position of hegemony over a large part of the Western Hemisphere.

1. In North America

The United States is blessed by the happy circumstance that she is a strong power between two weak powers. She need fear no direct assault on her land boundaries, and her security problem is not one of frontier defense. The military equipment of Canada is modest, and her naval power slight. In the technical aspects of the military arm and in strategic position, there is no comparison between the two countries. The advantage is overwhelmingly with the United States. Geology, topography, and climate give the latter the entire continent to draw upon while the same factors sharply restrict what Canada can use of her own domain. The United States excels in man power and resources, has more military aircraft, a greater army and navy, and can seriously cripple both the internal and external communications of her neighbors. In strategic location, as in all other factors of war, the United States dominates Canada.

The defense problem on the southern border resembles in some respects that of the north. The same disparities that give the United States predominance over Canada also favor her against Mexico. The total Mexican population is only about one-eighth that of the United States, and natural resources and industrial capacity are even more meager. There is no navy, an army of approximately fifty thousand men, and a small air force, but neither is well equipped, and the country has had no experience with modern warfare.

It is, therefore, perfectly obvious that the land neighbors of the United States cannot menace her boundaries. Regional location gives

our country a position of unrivaled territorial security. Canada and Mexico are not in a position to threaten us now and are prevented by geography and lack of resources from ever becoming strong military powers. They affect the defense problem of the United States, not as primary sources of danger, but only as possible advance bases for enemies from across the oceans.

2. *In the American Mediterranean*

The American Mediterranean is today a zone in which the United States holds a position of unquestioned naval and air supremacy. This body of water is now to all intents and purposes a closed sea to which the United States holds the keys, a strategic situation approached only by Great Britain in the Indian Ocean and by Japan in the marginal seas off the coast of northeastern Asia. No serious threat against the position of the United States can arise in the region itself. The islands are of limited size, and the topography of Central America, like that of the Balkan peninsula in the European Mediterranean, favors small political units. Even the countries of large size like Mexico, Colombia, and Venezuela are precluded by topography, climate, and absence of strategic raw materials from becoming great naval powers. The supremacy of the United States in this area can, therefore, be challenged only by forces from outside the zone, either in South America or in Europe or Asia.

The international trade of the region is at the mercy of the United States, and the littoral states can be blockaded and cut from their access to the world market with the greatest of ease. For Mexico, Colombia, and Venezuela this means a position of absolute dependence on the United States, of freedom in name only, and, therefore, a situation which the proud citizens of those republics must resent as deeply as the Italians have resented their position on a closed European Mediterranean. Only a very skillful diplomacy and a very thick velvet glove will be able to make the reality of the power relationship tolerable to our good neighbors.

3. *In South America*

There is no likelihood that the west coast of South America will ever become the seat of great naval strength, although the Chilean navy was strong enough at the time of the Pacific War to discourage the United States from backing up with force her demands for a revision of the peace terms. The political units are small in population, backward industrially, and lack the facilities for building modern armaments. Since the building of the Panama Canal, the comparative naval strength in the region is expressed less in terms of the small local navies than in terms of distance from the bases of the major naval powers. This means a position of relative advantage for the United States. Operating from the Canal Zone she can exert naval pressure far down the coast beyond the southern border of Peru, and only the economic and political center of Chile enjoys the protection which distance and a small air force provide against effective blockade.

In the Atlantic drainage area of South America, beyond the buffer zone of the American Mediterranean and accessible only by sea, lie the two most powerful states of the southern continent. Geographic analysis, however, dispels the illusion of an economic war potential. Brazil is larger than the United States, but much of her territory consists of a tropical forest zone, and the much narrower zone in which her economic life is centered lacks the energy resources and the economic productivity necessary to sustain military power. Argentina, with greater possibilities as an agrarian state because of her location in the temperate zone, is very much smaller than the United States and lacks the basic raw materials for heavy industry without which war strength is unreal. Even combined, these two states could offer no serious threat, and alliance is highly improbable in the light of the inherent conflict that flows from their geographic location.

Relative strength gives the United States an enormous advantage, but relative distance gives these southern states considerable protection. It is true that our navy, operating from bases in the American Mediterranean, could blockade the exit of the Amazon basin and the ports of northern Brazil, but the real political and economic center of that country lies beyond the bulge and outside the radius of simple

naval operations. Buenos Aires and the La Plata region are even farther away from Washington, approximately 7,000 miles, or twice as far as Europe. If the United States were willing to go to war and exert herself fully, she could of course defeat both Brazil and the Argentine with comparative ease if the South American opponents found no allies among the naval powers of Europe. But the fact remains that the temperate zone of the southern continent lies too far away from the center of our power to be easily intimidated by measures short of war. The result is that the nations of the extreme south enjoy a sense of relative independence from the United States which the smaller political units of the American Mediterranean can never possess. The A.B.C. states represent a region in the hemisphere where our hegemony, if challenged, can be asserted only at the cost of war.

The Balance of Power in the Western Hemisphere

The United States is today the strongest power in the New World. How has her power been used? Compared with the general practice in Europe and Asia, it has been exercised with a good deal of moderation and restraint. Uncle Sam has respected frontiers for almost half a century. He has been a fairly lenient creditor for the last two decades and has permitted his southern friends a good deal of liberty in their treatment of his property. In his Good Neighbor Policy he has promulgated a self-denying ordinance seldom recorded in the annals of diplomacy. The non-intervention doctrine is a declaration that the supremacy of power which hegemony provides is not to be used as an instrument of national policy. It is an invitation to the states of Latin America to cease worrying about our strength and start rejoicing in our good intentions.

If there is considerable satisfaction in the United States about the restraint with which we have used our power, there is no such enthusiasm in Latin America about the virtues of our foreign policy. During the twenty-five years from 1905 to 1930, Washington accepted an interpretation of the Monroe Doctrine which enabled us to take extraordinary liberties in our relations with the states of this hemisphere. This interpretation was known as the Roosevelt Corollary. The Monroe Doctrine, reiterated at several occasions since its first

pronouncement in 1823, expressed our determination to protect the territorial integrity and political independence of the states of the New World. To Theodore Roosevelt, this meant that the European powers were denied the right of intervention and the use of force for the protection of their rights under international law. It seemed to him perfectly obvious that under these circumstances we would have to make ourselves responsible for the abuses that might give rise to European intervention. These problems arose particularly in the American Mediterranean area in which the states were eager for foreign capital but not eager to conform to the capitalist superstitutions about interest and amortization. The United States was, therefore, to undertake the duty of policeman and force the states to perform their international obligations. Under this doctrine we landed marines, supervised elections, controlled customs receipts, managed central banks, and established virtual protectorates over several of the Caribbean states.

This policy has now been repudiated. President Wilson was the first to promise a change, but he himself was forced to intervene in Mexico and Haiti in spite of his good intentions. Real changes began to occur in the Hoover administration. They were made easier by the fact that the depression caused even the most respectable capitalist nations to default on their loans. In 1930 the State Department in Washington published the Clark Memorandum which stated that the Roosevelt Corollary was not part of the Monroe Doctrine. The new policy initiated by the Hoover administration was continued and elaborated by Franklin D. Roosevelt who called our new outlook a "Good Neighbor Policy." We have now withdrawn our marines, surrendered the rights exercised in Cuba under the Platt Amendment, foregone special privileges in Panama and Haiti, and declared ourselves staunch adherents of the doctrine of non-intervention.

Our Latin American neighbors have heard us proclaim the new faith, but they have also learned of our new interest in naval and air bases which would bring United States marines and soldiers to their territory as permanent visitors. Their memory of our dollar diplomacy has not yet been erased by our current policy of restraint, and our professions of noble intent are taken with several grains of salt. Most of our expansion has been at the cost of the Latin part of

America, Louisiana, Florida, Texas, California, Puerto Rico, and Panama, and our so-called painless imperialism has seemed painless only to us. The Central American republics, who played host to our marines, custom directors, and bank supervisors, found the bayonet-supported lessons in modern accounting very painful indeed. It looked at the time as if our respect for frontiers and territorial integrity was merely the outcome of our preference for custom houses and central banks. We are now repentant sinners and have promised to be good. Our Latin American friends have heard our protestations of good intentions and are watching with keen interest to see whether the reform will stick.

To our neighbors below the Rio Grande we remain the "Colossus of the North" which in a world of power politics can mean only one thing, danger. Good will is fine, but balanced power is a greater security. This means that those countries outside the zone of our immediate predominance, the larger states of South America, must try to counterbalance our strength through common action and through the use of weights from outside the hemisphere. They rejoice in the competition for their favors between Uncle Sam and the European states and try to play one off against the other. Europe seems far away, much farther than Washington. It is to them neither a danger nor an abomination but a weight with which to balance the "Colossus of the North."

III. From Monroe Doctrine to Hemisphere Defense

By a steady adherence to the Union, we may hope, erelong, to become the arbiter of Europe in America, and to be able to incline the balance of European competitions in this part of the world as our interest may dictate.

ALEXANDER HAMILTON

THE previous pages give a brief sketch of the geography of the Americas and of the factors which affect their power relations. The United States is politically supreme in this hemisphere. She represents in population, in natural resources, and in industrial development the most important war potential on the continent and is in a position to make her naval and air forces effective over a large part of the western world. This means the ability to exert military pressure and, therefore, political pressure. It can be applied with ease in North America and the American Mediterranean, with difficulty in the further end of South America, but the power relations between the United States and the A.B.C. states are such that our military strength would be conclusive if it were ever used in earnest.

How was this position achieved? Why were thirteen colonies on the Atlantic seaboard permitted to become a great independent state of continental dimensions? How did a small group of ineffective coastal gunboats develop into one of the great battle fleets of the world? Was it solely the great skill of the eminent statesmen who guided us that enabled us to follow the road to manifest destiny without apparently meeting either obstacle or resistance? Did no one challenge our growing strength? Were no other states interested in pre-

serving a balance against us? Indeed they were! We had a chance to grow up relatively undisturbed but not in isolation from the rest of the world. The European states were greatly concerned with our growing strength, but they were of necessity more concerned with the balance of power in Europe and their own territorial security than with the power relations on the American continents.

The history of the Western Hemisphere is not a denial but a confirmation of the workings of power diplomacy. These continents were originally British, Spanish, and French colonial domain, and, as such, their inhabitants had to suffer the vicissitudes of the power politics of Europe. They obtained and preserved independence both in North and South America, because there was never a united Europe to gainsay them and because no single European state ever obtained sufficient freedom of action to throw its whole military weight into a struggle in this hemisphere. It was a balanced Europe that provided these continents with the opportunities for a political development of their own, and, with Europe neutralized, inherent factors of geography and economic potential inevitably brought supremacy in the New World to the United States.

Independence for the New World

The North American War of Independence was fought to a successful conclusion, at least in part, because of aid received from France and Spain, direct tangible support from the former and very useful help from the latter through the dispersion which she forced on British sea power. When fifty years later the French and Spanish governments contemplated the possibility of a reconquest of the independent Spanish colonies in South America, the British had an opportunity to return the compliment and interpose their sea power between that dream and its realization. British-French opposition in Europe was, therefore, the midwife at the birth of political independence on both the North and South American Continents.

The revolutionary wars and Napoleon's quest for empire kept France and Britain thoroughly occupied, and it was not until 1815 that there was even a possibility for concerted action. Neither of the great European states was able to devote its full energies to the

Western Hemisphere, and the strife among them provided indirectly a protection for the United States. The young republic had time to recuperate from the war effort, start a national economy, and try out its new form of government before there was another challenge from Europe. The conflict between Britain and France created the opportunity to purchase the Louisiana Territory and prevented the British from a whole-hearted prosecution of the War of 1812 until Europe was again at peace.

British preoccupation on the European Continent proved a blessing to the United States who was ill-prepared for a military struggle and far from united even in the face of danger. The attempts made since 1807 to force Britain and France to respect our neutral rights at sea by measures short of war had failed; the embargo on exports merely proved a boomerang that threatened to divide the nation. The effect had been very detrimental to the economic life of the Middle Atlantic and New England states, and in the latter voices had been raised demanding secession from the Union. The early war efforts of the British were on a small scale because of their preoccupation with Napoleon, but after the defeat of the Emperor in 1814 it became possible to devote large naval forces and a considerable army to the war in the Western Hemisphere. The effect on Britain of the release from a European continental threat was instantaneous. Her fleet blockaded most of the Atlantic coast; British armies operated in Oregon, occupied the coast of Maine; and an expeditionary force of five thousand regulars landed in Chesapeake Bay, defeated an ill-trained militia several times its size, and burned the capitol of the United States. It was fortunate that the Peace of Ghent ended the struggle before the British had a chance to make use of their full military strength which they might have done if new troubles in Europe had not made it necessary to keep their power concentrated in the eastern Atlantic.

The Treaty of Ghent did not affect the independence of the United States, and by 1815 a large part of North America was safely embarked on a political career of its own without ever quite appreciating how much its independence had been due to the French Revolution and Napoleon. The Corsican Dictator was an equally important factor in the new freedom that was to come to South America. By placing his brother Joseph on the throne of Spain in 1808 after the forced

abdication of the Bourbon dynasty, he inspired revolts in the Spanish colonies of the Western Hemisphere. The restoration of Ferdinand VII in 1814 brought a short reassertion of Spanish authority, but the colonies, having tasted the first fruits of liberty, refused to accept again the old absolutism. They fought for their independence under the leadership of Simon Bolívar and José de San Martín and achieved the final expulsion of Spanish rule from the mainland of the New World through the defeat of Ferdinand's army in the mountains of Peru in 1824.

There was a great deal of sympathy in the United States for our southern neighbors and their desire for independence from Europe. The slogans under which they fought appealed to the political ideology of the American people and their devotion to republicanism seemed to make them kindred souls. It is, therefore, not surprising that the success of their efforts should have been of great concern to the United States. A free America to the south of us would not only be a demonstration of the soundness of our political ideas but it would also provide a world of commercial opportunity free from the monopoly restrictions of Spain and improve our relative power position in this hemisphere. When information reached us that the powers of Europe under the leadership of France might combine to restore the Spanish colonies to the Bourbon throne, President Monroe voiced the determined opposition of the United States to such a program.

The Monroe Doctrine

The Monroe Doctrine was proclaimed in a presidential message to Congress on December 2, 1823. It expressed the views of the United States regarding the proper relations of the European powers to the Western Hemisphere and outlined the policy which she intended to pursue. It stated that the American continents were henceforth not to be considered as subjects for future colonization; that we should consider any attempt to extend the political systems of Continental Europe to any portion of this hemisphere as dangerous to our peace and safety, and any attempt to control the destiny of American states as a manifestation of an unfriendly disposition toward the United States. In modern language, it meant that the United States

announced to the world that she was interested in the territorial integrity and political independence of the states of the New World and that European intervention would be unwelcome.

The position of the United States at the time when President Monroe delivered his famous message shows certain interesting similarities to the contemporary political scene. There were threats of territorial conquest from Asia across the Pacific and from Europe across the Atlantic. In the eighteenth century the Spaniards had been disturbed by a Russian eastward expansion toward the American coast from Siberia by way of Kamchatka, the Aleutian Islands and Alaska, a development which gave them an extra incentive to settle California. A new Russian drive down the American coast began early in the nineteenth century. Sitka became the capital of Russian America in 1802, and the Russian American Fur Company, under the energetic leadership of men of vision, explored the possibilities of further southward expansion. A trading post was established at the mouth of the Columbia River, and in 1812 the Russians built Fort Ross north of Bodega Bay not far from San Francisco. From that post, expeditions in search of sea otters went as far south as the Santa Barbara Channel. It was fair to assume that if the grip of Spain in California ever weakened, Russia would be eager to take her place.

In Europe the attempt to create the beginnings of international government had failed. After the disastrous wars of the French Revolution and the Napoleonic period, the Congress of Vienna in 1815 had initiated a new system of conducting international affairs by means of systematic conferences, but by 1820 this system had begun to disintegrate.

An important contribution to the rift was the difference in social and political outlook between the British on the one hand and the Holy Alliance on the other. Under the leadership of Metternich, Russia, Prussia, Austria, and France agreed to use their military power for the repression of democratic and republican movements. This principle of intervention was repudiated by Castlereagh at the Congress of Troppau in 1820, but the three emperors were determined to subdue the revolts and uprisings occurring in Europe at that time. It was a period of revolutionary struggles, social and ideological warfare, and the balance of power in Europe consisted of the

sea power of Britain which stood for representative government and personal liberty on the one hand and the combined land power of the continent representing absolute monarchy and repression on the other hand.

In 1822 the Congress of Verona authorized France to intervene in Spain and destroy the existing Spanish regime which had arisen as the result of a republican revolution. France declared war on the Spanish Cortes, restored the monarchy, and began to toy with the idea of collective European action to repress the revolutions in America and restore the valuable possessions to the crown of Spain. The powers were invited to a meeting in Paris to discuss this program. If the Concert had approved the proposal and agreed on common action, the political alignment in the world would have been similar to that which would result from an Axis victory over Russia and China in the present world war. On one side of the balance would have been an alliance of powers stretching from the North Sea to the Pacific Ocean across the whole of the Old World, on the other side Great Britain and the Western Hemisphere. The French approach would have come across the Atlantic and the Russian approach across the Pacific. Except for the British Empire the United States would have been encircled by a Euro-Asiatic alliance which aimed to destroy democracy and make the world safe for the principles of absolutism.

In the light of this situation, Canning, the British Secretary for Foreign Affairs, approached Rush, our minister to England, with a plan for joint action. If the Spanish part of the New World was again to become a possession of the Bourbon throne, British trading possibilities in that area would inevitably be limited and restricted. In addition, the balance of power in the world would shift even more completely in favor of the European land powers. They would control not only the main land mass of Eurasia but the Continent of South America as well. It was, therefore, a wise policy to "call the New World into existence to redress the balance of the Old."

The interests of the United States were in general similar to those of Great Britain. The reconquest of Spanish America would have been detrimental from both an economic and a political point of view. We also would have been deprived of trading opportunities, and we too would have seen our power position weakened. It was obviously

an advantage to have on our southern border an independent American state instead of a strong France and in the rest of the southern continent a multiplicity of independent republics instead of a single Spanish domain. But the fact that British and American interests were similar in regard to the French plan of conquest did not make them identical within the Western Hemisphere. We would inevitably be competitors for the trade and the good will of the southern continent. This fact together with the isolationist views of John Quincy Adams and his profound distrust of Great Britain prevented acceptance of Canning's suggestion for concurrent action.

President Monroe, as well as the former presidents Madison and Jefferson whom he consulted, were favorably disposed toward common action, and there was considerable support for such a step in the cabinet. But our Secretary of State continued to plead for independent action. He pointed out that Great Britain as a European state was inevitably forced to maintain political relations with the other Great Powers on that continent which differed profoundly from those of the United States and that there was, therefore, no sound foundation for joint action. Adams finally won over his colleagues, and the President made a unilateral declaration in the form of a presidential address to the Eighteenth Congress. It announced as an independent policy of the United States her acceptance of the role of protector of the Western Hemisphere.

The Monroe Doctrine was a brave pronouncement, but the fact remains that the policy which it announced could not possibly have been carried out if the Holy Alliance had seen fit to accept our challenge. The tendency to over-estimate our military strength is a recurring feature in our national psychology, but we have seldom indulged more gloriously than in the famous presidential proclamation. In 1823 the United States alone could not possibly have defended the Latin American republics against a combination of European powers with the war potential of most of the Eurasian continent at its disposal. Only eleven years before we had been unable to save our capitol from destruction at the hands of the British, but the memory of this painful fact did not inspire us with any modesty when we announced our determination to extend the protection of our arms to the whole hemisphere.

At the time the Monroe Doctrine was declared we could probably have achieved naval supremacy in the Gulf of Mexico, but it is doubtful whether we could have achieved superiority over the arms of the European alliance on the Continent of South America. Our naval power was inferior to that of France and Russia, and the French naval bases in the West Indies placed the continental coalition in a far more advantageous position for action in South America than the United States.

In the first quarter of the nineteenth century, the navies of the world still moved by sail. The colonial route from Spain to the west coast of South America had passed through the Caribbean to Cartagena or the Isthmus of Panama. From there it became either an overland journey or an isthmian land crossing and a new sea voyage. The latter was, however, little used because prevailing southeastern trades provided nothing but steady head winds for a southern journey. In regard to this coast the United States had no position of advantage. Our own western expansion had not yet reached the Pacific, and the isthmian canal was still to be built. If the Holy Alliance had chosen the old colonial route for reconquest and commenced with New Granada we might have prevented this action by establishing naval supremacy in the Caribbean, but this condition would have been difficult to achieve without British co-operation. If the approach to the west coast had been made by way of Cape Horn, we would have been powerless until the acquisition of California gave us access to the Pacific.

Defense of the east coast of South America would have been equally difficult. In terms of simple geography, Pernambuco was about the same distance from Norfolk as from Cadiz, but in terms of sailing time Europe was much nearer. In those days, the quickest way to reach the La Plata from the Atlantic ports of North America was to sail to the neighborhood of Madeira and the Canary Islands by means of the prevailing westerlies and to travel southwest by means of the trades. An American fleet sailing for the La Plata would, therefore, have to pass through an area of European naval supremacy. Successful defense of Brazil and the Argentine could consequently be achieved only by means of a naval victory in European waters. Geography played an amusing trick on the distinguished

statesman who solemnly incorporated in one pronouncement our determination to defend the Western Hemisphere and our intention to stay out of Europe.

The defense of Latin America which we had so nobly promised to perform we were fortunately not required to undertake. The firm opposition of Great Britain to the French plan discouraged the continental bloc and prevented its members from attempting the reconquest of the Spanish colonies. There were few illusions in the southern continent about the strategic implications of the problem of hemisphere defense. Our South American friends were most appreciative of our solicitude and grateful for our intentions, but they were fully aware that what held the navies of the coalition in the eastern Atlantic was not the courageous words of an American president but the ships of the British fleet.

The Monroe Doctrine was not a measure of our actual strength; it was an expression of the power position to which we aspired. But it was to take almost a century and the development of steam navigation before we could make an approximation to the role of protector of the Western Hemisphere. Before we reached that stage, the doctrine was to be challenged by all the Great Powers of Western Europe and their failure to make good on their threat was due at least as much to their preoccupation with the balance of power in the Old World as to our own growing strength.

The French Challenge

The Louisiana Purchase had added an enormous territory to the original colonies, and the Florida Purchase had created a single uninterrupted coast line on the Atlantic and an improved strategic position in the Gulf of Mexico. With the addition of these two territories the United States had obtained so much strength that it had become practically impossible to create a balance against her on the North American Continent. Both Britain and France toyed with the idea and pursued a mild interventionist policy in Texas, hoping to persuade that state that independence was preferable to annexation, but they argued without success. Britain also showed a more than platonic interest in California for, if she could have added it to Oregon and

Canada, the balance might have been slightly restored. Real co-operation between France and Britain would have been very detrimental to our position, but united action was out of the question. The short-lived Quadruple Alliance of 1815 had already come to an end. The Egyptian and Moroccan difficulties and the disputes over the Spanish marriages had nearly brought the parties to blows. The British settled the Oregon boundary dispute, and the United States fought her war with Mexico without intervention while Europe was occupied with revolutions and the Near Eastern question.

The Mexican War gave the United States the possession of her continental domain and access to two oceans, but more than mere possession was necessary for the realization of the full power possibilities afforded by its size and location. It required more technology than existed in 1848 to integrate the enormous territory that had become the national domain. The pony express and the covered wagon were inadequate for the purpose, and it took the telegraph and the railroads to complete the task, but their successful introduction demanded at least a minimum of political unity. The United States emerged from the Mexican War only to find herself involved in the slavery issue which culminated in the disastrous Civil War. It was not until after 1865 that she acquired freedom of action in foreign policy and sufficient power to assert herself in international affairs with the knowledge that she had the means to enforce her demands.

The new national strength expressed itself both in the north and in the south: in the north in the Alaskan Purchase, in the south in pressure on France to withdraw her troops from Mexico. A joint action for redress of just grievances by France, Britain, and Spain had been turned by the former into an intervention that made Mexico a monarchy and placed Maximilian on the throne as emperor. Napoleon III had dreams of creating a great state in Central America and the northern part of South America under the protection of France, and the Mexican venture, undertaken when the United States was unable to act because of the Civil War, was the starting point for this far-reaching enterprise. The political disturbances in Mexico in the years just preceding the Civil War had created a desire for intervention below the border and supervision of this turbulent country by the United States. French intervention spoiled this plan, and made

itself unwelcome on several other grounds. Mexico was a small border state and as such a buffer state. To have this power relation upset and the buffer destroyed by the creation of a strong political unit to the south of us in control of the Caribbean was obviously undesirable; besides, the whole venture was a direct challenge to the Monroe Doctrine.

While the United States was engaged in her Civil War there was no possibility for strong action. There had been mild protests from Washington and a reminder that the United States disapproved of the acquisition of territory by a foreign power and of attempts to impair the right of the people of Mexico to constitute freely the form of their government, but once unity had been restored and military strength had become available for foreign policy, it was conveyed to the French in no uncertain terms that withdrawal of their forces was confidently expected. The French considered it wise to accept the suggestion. The growth of Prussian strength after the war with Austria had affected the European balance. Troublesome times lay ahead; within a few years France became involved in the Franco-Prussian War in which she was disastrously defeated, and her imperial conflicts with Great Britain in Asia and Africa continued. There was a brief renewal of interest in Central America ten years later after a French company commenced the construction of the Panama Canal; but France was never again in a position to resume an expansionist role in the Western Hemisphere.

The British Challenge

Military supremacy of the United States on the northern continent was assured by the outcome of the Civil War. Naval supremacy in the American Mediterranean took another forty years to achieve, and it involved a prolonged struggle with Britain primarily over the control of the trans-isthmian canal. After the acquisition of California, the United States could not contemplate with equanimity a water route between her two coasts in the hands of a foreign naval power. Great Britain, on the other hand, saw no reason why she should surrender dominion over an important maritime route. Four possible areas were given practical consideration: the transit zones of Tehuan-

tepec, Honduras, Nicaragua, and Panama. The United States was most interested in the route through Panama and had assured herself a right of transit and equality of treatment in a treaty with New Granada signed December 12, 1846, in which she promised to protect the neutrality of the isthmus and the right of sovereignty which New Granada had over the territory. Negotiation for similar rights through Nicaragua failed because the United States was unwilling to guarantee the transit zone against British encroachments. Great Britain considered Nicaragua the logical route and was trying to obtain control over the territory by extending the boundaries of British Honduras and by occupying San Juan at the mouth of the river that would form part of the transit route. This action was taken on the theory that it belonged to the king of the Mosquito Indians for whom she acted as protector. The United States was, of course, seriously disturbed about this challenge to the Monroe Doctrine and the threat of alien control of the future canal, but she was not strong enough to defeat British sea power.

The Clayton-Bulwer Treaty signed on April 19, 1850, represented a compromise and symbolized the power relation at the time. Envisaging the future construction of a canal, the treaty provided that neither power should ever obtain for herself exclusive control over the transit route nor strive for dominion over any territory in Central America. Other powers were invited to accede to the treaty, but none accepted the invitation.

In the period following ratification, the signatories tried to give the treaty the interpretation best suited to their own special interests. Great Britain was not yet ready to relinquish her traditional policy of painless acquisition of territory. She continued to use the best devices of her imperialist repertoire, loans, liens, boundary disputes, and protectorates, in her effort to gain for herself a foothold in the zones through which the canal might pass. After the Civil War the tables were turned, and it was the United States who began to take liberties with the treaty. The first demonstration of a renewal of interest was the final ratification of a treaty with Nicaragua for which negotiations had begun twenty years earlier. In provisions similar to those in the treaties made with New Granada in 1846 and Honduras in 1864, the United States was granted transit rights and in return promised pro-

tection of the route and guaranteed its neutrality. By 1870 she had secured the right of transit through all the most likely zones, was legally entitled to take action to protect the neutrality of any future canal, and had managed to keep the transit territory under the sovereignty of American states.

As the United States became stronger her statesmen became more and more determined that the canal should come under her exclusive control. In 1878 a French company, inspired by the success of de Lesseps in cutting the Isthmus of Suez, obtained a concession from the government of Colombia for the construction of a canal through the Isthmus of Panama. The European Mediterranean had become a passageway from the Atlantic to the Indian Ocean; the American Mediterranean was to become a passageway from the Atlantic to the Pacific. But it was not the nation of President Monroe but the nation of Napoleon III that was to build and, therefore, inevitably to control the inter-oceanic canal. The reaction in the United States was instantaneous. The press editorialized; Congress was bombarded with protests; and President Hayes in his message of March 8, 1880, demanded a canal under American control in an argument based on sound geo-political analysis.

The President declared that an inter-oceanic canal across the American isthmus would essentially change the geographic relations between the Atlantic and Pacific coast of the United States and between this country and the rest of the world. The canal would virtually become a part of the coast line of the United States, and our commercial interests would, therefore, be greater than that of all other countries. But the canal was of paramount concern to the people of the United States, not only because of its economic importance, but also because its control would affect our means of defense, our unity, peace, and safety.

What stood in the way of an American canal was the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty in which Great Britain and the United States pledged themselves not to seek exclusive control. One or two specious attempts were made to obtain freedom of action by invoking the earlier treaty with New Granada, but Great Britain refused to be impressed by our legal virtuosities. It was quite obvious that not even the most generous interpretation of the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty could have

given the United States exclusive control. Secretary Hay, therefore, asked for its abrogation, stating quite frankly that the United States felt that changing conditions had rendered the treaty disadvantageous. Among the conditions which had changed but which were left unmentioned in the exchange of notes was the American attitude toward naval preparedness. At the end of the Civil War, the United States had a fleet of considerable magnitude, but interest had lagged, and we were slow in following the new naval developments in Europe. A new enthusiasm, however, had appeared in the eighties, and the naval program of 1890 definitely turned its back on all ideas of navies as instruments of coast defense. It struck out boldly for an ocean-going navy with a powerful line of protected and heavily armed battleships.

After fifty years the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty which symbolized a balance of power was replaced by the Hay-Pauncefote Treaty proclaimed on February 22, 1902. The new agreement symbolized not a balance of power but the supremacy of the United States in American waters. Under this treaty the United States secured the right to construct and assume exclusive control of the isthmian canal. It contained no prohibition of the erection of fortifications and although the canal was to be open in time of war as well as in time of peace, the United States would obviously be in a position to deny transit to her enemies.

With the European obstacle removed by the new treaty, the American difficulties were overcome with comparative ease. The French Canal Company had undertaken a task too large for its abilities and had gone bankrupt in the process. By 1899, it was ready to sell out to the United States for forty million dollars. Colombia refused to grant the United States a treaty deeding a canal zone, but this problem was fortunately solved by the "spontaneous" birth of a new state. The young republic of Panama was eager to grant us the desired transit area and was recognized with almost indecent speed by the Washington government. The canal was completed in 1914 and formally opened by the President of the United States in 1915. By that time the First World War was in full swing. In Europe, the German challenge to British sea power had been accepted, and in Asia the Japanese had confessed their dream of hegemony by the

presentation of the Twenty-One Demands which asked for a protectorate over China. In the midst of these conflicts across the encircling seas, the United States obtained the realization of one of her great aspirations in the Western Hemisphere, control of the center and pivot of all inter-oceanic coastal routes and interior lines of communication between the Atlantic and Pacific.

Control of the Panama Canal was extremely important, but it alone did not provide strategic control of the American Mediterranean or local supremacy over British naval power. Geographic location forced the United States to concern herself not only with Central America as a possible western exit from the Caribbean but also with the Lesser and Greater Antilles and the eastern approaches to the middle sea. Columbus had begun the history of the New World where the Atlantic trade winds reached a friendly shore on the eastern rim of the American Mediterranean, and these islands became the starting point for the European domination of the American Continent. From here the Spanish moved to the control of the western shore and the creation of their huge empire. But Spanish naval power proved inadequate to assure continued control of all the islands, and the Lesser Antilles were to change hands in faithful reflection of the outcome of the struggles between European maritime powers. At the end of the Revolutionary War they were held by the Dutch, the French, and the British who controlled, in addition, the valuable island of Jamaica with a strategic location comparable to that of Malta in the European Mediterranean.

The Louisiana and Florida Purchases made the United States the most important littoral state on this inland sea, and the annexation of Texas enhanced her interest in the power relations along its shores. It is, therefore, not surprising that after the Spanish colonies had obtained their independence the fate of the islands became a source of anxiety to this country. It was one thing to have them in the possession of a relatively weak Spain. It was another to have egress from the Mexican Gulf controlled by strong naval powers. This consideration applied particularly to Cuba because of her proximity to the mainland and her potential control of the Florida Strait. The annexation of Cuba was considered several times but never materialized. Not only Cuba but also the next island in the group which contains

Haiti and Santo Domingo caused a great deal of concern to the government in Washington. Spain had used the opportunity of the Civil War to reoccupy Santo Domingo, and Seward's efforts to get her out by correspondence proved of no avail. Stronger action would undoubtedly have been taken at the end of the struggle if the firm resistance of the Dominican population had not inspired Spain to leave in 1865 without any extra urging on our part.

After the war of the states, American naval circles became interested in Samana Bay which offered an excellent opportunity for a naval station from which to control the Mona Passage, and President Grant arranged to purchase Santo Domingo from dictator Baer, but his treaty of annexation was defeated by the Senate. It was not until after the victorious war against Spain that the United States obtained a secure position in the Greater Antilles. Puerto Rico was annexed and provided an alternative method of controlling the Mona Passage, and Cuba granted Guantanamo Bay for a naval station ideally located for patrolling the Windward Passage. The two most important northern entrances into the Caribbean Sea were now firmly held by the United States.

Before the Hay-Pauncefote Treaty and the acceptance by Great Britain of our position of supremacy in the American Mediterranean, there had been another test of relative strength over an issue on the north coast of South America. The boundary between Venezuela and British Guiana had never been defined, and the discovery of gold in the eighties led both parties to make extravagant claims. The British at first declined all offers of arbitration and the United States, unduly influenced perhaps by the almost completed partition of Africa and the contemplated partition of China, felt called upon to take a strong stand to discourage dreams which European states might have about a Western Hemisphere protected by the Monroe Doctrine.

Cleveland stated that, if the British persisted in their refusal to arbitrate, it would become the duty of the United States to determine for herself where the true boundary lay and to resist by every means in her power the appropriation by Great Britain of any land that the United States had determined as belonging to Venezuela. Secretary Olney's note contained a rather exuberant statement of the American position. "Today the United States is practically sovereign

on this continent, and its fiat is law upon the subject to which it confines its interposition." The British accepted our contention of supremacy in the American Mediterranean, reluctantly at first, but finally generously and whole-heartedly, and a treaty of arbitration was signed and ratified.

The Spanish-American War symbolized this turning point in American-British relations, and its outcome further strengthened our position in the Caribbean in relation to British sea power. The hegemonic position of the United States on the American Continent had been accepted, and Great Britain began a policy of co-operation on this basis. She gave us moral support in Manila and in Europe when the continental states began to contemplate intervention. The British reduced the West Indies fleet and the garrisons and refrained from developing and modernizing the fortification of the islands into bases that could be used as operating centers for the application of naval pressure against the United States. The struggle for supremacy in the American Mediterranean was over. Proximity made it inevitable that the young republic should be the victor, once the economic potentialities of its vast domain began to express themselves in naval power, but the British occupation with the balance of power was again a powerful aid.

It was not a sudden and irresistible impulse of friendliness that gave the British lion his new manners, but grave concern with political problems in different parts of the world. During the nineteenth century, Great Britain was deterred, at least in part, by the exposed position of Canada from opposing our southern expansion by the method of war. Now difficulties in areas more vital to the empire suggested the need for liquidation of her position in the Caribbean. The defeat of China by Japan had disturbed the balance of power in the Far East. The Jameson Raid and the Kruger telegram coincided with the Venezuela dispute; the Fashoda Incident was the symbol of serious colonial conflicts with France, and the Boxer Rebellion, the Boer War, and continued strained relations with Russia added to the difficulty. Nearer home the new Germany had embarked on a naval building program with the frank avowal to become the second sea power and to build a fleet so strong that in a war with Britain it might do

sufficient damage to imperil her position in the world. The result was a new distribution of British naval forces, withdrawal from the distant zones, and concentration in Europe and the North Sea.

The German Challenge

The Spanish-American War which symbolized the end of the struggle with Britain for supremacy in American waters initiated a long period of suspicion and misgivings about Germany. The reports of the strange behavior of the German squadron in Manila harbor during Dewey's campaign created a profound distrust in American public opinion. Relations between the two countries did not improve, notwithstanding the fact that we permitted Germany to take over the Spanish possessions in the Western Pacific that did not belong to the Philippine group. There developed a widespread fear in certain circles in the United States that the German flag might some day follow the large-scale emigration to South America, and there was particular concern about the great German settlements in southern Brazil. Equally disturbing seemed the interest in the Caribbean area and the approaches to the future Panama Canal.

There was a good deal of justification for some of these suspicions. Germany had decided on a naval policy that would challenge the position of British sea power and had embarked on an extensive building program, but she needed naval bases from which to operate her cruiser squadrons. The German Admiralty began, therefore, to display a perfectly natural interest in the acquisition of suitable stations. The former Spanish islands in the Western Pacific, added to Tsing-tao, Samoa, New Guinea, and the Bismarck Archipelago, improved facilities in the Far East. The routes to the Suez Canal were secure in British hands and could not be challenged, but along the approaches to the new Panama Canal something might perhaps be made available by an enterprising diplomacy. Haiti, the Virgin Islands belonging to Denmark, Curaçao belonging to Holland—both possessions of small neighbors of Germany—as well as the Santa Margarita Islands off the coast of Venezuela, and the Galapagos Islands west of Panama all had merits in the eyes of the naval officers. The German Foreign Office was, however, fully aware of what

our reaction would be to an open challenge of the Monroe Doctrine and managed to keep the Admiralty in check. Except in the case of the concerted action against Venezuela under the German leadership in 1902, open conflict was avoided, but the United States government used the occasion of a display of interest in the islands to affirm once more in no uncertain terms her unalterable opposition to the transfer of American territory to a non-American power.

The fact that an open break was avoided did not mean that the opposition was not intense. After the withdrawal of Great Britain from the New World, Germany became the country to be watched. She was the only power left that could challenge the Monroe Doctrine and the only state strong enough to endanger the safety of the hemisphere. The strength of the German navy became the measure of our need. A navy second in rank to Great Britain became the objective of American naval policy and that meant, in plain language, a navy stronger than that of Germany. Opposition between the United States and Germany eventually turned to war, but when it came the issue was not the Monroe Doctrine but our neutral rights against unrestricted submarine warfare and the balance of power in Europe. We participated in the First World War, and the outcome of that war was the complete destruction of German naval power and the removal for a quarter of a century of all possibility of another German threat. France, Britain, and Germany had each challenged us on our road toward naval predominance in American waters, and each had been forced to withdraw because of involvement in conflicts and power struggles in the Old World.

The Supremacy of the United States

The First World War further increased the naval strength of the United States as the result of an enormous building program, and the Second World War has permitted the final completion of the program for the domination of the American middle seas as well as for the control of the offshore islands on the Atlantic coast. Great Britain was in desperate need of small craft, and in September, 1940, the United States exchanged fifty over-age destroyers which had been reconditioned for service for a ninety-nine year lease of areas for

naval and air bases on islands in the Atlantic belonging to Great Britain. It took many months to complete the arrangements, but the agreement was finally signed in London on March 27, 1941. The use of the bases in Newfoundland and Bermuda is an outright gift; the lease of territory in the West Indies, which includes Jamaica, Antigua, St. Lucia, and Trinidad, as well as the base in British Guiana, is a *quid pro quo* for the destroyers.

These additional naval and air bases have completed the control of the United States over the eastern rim of the Caribbean and have made the blue waters between New Orleans and Trinidad a truly closed sea. The circumferential expansion of the United States which began with the Louisiana Purchase has now reached the southeastern exit at Trinidad, and the struggle for the control of the American Mediterranean which began its modern phase shortly after the signing of the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty has entered into its last period.

The present agreement with regard to the islands is clearly a makeshift, and a very expensive one at that. There is an enormous amount of duplication between existing British establishments and the new ones being built for the United States. It will probably be necessary in the long run to take over the British West Indies together with all the other European possessions in this hemisphere. Two authorities and two ways of doing things on one small island will inevitably produce friction and bad feeling. There is no historical illustration of a successful condominium, and the experience with leased naval bases in China is also not conducive to optimism. Instead of prolonging the inescapable irritation, it will be better to transfer the European possessions to the United States as part payment for the benefits received under the Lend-Lease Act. If the mood of the New World is then still internationalist, the islands can be placed under the trusteeship of the American states as provided for in the Convention signed at Havana in 1940. But real control must inevitably lie with the power that operates the naval and military forces, which can be no other than the United States. Whatever the outcome of the war, the last vestiges of the colonial period of the American hemisphere should disappear.

Evolution of the Monroe Doctrine

President Monroe was probably not aware of the fact that he was laying down the basis for a permanent policy for the United States when he delivered his famous message to Congress. His own declaration was a response to a specific situation. But the doctrine became part of the political ideology of the nation and has been accepted by the general public as one of the immutable principles of the foreign policy of the United States. It came to be expected that whenever a threat arose to the independence of the states of the Western Hemisphere, the government in Washington would reaffirm its adherence to the famous doctrine, and on the whole the people have not been disappointed.

Between 1823 and 1843 there was no restatement of the policy, partly because the United States was occupied with slavery and continental expansion, partly because the threat at that time came from Great Britain and was too hard to resist. But since then there have been reiterations and reaffirmations by many of the presidents. In 1845 came an important declaration by President Polk inspired by the efforts of European powers to prevent the annexation of Texas, and the fear that the British might have designs on California. After the Civil War reaffirmations became more frequent. In almost every administration either the President or his Secretary of State managed to find an appropriate occasion for a declaration of adherence to the traditional policy.

The original principles contained in the message of President Monroe, no acquisition of territory, no introduction of alien systems, and no intervention, have been expanded and clarified throughout the years. No acquisition of territory now means opposition not only to conquest but also to voluntary surrender of territory and to transfer from one non-American power to another, an extension which is of immediate practical importance in the light of the conquest of Holland and France, who have colonies in the West Indies and South America. Objection to the introduction of alien systems is still as firm as ever, but the solution of the problem is much more complicated. At the time of the original declaration, alien systems could be estab-

lished only by military pressure and preventing the latter would inevitably prevent the former. But that was before the development of large-scale propaganda and modern methods of non-military intervention. The United States will, therefore, have to develop new techniques for preventing the introduction of alien systems under modern conditions.

The disapproval of intervention has become increasingly strong. There has been no objection to the services of European statesmen in the mediation and arbitration of intra-American disputes, and similar services performed by the League of Nations have been accepted without protest. Originally there was not even opposition to the use of force by European powers for the protection of their rights and the collection of their debts, provided such military activities did not lead to territorial acquisition or subversion of republican forms of government. Only since the blockade of Venezuela by European forces in 1902 has the United States opposed such forms of coercion. But in regard to one aspect of the problem of intervention the policy of the United States has not changed. She has objected in the past and will continue to object in the future to any action that weakens her power position in the Western Hemisphere.

Monroe's declaration did not take the form of an actual guarantee. It did not create an obligation to preserve the territorial integrity and political independence of the American republics, nor did any of the later presidents interpret it as such. Woodrow Wilson was the first and only President to describe it as an actual "guaranty," but not even this phrase could turn the doctrine into a legal obligation. The United States has consistently preserved complete freedom of action, freedom to decide in each instance whether she would respond to threats from Europe or Asia, and if so, what steps she would take. Even the Consultative Pact signed at Buenos Aires in 1936 and the Declaration of Lima signed in 1938 did not contain obligations other than that of consulting in case of a danger of transoceanic aggression. Poetic license entitles enthusiastic devotees of Pan-Americanism to call this a continentalizing of the Monroe Doctrine, but it does not mean that the United States has accepted a legal obligation to protect the South American neighbors comparable to that contained in Article 10 of the Covenant of the League of Nations.

As a declaration of policy, the doctrine occurs primarily in presidential proclamations, but it would be a mistake to assume that it had not received congressional confirmation. As recently as April 10, 1941, our representatives reaffirmed by a joint resolution the principle of non-transfer of any region in this hemisphere from one non-American power to another. Expressions of congressional adherence to the doctrine in the form of treaty reservations have been numerous. It appears in the reservations to the Hague Conventions, to the Root Arbitration Treaties, as well as to the Arbitration Treaties of 1928, and to the Kellogg Peace Pact of August, 1928, in which it was stated explicitly that nothing in that agreement should prevent the United States from using force in the defense of the hemisphere. Specific exception to the doctrine has also been made quite systematically in the neutrality laws in which it is stated that their provisions shall not apply to any American republic engaged in war against a non-American state, providing that the American republic is not co-operating with a non-American state in war.

President Monroe included in his doctrine the entire Western Hemisphere. Some of his successors in the first half of the nineteenth century, while asserting their allegiance to his principles, found it expedient to limit their application to the North American Continent or the American Mediterranean. It has already been suggested that, before the construction of the Panama Canal, Europe was not only nearer than the United States to the east coast of South America, but also nearer to the west coast. It should be remembered in addition that, during most of the nineteenth century, Great Britain, France, and Spain had naval bases in the West Indies which were nearer to the southern continent than anything available to Uncle Sam. Those European states were, therefore, in a better position to exert naval pressure on the republics to the south than the government in Washington. This explains in part why conformity to the letter of the Monroe Doctrine was not insisted on beyond the Brazilian bulge. In 1864 the United States protested when Spain occupied the Chincha Islands in her war with Peru, and sometime later during the war of Spain with Chile she warned against subverting the republican system of government, but there was no protest when Great Britain repossessed the Falkland Islands in 1833, nor was objection raised to the

British-French interventions in the La Plata regions in the forties and fifties.

With the development of steam navigation and our growing strength after the Civil War and particularly after the Spanish-American War, the relative power position of Europe and the United States in the countries below the Rio Grande changed in favor of the latter. The Monroe Doctrine was again considered applicable to all of Latin America. President Theodore Roosevelt extended the doctrine to apply not only to European powers but also to Asiatic powers and gave it thereby its modern two-ocean form.

It is not surprising that, in the face of the political constellation of the contemporary world in many ways so similar to that existing at the time of Monroe, a president of the United States should again have reaffirmed our determination to resist intervention from across the oceans. Franklin D. Roosevelt, speaking before the Governing Board of the Pan American Union in 1939, announced that we were prepared to maintain the American peace and to defend it to the fullest extent of our strength, "matching force to force if any attempt is made to subvert our institutions, or to impair the independence of any one of our group." The President had already indicated that our power would be available to defend the Dominion of Canada and in April, 1941, he signed a convention with the Danish Minister extending our protection over Greenland. The original doctrine of Monroe had become a doctrine of total hemisphere defense.

Since our fifth president first announced our intention to become the protector of this hemisphere, the political aspect of the world has changed greatly. We have grown from a relatively small country on the Atlantic coast of North America to a state of enormous size with the resources of a continent at our command. Before our growing strength, the powers of Europe have gradually withdrawn from this continent, and we are supreme over much of the New World. Whether we are actually strong enough to defend the hemisphere against a coalition of Germany and Japan, a combination much stronger than the one that faced us in the days of Monroe, will be analyzed in the second part of this book. But there is no doubt that, in 1939, we could have defended the western world against any single European or Asiatic state.

The New World, notwithstanding its insular character, has not been an isolated sphere on which political forces were permitted to find their natural balance without interference from outside. On the contrary, the power structure has been dependent not only on the power potentials inherent in the geography of the continent, but also on the amount of power that states in Europe were able to make available in this area. Preoccupation of the European nations with the balance of power at home gave us the opportunity to grow to our present position of power. The states of Latin America, although they too have grown in strength, are poorly endowed with the elements that make for a great war potential, and they have been unable to combine their strength against us. The southern continent offers no threat to the hegemonic position of the north, and the United States obtained, therefore, power to spare for activities outside the New World. It is this fact that made us a world power after the Spanish-American War. Since the beginning of the twentieth century, we, in turn, have begun to affect the balance of power across the oceans.

IV. America and the Transatlantic Zone

The policy of the German people toward the outside world must ever be guided by the following basic rule. Never tolerate the emergence of a second great continental state in Europe. It is not only the right but the duty of the German people to prevent the establishment of a military power on its frontier by all means at its disposal, including war.

ADOLF HITLER

THE geographic location of the United States has as a unique feature its position between Europe and Asia with direct access to both the Atlantic and Pacific oceans. The Atlantic will probably always remain the more important of the two, not only because American culture originated as a transatlantic projection of western civilization, but because, for a long time to come, its European coast will be economically and politically more significant than the distant shores of the Pacific. Until two years ago, Europe contained five of the great World Powers, and although that continent is relatively less important today than it was in the nineteenth century, it still remains the greatest power potential in the world, and the region from which both Africa and the Near East will inevitably be controlled.

Because of the distribution of mountain ranges in the world and the resulting river flow, the Atlantic has relatively more drainage area than the Pacific. On its shores and along its inland seas live almost half the population of the globe, and it carries three-fourths of all the ocean traffic. Contributing to its importance is the fact that it drains the most significant economic section of the United States. Approximately 70 per cent of our exports by value start their voyage

to world markets through Atlantic ports either directly or by way of the Mexican Gulf.

The eastern coast of the North American Continent, because of estuaries and indentations, provides innumerable favorable locations for harbors. It was on this shore that the economic life of the United States first developed, and it was in New England that the maritime history of the nation began. The Erie Canal and the railroads through the passes of the northern Appalachians made the eastern seaboard the great transit region of the American Continent. This was a victory of man-made communication over topography, for the natural tendency of the trade of the great central region was to move south with the current of the Mississippi and its tributaries, and to make New Orleans the great emporium of the central plain. Now the economic life of the North Central region as well as that of the seaboard itself reaches the world trade routes through the harbors of Boston, New York, Philadelphia, and Baltimore.

The African Continent

In the transatlantic zone lie two continents, Europe and Africa, divided by the European Mediterranean. Africa, the second largest continent in the world, with an area of approximately 12 million square miles, consists almost exclusively of colonial possessions of European powers. Despite its size, it contains less than 150 million people and it ranks economically, in terms of international trade, just above Australia. The broad part of the land mass lies in the tropical and equatorial zones, and the larger part of the country north of the Equator is desert. The northern coastal zone is the southern littoral of the European Mediterranean, and its economic and political life has usually been more closely interwoven with Europe than with Black Africa beyond the Sahara. As in the case of the Western Hemisphere, the obstacle to communication between the northern and the southern continents is not the middle sea but the great land barrier beyond the southern littoral. There are caravan routes from the Mediterranean to equatorial Africa across the desert waste, and the French are building a railroad from Algiers to Dakar and the Niger River. But the important lines of communication from

Europe to Africa beyond the desert will remain the sea routes along the west and east coast of the continent.

The part below the Sahara contains the colonies and mandated territories of the European powers except for the Union of South Africa and the independent native states of Ethiopia and Liberia. Ethiopia lost her independence during the six years that she became part of the Italian empire, and Liberia continues a precarious existence with the blessing of the United States.

Geography has not dealt kindly with the Dark Continent. It consists mainly of a great table land. The rivers which flow from the plateau country drop to the narrow coastal plains by a series of falls and rapids and are not navigable inland for any distance from the coast. This feature, together with unfavorable winds, lack of harbors, and inhospitable and fever-infested shores, is responsible for the fact that although the continent has been circumnavigated for more than three hundred years, it was explored and opened up only in the second half of the nineteenth century. Most of the areas except Egypt are thinly populated and lack an adequate labor supply which explains in part why the Asiatic equatorial zone, and not Africa, although it is nearer to Europe, provides the great tropical staples for the European economy.

The African Continent lacks the raw materials, the man power, the culture, and the technology necessary for the development of indigenous states with military power. As a colonial world, it has been asked to contribute raw materials and soldiers to the strength of European states, but since Ancient Egypt, Carthage, and the Arab Kingdoms no political units have developed strong enough to threaten Continental Europe. Africa is important in the struggle for power partly because of its production of gold and certain important raw materials, but primarily because of its strategic location in regard to the great sea routes. The North African coast plays an important role in the power struggles of the European Mediterranean. South Africa and Cape Town flank the turning point on the route to India. They were of enormous importance in the days before the opening of the Suez Canal and are again benefiting from the closing of the Mediterranean passage. They have once more become a significant pivot in the imperial lane to Asia and the Far East. Most important, how-

ever, is the coastal zone from the Strait of Gibraltar to Liberia with the chain of offshore islands from Madeira to the Cape Verde group. This section not only flanks the European routes to the Cape but also to South America, and contains between Dakar and the Gold Coast the territory nearest to the Western Hemisphere.

The United States has shown little interest in the African Continent notwithstanding the fact that it was a source of energy and labor for the economy of the South until early in the nineteenth century and an opportunity for a profitable slave trade for New England. She did, however, inherit from this early period a special bond with the black Republic of Liberia. This republic was founded for the express purpose of settling free American Negroes on African soil, and although the number that actually emigrated was exceedingly small, the objective found sympathy in abolitionist circles. Private and public money supported the venture, and the United States formally recognized the new state in 1862 when the thoughts of Congress were very much focused on a better future for Negro slaves.

The Black Republic has led a precarious existence ever since her birth. The British and French neighbors developed a habit of moving boundaries and encroaching on her territory, and the government at Monrovia developed a habit of financial mismanagement and neglect of internal order. During the last two decades of the nineteenth century the United States several times interested herself sufficiently in Liberian welfare to admit the existence of "peculiar relations" and to state that she would not regard with indifference attempts to deprive Liberia of her independence.

Since 1912 there has been American financial supervision through a receiver-general of customs and American aid in the training of frontier police. The result was a relation between the United States and Liberia not unlike that existing at about the same time between Washington and some of the Central American republics. In the decade following the First World War we added to our sentimental concern with the Black Republic an economic interest in the form of a great rubber plantation. The agreement of 1926 between the Firestone Plantation Company and the Republic of Liberia provided for a concession of a million acres. It was accompanied by a second agreement with another subsidiary of Firestone, called the Finance Cor-

poration of America, providing for a loan of five million dollars to be guaranteed by means of the supervision of both customs and internal revenue. This supervision was entrusted to an American financial adviser designated by the President of the United States and five American fiscal officials.

The new dispensation did not prove an unmixed blessing; neither did it inspire the Monrovian politicians to a life of honesty and good works. The complaints against slavery and forced labor in the republic of freed blacks became so loud that they created an international scandal, and drastic changes were demanded both by the United States and the League of Nations. When in 1932 the republic defaulted on her loan and began to treat the American fiscal advisers with remarkable disrespect, the Black Republic had become a first-class international nuisance, and a subject of dispute between the United States and the League.

Liberia insisted on a revision of the agreements of 1926 demanding lower interest rates and less control by outsiders and asked for financial assistance from the League on terms that would respect the sovereignty and independence of the republic. The League recommended changes in the loan agreement, higher rentals for the rubber land, and the appointment of a number of foreign officials including health officers, provincial governors, and a chief adviser who would arbitrate between the government of Liberia and the American fiscal advisers. The United States took the point of view that her first duty was to protect the interests of her citizens, in this case the Firestone Company, and to see to it that the power of the American officials provided by the agreement of 1926 should not be dangerously reduced. The three parties were unable to settle their differences with the result that Liberia was never placed under official international supervision. She has since attempted to introduce some of the necessary reforms herself and appointed some foreign advisers. The relations between the United States and Liberia remain vague and undefined. Washington has never officially proclaimed a protectorate and has never insisted on exclusive control, but as long as the agreement of 1926 providing for financial supervision is in effect in some form, and as long as the Firestone Company remains the most important economic unit in the country, the position of the United States in

Liberia will be different from her position in all other parts of the Black Continent.

In other parts of Africa the United States has shown little interest. She attended the Berlin Conference of 1884 called at the invitation of the German government to consider the status of the Congo. The resulting convention providing for suppression of the slave trade, freedom of navigation on the Congo River, the open door for trade, and neutrality for the territory was not submitted to the Senate. Apart from the Berlin conference the United States also participated in the two Morocco conferences. The first, which took place in Madrid in 1880, dealt primarily with the rights of foreigners residing in Morocco; the second, which took place in Algeciras in 1906, involved the security of the Strait of Gibraltar and a struggle for position between Germany on the one hand and France and Britain on the other. Although we were in no way involved, we definitely sided against Germany and with France and Great Britain. Apart from our participation in these three conferences, the continent seems to have caused us little concern. When the European powers began their scramble for colonies during the last quarter of the nineteenth century, the United States remained remarkably undisturbed in sharp contrast to her excitement about the competition for spheres of influence in China. The fact that she was still in a phase of continental orientation and primarily occupied with her position in the American Mediterranean is probably responsible for her lack of interest.

The European Mediterranean

Africa is separated from Europe by the Mediterranean Sea. This basin is surrounded along most of the littoral by mountain chains that come down to the water's edge. There are very few fertile plains and little lowland except desert. The valleys of the Aude and the Rhone break through to the Gulf of Lions; the valley of the Isonzo, to the Adriatic; that of the Vardar, to the Aegean Sea; but the Po and the Nile are the only rivers that provide irrigation for broad plains under intensive cultivation. Climate makes the Mediterranean region suitable for growing cotton, sugar, citrus fruits, and olive trees, an important source of vegetable oil, but the possibilities of the area

as a food producer are distinctly limited. Spain, Italy, the Balkans, Asia Minor, and the Atlas Mountains all contain mineral deposits, but the absence of iron and coal precludes any great industrial development notwithstanding the presence of petroleum in the Near East.

The middle sea saw the beginning of western civilization and along its shores operated some of the great states of antiquity, both sea powers and land powers. The wars of today, however, can be fought only on the basis of powerful industrialization and for this type of struggle the region contains nowhere an adequate war potential. It is, therefore, not surprising that the shift of European politics from the Mediterranean basin to the region north of the Alps, which began with the development of transoceanic shipping, has never been reversed. Although unimportant in terms of war potential except for oil, the region has preserved its strategic significance as a great transit zone. It provides maritime communication between the European and African Continents and a route from the Atlantic to the Indian Ocean, originally with the aid of overland communication through Syria and Mesopotamia and later with the aid of the Suez Canal. Great wars have been fought for the control of those routes, between Phoenicia and Greece, Greece and Persia, Carthage and Rome, and between the sea power of the Italian Renaissance cities and that of the Turks and the Arabs. This struggle for routes and the points which control them has continued to this day not only between the new national states along the northern littoral but also between those states and the distant sea power of Great Britain.

The European Continent

The real heart of the transatlantic world and the source of its economic, military, and political power in modern times is Europe beyond the Alps. The European Continent is the western peninsula of the great Eurasian land mass, separated from Asia proper by the Ural Mountains, the Caspian Sea, the Caucasus, and the Black Sea. From Portugal came modern navigation; from England, the Industrial Revolution; and from the laboratories and universities of Western Europe, much of the scientific basis of modern life. Until the latter part of the nineteenth century this smallest of the continents contained

all the Great Powers of the world and was the center from which a large part of the earth was governed.

The European land mass contains a great lowland plain which extends from the Channel to the border of Russia and forms the basis of much of its agricultural wealth. To the north lies the massif of Scandinavia, to the south the broad mountain belt which starts with the Pyrenees and ends with the Balkans. Including Russia west of the Urals, the area of Europe is almost four million square miles with a population of approximately 550 million people. Exclusive of Russia, these figures become approximately two million square miles and 400 million people. The mineral wealth of the continent is great, and its iron and coal deposits form the basis of an industrial development that has sustained the war efforts of several states. Distribution of coal and other minerals in a broad belt running from the English Midlands through Artois, the Ardennes, the Ruhr, Saxony, and Silesia accounts for the geographic distribution of manufacturing on the continent and the industrial importance of Great Britain, France, Belgium, and Germany.

Before the great industrialization of Russia under the Communist Regime Europe was divided into two sharply differentiated zones: Western Europe, predominantly industrial and urban, and Eastern Europe, primarily agrarian and rural. It is true that the Ukraine is still the largest area in Europe producing a net surplus of grains, but it has also become one of the great industrial centers of Russia.

The land mass of Europe is broken up into several smaller peninsulas as the result of deep penetration by inland seas, the Baltic in the north, and the Mediterranean and the Black Sea in the south. Entrance to the Baltic is by the narrow passage between Denmark and Sweden past Copenhagen, and the entrance to the Mediterranean and to the Black Sea is by the Pillars of Hercules between Gibraltar and Tangier. The existence of these inland and marginal seas and the deep penetration and navigability of the rivers account for the importance of water transportation and the significance of sea power in European wars, and the latter is enhanced by the fact that Europe as a whole is dependent on overseas imports for both foodstuffs and raw materials.

The Position of Great Britain

In front of the European Continent and across the lines of communication from the United States lies the island group of Great Britain, the heart of a great sea power. The configuration of the European coast line and the position of England and Scotland have given Britain a strategic location of extraordinary importance. The northern part of Scotland projects northward beyond the southern part of Norway, and the three hundred mile stretch from Aberdeen to Bergen is partly flanked by the Orkneys and the Shetland Islands. The Strait of Dover, less than thirty miles wide, and the English Channel can be controlled from a number of magnificent harbors in the south of England. As long as Great Britain can maintain naval supremacy in the North Sea and close the Channel between Plymouth and Brest she can blockade the north of Europe. Control of the Strait of Gibraltar, the Suez Canal, and the Red Sea means control of the entrance and exit of the European Mediterranean to the Atlantic and the Indian oceans. Mastery of the Bay of Biscay and continued possession of the Mediterranean bases assures Great Britain control of all the routes to southern Europe. The international commerce of both the northern and southern part of the continent must pass British-controlled portals before it can reach the open oceans and free access to the trade routes of the world.

British sea power lies between the Continent of Europe and the Atlantic and, therefore, between Europe and the United States. England can function as a barrier against continental threats to the Western Hemisphere and, conversely, she can function as a buffer state against American threats to the continent. The relations between the United States and Continental Europe are, consequently, influenced by the geographic location of Britain. The United States can be effective in military action on the continent only in alliance with British sea power, not against it. The Continent of Europe can engage in distant naval operations only with the consent of Britain, not against her. British sea power in turn must consider other European navies and will, therefore, be available for distant operation only to the extent that it is not balanced by continental fleets.

Because Britain lies across our lines of communication and is the most important maritime state, it is her power politics more than that of any other state that has defined our relations to the European balance. British relations with the continent have been guided by three sets of considerations: territorial security for Great Britain, protection of the Mediterranean route, and the need for freedom to defend and expand the empire.

From the point of view of British sea power, the European Continent is a peninsula in the shape of a triangle with the apex at Gibraltar. The western side of this triangle faces the British islands which lie near the middle of the coast line from the North Cape to Morocco. The northern flank of this side is represented by the fjord-indented highlands of Scandinavia and the southern flank by the mountain mass of Spain. Between these two, from the Skagerrak to the Bay of Biscay, lies the heart of the European Continent and its greatest war potential. Thrusts from this side of the triangle are threats against the British homeland itself and against its lines of communication with the Atlantic.

Security for the British islands has depended traditionally on the ability to prevent invasion from across the narrow seas, and, because the country is largely dependent on imported foodstuffs and raw materials, on the ability to prevent blockade. Only a navy could perform this function of national defense; the role of the army was inevitably incidental. As long as the British could maintain naval supremacy in the waters around the islands, no invasion was possible, and, if the ability to control the seas were lost, no invasion was necessary. The enemy would then be able to force surrender by the application of blockade and the resulting economic dislocation and starvation. The development of aerial warfare has modified the situation to the extent that fleets now need the support of air power and that air power can bring both invasion and counter-blockade independent of fleets by passing over the zone controlled by the navy.

Naval strength is fleet strength plus strategic location. The excellence of the strategic location of the British Isles on the flank of the western coastal front of the European Continent has already been mentioned. British foreign policy wisely endeavored to improve the natural strength of her position by preventing the emergence of a

strong naval power across the Channel and the narrow part of the North Sea. This was originally attempted by actual control and possession of the mainland coast, later by the occupation of bridgeheads, and finally by the preservation of buffer states such as Holland and Belgium. To prevent the control of the Lowlands by a strong continental power, Britain fought France in the Middle Ages, Spain in 1588, Louis XIV, the Directoire, Napoleon, Wilhelm, and is now fighting Hitler.

Before the development of submarine and aircraft, naval supremacy—the control of the seas—was a comparatively simple problem. It demanded quantitative superiority and, because surface craft was threatened neither from above nor from below, this merely meant supremacy in ships of the line, possession of the most powerful battle fleet. To preserve that supremacy the British had to be prepared to out-build the fleets of the continental powers. In periods of isolation it meant a navy strong enough to fight the combined fleets of the mainland unless the political constellation made such an alliance unlikely. A balanced continent meant maximum security. In that case, Great Britain had to build merely against the strongest combination. This meant in practice a two-power standard or better; a fleet strong enough to deal with the two strongest continental states.

In times of continental threats to her naval supremacy Great Britain usually deserted her policy of isolation and joined one of the continental combinations. Such a step improved the relative power position, reduced the size of the naval strength to be met, and increased the size of the fleet with which to meet it. A continental ally was helpful in the early stages of the power struggle and absolutely indispensable when war broke out. Only through a land power on the mainland could Britain take a successful offensive against a large continental state. Only with the army of an ally could the land frontier of the opponent be attacked and the type of action developed which, together with the British blockade, might bring victory.

The relations of Great Britain to the Continent of Europe are not limited to contacts with states on the western side of the triangular peninsula but include those that touch the coast line from Gibraltar to the Dardanelles. The western flank of this front is the same mountain block of Spain; the eastern flank is the Balkans; and the center

is the peninsula of Italy in an advanced and exposed position. None of these three mountain areas contains the war potential necessary for the development of great naval power, and really serious thrusts can, therefore, only come from the points where continental economic strength can project into the Mediterranean basin at Marseilles, Trieste, Salonika, and Constantinople. A thrust from this southern coast line threatens not the British homeland but the transit route through the Mediterranean which must be secured by sea power operating from the naval bases in Gibraltar, Malta, and Alexandria.

The Mediterranean was originally significant primarily in terms of the commerce of the Levant and the overland route to the Near East and India. After the opening of the Suez Canal, it became the principal sea route to India and the Far East and the most important line of imperial communications. The defense of this line required the maintenance of naval supremacy either by out-building the fleets of the littoral states or encouraging opposition between them. A balanced European mainland is, therefore, of interest to Great Britain not only because of its effect on the power relations along the western coast of the triangle, but also because of its effect on the power relations along the Mediterranean route. An important reason for England's participation in the War of the Spanish Succession was the fear that the success of the plan of Louis XIV would have brought the control over the whole littoral of the western Mediterranean, Spain, France, and Naples, into the hands of a single power. In the days before the First World War the political alignment contributed greatly to the security of the British lifeline. Italy balanced France in the western Mediterranean and the opposition between Russia and the Austro-Hungarian Empire gave the British freedom of action in the eastern end of the basin.

The southern littoral of the European Mediterranean consists of the north coast of Africa, Palestine, Syria, and Asia Minor. The African section possesses no war potential for the development of naval strength. The zone is colonial or semi-colonial territory held by the European powers on the opposite shore, and it operates in the power struggle along the British lifeline only in terms of the strategic advantages which it offers to the armed forces of the European states. If these are balanced, the southern littoral can create no special prob-

lems of its own. Only the land in the immediate vicinity of the three entrances to this inland sea needs special care and attention.

The Strait of Gibraltar at the narrows between Tarifa and the coast of Morocco is only eight miles wide. Control of this shore opposite Spain by a strong military power would neutralize the value of Gibraltar and threaten the western entrance to the Mediterranean. During the whole of the nineteenth century the British, therefore, sought to maintain the territorial integrity and independence of Morocco. When the country could no longer be preserved as an independent state and when it became necessary to support France in her desire for exclusive control over the sultan's domain, Great Britain took special precautions to safeguard her position in Gibraltar. She arranged that a strip along the north coast of Morocco, opposite the Spanish shore, should go to Spain, who seemed at that time the least dangerous occupant, in exchange for a promise that neither the section along the narrows nor Algeciras would ever be fortified.

Concern about the eastern entrance into the Mediterranean from the direction of the Black Sea inspired British interest in the other sick man of Europe, Turkey, in control of Constantinople and the Straits. To preserve his integrity against Russian expansion toward the Mediterranean was the constant endeavor of British foreign policy throughout the nineteenth century. The promise made to Russia in 1915 that, in case of an Allied victory, she would be granted Constantinople is an indication of the price Great Britain was willing to pay for all-out Russian aid against Germany. Fortunately for the British naval position in the eastern Mediterranean, the Bolshevik revolution and the Turkish national renaissance made it possible to keep the Straits in Turkish hands.

More important even than the "Question of the Straits" is the problem of the control of the Suez Canal. It explains why the temporary occupation of Egypt by British troops in 1882 continues to this day and why, after the vulnerability of the canal to attacks from the east had been demonstrated in the last war, the post-war period found the British in control of Palestine as a mandatory power. Here, as in Morocco, the original threat came from France, most clearly demonstrated when Napoleon tried to obtain control of this strategic pivot of the British Empire by his expedition to Egypt, later by the

fact that it was a French company that built the Suez Canal. It was the entente agreement of 1904 which settled both the Gibraltar and the Suez problems in a manner satisfactory to the British Empire. French supremacy in Morocco outside of the Spanish zone was recognized by Great Britain in exchange for French recognition of British supremacy in Egypt.

The control of sea routes raises oppositions and conflicts in international relations of an especially acrimonious nature. The power to control a route is the power to deny it to others. While the power to deny the use of a land route is accepted as the natural and obvious result of territorial sovereignty, the power to deny a sea route is felt as a denial of the freedom of the seas and something to be resented even if it places no obstacles to peaceful trade. The power to control a sea route or an inland or marginal sea such as the Mediterranean or the North Sea becomes the power to deny the littoral states their access to the oceans. Such a situation will be felt by the strong coastal states as an intolerable obstacle to freedom to be removed at all cost. The determination of Great Britain to protect her territorial security and her Mediterranean route by dominating the two coastal sides of the continental triangle and the drive of the great land powers to break through the ring of British sea power provides one of the basic and centuries-old conflict patterns of European politics.

Britain and the Balance of Power

Because of its contribution to her territorial security, relative naval strength, and political power, the continental balance has been an objective of British foreign policy for the last three hundred years. Great Britain has played an active role in most of the coalitions that have been formed to restrain the growing continental powers. In the name of preserving the equilibrium, everybody in Europe has fought everybody else. Britain has successively defeated Spanish, Portuguese, Dutch, French, and German sea power and has successfully used Spain, Portugal, Holland, France, and Prussia as allies. Power politics is responsible for her reluctance to make advance commitments to any nation beyond the buffer zone. He who plays the balance of power can have no permanent friends. His devotion can be to no

specific state but only to balanced power. The ally of today is the enemy of tomorrow. One of the charms of power politics is that it offers no opportunity to grow weary of one's friends. England's reputation as *perfide Albion* is the inevitable result of her preoccupation with the balance of power.

British policy toward the European Continent seems to move in a long series of cycles in which with monotonous repetition occur the stages of isolation, alliance, and war; shift of partners, isolation, alliance, and war; and so on *ad infinitum*. If Great Britain had her wish, she would never leave the stage of isolation, that happy situation that gives her freedom from worry about the eternal quarrels of the continental states, freedom to attend to her imperial affairs. But the joys of isolation are available only when Europe across the Channel is in equilibrium. Unfortunately that continent never stays balanced. Dynamic forces are always shifting the relative strength of states, and, sooner or later, usually later, the British begin to show concern. When the continental states cannot balance themselves without the weight of Great Britain, she reluctantly joins a continental alliance. The expanding state usually refuses to accept the power status which Britain is willing to assign her, and the mere formation of an alliance is seldom enough to restrain further expansion. Eventually the balance has to be preserved by war.

The British have traditionally tried to limit their obligations to their allies and have attempted to fight their continental wars as cheaply as possible. Most ideal was the ally who needed only loans, subsidies, and war materials. Desirable was the one who needed only active participation by the British fleet. Blockade was a normal and not very expensive form of warfare for sea power, and distant fleet operations usually created opportunities for acquiring strategic islands and small pieces of valuable real estate that were their own reward. Less desirable were allies who required the aid of large British armies; expeditionary forces, if used at all, should be kept as small as possible.

If the war is fought to a successful conclusion and brings complete defeat to the opponents, Britain is apt to shift her diplomatic and economic support. The former ally is deserted because he is now on the strong side; the former enemy supported, because he is now weak.

With the balance thus restored to her satisfaction Britain returns to splendid isolation. But the balance gets upset and the cycle starts again. Thus it has been for three hundred years.

As suggested in the first chapter of this study, a balance of power in which the weights are equal gives no sense of security; it contains no margin of safety. The only useful balance is the balance that gives freedom of action, and this is particularly true in the case of Great Britain. Britain is unfortunately faced with an almost insoluble dilemma. As a small island off the west coast of the continent she is geographically part of Europe, how much, she is now learning reluctantly under constant air-bombardment. But she is not only part of Europe, she is also the seat of a world-wide empire. It is this fact, not the former, that traditionally guides British conservative thinking and, even more, British political action. For the true imperialist, continental questions are merely an interruption of imperial politics. The problems on the Vistula must not be permitted to detract attention from the problems of the Congo, and the question of Austrian independence must not be permitted to disturb attempts to solve the issue of dominion status for India. As long as Great Britain intends to be primarily an empire, her balance of power policy must strive for a large margin of freedom, an unbalanced surplus of considerable strength. When her military power becomes completely absorbed in Europe, her imperial interests suffer, as the history of the Far East attests. By creating a balanced mainland and keeping British power free, her Empire was created and only under similar conditions can it be preserved. A divided and balanced continent is a prerequisite to the continued existence of the Empire and a divided continent means British hegemony. This power relation is inevitably opposed by the state that aspires to the dominant role, which in different periods of history has been Spain, Austria, France, and Germany.

During the lifetime of the United States, Great Britain has repeated three times the cycle that seems to be characteristic of her power struggle with the European Continent. The first of these, which involved opposition to the growing power of France, gave us our chance at freedom and the consolidation of our early strength. During the second cycle, British policy was faced with the growing power of Germany under Wilhelm, and the resulting war brought

the United States to Europe as an ally. During the last one, which began in 1919, the problem was again to prevent Germany from dominating the continent, but this time it was a revolutionary National Socialist Germany under Hitler.

The second half of the nineteenth century saw the growth of Germany to a first-class power. Through the war with Denmark she obtained the territory necessary for the Kiel Canal; through the war with Austria, the dominant position among the German states; and through the war with France, the iron ore deposits of Alsace-Lorraine. Schleswig was followed by Sadowa, and Sadowa by Sedan, with the result that in the heart of the European Continent there was now a state stronger than France, with the coal and iron base for a great military machine. But the Triple Alliance between Germany, Austria, and Italy was balanced by the Dual Alliance between France and Russia, and Britain could dream of splendid isolation a little longer. The late nineties shattered this enchanting illusion. Difficulties with France and Russia, problems in the Far East and in Africa caused grave concern. Both the French and the Russians were building modern fleets, and the alliance between them threatened the British naval position in the Mediterranean. When Germany also threw out a challenge and announced plans for an imperial future and a navy to sustain it by force, the situation had become serious indeed. Merely to build up the British fleet to the naval strength of one of these combinations would leave the other free and make it the arbiter of Europe, able to sell its neutrality for what the traffic would bear. Britain had to choose between building a fleet stronger than the continental powers combined or renouncing isolation and seeking a political solution. There were two political possibilities, a deal with Germany and the Triple Alliance or an understanding with France and the Dual Alliance.

Britain's first choice was an approach to Germany. Several attempts were made to get the Germans to accept a naval ratio agreeable to the British. Joseph Chamberlain advocated a policy of appeasement, convinced that Germany could be made to accept a reasonable agreement. There were partial satisfactions of colonial claims and delicate discussions about the future of the Portuguese colonies. All of these attempts, however, broke down. Germany was determined to achieve

her place in the sun, and there was no other way for Britain than to try to balance her growing strength. The search for allies led to explorations in many directions and produced first a treaty with Japan and then an agreement with France (1904). This was later followed by an understanding with Russia (1907). Britain had become a party to a three-power alignment opposed to the Triple Alliance. Isolation had come to an end.

The acceptance of allies by no means meant complete renunciation of freedom of action. An unconditional assurance of support might make the partners recalcitrant to compromise, and the road to mediation and appeasement had to be kept open. Full absorption in the balance was to be avoided if possible, and the role of arbiter was not to be surrendered until all hope was lost. Specific commitments were, therefore, evaded as long as possible with results for military preparedness that were disastrous. The agreement with France was called an "entente," not an "alliance," and it was only after long and constant pressure from their partner that the British finally consented to staff discussions. In 1912 the French fleet moved to the Mediterranean and the British fleet, by implication, took over the defense of the French Atlantic coast. This perfectly sound arrangement had to be accompanied, however, by an exchange of notes in which the parties solemnly declared that they preserved full freedom of action. It took another two years before it was possible to start an exchange of views between the British and Russian admiralties.

The First World War

The power struggle between Great Britain and Germany finally broke out into military combat, but the war did not actually begin over colonial questions or issues in Western Europe. It developed out of a new phase in the ancient struggle between Teuton and Slav for the control of Eastern Europe. The system of alliances made it impossible to localize the conflict, but even without the existence of previous commitments the power implications of the issue would inevitably have involved other states. The Balkan struggle became a European struggle and finally a world war ultimately affecting power relations in all parts of the globe.

The defeat of Germany and Austria took four years to accomplish. Land operations against the Central Powers were fought on four fronts with the combined man power of Great Britain, France, Italy, and Russia, and the industrial output of most of the world. The naval war, except for a single, large-scale battle, evolved into a blockade and counter-blockade in which the Germans used a submarine fleet and the Allies had at their disposal most of the existing naval power and were in a position to enforce the collaboration of Germany's neighboring neutrals. In terms of that alignment, the war produced a stalemate not broken until the entrance of the United States in the third year of the conflict. The eventual outcome was a complete victory for the Allies, but it took America's participation to turn the scale.

The war ended with the collapse of the Russian Empire and its transformation into a communist state, the disintegration of the Austro-Hungarian Empire into several national groups, and the conversion of the Turkish Empire into a national state based mainly on Anatolia. Germany was reduced in size and population, forced to surrender coal regions in both Silesia and the Saar Basin, and obliged to return to France the province of Alsace-Lorraine with its rich iron deposits. She was saddled with heavy reparations, forced to surrender her fleet and her merchant marine, and obliged to accept a demilitarized Rhineland zone, a reduction of armed strength to one hundred thousand men, and a temporary army of occupation.

President Wilson offered the world as part of the peace settlement a plan for an international organization which he thought should replace the discredited balance of power system as an instrument for the prevention of war. The League of Nations would unite the members of the international community in an association in which all partners collectively would come to the aid of a state attacked, thus making each individual nation less dependent on its own armaments or on those of its allies. It would discourage the use of unauthorized force by facing the aggressor not with balanced power but with overwhelming force. The United States, however, refused to join the League, and the other Great Powers who did become members failed to attune their foreign policy to the spirit of the Covenant. American membership, a greater devotion to international solidarity, and a broader vision of national interest would undoubtedly have made the

League a more successful instrument of peace, but the idealists were wrong in thinking that its procedures represented a radical departure from the policy of power politics. The League changed the legal obligations of states, but it did not basically alter the organization of force in the international community. A system in which the control of the armed forces is retained in the hand of sovereign independent states, each with a veto power over collective decisions, remains a balance of power system even if it is called a system of collective security.

The Treaty of Versailles became the symbol of German defeat and liberation from its provisions, therefore, became the natural objective of post-war German policy. Some favored fulfillment in the hope of clemency for good behavior; some looked toward renewed negotiation once the hatred of war had subsided; some hoped to use the League of Nations as an instrument of change; others, more realistic, began to study ways and means of building a new military strength with which to force revision.

Because Germany had lost the war, her military experts undertook a serious study of the causes of her defeat. The unsolved problem of the war was the stabilized front. Military scientific thinking devoted itself, therefore, to the question of neutralizing the machine gun, the problem of shifting the advantage back to the offensive, the task of designing new tactics for breaking through entrenched positions and re-creating mobility. The long war, the war of attrition, had proved Germany's downfall; only a short war, a war of mobility, could bring her victory. Strategically, this meant that a war on two fronts was to be avoided at all costs. Economically, it meant reducing the vulnerability to British blockade through a program of maximum self-sufficiency, the integration into the German economy of a large section of Central and Eastern Europe, and a thorough economic preparation and mobilization long before the outbreak of hostilities. There was also serious complaint about the inadequacy of German propaganda and an often voiced insistence that the Reich should learn this important subsidiary technique of modern diplomacy. Political analysis suggested a program which would postpone a war with Great Britain as long as possible, discourage British and French co-opera-

tion, and prevent at all cost the old Dual Alliance and the resulting encirclement.

The peace did not re-establish the balance which the growth of Germany had threatened to upset. It created a continental structure in which France obtained a precarious hegemony. The war had been fought on French territory, and the devastated regions remained a visible token of its cost, even to the victor. It was, therefore, natural that reparations and territorial security should be uppermost in the minds of the French delegation to the Peace Conference. They asked for material guarantees of security in the form of a Rhine frontier and French occupation of the west bank. The British and Americans opposed this demand, and at their request this strategic boundary was surrendered in exchange for a promise of a military alliance with the United States and Great Britain. The Senate refused to make good on Wilson's pledge. It ratified neither the Treaty of Versailles nor the Treaty of Alliance, thus releasing Great Britain from her obligation as third party to the agreement. For France the post-war period began with the refusal of the two most powerful states in the world to remain her allies, and the refusal of the United States to become a member of the League.

From that moment on, territorial security became an obsession with the French and the guiding concept of their foreign policy. It inspired the Maginot Line, attempts to give the League of Nations a system of automatic sanctions, treaties with the weak states on the eastern border of Germany, useless efforts to obtain British commitments in Eastern Europe, and financial largesse toward the Danubian States. It was also responsible for the refusal to discuss disarmament except in terms of substitute guarantees of security, and for an attitude that refused to consider claims for revision of the peace terms on their merits and insisted on judging them exclusively in terms of their probable effect on the balance of power.

The principal elements of the post-war power structure of Continental Europe were, therefore, the disarmament of Germany, the demilitarization of the Rhineland, and the alliances of France with the successor states of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. These relatively small political units could act as a weight in the power balance against Germany only as long as the latter was disarmed, and France could

come to their support only as long as there was no fortified frontier in the west to bar her passage. Her hegemony rested, therefore, on a precarious foundation, but while it lasted it represented an unquestioned military supremacy.

Great Britain more than France became the real beneficiary of the Treaty of Versailles. The so-called satiated empire managed to digest in the form of mandates most of the German colonies in addition to a fair slice of the Ottoman possessions. The surrender of the German fleet removed a serious naval threat from the Continent of Europe and left British naval power unchallenged from the North Cape to Gibraltar and from Gibraltar to the Dardanelles. But public opinion was thoroughly tired of the continent and appalled at the losses in blood and money which the struggle had cost. The war had forced a departure from the century-old practice of professional armies and obliged the British to resort to conscription and the raising of a large national army. Peace brought dreams, dreams of a return to splendid isolation, of a continental policy without commitments, and of a world in which wars, if necessary at all, would be old-fashioned wars, wars of limited objectives fought with British naval power and a small expeditionary force.

The British had won the struggle and they had, therefore, less reason than Germany for a careful scrutiny of its lessons, and a greater temptation to return to traditional thinking. The result was a tendency to underestimate the role of land warfare and to overestimate the importance of naval warfare. There was some debate over the effect of new techniques and new weapons on naval strategy and tactics, but the popular answer proved to be the simple reaffirmation of faith in "control of the seas" as the cure for all problems. It was, of course, quite obvious that the traditional naval supremacy derived from superiority in battle fleet strength had made enormous contributions to the victory. It had restricted the operation of the inferior German fleet, permitted the safe transportation of large armies across the seven seas and the support of expeditions in all corners of the globe. It had reduced to a small number the German surface raiders and made possible auxiliary operations against submarine activities. But this complete and overwhelming naval supremacy and unchallenged control of the surface of the oceans had not

prevented the Germans from developing their submarine warfare into a counter-blockade that almost brought disaster to the vulnerable island.

There had also been Zeppelin raids and air attacks, but to the British the airplane seemed primarily a new auxiliary weapon in sea and land operations involving only minor changes in tactics. There was no general recognition in Great Britain that the days of two-dimensional wars were over and that the whole strategic meaning of the geographic location of the islands had changed for the worst. British foreign policy returned to its old pattern: buffer states, balance of power, and isolation.

There was little realization that the Channel had lost much of its protective value and that small buffer states would be no barrier to night bombers. The Lowlands were, therefore, expected to resume their function as weak and harmless occupants of a strategic shore. It seemed at times as if Britain would have liked to assign a similar function to France, but, at the outset of the post-war period, France was too strong to accept with grace the modest role of buffer state for Britain. Twenty years later, however, when the Second World War broke out, France had become so obsessed with the idea of mere territorial defense that this was the only function which "La Grande Nation" could see for herself in the struggle and even in that role she proved a failure.

The very strength of the French position in the early post-war period made it inevitable that Great Britain would shift partners and pursue a policy of reconciliation with the defeated powers. The Continent of Europe was the most important market for British exports, and she was naturally interested in an early settlement of the reparations questions and a quick economic recovery for her future clients. She was not only glad that the refusal of the United States to ratify Wilson's Treaty of Guarantee permitted her to escape from a similar obligation, but she also gave increasing diplomatic support to the revisionist demands of Germany and Italy. With her own territorial security resting on an unquestioned naval supremacy, Britain kept urging France to accept the German demand for equality of land armaments. She had, however, no intention of taking on any obligation for the support of the eastern pillars of French security. The

Locarno Treaty with its promise of aid in case of a German invasion of France remained the limit of her commitments. Great Britain would obviously aid Holland and Belgium in case of invasion even without treaty obligation, but, apart from this simple buffer state policy toward the littoral states in the center of the western coast of the European continental triangle, she pursued rather a policy of isolation and non-commitment. The League of Nations was for the British merely an improved form of consultative pact which in no way restrained their complete freedom to decide in each individual instance whether an act of aggression had been committed and what, if anything, they intended to do about it.

This general policy of neutrality between the former ally and the former enemy with a slight partiality toward the latter gave the British a great deal of emotional satisfaction. It appealed to all the best instincts of their temperament, the sense of justice, the desire for generosity to the fallen foe, and the principle that bygones should be bygones. In addition, the policy relieved their sense of guilt about the Treaty of Versailles.

The Second World War

When Germany began to tear up the treaty and to follow a new leader and a new faith, the British looked with amused tolerance at people who needed ideologies to guide their lives. Hitler's first call to his people was a plea to free the world from the Bolsheviks and the Jews, and there seemed, therefore, no immediate reason for British concern with the resurgence of German vitality. But when the National Socialists took control of Germany in 1933, they pledged themselves to achieve in addition the complete revision of the peace treaties and a new place in the sun for the Third German Reich. Such a program would, of course, affect Great Britain, and when the ideology of force became a program for the domination of Continental Europe and the philosophy of strength became a feverish preparation for rearmament, the challenge was unmistakable. The British were forced once again to awaken from their dream of isolation.

The first approach to the problem was, as always, negotiation and

appeasement. It was inspired partly by the old sense of guilt about the peace treaties, partly by faith in the possibility of a deal profitable to both parties, partly by hope of a German-Russian clash, and partly by fear and complete lack of military preparedness. This time, also, there was a Chamberlain who was convinced that there was room for reasonable agreement. Neville's father had been willing to accept the idea of Germany's legitimate right to colonies, and the son was willing to accept Germany's legitimate right to rule Central Europe, but neither idea proved a basis for permanent agreement. This time, also, there were attempts to establish naval ratios. The British rejoiced when the Germans graciously agreed, but Mr. Goering had already started to build the air fleet that was to bomb London.

In March, 1936, the Germans destroyed the power framework of the legal and political structure of post-war Europe. The return of the Saar Basin in the previous year had removed a dangerous salient in the territory west of the Rhine, and this was followed by a great speeding up of rearmament. The occupation of the Rhineland and its remilitarization marks a turning point. The French had built no air force and the construction of the Siegfried Line of fortifications along the German frontier, therefore, confined French military power to Western Europe, blocked its road to the east, and destroyed all chance of bringing effective assistance to her Danubian allies. Germany started her expansion in Central Europe, fighting on all fronts, ideological, social, economic, and political, and clinched each victory by means of military occupation. Each step began with a psychological attack accompanied by troop movements and a war of maneuver according to a definite strategic pattern. The result was pressure on the center, double encirclement, and the threat of a great striking force on the flanks. The incorporation of Austria drew a circle around Czecho-Slovakia from Vienna to Silesia, and the occupation of Czecho-Slovakia drew a circle around a large part of Hungary and surrounded Poland from Eastern Prussia to the passes of the Carpathians. With the forced co-operation of the small Magyar state the German armies not only encircled Poland; they faced and flanked the borders of Rumania as well.

When the Germans destroyed the power foundations of the political structure of Europe, there was no opposition. They were per-

mitted to rearm, occupy the Rhineland, fortify the western frontier and incorporate Central Europe into a Greater Germany with no more resistance than verbal protests. There was apparently a complete misunderstanding of the nature of the new opponent and a failure to comprehend the implication of the new revolutionary techniques with which the old power struggle was fought. The Fascist Powers made allies of important circles within the democratic states, and their social and ideological attacks went unparried. It was realized too late that military action might not be the beginning but merely the end of a war already half won on other fronts that had been left undefended. Action came, but too late. The successful incorporation of Austria, Czecho-Slovakia, and Memel into the German Reich and the increasing economic penetration into the Balkans finally brought a British reversal of policy in regard to Eastern Europe. For twenty years, when the power was available, Britain had steadfastly refused to accept League commitments beyond the Rhine; now, when she could neither reach them nor aid them effectively, she suddenly gave guarantees to Poland and Rumania.

The reversal on Eastern Europe is one of the strangest decisions in the history of diplomacy and can be explained only in terms of a response to an emotional outburst of public opinion. German claims to the Polish Corridor were better than to any other territory she had so far incorporated. Poland and Rumania had interesting forms of government, but to call them democracies was stretching the meaning of even that elastic term too far. Important circles in Western Europe were very happy that the direction of German expansion was eastward. Why then try to stop the continuation of this desirable movement? If the decision was rational, it must have been based on concern with the balance of power and fear that further conquest would make Germany too strong. But from the point of view of power politics, the guarantee to Poland and Rumania was an erroneous and fatal decision. Further eastward expansion and even total incorporation of these two countries would have strengthened Germany but primarily in regard to Russia and not a great deal in regard to the west, notwithstanding the large grain fields and the oil wells of Galicia and the Carpathian foothills.

But even if the accretion of German power had been considerable

and the vulnerability to blockade greatly reduced, it was still an unwise decision. Up to the time of the rearmament of Germany, Poland and Rumania could have functioned as the eastern allies of France, and, if it had been possible to unite them with Czecho-Slovakia, they might have represented a considerable military pressure. When, however, the economic potential of Germany began to express itself in the creation of an up-to-date military force, Poland and Rumania changed their status automatically. They became little buffer states locked up in Eastern Europe. The life of a buffer state can be preserved only by the immediate neighbors, not by a distant state which cannot reach it. It was a noble decision to guarantee their existence but not a wise one. From the point of view of Western Europe, it was much better to have Germany and Russia share a common frontier than to have them separated by buffers. Only with Germany in a position to be a direct threat to the Ukraine was there a possibility of winning Russia as an ally of the West, as subsequent events have proved.

It would have been much wiser to have left the eastern buffer states to their fate, but once it was decided to make further German expansion a fighting issue, Russian co-operation should have been obtained in advance. Only Russia was in a strategic position to offer effective resistance in Eastern Europe, only Russia had the air force and the mechanized divisions necessary to parry a German thrust. Liberal statesmen in both France and England had stressed the necessity of a Russian alliance, but the conservatives in both countries remained unalterably opposed, and their objection was shared by the Polish government. An attempt was made to get Russia to place at the disposal of the threatened buffer states such military forces as they might call for, to fight presumably under Polish and Rumanian direction, but this the Russians refused.

The Russian counter-proposal asked for a treaty in which the large powers would guarantee both the western and the eastern buffer states, Holland, Belgium, and Switzerland as well as the Baltic states, Poland, and Rumania. This was refused by the French and the British, as was the alternative Russian demand for a full treaty of alliance with Poland and Rumania. In June, 1939, the Western Powers were sufficiently impressed by the seriousness of the situation

to consent to the negotiation of an alliance on equal terms, but even then there was reluctance to discuss the supplementary military convention. When in the late summer the last scruples were overcome, it was too late. On August 24th came the announcement of the German-Russian treaty. Hitler, faced with a war in the west, had decided to satisfy the demands of his general staff. There was to be no eastern front. The price of Russia's neutrality was paid, and Germany obtained her freedom of action, liberty to fight a European war without the danger of encirclement.

The failure to achieve an alliance between Russia and the Western Powers was partly due to mutual distrust, and partly inherent in the geo-political situation. Long before Germany had embarked on a career of revolution, Russia had systematically attempted to destroy the social and political system of the democracies. This period left its mark in an ineradicable suspicion of Russian motives. Poland, which has long had closer contacts with the Russians than Western Europe, was even more distrustful and found it difficult to decide whether the army of the German enemy or of the Russian friend would be more dangerous to her freedom. British conservative circles had quite openly expressed their pleasure when Hitler suggested that the German war machine would be used to destroy the Bolshevik government. Thus, when the British government became ready to discuss an alliance, its motives were profoundly suspicious to Moscow. This mutual distrust, combined with the fact that the buffer states still existed and that Germany could make offers which the democracies could not match, was responsible for the failure of the negotiations.

Not only did the West decide to go to war without the preparation of an eastern front; it had been equally neglectful of its political and strategic position along the two coastal fronts of the continental triangle. British and French action had been too weak to prevent the Italian conquest of Ethiopia, but strong enough to create a profound resentment which led Italy to align herself with Germany. Equally serious had been the failure to save the Spanish Republic. Fascist Spain, which owed her victory to Germany and Italy, controls the most strategic zones on the coast line of the continental triangle. The homeland surrounds the British naval base at the entrance to the

Mediterranean, Spanish Morocco faces the Iberian coast across the Strait of Gibraltar, and the possessions in West Africa flank the sea route to the South Atlantic.

The military preparations for the war were as inadequate as the diplomatic. Although German rearmament had been no secret, there had been no attempt to match it. When the Allies finally began war preparations in earnest, they followed their traditional patterns, and nothing was permitted to interfere with normal business. The British built battleships, and the French built fortifications. Churchill had been warning his compatriots against the danger of aerial warfare, but there was no vigorous demand in any circle for a two-power standard for air forces as there had long been a two-power standard for naval forces. The collective security system of the League had never been developed; the individual security system of national armaments had been neglected.

The policy pursued was a traditional balance of power policy, but the British had lost that fine sense for weights and measures which the nation of shopkeepers was supposed to possess. They failed to obtain the support of Russia and, when the war finally started, the weight of the British continental allies could not hold the scales. Neither Poland, Rumania, nor France could withstand the thrust of the German war machine. Europe was unable to balance the power of the Third German Reich as it had failed to check the military strength of the Second German Empire a quarter of a century ago.

The Second World War began in September, 1939. On June 10, 1940, when it was clear beyond doubt that the French army was defeated, Mussolini joined his Axis partner. The campaigns in Poland and in the west had demonstrated that Germany had lost none of her military skill in the years of enforced disarmament. She, alone, had built her new army in terms of the lessons of the last war; she, alone, had fully developed the strategic and tactical implications of technical improvements in tanks and aircraft; and she, alone, had fully grasped the possibilities of mechanized divisions and three-dimensional warfare. No army in Europe was able to stand up against the German military machine. Poland was overrun, Scandinavia captured, the Lowlands taken, France defeated, and the Balkans incorporated. The buffer states were absorbed and the British were forced

to withdraw from Norway, Belgium, France, and Greece. The whole of the continent west of the Russian border came under German control. All the British allies in Europe were defeated, leaving no bridgehead from which to start a continental campaign and no European army to take the brunt of the fighting.

Control of the continental triangle meant that its two sides from the North Cape to Gibraltar and from Gibraltar to the Dardanelles became available to the Axis for military action. The west coast from Norway to Spain became a base of operations for submarine and air attacks on the British islands and a possible starting point for invasion; the south coast, the source of thrusts against the Mediterranean life-line, Egypt, and the Near East. The war became a struggle between a small offshore island supplied from overseas and Germany in control of most of the continent. The British fought by means of blockade and air attacks on the industrial plant of Germany. Naval supremacy in surface craft aided her economic warfare, facilitated overseas expeditions to distant fronts, and reduced the Italian navy to impotence. The naval air arm scored significant triumphs against German raiders and Mussolini's fleet, but inadequacy of small patrol vessels once again proved a handicap in the defense of the supply line to Britain. Germany fought by means of a counter-blockade sustained by submarines and aircraft based on numerical superiority in the third dimension of modern war. But neither side was willing to risk invasion because of the inability to establish both naval and air supremacy at the point of landing.

The Germans, although victorious on the continent, wisely refused to occupy all of France and created a puppet regime in Vichy. This prevented the French colonies from going over to the British side and kept many of them indirectly under the control of Berlin. By maintaining Unoccupied France, Spain, and Portugal as semi-independent states, Germany discouraged Great Britain from taking over the territorial possessions of these countries in Africa, thus preserving them until such time as they might become useful as bases for military operations. The arrangement had the additional advantage of making the diplomatic and consular services of the dependencies available as supplementary channels for fifth column activities all over the world.

In June, 1941, almost two years after the outbreak of the war, Germany resumed her eastward expansion and attacked Russia. This was a return to the original plan of campaign which had chosen a route that could be forced by land power and air power without a head-on collision with sea power. But this time she had joined battle with the only army in Europe equipped with both the air force and the mechanized divisions that modern warfare requires and trained in tactics designed to serve as a reply to the methods of the blitzkrieg. If successful, the campaign would eventually reduce Germany's vulnerability to blockade. If she could conquer western Russia and drive the Russian government beyond the Ural Mountains, she would have achieved the geographic foundation for a *Grossraumwirtschaft* that could be made self-sufficient to a very large degree. The Ukraine is the only large area in Europe that produces an exportable surplus of grain, and improved technology and agriculture could make it again what it was in the nineteenth century, an important source of wheat for Western Europe. Western Russia and the Ural Mountains would add large coal, iron, manganese, nickel, and copper deposits to the mineral resources of the German sphere and provide access to the great oil pools of the Caucasus region. It would take, however, several years before the economic potential implied in the conquest of European Russia could be translated into actual productive capacity and before the region could be fully integrated into the economy of Continental Europe. To solve the transportation problem involved demands not only the control of the maritime routes of the Baltic but also control of the maritime routes from the Black Sea to the Aegean through the Dardanelles. The defeat of British naval power in the Mediterranean must, therefore, be achieved before the fruits of victory on the Volga can be enjoyed.

If the Russian war were successful, it would not only improve Germany's war potential but it would also improve her power position in other respects. The Russian army was the only undefeated army in Europe and the only one that could possibly have challenged Germany's domination of the continent. The existence of that force on her eastern frontier was a threat that had to be dealt with and only its destruction could make Hitler the unquestioned master of the whole of Europe. The Führer himself declared that the existence of

a large Russian air force compelled him to keep so many of his air squadrons in the east that he could not employ his full force against Great Britain.

If the campaign were to lead to the destruction of the Russian army, it would undoubtedly enhance the chances of a victory over Great Britain. But the very attack created the political encirclement that Germany had always dreaded and the war on two fronts which the General Staff had insisted should be avoided. Its first result was inevitably the conclusion of the British-Russian alliance which had proved impossible in August, 1939. It also weakened at least for the time being Germany's strength in the west. It is true that there was no longer any land warfare in Belgium and France, but the Germans had become involved in aerial warfare on two fronts with the result that the counter-blockade against Great Britain was considerably weakened and British bombing of German industrial centers greatly increased.

Plans for a German Hemisphere

How far the domain of the Third Reich is to extend and how its power is to be used is no secret to be guessed, no mystery to be divined; it has been published widely in German geo-political literature for all to read. The plan is to achieve for Germany, in the western half of the Old World, a position similar to that which the United States enjoys in the New World—possession of the northern continent, the European land mass, control of the middle sea between Europe and Africa, and hegemony over the southern continent. That the southern continent is a colonial world and that hegemony will, therefore, mean possession, is for many Germans merely a minor difference. The European land mass from the North Sea to the Ural Mountains will be organized on a continental basis as the economic heart of the great "living space" and the foundation of the war potential for the inter-continental struggle for power. The Near East, which controls the routes to the Indian Ocean and contains the oil on which European industrial life depends, will be integrated, economically and politically, in the form of semi-independent states controlled from Berlin.

Africa under German management and large-scale planning will become the tropical plantation for Europe and a source of strategic raw materials. Its Negro population will be lifted out of its ineffective indigenous economy and transformed into a cheap, dependent labor supply for a National Socialist system of exploitation. There is no indication so far that Liberia, the protégé of the United States, is to remain outside the general scheme. With the southern continent organized and firmly controlled, the region opposite the bulge of Brazil will become an important intersection of air traffic and a great terminus for the ocean routes to South America. A frequent and fast air service will maintain communications between Berlin and the temperate zone of South America, which will function as a source of foodstuffs and raw materials and a market for European goods, until such time as the Eurafrican zone has become self-sufficient. The German program is definite and clear cut; it envisages a large "living space" covering the northern and the southern continents with the Mediterranean in between, an empire from the North Cape to the Cape of Good Hope.

In the fall of 1941, only Russia and Great Britain remained as obstacles in Europe to Germany's dream of empire. Along a two thousand mile front the armies of Stalin were resisting the repeated thrusts of Hitler's powerful mechanized divisions. The Channel had not yet been crossed by the German army; the British air force continued to defend the islands; and civilian morale was still unbroken notwithstanding constant bombardment. British resistance continued and Britain must, therefore, be destroyed. Geographic location, sea power, and a balanced continent have permitted that little island to control Europe's access to the oceans and to be the arbiter of continental questions. Germany is the latest power on the mainland to revolt against this state of affairs. The largest, most populous, and industrially most advanced state in Europe refuses to accept the role of a second-class power. Her first attempt to break through the ring of British sea power twenty-five years ago proved a costly failure. This time she feels that air power, the weapon of the third-dimension, will bring her victory. The grip of British sea power on the marginal seas of Europe must be broken and the chances of a balanced continent forever destroyed. If Germany can defeat Great Britain, her domination

of Europe will be assured and with that domination will come free access to the oceans and world power. The United States will then have as an eastern enemy a political unit of hemisphere dimensions.

The United States and the European Balance

The effect of the European balance on the position of the United States in the Western Hemisphere was sketched in the last chapter. The previous pages have indicated the operation of power politics on the European Continent itself. Because Great Britain is interested in balanced power and actively engaged in the pursuit of that objective, the United States has felt that she could disinterest herself in European political questions most of the time. Isolation was valid when Europe was in balance, as it was valid for Britain when the continent was balanced. Only complete success or complete failure of British foreign policy would mean replacement of equilibrium by the domination of a single power, a situation sufficiently dangerous to warrant American intervention.

Whenever British policy was successful and her insular security assured, her naval power became available for overseas operations in other continents. It was in such periods that the Empire was expanded, and it was in such periods that her activities in Latin America came into conflict with our own policies. It was British sea power balancing a continental thrust that prevented the re-establishment of a Spanish Empire in South America and gave the Monroe Doctrine its first reality, but it was also British sea power, not balanced by continental fleets, that disputed for fifty years our desire for an exclusive control of the American Mediterranean and the passageway to the Pacific. It took our victory in the Spanish-American War and the emergence of a powerful German fleet in European waters to make Britain accept our complete supremacy in the American zone.

If the complete success of British policy is inconvenient, its complete failure would be very dangerous. Her disappearance as a buffer state between us and the Continent of Europe would be unfortunate, and the integration of the whole of Europe including the British Isles into a single political unit able to express its total economic potential in naval strength would seriously diminish our own relative power.

The position of the United States in regard to Europe as a whole is, therefore, identical to the position of Great Britain in regard to the European Continent. The scale is different, the units are larger, and the distances are greater, but the pattern is the same. We have an interest in the European balance as the British have an interest in the continental balance. It is not surprising, then, that we have pursued a similar policy and have apparently become involved in the same vicious cycles of isolation, alliance, and war. We, like the British, would prefer to achieve our aim with the least possible amount of sacrifice. It would be fine if loans and subsidies and material support were enough. The participation of our naval forces although much less desirable is still a logical function for a sea power, but because of the remoteness of our continent it has been felt that the sending of an expeditionary force should be avoided as long as possible.

When the World War broke out in 1914, the United States was living in splendid isolation. The war was obviously a purely European affair, and the United States indulged in a good deal of self-righteousness by comparing the peaceful nature of the Western Hemisphere with the warlike spirit of the Old World. Our response was immediate and obvious, neutrality. But as the war progressed and Allied victory became more and more uncertain and the destruction of the balance of power in Europe more and more likely, there arose serious doubts about the possibility of preserving our neutrality under all circumstances. Government circles began to fear that a German victory might be detrimental to the United States and seriously upset our own power position.

The old issue of isolation versus intervention was clearly before the country, and the debate over the merits of the government's policy continued throughout the war. The administration led the country progressively toward increasing aid to Great Britain and France, from neutrality to sympathetic impartiality, to economic support, and finally to war. After the United States officially joined the Allies in 1917, the first contribution took the form of gigantic loans for war purchases. Then came the taking over of enemy and neutral merchant shipping and active naval co-operation. The hope in many circles that military support could be limited to a small expeditionary force did

not materialize. When the struggle ended there were two million American soldiers in France.

The peace treaties, like all peace treaties, were a reflection of the power balance on the day of the Armistice. In this case they mirrored a power relation between Germany and a world coalition, but the state that had brought the victory refused to stay to maintain the peace. The United States declined to join the League of Nations and withdrew to splendid isolation. The balance of power in Europe was again expressed exclusively in terms of European forces, and with this shift came a weakening of the power basis of the treaty structure.

In the years following the war, the former European Allies were faced with a dilemma. Were the German demands for revision to be granted or were the treaties to be enforced? In the latter case it would obviously be necessary to compensate for the withdrawal of the United States and to create the power organization necessary for enforcement. The actual policy pursued did neither because Great Britain and France could seldom agree on a common line of action. The former favored revision; the latter, enforcement. The result was that certain demands for change were accepted, several merely because of a *fait accompli*, and that others were refused without the creation of the force necessary to sustain the refusal. The conduct of the former allies was an unworkable mixture of appeasement and collective security, and it failed in both phases to take account of the realities of power politics.

When Hitler's Germany began to challenge the peace treaties in earnest and to extend her domain eastward, thereby making another European war at least a probability, the first American reaction was again simple and direct, neutrality. Europe was not our concern, and a wise policy could keep us out of war. Isolation had been the watchword of American foreign policy for twenty years, from the end of the last World War until the beginning of the new one, from the Peace Conference to the fall of France. The isolationist bloc in the Senate had forced its views on successive administrations, and the country accepted its leadership. In magnificent denial of the fact of our participation in the First World War, the loss of 150 thousand lives, and the expenditure of fifty-five billions of dollars, its members maintained that Europe was of no concern to the United States,

that its power struggles could not affect us, and that we could stay home to enjoy the blessings of isolation. Membership in the League of Nations was to be avoided because it might involve us in European quarrels and cost us lives and money. The American public responded with alacrity. It was emotionally tired of Europe, dissatisfied with the peace settlement, the blunders of the democracies, the failure to collect war debts, and it was convinced that the United States was so powerful that she would never need the help of others. The majority of the nation seemed to feel that the only thing necessary was to make some corrections in our neutrality technique and to remove the weaknesses which had drawn us into the last conflict.

Introduction of neutrality legislation into Congress was the signal for a renewal of the debate between the isolationists and the interventionists in which the former at first won the argument as far as public policy was concerned. After two provisional neutrality resolutions had been enacted in 1935 and 1936, a definitive law was approved on May 1, 1937. It imposed a number of self-denying restrictions which it was hoped would reduce the likelihood of disputes over American rights and moderate the war boom sufficiently to preclude American involvement for economic reasons. This was to be accomplished by placing an embargo on the sale of arms, munitions, and implements of war to all belligerents, by prohibiting the entry of American ships into war zones, by forbidding loans, and by requiring that title to all exports to belligerent countries pass to foreigners before leaving American ports, the so-called "cash and carry" provisions. The neutrality law was designed to save us from all dangers except the most important one, which was not recognized, the danger that balance of power considerations might actually force us again to participate quite independently of moral judgments, infringement of our neutral rights, or the interests of bankers and munitions makers.

President Roosevelt early took the lead in trying to awaken the country to the implications of the shifting balance of power in Europe and the dangers of a German victory, but the majority remained convinced that neutrality was the correct course to pursue. As the situation became more and more serious, however, his attitude found increasing support. When the embargo provisions expired in the spring of 1939, they were not renewed by Congress, thus making it possible

for Great Britain to obtain war material in this country as long as she was able to pay cash and move it in her own ships. Since that first shift from the position of absolute neutrality and impartiality, the pace has been rapid. Within a year the country, which originally was determined to treat all belligerents alike, announced its determination to become the arsenal of democracy.

In August, 1940, the United States provided the British with fifty reconditioned destroyers in exchange for a lease of land on important naval bases. Ever since the defeat of France, the cry has been for more aid to Britain. An important step in the realization of that program was the passage of the Lend-Lease Bill by Congress on March 11, 1941. It authorized the President to "sell, transfer, exchange, lease, lend or otherwise dispose of," instruments of war to any government whose defense is deemed vital to the defense of the United States. The act limited the quantity of existing war material, which the President could transfer immediately without special appropriation, to one billion three hundred million dollars, but it was supplemented by another act which made seven billion dollars available for the needs of governments fighting the Axis powers. In October, 1941, Congress passed a supplementary Lend-Lease Bill for several billions more. When Germany attacked Russia and made her the ally of Great Britain, President Roosevelt began to extend help to Moscow. There was some grumbling among the isolationists about the lack of logic in a foreign policy that expected to defend democracy by giving aid to the wicked dictatorship of Stalin, but Washington was determined that the opportunity of keeping an army in the field against Germany should be used as long as possible.

Under the provisions of these acts and under his power as chief executive and commander of the armed forces of the nation, the President began to divert to Great Britain a very large part of the output of the new war industry, particularly aircraft. The repeal, in November, 1941, of the section of the Neutrality Act which kept the American merchant marine out of the combat zone made it possible to send supplies to the Allies in American vessels. The American navy had already undertaken to do reconnaissance work for the British fleet and to clear the sea lanes of Axis submarines and raiders. We had joined the British in their occupation of Iceland and established a

naval base, and, under the disguise of protecting our supplies to that island, we had created a system of convoy that covered three-quarters of the journey to Great Britain. In December, 1941, Germany, Italy, and the United States exchanged declarations of war.

We have thus completed another cycle in the Anglo-Saxon version of the game of power politics: war, isolation, alliance, and war. We, like the British, dream idle dreams of detachment in peace time because there is a little water between us and our neighbors. But once again the United States has placed her economic strength, the output of her war industries, and her man power in the scales of a European power struggle. Once again her policy is directed at the preservation of a balance of power in Europe.

V. America and the Transpacific Zone

Nothing can be permitted to interfere with Japan's Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere, because this sphere was decreed by Providence.

PREMIER GENERAL HIDEKI TOJO

THE transpacific neighbors of the United States are much farther away than the countries of Europe. The rim of the Asiatic mainland rises across 5,000 miles of ocean beyond the series of island chains that stretches from Kamchatka to Singapore. On the western shores of this wide ocean are the Great Powers—Russia, China, and Japan; the colonial possessions of the United States and the European powers; the Dominion of New Zealand; and the most important part of Australia. The political significance of the Pacific area has been increasing ever since Perry persuaded the Japanese to give up isolation, but, even so, it cannot match the importance of the transatlantic zone. Greater distance makes the repercussion of its political struggle on our own position less significant.

The Pacific is the greatest body of water in the world, but the tributary land area is relatively small. The Western Hemisphere offers little, and much of Asia is turned toward the Indian Ocean and the Polar Sea. Around the western ocean live about seven hundred million people, most of them on a very low standard of living. Small per capita purchasing power in the Far East will retard the development of the area as a market and limit its economic significance notwithstanding its importance as a source of raw materials. Less than 25 per cent of our total foreign trade, however, is with countries in the Western Pacific, and the area accounts for less than 10 per cent of our total foreign investment.

The United States faces this ocean with a narrow strip of territory west of the Sierras. It consists of a long valley between the Coast Range on the west and the Cascade Range and the Sierra Nevada on the east. Communication with the interior is difficult because of the scarcity and altitude of passes. This area beyond the coastal ranges is the great mountain region of the Rockies, the least productive section of the United States. A series of mountain barriers limits effective economic integration with the great central basin of the country, and the west coast leads, therefore, a somewhat detached existence. From the maritime point of view the Pacific shore is the least important of the three sea frontiers because of the restricted size of its accessible hinterland. The exports moving through the four main ports of Seattle, Portland, San Francisco, and Los Angeles amount to only 12 per cent of the total exports of the United States. The Pacific, however, carries not only trade originating in the West; since the opening of the Panama Canal, the eastern part of the country and the Mississippi Valley have also obtained access to the western ocean.

The Australian Continent

The transpacific zone, like the transatlantic zone and the Western Hemisphere itself, consists of a northern and a southern continent with a mediterranean region in between. The southern continent is the national domain of the Commonwealth of Australia. The east coast of this great island faces the Pacific, the west coast the Indian Ocean, and the north coast the Asiatic Mediterranean. Australia is three million square miles in size, approximately the same as the United States or Canada. The land mass is divided by the Tropic of Capricorn with the smaller section in the tropics and the larger half in the south temperate zone. The greater part of the continent, especially the West, consists of a desert plateau, and economic life is concentrated along the eastern and southern rim where an adequate, though irregular, rainfall permits agriculture, and a mild climate makes the land suitable for white colonization. Communication between the different coastal regions is maintained by means of circumferential navigation instead of overland transportation partly because

of lower cost, but principally because the great desert belt that occupies most of the center of the continent acts as a barrier.

In Australia, as in other new countries, men have dreamt dreams of growth and expansion far beyond the limits of the geographic possibilities in terms of climate, arable land, and natural resources. They have seen visions of a great future, of a populous continent maintaining a high standard of living on rich natural resources. But the truth of the matter is that in this southern continent across the Pacific nature has not been very generous. There are productive areas only around the edges, and the center is empty waste. The land mass has been compared, not unfairly, with a soup plate in which the soup is found not in the wide, deep center but on the narrow rim. There is room for additional population along the coast, and the northern tropical region is a desirable zone of emigration for the crowded Asiatics of the northern continent, but the Dominion is firmly committed to an immigration policy that will preserve a white Australia.

Australia has considerable mineral resources: gold, copper, silver, lead, fairly good coal, and some iron. She has developed behind a protective tariff a small steel and machine industry and some light manufacturing, but she remains primarily a country with an extractive economy whose main emphasis is on agriculture and whose largest exports are wool, mutton, wheat, and other grains. Approximately twelve hundred miles east of Australia lies a second British dominion, New Zealand, consisting of two large islands and a number of smaller ones. She covers a total area of approximately a hundred thousand square miles, slightly larger than the British Isles. Her population is less than a million and a half, but it has managed to create a high standard of living from a predominantly extractive economy of an agrarian nature. Raw materials are insignificant and industry of little importance. Her export products are similar to those of Australia with dairy products relatively more important.

Both these British dominions lack the elements that make for military strength. They would represent a power vacuum if it were not for the fact that they do not exist in terms of their own strength but as part of the British Empire and enjoy a considerable protection from their geographic location. Between this weak world and the

pressure areas on the northern continent in the Far East of Asia lies a mediterranean buffer zone, an insular colonial world at present still largely held by western sea power and the naval base of Singapore.

The Asiatic Mediterranean

The Asiatic Mediterranean lies between Asia and Australia and between the Pacific and the Indian Oceans. This middle sea has a roughly triangular shape with corners at Formosa, Singapore, and Cape York on the Torres Strait near the northern tip of Australia. The rim includes the Philippines, Halmahera, New Guinea, the north coast of Australia, the Dutch East Indies, British Malaya, Siam, French Indo-China, and the southern coast of China up to Amoy, as well as Hong Kong.

The continental littoral stretches from Amoy to Singapore, the base which controls the Strait of Malacca and the exit to the Indian Ocean. The southwestern rim, 3,000 miles long, from the tip of Sumatra to Port Darwin consists of the Greater and Lesser Sunda Islands belonging to the Netherlands, except the eastern half of Timor, which is Portuguese. There are a small number of passages between the islands of this chain, but they can be easily closed by mines and submarines. Port Darwin controls the exits from the Banda Sea to the Indian Ocean and the Torres Strait. British, Dutch, and Australian naval co-operation can, therefore, close all the passages from the Pacific to the Indian Ocean and force a detour around the Australian Continent. This fact is responsible for the special importance of Singapore and the geo-political similarity of its location with that of Panama. The eastern rim which extends from Amoy to New Guinea includes Formosa, the Philippines, and Halmahera, held respectively by Japan, the United States, and the Netherlands. In the center of this large middle sea lie the great islands of Celebes and Borneo and innumerable smaller ones. The Asiatic Mediterranean zone is an insular world par excellence.

This region is a tropical area, rich in minerals and endowed in certain sections with an extremely fertile soil. The Archipelago contains important oil fields, coal, and iron, and a large potential water power, precious minerals, and the largest tin deposits in the world. Good

soil, plenty of rainfall, and an ample labor supply eminently suited for plantation work have combined to make this region the most important exporter of the products of tropical agriculture, far surpassing in output the African or the American tropics. It supplies its own neighboring continents as well as America and Europe with coffee, tea, copra, palm oil, quinine, rubber, and various other products.

The total population along the littoral and island rims of this mediterranean basin in approximately 125 million people, not counting the people of southern China. From this Chinese coast there comes an outward thrust of economic expansion in the form of emigration of labor, traders, and capital. In many regions, a Chinese middle class layer has worked itself in between the native barter economy and the western capitalist system with its large-scale production and long-term credit. This Chinese economic penetration has so far not been accompanied by any political control partly because of the nature of present-day Chinese society, partly because of the non-existence of Chinese naval power. The area is, therefore, dominated not by the littoral state with the largest population and the greatest economic potential but by distant naval powers. It is a colonial world, the scene of a great struggle for power and control between Japan—the greatest naval power of Asia—and the western nations operating far from the sources of their military strength in Europe and America.

The Asiatic Continent

The northern continent of the transpacific zone consists of the mainland of Asia and a chain of offshore islands. The Pacific drainage area of the continent north of the Asiatic Mediterranean is the land mass east of the Tibetan highland and the Mongolian plateau. It consists of China, Mongolia, Manchuria, Korea, and a section of northeastern Siberia. The economic life of China lies primarily in the river basins of three great streams, the Hwang-Ho, the Yangtze Kiang, and the Si-Kiang. The latter reaches the sea near Canton and Hong Kong and is, therefore, part of the drainage area of the Asiatic Mediterranean. The lower valleys of the two northern rivers join to form the great plain of North China which reaches the coast

on both sides of the Shan-tung peninsula. This concentration of population and economic life in three parallel river zones with difficult mountain territory between is responsible for the recurring tendency toward regionalism in Chinese history and forms an obstacle to effective political integration.

The power resources for an industrial civilization in China are fair but by no means abundant. There are so far no indications of rich oil fields and the water power potential, viewed in the light of the very large population, is not overwhelming. There are, however, considerable coal deposits in different parts of the country. Iron is available but not in great amounts, and the country contains other mineral ores that must await development of transportation facilities before large-scale exploitation can begin. The raw material basis is, therefore, not as favorable as that of the industrial sections of Europe and the United States, but a judicious application of western technology to the resources available, combined with a population of four hundred million and a country of enormous size, could create a considerable war potential.

East of the Khingan Mountains between Mongolia and Korea and detached from China proper lies Manchuria and the river basin of the Amur. Southern Manchuria drains into the Gulf of Chih-Li west of the Liao-tung peninsula, and the Amur River reaches the coast at Nikolaevsk on the Okhotsk Sea. Manchuria and Eastern Siberia are rich in lumber and mineral resources and represent, compared to China proper, almost undeveloped virgin land. They have been exploited only during the last fifty years and still offer enormous possibilities for growth notwithstanding the limitations of a very severe winter climate. It was through the Amur and Ussuri valleys that Russian eastern expansion reached the Pacific, and it is through the same depression that the great Siberian plain, west of Lake Baikal, finds an eastern outlet to the sea. North of Vladivostok lies the barren Asiatic littoral of the largest political unit in the world, the former Russian Empire, now the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

The mainland of Asia is separated from the Pacific by a number of marginal seas closed in by peninsulas and island chains: the East China Sea and the Yellow Sea bordered by Formosa, the Ryukyu groups, the southern island of Japan and Korea; the Japanese Sea,

fringed by Karafuto, and the three main islands of Japan; and the Sea of Okhotsk, bounded by the Kuril group and Kamchatka. On Kyushu, Shikoku, Honshu, Hokkaido and Karafuto rests the military strength and sea power of the Land of the Mikado. These islands alone are inadequate as a food and raw material basis for a highly industrialized nation with a dense population. Because of the mountainous and volcanic nature of the country, the percentage of arable land is very small. Improved agricultural technique has increased the yield of the rice fields, but Japan is a net importer of food. The deficiencies are made up by imports from Korea and Manchuria on the mainland and from French Indo-China and Siam in the Asiatic Mediterranean.

In regard to the power basis of industry, her position is equally unfavorable. Water power is plentiful, but coal is inadequate and oil production covers only 30 per cent of consumption. The whole metal industry is dependent on imports which include iron ore, pig iron, and scrap iron; the alloy metals, manganese and tungsten; and a large part of the requirements of bauxite, copper, lead, nickel, tin, and zinc. Even the textile industry must use imported wool, cotton, and wood pulp for rayon. Compared to China, the Japanese power potential is small indeed, but available resources have been developed to a much greater extent so that actual war industry is far more productive on the island empire than on the mainland. In the transpacific zone as elsewhere it is the northern continent that contains the great power potentials, and it is the balance of power in the north that will ultimately define the political constellation of the whole hemisphere.

The Position of Japan

Our location in regard to the Continent of Asia is very similar to our position in regard to the Continent of Europe. Across our lines of communication to the west lies a great sea power based on offshore islands. The Sea of Japan, like its European counterpart, the North Sea, separates the island group from the mainland, but in contradistinction to the Continent of Europe which formerly contained a great many states and in which power was therefore dispersed, the Far Eastern mainland originally contained only two great land

powers. At the beginning of Japan's westernization the political geography of the Far East was not dissimilar to that of Europe in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, when the continental coast contained no buffer states but was held by France and the Holy Roman Empire. The littoral of the Japanese Sea at the end of the nineteenth century was equally without barrier states; only the two large empires of Russia and China faced the island state across the narrow seas.

These empires represented potentially great economic and military strength and were, therefore, a threat to the security of the Japanese nation. Although the center of the economic and military strength of Russia will always remain at the European end of her land mass, eastern expansion and penetration into China have seriously endangered Japan. The first thrust in this direction at the end of the last century was parried, but the control of Vladivostok still remains. This means the threat of a continental air force within six hundred miles of Tokyo; the menace of an operating base for bombing squadrons in close proximity to the paper and bamboo cities of the Land of the Mikado.

In contrast to the location of the Russian center of power, the potential military strength of China lies inevitably in the immediate vicinity of Japan. At the beginning of the modern history of the Far East, China extended from the Amur River to the Gulf of Siam and covered the larger part of the Asiatic mainland. Her territory was almost four million square miles, and her population probably about three hundred million, and she represented, therefore, a serious threat to a small state on nearby islands. To avoid being placed in a similar position, Great Britain has fought for three hundred years to preserve the balance of power on the Continent of Europe.

Japanese sea power lies between the Continent of Asia and the Pacific and, therefore, between Asia and the United States. With naval superiority in Asiatic waters, Japan can control all communications through the marginal seas of that continent from Siberia to Amoy. She can act as a buffer and balance against continental threats to the United States and against American threats to the Asiatic mainland. The United States can be effective on that mainland in a military sense only in alliance with Japanese sea power and not against it. As

in the case of Great Britain, Japan's sea power can become available as an instrument for distant operations only when the continent is balanced and Japan's insular security assured.

Because Japan lies across our path and is the most important Asiatic sea power, it is her power politics more than that of any other state that has defined our relations to the Asiatic balance. The remarkable similarity of the geographic position of the United States in regard to Europe and Asia is, however, not paralleled by a similarity in political relations. On the contrary, they have been quite different. The United States has usually accepted and supported the continental policy of Great Britain but the continental policy of Japan, the dominant sea power in Asia, has been systematically opposed.

Japan and the Asiatic Balance of Power

The power balance in the Orient rests, in the first place, on the relative strength of the states within the area and, in the second place, on the pressures which the Western States can make effective in the region. Since the turn of the century, the significance of these two sets of factors has shifted more and more in favor of the local forces.

When the British opened China to western trade and Perry ended the seclusion of Japan, the Far Eastern world led a self-sufficient life. The Middle Kingdom represented an enormous, sprawling empire, unintegrated either economically or politically. Japan still preserved a feudal regime with an economy based on agriculture and handicraft, and Russia, with her real life in Europe, looked out on the Pacific through the frozen windows of Eastern Siberia. There was no naval force in the region that could resist the European fleets, and the early power relations were almost exclusively defined by the navies of the Western Nations.

The first significant shift in the relative importance of regional and extra-regional forces was the emergence of the local sea power of Japan. The Empire of the Rising Sun had thoroughly understood the implications of Perry's visit and had decided to westernize her economy and technology and to build a modern war machine. The new instrument was tried out on China in 1895 with astounding re-

sults. The great Celestial Empire was thoroughly defeated by the small island state, and Japan got her first taste of military success. But the peace treaty was not permitted to express the local power relation; it was modified by European intervention. Russia was in search of an ice-free harbor, and this search led her to contemplate expansion through Manchuria to the Yellow Sea. While Japan obtained recognition of an independent Korea as a buffer state between herself and China, she was obliged by the joint pressure of Russia, France, and Germany to renounce her claim to the Liao-tung peninsula and Port Arthur.

The discovery that China was weak led to a great scramble for concessions and spheres of influence and for harbors from which to operate naval forces. Germany, Russia, France, and Great Britain strengthened their positions by increasing their naval strength and acquiring bases. The United States decided to stay in the Philippines and become an Asiatic power. All of the great states of the world except Italy were now in a position to exert naval pressure in Far Eastern waters, and the relative significance of regional and extra-regional forces shifted back in favor of the latter.

In November, 1898, Germany occupied Tsing-tao and established a Far Eastern squadron. The Russians increased the size of their Asiatic fleet and sailed into Port Arthur the following month with the firm intention of staying. France also added to her naval strength in those waters and obtained Kwang-chow. The British in Hong Kong, between the French in the south and the Russians in the north, began to feel uncomfortable. Their response was a considerable increase in naval units and the acquisition of Wei-hai-wei, opposite Port Arthur, an excellent location from which to neutralize Russian pressure on Peking. British naval strength was brought up to approximately that of the combined strength of France and Russia. This left the small German and American squadrons and the Japanese fleet unbalanced, but the possible threat to Britain inherent in this naval situation was largely neutralized by a political rapprochement with Tokyo and Washington. This general alignment of forces in the Far East remained relatively unchanged until the time of the Russo-Japanese War.

American Possessions in the Pacific

It was the acquisition of the Philippines after the Spanish-American War that made the United States a landowner in the Further Orient on the eastern rim of the Asiatic Mediterranean and near the homeland of Japanese sea power. The territory consists of a chain of several thousand islands between the Dutch East Indies and Formosa. Thirty of them have an area of one hundred square miles or more, and the two most important ones are Luzon and Mindanao on which live the majority of the population.

There was serious objection in the country to the idea of keeping the Philippines, particularly when it became evident that the Filipinos showed no enthusiasm about being kept and began to fight our soldiers who had come to liberate them from Spanish domination. It was argued that it would be against the traditional continental policy of the United States to obtain possessions in the far Pacific. Expansion in the Western Hemisphere was "manifest destiny"; expansion across the oceans was "wicked imperialism" and against our best interests. The opponents of retention stated that our interests in the Far East were purely economic and required neither territorial possessions nor naval stations. They argued in terms of geography and tradition, but to no avail. An urge for expansion, great hopes for the Chinese market, philanthropic and missionary interests all conspired to make us keep not only a naval station in Manila Bay but the entire group of islands.

The Philippines became an American colony. Under our administration they have made considerable political and economic progress, and they represent today a not insignificant market for American products. They have nevertheless been promised independence by 1946. Those who wanted to give them the freedom which they asked for and those who wanted to exclude competing Philippine products from the American market joined forces in March, 1934, and passed the necessary legislation. Naval and fueling stations are to be retained by the United States pending the conclusion of negotiations on their disposition which are to begin not later than two years after the establishment of the Republic. The islands now enjoy a great deal of self-

government, although considerably less than that represented by dominion status, but they are still a part of the national domain, and until their independence is achieved, Uncle Sam remains an Asiatic power with problems of territorial security in a far-distant ocean.

The acquisition of the islands did not, however, end the dispute between interventionists and isolationists about the correct policy for the United States in Asia, although it gave us a problem of territorial security in the Far East which never arose in Europe. Every time a situation emerged which demanded that the United States decide on a course of action in the face of Japanese expansion, the debate was reopened. Should we attempt to check the growing power of Japan or should we take the point of view that the Far East is far away and that its balance of power does not concern us? There has been persistent objection to participation in Far Eastern affairs, but it has never been as strong as the objection to participation in Europe. It has lacked a traditional and emotional basis. George Washington never warned us against entangling alliances with the Manchus and the Mongols; Monroe never promised not to interfere in Asiatic wars; and the population of the United States does not consist of descendants of people who had turned their backs on Asia. On the contrary, a large section of the population, interested in the spread of Christianity, has felt that Asia is a country that needs our help—a land in which we have a mission.

The China trade stimulated an early interest in stepping stones along the route to the Far East, and sovereignty was proclaimed over a good many of the small islands. Except for the Hawaiian Islands, which were annexed in 1898, three months after the outbreak of the Spanish-American War, their commercial value is slight, but they play a definite part in the defense of the mainland and the protection of trade routes. Hawaii contains Pearl Harbor, the great American naval base on the island of Oahu. The United States' interest in the Samoa group led to a dispute with Great Britain and Germany in the eighties which was at first settled by a tripartite condominium and finally, in 1899, by dividing the islands. We received Tutuila, which contains a first-rate harbor at Pago Pago from which a fleet could dominate a large section of the South Seas. The island of Guam, which

belongs to the Marianas group and was ceded by Spain in the Treaty of Paris of 1898, occupies a strategic position of great importance in the Western Pacific. Other insular possessions of the United States in the Pacific, such as Midway, Wake, and Dutch Harbor in the Aleutian Islands, could be used as fleet stations and some of the larger atolls were available for naval air bases.

The Pacific Ocean, in contrast to the Atlantic Ocean, was for the United States not merely a passageway, a route of communication to a profitable market; it was the zone in which lay her colonial domain and her insular possessions. It had a territorial and strategic significance which the other sea lacked and this accounted, at least in part, for some of the differences in attitude toward the power struggles in Europe and Asia.

The Russo-Japanese War

During the nineteenth century, before our acquisition of territory, the interest of the United States in the Far East was primarily commercial. The China trade was the foundation of many a New England fortune, and the protection of our trading rights was the government's main task. It was concern with the future of American exports to the European spheres of influence that led to the formulation of the "Open Door" notes. On September 6, 1899, our Secretary of State addressed to the European powers a communication inviting their adherence to the principle of equality of opportunity.

Only after it became clear that some of the powers intended to use their participation in the repression of the Boxer Rebellion as an excuse for obtaining further spheres of interest and exclusive rights, did the conviction arise in Washington that only the preservation of China's full sovereignty over her territory could preserve the "Open Door." The second Hay note of July 3, 1900, expressed therefore an interest, not only in the principle of equality of opportunity but also in the territorial integrity of China. At the outset, that integrity was conceived merely as a means to commercial ends, but it soon became an end in itself, a political consideration inspired by concern with the preservation of a balance of power in the Western Pacific.

Ten years after the Japanese-Chinese War, a second important

shift took place in the relation between local and extra-regional power and again in the direction of increased Japanese strength. The Land of the Cherry Blossom had carefully laid her plans in the light of her previous experience. The war indemnity obtained from the Chinese government as a substitute for the Liao-tung peninsula was used for a naval program which aimed at equality with the combined naval forces of France and Russia in the Orient. This program was by no means completed when the Russo-Japanese War broke out, but an alliance with Great Britain concluded in 1902 prevented France or any other state from joining the Czar, and the war was, therefore, fought against Russia alone.

This alliance between the two naval powers based on offshore islands on opposite sides of the mainland of the Eurasian Continent was a natural combination. They had the same basic security problem for their homelands, the same enemy, and the same interests in North China. Great Britain, at the turn of the century, was trying to work herself out of an uncomfortable position of isolation in which she was faced with the increasing naval strength of the Dual Alliance and the additional threat of a German building program. Difficulties with Russia over Persia and Afghanistan made the empire of the Czar a danger to British India, and its penetration into northern China was a threat to British commercial interests. To Japan this eastern expansion meant more than a threat to the profits of trade; it meant the danger that the whole opposite coast of the Japanese Sea from the mouth of the Amur River to the tip of Korea might come under the control of one great land power.

The war was fought in Korea and Manchuria with minor naval actions before Port Arthur and Vladivostok and a great battle in the Strait of Tsushima. It ended because both parties were exhausted by the struggle and had reached the end of their economic resources. The Russians had been forced to fight seven thousand miles from their economic center at the end of a single track railroad, and the modest industrial establishment of Japan had been subjected to great strains. Roosevelt's offer of mediation was accepted, and the parties finally agreed to the Treaty of Portsmouth in 1905. On the surface the outcome of the war, however, seemed a complete victory for Japan. Her armed forces had been successful both on land and on sea

and her ability to defeat a Western Power added greatly to her prestige, but the fact remained that she was economically and financially exhausted and not in a position from which to attack any vital Russian area.

In the light of this situation, the terms of the peace were extraordinarily favorable to Japan. The government of the Czar ceded half the island of Sakhalin and was forced to give up its dream of expansion into Korea. It was obliged to surrender its position in southern Manchuria, and was left with only Vladivostok as an outlet to the Pacific. One threat to the security of Japan had been greatly reduced. The British alliance had aided the victory, and French pressure on Russia had facilitated the peace. It was not the last time that Japan was to profit from the political opposition and the struggle for power in Europe. Like the United States in the Western Hemisphere, she was able to become increasingly strong on her own continent because Europe was never able to oppose her collectively for any length of time.

The First World War

It was during the First World War that Japan increased her relative power position most rapidly, both in regard to her neighbors and in regard to the Western Powers. The Chinese Revolution which had begun in 1911 was splitting the empire apart into autonomous provinces run by feudal warlords. The struggle in Europe against the military power of Germany fully occupied Russia, France, and Great Britain and later the United States as well. The opportunity was too good to be missed, and it was used with skill and determination. European naval power withdrew from the Western Pacific. Japan replaced Germany in Shan-tung province and presented China with the famous Twenty-One Demands, a blueprint of her continental ambitions. Some of these served to strengthen her position in Manchuria, some had reference to Shan-tung province, others to economic concessions. With the moral support of the United States, who was not yet at war, China managed to refuse the last five which, if granted, would have made her a protectorate of Japan. This part of the imperialist program had to be postponed, but it was not relin-

quished as was subsequently proved by the speeches of Japanese statesmen and the actions of Japanese generals.

The war not only strengthened the Japanese position in China; it also created a chance to remove the remaining Russian threat from the Japanese Sea. The occasion presented itself when the Communist Revolution led to Allied intervention and an opportunity to occupy parts of Siberia, the Maritime Provinces, and Vladivostok. Japan's actions in the north were greatly resented in Washington, but the war time acquisition most detrimental to the United States was that of the German islands north of the Equator. These islands which had been part of the colonial domain of Spain were not retained by the United States after the Spanish war but allowed to go to Germany. They occupied a strategic position across our line of communications from Hawaii to the Philippines, thus making our chances of successfully defending that exposed outpost even smaller than they were already. Japan not only took possession but assured herself of diplomatic support for her claim that she be entitled to keep them permanently. The German islands south of the Equator had been occupied by Australia and New Zealand and in a secret treaty made in London in February, 1917, the British and the Japanese agreed that they would support each other's claims to the island groups which they had occupied. France had also consented to Japanese possession. Islands were the price that Great Britain paid for Japanese naval support against the German submarine campaign, for the work of Japanese destroyers in European waters. An excellent precedent had been set for the Second World War and the exchange of American destroyers for Caribbean bases.

But peace came, and with peace freedom of action for the western states. The German navy was destroyed; the British and Americans who had greatly added to their naval strength during the war were free to use their vessels elsewhere than in the Atlantic. For almost a century and a half the American fleet had been concentrated in the eastern ocean. Shortly after 1919, the bulk of it was moved to the Pacific, although we still maintained a sizable force in the Atlantic. This division, contrary to all classical strategy, was excused on the ground that the Panama Canal, opened in 1914, made possible rapid concentration in either ocean. Early in 1921 the Atlantic squadrons

joined the Pacific Fleet for combined maneuvers, and a little later in the year it was announced that most of the fleet strength would remain permanently stationed in the Pacific. The British also displayed renewed interest in Far Eastern waters. Plans for a naval base in Singapore were quite freely discussed as was the size of the battle fleet to be stationed in the Asiatic Mediterranean.

The balance of power in the Far East was no longer determined exclusively by local forces. Pressure began to be applied to Japan, first at the Paris Peace Conference and later at the Washington Disarmament Conference, and she was forced to surrender many of her gains. The former German islands north of the Equator she was permitted to keep, albeit in the form of a mandate, but on the Asiatic mainland she was less successful. Shan-tung was restored to Chinese sovereignty, and Japan eventually withdrew from Siberia. The United States obtained a reiteration of Japanese disinterest in the Philippine Islands by means of the Four-Power Treaty in which the signatories undertook to respect their respective rights in their insular possessions and insular dominions. In addition, Japan also solemnly pledged in the Nine-Power Treaty to respect the territorial integrity and political independence of China and to undertake no steps which might infringe upon the principle of the "Open Door." The Washington Conference was, therefore, in terms of promises an unqualified success for Uncle Sam. Japan subscribed in solemn pledge and formal treaty to the basic principles of the Far Eastern policy of the United States.

But the Washington Conference not only discussed Far Eastern questions. It also dealt with problems of disarmament, and it was the accomplishment in this latter field that was to have the more important consequences for the balance of power in the Pacific. A naval ratio of ten to six for the United States and Japanese fleets respectively was proposed by Secretary Hughes. This ratio was an approximation to existing fleet strength, but it had the additional advantage of precluding large-scale action across the ocean. The Japanese Empire was located in a relatively compact area in one ocean; the United States faced two oceans and would inevitably have to keep part of her fleet in the Atlantic and the American Mediterranean. The remainder, available in the Pacific, could not threaten the Japanese

homeland any more than the smaller Japanese fleet could endanger California.

There was, however, one important difference in the naval position of the two powers. The Japanese owned no islands in the Eastern Pacific in the vicinity of the American coast; but the Americans owned several islands in the Western Pacific. Strategically most disturbing to Japan were Guam, less than 1,500 miles from the island empire, and the Philippines on the rim of the Asiatic Mediterranean in the vicinity of Formosa. In the period immediately preceding the Washington Conference the United States had not only declared that her naval aim was to obtain the strongest fleet in the world, but the navy department had also prepared plans for the construction of a major fleet base in Guam and for the intensive development of the facilities of the Philippines. If these plans were completed, an American fleet operating from Guam could dominate a large section of the Western Pacific and could threaten Japanese communications with the Asiatic Mediterranean. It was, therefore, not surprising that the Japanese delegation at the Washington Conference should have intimated that the ratio which Mr. Hughes proposed was not acceptable unless accompanied by a demilitarization agreement for the islands of the Western Pacific.

After prolonged debate and negotiation, an agreement was finally reached which was an unqualified success for Japan. It meant for Great Britain the preservation of the status quo in Hong Kong and an eastern limit for first-class naval bases in the vicinity of Singapore. For the United States it meant a renunciation of adequate defense measures for the Philippines, disavowal of plans for constructing a major fleet base at Guam, and the impossibility of improving bases in the Aleutians and on the smaller islands west of Hawaii.

Pacific distances, the non-fortification agreement, and the ten to six ratio provided Japan with naval supremacy in the marginal seas between the Asiatic mainland and the Pacific and in the western part of that ocean. In the future her fleet would be strong enough to screen continental operations against the naval forces of either Britain or the United States, both obliged to operate from great distances. The British battle fleet would have no base beyond Singapore, the American none beyond Pearl Harbor, and both ports were more than 3,000

miles from the Japanese homeland, well beyond combat range. A declaration of good intentions had brought the Japanese freedom of action in Northern Asia. In exchange for a verbal adherence to the Far Eastern policy of the United States, she obtained recognition of her new power position and was left with only her conscience to guide her.

The Washington Conference was a bitter experience for Japan notwithstanding the recognition of her superior naval position in the Western Pacific. For her patriots it did not acknowledge enough. National pride demanded acceptance of her claim to full naval parity as it demanded recognition of her claim to racial equality. The acceptance of inferior maritime rank by her statesmen in Washington and later in London was one of the main reasons for the revolt of the military extremists and the long series of patriotic assassinations which it entailed. But more serious even than the question of naval parity was the forced surrender of the Far Eastern spoils. Once again the Western Powers had upset what seemed to Japan the natural balance of power; once again she had been deprived of the full fruits of her war activities. It was the bitter resentment against this interference which inspired the dream of a Monroe Doctrine for Asia. Like the United States she could be dominant in her own sphere only if the extra-regional forces could be kept out. Her goal became a Far Eastern world in which she had a position of hegemony and freedom to act without intervention by the Western Powers. "Asia for the Asiatics" became the slogan for this new order.

If the statesmen at Washington expected that the future would bring a real balance of power in the Orient independent of western participation, they made two serious errors of judgment. They guessed correctly that new forces were at work in Asia which would inevitably reduce the relative power position of Japan, but they underestimated the time which it would take to translate those forces into military strength adequate to check the ambitions of the island empire. It was also a mistake to assume that her military leaders, trained in strategic thinking and political realism, would simply accept the decline in Japan's relative power position and the new threats to her territorial security without taking any action to stop the trend.

Russia eventually emerged out of the chaos of revolution and embarked upon a program of national planning which called for the creation of important economic and industrial centers east of the Urals and for the formation in Eastern Siberia of an independent and almost self-sufficient war economy. Even more serious was the threat of the new nationalism in China which had imposed a central government over the provincial warlords and promised to achieve territorial integration and greatly increased military strength. Its leaders even attempted to recapture the lost province of Manchuria by a military agreement with the local warlords and by a program for railroad construction which would have drawn part of its economic life to Chinese ports away from the Japanese-controlled South Manchurian Railroad. The balance was shifting against Japan, and the time had come to strike.

The Second World War

The Mukden Incident of September 18, 1931, marked the opening of a new chapter in continental expansion and the beginning of a series of steps designed to provide a radical solution of the strategic problems created by the existence of huge military potentials on the shores of the Japanese Sea. The problem of Japanese security was still the same, and Nippon still hoped to achieve in relation to the mainland the same strategic and political advantages that Britain had once enjoyed in regard to the mainland of Europe. The Korean-Manchurian area was to be the equivalent of Holland, and to this was to be added eventually the Russian Maritime Provinces. North China across the Yellow Sea was to be the equivalent of Belgium. If the remaining part of China and the remaining part of Russia could then be balanced against each other, the security of the insular homeland would be assured. Japanese naval power might then become available for action in distant regions and the building of an overseas empire.

The first phase of this program was successful. Manchuria was occupied after a short campaign and established as the so-called Independent State of Manchukuo in 1932. It is now a free and independent state, free from all bonds with China, and independent of

Russia but incidentally under the direct and complete domination of Japan. The second phase of the program, which began in 1937 with the military occupation of the northern provinces of China, miscarried. It proved impossible to set up a North China State. The Chinese Nationalist Government accepted the challenge, and, instead of a war of limited objectives, Japan became involved in an all-out war with an opponent who, although weak in matériel, is strong in size and man power.

China had changed since the Manchu regime gave Japan her first easy triumph in modern war in 1895, and much had happened since the days of 1915 when a frightened Peking government accepted most of Tokyo's demands. China was still primitive, backward industrially and without a mobile army, but she had acquired a national government and a will to resist and her power of endurance was heroic. After a number of spectacular victories at the beginning of the war, the Japanese found themselves stopped along a two thousand mile front in western China.

Japan was able to conquer the coastal provinces and move into the interior because she had modernized her economy and transformed her war potential into actual military strength. China was able to continue resistance notwithstanding the Japanese conquest because of her inexhaustible man power, and her economic backwardness. Her pre-capitalist economy, amorphous, dispersed, and unintegrated, is without vital spots or vulnerable centers, the conquest of which would spell defeat. The Japanese control the railroads and the rivers, but beyond the main lines of communication Chinese life continues.

Because of this primitive nature of the economic system and the enormous size of the country, the Chinese government was able to withdraw into the interior, thereby forcing the Japanese to extend their lines beyond the limits of effective supply. The result was that the war reached a stalemate and became a war of attrition from which the apparent victor suffered most. An army of a million men became immobilized on the continent, fighting guerillas and holding territory, but the territory held could not be made productive in the ways in which the Germans managed to exploit their conquests in Europe. It did not add to the Japanese war potential but continued to be a drain on the island empire where the strain of the war effort

caused hardships and serious economic dislocation. Japan met in China difficulties similar to those that had once defeated Napoleon in Russia.

The outbreak of the war in Europe in 1939 seriously affected the amount of power which the western states could make available in Far Eastern waters. Both Great Britain and France were forced to concentrate on home defense, and the balance of power, therefore, shifted in favor of Japan. A European conflict was once again a golden opportunity for Japanese expansion. During the First World War, she had presented China with the famous Twenty-One Demands and had taken from the losing European power her possessions in the Orient, the German islands north of the Equator, and the concession in Tsing-tao. This time a war with China was already in progress, and the losing power was the French Republic.

The defeat of France had deprived French Indo-China of home support and placed her at the mercy of Japan. The opportunity was seized and a southern drive, the favored form of expansion in navy circles, was added to the continental drive against China, the special task of the army. The border war between Thailand and French Indo-China permitted Japan to perform some very remunerative services of mediation. The venture proved a great success and brought benefits to Japan from both a strategic and an economic point of view. In September, 1940, the Vichy government granted her the right to maintain troops in Indo-China and to occupy naval and air bases and extended special privileges in regard to trade and investment. Military forces occupied Tong-king, and the Japanese war economy was strengthened by the incorporation of Indo-China into the yen bloc. This created an opportunity to resume rice imports without increasing the drain on the limited resources of foreign exchange. Japan was moving cautiously and followed the early German technique of demanding only small concessions at one time. She waited a whole year before she took the next step on the road to Singapore and incorporated the southern part of the former French colony.

The other colony in the Asiatic Mediterranean belonging to a defeated power in Europe proved more difficult to handle. As early as November, 1937, Japan had begun to negotiate with the Dutch East Indies, asking for special economic privileges. Instead of produc-

ing quick and easy results, the negotiations were to last almost two years and end in failure. The effect of the great German victory in the spring of 1940 proved a disappointment to Japan. It is true that the defeat of France gave her control over the northern section of French Indo-China, but Britain's determination to continue the struggle was a blow. Equally distasteful was the fact that the Netherlands government moved to London and decided to carry on the war in alliance with Great Britain. This meant that the products of the Asiatic Mediterranean, so important for Japanese war industry, were going to be used to sustain the British war effort.

The Japanese government began to demand from the Dutch East Indies assurances of delivery of large quantities of oil and other strategic raw materials and to insist that she be given exceptional rights and privileges. Some of the requests were vaguely reminiscent of the Twenty-One Demands presented to China during the First World War. The government of the Dutch East Indies stood firm. It announced its willingness to sell oil and other material to Japan in so far as these exports would not involve reduction of deliveries to Britain and it delicately intimated that any attempt to get more oil by force than the government was willing to grant voluntarily would mean destruction of the oil fields and no oil at all.

The German attack on Russia in June, 1941, whatever ultimate advantage it may bring to Japan, did not at the outset improve her situation. The Second World War had at first undermined the position of the Western Powers in the Far East, but they managed to compensate for their individual loss of strength by increasing co-operation. The same applied to Russia. Because of her struggle in the west, she was weakened in Asia but because Germany became her enemy, Great Britain became her ally and the United States her friend. The result was Japanese encirclement. The Russians, the Chinese, the British, the Dutch, and the Americans were all determined to halt her conquest. Japan had appropriated what could be obtained without serious fighting. Any further expansion, either north or south, would involve her in large-scale military operations in addition to those which occupied her along the Chinese front. For the time being, the forces in the Far East seemed balanced, but the equilibrium was precarious and highly unstable, and it rested in large

part on forces which non-Asiatic powers made available in the region.

The German-Russian War had opened up possibilities for northward expansion, for the conquest of Siberia and the Maritime Provinces, a prospect tempting particularly to army circles worried about Japan's vulnerability to air attack. To remove Russia forever from the littoral of the Japanese Sea is an old ambition. It was realized temporarily during the First World War, but the gains were lost at the Washington Conference. The advantages which Germany was deriving from her occupation of Holland and Belgium as an operating base for air attacks on London only convinced the Japanese generals of the soundness of their original analysis. The general strategic situation was favorable for Japan. Occupation of Manchuria had made it possible to ring Vladivostok and Khabarovsk with a string of air bases, and the northwest corner of the country offered excellent opportunities for thrusts against the Trans-Siberian Railroad and toward Lake Baikal.

The conquest of the Maritime Provinces could, however, not be realized without very serious fighting. Much of Japanese strength was tied up in China, and a Russian army of approximately 300 thousand men well supplied with aircraft and mechanized forces was ready to meet the advancing Japanese along the Amur River. There was a considerable number of submarines ready to start operating on Japanese lines of communication, and there were bombing squadrons on the runways near Vladivostok ready to fly out and drop their cargo over the cities of Japan. Japan found it wiser to wait until Russia was thoroughly defeated west of the Urals before she tried to conquer Eastern Siberia. The garrisons in Manchukuo were reinforced, but the expansion was toward Singapore.

On July 23, 1941, Vichy announced that it had agreed to Japanese demands for military control, and the soldiers of the Mikado took over the rest of the Far Eastern colony. The Empire of the Rising Sun had extended her control over two-thirds of the mainland littoral of the Asiatic Mediterranean. She acquired the fleet station at Cam-Rahn Bay and the commercial port of Saigon, thus obtaining bases for naval operations within 750 miles of Singapore, and airports within the same range. This step coincided with renewed negotiations with Thailand and the presentation of demands for air bases across

the Me-ping River. With Thailand under her control, Japan would be in a position to set up a series of air fields paralleling the Burma Road from Kunming to Rangoon, and to threaten seriously the one remaining route for supplies to China. Domination of the "Land of the White Elephant" would also create an opportunity to operate air and submarine bases at the northern entrance to the Strait of Malacca, the western approach to Singapore. That city is the key to the Asiatic Mediterranean and its capture would threaten the security of Australia and New Zealand as well as the Dutch East Indies and British India. It would also result in the complete encirclement of the Philippines.

The remaining littoral states seemed to be aware of the strategic implications of the threat to Thailand and Singapore. The British and the Americans announced their intention of improving their respective positions and of increasing their naval, land, and air forces. All through 1941 reinforcements moved from England, India, Australia, and New Zealand. The Philippines received additional contingents and a small number of bombing squadrons, and the Dutch East Indies bought large quantities of airplanes and mechanized equipment in the United States. By the summer of 1941 there seemed to be enough military strength in the region to organize resistance against Japan. It was, therefore, not surprising that the reply to the Japanese occupation of Saigon and her threat against Thailand was concerted action by the United States, Great Britain, and the Dutch East Indies in the form of severe economic measures and a strong warning by President Roosevelt and Mr. Churchill that their two governments would consider any attempt to control Thailand a serious threat to the safety of their territorial possessions. These words did not, however, restrain Japan. On December 7, 1941, she began hostilities against the British and American possessions in the Western Pacific. The final campaign for the control of the Asiatic Mediterranean had begun.

Plans for a Japanese Hemisphere

It was clear that the occupation of French Indo-China was not the limit of Japanese ambition. On the contrary, times were never

so propitious for the dreamers of dreams and the architects of vast political mansions. With Europe again in turmoil, the vision of Japan's manifest destiny had become a blend of the visions of naval and military extremists. The former see her as a great sea power on the British model; the latter see her as the successor to the Mongols and the Manchus, as the organizer of a great Asiatic land empire based on Chinese man power. The blueprint for the future is a sketch of Japanese hegemony over the Western Pacific rimland from Siberia to Tasmania and of an economic empire which will include 600 million people under the military and political domination of Tokyo.

Since the Land of the Cherry Blossom has become an Axis partner, Nazi concepts and Nazi terminology have begun to influence the formulation of her political plans, but this influence touches merely the form of expression, not the nature of her aspirations. Japan has needed no prodding from her National Socialist friends to enlarge her programs. Japanese statesmen have never been bashful in their ambitions for the future of their country. It was natural that people who believed themselves the descendants of the gods should design a future commensurate with their past.

Because of certain geographic similarities between the transpacific and the transatlantic zone, the plan for the "New Order in Greater Asia" is not unlike the German blueprint for the New Order in Europe. The heart and power center will be, of course, on the northern continent. Its economic center will consist of Japan, the Maritime Provinces, Manchukuo, and North China. This region will be the great industrial core, the importer of foodstuffs and raw materials, and the exporter of manufactured articles. The second zone will consist of the Asiatic Mediterranean. The circumferential expansion around this middle sea, begun with the occupation of South China and French Indo-China and the penetration into Thailand, will be completed after the fall of Singapore and Manila. This world will represent a great tropical plantation zone as well as the main oil-producing region and a source of strategic raw materials.

With complete naval control of the Asiatic Mediterranean will come control over the adjacent regions to the west and east and domination of the southern continent. In the Indian Ocean, it is hoped

west of India, will lie the demarcation line between the German-European sphere and the Japanese-Asiatic sphere. Far beyond the great insular world of the South Seas, which is to be incorporated into the living space of Greater Asia, will lie the demarcation line of the American sphere. Australia and New Zealand will cease to be white man's countries; they will be opened up for Asiatic settlement and racially assimilated into the new Oriental world.

If the Japanese could realize their dream of empire, the position of the United States in the world would be seriously affected. It would involve the loss of the Philippines, Guam, and probably Samoa. It would end the "Open Door" in China and make us dependent on Japanese good will for the strategic raw materials of the Asiatic Mediterranean such as tin, rubber, kapok, and Manila hemp which are very difficult to replace. A "Japanese Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere" would mean the final destruction of the balance of power in the transpacific zone which would have ultimate repercussions on our power position in the Western Hemisphere.

The United States and the Asiatic Balance

The concern of the United States with the balance of power in Asia antedates the threat of the emergence of a great naval empire across the Pacific. It was originally inspired not by any worry about our position in the Western Hemisphere but by anxiety about our position as an Asiatic power. The problem has now taken on a new significance, but its basic character is still defined by the same geographic and strategic factors, and the possible approaches are still the same: restraining Japan by the individual or collective action of non-Asiatic powers, or building up local states as a counterbalance to the dynamic expansion of the Empire of the Rising Sun.

To restrain Japan, we have employed for thirty years all the methods available in international relations except one. We have tried persuasion, barter, and the threat of force, both individually and collectively, but we have never been willing to go to war and that explains, at least in part, the reason why our diplomacy has had so little success. The method of persuasion has its limitations. Our notes and protests have been well written, cogently argued, and

bolstered with the immutable principles of international law, but the Japanese have refused to be impressed. The method of barter has also proved a field of restricted possibilities. The only thing we could barter away in the Far East was the thing we wanted most to preserve, Chinese territorial integrity. The Root-Takahira Agreement of 1908 exchanged a Japanese promise to respect the territorial integrity of the Philippines for an American recognition of the special interests of Japan in Manchuria, but that was as far as our conscience permitted us to go.

The United States supplemented her direct negotiations with Japan with attempts at joint action with Great Britain but British American co-operation in the Far East proved difficult notwithstanding a similarity of interests. This was due to the fact that the region had a different meaning for the two states. British imperial interests in Asia were subordinate to problems of territorial security at home and the balance of power in Europe. Although strategically better placed to exert pressure in the Far East, Britain was never completely free politically. The United States on the other hand had no problem of territorial security or balance of power in the Western Hemisphere but she was, especially in the early days, in a much less advantageous position for the application of force.

Because of the basic difficulties in British American co-operation, successful League action also proved impossible. After the Manchurian invasion, the Chinese government had appealed to the League of Nations and to the United States, but her call for help had been in vain. The British government was not interested, and Mr. Stimson's attempts to create a common western front proved a failure. The League passed a resolution condemning Japan, and the people of America held indignation meetings, but neither action prevented the landing of troops or the bombing of cities.

The United States had no intention of taking action alone and she was, therefore, reduced to a mere expression of disapproval. It took the curious form of the proclamation of a new principle of American foreign policy, the non-recognition principle. This doctrine at least was free from alien inspiration. It had a guaranteed American ancestry and had been foreshadowed in Bryan's protest note against the Japanese demands made on China in 1915. It declared

that the United States would not recognize changes in territorial status which affected her interest, unless she approved of the legality of the means by which they had been achieved. It did not announce that we would do anything to resist such action; it merely informed the world that we would not recognize its result. So far the puppet state, Manchukuo, has managed to survive without our approval.

When the invasion of North China began in September, 1937, the Chinese appealed again to Europe and America. By that time France and Britain were fully occupied with the growing menace of Germany, and the West, unable to act, again expressed noble sentiments. The League voted to give China moral support, and Mr. Hull sent a circular letter to the Powers stating that the United States believed in orderly processes and mutual helpfulness. Britain and the United States attended a conference at Brussels of the signatories of the Nine-Power Treaty and other states especially interested in the Far East, but they made it perfectly clear that they would undertake no positive action. Nineteen countries assembled and passed solemn resolutions. The only one not in court was the culprit who was too busy with his conquest of China to have time to attend protest meetings.

In addition to our attempts at persuasion and barter, we have at times made foolish and futile efforts to impress the Japanese by threats of force. In 1931 at the time of the Japanese conquest of Manchuria, the scouting fleet had been moved from the Atlantic to the Pacific and the whole fleet once more united. With this united fleet our navy conducted in 1932 some very ostentatious maneuvers northwest of the Hawaiian Islands, and when the exercises were completed much was made of the fact that the fleet would not return to its mainland bases but would remain concentrated in Pearl Harbor. This gesture was made on the somewhat naïve assumption that its existence in Pearl Harbor would exert a restraining influence on another fleet safely beyond its combat range. The demonstration was as spectacular and as futile as the British naval display in the Mediterranean against Italy a few years later.

In July, 1939, the United States served notice on Japan that she intended to abrogate the Commercial Treaty of 1911. This cleared the way for economic discrimination and retaliation, after the date of expiration on January 26, 1940. In July of that year, Congress passed

the Sheppard-May Bill which authorized the President to prohibit or restrict the export of materials needed in national defense. Under this authority a system of licensing exports was established for a number of commodities. These half-hearted attempts at single-handed pressure produced measures just strong enough to be irritating but not strong enough to restrain. Their effect on Japan has been the same as the effect of economic sanctions on Italy. They increased the bitterness of American-Japanese relations, but they did not affect the balance of power.

Not until July 25, 1941, after the occupation of French Indo-China, did the American government really begin to use the enormous economic strength of the country when it froze all Japanese assets in the United States. This measure was also taken by the British Empire and the Dutch East Indies and Japan was, therefore, threatened with an almost world-wide embargo. This measure deprived her of strategic raw materials without having to apply a blockade and threatened Japan with economic strangulation, the form of pressure she was least able to survive.

Until the freezing of Japanese assets, the economic strength of the United States had not been used to reduce the military power of Japan but to extend it. It was American oil that provided most of the fuel for the Japanese navy, American gasoline that flew her airplanes, American trucks that gave her army mobility, American scrap iron that kept her steel industry going, and American machine tools that manufactured her munitions. President Roosevelt has declared that he refrained from putting an embargo on oil in order that Japan might not be tempted to conquer the Dutch East Indies. But he has so far not explained why, in other respects, the economic strength of the United States remained at the disposal of Japan for the construction and operation of a war machine that was conquering China and destroying our position in the Far East.

One of the reasons for our reluctance to use our full economic strength against Japan has been our strategic weakness in the Western Pacific and the fear of Japanese retaliation by an attack on the Philippines. Notwithstanding the firm conviction in naval circles that, ship for ship and sailor for sailor, we are infinitely superior to the Japanese, the Philippines would have been very hard to defend, and the ulti-

mate defeat of Japan by the United States, acting alone, would have been a very difficult undertaking. Our government has shown a sound appreciation of geographic realities and has, therefore, been unwilling to risk a war to preserve the Asiatic equilibrium without the assurance of adequate British aid. Participation in a war to preserve the balance of power in Europe against Germany means war in *co-operation with the dominant naval power.* Participation in a war to preserve the balance of power in Asia in this period of history means war against Japan, *against the dominant naval power,* a strategic problem of an entirely different nature. For a transoceanic power to restrain Japan by force from action on the mainland of Asia would be as difficult as to restrain Great Britain on the mainland of Europe, and to oppose her in the northern part of the Asiatic Mediterranean would be almost as difficult as to oppose the United States in the Caribbean.

The history of the Far East during the first quarter of the twentieth century shows interesting parallels to the history of the American Mediterranean in the last quarter of the nineteenth century. In the beginning of each period, distant sea power based on naval stations within the area exerted more pressure than any state within the zone. With the growing strength of local sea power, in one case that of the United States, in the other that of Japan, the distant states inevitably had to retreat. It is true that the Japanese war potential was very much smaller than that of America, but it was formidable enough to create a navy difficult to challenge in the Western Pacific. The naval bases of the United States and Europe in the Far East were elements of strength for naval actions against China and for the preservation of balanced fleet strength among the Western Powers. But once there emerged a strong naval power in the region itself they became a hostage to fortune, an Achilles heel, as Theodore Roosevelt called them.

After the Russo-Japanese War it became practically impossible to create an effective defense for French Indo-China, Hong Kong, or the Philippines against the growing might of the Empire of Japan. Their territorial security, like that of the European possessions in the Caribbean since 1900, came to rest primarily on the good will of the dominant regional sea power and this situation continued until the development of air power during the last decade. Distance and

the nature of naval warfare as it existed at the end of the last world conflict made it impossible for the United States to restrain Japan across the wide expanse of the Pacific Ocean. We would have been in a much stronger position if we had owned no territory within the area of Japanese naval supremacy. Under such conditions we could have used the full weight of our economic strength in the certainty that if Japan wanted to make our economic pressure an occasion for war, she would have had to fight in the Eastern Pacific, the region of our naval supremacy. In the Western Pacific, the area of Japanese strength, the situation is reversed.

The Washington Treaties accepted in a realistic manner the inescapable fact that until such time as China could really develop first-class naval strength, the dominant sea power on the northern continent of the transpacific zone would have to be Japan. They acknowledged a strategic geographic fact not unlike that expressed in the Hay-Pauncefote Treaty which had recognized American naval supremacy in the American Mediterranean twenty years earlier.

It is true that the United States never developed the strategic possibilities of her possessions in the Western Pacific and agreed in the Washington Treaties to leave them unfortified but it is a mistake to assume that this was necessarily an error at the time. Naval bases can alleviate but not overcome the basic fact of distance which keeps the powers across the Pacific well beyond combat range, and insistence on freedom of action at the conference might have created an insoluble political problem. The Philippines could have been given effective territorial security only by the development of large naval bases in Guam and Manila Bay and the establishment of American naval supremacy in the Western Pacific. This would have meant a threat not only to Japanese outlying possessions but also to the territorial security of the Japanese homeland. The United States would never have permitted a European power to develop its island possessions in the West Indies into a base for sea and air power that could threaten the security of the United States, and there is little reason to assume that Japan would patiently have awaited the construction of a similar threat to her homeland. It is much more likely that some day, long before the bases were ready, at a moment convenient for Japan, she would have appeared quite suddenly in overwhelming

force and taken the islands. Postponing a fight until after one has been outmaneuvered is practiced only by democracies.

In terms of old-fashioned naval power and ability to control the seas, the position of Japan in the Far East was extremely strong. But since 1921 the strategic picture of the Western Pacific has been fundamentally altered by the development of air power. We have already indicated that naval victories under conditions of modern warfare demand air superiority and suggested that in narrow marginal seas it might be extremely difficult to establish that superiority by carriers if the opponent could depend on land-based aircraft. Mere command of the sea in terms of naval supremacy is no longer enough to dominate an area and invasion has become even more difficult than it was already.

Far Eastern waters, which consist of a series of marginal seas, were of course affected by these changes. It became more difficult than ever to defeat the Japanese fleet in its home waters within range of land-based aircraft, but it should have been much easier to defend the possessions of the Western Powers in Asia. An opportunity was created to neutralize the naval supremacy which Japan enjoyed in the Asiatic Mediterranean by air power operating from the littoral zones. Japan's advantage was her superior sea power; her superior man power was only partly available because much of it was tied up in China. But this opportunity to improve the position of the Western Powers in the Far East was neglected. Japan was permitted to create an air force in Asia unmatched by Great Britain and the United States as Germany had been permitted to create an air force in Europe. Only the future can tell the cost the Anglo-Saxon powers will have to pay for their inability to understand the implications of the new aerial warfare and their neglect of adequate defensive measures.

The development of aviation might have prolonged the influence of the Western Powers in the Far East, but it could not have restored permanently their ability to balance the Empire of the Rising Sun. Extra-regional powers can no more check the expansion of modern Japan than they could balance the United States in the New World. Fortunately for the Western Powers there is a possibility of finding a counterweight against the Land of the Mikado in the region itself.

The similarities in the evolution of the American power pattern up to the Hay-Pauncefote Treaty and the Asiatic power pattern up to the Washington Treaties were achieved on a different geo-political basis. In the New World the growing naval power was the United States with a war potential based on the continental mass and, therefore, potentially the strongest in the region. In the Far East, the positions were reversed. The growing naval power rested not on the continental land mass but on small off-shore islands. On such a geographic basis Great Britain had established naval supremacy in Europe but only because she managed to keep the continent divided. Japan tried to create this pattern in Asia but failed. The very attempt to destroy China unified her people and she remains available as a power potential more than adequate to balance Japan.

It has taken a long time for the Chinese strength to develop and until recently she has been a disappointment to her friends. The westernization of the old Middle Kingdom and the introduction of new technologies and new industries have gone much more slowly than the comparable transformation of Japan. The aftermath of the restoration in Japan was centralization and strength; the aftermath of the Chinese revolution was disintegration and weakness. For a long period, therefore, China has been in the hands not of farseeing statesmen but of feudal warlords struggling for power among themselves, and guided by leaders whose main object was not national interest but provincial welfare and private purse. In that circle Japanese bribery and corruption found a fertile field.

When the new nationalist government first emerged, it found a symbol for national unity in anti-foreign agitation and in a program designed to eject the white man from the Far East. This created conflicting desires in the western capitals. The desire to support the Chinese government in terms of balance of power considerations was neutralized by the desire to support Japan as a protector of imperialist interest. It was Japan, however, that resolved this conflict. She forced the nationalist movement to concentrate its energy on defense against invasion and to postpone, at least for the time being, its struggle against the West, and she indulged in such discrimination against western interests herself that it was easy to decide that it was China and not Japan that deserved western aid, although it was

quite safe to predict that whatever the outcome of the struggle, Asia would belong to the Asiatics and the days of extraterritorial privileges for the white man would be gone forever.

When the League members failed to undertake any action that might stop Japan after her invasion of Manchuria in 1931, they salved their consciences with a vote that recommended technical assistance for China in her great work of reconstruction. Out of this came a form of support, which although not hampering Japanese military activity, proved none the less a great help in the modernization of Chinese social and political life. Experts in transportation and communication, in public health and public finance, placed their experience and their skill at the disposal of the Nanking government and helped it to create a modern administration. Of more direct usefulness in the struggle against Japan has been the help which China has received from Russia ever since 1937. The existence of a large Russian force on the border of Manchukuo has immobilized a good part of Japan's best army, and, apart from this indirect support which flows from the facts of geography, there has been considerable direct aid in the form of airplanes and supplies of raw materials that have been slowly trickling east over the desert routes of Central Asia.

The United States also found a way at last to practical aid and support. Japanese control of all the sea routes makes it more difficult for China to receive American than Russian supplies, but the United States government was aiding at least to the extent of offering financial assistance and credit for the purchase of essential war materials. The first of these loans was made in December, 1938, by the Import-Export Bank and amounted to 25 million dollars. Other loans have followed made both from the resources of the Import-Export Bank and the Stabilization Fund, and the passage of the Lend-Lease Bill enabled China to receive additional credits without the need of congressional appropriations.

In 1941, aid to China began to move beyond mere credits. We sent a military mission to Chiang Kai-shek to provide him with western technical assistance which had not been available since Hitler forced the return of the German mission in 1938. As part of the lend-lease program, there went to Chungking not only a number of experts to help in solving the transportation problem of the Burma

Road, but in addition one hundred Curtiss pursuit planes complete with volunteer pilots whose task it was to see to it that the goods sent to China along that road reached its destination, notwithstanding the Japanese bombers operating from bases in French Indo-China.

By the fall of 1941 our participation in the Second World War was beginning to show interesting similarities in the Atlantic and the Pacific. American planes and torpedo boats were protecting a sea-lane to London in order that our aid might reach the transatlantic ally; and American planes were protecting a land-route beyond the Pacific in order that war material might reach Chungking. Short of naval action and an expeditionary force, we were in the struggle as an associated power, trying to preserve the balance in Asia. On December 7 of that year, the Japanese struck and transformed the conflict into open warfare.

VI. The United States in the World

Great statesmen have never lacked a feeling for geography. . . . When one speaks of a healthy political instinct, one usually means a correct evaluation of the geographic bases of political power.

FRIEDRICH RATZEL

THE previous chapters have sketched the geographic position of the United States in the world and the effect of the interplay of forces on the balance of power in the different continental zones. The great coastal regions of the world are interdependent not only economically but also politically. Oceans are no barriers; they are routes for the thrusts of sea power as well as highways of commerce.

Because the effect of force is in inverse proportion to the distance from its source, widely spaced regions can preserve a certain degree of autonomy but they cannot hope to live in isolation. Any war that affects the power relations between great states in one zone inevitably affects the power relations in all others. In a period of total war the field of struggle coincides with the total earth's surface. No great state can afford to conduct regional foreign policies as if the different continents of the world consisted of water-tight compartments. Only statesmen who can do their political and strategic thinking in terms of a round earth and a three-dimensional warfare can save their countries from being outmaneuvered on distant flanks. With air power supplementing sea power and mobility again the essence of warfare, no region of the globe is too distant to be without strategic significance, too remote to be neglected in the calculations of power politics.

Continental Interdependence

Oceanic distance brings some protection, permits some autonomy but not isolation. The world is still a single field of forces even if the points of dispersion now lie farther apart. Europe was once the center from which the world was governed, and, ever since the adventurous sailors of the Spanish peninsula first circumnavigated the globe, the balance of power in Europe has affected the balance of power in all other areas. In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, all wars between European naval powers inevitably became world wars, because their colonies were distributed all over the globe and colonies were the prize for which they fought. In the nineteenth century there emerged an independent source of power in the Western Hemisphere and finally in the twentieth century a new power center in the Far East. For a long time the European zone remained the most important one, the outcome of its power struggles affecting the balance in all other regions, but eventually the relative significance between the zones shifted, and the others began to influence the power balance in Europe.

The twentieth century is, therefore, a period characterized by regional decentralization of power and the existence of relatively autonomous spheres dominated from different geographic centers. But regional decentralization merely means autonomy and not independence as was demonstrated by the fact that an attack on the life of an Archduke of Hapsburg in June, 1914, could develop into a world war. A conflict which began in Europe as a struggle for power in the Balkans between Russia and Austria, ended as a war in which nations in all corners of the globe participated and which was fought on battlefields from the China Sea to the coast of Flanders. The peace treaties were inevitably on the same scale and contained provisions for territorial revisions not only in Europe but also in Africa, Asia, and Australia. When Wilson offered the statesmen assembled in Paris a plan for a new world order, he drafted a political instrument commensurate with the scale on which international affairs would have to be conducted. The League of Nations in its very name symbolized the historical change that had occurred since 1815 when it

was felt that a concert of European Powers would be the proper committee for administering the affairs of the world.

The idealists who thought that the world could be ruled by public opinion and moral sanctions believed that the Covenant would enforce itself. But the hard-headed realists who were convinced that material force would still be necessary became concerned about its nature under League auspices and the need for checks and balances. The role of air power was not foreseen, and the Anglo-Saxon interpretation of the war which attributed German defeat to blockade naturally asumed that economic pressure would be the great instrument of international coercion of the future. Economic pressure meant blockade and blockade meant the British fleet. Who was to guard the guardian, who was to prevent the Empire from making the League an instrument of British policy? Only a fleet strong enough to balance the British could perform that function, and only the United States could build and maintain such a fleet. In the light of the fact that the United States never joined the League and Great Britain half the time wished that she had refused, this early preoccupation with the exercise of its authority is rather amusing, but it illustrates that, when the League was considered seriously as an instrument of world politics, considerations of balance of power were very much in the foreground.

As it turned out, the two states that would have profited the most from the development of the new instrument spurned it, the first indication that their leading statesmen were out of tune with their times and unaware of the fact that the nineteenth century had gone forever. Great Britain was a world power with territories in every part of the globe, and the United States had just found herself sufficiently involved in European questions to participate in its bloody struggle and sufficiently involved in the Asiatic question to discuss openly the possibilities of another war with Japan. But a strange legalism hampered their thinking and made them afraid of the commitments that membership implied, forgetting completely that the facts of geography and the nature of power politics would inevitably involve them in far distant struggles, their legal freedom to the contrary notwithstanding.

If the United States had joined the League of Nations, the council

table in Geneva would have become the central chessboard for the game of world politics and disarmament conferences under League auspices, the battle arena for world power struggles. The United States did not join, but she took the initiative in calling the first post-war conference to negotiate arms reduction, and she later participated in the preliminary League meetings in Geneva.

For the student of power politics, disarmament conferences have a special fascination which distinguishes them from all other conferences. They bring into the full glare of daylight the competition and struggle for power that otherwise remain hidden behind the courtesy visits of prime ministers, the verbiage of diplomatic language, and the empty phraseology of unanimous resolutions. It is when statesmen try to reach agreements on the maximum armament which countries should have that the effect and interplay of regional power balances become most clearly visible. This is particularly true for naval disarmament, because sea power is by nature less restricted in its operations than land power.

In a disarmament conference a state formulates its requirements for territorial security both at home and overseas, and these requirements are inevitably relative to the military strength of other states. But the statement of military needs is not only an estimate of the means necessary to assure territorial safety, it is also a confession of power aspirations both regional and extra-regional. States are always perfectly willing to disarm provided their potential enemies disarm more, provided their relative power position is improved. A naval disarmament conference becomes, therefore, a paper war in which each delegation tries to preserve its own fleet and to sink as much of the other fleets as possible. It symbolizes pure power struggle, with each state striving for the greatest margin of safety.

The Washington Conference

The first disarmament conference after the First World War which aired the power aspirations of the great maritime states and demonstrated the interdependence of regional power struggles was the conference called at Washington in 1921. The relations between the former allies were far from cordial; tension over the Japanese

moves in Asia had created a situation which threatened to develop into a serious naval rivalry; and American relations with Great Britain were also far from harmonious. Common action against the few neutrals remaining after 1917 had not obliterated the bitter feeling against British treatment of American neutral rights in the days of our non-belligerency. Certain circles were determined that the United States should never again have to face a situation in which she might have to accept a belligerent's interpretation of her rights under international law. Adequate naval strength seemed the answer to the problem, and the end of the war that had brought about the removal of one great sea power initiated, therefore, a fierce naval competition among the survivors.

Great Britain came out of the war with a greatly improved maritime position. The German fleet had been destroyed, while the British had continued an enormous building program all through the struggle. France and Italy had dropped far behind in battle fleet construction, and their fleets were in potential opposition and neutralized each other in the Mediterranean. Not since the Battle of Trafalgar had there been less naval strength on the European Continent to challenge British power. Her fleet was free for the task of empire building and world politics, but on that wider horizon she found new naval strength in American waters and on Far Eastern seas.

Japan and the United States with practically no naval losses in the war and with greatly increased construction came out much stronger than they went in. It is true that the United States, at the request of the British, had concentrated rather heavily on destroyers, but with the Armistice came freedom to devote herself to long term needs. The 1918 building program, which was to be completed in 1925, included twelve additional battleships and sixteen more battle cruisers, and in the three years between the Armistice and the Washington Treaty the United States built more ships than the rest of the world combined. If the contemplated expansion had actually been achieved, the United States navy would have been the strongest in the world.

The British made several delicate attempts to deter us from our naval ambitions and suggested that it would be impossible for them to contemplate the surrender of their traditional position of naval

supremacy. Uncle Sam continued to build, and Great Britain had to adjust herself to the fact that a power had emerged in the world which could not be balanced in its own sphere and which not only refused to accept second rank but had the financial strength to outbuild her if she so desired. Great Britain continued to plead, and the United States finally offered what seemed a generous compromise, parity. An agreement on an informal truce was made at the Paris Peace Conference in which Wilson promised to suspend competitive building in exchange for support of the League of Nations, but no formal action was taken until the Washington Conference.

The plan for the limitation of naval armament contained in the opening speech of Secretary Hughes included a proposal for a ratio of strength among the great navies of the world which paid due attention to the reciprocal effect of regional power. The proposed ratio was 5:5:3:1.75:1.75, for the United States, Great Britain, Japan, France, and Italy respectively. France and Italy were granted equality of strength in relation to each other, and the British were offered a ratio of 5:3.5 over their combined fleets which was a safe margin over and above their traditional European two-power standard. The ratio between American, European, and Asiatic naval strength was expressed as parity for Great Britain and the United States and the proportion of 3:5 for the Japanese fleet.

After prolonged and sometimes acrimonious debate, the conference finally arrived at an agreement, but it covered much less than had been hoped. It provided for limitation, but this applied to battleships and aircraft carriers only. The maximum size of cruisers was to be ten thousand tons and their armament eight-inch guns, but it was impossible for the states to agree on the number that each should have and other auxiliaries remained equally unrestricted. The French had greatly resented the American proposal that they accept parity with Italy, and the French delegation argued cogently that France was a world power, inevitably obliged to detach large elements of her naval strength to outlying possessions, while Italy was only a Mediterranean state and could, therefore, concentrate the whole of her force in the neighborhood of French shores. Japan also wanted a higher ratio than that proposed for her, and the British and French became involved in a bitter dispute over the former's attempt to abol-

ish submarines. A limited agreement, however, was finally reached. The principal naval powers of the world accepted a naval holiday and a program of replacement by means of which a ratio of 5:5:3:1.67:1.67 would in ten years become the expression of their relative naval strength in battleships and airplane carriers.

The agreement had stabilized the size of the battle fleets, and naval competition transferred itself, therefore, to the field of cruisers. Between 1921 and 1930 the three principal naval powers as well as France and Italy attempted to improve their relative power position by cruiser-building. This form of struggle ended in 1930 when the London Conference brought an agreement on the number of cruisers as between Great Britain, the United States, and Japan. From that moment on, the nature of the struggle was transferred from a competition for more ships to a competition for better ships. But even the quantitative restrictions were not to last. They came to an end in December, 1936, when the Washington and London Treaties lapsed as the result of a formal two years' notice given by the Japanese government in December, 1934.

The American proposal that Great Britain accept parity and surrender her traditional claim to naval supremacy was a request difficult to grant. The British objected on the same grounds that the French had used in arguing against granting parity to the Italians. Great Britain, her spokesmen pointed out, had responsibilities in all parts of the globe, the United States only in the Western Hemisphere and in the Far East, and the British, therefore, obviously needed a much larger fleet. In Washington they reluctantly accepted parity in principle, but it was to take another ten years before Britain was really ready to yield. The early agreement provided for equality only in capital ships and carriers, and by means of a strict adherence to the letter of that treaty the British tried to prevent its extension to all categories. The United States was, however, fully determined to obtain recognition of her claims to all-round parity. After an abortive conference in Geneva in 1927, this was finally achieved in 1930 at the conference in London.

The ratio which had been proposed for the United States, Great Britain, and Japan was not only a rough approximation of existing fleet strength in terms of ships built and building; it was also a fairly

accurate estimate of the potential sea power of the parties. The age of Nelson had passed. The seat of power was no longer in Europe alone, and the possibility of maintaining world supremacy by means of a balanced Europe had ceased to exist. At the turn of the century, the Western Hemisphere had been removed from British naval control. The Argentine and Chile had begun to build navies that surpassed in strength British squadrons operating from the Falkland Islands, and the United States had obtained naval supremacy in the American Mediterranean. In terms of her alliance with Japan, Great Britain continued to control the sea routes around the Old World, but the naval strength of the Far Eastern partner had progressively increased, and after the World War, the latter achieved naval supremacy in her home waters. Regional decentralization of power was a fact.

The British-Japanese Alliance

Decentralization meant relative autonomy but not independence. The power balances in the different zones continued to influence each other, and relations between the Asiatic and the European zones had an immediate bearing on the meaning and significance of the naval ratios for the United States. The proposal had been for a general ratio of 5:5:3 which would have permitted each of the Great Powers to remain supreme in its own respective sphere. The Japanese were protected by distance, the ratio, and the demilitarization clauses. With the United States inevitably forced to retain considerable naval forces in the Pacific, Great Britain beyond the Atlantic could send a considerable part of her fleet outside of European waters without having to fear American sea power. The same situation applied to the United States. Her position was assured provided that she only had to face the possibility of war in one ocean.

Any alliance between the European and the Asiatic naval powers would, however, mean that the United States was exposed to a war on two ocean fronts and a ratio of eight to five. Such an alliance between Japan and Great Britain dating from 1902 and renewed at intervals for subsequent periods did indeed exist. The agreement had originally been directed against Russia and not against the United States, and it had always been assumed that it would not be applicable

in case or an American-Japanese war, but the actual wording was no positive guarantee that this was the only interpretation. The existing agreement was to end on July 13, 1921, and the American government had suggested in London that, if the treaty were to be renewed, it would like to have included a clause stating specifically that it was not directed against the United States.

At the Washington Conference, the American delegation together with the Canadian delegation argued strongly against renewal, and the British government finally consented. The counter-proposal for its transformation into a triple alliance was not accepted, but a substitute compromise was finally reached in the form of a Four-Power Treaty, a much less binding commitment. It included France, partly to give her prestige, but mainly to protect the United States against a minority position. It was not an agreement for mutual support but only a promise to respect insular possessions and to consult in case of danger. The British-Japanese alliance was no more, and the danger of a European-Asiatic encirclement of the United States was removed.

The German-Japanese Alliance

The specter of finding ourselves between two great naval powers in control of the European and Asiatic coastal zones of the Eurasian Continent, which had disturbed our statesmen at the Washington Conference, was to become a threatening reality twenty years later. On November 27, 1936, Japan became a partner to the so-called Anti-Comintern Pact. The common interest expressed in this agreement with Germany derived from the simple geographic fact that both were neighbors of Russia, encircling her in the west and in the east, and were therefore in a position to prevent her, by a simple alliance, from concentrating her total military strength on one frontier. Japan and Russia had been fighting border skirmishes on the Mongolian and Manchukuoan border for several years, and there always remained the ever present threat of air attacks from Vladivostok. An agreement which would keep Russia occupied on her European border was, therefore, of great advantage to Japan; it provided her with considerable freedom of action against China.

Because of the obvious advantages of this alliance for Japan, the

news of the German-Russian agreement made on August 23, 1939, for the fourth partition of Poland caused considerable consternation in the Land of the Cherry Blossom. It brought about the fall of the cabinet and fostered doubt about the reliability of the European partner. But there really was no reason for worry or anxiety. The deal concerning Poland could only be a temporary expedient and the disappearance of the buffer state could not diminish but only intensify the inherent opposition between Berlin and Moscow. Moreover, the war which the treaty initiated brought other advantages to Japan. It meant the absorption of British naval power in the west and the reduction of its strength in the Far East and the Asiatic Mediterranean. The alignment between Germany and Japan under modern conditions of world politics is a logical one, and it should, therefore, have caused no surprise that it was reaffirmed on September 27, 1940, in the form of a treaty of alliance between Germany, Italy, and Japan.

The treaty provided for "reciprocal recognition and respect for the leadership of the respective partners in the establishment of the new order in Europe and Greater East Asia." It also stipulated that the allies would assist one another with political, economic, and military means if one of the contracting states was attacked by a power not at that time involved in the European war or in the Chinese-Japanese conflict. Although the treaty provided that it did not affect the political status which existed between each of the contracting parties and Soviet Russia, it was obvious that the agreement was directed not only against Russia whose geographic location made her a permanent threat on the German and Japanese land frontiers but also against the United States.

In 1940 Germany was, however, not yet ready to resume her eastern expansion, to take on her natural and traditional enemy, and to pursue her historic mission of driving the Slavs out of Europe. She was still following the policy expressed in the maxim "One war at a time," still anxious to avoid military conflict on two fronts. This meant concentration on Great Britain and postponement of the Russian campaign. Germany tried to freeze not only the German-Russian frontier in Europe but also the Japanese-Russian frontier in Asia. If that could be achieved, both partners would be able to concentrate

on action against Anglo-Saxon sea power. Berlin, therefore, attempted to bring Tokyo and Moscow together in a deal comparable to the Berlin-Moscow agreement of August, 1939, but it was not until April 13, 1941, that Japan and Russia finally signed a treaty of non-aggression and neutrality. In this treaty they promised to maintain peaceful and friendly relations and to respect the territorial integrity of each other's country.

By the time the treaty was negotiated, signed, and ratified Germany had decided on a fundamental change in war policy. All-out attack on Great Britain was postponed and eastward expansion resumed. On June 22, 1941, she invaded Russia and threw her forces in the direction of Leningrad, Moscow, and Odessa. Japan was invited to forget her neutrality agreement with Russia signed in the month of April and to remember her treaty of alliance with Germany concluded the previous year. The might of Hitler's army would occupy all of Russia's strength in the west; it was up to Japan to realize her great opportunity and take Eastern Siberia. Up to December, 1941, she had not yet availed herself of the occasion for reasons indicated in the last chapter. Mr. Stalin had not been sufficiently impressed by the Japanese promise of non-aggression to remove his army from the Asiatic frontier, and the defeat of the Russian forces in Europe was not yet sufficiently conclusive to induce Japan to act in the face of British and American opposition.

Geography made a German-Japanese alliance against Russia inevitable, but when the agreement between the two partners was announced in 1940, it was primarily intended to impress the United States and to threaten her with a war in two oceans if she should decide to join Great Britain in military operations across the Atlantic. The publication of the treaty and the comments on its meaning made by German and Japanese spokesmen were clearly intended to serve as a warning in the hope that we would focus our attention on the Far East and feel incapable of effective action in the eastern ocean. It was an obvious attempt to keep the principal victims of German-Japanese expansion from joining forces in order that they might be destroyed separately. If the United States could be kept out of the conflict, it would be easy to deal with her after Great Britain and

Russia had been defeated and all power of resistance in the Old World destroyed.

Quite a number of people in the United States, particularly in isolationist circles, were impressed by the maneuver and began to talk about the danger of becoming involved in a conflict in both oceans, but the majority of the nation refused to be impressed. The attempt to frighten us into non-intervention, however soundly conceived from the point of view of strategy and politics, was faulty from the point of view of psychology. If the alliance wanted to throw terror into the hearts of the American people, it should not have selected Japan as a threat. The Empire of the Rising Sun had just proved that it was having difficulty in defeating China and rightly or wrongly the military strength of the Mikado was not something that frightened the average American citizen. The United States refused to be intimidated. She increased her aid to Great Britain and China and began to convoy lend-lease shipments along the Atlantic sea-lane and the Burma land route. Japanese invasion of French Indo-China was answered by economic reprisals, and the German invasion of Russia was met with a joint declaration by Prime Minister Churchill and President Roosevelt that their countries would grant full aid to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

The Pattern of World Politics

The German-Japanese Alliance of 1940 and the counter-alliance that has been built up against it among Great Britain, Russia, China, and the United States define the basic outline of contemporary world politics. It results from the policies of these great power units and contains the following conflict patterns.

Germany is engaged in a struggle with Great Britain for the hegemony of the European Continent and the control of the European Mediterranean which will give her dominion over North Africa and the western access to the Indian Ocean. She would like to incorporate European Russia, including the Ural Mountains, into the German sphere, destroy the Russian Army, and remove forever any danger to her position that might come out of the heartland of Asia.

She is using Japan as a threat to Russian land power and British and American sea power and is trying to use Latin America as a balance against the United States in the Western Hemisphere.

Japan is engaged in a struggle with China for the hegemony of the Far Eastern continent and with Great Britain and the United States for the control of the Asiatic Mediterranean which will give her dominion over Australia and the eastern access to the Indian Ocean. She would like to incorporate Asiatic Russia up to Lake Baikal into the Japanese sphere and remove forever the danger to her position that might come from the heartland of Asia by way of Vladivostok. Germany, her ally in the west, engages Russian land power in Europe and British and American sea power in the Atlantic. Japan would like to use Latin America as a balance against the United States in the Western Hemisphere, but she is not well placed for the successful execution of such a policy and leaves, therefore, the main burden of this task to Germany.

Russia is encircled by Germany in the west and by Japan in the east. She has supported for years the forces of the Chinese Republic which have engaged Japanese land power. She is herself fighting German land power in Europe and is co-operating with Great Britain and the United States, who are engaging the naval and air power of her eastern and western neighbors.

The Latin American states would like to preserve their freedom and independence and they pray for a world in which Asia and Europe will be sufficiently strong to balance the United States without endangering their own security.

The United States wants to preserve her naval supremacy over the Eastern Pacific and the Western Atlantic, absolute control over the American Mediterranean and hegemony over the larger part of South America. She is aiding Great Britain across the eastern ocean, China across the western ocean, and Russia in the heart of the Eurasian land mass in order to preserve some balance of power in Europe and Asia. Since December, 1941, she has been involved as a full belligerent in the Second World War.

The Geography of the Second World War

To understand the full implications of this alignment of forces, the pattern of world politics must be projected against a picture of the geography of the earth's surface. The regional position of the United States in the Western Hemisphere and her relation to the conflict now being waged in the transatlantic and transpacific zones have already been sketched. This chapter must draw those regional sketches together into one global picture.

Because the world is a sphere and not a plane surface, the relations between the New World and the Old World are in reality quite different from those which a flat chart suggests. Only by looking at several different map projections * at the same time can we get a picture of the geo-political meaning of the distribution of the land masses over the earth's surface.

On a polar projection, two significant features clearly stand out: the concentration of the land masses in the Northern Hemisphere, and their starfishlike dispersion from the North Pole as a center toward Africa and the Cape of Good Hope, South America and Cape Horn, and Australia and Cape Leeuwin. This type of map clearly indicates that the northern continents, in terms of ocean distances, are much closer together than the southern continents. It exaggerates the actual geographic separation of the latter but it gives symbolic expression to their political isolation from each other. The relations between North America and the two sides of the Eurasian continent are the base lines of world politics while the relations between South America, Australia, and Africa are unimportant.

Such a projection makes it clear also that the Western Hemisphere and the Eurasian land mass actually face each other across three bodies of water: the Arctic Ocean, the Atlantic, and the Pacific. It shows all three sets of opposite coasts, but it emphasizes particularly the forgotten polar front which, although of little consequence economically and politically, and with little significance for sea power, is none the less beginning to be important in terms of air power. The ice-covered shores have little to exchange and no points of strategic

* See Appendix I.


importance worth fighting for but it is conceivable that the polar zone may in the future become a transit area for air communication. Along this front the shortest distances between the opposite shores of the Old World and the New World are found at the points where the Polar Sea joins the Pacific and the Atlantic oceans. Eastern Siberia and Alaska are less than 60 miles apart across the Bering Strait, and Norway and Greenland are separated by the North Atlantic at a point where its width is less than 1,000 miles.

Because of climatological conditions, this northern front is actually least important and the principal contact zones between the Old and New Worlds lie, therefore, across the broader ocean belts of the Atlantic and the Pacific. This fact, which a polar projection fails to show, is clearly seen on such projections as the Mercator or Gall's stereographic projection. This kind of map shows that both the Old and the New Worlds have coasts on the two oceans and, from a geographic point of view, they can therefore be said to embrace each other. Such a map with the center along the meridian of 80° east near the tip of British India will show the Old World continents surrounded on the east by the west coast of the New World and on the west by the east coast of the New World. A similar map with the New World in the center along the meridian of 90° west indicates that the Americas are surrounded by the west coast of the Old World on the east and the east coast of the Old World on the west. Unless it be maintained that oceanic distances will prevent the exertion of dangerous pressure, the relative strength of the two partners will determine for whom the embrace might become a stranglehold and a caress of death.

If the New World can be united or organized in such a manner that large masses of unbalanced force are available for action across the ocean, it can influence the politics of Europe and Asia. And if the Old World remains divided and balanced that external force can play a determining role in its political life. If, on the other hand, the Old World can be united or organized in such a manner that large masses of unbalanced power can become available for action across the ocean, the New World will be encircled and, depending on its powers of resistance, may have to submit to the dictates of the Old. The possibility of encirclement depends, therefore, on the power potentials of

the Old and the New Worlds and the likelihood of their integration into single political units or coalitions.

The battlefield on which the great struggle for world power is now being fought is the Old World, which consists of the great Eurasian continent in the north with Africa to the southwest and Australia to the southeast. The two latter continents are separated from each other by the Indian Ocean. The Eurasian land mass and the north coast



THE ENCIRCLEMENT OF THE OLD WORLD

of Africa and Australia form three concentric zones, and function in world politics in terms of the following geo-political realities: the heartland of the northern continent, the encircling buffer zone, the marginal seas, and the outlying continents of Africa and Australia.

The inner zone around which the others are grouped is the central core of the Eurasian heartland. Its coast line lies along the Arctic Ocean between the northern mountain ranges of Norway and the Anadir Mountains on the Chukotski peninsula of Siberia. Its enormous territory stretches from the Arctic Ocean down to an encircling mountain chain which begins in Europe with the Carpathians and includes the Balkans and the Anatolian, Iranian, and Afghanistan plateaus in the Near East. From there the barrier function is taken over by the Pamir Highlands, the Tien Shan range, the Altai Mountains, and the plateaus of Mongolia and Siberia east of Lake Baikal. Around this land mass from Great Britain to Japan and between the northern

continent and the two continents to the south, runs the great circumferential maritime highway of the world. It starts in the inland and marginal seas of Western Europe, the Baltic and the North Sea; progresses through the European Mediterranean and the Red Sea; traverses the Indian Ocean from Aden to Penang; passes through the Asiatic Mediterranean and the marginal seas of the Far East—the East China Sea and the Sea of Japan—to end finally in the Sea of Okhotsk.

Between the center of the Eurasian land mass and the circumferential maritime route lies a great concentric buffer zone. It includes Western and Central Europe; the plateau countries of the Near East, Turkey, Iran, and Afghanistan; Tibet, China, and Eastern Siberia; and the three peninsulas of Arabia, India, and Burma-Siam. In this border zone have developed all the great civilizations of the world except Egypt and Carthage on the southern littoral of the European Mediterranean and the early civilizations of Sumatra and Java on the southern littoral of the Asiatic Mediterranean.

Because of the inadequacy of the Arctic Coast as an outlet to the ocean, the great heartland can find access to the sea only by routes that cross the encircling mountain barrier and the border zone beyond. The only easy exits are through the Baltic and the Black Seas and by the overland routes through the North German plain between the Scandinavian massif and the Carpathians. The other passages are narrow and difficult and limited to single roads over arduous mountain passes. Russian Turkestan can find an outlet only across the Iranian plateau to the Persian Gulf or through Afghanistan and the Khyber Pass to the valley of the Indus. It has one other outlet to a distant ocean, the old silk route across the passes of the Tien Shan Mountains through Sinkiang north of Tibet to Central China and the Pacific. Central Siberia can reach the sea through the depression between the Tien Shan and the Altai Mountains over the Mongolian plateau to Peking and the Gulf of Chih-Li or north of the Altai ranges, around Lake Baikal, down the valley of the Amur to the Japanese Sea.

The north coasts of Africa and Australia are strategically part of the European and Asiatic Mediterranean and as such part of the maritime zone and circumferential highway. The rest of the two southern

continents is separated from their northern coasts by broad desert belts. They function, from the point of view of communication, as separate islands, not as connected parts of the same continental mass. Because they lack the man power and the resources that are necessary for the development of a war potential, they have been dominated by whoever could create naval supremacy in their coastal zones.

The heartland of the Eurasian Continent is the domain of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the largest state in the world. Much of its territory is Arctic waste, desert zone, and inhospitable mountain range, but there remain vast areas suitable for agriculture and a subsoil rich in mineral resources. There is room for a population far beyond the present number of almost two hundred million and full application of western technology to the resources of the vast territory could develop an economy strong enough to support one of the great war machines of the twentieth century.

From Central Asia came the early invasions into the border zone, the irruptions of nomadic barbarians into Europe, Persia, India, and China. Most persistent has been the pressure on Europe and China because geography forces the flow of power into the east-west channel. To the north lie tundra waste and the Polar Sea; to the south stretches a zone of barren desert and the highest mountain barrier in the world; in between an easy grassland belt provides an area of mobility. Along this broad way the ancient horsemen of the plains exerted pressure on Vienna and Peking, and along this same line have flowed the power thrusts of modern Russia. For two hundred years, since the time of Peter the Great, Russia has attempted to break through the encircling ring of border states and reach the ocean. Geography and sea power have persistently thwarted her.

Long wars with Sweden brought access to the Baltic; long struggles with Turkey, access to the Black Sea; eastern expansion caused the gradual absorption of Chinese Turkestan, Mongolia and at one time Manchuria with ports in Port Arthur and Vladivostok. But all of these coasts are on inland and marginal seas, and their exit to the oceans is still controlled by other powers. One of the basic patterns in the politics of the Old World during the last century was the opposition between British naval power operating along the circumferential sea route and Russian land power trying to smash an open-

ing through the encircling ring. Up to 1902, the actual naval strength for the enforcement of this imprisonment was provided by Great Britain alone; after that date, which marked the signing of the first British-Japanese alliance, the two island empires operating from opposite flanks of the Eurasian continent shared the burden. Japan undertook to guard the exits to the Pacific, Great Britain those to the Atlantic and Indian oceans.

In the present phase of world history, the trend is in the opposite direction. It is the border zone that is encroaching on the heartland. In Europe, Germany is moving eastward and in Asia, Japan is moving westward. The sea power of the Far Eastern Empire has carried her across the marginal seas and she occupies the continental coast from the neighborhood of Vladivostok to Saigon, has set up puppet governments in Hsinking, Peking, Nanking, and Hanoi, and is ready to move into Eastern Siberia. If the two partners are successful, Russia will be pushed back behind the Urals and Lake Baikal. She will still have a large territory in Central Siberia but it will consist mostly of polar ice, tundra, and desert and have resources inadequate for the formation of a great war potential. Compared with the size of her conquerors, she will have become a relatively small buffer state like Poland between Germany and Russia in 1939. The result will be the final removal of all threats to land power in Europe and the Far East that might come from the heartland of the continent. Germany and Japan will then be free to devote themselves to their remaining enemies, to break through the European and Asiatic Mediterranean into the Indian Ocean and to begin a pincer movement against the Western Hemisphere.

The drainage area of the Indian Ocean includes the eastern coast of Africa, southern Arabia, Iraq, and Syria and the southern slopes of Iran and Afghanistan, as well as India and Burma, a narrow strip of Western Thailand and a coastal zone in the Great Sunda Islands and Western Australia. The northwestern approach into the Indian Ocean is through the European Mediterranean past Suez and the Red Sea or overland through Syria and Iraq and down Mesopotamia to the Persian Gulf. The northeastern approach is through the Asiatic Mediterranean, past Singapore and the Strait of Malacca or overland by way of Thailand across the narrow Isthmus of Kra. The Indian Ocean

is open on the south toward the South Polar Sea, but he who sails in this direction must pass the flanking naval bases of either Cape Town in South Africa or Albany in southwest Australia.

This ocean was in 1941 the only maritime zone in the world thoroughly dominated by British sea power and its borderlands were again in complete control of British arms. The costly mistake of 1936 had been repaired and Mussolini's empire in Ethiopia at the narrow exit of the Red Sea had been destroyed. French Somaliland was neutralized, the Iraquian revolt repressed, Persia occupied and Afghanistan under control. The region had become the second most important strategic zone in the struggle for world dominion, not so much because of the war potential of its littoral states, but because its rimland near the European and Asiatic Mediterranean contains the great oil-producing regions of the Eurasian land mass and the overland routes to the heartland.

In this relatively small drainage area live five hundred million people, about one-fifth of the population of the earth, most of them on a very low standard of living. Except for Western Australia, it is still a colonial world without a foreign policy of its own. Neither Africa nor Australia is important as a war potential and much of the littoral is of no economic significance. Only British India contains economic and industrial possibilities which, together with the enormous man power provided by a population of 400 million, could be translated into an imposing war effort. How much of this will actually become available depends to a very large extent on whether the British can satisfy the demand of the Indian nationalists for dominion status.

More important in the present world struggle than the war potential of British India is the fact that in the Indian Ocean start the only two roads through the border zone into the Eurasian heartland not controlled by Germany and Japan. Conquest of most of the European Continent has placed Hitler in a position to close all the Russian approaches to the Atlantic. But in the south, Russia can be reached from the Indian Ocean by way of the Persian Gulf and the overland routes through Persia. The older one is a primitive motor road from Baghdad to Teheran by way of Kermanshah and Hamadan. The modern one is a railroad which begins at Bandar-Shapur at the head

of the Persian Gulf and crosses over the Persian plateau to the capital, Teheran. From there it travels eastward across the Elburz Mountains to the port of Bandar-Shah on the Caspian Sea. From this port supplies would have to be ferried across the Caspian Sea to Baku for the southern Caucasus, to Makhach Kala for the northern Caucasus, to Astrakhan for the Volga district and Moscow, to Guriev for the Ural district, and to Krasnovodsk for Russian Turkestan and the Kuznetsk district. There are also two overland connections with Russia from Teheran. The first consists of a branch line of the railroad to Kazvin and a road from there to Tabriz which connects with the Russian railroad from Tiflis. The second is a motor road of modest capacity which follows the old Persian highway to Meshed, from where it crosses the northern mountain rim of the Persian plateau and descends into Russian Turkestan to join the railroad near Lutfabad. This whole Persian road system is, however, limited by the very restricted port facilities on the Persian Gulf.

On the northeastern coast of the Indian Ocean, China can be reached by the Burma Road which begins at Rangoon as a railroad and meets the Chinese frontier near Lashio. From there, transportation becomes highway trucking over a long and tortuous mountain road which crosses the ranges of Yun-nan, containing some of the deepest canyons in the world. The distance from Rangoon to Lashio is about 500 miles; from there to Kunming, the former Yun-nan-fu, 726 miles; and from there to Chungking, 300 miles. In its present form and working at full capacity, this road system can carry about thirty thousand tons a month as a maximum, which is small indeed for an army of one million men.

When the United States joined the conflict as a full belligerent, the disposition of forces on the battlefields of the Old World was as follows. In Europe the Russians had been forced back from their frontier by advancing German armies and had suffered great losses, not only in men and matériel, but in war potential and armament industry as the result of the conquest of a large part of Western Russia. The Germans, on the other hand, had the productive capacity of the entire European Continent at their command. The two enemies faced each other along a 2,000-mile front from the Arctic to the Black Sea.

On the Asiatic side of the Eurasian land mass, the front was even longer. It was divided in two principal sections. In the northeast, the Russians and Japanese faced each other with fully mobilized forces, but preserved a precarious peace. This section extended from Vladivostok along the Amur River, around the northern boundary of Manchuria up to Chita. Between Chita and the northern armies of China, the front was thinly held by Russian patrols in Outer Mongolia and Japanese forces in Inner Mongolia. The Chinese-Japanese War had produced a more or less continuous front in the western provinces from Shan-si to the border of French Indo-China. In terms of war potential and war industry, the situation along the eastern front was even more unfavorable than that along the European front. There was a small metal industry to support the Russian divisions in Eastern Siberia and the Maritime Provinces, but almost no industry of any kind with which to supply the Chinese armies. The two members of the Allied group who were doing most of the fighting were in desperate need of supplies that could only come from the war industries of the United States.

In order that goods may reach Russia and China, they must first come to the great circumferential maritime highway around the Eurasian land mass and then pass through the border zone. The extent to which the marginal seas and the coastal belt are in control of the German-Japanese Axis is, therefore, an indication of the seriousness of the situation for the two encircled land powers. By the fall of 1941, the European transit area was in German hands and the marginal seas were invested with submarines and under constant air attack by land-based planes. By preserving a puppet government in Vichy and the theoretical independence of the vassal states of Portugal and Spain, she had induced Great Britain to respect their territories in Africa. The result was that the whole southern littoral from Benghazi to Casablanca was held in reserve for Hitler until such time as he was ready to use it and the same applied to the west coast of Africa down to Senegal and the Port of Dakar.

In the Far East, the Japanese occupied the coast from Saigon to Vladivostok and were in control of the marginal seas north of the Asiatic Mediterranean but they had not yet used their power to close the sea routes to the Russian ports. The island empire's drive across

the middle sea to the Dutch East Indies and Australia had been less successful. She had reached as far south as Saigon along the western shore but her attempt to cross over to the southern littoral had been blocked for the time being. The colonies of defeated Holland had not become available in the same manner as the colonies of defeated France. The sea route from the Pacific to the Indian Ocean through the Asiatic Mediterranean had remained in the hands of the Allies and the Indian Ocean was still dominated by British sea power. Imperial troops controlled the territory through which pass the routes into the Indian Ocean from the European and Asiatic Mediterranean and the highways from this maritime zone to Russia and China. It was in terms of this strategic picture of the distribution of forces and war potentials on the Eurasian land mass that the United States had to begin her war participation, both in terms of military operations and in terms of continued lend-lease aid.

The Transoceanic Routes

The United States, in terms of her location in the northern continent of the New World, lies outside the main field of battle. It is only in terms of her possessions in the Western Pacific that she holds a small section of the front in the Asiatic Mediterranean. She began her participation in the conflict originally as the arsenal for the Allies, a function for which both economic resources and location gave her special advantages. Her war potential was the largest of any state in the world and her industrial centers were still beyond the range of the military forces of the Axis. When the newly created war industries began to go into full production in the latter part of 1941, the United States accepted the additional responsibility of delivery of her output to the fighting forces of the Allies. Control of the routes between the Old and the New Worlds took on a new importance.

1. The Polar Sea

Across the Polar Sea lies the shortest air route from Los Angeles to Yakutsk in Eastern Siberia and from Baltimore to Moscow. Both these centers of aviation industry make long-range bombers, and the

easiest delivery of planes to Russia in terms of distance would be made across the Polar front. The western route lies wholly outside the range of enemy action. It runs from California to Alaska across the Bering Strait to Siberia, and is the only way to Asiatic Russia that cannot be interfered with by Japan. Because bases in Labrador, western Greenland, and Spitzbergen are not available, the eastern crossing must deviate from the great circle route and follow a more southerly direction: from New York to Newfoundland to Iceland and to North Russia. Both the western and the eastern crossing of the Polar front are, however, of very limited usefulness not only because of the lack of well-equipped bases, but primarily because flying weather is unfavorable most of the year.

The eastern route has taken on a new significance as a shipping lane. The German occupation of Denmark has blocked the Baltic, the conquest of Greece, the Dardanelles, with the result that Russia can be reached across the northern Atlantic only by way of the Polar front through the ports of Murmansk and Archangel via Newfoundland and Iceland. From her position in northern Norway, Germany flanks the sea route from these ports to the open ocean. Archangel is open only part of the year, but Murmansk is ice free most of the time because of the Gulf Stream. British naval supremacy may make it possible to convoy transports into these harbors, but it is a dangerous and difficult route and German troops operating from Finland can threaten the overland journey to Leningrad.

2. *The Atlantic*

The most important ocean, from the point of view of aid to the Allies, is the Atlantic. It is narrowest in the north between Greenland and Norway which are separated by approximately 1,000 miles of water, widens toward the south and reaches its greatest width between Norfolk and Gibraltar. South of the thirtieth parallel it begins to narrow again and the coasts of Africa and South America approach each other to within 1,800 miles between Natal in Brazil and Freetown in Sierra Leone. Beyond this point, the ocean again widens toward the south and reaches a second maximum between Buenos Aires and the Cape of Good Hope.

There are three important sea routes across the Atlantic, the northern one to Great Britain, the middle route to the European Mediterranean, and the southern crossing to South Africa. Until the repeal in November, 1941, of the clause in the Neutrality Act of 1939 which prohibited American vessels from sailing through combat zones, the two northern routes were not available for the American merchant marine. Since repeal the Stars and Stripes have joined the other flags in the convoys along the northern sea lane from New York. Over this route moves the bulk of the lend-lease aid, and it is along the later stages that the Battle of the Atlantic is being waged between protected convoys and submarines supported by long-range bombing planes.

The great circle route for destinations in northern Scotland and northern England skirts the coast of the North American Continent and crosses the ocean between Newfoundland and Ireland. This route is relatively the best protected of the three crossings because the American navy can guard the first half from bases in New Brunswick, Newfoundland, and Greenland. Though the United States has no territorial possessions at these points, she has succeeded in acquiring the necessary bases. The agreement for joint defense between Canada and the United States in August, 1940, made Canadian ports available to the American navy. As a result of the destroyer deal with Great Britain in September, 1940, we secured a base at Newfoundland. Then, in April, 1941, an agreement was concluded with the Danish Minister at Washington which gave the United States the right to build naval and air bases in Greenland in exchange for the establishment of a protectorate over this Danish territory.

The final step in securing the protection of the first stages of the northern route was taken on July 7, 1941, when President Roosevelt announced that, at the invitation of the government of Iceland, American forces had occupied the island and would co-operate with the British in the task of guarding this important outpost. In the light of these facilities, we were able to give merchant vessels moving to Great Britain protection for more than two-thirds of the way. It was also announced in 1941 that work was progressing on the construction of bases in northern Ireland which were eventually to be used by American naval forces. After the completion of these latter bases, we

would be in a position to assume full responsibility for the most important of the transatlantic crossings.

The middle route runs from Atlantic seaports to the European Mediterranean. The route beyond Gibraltar would have been practically impossible for American shipping even without the restrictions of the Neutrality Act because German submarines and land-based aircraft made the passage through the inland sea extremely hazardous. This transatlantic lane was, therefore, used primarily by vessels going to the Iberian peninsula and to Morocco. Since all this territory belonged either to the puppet government of Vichy or to the vassal states below the Pyrenees and functioned as loopholes in the British blockade, this shipping was not interfered with in the zone of German naval operations along the west coast of North Africa.

As the Mediterranean route became impossible as a line of supply to the Near East, the British were more and more forced to depend on the route around Africa by way of the Cape of Good Hope. This also gave a new significance to communication between the Atlantic coast of the United States and Cape Town in South Africa. This line runs parallel to the West Indies and the northeast coast of Brazil between the mainland and the Cape Verde Islands and begins the crossing of the South Atlantic from the neighborhood of Natal. The area between the shoulder of Africa and the bulge of Brazil in the general vicinity of the Cape Verde Islands represents the intersection of the great maritime highways across the Atlantic. Through this zone pass the routes from the La Plata to Great Britain, from Cape Town to Great Britain, and from the North Atlantic ports of the United States to South Africa. In terms of lifelines for the British Empire, it is next in importance to the zone between Iceland and Scotland, and it has, therefore, become the second most important maritime battlefield in the struggle for control of the Atlantic.

The Atlantic offers five possible airway crossings. The northern one reaches England by a series of short hops. Beginning at St. John's, Newfoundland, it touches Cartwright, Labrador, a distance of about 450 miles; southern Greenland, 650 miles; Iceland, 750 miles; the Faeroe Islands, approximately 500 miles; and reaches Scotland in a 450-mile flight. This route has the advantage that the longest hop (southern Greenland to Iceland) is less than a thousand miles, a dis-

tance which could be reduced still more if a second base could be made available on eastern Greenland. But this advantage does not compensate for the climatological conditions already referred to which make flying exceedingly hazardous in most seasons. The direct line from Newfoundland to Great Britain on the great circle is, therefore, more important. It is along this course that Pan American clippers flew from Newfoundland to Ireland and that American bombing planes regularly cross to England and that official missions move back and forth.

The next air crossing is the commercial route operated by Pan American Airways to Bermuda, the Azores, and Lisbon. It is flown with the consent of Portugal and will cease to be available if Berlin orders Lisbon to withhold the necessary facilities. During certain periods of the year when the prevailing westerlies between Bermuda and the Azores affect the safety and pay-load, Pan American has flown the return journey from Portugal to New York by way of Portuguese Guinea in West Africa, and Pará in Brazil. An airline is also operated from New York to Cape Town, following the regular route to Rio de Janeiro as far as Natal by way of Puerto Rico, Trinidad, Georgetown, and Pará. From the bulge of Brazil, the planes cross the southern Atlantic to the shoulder of Africa, landing at Bathurst in Gambia. Along this course, Pan American Airways has undertaken for the government a ferry service of bombers destined for the British Near East Command. They fly from Bathurst eastward through the Free French colony of Equatorial Africa to the Sudan and then by way of Egypt to the border zone between the Eastern Mediterranean and the Indian Ocean. The first section between New York and Trinidad is flown between American-held airfields. The base at Georgetown was obtained as part of the general agreement providing for the use of British facilities in exchange for over-age destroyers. The section between Georgetown and Natal is dependent on the consent of the Brazilian government, and the use of the air base in Africa on the co-operation of the British Empire. The African end of the South Atlantic crossing is in an extremely dangerous spot. Bathurst is within the range of fighter planes operating from Dakar, and Germany will insist sooner or later on the use of the air base at that port for operations against the ferry service.

Moving farther south to Freetown or preferably to Monrovia in the semi-protectorate of Liberia would improve the chances of defending the eastern base, but the shoulder of Africa offers no terminus outside the bombing range from Dakar.

3. The Pacific

The Pacific is the largest of the three oceans which separate the Old and the New Worlds. From Bering Strait in the north, it widens progressively toward the Equator to narrow again in the Southern Hemisphere because of the eastern projection of the Australian Continent. The United States maintains control of the Eastern Pacific because it possesses the great naval base of Pearl Harbor in the middle of the ocean and has the possibility of conducting aerial observation and bombing operations from the Aleutian Islands, Midway, Wake, Johnson, Palmyra, and Samoa. But our position in the Pacific is modified considerably by the fact that, in contradistinction to the situation in the Atlantic, the dominant naval power on the opposite coast is our opponent and not our ally. This condition is by no means neutralized by the fact that we do own a series of islands in the Western Pacific. Hawaii is still about 4,000 miles from Yokohama and more than 5,500 miles from the Philippines, and west of the International Date Line begins the maritime zone of Japanese naval supremacy. Her control of the marginal seas north of the Asiatic Mediterranean makes it impossible to reach Chinese or Russian ports without her consent and the crossing to that middle sea must pass through the Japanese-mandated islands. This region is eminently suitable for the operations of submarines and flying boats and the islands, therefore, form a screen between Pearl Harbor and Manila. Such a situation constitutes a serious threat to our supply lines in the Western Pacific.

There are three maritime routes over which American material was being sent to supply the fighting forces of Russia and China when the Japanese opened hostilities. The northern one follows the great circle from the west coast of the United States, skirts the Aleutian Islands, and bends down to the Sea of Japan which it must cross to reach Vladivostok. The second route carries ships from the American

Mediterranean through the Panama Canal to the Asiatic Mediterranean at Singapore by way of Hawaii and Manila. It was envisaged that, in case of war with Japan, we would have to use the more southern passage to Singapore and Manila. This route goes by way of Samoa and Port Darwin and, although much longer, avoids the dangerous area of the Japanese-mandated islands. It is this lane from Hawaii south to Samoa which is taken by ships going from Pacific coast ports to New Zealand and Australia.

Aerial communication across the Pacific was represented by two routes, one to the Far East and one to Australia. Pan American Airways was able to use Hawaii, Midway, Wake, Guam, and the Philippines, islands already in the possession of the United States, as intermediate stations on the course to the Far East. From Manila, one branch went to Hong Kong and one branch to Singapore. At Hong Kong, a connection was made with the Chinese airline which flew from this British island over Japanese-occupied territory to Chungking. At Singapore, the American line connected with Dutch Airways to reach Java and Australia. The American navy was using this route for flying bombers to the Asiatic Mediterranean.

For the most convenient air transportation from Honolulu to New Zealand, the recognized possessions of the United States had proved inadequate. Kingman Reef, about 1,000 miles southwest of Honolulu, although used on the trial flights, was unsatisfactory. The United States, therefore, began to lay claim to other islands along the way. The Boy Scouts camped on Howland, Baker, and Jarvis in 1935, and by their good deeds helped to perfect our title by adding occupation to discovery. In 1938 the United States claimed Enderbury and Canton in the Phoenix group. These islands are approximately halfway between Honolulu and New Zealand, lying about 2,000 miles from Hawaii and about 1,000 miles from Samoa, and Canton contains a nine-mile lagoon well suited to shelter planes. The British, however, refused to recognize our claim and as a compromise solution, we accepted joint control. The route was temporarily discontinued after a small number of flights because of lack of planes and heavy demands on equipment for use in the Atlantic. In November, 1941, service was resumed, thereby providing two possible routes to Australia, the northern route by way of Singapore and the southern route

by way of New Zealand which, after leaving Honolulu, touches Canton Island, the Fiji Islands, Noumea in French Caledonia, and Auckland in New Zealand. The outbreak of hostilities in December caused the suspension of operations on the northern route.


The Encirclement of the Western Hemisphere

Along these sea routes and air lines across the oceans that separate the New and the Old Worlds, war supplies must flow to our Allies and it is along these channels that the power of the United States must make itself felt in the conflict. As long as Stalin's armies fight in Russia, Chiang Kai-shek's troops resist in China, and British sea power rules the Indian Ocean, the Eurasian land mass will remain balanced, and ours will be the deciding role in the power struggle of the Old World. If Russian-Chinese resistance should cease before the exhaustion of the Axis partners, the latter might well succeed in obtaining control of the European and Asiatic Mediterranean and the western and eastern entrances to the Indian Ocean. This would mean control by the German-Japanese partnership of the whole of the Old World except for the British islands across the North Sea, which, sooner or later, would have to surrender. The first strategic objective of our opponents must therefore be to break our supply lines to our allies, to cut our transoceanic routes.

Victory in the Old World would mean for Germany the realization of her dream of a great Euro-African sphere controlled from Berlin. It would reach from North Cape to Capetown and include Europe up to the Ural Mountains, the Mediterranean, and the Near East. It would contain a population of 550 million and represent an enormous agglomeration of power. Victory in the Old World would mean for Japan the transformation of her island empire into a unit of continental dimensions. Her world would stretch from the Bering Strait to Tasmania and include more than half the population of the earth. The New World would then be surrounded by two gigantic empires controlling huge war potentials. The present flow of force would be reversed, the balance of power across the ocean destroyed, and the relative power potential of the two great land masses would

then turn the geographic embrace of the Western Hemisphere by the Old World into political strangulation.

The threat of an encirclement of the United States by a European-Asiatic combination, which first emerged at the time of President Monroe, reappeared at the time of the First World War, and lay dormant in the British-Japanese Alliance, has again appeared, but on a scale undreamt of in former times. Our power position in the world,



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which has always depended on the existence of a balance in Europe and Asia, is now threatened by a combination between unified hemispheres across the seas. The outcome of the Second World War will determine whether the United States is to remain a great power with a voice in the affairs of the Old World, or become merely a buffer state between the mighty empires of Germany and Japan.

Before the Nipponese attack on our island possessions, the thought of a German-Japanese victory in the Old World connoted no calamity to the American isolationist. He accepted the fascist conception that the world should be organized into a few large-scale hegemonic systems operating planned and integrated regional economies. In that "New Order" the isolationist envisaged for the United States a position of leadership over the Western Hemisphere. The New World appeared to him a logical geographic unity and its territory a sound basis for economic and political integration. Because it is surrounded

by oceans, it seemed to offer an opportunity for hemisphere defense through hemisphere isolation, and because of the width of those oceans, it appeared that the integrated states could survive in the coming struggle for power by the adoption of a simple defensive policy.

Taking its cue from the native isolationist argument, German propaganda in the United States had praised the advantages of a policy of reciprocal non-intervention by suggesting that, in a world order based on regional isolation, the struggle for power would cease. If the United States would refrain from interfering in Europe and Asia, then Germany and Japan would be willing to refrain from action in the Western Hemisphere. Under such an agreement, there would be full equality of opportunity for each of the three great powers in their respective regional zones. Each would be left alone to create within her sphere the power structure which the resources of the region permitted.

This argument would have been more convincing if the actual policies of Berlin and Tokyo had not been in flat contradiction to the program so eloquently advocated by the propagandists. Neither the blueprints of the New World Order which appeared from time to time in the Axis capitals, nor the activities of German diplomatic officials in the republics of Latin America suggested that we were to be left undisturbed in our attempts to integrate the states of the New World. On the contrary, German practice indicated a firm determination to prevent at all costs the creation of hemisphere solidarity.

The place for the United States in the New World as it is really conceived by the German and Japanese governments was revealed in May, 1941, shortly after the return from Berlin of Mr. Matsuoko, the Japanese Foreign Minister. The Japanese *Times and Advertiser,* at that time the mouthpiece of the Foreign Office, published an outline of some of the principles that would have to be incorporated into the peace structure in order to make it acceptable to the Berlin-Tokyo Alliance. The terms outlined a world in which the United States would not only withdraw completely from Asia, but also accept a very much circumscribed position in the Western Hemisphere. She would be asked to surrender her island possessions in the Western Pacific, to accept partial disarmament of the great naval base in the Hawaiian

Islands, and to agree to transfer her Pacific Fleet to continental waters. In the New World, her sphere of influence would be confined to the North American Continent, and her strength could not be used for the exercise of hegemonic power in South America. The United States was to accept for herself a policy of non-intervention in that continent but grant Germany and her allies "full equality of opportunity" and "freedom of action" to protect their interests.

In the light of German practice and the use she has made in the Danubian countries of her "equality of opportunity" and "freedom of action," the meaning of these terms leaves little room for doubt. The freedom which Germany asked was the freedom to overthrow by revolutionary action any established government and to replace it by a regime favorable to Berlin. In the "New World Order," the United States would have to rescind the protective policy implied in the Monroe Doctrine and be forced to accept in the sister republics below the American Mediterranean fascist governments controlled from Berlin. The result would be complete encirclement. The ring around her would include the great transoceanic empires across the Atlantic and the Pacific, important sections of the Polar front conquered from Russia, and the South American Continent as well. The real role assigned to the United States by the rulers of Berlin and Tokyo is not that of leader of an integrated Western Hemisphere but of a state isolated, surrounded, and locked up in the North American Continent.

The validity of the policy recommended by the non-interventionists, hemisphere defense through hemisphere isolation, rested, therefore, not only on the assumption that the New World would be strong enough to defend itself against the Old, but also on the assumption that the New World could actually be integrated into an economic, political, and military unit in the face of German-Japanese determination to prevent it. Many of the isolationists accepted the policy of hemisphere defense because it seemed a way of avoiding conflict with Germany, but they overlooked the fact that, even if it could have avoided war with Germany over Europe, it could not have avoided a struggle with Germany for hegemony over South America. Hemisphere defense implies hemisphere integration. The objective of Germany was to prevent this integration at all costs and

to preserve an independent southern continent in opposition to North America.

The German-Japanese Alliance has drawn the United States into full belligerency and the struggle for the allegiance of South America has therefore become more significant. It must inevitably partake of all the characteristics of modern war which is total war. Modern conflicts use many forms of assault. They begin with propaganda attacks on the ideology of the opponent, attempts to disintegrate his social structure, efforts to destroy his faith in himself and his power to resist. International war today begins as civil war. Belligerents attempt to conquer the enemy state from within by means of fifth columnists and to bring into power the group or party willing to accept their control. The economic weapon is used long before the actual outbreak of military hostilities, not only as an instrument in bargaining for economic advantages but also as an instrument of political penetration and domination. It exploits a country's dependence on imports and on exports; the former, by withholding through embargo and export prohibitions essential and strategic raw materials necessary to build military strength; the latter, by refusing access to controlled markets except in exchange for political favors. Both forms of pressure, the psychological and the economic, are used as instruments in the political approach which aims to isolate the opponent, to break up alliances or combinations from which he might derive strength, and to prevent at all costs the building of effective systems of collective security. Military assault is only the last weapon in the struggle for power and is used only if other forms of coercion fail to bring surrender.

In the conflict between the United States and Germany for hegemony over South America, not all the phases of total war are in full operation. Psychological warfare represents today the principal front. The economic warfare was waged with great vigor between 1933 and 1939 but, with the outbreak of war in September of that year and the increasing effect of the British blockade, Germany temporarily lost her economic weapon. She has, however, improved her position in the economic struggle of the future because of her conquest of Continental Europe, the natural market for South American export products. The political struggle is carried on by means of

propaganda and threats of future economic penalties on the side of Germany, and by means of propaganda and offers of present economic benefits on the part of the United States. The intensity of the military phase of the struggle will depend on the freedom of action for overseas operations which the German-Japanese Alliance will be able to obtain, but its full development must of necessity be postponed until the defeat of our Old World allies.

Isolation as a policy for the United States lost many of its adherents in the first emotional outburst with which public opinion responded to the Japanese attack. But unless the assumptions regarding the Western Hemisphere on which the doctrine rested are proved false, there can be no assurance that they will not continue to influence popular thinking about war strategy. When the cost of fighting in Europe and Asia becomes evident, there will come a demand for a defensive policy on this side of the water because of the illusion that we could transform the New World into a power structure adequate to resist the Old. What are the possibilities of actually developing a common front of American states and what would be its strength if such a union can be achieved? The answer to that question will determine to a large extent the dependence of the security of the United States on a balance of power in Europe and Asia.

PART TWO

THE STRUGGLE FOR SOUTH AMERICA

VII. The Two Americas

. . . Mais là s'arrête la ressemblance des deux Amériques, car l'histoire leur a imposé des destinées différentes. Les Anglo-Saxons protestants du Nord, les Latins catholiques du Sud évoluent dans des cadres de civilisation distincts, ils sont de part et d'autre marqués par leur origine.

ANDRE SIEGFRIED

IDEOLOGICAL warfare has been important at all times as an aid to military warfare, but it is particularly so today. Not only have public education and new technological developments made it easier to influence the thinking of the masses, but the present world conflict is a revolutionary war as well as a struggle for power and by that very fact a battle of opposing ideologies. The European partner of the German-Japanese Alliance is fighting not only for land and minerals and power but also for extension of a social and political system. Germany is out to conquer not only bodies but souls, and this means that the conflict partakes of some of the characteristics of the early conquests of Islam, the religious struggles of the seventeenth century, and the French revolutionary wars.

Human beings have a number of elemental needs, desires, and motives. The social system which provides adequate satisfaction and permits ample expression of these requirements through existing institutions and practices is a stable society. When inherent needs and desires are frustrated and repressed, the social system becomes unstable and ripe for revolution. Such an upheaval involves replacing one governing group by another through extra-legal means. It is a social revolution in contradistinction to a palace revolution if the

change comes about with the participation of the people and involves not only a change in personnel but also a change in social system. Under such circumstances, the new rulers take power as leaders of a mass party with a new ideology, and the result is a change not only of magistrates but also of the whole legal foundation of society. It is a popular but erroneous conception that such revolutionary changes always lead to more freedom, more democracy, and increased restriction on governmental powers. There are revolutions and counter-revolutions but most of them, whatever their names, have created governments that exercised far greater control over the citizens than the ones they replaced. Revolutions do not come because governments exercise too much authority but because they exercise it badly or not at all.

Whether a revolution actually will take place in an unstable society depends on a great many factors. The demand for a revolution results from the failure of the government to use the power of the state to solve pressing social problems, but it cannot occur so long as the social philosophy which provides the common intellectual bond for the members of the national group continues to perform its integrating function, so long as national allegiance remains stronger than consciousness of class differences. If the ruling class has not lost the conviction of its right and duty to rule and is willing to use the instruments of coercion and propaganda at its disposal, the revolution cannot succeed. But if the rulers become inefficient, seem unable to deal with riots, or fail to repress civil disturbances, they will lose the support of large sections of the population. There will be a transfer of allegiance by those who refuse to accept any longer the ideology of the ruling class, and by many who continue to adhere to that ideology but who have lost faith in the government's capacity to rule and maintain order. When the transfer of allegiance includes the police and the army, the rulers will have lost both consent and force, the two indispensable factors of government, and conditions will have become favorable for a successful revolution.

An obvious prerequisite of revolution is, therefore, a party with a desire for power and control which offers an alternative to the existing ruling group. To these new leaders will be transferred the old loyalty, and the first task of the revolutionary party then be-

comes the creation of instruments of force and coercion that will re-establish the order which the previous government failed to maintain. A successful revolution begins with a disintegration of society and ends with its reintegration along different lines in terms of a new ideology.

Societies maintain their unity and structure partly through coercion, partly through personal loyalty to leaders, partly through habit, and partly through acceptance of a common social philosophy. This philosophy or "social myth" contains an explanation of the existing social order, justifies its component relations in terms of accepted values, and depicts the social ideal, the future toward which the society is moving. The myth, although more symbolic than factual and without claim to historical or scientific accuracy, will none the less lose allegiance if it incorporates too many contradictions or too many elements out of harmony with human nature or social reality. Unless it is constantly reinterpreted, it must, therefore, inevitably lose strength as a social bond when changes occur in the pattern of life.

When the myth loses vitality, the ruling class is no longer accepted as performing a useful social function, as being a necessary instrument for the realization of the accepted way of life. The rulers then become, in the eyes of a section of the population, oppressors and servants of class interest. Under such conditions a society becomes extremely vulnerable to revolutionary propaganda. It will be pointed out that the old myth is no longer relevant to the new circumstances, that human needs cannot find satisfaction within the existing framework of society, and that there is need for a new order and a new ideology. Revolutionary propaganda is, therefore, in part an attempt to win others to a new philosophy, and in part an attack on the weakened but still prevailing old myth. The new myth cannot be tenderly superimposed on the old; it must make room for itself. All revolutions are at first destructive; they must tear down before they can build up, attack old myths before they can preach new ones, destroy old patterns before they can be reintegrated into new forms.

The Third Reich, created by revolution out of the former German Republic, is now engaged in a struggle with the United States for hegemony over South America and is using ideological warfare as

one of her weapons. This form of assault is a mixture of direct psychological attack and revolutionary propaganda. It uses both an intellectual and an emotional approach and wages the struggle with a variety of tactics. One aim is to destroy the power of moral resistance and to overcome the will to fight. Attempts are made to destroy social cohesion. Social disintegration makes nations powerless to act, incapable of a strong foreign policy, and unable to defend themselves against external aggression. This approach tries to destroy the confidence of the people in their government and to stimulate all actual and potential discord within the nation. The purpose is to transform the integrated national society into a mass of conflicting, fighting, and quarreling groups. Public opinion is confused and stirred up against the government by rumors, illusions, suggestions, lies, and agitations; and social disintegration is fostered by inflaming all potential conflicts whether of ideas or of material interest. In Europe the Germans exploited racial antagonism, whipped up anti-Semitism, encouraged distrust and hatred among ethnic minorities, stimulated class feeling between capital, labor, and middle class, and excited religious intolerance.

Another approach, the positive revolutionary technique, aims to create within each state a branch of the National Socialist Party. Its task is to be the advance guard of propaganda and agitation, to induce the government to follow a friendly policy, and ultimately to take over the state. It has to win friends and influence people. For propaganda abroad, Germany cannot use the whole of her revolutionary ideology. Some of it is obviously applicable only to Germany, and some of it, propagated abroad, would make enemies instead of friends. Whatever may be the revolutionary zeal of the priesthood of the new faith, and however unshaken its conviction about the absolute and eternal validity of its doctrines for all times and all places, it is not permitted to preach its visions uncensored. Revolutionary ideology must remain the servant of the German state and subordinate itself to the requirements of power politics. It is, therefore, a very much expurgated edition of Nazi ideology that is exported abroad, and it usually arrives in different wrappings in each individual country.

The doctrine of the superiority of the Aryan "race" is hardly use-

ful in countries in which no Aryans live, but the conception of racial inequality and difference in biological endowment can be preached everywhere. The theory that certain races are predestined to rule over others and that such dominion reflects the order of nature is a doctrine to which many people can be won wherever different races live together. Only certain countries will be receptive to the new pagan ethics with its shift of values from reason to instinct, from reflection to action, from spirit to body, from moral restraint to vital force, and from compromise to struggle. Wider will be the appeal of the new faith, the philosophy of optimism, the reaffirmation of the possibility of shaping human destiny through collective effort, the attempt to dispel the spiritual impotence resulting from the economic depression by a dynamic will to action.

It is, however, neither the racial doctrines nor the individual ethics that are most consistently preached abroad. The real export articles are the economic, social, and political doctrines of the new faith. Other nations are invited to copy Germany, adopt her solutions for the evils and inadequacies of liberal democratic regimes, and enjoy a similar protection against the danger of communism and Jewish international finance. That National Socialism, notwithstanding its opposition to communism, implies a complete control of economic life and a system of national planning as a substitute for the free market and the individual decisions of business men, is not stressed abroad except in certain circles. What is presented is a neo-mercantilistic reaffirmation of the supremacy of the political over the economic life. What is stressed is the need for a totalitarian state, for a political organization strong enough to assert itself over the large agglomerations of private power which the industrial system has permitted to develop in the form of large-scale monopolies and vast labor unions. This presentation has the advantage of providing an appeal to all classes. It offers to labor a state that will control the industrial monopolies; it offers to capital a political organization that will keep labor in place, and to sections of the middle class a road to security through national planning.

The social theory stressed in this propaganda is an organic theory. It denies the validity of the doctrine of the social contract, refuses to see society as association, as the mechanical result of the action of free

individuals. It insists that society is a community, a living dynamic organism. This implies not equality but inequality of the component elements, a social hierarchy in which each should occupy an allotted place, should work not for self-gratification but to serve the needs of the collective whole. In such a society government must inevitably be government by an elite, not in the sense of an hereditary caste, but in the sense of rulers specially endowed by nature and trained from early childhood for their function as leaders. Government cannot be the task of individuals elected by an ignorant mass; it must be entrusted to a qualified class of rulers.

In this conception of the nature of society there is no room for the existence of an individual apart from his state and, therefore, no room for a realm of absolute freedom in which the individual retains inalienable rights and in which his government cannot interfere. The concept of personal liberty which the British, the American, and the French revolutions bequeathed to modern democracy implies an unwarranted restraint on the sovereign power of the totalitarian state. Besides, such checks and balances are unnecessary because the one-party state provides a better protection for the freedom of the individual citizen than the concept of inalienable rights in decadent liberal democracies. The Führer as personal leader of the nation provides all the protection citizens could possibly need. From him emanates the magic quality which permits him to divine what his people really want and need. An American president has to divine his mandate by an inspired interpretation of the meaning of election returns. A true Führer can dispense with the paper paraphernalia and intuitively feel the needs of his people without resort to the ballot. It is indeed an appealing theory for times of crisis, a tempting ideology for all who feel the urge to serve their people through personal leadership.

When propaganda in a foreign country has been successful to the extent that a National Socialist Party has been formed, it becomes the task of this group to advocate co-operation with Germany. On the negative side this means to convey the thought that the Third Reich has no aggresive designs on the country in question, and that there is, therefore, no reason for fear or apprehension about her present conquests. On the other hand the party should also convey the idea that Germany's triumph is inevitable, that she rides on the wave of

the future, and that resistance to her is futile. Promises of rewards for those who join in time, prophecies of dire consequences for those who resist, are among the methods of persuasion, but the most effective instrument in this propaganda is an actual demonstration of power and success. Each victory brings new adherents, each conquest new converts, and the moving pictures of successful campaigns, carefully edited to convey an impression of irresistible force, merely multiply the effect.

The general aims of National Socialist propaganda in the Western Hemisphere are exactly what they were in Europe, to encourage isolationism, to heighten national particularism, to inflame conflicts between states, and to prevent by all means the development of Pan-American unity and effective concerted action. It tries to create the belief that Germany has no designs of any kind either economic, territorial, or political on any part of the hemisphere, and it attempts to destroy in each nation the power and the will to resist. For both these purposes, it uses not only long-distance propaganda from Berlin itself, but in each state an organization which, whatever its name, remains an instrument of German foreign policy, an agent of the German Foreign Office. As part of the struggle for power between the continents, Germany fights a civil war in each nation of this hemisphere, and, if the latter is successful, military action will not be necessary. The New World will have been conquered from within.

Anglo-Saxon America

A propaganda machine that has managed to create social cleavages in every country of Europe on the basis of the existence of ethnic minorities and the doubtful racial distinctness of the Jew could not ask for a more ideal land in which to exploit its talents than the Western Hemisphere. The composition of the peoples of the New World is the result of the immigration of different racial and ethnic groups, and three hundred years has not sufficed to create an approximation to homogeneity. The Indians, the Caucasians, the Negroes, and the Mongoloid Orientals have intermarried in different sections and preserved relative purity in others. The different European nationalities which came to the Western World have been subjected to

both natural and artificial processes of assimilation, but the persistence of separate ethnic groups is an indication that the process has failed to absorb fully the large numbers that moved into the New World in the period preceding the First World War.

1. Racial and Ethnic Composition

The United States is probably as mixed racially and ethnically as any state in the Western Hemisphere. According to the census of 1930 * the population was 122 million of which 108 million belonged to the Caucasian race, approximately 12 million to the Negroid race, and slightly more than 2 million to the Mongoloid race. The Negroid minority is almost exclusively composed of American-born Negroes, but the Mongoloid minority is represented not only by American Indians and a Mexican population which is mostly Indian but also by 200 thousand Orientals.

There have been race conflicts between whites and Orientals along the Pacific coast and minor frictions arising out of social segregation and economic competition between whites and Mexicans in the Southwest, but the most important and potentially the most dangerous race problem is represented by the relations between whites and Negroes in the South. Although the treatment of the Negro in the cotton belt varies considerably from that of the Jew in Germany, there is none the less an ideological orientation toward the race question not dissimilar to that of National Socialism. About Aryan superiority there is no doubt. The Negro carries with him in modern society the historical stigma of his slave origin. The amendments to the constitution are a magnificent expression of the rights of man, but they have neither removed the social inequality of the Negro nor have they guaranteed him real equality of civil and political rights. He is not wanted for jobs that involve more than unskilled labor, and his position in the social structure remains that of a member of an inferior and subject race. In the social and psychological tension which race friction inevitably brings with it, both the communists and the fascists have found a fruitful soil for agitation.

The Caucasian majority represents neither racial nor cultural

* In the fall of 1941 the census figures for 1940 were not yet available.

homogeneity. It includes all the sub-races of Europe and all the nationalities of that continent and the Near East. In 1930, 13 million people in the United States were foreign-born and 25 million people were of foreign or mixed parentage, the two groups representing respectively 11 and 21 per cent of the population. The group that might be called most truly American from the point of view of cultural orientation, the native-born white of native parentage, represented only little more than half of the population, in actual figures 57 per cent. The most important of the foreign ethnic groups, other than the descendants of Anglo-Saxon stock, were the Germans, Italians, Poles, Irish, and Russians. Many of these are actually loyal citizens devoted to the United States, but they represent, none the less, a considerable part of the population in which assimilation is incomplete and in which foreign propaganda might find a fertile soil.

The Germans constituted in 1930 a group of almost 7 million of which 1½ million were foreign-born and the remainder were native-born of German or mixed parentage. More than half a million people of German stock lived in New York City alone, and there was a heavy concentration in Chicago, Philadelphia, St. Louis, Detroit, Cleveland, and Milwaukee. In fact, nearly every city with a population of 100,000 or over had a large German colony. The people of Italian stock were 4½ million, of which almost 2 million were foreign-born. Foreigners of Polish extraction numbered over 3 million, of which more than 1 million were born abroad. The nationalities next in importance numerically were the Irish and the Russians. The country also contained a Jewish population which was estimated at about 4½ million. Although neither a racial nor a national group, it functions none the less in certain respects as an ethnic minority. A large number of Jews preserve enough of their traditional cultural and religious pattern to set them apart from the majority of the population, although they are by no means homogeneous.

The composition of the population of the United States has a rich and varied texture, and, although she is still called an Anglo-Saxon country, the relative importance of that stock has considerably declined as a result of the predominance of Central and Eastern Europeans in the immigration of the last fifty years. Assimilation has been

imperfect as the existence of the hyphenated Americans suggests, and the result is that our nation has a great many ethnic fault lines ready to become fissures and lines of cleavage under stress and strain. There has usually been resentment on the part of the older population against the new immigrants, and the Atlantic crossing did not always wash out the historical antagonisms of the Old World.

Imperfect assimilation means that a considerable part of the population continues to live intellectually, emotionally, and politically not in terms of the United States but in terms of its former residence and allegiance. This section avails itself of the opportunity which our political system offers and attempts to influence the government at Washington in the direction of a policy which would aid its own ethnic groups in Europe. The result is that all European quarrels create ethnic frictions on this side of the water, that every European war becomes potentially a domestic conflict, and that it is almost impossible to obtain universal support for a strong American foreign policy toward the Old World.

In Canada the racial and ethnic composition, although not as varied as in the United States, has in recent years begun to show considerable complexity of pattern. The climate is not conducive to the development of plantation crops, and there was, therefore, no reason for the importation of black slaves, a fact which has kept the Dominion free from the serious racial problems which confront the United States. There is some race conflict along the Pacific coast because of a small immigration of Orientals, but it is comparatively mild in character and of small dimensions.

The ethnic origins of the population in 1931 were reported as follows: British 52 per cent, French 28 per cent, Germanic 6 per cent, Slavic 6 per cent, and Scandinavian 3 per cent. In regard to one of these groups, the French Canadians, concentrated particularly in the Province of Quebec, there is practically no assimilation of any kind. The Dominion to the north is not, like the United States, an ethnic agglomeration in a more or less advanced stage of assimilation, but a country with more than one nationality like Belgium or Switzerland. The French Canadians, who were the early settlers and antedated the British conquest, have for generations maintained their ethnic and cultural identity. Encouraged by their Catholic Church, they continue

to live as a separate community using the French language and French law. They give Canada a second nationality with all the difficulties and weaknesses which this involves.

2. *Economic and Social Structure*

Both Canada and the United States have built on their large territories a modern, capitalistic, credit economy with a highly developed industrial system supplementing a vast extractive economy devoted to agriculture and mining. It is characterized by a lavish use of mechanical energy which, because of the great output per worker, permits a high standard of living. Manufacturing added a new economic class to the social structure with distinct interests, different from those of the farmers, and introduced a struggle between industry and agriculture over the division of the national income. Because of the enormous size of the countries and the specialization in certain geographic regions, this opposition has taken on the form of a regional conflict. It was originally, in the United States, a conflict between North and South, and is now, both here and in Canada, a conflict between West and East.

Economic and political freedom under a "laissez-faire" system combined with almost inexhaustible resources and a large market have aided the trend toward monopoly and concentration of economic power. Organization of capital in large super-corporations is now being matched by organization of labor in huge unions, and the struggle between them for the relative share of profits and wages is taking on gigantic dimensions. There is a tradition of violence in labor disputes and a tendency to use middle class vigilante groups to break up strikes, an approach to social problems which makes for receptivity to Nazi ideology.

There were indications in the depression years that frustration of the hopes and aspirations of the middle class is as fertile a soil for Nazi philosophy in this country as it was in Europe. Contrary to the expectations of Karl Marx, advanced capitalism does not actually diminish the relative size of the middle class although it does tend to squeeze the group between the pressure of capital and labor. North America in particular is a country in which the middle class is

extremely numerous. The farmer is not a peasant but a small independent business man, and a large section of skilled labor lives, not in terms of a proletarian philosophy, but in terms of a middle class ideology. It has a standard of living that compares favorably with the middle class of Europe and has been traditionally very conscious of the fact that its social rank is superior to the class of unskilled labor which has always consisted of the recent immigrants from the Old World.

The United States has today a social structure of great fluidity in which no fixed social hierarchy is perceptible. There are, of course, social gradations, but they do not function as class barriers or castes unless they run parallel to racial differences. There was once an aristocratic society in the South based on slavery and an hereditary caste of large landowners. There was a business oligarchy in New England based on industry, shipping, and foreign trade. Both of these patterns survive as pale reflections of former days in these two regions of the Atlantic coast, but the country as a whole, and particularly the part west of the Alleghenies, operates its social structure almost exclusively in terms of a middle class democracy. Large numbers of people in the United States live in sections of the country far away from the state in which they were born and work at occupations which give them a social status unlike that of their parents, and they expect that their children will differ again as much from them as they differed from their elders.

Under these circumstances of geographic and social mobility it is extremely difficult to develop class consciousness in the European sense of the term, a consciousness of unalterable class difference and inevitable class conflict. Notwithstanding the fact that the frontier is closed and that pioneer days are over, a considerable percentage of the population now engaged as wage laborers expects to become its own boss. It thinks not in terms of its present position but in terms of its middle class status of the future. The result is that the American labor movement has, on the whole, been less receptive to Marxist revolutionary ideology than that of any other country. This is, however, no guarantee that a nation with such a broad middle class orientation will be similarly unresponsive to Nazi revolutionary ideology. Notwithstanding the long tradition of democratic proce-

dure, it would be unwise to assume in the light of the easy acceptance of the proto-dictatorships of certain southern governors that the American people would not change their form of government if it failed to provide for their needs.

3. Government and Politics

Both Canada and the United States derive their political systems from early British practice and their legal systems from English Common Law, with the principle of individual liberty declared in a Bill of Rights. The state is organized as a federal union and operates as a representative democracy on the basis of a free vote expressed in a secret ballot.

In the United States a predominantly middle class orientation and absence of sharp class divisions prevents political life and party organization from operating along class lines. It is true that the Democratic party contains a large part of the city proletariat and that the Republican party is enriched with a large sprinkling of bankers and business men, but the former also represents the conservative sections of the South and the latter the progressive farmers of the West. In both parties the broad middle class forms the central bloc, and this fact contributes significantly to the preservation of liberal government and the prevention of political extremism.

4. Culture and the Social Myth

North American ideology, as might be expected, is essentially a middle class business ideology. Although the original population is becoming increasingly diluted with continental ethnic groups, the prevailing outlook remains none the less predominantly Anglo-Saxon in orientation. Its roots go back to Puritanism and the English Protestant Reformation, to the rationalism of the French eighteenth century, and to the English Utilitarians. From the Protestant orientation come powerful impulses toward a democratic view of life, a strong sense of social responsibility, a missionary spirit, and an urge to transform society and eradicate human suffering. Self-control, moral discipline, and the belief that goodness and industry will be

rewarded with prosperity were confirmed by the actual facts of frontier living which anchored much of the Puritan morality deep in our middle class ideology. The value of industry, perseverance, and sincerity was proved by experience. The country, however, was too rich and its resources too lavish and easily won to encourage much frugality and thrift.

The heritage of seventeenth-century Puritanism is responsible for one of the characteristic features of our approach to international relations. Because of its concern with ethical values, it has conditioned the nation to a predominantly moral orientation. It makes our people feel called upon to express moral judgments about the foreign policy of others and demand that our presidents shall transform the White House into an international pulpit from which mankind can be scolded for the evil of its ways. The heritage of eighteenth-century rationalism has contributed another characteristic feature, a legalistic approach, and a faith in the compelling power of the reason of the law. This almost instinctive preference for a moral and legal outlook on international affairs tends to obscure for the American people the underlying realities of power politics.

The political theory contained in our social myth is embodied in the Declaration of Independence which proclaims that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain inalienable rights, that among these are life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness, and that to secure these rights governments are instituted among man deriving their just power from the consent of the governed. This political creed expresses a religious conviction concerning the divine nature of man which demands respect for human dignity. It declares that government is not an end in itself nor is the individual a mere tool of the state; both government and state are created to serve the individual, to aid him in the full realization of his God-given talents.

Our economic philosophy continues to profess an abiding faith in freedom of contract, the value of individual initiative, and the need for "laissez-faire." It preserves many of the ideas of Adam Smith. American business still believes that an invisible hand guides the economic process and that an intelligent selfishness and a free and

unhampered operation of the price system will produce the greatest good for the greatest number. But in the realm of economics, actual practice and social myth have already parted company. We continue to pay lip service to "laissez-faire" but insist on increasing intervention by the government; we hail the principles of free trade but operate with tariffs, subsidies, and monopolies. We believe in rugged independence, but industry, agriculture, and labor all receive special benefits from the state, and the management of the economic system is becoming more and more a function of government and less and less that of the entrepreneur.

The myth and the faith which it engendered and which provided the social cohesion of our civilization have lost much of their effectiveness. As a social philosophy the myth is in flat contradiction to social experience and no longer in harmony with actual practice. The social system which liberalism inaugurated has failed to bring the promised benefits, and economic progress seems to have ended in permanent technological unemployment. These two developments have greatly undermined the hold of democratic liberalism on the people. Large sections of the population have become indifferent and lost faith, and smaller sections have definitely transferred their allegiance to communism and fascism. The myth is badly in need of reinterpretation and reconstruction.

Freedom of opportunity means little in a period of permanent unemployment; free trade means less in a world of universal state subsidies; "laissez-faire" sounds unreal in an era of government control; individualism seems irrelevant in times of state socialism; and the beauties of democracy appear remote when all our cries are for a strong executive and masterful leadership. There is need for a new social philosophy, for a formula that will reconcile the values of individual freedom and social security, that will harmonize respect for the worth of the human spirit, the dignity of the individual, and the need for personal liberty with the requirements of social discipline and centralized control of social and economic planning. Up to the middle of the last century liberal democracy was a fighting doctrine that nailed its banner to the barricades and inspired revolution. In its present form it only re-echoes feeble affirmations of the value of

personal liberty; it has lost the character of a militant faith and seems unable to take the counter-offensive in the war of propaganda against the revolutionary force of National Socialist ideology.

Latin America

Around the American Mediterranean and on the continent to the south lies the world of Latin America. If the word "America" suggests similarity, the word "Latin" should underline a difference. The other America is expected somehow to be like our own because it is a part of this hemisphere, but the actual differences between the Anglo-Saxon and the Latin sections of the New World far outweigh the similarities suggested by the common term American.

The world to the south of us contains twenty independent republics of varying sizes and shapes, in different stages of economic development and with diverse mixtures of populations. The chapter on the geography of the Western Hemisphere has sketched some of the principal features of the great land mass and indicated the infinite variety of climate and environment that condition the life of our southern neighbors. It is a world as rich in contrasts as Asia, stretching from the hot tropical swamp lands on the Caribbean littoral to the bleak wind-swept coasts of Tierra del Fuego. It contains straw villages along the banks of the upper Amazon; Buenos Aires, the bustling metropolis that tries to imitate Paris with the energy of Chicago; and quiet provincial cities tucked away in the valleys of the Andes looking like models of old Spanish towns projected against a backdrop of white-capped volcanoes.

Latin America is a world of many nations. It is true that the majority speak Spanish albeit with different accents, but modifications of Castilian are by no means the only tongues in the world to the south. Portuguese is the language of Brazil, the largest state with the greatest population, and the people of the little republic of Haiti speak French. Among the Indian populations, there is not only a great variety of dialects but several distinct language groups. The world beyond the Rio Grande is a world of infinite variety, and the inhabitants of each state are proud of their differences and imbued with a fierce nationalism. It is none the less true that all of them stem from

a cultural world and an intellectual tradition which differ from our own and that they have a great many features in common distinct from the Anglo-Saxon pattern and justifying the use of the inclusive term Latin America.

1. Racial and Ethnic Composition

In the area immediately beyond the Mexican Gulf, the mainland has a population of predominantly Indian blood and the islands a population of predominantly Negro blood. The original Indians on the islands were unsuited for plantation labor and have largely disappeared, and the population consists today of a mixture of whites and the descendants of imported slaves. Cuba, Santo Domingo, and Puerto Rico contain a certain percentage of whites as well as mulattoes, but the West Indian colonies of the European powers are almost exclusively black.

The mainland littoral from Mexico to Venezuela includes a population made up of descendants of Spanish conquerors of whom a small number have maintained themselves as a landholding aristocracy preserving the purity of their race. The native Indian population was not exterminated as it was in North America but used as labor, and there is, consequently, a very large percentage of Indian blood in the present population. There are still pure Indian tribes living in remote mountain districts but the majority of the population consists of mestizos, the descendants of Indians and whites. To these elements have been added Negro immigrants from the West Indies who have settled in hot coastal districts and intermingled with the mestizo population.

The American Mediterranean is in general not a tempting area for European immigration, but the highlands have none the less attracted people from Italy and Germany. The Italians have a considerable colony in Venezuela, and the Germans have small but important colonies in the same state and in the four Central American republics. In Mexico they are outnumbered by both the British and the Americans.

The population pattern of Ecuador, Peru, and Bolivia is very similar to that of Mexico and Central America. This part of the

west coast was, because of distance, climate, and topography, unattractive to European immigration with the result that the ethnic composition of the population was less disturbed in the nineteenth century than that of any other region of the Western Hemisphere and the original pattern of colonial times better preserved. Fifty per cent of the population of Bolivia is pure Indian, and the figures for Indians and mestizos combined approximate 90 per cent for all these republics, leaving a white population of 10 per cent or less. Paraguay in the hot upper regions of the La Plata drainage basin has a similar racial pattern. The population is almost exclusively Indian, and the principal language is not Spanish but Guarani.

The east coast of South America repeats in reverse order the east coast of North America in terms of racial and ethnic composition. In the Guianas and northern Brazil the population is black, descended from the early slave labor that was brought in to work on the sugar plantations. Toward the south the percentage of whites increases, and the states which form the heart and economic center of Brazil contain a large number of recent immigrants. The Portuguese in northern Brazil have been less insistent on racial purity than the Spanish colonists in the highlands with the result that there has developed in the northern coastal provinces an Ibero-African population. It differs considerably from the almost white population of the southern states which continues to rule the vast country politically.

The temperate zone of South America, which includes the southern part of Brazil, Uruguay, the Argentine, and Chile, has a population pattern that approaches that of the United States with two important differences. It contains almost no Negroes, and its white population is predominantly drawn from the Latin people around the Mediterranean. Both the Argentine and Chile contained originally a small Indian population, but the tribes were unsuited for slave labor and had not been prepared for serfdom by the national socialist regime of the ancient Incas. In so far as they were not destroyed and exterminated, they now live on reservations or have become incorporated in the population, but Indian blood represents only a very small percentage of the total population. The pattern of colonial times has been considerably transformed by the immigration of the nineteenth century, which was principally Spanish and Italian, but also German

and to a small degree English and Central European. Chile seems to have drawn on the Basque provinces and the northern sections of the Iberian peninsula for her Spanish immigration. She thereby obtained a hardier and more energetic type of people than the Andalusians who seemed to favor other parts of Latin America. This fact is usually offered as a partial explanation for the difference between the energetic Chilean and the other inhabitants of the west coast.

In recent times Italian immigration has been almost as numerous as Spanish immigration. More than two million Italians have moved into the Argentine in the last fifty years, and they also form a large percentage of the European influx into Brazil. In the state of São Paulo they represent one-third of the population, and they compose one-half of the city of Rio de Janeiro. There has also been considerable immigration into Chile, and Italians form a large foreign colony in Peru.

South America has been an important destination for German emigration since the last quarter of the nineteenth century. The total number of Germans in Brazil is estimated at approximately one million, of which probably 50,000 are first-generation immigrants born in Germany. They are important in the coffee states but are concentrated most densely in the two southern states of Santa Catharina and Rio Grande do Sul. In the Argentine the population of German descent is estimated at a quarter of a million with probably 50,000 German born. They are more dispersed than in Brazil, although there is a good deal of concentration in the state of Buenos Aires as well as in the territory of Misiones which borders the German section of Brazil. Experts differ profoundly on the number of Germans in Chile. Their figures for people of German descent vary from 60,000 to 200,000, all of them guesswork because there has never been a census of nationality. The German element lives in fairly large concentration in the southern section of the Central Valley, but it is also important in the urban centers. Peru, Bolivia, Paraguay, and Uruguay all contain small German colonies, but they have never been as attractive to German immigrants as the countries farther to the south.

Latin America knows no race problem in the sense in which it exists in the United States or in South Africa, but it would be a mis-

take to assume that race and color play no role in the articulation and stratification of the social structure and provide no lines of potential cleavage. Social segregation is much less evident than in the United States, and the Latin consciousness of race difference is apparently not so strong as that of the Anglo-Saxon. The fact remains, however, that the social value of being white is very great and that the social scale roughly follows skin color from light to dark, either toward red or toward black. Geography tends to preserve this gradation by maintaining parallels between racial and economic groups. In the humid tropical zones only blacks can do sustained manual labor, and on the high plateaus of the Andes physical work can be done only by native Indians whose barrel-shaped chests and enormous lung capacity are an indication of their adjustment to high altitudes. In the extreme south, new white immigrant groups are working themselves up in the social scale. In Brazil, color segregation is less marked, but in the rest of the continent the composition of the population preserves its ancient character. It consists of a small aristocracy and upper middle class which is white and descended from the Spanish and Portuguese conquerors, a mestizo or mulatto lower middle class, and an Indian or Negro working class. The predominant pattern of Latin American society is that of a nation ruled by a racial elite.

2. *Economic and Social Structure*

Latin America is in a process of transformation away from the agrarian feudal regime of colonial days toward a modern individualistic, commercial, and industrial society. European immigration and European and American capital are superimposing on the simple extractive economy of former days the whole network of institutions that goes with modern capitalist society. The process is upsetting established traditions, creating new classes, disturbing the balance of power between the old classes, and causing tension and friction all through the social structure. The transition is further advanced and has penetrated most deeply in the temperate zone, but it is operative all through the American Mediterranean and the southern continent.

In the social structure which has come down from colonial days, the upper class consisted of a small number of great landowners liv-

ing on large estates or in elaborate town houses in the capital. They were enormously wealthy, highly cultivated, cosmopolitan in cultural outlook, and spent part of their time in Europe, mostly in Paris and on the Riviera. Next in social scale came the upper middle class, originally a class primarily of intellectuals. It was made up of the professions, the military and the academic world, the higher government officials, and the politicians. The economy had room for only a small lower middle class of artisans, shopkeepers, and clerks, and the mass of the people consisted, therefore, almost exclusively of a laboring class. In sharp contrast with the life of ease and luxury of the upper classes was the misery and poverty of the laboring classes and the landless peasant who continued to work in many sections of the country, under conditions that can only be described as serfdom, long after slavery was officially abolished.

In a feudal aristocracy based on large landholding there is no economic road to social advancement, and, as education was limited to the upper classes, learning also provided no avenue of escape. The social structure was, therefore, of great rigidity and accepted as a natural order, a conception to which the Catholic Church, with its emphasis on piety, conformity, and respect for authority, gave ecclesiastical approval. If it had not been for frequent political revolutions, society would have remained a rigid and water-tight caste system. The army and politics offered the only possibility of advancement for exceptional individuals, and revolution the only portal to higher ranks of society. But revolutions were only temporary interruptions. Latin American society believed in the aristocratic tradition as a way of life and in a social structure that would express the values of orderly hierarchy and avoid the chaos of egalitarianism.

In this feudal society in which most of the wealth was concentrated in the hands of large landholders, the economic penetration of modern capitalism brought great changes. It began with an enormous extension of the production of foodstuffs and raw materials for European markets and the exploitation of the mineral resources other than gold and silver which the Spaniards had left largely untouched. This has been followed, particularly since the First World War, by an increase in industrialization, especially in the A.B.C. countries of the temperate zone. The result has been the emergence of a new upper middle

class, a great expansion of the middle class, and the creation of an urban proletariat. Merchants, industrialists, and bankers now challenge the exclusive position of the landholder. A new group of managers, engineers, and technicians has been added to the former professionals and intellectuals, the class of retailers has expanded with the increasing urbanization, and both commerce and industry have increased the demand for clerks and manual workers.

This economic transformation developed class frictions and shifts in the struggle for power. The result in almost all countries is a tension between the old landowning class and the new entrepreneurs of commerce and industry. There are differences of interest, and they find expression in political opposition, but the quarrel is not over democracy, in which neither party believes, but over the direction of social and economic planning and over the relative cost which is to be borne by each party. Not the new capitalist, but the new middle class, is demanding equality of opportunity, a democratization of political life, honest elections, and a change from a government of men to a government of laws. This demand for a liberal regime by the new middle class has so far won only limited support. In most countries the conservatives are still firmly entrenched and difficult to dislodge from their position of social and economic pre-eminence.

Industry and urbanization have also created a city proletariat and aided the emergence of a labor movement. The percentage of workers organized in unions is still small, and the unions are patterned after European rather than after North American examples. Immigration from Spain and Italy brought not only an increasing class consciousness but also radical doctrines, revolutionary approaches to labor problems, and factional disputes between anarchists, syndicalists, and communists. Because industrial and mining enterprises are in many instances foreign concerns working with imported capital, labor conflicts tend to be magnified by national antagonisms. The foreign character of many of the large manufacturing concerns is also in part responsible for the fact that many of the countries which are industrially still quite backward have, at least on paper, very advanced social legislation. Legislatures controlled by native agrarian interests have shown little concern for labor costs of foreign enterprise.

Social legislation which tried to improve the fate of agricultural labor was, of course, a different story and has not been encouraged by the landowning class.

More dangerous to social cohesion than the emerging labor struggle is the potential conflict that lies hidden in the existence of a great landless peasantry. The specter of agrarian revolution hangs over much of Latin America, and the advisability of dividing up the larger estates either by purchase or nationalization is a burning issue from the Rio Grande to the Strait of Magellan. Mexico has been the first to take action, and her revolutionary approach to the problem contains evil forebodings for the landholding aristocracy everywhere. It is, however, by no means certain that dividing the large estates is the most adequate solution for the agrarian problems of the southern continent. It has been recognized since Aristotle that prosperous independent farmers contribute an element of social stability to the life of nations, and it was once believed in the United States that they were a prerequisite for a successful democracy. Nobody, however, has yet solved the problem of efficient and profitable cultivation of coffee, cotton, sugar, and other tropical products on small holdings without the use of slave labor. Latin American society, in transition from feudalism to modern capitalism, is full of stresses and strains, full of the frictions and potential conflicts that form ideal points of attack for propaganda and psychological warfare directed against the integrity of the social structure and the sense of unity of the national group.

3. Government and Politics

There are as yet few elements in Latin American society predisposed toward Anglo-Saxon liberalism, and it is extremely doubtful that the existing oppositions and class conflicts will work themselves out by means of the orderly processes of democratic government. Not only is the social structure not conducive to democracy, political habits are against it, and it represents a pattern that fails to express the accepted values of large sections of the population. A person who prefers the verdict of a paper test to that of a real test of strength is no representative of the ideal of South American manhood. Latin

American political tradition is not that of the ballot box but that of dictatorship tempered by revolution.

It is true that the American colonies revolted against George III because of what they considered unwarranted interference in their economic and political life, but compared with the system of colonial government in Latin America, the people of the northern continent had practically dominion status. The Spaniards fortunately did not come to America to seek political freedom or religious liberty because they certainly did not find either. Spain systematically denied her colonies opportunity for self-rule. She granted a very limited degree of municipal self-government through participation in town councils, but important affairs were all regulated from the home country by an absolute monarchy. Government posts were reserved for officials sent out from Europe, and no one born in America had an opportunity to display his administrative talent. Spanish rule offered no opportunity to learn the difficult art of self-government.

Independence from Spain did not end dictatorship and absolutism. In the early years of freedom, the new republics in a wave of idealism adopted constitutions similar to that of the United States, and a form of government more unsuited to the needs of the post-colonial social structure with its large illiterate population could not possibly have been devised. Geographic and social realities soon reasserted themselves over paper constitutions, and after a period of anarchy there emerged a political pattern that has been characteristic of Latin America ever since: government by the "Caudillo," the military dictator. There was no middle class on which to build an opposition party to the landowner and not enough literacy to conduct a system of free elections. The state was too abstract a concept to inspire political action, and national issues were too far removed from the real life of the Indian and Negro. For broad masses of the population there could be no allegiance to principles but only to persons, and personal leadership, therefore, had to become the most important institution of government.

The dictators did not destroy the democratic institutions; they used them and interpreted them. They were, of course, determined to stay in power and give their countries the continued benefit of their wisdom and experience, but they were not basically opposed

to elections so long as their own representatives could count the votes. They never achieved the magnificent record of Mr. Hitler in the well-conducted plebiscites of the early years of his regime, but they usually managed to count a safe majority. Only if majorities produced by this procedure would seem unconvincing did they set aside the constitution and postpone elections for reasons of national emergency or interest of state. The result of this tendency toward permanency in office was inevitably revolution, the only procedure left for obtaining a change of government. Many of the revolts have tried to take on the guise of social revolution, but in most cases they turned out to be merely palace revolutions which involved nothing more than a change of rulers. No fundamental social transformation followed, and the so-called revolutionary program was usually forgotten once power was obtained.

Toward the latter part of the nineteenth century the habit of revolt seemed to weaken in the A.B.C. states, and there were actually long periods of an approximation to democratic forms of government and changes in administration on the basis of free elections. But dictatorship remains ingrained and inevitably emerges in periods of crisis. Since the depression of 1930 there have again been revolutions in most of the Latin American states, inspired by military leaders. Latin America, both in theory and in practice, believes in the "Führer Prinzip," and its traditional form of government is that of personal dictatorship.

4. Culture and the Social Myth

The Latin American world represents a cultural tradition entirely different from that of Anglo-Saxon America. It was shaped by an aristocratic not a democratic society, nurtured by a landed gentry not a commercial middle class, and its religious overtones are Catholic not Protestant. Much of its social philosophy has been left untouched by the democratic revolutions of England, the United States, and France. Its writers and poets have paid glowing tributes to the doctrine of the "rights of man," but until quite recently the southern continent has lacked the commercial middle class which in Europe and North America has been the main support of a liberal political regime.

The Spanish feudal society that ruled during the nineteenth century believed in a set of values very different from those of the New England Puritans. Not the creation of wealth, but the possession of wealth and the cultured use of leisure found social approbation. Not thrift, but gracious spending; not labor, but relaxation; not business honesty, but class honor commanded the devotion of the gentleman. Spanish society was a formal society with emphasis on good manners, ceremonial customs, and gracious and rich conversation. Like all aristocratic societies it despised manual labor and looked down upon business and commercial pursuits. Its sons went into the army, into the service of the government, or studied for the professions, preferably for the law. The economic development of the nineteenth century has created in most countries a new business class, but it still ranks below the great landowners in social prestige, and it has not yet impressed its commercial values on the national cultures.

More important than the business community in shaping Latin American culture are the church and the army, which embody the values most dear to the Spaniard—religion, honor, and courage. The aristocratic societies of the southern continent have a great admiration for the purely intellectual pursuits but tend to neglect the scientific and technological in favor of the literary and artistic aspects of life. There is widespread interest in poetry and music and a fine appreciation of literary style. The Spanish gentleman is an extreme individualist, and this aristocratic type of individualism continues to color Latin American society. It is very different from Anglo-Saxon individualism in that it does not derive from a concept of individual rights to which all are entitled, nor does it contain the Protestant overtone of social responsibility. Spanish individualism is a predisposition toward anarchy. It demands that the individual, because of his individual uniqueness, shall be free to do as he pleases and thinks best without need for social conformity. It is not these qualities, admirable in themselves, that make Latin America difficult to understand but their exaggeration which turns individualism into selfishness, love of leisure into laziness, and the gift of literary elaboration into mere verbosity. It is in the face of these exaggerations that the practical,

matter-of-fact Yankee despairs of ever comprehending his fellow American below the Rio Grande.

In the century since independence was achieved, it has been France rather than Spain that has been the source of cultural inspiration. The upper classes have gone to France for the completion of their education, obtained degrees in French universities, and spent their winters in Paris. French architecture from the Ecole des Beaux Arts to Corbusier has influenced recent Latin American building and town planning; the French romanticist, its literature; and the French post-impressionist, its painting. But these European features represent an upper class culture; the lower classes remain Indian and Spanish in religion and approach to life.

The dichotomy thus produced is heightened in all countries with a large Indian population. It appears racially as a struggle between mestizos and whites, and culturally as a dispute between those who believe that the future national life should be built exclusively on European elements and those who feel that it should be enriched and vitalized with elements from the native Indian culture. This issue has played a role in the Mexican revolutions and in the Aprista movement in Peru, and it represents a potential conflict in the whole Pacific littoral from the Rio Grande to the Chilean border.

There are important cultural variations in the different states of Spanish America as well as considerable differences between Portuguese Brazil, French-speaking Haiti, and the Hispanic republics. But the fact remains that they resemble each other far more closely than any of them resembles North America. The instinctive orientation toward life is traditionally neither in terms of commercial benefit nor in terms of moral judgment but in terms of honor and prestige.

The previous pages have briefly sketched the two Americas, Anglo-Saxon and Latin. They exist in the same hemisphere, but they represent two different worlds, different in racial and ethnic composition, different in economic and social structure, different in political experience, moral values, and cultural orientation. Faced with the threat of German psychological warfare and revolutionary propaganda, what are the chances of winning the people of Latin America to co-operation and concerted action with Anglo-Saxon America? What, in the light of the various tensions and oppositions in the

national societies of the New World, are the chances of creating an adequate defense against the onslaughts that aim at social disintegration? What is the relative predisposition of the nations of the New World toward Anglo-Saxon democracy or totalitarian dictatorship? What are the possibilities of creating a common ideological front under the leadership of the United States?

VIII. Propaganda and Counter-Propaganda

The place of an artillery barrage as a preparation for an infantry attack will in the future be taken by revolutionary propaganda. Its task is to break down the enemy psychologically before the armies begin to function at all.

ADOLF HITLER

THE present period of world conflict is not the first time in history that the nations of Latin America have been courted and their favors sought by the Great Powers. Even ideological and cultural propaganda is for them no new experience. The motive has, however, traditionally been more economic than political; the purpose, to win Latin America as a market not as an ally. The countries below the Rio Grande could not make an effective contribution to the struggle for power in Europe or Asia, and there has, therefore, been little reason to court them for military aid, but the drive for markets which inspired the new imperialism in the latter part of the nineteenth century created a great interest in their economic possibilities.

The Early Suitors of Latin America

In the competition for trade with Central and South America, the Latin nations of Europe have tried to strengthen their position by claims of cultural affinity. Similarity in ideology and cultural outlook has been used as a way to win good will and co-operation. Italian contacts with Latin America date from recent emigration, but the Italians who went out to Brazil and the Argentine soon lost their national identity. Italy is, therefore, poorly placed for such propa-

ganda in comparison with Spain who has contacts both in terms of historical tradition and in terms of recent emigration, and in comparison with France who is the cultural and spiritual motherland of all educated Latin Americans.

1. *Spain*

The Hispanic-American movement began in the early nineties of the last century, but it became important only after the Spanish-American War. The severance of the last political bond with the New World and the spiritual renaissance which followed shortly thereafter seem to have created a resurgence of cultural imperialism not unlike that which inspired, at least in part, the early conquest of America for Christianity and the mother church. The new imperialism was, however, not a religious but a cultural imperialism and inspired not by the church but by the universities. The leaders not only hoped to preserve a cultural identity between Spain and the New World, but they expected that the spiritual affinity of the Hispanic-American people which would be preserved through their efforts would give Spain a preferred position in the struggle for markets. In certain circles there was talk of customs unions in imitation of the Pan-Americanism of Blaine, and some even hoped that a "Zollverein" might become a road to political hegemony, that the mother country might recapture through this new form of leadership in the Americas her old position as a world power.

The movement for Hispanic-American unity found whole-hearted support in intellectual circles, and for thirty years Spain has wooed her lost daughters culturally and ideologically. The universities and academies established "Centers of American Studies," "Institutes of American History," and courses in American Law and Economics. In this connection the word America meant, of course, not the United States but the America below the Rio Grande. Latin American students were tempted to attend Spanish universities; Spanish professors went on lecture tours, preceded and followed by good will missions of statesmen, bankers, business men, and artists. On both sides of the ocean banquets and receptions were held for distinguished visitors, speeches and orations were delivered, and long resolutions were

adopted affirming in rhythmic and melodious language a spirit of solidarity, mutual admiration, and good will.

The total effect of this long orgy of filial love was very small indeed and the economic and political consequences almost imperceptible. The reasons are not far to seek. It did not appeal to Brazil who thinks of herself as Portuguese, and it did not really win the intellectual classes in the countries to the south which are in spirit and feeling more French than Spanish. There was no economic basis for the trade which was envisaged and no possibility for reciprocal political support. The economic and political relations of Spain to the New World were of the past and not of the future. The mother country could not absorb the main exports from the lands across the Atlantic, and the relatively small industrialization of the Iberian peninsula could not provide the southern continent of the New World with the capital goods or the credits which it needed for its development. Spain was a second-class power and could obviously be of no assistance to the republics below the Rio Grande in solving their outstanding political problem which was to find a counterweight to the power of the United States. Hispanic-American solidarity was doomed to remain largely an exercise in rhetoric, an expression of noble sentiment, without economic or political consequences.

2. *France*

The second cultural approach to Latin America was made by France which, as a matter of fact, was more pursued than pursuing. France was the intellectual and artistic inspiration for the educated classes of both Spanish and Portuguese America, and it required very little effort to keep this favored position. Paris fashions and French luxury goods have met little competition in their appeal to the preferences of the Latin American buyers. With the "Alliance Française" operating in most of the capitals and a limited number of visiting professors lecturing before Latin American audiences, the cultural situation has been kept in hand, but the results outside of the luxury trades have been economically unimportant and politically without consequence.

3. Great Britain

Non-Latin nations have had no opportunity to build commercial good will in terms of vague ideological and cultural similarities and have, therefore, been forced to seek different lines of approach. It is true in one sense that the British have been cultural imperialists, that they have spread some of their economic and financial practices and social and political institutions over much of the world, but they have not made any particular effort to export their artistic creations. This is perhaps just as well because the Latin American temperament does not seem to respond with enthusiasm to British architecture, painting, sculpture, and music, and only mildly to English literature. But Great Britain has none the less built an important place for herself through the quality of her products, the inevitable influence that flows from large-scale investments, and the social and economic importance of her resident communities. She is influential in Chile and Brazil and represents the most important foreign influence in the Argentine.

4. Pre-Hitler Germany

The Germans have no cultural affinity with either the lower or upper classes in Latin America. Before National Socialism, which added political and social doctrines to ideological propaganda, there was, therefore, little opportunity for a cultural approach. German penetration was, like that of the British, due to the quality of their export commodities, their willingness to grant long-term credits, and their readiness to take infinite pains to please their customers. They used the German communities, which in a great many countries had preserved their cultural identity, as the spearhead of their economic penetration, and in so far as they made an ideological approach to the Latin American world, they wisely limited themselves primarily to the fields of science and technology in which they could make important contributions.

5. *The United States*

The earliest suitor for the favors of Latin America in the last quarter of the nineteenth century was neither Spain nor France but the United States. The great industrial expansion which followed the Civil War led to an interest in export markets for manufactured goods, and it seemed logical to direct foreign trade expansion toward our sister republics below the Rio Grande who had up to that time been provided principally by Europe. Interest in the Latin American market and a desire to obtain a privileged position and preferential treatment in the competition with Europe were the principal motives behind the new Pan Americanism fostered and led by the United States. It gradually developed into a general movement for inter-American co-operation, but it was in origin primarily a super-colossal trade promotion scheme in dignified attire. This made it different in spirit and in purpose from the early Pan American movement which had inspired some of the leading personalities in the two Americas in the early quarter of the nineteenth century. That movement had an idealistic instead of a commercial inspiration and a political rather than an economic objective. It led men of vision to dream of political co-operation and a system of common defense for the states of the Western Hemisphere against the Old World from which they had only recently obtained their independence.

One idea, however, was transferred from the old Pan Americanism to the new and used by the United States as a cultural motif in the ideological approach to the Latin American world. It was the concept that the New World was basically distinct from the Old, that the states on this side of the Atlantic were similar in spirit and ideology and resembled each other more closely than they resembled the nations of Europe. This thesis of a Pan American identity, cultural affinity, and similarity of political outlook was a noble idea, but completely invalid as our analysis of the two types of civilization has already suggested.

Pan Hispanism had a cultural reality but no economic basis; Pan Americanism had an economic basis but no cultural reality, and it was faced by stubborn political facts which hampered its success from the

start. As the economic and political power of the United States grew, she became not loved but feared and distrusted. The war with Spain, intervention in the American Mediterranean, dollar diplomacy, and Theodore Roosevelt's interpretation of the Monroe Doctrine made us appear more like an enemy than a friend. The distrust came not from misunderstanding; our neighbors understood us too well. There was little that ideological and cultural propaganda could have done to make them change their minds. Not even a course of compulsory reading in Emerson, Longfellow, and Mark Twain in every lycée below the Rio Grande could have made Latin America forgive and forget *el imperialismo yanqui.*

Modern man has an unshakable faith in the healing power of cultural education. It is, therefore, not surprising that the Pan American movement should have displayed great interest in the exchange of artistic and intellectual products of the two Americas and that it should have passed resolutions on the need and beauty of mutual understanding which it instructed the Pan American Union to achieve. This cultural approach became particularly significant in the years following the First World War when, in imitation of the League of Nations, the Pan American Union was provided with a Division of Intellectual Co-operation that began to foster more intimate contact between the intellectual and artistic institutions of the two continents and to encourage exhibitions of art and translations of noted works of literature. It brought together distinguished journalists, noted educators, and other personalities strategically placed to influence public opinion. The political results of the great cultural campaign have been nil, and it is extremely doubtful that its efforts have sold a single motor car or a single refrigerator. Fear and distrust of the United States have become considerably less in recent years, but the change is not due to a better understanding of our culture but to the basic shift in our attitude toward Latin America symbolized in the Good Neighbor Policy.

The Fascist Offensive

During the period of the First World War the Great Powers added to their predominantly economic interest in Latin America a

concern with its political orientation. It was of some importance to the success of the British blockade whether the states of the New World acquiesced in British methods of economic warfare or fought them with counter-measures. Both Germany and the Allies, therefore, sought to win the good will of the nations of the Western Hemisphere. During the early years of the war when the United States was not a belligerent, she was not interested in achieving a common neutrality policy with the Latin American states, but after her entry into the war as an associated power she pleaded the necessity of active collaboration in economic warfare by the sister republics.

The Second World War has once again created competition for the good will of Latin America. They are again being flattered and courted from all sides. The German objective, as suggested in the last chapter, is to weaken the power of resistance in the individual states against the Nazi program of expansion, to obtain in each state a party favorable to its program, and to prevent the achievement of hemisphere solidarity.

The new psychological warfare is prepared with all the care and attention to meticulous detail that has characterized German military campaigns since the first von Moltke. It rests on the one hand on the application of the latest scientific and technological achievements in the field of psychology and the social sciences, and on the other hand on a careful and detailed analysis of the peculiarities of the intellectual and moral terrain on which the battle is to be fought. Tactics are adjusted to the specific character of each state. Organization is thorough and reaches from Berlin right down into the home of the German coffee merchant in São Paulo or the wool grower in southern Chile.

Propaganda comes from Germany in the form of radio broadcasts and news reports, but the really important instrument seems to be the local organization in each country for which the diplomatic and consular service functions both as staff and as command. The program apparently calls for the creation of two separate types of organization, one recruited from the local German minorities and the other from the indigenous population. The Third Reich tries to put into actual practice a doctrine which President Coolidge once preached, that national sovereignty extends to the citizens and their property wherever

they may be. Germany has expanded this idea to include not only German citizens (*Reichsdeutsche*) but also the citizens of other countries, if they are of German descent (*Volksdeutsche*). The Teutonic minority is expected to function solely for the benefit of the Third Reich and to be a willing and well-disciplined instrument of her foreign policy. The result is that all nations with large German minorities are exposed to the danger of finding themselves some day with a small German state within their borders and a National Socialist state at that.

In order to prepare the German minority for this function it must obviously be preserved as a separate and distinct entity with its ethnic and cultural character intact. The propaganda aims, therefore, to counteract all attempts of the Latin American states to assimilate their Teutonic immigrants. Germany, even before the National Socialist regime, was interested in preserving the German language and encouraged through separate schools and churches the continuation of German community life. Since the establishment of the Third Reich, this objective has developed into a desire to transform the German communities abroad into replicas of the Nazi Germany at home. In states in which the German minority is sufficiently concentrated to permit a separate community life, attempts are made to create a National Socialist party complete with *Gauleiter*, Storm Troops, Hitler Youth, and Gestapo. Every German should become a good Nazi and a propagandist for the new regime in his contact with the native population, and the community as a whole should provide the semi-military organization that proved of such tremendous advantage in the German conquest of Europe.

In the Old World German residents performed the function of espionage and sabotage, created confusion by wearing the uniforms of the country in which they operated, and in conjunction with large numbers of "tourists" occupied bridges, strategic road centers, and airports in advance of the invading army. In the New World their function will undoubtedly be the same when invasion comes, and in the meantime they are expected to provide a private army available for any native fascist movement which might attempt a coup d'état.

Sections of the German community can be used for these purposes because many of its members approve of the new German regime and

are in sympathy with its aims and aspirations. They take pride in Germany's new military strength, are convinced of her ultimate victory, and anticipate with pleasure the important and authoritative position which the German minority will then occupy in Latin America. Adherence to the new regime is, however, by no means unanimous and those who cannot be won through propaganda must be won through coercion. The German officials have a long repertoire of pressures to choose from, and they have been used with good effect. They include simple physical coercion and terror through the local Gestapo, economic boycott and the destruction of the livelihood of individuals through control of jobs or trade with Germany, and blackmail through the threat of action against relatives in Germany.

The Italian and Spanish minorities in Latin America have, of course, been enlisted in the campaign. Germany has called on her two Latin allies for support. The former citizens of Mr. Mussolini have been brought into the propaganda activities of the totalitarian powers, but they have proved much less useful than the Spaniards. The Italian immigrants have lost much of their original ethnic identity and have been largely assimilated into the indigenous population. Even the more recent arrivals have proved to be too individualistic and undisciplined to be effective agents of Italian policy. More valuable as an instrument of penetration for fascist ideas have been the Spanish colonies and the Falange organizations supported by Franco. It is these groups that have been conducting a totalitarian version of the old Pan Hispanic propaganda and keeping alive the fear of Yankee imperialism. This approach contains, however, inherent difficulties. The sections of the population which are most Spanish in cultural affinity are the more recent immigrants which also represent the sections least inclined to favor Franco. If handled with care, the relatively small Falange organizations can be used as a useful diversion on the flank of the main ideological attack.

The ultimate objective of the Axis campaign is a national government favorable to the totalitarian cause and the activities of the foreign ethnic minorities must, therefore, be supplemented by a national fascist party. For this approach to the Latin American community, the German minority is excellently equipped. It is true that in many sections it has preserved its identity, but it also can command the

services of a number of able individuals of German descent who are fully conversant with the language of the country, have adopted many of its customs, married Latin American wives, and live in intimate contact with influential sections of the native community. They serve as focal points for the dispersion of National Socialist ideology.

That propaganda in favor of a strong national state organized on fascist principles finds a sympathetic ear in many circles in Latin America should cause no surprise. In the republics below the Rio Grande there are many individuals who would profit from the "New Order," and the very nature of the social structure makes the states vulnerable to fascist ideology. There are many sections of the population for which the expurgated edition of the Nazi doctrine offered on this side of the Atlantic has an appealing sound.

In several Latin American countries there are former dictators thrown out by a palace revolution who form the nucleus of potential opposition parties probably quite willing to receive outside aid in their attempts to return to power. The great landowners are firmly convinced that democracy is a dangerous doctrine and that only a strong state can preserve national order in a period of transition. The conservative industrialists, like their colleagues elsewhere, are disturbed by a rising labor movement and particularly aroused by the dangerous social implications of its radical tendencies. Certain elements in the Catholic hierarchy, although resentful about the treatment of the church in Germany, are definitely pro-fascist in orientation. They favor the kind of fascism that Dollfuss gave to Austria, Salazar to Portugal and Franco to Spain. The new doctrine also makes an appeal to sections of the intellectual middle class temperamentally opposed to the drab procedures of democratic government and intellectually prepared by their reading of Sorel and Pareto for the role of theoretical exponents of the New Order.

More important, however, than any of the groups mentioned so far, is the army. Without the aid of the army there can be no successful coup d'état; without the support of the armed forces a National Socialist party cannot hope to maintain itself in power. If the time should ever come that Germany needed to take military action in Latin America, it would be exceedingly helpful if harbors and strategic air bases were held by friendly factions in the local military

forces. The Germans have, therefore, made very special attempts to win friends in influential army circles, a campaign in which they have been greatly aided by the natural predilection of a certain type of soldiers for a fascist regime.

In Nazi Germany civil society has been transformed in the image of the Prussian army. Its ideology embodies the idea that the nation should be run by men able to command on the basis of competent staff work by specialists. The notion that a society should be guided by the votes and free discussion of its citizens seems as insane to her rulers as trying to plan and execute a military campaign on the basis of the votes and free discussion of the private soldiers. The German people have been provided with the equivalent of an all-pervading military hierarchy of command and are expected to find psychological compensation for discipline and obedience in an intimate sense of comradeship in the ranks. This idea of giving civil society the benefits of military organization is a concept that appeals to a great many army men in Latin American states as well as in other countries.

The most successful instrument for this approach has been the military mission aided by free trips to Germany for study purposes and a lavish generosity with honors and decorations. These would, however, not have sufficed if it had not been for the actual success of German arms and the apparent superiority of German strategy and tactics. The soldier is a technician and a pragmatist and inevitably impressed by actual achievement. German officers have acted as instructors in Latin America ever since the victory of Germany over France in 1870. They trained the new army with which Chile won the War of the Pacific in the eighties and have been important ever since. Germany's defeat in the First World War and the failure of the German-trained Bolivian army to win the Chaco campaign temporarily obliterated her military glory, but since her recent rearmament she has again become a worthy example. The success of her new tactics in mechanized and aerial warfare which led to the conquest of the Continent of Europe has once more made her the unquestioned leader in contemporary military science. It is not strange that the victory of German arms should be interpreted as proof of the validity of fascism as a social regime, and that in Argentina, Chile, and Brazil important sections of the army are not only fascist in spirit and pro-

German in orientation but convinced of the ultimate victory of Germany.

In her ideological warfare and fascist propaganda, Germany has found allies in all countries, but the campaign has by no means been a universal success. The countries in Latin America to which Hitler has devoted most of his efforts are the Republic of Mexico, Panama, and the A.B.C. states of South America, politically the most important group. Mexico was the target for a great deal of German propaganda in the last war and seems to be as interesting to the Third Reich as she was to the Second. The campaign is much more intelligently conducted than it was the last time, but the results to date have been very modest.

Fascist propaganda in Ecuador and Peru has been both Italian and German, but in the other countries of South America, the Teutonic member of the Axis has been the predominant influence. Both Bolivia and Paraguay have in recent years had forms of government which started out according to the classic pattern of Latin American revolutionary dictatorship but which took on many of the features of the German model. The government of Colonel German Busch which seized control of Bolivia in May, 1938, not only abrogated the constitution, dissolved the congress, and set up a strict censorship of the press, but it also introduced compulsory national service for boys and girls, passed anti-Semitic legislation, and attempted new types of national economic planning. Negotiations were under way for intimate economic collaboration with Germany and development by the latter of tin deposits and the oil resources confiscated from the Standard Oil Company. The outbreak of the European war prevented the materialization of this plan. Colonel Busch has since been succeeded by a more liberal regime. The new government reported in July, 1941, the discovery of a plot for a coup d'état inspired by the Bolivian military attaché in Berlin and the former finance minister, which, if true, would suggest that fascist circles are by no means ready to cease their political activity.

Absence of a broad commercial middle class in Bolivia and Paraguay makes it difficult to find mass support for a fascist party. But the fact that the proletariat, consisting mainly of Indians, is politically inert makes such support unnecessary. The small totalitarian middle

class groups are able to exert a political influence out of all proportion to their number. In the Argentine, Chile, and Southern Brazil, where the population is predominantly white, the economic structure more advanced, and the proletariat both class conscious and politically alert, political control needs support from broader sections of the population. The middle classes in the A.B.C. states created by the economic and social transformation are, however, by no means whole-heartedly for the totalitarian cause. On the contrary, they represent on the South American Continent the people most devoted to political democracy and personal freedom, the very people for whose allegiance Washington and Berlin are struggling.

In the Argentine, the totalitarian philosophy has many adherents in army and navy circles, and particularly in the air force, and finds spokesmen among the intellectuals. The native fascist groups have been actively striving for political control and appealing for financial support to the great landowners and industrialists. They have achieved some importance in local politics, and the government of the province of Buenos Aires, which rules over a quarter of the population of the country, has been conducted for a number of years on fascist principles.

In Chile, ruled in recent years by a "Popular Front" government, political tension runs very high. The fascist parties receive moral support from the church hierarchy and financial support from the conservatives. A coup d'état in September, 1938, was defeated, and in the election which followed, the "Popular Front" remained victorious. It would, however, be too optimistic to expect that the future of democracy in Chile is permanently assured.

In Brazil, German influence has long been significant not only because of the large German minority, but also because of the importance of German trade. The *Integralista,* the strongest of the fascist parties, received support from both Germany and Italy and felt itself strong enough in 1937 to contemplate a coup against the government of President Vargas. The latter forestalled this threat by absorbing the party into his own following, making himself dictator, and then dissolving the *Integralistas.* The attempt of an extremist faction of the Party to assassinate the President and overthrow the government in May, 1938, was unsuccessful, and the position of the

President since that time has become stronger. A new constitution has been promulgated on the pattern of the corporate state, congress dismissed, legislation replaced by executive decree, a censorship placed on the press, and freedom of speech restricted.

The *Novo Estado* is, according to its adherents, a new kind of democracy, but its practices show a remarkable similarity to fascist techniques. President Vargas works with a government which is composed partly of people favorable to the United States and democracy and partly of people pro-German in feeling and pro-fascist in orientation. He preserved a balance between the two factions until the end of 1941 when he began to co-operate closely with the northern republic.

In the A.B.C. countries with their large Teutonic minorities Germany has found enough adherents to create semi-military organizations modeled after the Brown Shirts of the Fatherland. Their principal task, as suggested, is to provide additional shock troops for the support of native fascist movements, to assist in revolutionary coups d'état, and to hold strategic points if Germany should ever contemplate military action in South America. Premature disclosures have suggested that this role is somewhat too tame for the more adventurous spirits, and that a program for the establishment of German states in Patagonia, Southern Chile, and in the corner between Brazil, Uruguay, and the Argentine would more truly express their revolutionary and dynamic nature. It is, however, unlikely that such attempts will be permitted until Germany is really ready to profit from the results.

The Democratic Counter-Offensive

German ideological campaigns have not been limited to Latin America. It was obviously the foreign policy of the United States, not that of the states of the southern continent, that would determine the influence of the New World on the outcome of the war in Europe and Asia. To discourage our full participation was, therefore, the most important objective of German propaganda directed at the Western Hemisphere.

In his attacks on the national unity of the United States and his attempts to encourage internal opposition and group conflicts, Hitler

followed approximately the same procedure as elsewhere. For purposes of social disintegration through ethnic groups, the Third Reich could depend in this war only on the German people in the United States. The other European ethnic groups represented peoples subjugated by Germany since her conquest of the continent, and they were anti-German and not available as pressure groups for a policy of non-intervention. Only among extremist circles in the Irish community was there enough hatred of Britain to inspire individuals with a desire to become fighters for the German cause.

The German propaganda organization kept in close touch with the various native fascist and proto-fascist organizations and provided them with isolationist and anti-Semitic literature. But their following was small and they were hardly worth the effort necessary to keep them going. More important from the German point of view were the patriotic and loyal native organizations which had accepted the theory that a German-Japanese victory could not hurt the United States and which wanted, therefore, to keep out of war by refusing aid to Britain and her allies.

The general ideological approach used in the United States was to suggest that Germany was going to win this war and that there was nothing the United States could do about it. The conflict would be over long before American rearmament could begin to produce results and long before effective aid could reach Great Britain and her allies. But there was no reason to fear German victory because the Third Reich had no aspirations in the Western Hemisphere. She was ready to agree to a policy of non-intervention in the New World in exchange for a similar promise on our part in regard to Europe and Asia. On such a basis, a German victory would not be a danger but a blessing for the United States. It would create a unified orderly Europe from which war would be banished for a thousand years and which would offer the American business man unlimited commercial opportunities. If the United States, however, were unable or unwilling to recognize her true interests and persist in a policy of aid to Britain and her allies, she would merely create new zones of conflict and find herself sooner or later involved in a war in two oceans in which there could be no victory.

The German campaign in the United States was by and large

a failure. Public opinion continued to support President Roosevelt in his policy of increasing support to Great Britain and her allies notwithstanding the protests of a vociferous minority. The government in Washington was not taken in by any declarations of disinterest in Latin America and preferred to be guided by facts instead of by promises. It accepted the challenge of a struggle for the allegiance of Latin America and decided to take the counter-offensive in the countries below the Rio Grande. It realized that this required a new form of diplomacy, one that would supplement our well-written "notes verbales" and "aides-mémoires" with something more dynamic in character, that would streamline our traditional ideological approach. The administration asked for a revitalized Pan Americanism, a campaign to promote mutual understanding and to win support for the values of democracy.

1. Culture to the Front

Notwithstanding the very limited success which our ideological approach had achieved in the Pan American movement, we continued to follow the same line. Our faith in the value of cultural rapprochement was unshaken, and we were still convinced that reciprocal understanding would lead to mutual appreciation and that this would bring about effective co-operation. In order that the new campaign might be pushed with great vigor, there was established in July, 1938, in the Department of State a Division of Cultural Relations. The title discreetly suggested that its activities would embrace all countries of the world, but it was clearly understood that in actual fact its energies would be directed at Latin America. One of its functions was to administer the Convention for the Promotion of Inter-American Cultural Relations signed at Buenos Aires in 1936 on the occasion of the Pan American Congress assembled in that city. It contained elaborate provisions for the establishment of a regular exchange of students and professors among the universities of the New World. The Division was also to promote exhibitions of artistic work, to encourage translations of examples of distinguished national literature, and to perform all the other symbolic gestures that go with a faith in intellectual co-operation.

The new government office stimulated private organizations to a study of Latin American affairs, called a long series of conferences in Washington to discuss all possible and imaginable forms of co-operation, and devoted itself to its task with all the energy compatible with diplomatic restraint and good manners. The results were apparently inadequate, and it was felt in higher circles that the cultural approach pursued by the State Department was not yet the last word in ideological warfare and that better integration between its activities and those of the departments which occupied themselves with economic questions might be an advantage. To achieve this purpose, President Roosevelt created an Office for the Co-ordination of Commercial and Cultural Relations Between the American Republics. The new director assembled around him a staff of vigorous young business executives and energetic "public relations" experts and began to study new forms of approach that would speak with the appeal of advertising and the conviction of cash. Emphasis was placed on the improvement of transportation and communication, the encouragement of travel, and the development of a commercial intelligence service.

Government and private enterprise have thrown themselves into the new campaign with all the fervor and enthusiasm of a religious crusade. Latin America is the fashion; it is more, it is a mission. The broadcasting companies have accepted the German challenge and are providing the republics to the south with a constant stream of entertainment and news. The great news agencies are making special efforts to give the Latin American press more adequate information about North America. *Time* is publishing a special air mail edition for distribution below the Rio Grande, and *Reader's Digest* appears in Spanish translation. The movies have agreed to pension their Latin American villains and to select their gigolos from Lusitania and Ruritania, the only countries that have not registered diplomatic protest about Hollywood's assaults on national character.

Cultural rapprochement is going full blast, at least in North America. The pattern, first devised by the leaders of the Pan-Hispanic movement, has been taken over by us and enlarged into something stupendous. The Rotarians, Kiwanis, and Lions are eating their luncheons to the accompaniment of speeches on Brazilian economics.

The women's clubs of the country meet to knit for British soldiers and listen to lecturers who make them sigh over the cultural hunger of Peruvian Indians. Night classes all over the country are swarmed by people who want to learn Spanish. Every up and coming university is increasing its courses on Latin America and holds at least one institute a year on South American problems. If the co-operation of our Latin neighbors is dependent on the popular appreciation of the rhumba in the United States, the future is indeed bright.

2. Attack by Resolution

The new emphasis on direct propaganda did not mean that the United States had deserted her traditional Pan American approach. On the contrary, the Roosevelt administration has used every opportunity offered by recent conferences to plead for concerted action against the common enemy. Mr. Hull has repeatedly warned the states of the New World of the threats to their security that result from foreign propaganda. He has asked his fellow statesmen to take action against the cynical effrontery with which an evil technique has used the sanctuary of free speech for the very purpose of obliterating the institutions of liberty and fomenting dissension, prejudice, hatred, and fear.

The sudden adoption by the United States of the role of champion of non-intervention has inspired many a discreet smile in South America, although the conversion is graciously accepted without too many indelicate questions about the past. It is remembered, however, that in the prehistoric time before Franklin D. Roosevelt inaugurated his Good Neighbor Policy, delegates from the United States vigorously fought all resolutions in Pan American conferences that sought to incorporate the principle of non-intervention in the public law of the New World, and even the Roosevelt administration saw the light only gradually.

The enormous expansion of our economic interests in Central America, the size of our investments, the habit of revolution of our sister republics with its attendant danger to life and property, the radical views about the obligations of debtors in an era in which high finance still believed in Victorian puritanism, all conspired to give us

a vital interest in the internal political life of our smaller neighbors to the south. Theodore Roosevelt felt that the Monroe Doctrine clearly implied that we were responsible for the actions of our southern neighbors vis-à-vis Europe, and that we, therefore, had the right to keep them in order. President Wilson felt that they should learn the superior values of democratic elections and, therefore, refused to recognize governments that had achieved power through force. Both with and without the benefit of these doctrines we have used military occupation, economic pressure, and non-recognition as instruments of intervention with which to keep in power governments we liked and to ease out governments that failed to meet our approval.

In 1928, at the time of the Pan American Conference in Havana, our sister republics expressed vigorous disapproval of our practice and tried to bind us to a policy of non-intervention in the future. Secretary Hughes was willing to make a promise in regard to military intervention but unwilling to renounce the right of interposition. This did not satisfy our neighbors and after a long and acrimonious debate it was decided to postpone the issue. Postponement did not, however, lead to abandonment. On the contrary, when the next conference met in Montevideo in 1933, the Latin American states were determined to secure action. The atmosphere of the conference seemed less bitter partly because the Roosevelt administration had made some announcements which seemed to foreshadow a change in policy. On the other hand, Washington had just refused to recognize the Cuban government of Grau San Martin and had concentrated war vessels in Cuban waters. This display of force was, of course, only intended as a precaution and a protection of American lives and property, but the Latin American neighbors thought that the guns were there to underline Washington's intention to have a voice in the internal politics of Cuba.

The problem of intervention came before the Montevideo Conference in connection with a Convention on the Rights and Duties of States. Article 8 of that convention states that: "No state has the right to intervene in the internal or external affairs of another." The United States delegation suggested the appointment of a committee of jurists whose task it would be to define the terms of the conven-

tion and provide a clear distinction between diplomatic protection in case of a breach of international law and the type of intervention that was to be renounced. Opposition was, however, so strong that this proved impossible. Every small state which had been the object of our benevolent concern with its internal affairs spoke up to denounce the practice of intervention, and they were supported by Mexico and the Argentine. The foreign minister of the La Plata Republic reaffirmed its traditional opposition to all intervention and suggested that treaties and conventions which sanctioned it should be abrogated. In the face of this concerted attack, the United States gave way.

In answering the Latin American critics on the policy of the United States, Mr. Hull accepted the general principle of non-intervention, reminded his hearers that President Roosevelt had announced his willingness to revise the Platt Amendment, and stated that no government need fear intervention on the part of the United States under the Roosevelt administration. There was a reference in his speech to the uncertainty of the meaning of a number of terms, and the statement, therefore, did not imply a categorical renunciation, but it conceded far more than the Latin American statesmen had been led to expect and probably more than the American delegation had originally intended to grant.

On December 28, 1933, shortly after the conference had adjourned, President Roosevelt used his speech before the Woodrow Wilson Foundation to renounce armed intervention but intimated that it might be necessary to envisage multilateral intervention as a substitute for unilateral intervention. Our southern neighbors noted that the renunciation applied specifically only to armed intervention, but this was by no means the limit of their ambition. They wanted to establish as a principle of international law that no form of intervention of any kind was permissible. But if such a contention had really been accepted, all possibility of sanctions would have been removed, and it would have become impossible to hold states to their obligations under international law and to their responsibilities under international treaties. Acceptance of compulsory arbitration does not solve the difficulty. The new doctrine would have

added to the international anarchy which results from the absence of restraint on large powers a further anarchy due to the additional freedom that would have been granted to small powers.

In the years following the Montevideo Conference, the Good Neighbor Policy demonstrated the redemption of Uncle Sam in regard to the sin of intervention. The United States abrogated the Platt Amendment in 1934, withdrew the marines from Haiti, and inaugurated negotiations for a new treaty with Panama in 1936. The result was a much more friendly spirit toward the Northern Republic when a special Pan American Conference met in Buenos Aires in 1936. Mr. Roosevelt himself went on a good will mission to the City of the Good Winds, and the American delegation accepted further restrictions on the freedom of action of the United States by signing the Additional Protocol Relative to Non-Intervention which declared that intervention directly or indirectly or for whatever reason in the internal or external affairs of any other state is inadmissible. The second paragraph provided that violation would give rise to mutual consultation, and an additional article declared that questions of interpretation should be submitted to conciliation, arbitration, or judicial settlement. Two years later the Lima Conference in accepting the Declaration of American Principles once more resolved that "the intervention of any State in the internal or external affairs of another is inadmissible." There has been almost as much reiteration about the principle of non-intervention in the Western Hemisphere as about the principle of security in Europe.

It was inevitable that the new convert to non-intervention should now preach the faith to those who had not yet seen the light, and no one did it more eloquently than Secretary Hull in his speech before the Council on Foreign Relations on February 25, 1937. Referring to the fact that the American Republics seek a guarantee of full equality and complete freedom to manage their own affairs in the continued reaffirmation of the principle of non-intervention and the continued pledge of its observance, he remarked:

> What a boon to humanity it would be if other groups of nations were, at this crucial stage in world affairs, to give their plighted faith to a similar undertaking—if they were, in a spirit of peace, unity and moral consecration, to reassert and revitalize the law of nations, international morality,

and treaty obligations, and to pledge solemn observance of the doctrine of the equality, the sovereignty, the territorial integrity, and the liberty of all nations.

By the time the Lima Conference met in 1938, the United States was no longer the only danger to the political independence of the states of the Western Hemisphere, no longer the principal threat of intervention. A new peril loomed across the oceans. The Third Reich, imbued by a revolutionary spirit and striving for a position of world leadership, had extended psychological warfare to this side of the ocean. The German minorities were being transformed into instruments of intervention, and the fascist propaganda was in full swing. The United States, having graciously admitted the error of her ways, could now attempt to take the lead in a program for concerted action against the European threat.

A number of states in the Western Hemisphere which had communities of German settlers became fearful of the new interpretation of the principle of self-determination and the rights of national minorities which was being used in Europe to justify the destruction of the Danubian states. The Lima Conference received several proposals dealing with this subject expressing specific condemnation of the actions which German consular and diplomatic officers apparently felt free to take toward the inhabitants of German descent. It accepted, however, only the mildest of the resolutions, the one introduced by Brazil which merely declared that as a matter of principle "residents, who according to domestic law are considered aliens, cannot claim collectively the condition of minorities."

Two subsequent meetings attended by the foreign ministers of the American Republics, one in Panama in 1939 and one in Havana in 1940, also gave expression to disapproval of German propaganda. The Panama meeting passed a resolution recommending that governments take the measures necessary to eradicate from the Americas the spread of doctrines that tend to place in jeopardy the common inter-American democratic ideal. The Havana meeting reiterated the same recommendation in more specific language and urged the governments of the American Republics to prevent, "within the provisions of international law, political activities of foreign diplomatic or consular agents, within the territory to which they are accredited,

which may endanger the peace and the democratic tradition of America."

Two additional resolutions were passed indicative of the preoccupation of the continents with the problem created by German intervention. They recommended to the governments of the American states legislation that would provide for effective prohibition of every political activity by aliens, rigorous regulation of the entry of immigrants, effective police supervision of foreign groups, and the creation of an emergency penal system for such offenses. The second resolution provided in addition that in case such activity menaced the security of the American Republics they would immediately consult together. On paper we had achieved a solid front against foreign intervention, an expression of solidarity and common concern for the internal safety of the states of the New World.

The Possibility of a Common Ideological Front

Resolutions, particularly Pan American resolutions, are usually melodious in tone and indicative of a fine appreciation of literary style. Collected together, they make a charming exhibit and show what artistic results can flow from co-operation between legal and poetic minds. A reading of the resolutions on non-intervention passed in recent years would lead one to believe that every state in the Western Hemisphere from Hudson Bay to the Strait of Magellan had effectively stopped the activities of the German diplomatic and consular agents, dissolved the National Socialist organizations among the German minorities, suppressed the native fascist parties, and instituted a regime of democratic freedom and personal liberty. Such an impression would hardly coincide with the facts.

The much-reaffirmed solidarity remained largely platonic, the interest in democracy below the Rio Grande narrowly restricted, and the common ideological front far from realized. Our great counter-offensive had not produced the results anticipated. By the fall of 1941, there was a beginning of common action against German ideological warfare, but it remained sporadic and intermittent. The explanation lies in part in the basic differences in culture and social structure between Anglo-Saxon and Latin America, in part in wrong

emphasis used in the early phase of the campaign, and in part in our own hesitant policy toward the German peril.

The two continents of the Western Hemisphere vary considerably in their predilection for dictatorial forms of government and in their receptivity to totalitarian philosophies. In the North, the liberal democratic myth has lost much of its strength and much of its ability to provide social integration. The country was, therefore, vulnerable to revolutionary propaganda. The war effort, on the other hand, greatly increased national productivity and reduced unemployment. In so far as unemployment reappeared it led to criticism not of the social system but of government policy which is obviously a much less revolutionary force. Because of this, the effectiveness of German revolutionary propaganda greatly diminished as soon as the American armament program got under way.

Our neighbors to the south, as was mentioned in the previous chapter, are accustomed to the rule of the man on horseback, thoroughly familiar with the tradition of government by an élite and quite accustomed to an approach to politics in terms of personal allegiance and acceptance of the *Führerprinzip*. In this respect German fascist doctrine, particularly the expurgated edition available for the Latin American market, is less revolutionary than would be a propaganda which preached democratic practice, a fact which from one point of view places the North American counter-offensive at a distinct disadvantage.

In our campaign we addressed ourselves originally primarily to the intellectual classes of Latin America in terms of an approach that was open to serious doubt. Although it seemed, on the surface, an identical copy of the German propaganda technique, it was in reality completely different and much more akin to our old campaign of cultural rapprochement. The focus was not on the preaching of North American political philosophy adjusted and modified to suit local Latin American conditions and prejudices, but on an educational campaign designed to increase a reciprocal understanding of the differences in our culture. It has already been suggested that a good deal of our emphasis was wrongly placed and that readings from the poets of the Pampas for New York children were not likely to create good will in the Argentine. Courses on Walt Whitman in the public

schools of our sister republic would be a more logical attack, but the political effects of this procedure would still be insignificant. The difficulty lies much deeper. A program of cultural rapprochement is, from a political point of view, the most useless form of ideological warfare, whatever may be its value as a program of adult education.

This approach as a road to political co-operation rests on two basic fallacies, a psychological one and a political one. The assumption that people who are fundamentally different will necessarily begin to like each other as they become better acquainted is erroneous and disproved in everyday life. It has none the less remained one of the basic tenets of the pacifist thinking which is influencing our policy toward Latin America. The fallacy derives from a religious conviction, and no amount of experience to the contrary can apparently correct it. It is quite possible to accept the thesis that all men are created in the image of God and yet be cognizant of the fact that when they meet, their awareness of each other will not be in terms of that image, but in terms of the color of their skin, the luster of their eyes, the pronunciation of their gutturals, the queerness of their table manners, and their treatment of children and dogs.

The experience of our own relations with Europe during the past twenty years should have given pause even to those whose knowledge of history is slight, but it has not even made a dent in our faith. Our tourists have swarmed over that continent in hordes; our students and retired plumbers have explored its quaint customs from the North Cape to the Dardanelles and have complained about the coffee in every capital. The total result is a profound conviction that Europeans have strange manners and are not to be trusted. The large-scale tourist business of the twenties seemingly did not affect to any great extent the then prevailing isolationist sentiment of large sections of the population. The nation as a whole was much more favorably disposed toward the Chinese, whose country almost no one had visited and whose civilization practically nobody understood, than toward Europe, from which came our cultural heritage.

The second great fallacy in the approach of cultural rapprochement is the naïve idea that, in a world of power politics, states co-operate because their populations admire each other. There is nothing in five thousand years of diplomatic history that supports this contention.

Alliances are made in terms of geography and balance of power, not in terms of sentiment, and if there is a certain friendly feeling towards an ally, it is usually the effect and not the cause of political co-operation.

Since the beginning of the nineteenth century, foreign policy, particularly in democratic states, has come to be influenced by public opinion and to that extent by public likes and dislikes, but the difference between this situation and the one prevailing at the time of absolute monarchies is one of degree only. When self-protection brings nations together, sentiment will often follow. Before the French and the British signed the Entente of 1904, the two nations indulged in a glorious reciprocal hatred and disdain clearly evident in the acid tone of the articles which the press and the periodicals of the two countries published about each other. After the signing of the agreement, they began to discover each other's virtues. It was not that the people had changed, that Englishmen had suddenly become less Anglo-Saxon and Frenchmen less Latin, or that they suddenly began to understand each other better. It was merely the inevitable result of having to work together against a common enemy. Sympathy does not determine policy; policy tends to determine sympathy.

It is, however, not necessary to turn to the lessons of history to prove the fallacy of the contention that mutual admiration is a prerequisite for political co-operation. Between August, 1939, and August, 1941, the British, the Germans, and the Russians have managed to go through a complete cycle in their relations to each other. Even our own experience proves that the correct historical sequence is from political decision to cultural rapprochement and not the other way around. The United States decided that she wanted the political co-operation of South America and began to study its customs and culture. The Argentinians had not yet decided to co-operate with the United States, and they remained still profoundly indifferent to the beauties of our painting, music, and poetry. States cannot shift their ideological sympathies quite as fast as well-disciplined communist groups can respond to changes in the party line, but they usually manage to keep in step with the political exigencies of the international situation. Antipathies have seldom been permitted to interfere with necessary alliances. It is true that the Anglo-Saxon sometimes

tends to stick a little longer to his dislikes than most other people, but the British Empire has, none the less, managed to co-operate with Mohammedan Turks, heathen Chinese, the children of the Sun Goddess, and the followers of Joe Stalin.

There is reason to rejoice that a psychological and a political fallacy have inspired a great urge for knowledge and understanding of Latin America. The result can only be a valuable enrichment of our own culture with the artistic products of our southern neighbors. There are differences of opinion about the most valuable contribution that we could make in return. It is true that today the Latin American upper classes are more interested in the literary than in the practical aspects of life, in the humanities than in the sciences. If our purpose is to impress this group, we must of course stress our devotion to learning, display the work of our artists, and make available in the Spanish and Portuguese languages the products of our research in the humanities. But it seems inevitable that the economic and social transformation, which is taking place in the southern continent and which carries with it the increased application of science to all phases of human life, will inevitably bring into prominence the technician and the scientist. For them, we can make available the results of our work in the natural and social sciences and our technological and administrative skills, the very realm in which lie our most distinguished achievements.

This last approach has the additional advantage that it speaks a universal language and not a language which is inevitably a mere national tongue. It also lays a foundation for co-operation in work, which is a much better basis for mutual appreciation than the awareness of cultural differences. It must, however, be remembered that, as an ideological approach to political co-operation, a campaign for cultural understanding is largely waste motion. Intellectual co-operation is worthy as an end in itself; as an instrument of politics it is of very doubtful value.

Recognition of the inadequacy of the cultural approach has led certain circles to suggest that we imitate the German technique. There are, however, several obstacles to a successful application of such a method of procedure. Liberal democracy as an ideology for a revolutionary campaign in the modern world has certain obvious draw-

backs. Because of the responsibilities which it inevitably places on the individual, it runs counter to certain inherent tendencies of human nature. Modern man lives in a society confronted with problems so complex, so difficult to comprehend, so hard to solve, that the average man feels hopeless in the face of them. Asking him to master its difficulties in order that he may vote intelligently on matters of policy is asking the impossible, and it is not surprising that the confused crowd should cry for leadership and dictatorship. In that political aspiration lies hidden a desire welling up from the unconscious for a return to childhood, that happy period free from anxieties when a benevolent father accepted all responsibility for making decisions in exchange for obedience to command. This contemporary urge for security finds no answer in Anglo-Saxon liberalism with its emphasis on individualism and its stern insistence on personal responsibility.

The whole social myth of liberal democracy has lost most of its revolutionary force since the middle of the nineteenth century, and in its present form it is hardly adequate to sustain democratic practice in the countries where it originated, let alone inspire new loyalties in other peoples and other lands. The myth needs considerable streamlining to bring it into harmony with the realities of modern life. It is difficult to create a fighting doctrine by merely reiterating the values of individual liberty in a world of personal insecurity, and by reaffirming the beauty of laissez-faire when only government interference with economic life can prevent starvation.

But even if our democratic ideology were more dynamic in character, our campaign in Latin America would still be greatly handicapped. The methods and techniques of revolutionary warfare were first developed by the communists, then by the fascists, and finally improved and refined by the Germans. These techniques are alien to our tradition, and we have no tools below the Rio Grande with which to apply them. The citizens of the United States who live in Latin America cannot be organized as instruments of foreign policy. It is true that they live apart from the native community and that they preserve their cultural identity, but they are extremely individualistic. They do not form an organized minority and so far they have refused to conduct their commercial pursuits in terms of the political objectives of their homeland. Persuasion has failed, and the

possibility of coercion is limited. A democratic state, operating according to the principles of a humanitarian philosophy, lacks many of the weapons that are at the disposal of the Third Reich.

The creation of native democratic parties would also be much more difficult than the creation of native fascist parties. It is true that the economic and social changes which industrialization is introducing in the Latin American countries of the temperate zone are producing the very classes which once accepted liberal democracy as a new faith. But it is also true that these same classes under the economic conditions of modern life are equally fertile soil for fascist doctrines. The liberal social myth is not as convincing as it was formerly, and it is doubtful whether, in the prevailing type of social structure below the Rio Grande, democratic parties could achieve and hold power. Our analysis has suggested that neither race, climate, economic pattern, social structure, intellectual predilection, nor historical tradition promises a future development for Latin America similar to the Anglo-Saxon pattern. This does not mean that our neighbors must inevitably become copies of the New German Order or the Italian Corporate State, but it does suggest that their social myths are not likely to be facsimiles of Manchester liberalism or Jeffersonian democracy.

Social conditions in Latin America thus preclude a successful revolutionary campaign for the establishment of democratic government, and democracy is the one form of government that cannot be successfully imposed from the outside. It is, however, possible, under certain circumstances, to replace a dictator antagonistic to the United States with one more favorably disposed and the technique has been used in the past with some success. But it is well to remember that revolutionary campaigns inspired and financed by the United States have been as obnoxious a form of intervention to our southern neighbors as the present attempts of the Third Reich to establish fascist regimes. The United States is beginning to gain some good will on account of her Good Neighbor Policy. Her willingness to renounce the most objectionable forms of intervention has made it possible for her to assume the leadership in a program of concerted action against German infiltration. Much of the strength of that position would be sacrificed if she resorted to methods similar to those used by the to-

talitarian states. It is quite conceivable that, during war time, the United States, in the interests of national security, may be forced to rescind her promise of non-intervention within a certain strategic zone. But as long as her allies across the water are not defeated, she can afford and would do well to limit the forms of coercion used and to dispense with military pressure.

In many of the Latin American states there has been profound disapproval of the activities of the German consular and diplomatic officers and of the unwarranted interference of a foreign government in their internal affairs. Even nationals who are strongly in favor of a native fascist movement have resented the high-handed manner in which German ambassadors have presumed to dictate to sovereign governments. Action against German activities has, however, been taken with extreme caution. They have been tolerated partly because the doctrines preached found support in influential sections of the population, but also because of fear of the consequences of forceful repression. Most of the Latin American states are weak measured in terms of military power and many of them are dependent for their economic existence on trade with Europe. Like many of the small nations of the Old World, they have permitted the Germans to conduct psychological warfare and undermine their unity and social cohesion because of fear of economic and military reprisals.

Until the outbreak of the war, Germany was an important purchaser of the export products of Latin America and with the German government in control of trade there was great reluctance to displease so important a customer. The Argentinian government was in full possession of the details of the Patagonian plot when it negotiated a barter convention for the exchange of Argentine wheat and German railroad equipment. The Chilean government discussed clearing agreements while complaining of the action of German consuls, and the Brazilian government has always been afraid that too severe a repression of the activities of German minorities would bring commercial retaliation in Berlin. It is, therefore, probably no mere coincidence that really effective action against German propaganda was not undertaken until the summer of 1941 when it seemed that the chances of a German victory had been greatly reduced by the apparently successful resistance of the Russian armies.

The success of a propaganda attack can, therefore, not be understood unless it is viewed in conjunction with the other phases of total warfare. Economic or military pressure can serve as forms of coercion to obtain freedom of action for an ideological campaign. This applies as much to our own approach to Latin America as to that of Germany. When the United States discovered that she also was in possession of economic weapons and instruments of coercion, that she also could co-ordinate ideological warfare with economic, political, and military policy, her efforts became much more successful. She had failed in the counter-offensive against German operations when she limited herself to a cultural approach, but she achieved an outstanding success when she destroyed the financial basis of the German propaganda activities. Plans for this campaign were worked out by the office of the Co-ordinator of Commercial and Cultural Relations and decisive action was taken in June, 1941, when the United States prohibited the export of American goods to firms in Latin America which acted for the benefit of Germany and Italy. A tentative list of eighteen hundred names was published, and this so-called blacklist is to date our most effective weapon of defense. When the British blockade stopped German exports from reaching Latin American countries, pro-German importers managed to remain in business by purchasing goods from the United States. Thus American exports made it possible for them to continue their contributions to local Nazi organizations thereby enabling Germany to carry on her activities and her propaganda campaign against the United States. The new regulations for our export trade with Latin America made this impossible.

The United States also recognized the importance of military circles in the making of national policy in Latin America and the influence of fear of Germany on the probability of achieving co-operation. Not only did she increase her naval and military missions below the Rio Grande but she kept her neighbors informed about her growing military strength. After the rearmament program began to take shape and after the formation of several mechanized divisions and a new air force, she made a special attempt to invite the high-ranking officers of the different Latin American armies to view her war preparations. This program provided them with an opportunity to check the information from German sources about the technical

inadequacy of our arms and the obsolete character of our tactics. This approach was supplemented by special military scholarships designed to attract the younger officers of the armies of our neighbors to our staff schools for further study. In the fall of 1941 it was too early to say whether this campaign had managed to convince the military leaders of our southern neighbors that we would be able to defend the hemisphere.

The government of the United States began its counter-offensive against German activity in Latin America long before it took effective steps to defend its own country. It was only in the spring of 1941, after tolerating for years attacks on the social unity, that it finally expelled the German and Italian consular officials together with their cultural and press attachés who ran the campaign of psychological warfare. This step did not, however, presage a declaration of war. Canada was still the only full belligerent in the Western Hemisphere. Even as late as the fall of that year, the policy of the United States was full of ambiguities and contradictions. She was neither belligerent nor neutral, and although her President had declared that the destruction of Hitlerism was the principal objective of the nation's foreign policy, he also declared that he still expected to achieve this result without fighting. This policy may have been, from the point of view of the United States, the last word in astuteness and wisdom, but it was not one to inspire an easy acceptance of leadership in action against Germany. What were the weak sister states of the South to do against Hitler if the Colossus of the North remained full of hesitations regarding its own policy?

In the light of this situation, it is all the more remarkable that many of them took fairly drastic action against German government agents only a few months after our own expulsion of Axis propagandists. In the American Mediterranean, Cuba, Honduras, and Mexico all ordered the closing of German consulates. Brazil had earlier begun to regulate the German schools and the foreign language press, and Chile and the Argentine promulgated more stringent regulations for the same purpose. When the United States became a full belligerent in December, 1941, she increased her efforts to create a common front against German ideological warfare and to destroy the instruments of its execution, the diplomatic and con-

sular offices of the Axis. At the Conference of Foreign Ministers held at Rio de Janeiro in January, 1942, the delegation of the United States proposed that all the American republics break off diplomatic relations with Germany, Italy, and Japan and expel the Axis officials. The proposal found wide support, but it inspired no unanimity and no common front. The two republics of the extreme south remembered their European affiliations and were apparently not fully convinced that the Axis would be defeated. Argentina and Chile insisted on preserving their freedom of action.

When the struggle with the German-Japanese Alliance took the form of military action, the United States had not yet won the complete allegiance of Latin America. Even the co-operation actually achieved continued to rest on a shaky foundation in so far as it depended on a common ideological outlook and on the relative strength of the United States vis-à-vis Germany. A common ideological outlook for the Western Hemisphere is an impossible dream. Anglo-Saxon America and Latin America will remain two different worlds because of differences inherent in their make-up. There is little likelihood that an Institute of Intellectual Co-operation in Washington would be any more successful in achieving solidarity and co-operation in the New World than the Institute in Geneva achieved in the Old World. The success of our endeavor to win Latin America and to build with her a common front against the encirclement of the Axis powers must, therefore, rest ultimately on our ability to convince them of the existence of a common political interest in such a collaboration and on the strength of our economic and military weapons.

On December 7, 1941, our power position in the Western Hemisphere was still very strong. Our allies across the oceans were still fighting. The Russian armies, although in a critical position, were in the field; Chinese forces held Japan, and the British navy was in existence. The German-Japanese allies were still contained within the Old World. But, if the fascist states were to win the war, Germany would be the greatest military power of all time and in control of the most important markets for Latin American products. The republics to the south of us could not afford to displease such an agglomeration of power until they were sure that someone could defend them against both economic and military attacks. We made many reaffirmations of

the Monroe Doctrine, numerous declarations of our determination to defend the hemisphere and come to the support of our sister republics. Our latest assurances were given after we had become involved in a two-ocean war with a one-ocean navy and insufficient matériel for aerial warfare. It was remembered below the Rio Grande that another Anglo-Saxon power once promised to defend Poland and Rumania, and there were military circles which believed that the first guarantee was worth not much more than the second in certain regions of South America. Until it was clear that Germany was going to be defeated or quite evident that the United States could provide adequate protection, these circles advised appeasement rather than resistance, urged caution in the repression of German activities, and counseled a minimum of co-operation with the United States. The penalty for displeasing a humanitarian democracy was bound to be much less severe than the penalty for displeasing a fascist dictatorship.

IX. The Economic Pattern of the New World

The sooner we recognize that trade is essentially barter, an exchange of goods for goods, the better position we shall be in to safeguard our international commerce and protect American agriculture and industry whose prosperity is dependent on world markets and access to world supplies of raw materials.

HENRY F. GRADY

THE previous chapter represents an analysis of the strength and weakness of the social and ideological make-up of the peoples of the Western Hemisphere and an attempt to estimate the chances of building a common front out of the divergent national elements. In the modern struggle for power, ideological warfare is, however, only one of the forms of assault. At least as important as the propaganda of defeat or attempts to bring about social disintegration are the modern forms of economic warfare. In so far as they aim to deprive a state of imports they are traditionally associated with military warfare, particularly naval warfare, but under the circumstances in which the Western Hemisphere would find itself in the case of an Axis victory, they would be just as effective without the accompaniment of military action.

Economic warfare, which operates by preventing imports, tries to force a state to surrender by depriving it of foodstuffs for its population and raw materials for its war industry. It is basically a form of economic strangulation, and it operates by means of embargoes, blockade, and intimidation of neutrals who are pressed to deny their products to the enemy. The power to resist such economic pressure depends on the relative self-sufficiency of the economy, the ability to

control essential routes of communication, and the strength available to counteract attempts to influence neutral states. If the state which applies the embargo controls all the centers of production of strategic materials, neutrals cannot become alternative sources of supply, and there is, then, no need for blockade or military action of any kind. Strangulation can be applied by the simple process of embargo.

It is not only possible to break the will of a nation by depriving it of essential imports; it is also possible to force a state to surrender by depriving its people of all opportunity to export. Such action would cause unemployment and social unrest, dislocation of government finances, destruction of the purchasing power of the national currency abroad, and a profound disruption of economic life. When foreign trade is important and involves a large percentage of the national production, cessation of exports is almost as effective an instrument of coercion as withholding of imports. It is, therefore, possible to exert economic pressure and conduct economic warfare not only by depriving a nation of imports but also by depriving it of the opportunity to export.

Nazi Germany in the years before the war gave the world a demonstration of what can be accomplished along these lines with new methods of commercial policy and new devices of international trade. Out of these new techniques and the absolute control over the economy of a section of the Continent of Europe, she forged a weapon of economic domination and exploitation which enabled her to become a potent factor in South America and the dictator of economic life in the agrarian countries of Eastern Europe. The new weapon was simply a refinement of the device called a clearing agreement, an instrument of international trade widely used in the early years of the depression by countries which wanted to preserve their gold supply and maintain the exchange rate of their currencies.

A clearing agreement between two states provides for the creation in each country of a bookkeeping account on which the claims of exporters can be offset against the claims of importers. It is usually combined with a system of import licenses. The importer pays what he owes, not abroad, but to the clearing house, and the exporter collects from the same office what is due him in his own currency. The accounts in the two capitals of the signatories are balanced against

each other and, when necessary, import licenses are restricted to the sum available on the credit balance.

The new device was introduced in trade with the Western Hemisphere to the annoyance of the United States not by Mr. Hitler, but by our fellow "free-trader," Great Britain. In 1932, shortly after she incorporated the principle of empire-preference in the Ottawa agreements, she signed with the Argentine the so-called Roca Convention, through which the Argentine obtained, in the economic relations of the British Empire, a position not unlike that of a dominion. The British agreed that they would maintain future purchases of Argentine beef at a level not more than 10 per cent less than their imports of the previous year. In return, the Argentinians promised that, after deducting the amount necessary for servicing British loans, they would spend the remaining sterling exchange in purchases of English goods. Here were all the principles of the new order in international economic relations: international trade determined by government agreement, forced bilateralism, quotas, and blocked currencies.

This method of international trade, if honestly administered, offers certain obvious advantages in periods of depression and scarcity of foreign exchange. If followed by all states, it would destroy triangular trade and greatly encumber the flow of goods through state regulations and bureaucratic interference, but it need not necessarily be detrimental to the participants or become an instrument of exploitation. In the hands of the German government, clearing agreements became, however, an economic weapon both for economic exploitation and political pressure.

Under the National Socialist regime international trade was brought under the complete and absolute control of the state. Not the advantage of the trader but the welfare of the national group and the needs of the state were supposed to guide the individual transactions. The result was that the German government, in control of the purchasing power of the total German economy, became a monopoly purchaser dealing with individual traders in other countries. The detrimental effect of this procedure gradually forced other countries to institute government control over foreign trade. International economic exchanges ceased to be business deals between competing sellers and competing buyers and became direct governmental

transactions. The commercial policy of the National Socialist government made no attempt to preserve equality of treatment as between nations, and the bilateral agreements were frankly discriminating in nature and political as well as economic in aim.

The clearing agreement fixed the rate of exchange between the two currencies and usually provided that a balance, if any, was to be carried on the books as credit. This meant that a surplus of exports over imports in trade with Germany produced a balance in Berlin in blocked marks, usually called "Aski" marks.* If the agreement provided that under exceptional circumstances part of the balance could be transferred into free currency, the transfer was usually made at an arbitrary and ruinous rate of exchange. In practice the balance could not be settled in gold or free currency but only in goods, and it could, therefore, be used only for the purchase of commodities in Germany. By withholding her own exports and ordering great quantities of imports Germany forced the raw material exporting countries to accumulate large balances in blocked marks in Berlin. Complaints that the commodities ordered in Germany failed to arrive proved of no avail. If the German rearmament program had better use for them, such commodities were retained at home and the country which owned the blocked marks was told to take whatever the Nazi regime was willing to offer or receive nothing at all. The result was not only that mouth organs and cameras moved to destinations where locomotives and dredging machinery were expected, but that the raw material countries of Eastern Europe were forced to finance, at least in part, the military machine that was later to overwhelm them.

Once a country had entered bilateral clearing agreements with Germany, it would almost inevitably come more and more under German influence, particularly if its economy was not diversified but dependent on one or two export crops. The Third Reich would increase her so-called "purchases" and take a larger and larger percentage of the principal export commodities, often much more than she could consume herself. The surplus was then exported to other markets and sold for whatever it would bring in free exchange. Germany could afford to sell at extremely low prices. Within the ide-

* Ausländersonderkonten für Inlandszahlungen.

ological framework of National Socialist economics there was no reason why each individual sale should produce a profit, and besides, the products had been bought for credit and not for cash. The result of this procedure was that Germany sold at a discount in the world market in competition with the original producer with disastrous effects on price.

This practice was followed in the case of Brazilian coffee, South African wool, Bulgarian tobacco, and Greek currants. In each country there emerged a realization that the ultimate effect of trading with Germany on her terms inevitably meant foreign exploitation of the national economy, but in most cases the interested export groups brought so much pressure on their governments that trade agreements were continued or resumed long after their detrimental effect was clear to all. The inability to sell in other markets than Germany made them subservient to the bulk customer who held the whip hand of monopoly.

Under this system of trade the exporter of raw material faces a dangerous purchaser and the exporter of manufactured goods a competitor who cannot be outsold. Manufacturers of articles that are also made in Germany have found themselves faced with Teutonic competitors in neutral markets who operate with state subsidies up to 50 per cent of their cost. But the word competition is really a misnomer. Under a general system of bilateral trading either in the form of barter or in the form of clearing agreements, competition in the old sense of the term has lost its meaning. German goods did not really compete with American goods either in terms of price or in terms of quality. They were bought because their purchase is an indispensable and unavoidable prerequisite of the sale of national products.

The ability to force German exports derives from the dependence of certain countries on Germany as a market. If past performance is a guide, the power which such a situation places in German hands will be used not only for economic but also for political purposes. There is no room for purely economic transactions in the life of a totalitarian state. Each business deal must function as an instrument of political pressure, each transaction as a step on the road to power. When in the past Germany had established herself as the sole or the

principal purchaser of the main staples of a country, she would threaten to cease buying altogether unless certain conditions were fulfilled, and the conditions more often than not were of an ethnic or a political nature. Not only have individual firms in foreign countries been forced to submit to conditions laid down by the National Socialist government in regard to Aryan staffs and advertising in approved publications, but they have also been expected to exert themselves on behalf of a national policy demanded by Berlin.

Under the new system of totalitarian trading, the best instrument of intervention is no longer the gunboat before the harbor or the bombing squadron poised on the runways of a neighboring airport. A much better tool has become available, the control of the export market. It does not even require a display or a threat of physical force. The power to buy or not to buy a wheat crop, a coffee crop, or a sugar harvest may represent a mastery more complete, more devastating in its consequences than the power to command an air force.

Could the hemisphere resist the economic pressure that would be exerted by the transoceanic zones and the political consequences that must flow inevitably from that pressure? What are the chances of building out of the twenty-two independent national units an economic system that would be sufficiently independent of transoceanic strategic raw materials to build an adequate war industry and sufficiently independent of exports to be able to resist the power of commercial monopolies of gigantic dimensions in a world of permanent economic warfare? If it is impossible to make the New World independent of exports, is it feasible to create a centralized system of international trade through which the overwhelming bargaining power of the transatlantic zones could be matched and their destructive power neutralized? Unless these questions can be answered in the affirmative, there can be no independence for the New World under conditions of hemisphere encirclement.

In a struggle with totalitarian states, the countries of the Western Hemisphere must, therefore, defend themselves not only against blockade and embargo but also against economic devastation through denial of exports. In case of an Axis victory in Europe what would be the strategic position of the Americas in regard to the new weapons

of economic warfare? An attempt to answer this question must begin with an analysis of the international economic position of the countries of the New World in the years preceding the outbreak of the present war.

The United States

The second chapter has presented a rough description of the geography of the Western Hemisphere and an outline of the factors of location, topography, climate, soil, and natural resources that form the geographic basis of its economic life and help to define its position in the world economy. In those pages were sketched not only the broad contours of the continental land masses but also the diverse regional geographies that give rise to the varied types of economy that persist within the national frontiers. The Western Hemisphere began its existence as an economic colony of Western Europe, and for a long time its inhabitants have drawn from field and rock products needed in the Old World. Throughout the nineteenth century, the Americas continued to function in international trade primarily as exporters of foodstuffs and raw materials for the densely populated areas of Europe, and not until the end of the century, and then only in North America, did the New World change its basic character as a predominantly extractive economy.

Because the industrial center of the hemisphere lies in North America, it is the United States that will have to make the main contribution to military protection, and this means that it is the United States that must be provided with the strategic raw materials necessary for the building of a war industry. Because of our great national wealth, it is we who must take the lead in the defense of the hemisphere against modern economic warfare and guide the common action against the transoceanic zones. An estimate of the potential strength of the economic front of the Americas must, therefore, begin with an analysis of the international economic position of the United States.

On the three million square miles now included in the territorial domain, the European immigrants and their descendants have created the most powerful national economy in the world. A vast land with great areas of fertile soil, extensive mineral deposits, and large energy

resources has provided a basis for an economic system of great productivity. The United States has in recent years led the world in the development of techniques of mass production, and she has developed an industrial system with a productive capacity which excels that of any other single state. On this land lived in 1940 132 million people. The birthrate is declining, and the population is expected to reach a stationary level around 1950 with a total of approximately 150 million. In terms of available resources and existing production technique, the area could sustain a far larger population and a much higher standard of living, but the nation has been unable to solve the problem of periodic depressions and the more serious difficulty of technological unemployment as demonstrated by the existence of almost ten million unemployed in 1939 when the level of production was actually higher than that of 1929.

In terms of comparison with other countries, the standard of living is, nevertheless, quite high and the total national income quite large. The United States, with less than 10 per cent of the population of the world living on less than 10 per cent of the earth's surface, manages to produce 50 per cent of the corn of the world, 50 per cent of the citrus fruit, 40 per cent of the cotton, and 15 per cent of the wheat. The country is the largest mineral producer with an output of approximately 40 per cent of the iron, 30 per cent each of the copper and zinc, and 25 per cent of the lead. On the basis of enormous energy resources, with an output of 60 per cent of the world's oil, 35 per cent each of its coal and water power, there has been created an economic system which uses almost half the total energy produced in the world and an industrial system with twice as much investment in machinery per worker as that of its nearest rival, Great Britain.

In comparison with the total production and consumption, the percentage of exports and imports is relatively small, never more than 10 per cent. This compares favorably with countries like Canada, the Argentine, and Brazil, which export about one-third of their total production. The United States imports considerable quantities of special foodstuffs for the maintenance of her standard of living, a vast bulk of raw material to serve her industrial economy, and she must export considerable quantities of agricultural products in order

to prevent disorganization of her agrarian economy. But apart from the need for strategic raw materials, foreign trade is, for the nation as a whole, a contribution to comfort, not a prerequisite of subsistence as it is for the overpopulated regions of Western Europe and Eastern Asia and, in a different sense, for the purely extractive economies of Latin America.

Ten per cent of the national income of an economy as productive as that of the United States amounts to a very large total, and it is, therefore, not surprising that the United States was the greatest single factor in international trade in the years before the German expansion. In the period since the First World War exports have averaged approximately 4 billion dollars a year and imports 3 billion. The actual amounts have fluctuated in relation to the business cycle; total foreign trade (imports and exports) dropped from almost 10 billion in 1929 to approximately 3 billion in 1932, a decline of 70 per cent. Since then the trend has again been upward, and in 1937 the total was back to 6½ billion.

From an economic point of view Europe is the area most important to the United States. It was so in the colonial period and it remained so after independence. Even today Europe is the source of the greater part of our imports and the destination of the principal exports, notwithstanding the fact that its relative significance compared to other regions is declining. In the period before the First World War almost 60 per cent of our trade was with Europe. In the years preceding the Second World War this had dropped to approximately 40 per cent while commerce with the transpacific world had increased to 25 per cent and with the Western Hemisphere to about 35 per cent. The international trade of the United States has persistently shown a favorable balance due primarily to the great surplus of exports over imports to the European Continent. The other regions show normally a surplus of imports over exports but not large enough to undo the favorable balance with Europe. As an importer of foodstuffs and raw materials from Asia and the Western Hemisphere and an exporter of foodstuffs and raw materials to Europe as well as an exporter of manufactured articles to all zones, the United States economy is particularly dependent on triangular trade.

As the domestic economy of the country changed from a predominantly agrarian to an industrial organization, there occurred parallel changes in imports and exports. In the earlier days agricultural products were the main exports and manufactured articles were of minor importance; at the present time the reverse is true. A similar shift occurred in imports. Formerly the import ledger was heavily weighted by manufactured goods while foodstuffs were unimportant. Now, as a direct expression of the increasing industrialization, foodstuffs, crude materials, and semi-manufactures play the most important role. The foodstuffs are mostly specialties such as coffee, cocoa, tea, bananas, and sugar, and the raw materials include minerals, lumber and wood products, vegetable oils, fibers, and rubber. In addition to these articles which make up a large part of the total imports, there are a number of so-called strategic commodities which the country needs, some of them in small quantities but none the less of extraordinary importance because they are key products in the manufacturing processes, indispensable items in a war industry.

The industrial part of the national economy has been able to place its imprint firmly on the character of the country's imports. But this is not true to the same extent of exports which have continued to reflect the nature of an extractive economy, that of an exporter of foodstuffs and raw materials. Industrial exports have not replaced agricultural exports; they have merely been added. Neither the natural increase in population nor the huge immigration was able to absorb the growing output of the land resulting from improved agrarian techniques. The American farmer has continued to demand that his government find him an export market. It is true that only 10 per cent of the national production is exported abroad, but this figure gives no indication of the importance of the foreign market for certain specific products. Normally one-half of the entire cotton crop is sold abroad, one-fifth of the wheat crop, two-fifths of the leaf tobacco, one-third of the lard, and one-third of the rice, and almost one-half of the dried fruits.

Notwithstanding the continued importance of agricultural products in the trade statistics of the United States, the country is, none the less, primarily an exporter of manufactured articles. Since the First

World War, the value of finished manufactures has represented approximately 50 per cent of the total outflow of the country as compared to 20 per cent for semi-manufactures, a similar amount for crude materials, and 5 per cent each for manufactured foodstuffs and crude foodstuffs. Cargo on outbound freighters is not merely cotton and wheat but principally iron and steel products, automobiles, and machinery.

The economic structure of the United States, because of surplus productivity in both agriculture and industry, presents a special set of problems in the realm of economic foreign policy unlike that of any other state. In the markets of the world, the United States competes both with agrarian countries and with industrial countries. She competes with Great Britain and Germany in the markets of South America and with South America and the British Dominions in the markets of Europe. She has struggled against British competition in the Argentine and German competition in Brazil and has competed with Brazilian cotton and Argentine wheat in Continental Europe. This situation will make her task as leader of an economic bloc of the Western Hemisphere particularly difficult. But that leadership must none the less remain hers, because she is best endowed to withstand the economic pressure which Berlin or any other power can exert through the control of the European market. A smaller percentage of her total production is dependent on exports than is the case in any other country in the Americas, and a larger percentage of her exports consists of manufactured goods, commodities in which supply and demand can be more easily adjusted.

The progressive industrialization which began after the Civil War has gradually transformed the international economic position of the United States from that of a debtor to that of a creditor. This trend was greatly accelerated by the First World War, and when that conflict ended, the United States found herself, largely because of her economic contributions to the Allied cause, a creditor to her former partners for about 10 billion dollars. Time has proved that they were indeed contributions and not loans, as many people had hoped. Since the depression of the early thirties all payments of interest and amortization have stopped, and by 1937 the sum in default as to prin-

cipal and accrued interest was 12½ billion dollars. The Second World War has definitely killed whatever small chance there may have been for a resumption of payments in the future.

During the period following the First World War national production continued to outrun national consumption, and private investment abroad became an important outlet for national savings. The United States undertook to finance not only the marketing of her products abroad and the exploitation of natural resources in foreign countries, but also the economic reconstruction of Europe and the governments of Latin America. By 1929 our total private foreign investments had reached approximately 17 billion dollars. Since the depression years there has been a slight resumption of capital export in the form of direct investment, but the flotation of foreign loans has practically stopped altogether. There has been, on the other hand, a considerable influx of capital into the United States in recent years. The general political uncertainty and the fear of war in Europe greatly stimulated the transfer of funds for safekeeping with the result that our net creditor position has declined.

The estimates for 1937 mention 13 billion dollars of United States investments abroad and 8 billion dollars of foreign investments in the United States. In that year the distribution of our investments was as follows:

	Million Dollars	
Western Hemisphere		8,500
Canada and Newfoundland	4,000	
American Mediterranean	2,500	
South America (rest)	2,000	
Transatlantic		3,500
Europe	3,350	
Africa	150	
Transpacific		1,200
Asia	800	
Oceania	400	
		13,200

Of this total of 13 billion, 7 billion is in direct investment and approximately 6 billion in portfolio investment, and of the latter about

one-half is in default. These defaults were listed in the 1939 Annual Report of the Foreign Bondholders Protective Council as follows:

	Per Cent
Far East	1.8
Canada	4.9
Europe	58.2
Latin America	77.2

This unhappy experience has, however, not deterred the government of the United States from again using the financial strength of the country as an instrument of political and military warfare. Even Congress has accepted the fact that power politics costs money and has been willing to vote appropriations of more than 15 billion dollars to implement the Lend-Lease program of aid to Britain and her allies. The Stabilization Fund, the Reconstruction Finance Corporation, and the Import and Export Bank are all participating in a program of financial support to the Latin American republics.

All of this suggests that the United States is the most important economic unit in the Western Hemisphere. Her foreign trade in terms of value represents a very large sum, but in terms of percentage of national production it is actually much smaller than that of any other country in the Western Hemisphere. The United States is the most self-sufficient nation in the New World, the country with the most balanced economy. This fact gives an illusion of economic strength which is deceptive. Our economy is actually dependent on certain indispensable strategic raw materials that will have to come from Canada and Latin America if the Old World should be closed to us. In the last phase of the present world war, the war between the continents which would follow the defeat of our allies abroad, the German-Japanese Alliance would obviously try to deprive us of these alternative sources and force our neighbors to withhold their products. This means that the United States could survive under conditions of German-Japanese domination of the Old World only if we could control the economy of the Western Hemisphere or preserve its economic independence from Europe. To answer the question whether this is possible, we need, in addition to the analysis presented above, a picture of the relative significance of Europe and the

United States in the economy of the other political units of the New World.

The second chapter has sketched not only the broad geographic outlines of the American continents but also the factors which influence their economic and political relations. As a result of the operation of these factors the New World divides itself into a number of distinct regions: Canada, the American Mediterranean, two zones on the West Coast of South America, and two zones on the East Coast. Each of these has a special economic, political, and strategic meaning for the United States.

Canada, the northern neighbor, is the only other Anglo-Saxon country in the hemisphere and the country with which we maintain the most intimate economic and cultural relations. The British dominion represents an important buffer zone controlling strategic areas along the great circle routes to the North American Continent from Europe and Asia and, because of location and relative strength, could easily be dominated by the United States. The American Mediterranean to the south is an area of small political units. Its geographic configuration makes it entirely dependent on easily controlled maritime lines of communication and, therefore, extremely vulnerable to blockade. With the United States in possession of the strategic naval bases, the economic life of the region is entirely at the mercy of the "Colossus of the North."

The temperate zone of the southern continent lies beyond the range of easy intimidation. There is, however, an intermediate zone including the Guianas on the east coast and Ecuador and Peru on the west coast in which pressure can be exerted from the Mediterranean zone as a base. It is true that our navy could operate with ease along the north coast of Brazil and blockade the outflow of the Amazon Basin, but the real political and economic center of that country lies beyond the bulge and outside the radius of limited military action. To all intents and purposes the border of the intermediate zone on the east coast is, therefore, the frontier between French Guiana and Brazil. Below this zone lies the most important economic and political region of South America, the A.B.C. countries surrounding the buffer states of Uruguay, Paraguay, and Bolivia.

Canada

There is one other country on the North American Continent that has supplemented an extractive economy with an industrial system of production, Canada. Here in the north, geography is also responsible for an agrarian west and an industrial east, and there are other similarities with the economic system of the United States, such as great mineral wealth and a high standard of living. Canada is, however, less advanced industrially, more dependent on exports, and still a net debtor on international account.

The prairie provinces are the source of great agricultural wealth, particularly wheat, but an even larger percentage of the national income comes from the exploitation of great mineral resources. In 1937 Canada ranked first in the output of three minerals. She produced 89 per cent of the world's nickel, 58 per cent of its asbestos, and 50 per cent of its platinum. In that year the Dominion ranked third in world production of zinc and silver and fourth in gold, copper, and lead. The rapid development of radium resources in the Great Bear Lake region is making Canada the principal source of this valuable mineral. This list by no means exhausts the wealth of the Laurentian Shield and the great mountain regions of the west. Manganese, molybdenum, tungsten, and other metals add to the rich mineral output of our northern neighbor.

The industry of Canada is devoted primarily to the processing of foodstuffs and raw materials, particularly of wheat, pulpwood, lumber, and minerals. Supplementing this type of manufacturing is an industry producing consumption goods from imported raw materials, such as textiles and rubber, and a heavy industry based partly on a local steel production and partly on imports. A considerable part of the Canadian industrial structure consists of American branch factories and plants operated by subsidiaries of American corporations. Such mills, by location across the border, avoid the Canadian tariff and at the same time reap the benefits of the preferences given in Empire trade agreements.

It is not surprising that, with an economy in many ways so like that of the United States, Canada's international trade should have

followed a similar course of development. During the last half century imports have shifted from raw materials to semi-manufactures. Imports consist primarily of petroleum, coal, rolling-mill products, machinery, and automobile parts and come mostly from the United States. Exports consist of about 30 per cent foodstuffs and raw materials, 30 per cent semi-manufactures, and 40 per cent manufactures. The most important products are wheat, news print, wood pulp and lumber, nickel, and copper. Wheat, flour, and lumber find their principal market in Great Britain, news print and wood pulp in the United States; and the mother country is again the principal market for minerals except for nickel.

Industrialization has advanced sufficiently to bring national production ahead of national consumption, and there were indications in the years before 1937 that the economy had reached a stage of net capital export. Net indebtedness was declining, although it was still quite large. The estimates for 1935 place foreign investments in Canada at approximately 7 billion dollars and the Canadian investments abroad at about 2 billion, leaving a net indebtedness of 5 billion or 500 dollars per capita, probably the highest in the world. Of the total foreign investments, British capital represents about 3 billion and United States capital about 4 billion, and it is, therefore, not surprising that the Canadian economy should be most intimately interwoven with the mother country and the neighbor to the south. There is room for increased exchange across the border and modification in tariffs would undoubtedly stimulate additional trade between the neighbors, but no change in commercial policy could make the United States a substitute market for the agricultural exports of Canada.

The American Mediterranean

Below the Rio Grande lies the world of Latin America, the part of the hemisphere least advanced along the road from a simple agrarian and extractive economy to advanced industrialization. Nearest to the United States is the region of the American Mediterranean which includes Mexico, Central America, Colombia, Venezuela, and the islands along the eastern rim of the Caribbean. The area repre-

sents a tropical zone producing a great many commodities needed by the United States both as consumption goods and as raw material for her industries. The coastal regions with high temperature and great humidity are zones of tropical forests with valuable hardwoods, gums and resins, and medicinal products. When cleared they offer opportunities for the cultivation of sisal, bananas, sugar, rice, copra, and rubber. The mountain slopes can grow tobacco, coffee, and cacao, and the high plateaus with a more moderate climate can be used for cattle raising and the cultivation of products similar to those of the agriculture of temperate zones.

In addition to its significance as an exporter of tropical products, the area is also important because of its mineral wealth. Gold and silver were long its principal exports to the Spanish motherland. Today Colombia is an important exporter of platinum; gold is produced in small quantities in Colombia, Venezuela, and Mexico; and the latter continues to produce silver. Mexico also contains lead, tin, antimony, graphite, and copper. Mexico and Colombia contain iron, and manganese is found in Cuba, Panama, and Costa Rica. Sources of energy are widely distributed with potential water power in most of the mainland states, coal in Mexico, Colombia, and Venezuela, and oil in Mexico, Colombia, Venezuela, and Trinidad. Venezuela has today a petroleum output greater than all Asia; the production in Colombia is increasing; and the American Mediterranean as a whole is the greatest oil-producing area in the world.

The drainage area of the American Mediterranean which lies outside the territory of the United States contains a population of about 50 million people, most of them living on an exceedingly low standard of living with an average annual income of probably not more than 100 dollars in United States currency. The result is that the region is not as important economically as might otherwise be the case. The figures for international trade are, none the less, relatively high because of the large percentage of the national production that is exported. Total imports into the area in 1937 were approximately 600 million dollars of which 350 million came from the United States, and total exports from the region were approximately 900 million dollars of which 425 million went to the United States.

The close proximity of our country gives exporters a great advan-

tage in freight costs and it is, therefore, not surprising that the United States is the most important country of origin in the trade of the American Mediterranean. In 1937 we supplied over half of the imports of Cuba, Mexico, Honduras, Nicaragua, Venezuela, Dominican Republic, Panama, and Haiti and between 40 and 50 per cent of those of Colombia, Guatemala, Costa Rica, and El Salvador. The principal exports from the region are sugar, bananas, coffee, cacao, in the category of agricultural products, and oil and copper in the class of mineral products. Except for sugar and oil, which are produced in the United States, most of the commodities of this semi-tropical and tropical zone are supplementary and non-competitive to the products of the United States, and this is responsible for the fact that the great northern neighbor is also the most important market for the region. She takes from 50 to 90 per cent of the exports of the different countries except for Haiti (28 per cent) and the Dominican Republic (35 per cent), who export large quantities of sugar to Europe, and Venezuela (14 per cent) who sends a considerable part of her oil production across the Atlantic.

The American Mediterranean is even more dependent on foreign investment than Canada. Most of the sugar estates in Cuba, the banana plantations in Central America, and the oil companies in Mexico, Colombia, and Venezuela have been developed with capital from the United States. Mines, shipping and other transport facilities, public utilities, as well as government loans, have offered outlets for American savings with the result that a good deal of the economic life of the area has come under the control of the northern republic. The littoral of the Caribbean is the most productive zone in the American tropics and as such a region inevitably dominated by the United States, its principal market and source of capital.

The Intermediate Zone

Between the American Mediterranean and Brazil and Chile lies the so-called Intermediate Zone including the Guianas on the Atlantic side and Ecuador and Peru on the Pacific side. The Guianas are the only remaining European colonies in South America and export sugar, cocoa, and coffee. The trade of French Guiana before the con-

quest of France was primarily with the motherland, and British and Dutch Guiana, who produce large quantities of bauxite, have an important export trade with the United States and Canada. The area as a whole takes 18 per cent of its imports from the United States and sends us 8 per cent of its exports.

The Intermediate Zone on the Pacific contains the two mountain states of Ecuador and Peru. Ecuador is unimportant except as a potential source of quinine, but Peru is an exporter of sugar, cotton, and oil and one of the great mineral states of the world. She ranks fifth in copper production after the United States, Chile, Canada, and Mexico, all of them in the Western Hemisphere, and she produces 30 per cent of the world's output of vanadium as well as tungsten, lead, bismuth, and borax. The United States accounts for 40 per cent of the imports of Ecuador and 35 per cent of those of Peru and is the destination of one-third of the exports of Ecuador and one-fifth of those of Peru.

Temperate South America

The great temperate zone of South America lies beyond the bulge of Brazil in the east and the southern frontier of Peru in the west. Toward the Pacific flows the life of the high mountain regions of Bolivia and Chile, toward the Atlantic, that of southern Brazil and the great drainage basin of the La Plata. The Pacific area is one of the great mineral producers of the world, the Atlantic area one of the great agricultural producers. In both regions strenuous attempts are being made to supplement the extractive economy with manufacturing, but there are serious limitations to this process, especially the inadequacy of fuel.

The absence of good coal is a great handicap in the mining regions in the western states. The Bolivian highland is devoid of all fuel and has a possible source of future energy only in the potential water power of the eastern slopes. Chile has coal but not much of coking quality, and her water power is available in the south and not in the mineral region in the north. Since the development of the electrolytic process, copper production is less affected by this lack of fuel, but in the reduction of other ores it is a serious handicap. Chile con-

templates the creation of a small steel industry with an output of 150,000 tons a year to be produced by means of electric furnaces. This will lessen the dependence on steel imports, but it does not reduce the fuel difficulty for other industries. The result is that Chilean iron ore is transported to the United States and that tin leaves Bolivia in the form of ore concentrates to be smelted in Great Britain and the United States. Everywhere the transition from an extractive to an industrial economy is retarded and the development of heavy industry hampered if not precluded.

The eastern states are somewhat better provided, but neither Brazil nor the Argentine is endowed with the minerals and energy resources necessary for a great industrial development. The Argentine has important sources of water power in the Andean foothills in the western part of the country, but they lie far removed from the potential labor supply and the market for industrial products which are concentrated on the Atlantic seaboard. Oil from the fields near the Paraguayan border offers another source of energy, but large imports of coal will inevitably remain an important feature of Argentine trade. Brazil is endowed with enormous potential water power, estimated by some authors at over 40 million horsepower, larger than that of the United States. Much of it is, however, located in regions too remote from the centers of population to contribute greatly to industrialization. The same applies, although to a lesser extent, to coal which must be brought north from the southern provinces of Santa Catharina and Rio Grande do Sul. So far there are no indications of important oil resources and large-scale development of shale oil deposits will have to await the invention of cheaper processes of production.

Both countries have in recent years expanded the manufacture of consumers' goods, and all members of the A.B.C. group have used tariffs for the protection of infant industries. The Argentine is beginning to approach self-sufficiency in many commodities such as processed foods, soap, shoes, glassware, and furniture and is able to satisfy a very large part of her requirements in textiles. In Brazil the newly developed iron and steel industry will eventually supply a part of the local requirements, but even here most of the industrial development will inevitably remain within the field of consumers' goods.

The countries of the temperate zone of South America have been, like the United States in the nineteenth century, hungry for foreign capital to speed the development of their natural resources. In the west, the United States is the main creditor, with a heavy concentration of direct investment in mining and in the east, European capital predominates. British investments are the largest mainly in railroads, shipping, and commercial enterprises. Although net debtors for sums probably exceeding a billion dollars, Chile and the Argentine have begun to export capital themselves in recent years to the adjacent regions of the north. Chilean enterprise is penetrating into Peru and Bolivia; Argentine capital is invested in meat packing in Uruguay, in quebracho enterprises in Paraguay, and participates in the development of southern Bolivia and southern Brazil. Except for a lower level of industrialization the economic development of the two countries of the extreme south seems to have reached a phase comparable to that of the United States in the years preceding the First World War. They are both borrowers and lenders and as such convinced that the money which they borrow is tainted by exploitation and imperialism and that the money which they lend is an instrument to spread the blessings of productivity and civilization.

Notwithstanding the beginning of industrialization, the national wealth of temperate South America will continue to depend to a large extent on its agrarian and extractive economy, and the surplus products from mine and field will have to find a market abroad if the national income is to be preserved. On the west coast this means minerals, on the east coast agricultural products.

Of the total exports of Bolivia 90 per cent is represented by minerals, which is practically the whole of the national production. The most important product is tin which is shipped to Great Britain and the United States. Other mineral exports are silver, lead, tungsten, zinc, antimony, and copper. Chile is almost as dependent on mineral exports as Bolivia. Practically four-fifths of the value of her exports is in mineral products with nitrates (25 per cent) and copper (55 per cent) the most important items. Other mineral products are gold, lead, silver, manganese, and zinc, as well as iron ore shipped to the United States. Both countries take about 30 per cent of their imports

from the United States who receives about 7 per cent of the exports of Bolivia and 32 per cent of the exports of Chile.

The Atlantic drainage area of the temperate zone of South America includes the ports of Rio de Janeiro and Santos, the outlets of the most important economic region of Brazil. It also includes the southern states of that great country as well as Paraguay, Uruguay, and the Argentine. This zone contains the most important fertile area of the whole of South America, almost three-quarters of the population, the most productive economy, and the highest standard of living. Except for the border fringe near the tropics, the economy of the region is in many respects similar to the agrarian economy of the United States, and its products can, therefore, find no market in the northern republic; on the contrary, they compete with our own agricultural exports in the markets of Europe.

From Brazil come important mineral products such as manganese and quartz crystal, but her exports are primarily the products of agriculture and forestry. The principal commodities in order of their importance are: coffee, cotton, cacao, meat products, oranges, carnauba wax, tobacco, castor beans, timber, and vegetable oils. The predominantly agrarian nature of the economy of the Argentine is also reflected in the nature of her exports. Three-quarters of the livestock and two-thirds of the crops must find a market abroad. The principal products exported are: meats, wheat, flaxseed, corn, wool, hides, and quebracho extract. It is, therefore, not surprising that there is relatively less trade between the United States and this area of Latin America than with any other section. Of Brazilian imports the northern republic sends only 23 per cent and of the exports she receives 36 per cent, largely represented by coffee. In the Argentine the figures are 16 per cent of the imports and 16 per cent of the exports.

The relatively small volume of trade between the United States and the La Plata region is not only due to the fact that both regions produce the same agricultural products, but it is also due to the fact that the North American industrialist has no freight advantage over his European competitor. Rio de Janeiro and Buenos Aires are approximately equidistant from Europe and the United States, and transportation service from the Old Continent has usually been much better than from New York.

For the A.B.C. countries of South America, Europe, not the United States, is the most important economic region in the world. From the industrial region between the Elbe and the Pyrenees have come most of its imports, and to that densely populated area of Western Europe flow most of its exports. From London and Paris came the capital that made their early development possible and through these centers the savings of Europeans have continued to flow into the economic development of the region. The economic fate of the temperate zone of South America remains inevitably bound up with the fate of the Old World.

The Western Hemisphere

These states, briefly sketched in terms of their normal international trade, make up the Western Hemisphere, an enormous territory of approximately 14 million square miles which has at present a population of 275 million. Although there are large areas economically unsuited for close settlement, it is none the less true that the present density of about 15 people per square mile, compared with 135 for Europe and 65 for Asia, is indicative of the fact that great sections are still almost completely undeveloped. Immigration has been discouraged for social, political, and economic reasons, but not because soil and natural resources could not sustain a larger population.

From the point of view of international economic relations, the Americas consist of a number of economic regions, each integrated in a unique manner in the world economy. An extractive mineral economy is located in the mountain regions along the Pacific coast and in two zones near the Atlantic, one in Canada and one in Brazil. The western and southern parts of the temperate zone of North America and the eastern part of the temperate zone of South America are devoted to agriculture and export cereals, fibers, and meat products. Between these two temperate regions exporting the same products lies a tropical world which extends over the American Mediterranean and the Amazon Basin and provides a complementary economy producing for both north and south. There is a modest beginning of industrialization in the manufacturing of consumers' goods by the A.B.C. countries of South America, but the great industrial region

of the hemisphere, the exporter of the products of heavy industry, is in the eastern part of North America and includes the United States and Canada.

The difference between North America above the Rio Grande and the rest of the hemisphere lies not only in the relative degree of industrialization but also in the degree of general diversification of agricultural life. The Latin American countries have almost all succumbed to the temptations of mono-culture. A disproportionate amount of national income depends on a single crop or on a very small number of crops. Even the states which are primarily producers of minerals seem to derive most of their wealth from one or two products. In Cuba it is sugar, in Central America bananas, in Brazil coffee, in Uruguay cattle, and in the Argentine wheat and beef. In Venezuela it is oil, in Chile copper and nitrates, and in Bolivia tin and zinc. Dependence on a single export product means dependence on foreign markets, sharing in all the vicissitudes of distant areas and subservience to monopoly buyers. In a world of economic warfare operating by means of denial of exports it is the type of economy which has the least power of resistance. Latin America needs not only industrialization; it needs agrarian diversification.

The hemisphere as a whole is more than self-sufficient in the principal foodstuffs and fodder crops, but imports tea and vegetable oils from the Far East. The New World has a surplus of cotton, but it is dependent for most fibers except wool on the transpacific zone from which come silk, jute, and Manila hemp, as well as rubber. The Americas are self-sufficient in the principal non-ferrous metals except tin but import under normal circumstances many of the alloy metals used in steel-making. The transpacific area is primarily the source of raw materials; the transatlantic area is a source of both raw materials in terms of Africa and manufactured goods in terms of Europe. In the years before the outbreak of the war the net imports of the hemisphere from the transoceanic world amounted to about 3 billion dollars while exports totaled 4 billion dollars. Approximately 500 million dollars represented agricultural exports, ¾ of which came from the five great staples, wheat, corn, beef, cotton, and tobacco, products of the temperate zones of both the North and South American continents.

These facts indicate, at least in part, some of the more important aspects of the international economic position of the Western Hemisphere. But the true significance of that position cannot be evaluated unless we remember at the same time the international position of the transoceanic zones that would encircle us in case of German-Japanese victory in the Old World. Greater Germany is expected to control the whole of Europe, the Near East, and Africa. In 1937, the energy resources of the region were adequate in terms of water power and coal and inadequate in terms of oil, a large part of which came from the American Mediterranean. From the area which was expected to be controlled by her Japanese partner, the Far East, the Asiatic Mediterranean, Australasia, and the eastern Indian Ocean, came the following products: tin, tea, and rubber, as well as the fibers hemp, jute, silk, and wool. From the Western Hemisphere came copper, lead, zinc, and the alloy metals nickel and molybdenum as well as phosphates for fertilizer. The New World also supplemented Europe's inadequacy in foodstuffs and cotton and shipped large quantities of food cereals, feed crops, animal products, coffee, tobacco, and sugar.

In terms of the prevailing diet and the existing degree of industrialization in 1937, the area which Japan eventually hopes to dominate was considerably more independent of imports than the German sphere. There was self-sufficiency in cereal foodstuffs, feed crops, vegetable oils, and meat products, in fibers except cotton, and in rubber and other tropical products. Energy resources were plentiful in terms of water power, coal, and oil, and there was an adequate basis for an iron and steel industry. Lead, tin, and zinc requirements could be fulfilled within the zone, and the alloy metals for steelmaking were ample except for vanadium and molybdenum, which came from the Western Hemisphere as did copper.

Notwithstanding a considerable amount of intercontinental trade in foodstuffs and raw materials there was a great deal of relative self-sufficiency in the two spheres of the Old World. If, after the defeat of our allies abroad, Germany and Japan continued to co-operate in the realm of economic planning, they could eventually make the Old World largely independent of the New, provided that they were willing to pay the economic cost. It would be relatively easy to re-

place the American tropics by intensification of cultivation in the tropical zone of Asia and full development of the possibilities of Africa. More difficult, although probably not impossible, would be the problem of increasing the food production in the temperate zones of Europe. Most difficult of all would be to find substitutes for the minerals now coming from the Western Hemisphere.

Hemisphere Encirclement

The previous pages give a brief description of the economic structure of the countries of the Western Hemisphere and of the relations of the American continents to the world economy in 1937, before economic mobilization and war had destroyed the international trade pattern of peace. The Second World War, not unlike the first, created great dislocations in international trade and caused profound internal disturbances, so far more detrimental to the countries of South America than to those of North America. The international economic picture is dominated by the German conquest of Continental Europe and the extension of the British blockade and by the general increase in industrial productivity everywhere in the world, particularly in the armament industries. The Western Hemisphere has lost the markets of Continental Europe through the British blockade, those of China through the Japanese blockade, and this loss was only partly compensated for by the expansion of the war industry in the United States.

In North America the most significant developments have been due to the rearmament program of the United States and to a lesser extent that of Canada. Starting slowly, war expenditures in the United States reached a billion dollars a month by the summer of 1941, and they were expected to increase to well over two billion a month by 1942. The result was an enormous increase in industrial productivity, a complete reversal in a relatively short period of time from idle men and idle plants to a shortage of material and skilled labor. It led to an expansion of local mineral output and an increase in the importation of raw materials from South America.

The effect of the European war and the British blockade was very severe on the agrarian economies of the southern continent as well as

on those of Canada and the United States. Latin American countries lost an export market that used to buy about 500 million dollars' worth of foodstuffs yearly, or approximately one-third of their total exports. In the temperate zone of South America the effect was particularly serious. Chile lost one-half of her agricultural exports, Brazil one-third of her coffee and cotton exports, and the Argentine one-half of her meat exports. Shortage of shipping was also beginning to interfere with deliveries to the one remaining market in Europe, Great Britain. The result was widespread dislocation. Goods were piling up in the warehouses and docks, and there was obviously a serious reduction of purchasing power and a situation endangering the stability of the currencies. Because of the disappearance of commodities formerly bought in Continental Europe, the Latin American countries turned to the United States as a substitute provider, a situation reflected in an increase in our exports to the republics below the Rio Grande.

Full belligerency by the United States created further disturbances in the economic pattern of the Western Hemisphere and brought additional hardship to South America. As long as fighting continues in Europe and Asia, the German-Japanese Alliance will be unable to exert economic pressure on the New World. But if it can conquer all of the Old World, it will have obtained control of raw materials indispensable to the war industries of the United States and achieved a monopoly position in the great export market of the Western Hemisphere.

We have sketched the economic position of the Western Hemisphere in the world and particularly the place of the United States, its most powerful national unit. From the war potential of North America must be produced the defense instrument for the protection of the hemisphere against invasion, and from the strength of its economic system must come the leadership in the fight against blockade and economic strangulation, against the new techniques that use the need for exports as a weapon for economic exploitation and political disruption. The chapters which follow are an attempt to find out whether this New World could defend itself against these weapons and create a regional *Grossraumwirtschaft* that could survive encirclement by the Old World.

X. Mobilization of Natural Resources

The difficulties which we now experience in securing some of our essential imports provide an added unanswerable refutation to those who indulge in reckless assertions that our country can isolate itself from the rest of the world and prosper.

CORDELL HULL

THE United States is a country richly endowed with natural resources and perhaps more self-sufficient than any other state in the world. But the requirements of an advanced industrial civilization are so varied and so complex that even the wealth of the North American Continent is inadequate to supply the multitudinous demands of her economy. A vast fleet of steamers from every port in the world must bring its cargo to her warehouses and factories in order that peace time production may continue uninterrupted. Modern war demands an even greater output, particularly in so-called war industries. It creates a vast increase in the demand for the raw materials that go into rifles, guns, ammunition, armor plate, and tanks; the motors and power plants that make mobile warfare possible; and the airplanes that fight the battles of the skies. Preparation for war is, therefore, partly a problem of increased industrial production and partly a problem of procurement of raw materials. With the first we are not here concerned. Our problem is the position of the United States in regard to the availability of the raw materials necessary to fight a modern war.

Raw Materials

Much of the early research in the problem of raw material procurement has been made obsolete by the nature of the new war and the

political situation in which the United States finds herself. Some of the work is only of moderate value today because it was based on premises which are no longer valid. The authors usually assumed that the American war effort would have to be directed at a single state, not at powers with the resources of continents at their disposal. They thought of wars in one ocean and did not dream of the possibility of complete hemisphere encirclement. Wars were conceived as conflicts of limited duration that would be followed by a return to peace in which international trade would again be free and raw materials easy to obtain. No one expected a world in which the difference between peace time and war time economic policy would practically disappear and in which long periods of economic warfare might precede the outbreak of military hostilities. There is little in past experience to guide us and any presentation of the problem must, therefore, remain provisional and tentative.

In a memorandum published on January 7, 1939, the Army and Navy Munitions Board reported the raw material position of the United States in terms of strategic, critical, and essential materials.

Strategic materials: Are those essential to the national defense for the supply of which in war dependence must be placed in whole or in part on sources outside the continental limits of the United States, and for which strict conservation and distribution control measures will be necessary.

Critical materials: Are those materials essential to the national defense the procurement problems of which in war, while difficult, are less serious than those of strategic materials because they can either be domestically produced or obtained in more adequate quantities or have a lesser degree of essentiality and for which some degree of conservation and distribution control will be necessary.

Essential materials neither strategic nor critical: In this classification are included those materials, essential to the national defense, for which no procurement problems in war are anticipated, but whose status is such as to require constant surveillance because future developments may necessitate reclassification as strategic or critical.

The last paragraph shows not only official caution but also a thorough appreciation of the essentially dynamic and constantly changing character of the procurement problem. This problem

changes with shifts in our foreign policy, with new developments in the art of warfare, with different conceptions of military strategy, and with changes in the quantitative estimates of requirements. Emphasis on naval power means more steel, emphasis on air power, more aluminum, emphasis on motorized divisions, increased demands for rubber. The armament requirements of the United States are constantly being modified, and every new squadron of bombers ordered, every new motorized division planned, and every cruiser added to an existing building program immediately increases the need for iron, copper, aluminum, lead, vanadium, and a thousand other articles. Estimates are revised and shortages discovered where only a few months earlier there seemed to be a surplus with a comfortable margin of safety.

In each of the categories mentioned in the memorandum of 1939, the Commodities Division of the Board listed the following materials:

Strategic Materials (17)

Aluminum	Mica	Rubber
Antimony	Nickel	Silk
Chromium	*Optical glass	Tin
Coconut shell char	Quartz crystal	Tungsten
Manganese, ferro-grade	Quicksilver	Wool
Manila fiber	Quinine	

Critical Materials (20)

Asbestos	Graphite	Platinum
Cadmium	Hides	*Scientific glass
Coffee	Iodine	Tanning materials
Cork	Kapok	Titanium
Cryolite	Nux vomica	*Toluol
Flaxseed	Opium	Vanadium
Fluorspar	*Phenol and picric acid	

Essential Materials Neither Strategic nor Critical (35)

Arsenic	*Acetic acid	*Alcohol (ethyl)
Abrasives	*Acetone	Camphor

*Commodities which are not raw materials but manufactured products.

Castor oil	*Methanol	Shellac
*Chlorine	Molybdenum	Sisal
Copper	*Nitrogen compounds (ammonia and nitric acid)	Sugar
Copra		*Sulfuric acid (including sulfur and pyrites)
Cotton linters	Palm oil	Uranium
*Helium	Paper and pulp	*Webbing and duck
Hemp	Petroleum	Wheat
Jute	Phosphates	Zinc
*Iron and steel	Potash	Zirconium
Lead	Refractories	
Magnesium		

The list is constantly being revised in the light of changed conditions.† As the rearmament program became more and more ambitious and the country started planning for a huge air armada, a large number of mechanized divisions and a two-ocean fleet, the procurement problem became more and more serious. By the summer of 1941, the output of aluminum and magnesium was way below requirements, and the plans for 1942 were threatened by serious shortages in copper, zinc, and many other metals. The shortage in aluminum is not due to lack of raw material but to inadequate productive capacity and shortages in output of electric power. The same applies to magnesium, a metal mentioned in the official list as neither strategic nor critical, but which has taken on a new importance because it is even lighter than aluminum and, alloyed with the latter or with zinc, finds increasing usage in airplane construction.

The government is trying to provide the raw material requirements of the ever-expanding rearmament program by stimulating increased production, by introducing systems of priorities and by attempting to build up stock piles for reserve. Higher prices have brought many a marginal producer back into the market and stimulated production generally, but neither the output of local mines nor the increasing imports seem able to keep up with expanding demands. The result is an ever-widening system of rationing and priorities and

* Commodities which are not raw materials but manufactured products.

† A revised list was published in March, 1940, but some of the revisions were inspired by a somewhat unjustifiable optimism. For that reason we have adhered to the original classification.

finally the reservation of strategic raw materials exclusively for war industries.

Beginning in 1939, the Treasury Department began to purchase stock piles of strategic raw materials for emergency purposes and a more extensive program was launched in June, 1940, when the Reconstruction Finance Corporation was authorized to finance the acquisition of large reserves. Since that period the government through different agencies has bought and contracted for great quantities of antimony, chrome, copper, graphite, lead, manganese, nitrates, tungsten, and zinc as well as wool and rubber. But the reserves grew only very slowly, if at all. Shipping shortages soon began to interfere with imports, and growing consumption was in many cases depleting stocks faster than they were being replenished.

1. Transoceanic Sources

Stock piles are an excellent preparation for a war of limited duration, and they can provide a breathing spell and time for transformation of factories and development of substitutes, but they are no adequate solution in a world in which the struggle for power is incessant and economic warfare a permanent feature. Besides, such a procedure could continue only as long as Great Britain survived and sea lanes were in friendly hands. It is true that in the fall of 1941 much of the Eurasian Continent was no longer accessible, but the United States could still draw supplies from transoceanic zones. From the Philippines, the Dutch East Indies, and Australia and even from China along the tortuous Burma Road products flowed across the Pacific. From the Near East and British India by way of Cape Town, from Africa and even from England herself materials still came across the Atlantic to feed our war machine. But if the German-Japanese Alliance were victorious across the oceans, these sources could be denied to us. It becomes, therefore, necessary to analyze what would happen to the raw material situation of the United States in case of hemisphere encirclement.

The following tables indicate the geographic origin of our strategic and critical raw materials in 1937.

ORIGIN OF STRATEGIC RAW MATERIALS

Consumed in the United States in 1937[a]

	U. S. Production	*Transoceanic Imports*					
		Transatlantic		*Transpacific*		*Total*	
	As % U. S. cons.	*As % U. S. cons.*	*As % U. S. imp.*	*As % U. S. cons.*	*As % U. S. imp.*	*As % U. S. cons.*	*As % U. S. imp.*
Mineral Products							
Aluminum(Bauxite)	47.0	27.0	51.0	0.0	0.0	27.0	51.0
Antimony	7.0	2.5	2.5	9.5	9.5	12.0	12.0
Chrome	0.5	65.0	66.0	17.0	17.0	82.0	83.0
Manganese	4.0	74.0	77.0	0.5	0.5	75.0	78.0
Mica	70.0	14.0	45.0	0.0	0.0	14.0	45.0
Nickel	0.5	2.0	2.0	0.0	0.0	2.0	2.0
Quartz Crystal	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Quicksilver	47.0	49.0	92.0	0.0	0.0	49.0	92.0
Tin	0.0	11.0	11.0	88.0	88.0	99.0	99.0
Tungsten	56.0	1.0	2.0	41.0	92.0	42.0	94.0
Agricultural Products							
Coconut Shell Char.	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Manila Fiber	0.0	0.0	0.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Quinine	0.0	0.0	0.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Rubber	0.0	4.0	4.0	95.0	95.0	99.0	99.0
Silk	0.0	2.0	2.0	98.0	98.0	100.0	100.0
Wool	57.0	12.0	29.0	19.0	44.0	31.0	73.0

[a] Latin America and Canada are omitted in this table.

Sources: U. S. Department of Commerce, *Foreign Commerce and Navigation of the United States, 1937*; U. S. Bureau of Mines, *Minerals Yearbook, 1939*; League of Nations, *Raw Materials and Foodstuffs, 1939*; League of Nations, *Statistical Yearbook, 1938-39*.

ORIGIN OF CRITICAL RAW MATERIALS

Consumed in the United States in 1937 [a]

	U. S. Production	Transoceanic Imports					
		Transatlantic		Transpacific		Total	
	As % U. S. cons.	As % U. S. cons.	As % U. S. imp.	As % U. S. cons.	As % U. S. imp.	As % U. S. cons.	As % U. S. imp.
Mineral Products							
Asbestos	4.0	10.0	10.0	0.0	0.0	10.0	10.0
Cadmium	85.0	9.0	65.0	0.5	3.0	10.0	68.0
Cryolite	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Fluorspar	83.0	7.0	44.0	0.0	0.0	7.0	44.0
Graphite	....[b]	....	9.0	....	36.0	0.0	45.0
Iodine	0.1	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Platinum	11.0[c]	73.0	82.0	0.1	0.3	73.0	82.0
Titanium	....[b]	....	99.0	....	0.0	0.0	99.0
Vanadium	47.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Agricultural Products							
Coffee	0.0	2.0	2.0	2.0	2.0	4.0	4.0
Cork	0.0	100.0	100.0	0.0	0.0	100.0	100.0
Flaxseed	21.0	2.0	2.0	0.5	0.5	3.0	3.0
Hides	64.0	13.0	35.0	9.0	23.0	22.0	58.0
Kapok	0.0	0.0	0.0	97.0	97.0	97.0	97.0
Nux Vomica	0.0	27.0	27.0	73.0	73.0	100.0	100.0
Opium	0.0	100.0	100.0	0.0	0.0	100.0	100.0
Tanning materials	61.0	8.0	22.0	5.0	12.0	13.0	34.0

[a] Latin America and Canada are omitted in this table.

[b] Production figures for graphite and titanium are not published.

[c] This figure increased to 32% in 1938.

Sources: U. S. Department of Commerce, *Foreign Commerce and Navigation of the United States, 1937;* U. S. Department of Commerce, *Foreign Commerce Yearbook, 1938;* U. S. Department of Commerce, *Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1939;* U. S. Bureau of Mines, *Minerals Yearbook, 1939;* League of Nations, *Raw Materials and Foodstuffs, 1939;* League of Nations, *Statistical Yearbook, 1938-39.*

These tables give an indication of the effect which a German-Japanese victory would have on the raw material situation of the United States. The defeat of our allies in the Old World would mean encirclement and the loss of maritime communications across the Atlantic and the Pacific. American sea power would be reduced to coastal navigation along the shores of the Western Hemisphere and the New World would be an invested and blockaded island. Under these circumstances transoceanic products could be denied to us by the simple expedient of an embargo enforced by port authorities. With the whole of the opposite coasts in the control of our enemies, there would be very little need to supplement this embargo by blockade. Russian exports could be checked from the German-controlled marginal seas of Europe and the Japanese-controlled marginal seas of Asia. To deprive us of strategic raw materials before the complete conquest and integration of their respective spheres, Germany and Japan would still have to resort to a long distance blockade. In that case the Atlantic blockade would probably operate from points as far south as Dakar and the Pacific blockade from points as far south as Singapore. Under such circumstances some shipments might still come through from Australia and New Zealand in the west and from South Africa in the east, but such cargoes could do little to alleviate the shortage of raw materials caused by withholding the products of Europe and Asia.

Germany could withhold aluminum, manganese, mercury, and tin through the control of Europe; chrome and manganese through the control of Africa; and chrome, manganese, mica, and tungsten through the control of the western exits of the Indian Ocean. Of the critical raw materials Germany could withhold cork, fluorspar, opium, and platinum through the control of Europe; asbestos and fluorspar through the control of Africa; and graphite, nux vomica, and opium through the control of the Indian Ocean. Japan could withhold the following raw materials: in the strategic group chrome, Manila fiber, quinine, rubber, silk, tin, and tungsten through the control of the Far East; and nickel and wool through the control of Australia and Oceania. Of the critical raw materials she could withhold through her control of the Far East graphite, kapok, nux vomica, and opium. This situation is a clear indication that encirclement and blockade of

the Western Hemisphere would make it exceedingly difficult for the United States to maintain a war industry adequate for defense.

The ability of the New World to force exports from across the ocean by the pressure of counter-embargo is very limited. If Japan and Germany should continue to work together after the defeat of our allies, they would control the products of the Eurasian heartland, and the resources of the whole of the Old World would be at their disposal. Against such supernational units of continental dimensions, the United States alone would be powerless to exert effective pressure in spite of her overwhelming strength in a world of national states. Only if the Americas could build their separate economies into a single economic unit with a common front and a centralized control over hemisphere imports and exports would it be possible to exert any counter-pressure at all. For such purposes, mineral embargoes would probably be more effective than denial of foodstuffs. Notwithstanding the great quantities of wheat, corn and other feed crops, and beef which the Western Hemisphere normally sends to Europe, it would be exceedingly difficult to starve out the Old World. Prohibitions on the export of oil, copper, phosphate, nickel, nitrates, and zinc would undoubtedly cause inconvenience across the Atlantic and the Pacific, but they would not give the Western Hemisphere a weapon strong enough to undermine the military strength of the Eurasian Continent.

2. *Hemisphere Sources*

Since it is necessary to prepare for the worst contingency, North America must envisage the possibility of having to maintain a war industry and create the weapons of hemisphere defense in terms of the products of the New World. In order to estimate in how far an adequate war economy could be created in terms of the products of the Americas, the production figures for 1937 are presented in the tables on pages 302-3 as percentages of United States consumption in that year. This is obviously only a first step in an analysis of the position of our country. The complete answer would require a calculation of potential hemisphere production and of the future requirements of the United States. Estimates of needs, how-

ever, are constantly being revised, and potential production is dependent on willingness to make new investments, on availability of labor reserves in South America, on the possibility of building railroads and highways to new sources of supply, as well as on a number of additional factors. But, in any case, such a calculation, if made, would have to start with the actual output of a given year.

In 1937, manufacturing accounted for 16 billion dollars out of a total national income of 71 billion dollars. The industrial output was greater in this year than in any since 1929, but the percentage that went into war preparation was exceedingly small. There was apprehension about the future of Europe, but it had not yet been translated into a policy of rearmament. Only since 1939, however, has the country recognized the necessity of preparedness, and has Congress begun to vote huge appropriations that are eventually to be translated into ships and guns. In 1941, 15 per cent of the industrial output was devoted to armaments, a figure still small compared with the almost exclusive concentration on war industry in Germany and Great Britain. When the United States rearmament program really got under way, it began to absorb an increasingly large proportion of the productive capacity of heavy industry.

The size of the demand for raw material is suggested by comparing the figure for war expenditures in 1942 with the value of manufactures produced in 1937. The cost of the rearmament program will surpass 2½ billion dollars a month, or about 30 billion dollars for the whole year. This includes items such as pay for soldiers and sailors which do not necessarily represent a demand for manufactured goods, but it is a safe assumption that expenditures for munitions and implements of war will be considerably more than 16 billion dollars, the sum represented by the value of the whole industrial output in 1937. Industrial output will perhaps not actually double, because of forced reduction of civilian consumption, but it is none the less quite possible that, in a number of raw materials, war requirements will be twice as large as the peace time requirements of 1937.

If the United States could persuade her sister republics to send their products formerly shipped to Europe and Asia exclusively to the United States, our dependence on the transoceanic blocs would become considerably less. The raw material output of Latin America

HEMISPHERE SOURCES OF STRATEGIC RAW MATERIALS
1937

	U. S. Production	*L. A. Production*		*Total U. S. and L. A. Production*	*Can. Production*		*W. H. Production*
	As % U. S. cons.	*As % U. S. cons.*	*As % U. S. imp.*	*As % U. S. cons.*	*As % U. S. cons.*	*As % U. S. imp.*	*As % U. S. cons.*
Mineral Products							
Aluminum (Bauxite)	47.0	74.0	138.0	121.0	0.0	0.0	121.0
Antimony	7.0	119.0	129.0	126.0	0.0	0.0	126.0
Chrome	0.5	17.0	17.0	18.0	0.5	0.5	19.0
Manganese	4.0	42.0	44.0	46.0	0.0	0.0	46.0
Mica	70.0	2.0	5.0	72.0	3.0	8.0	75.0
Nickel	0.5	0.5	0.5	1.0	208.0	208.0	209.0
Quartz Crystal	0.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	0.0	0.0	100.0
Quicksilver	47.0	14.0	26.0	61.0	0.0	0.0	61.0
Tin	0.0	31.0	31.0	31.0	0.0	0.0	31.0
Tungsten	56.0	52.0	117.0	108.0	0.0	0.0	108.0
Agricultural Products							
Coconut Shell Char.	0.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	0.0	0.0	100.0
Manila Fiber	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Quinine	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Rubber	0.0	4.0	4.0	4.0	0.0	0.0	4.0
Silk	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Wool	57.0	88.0	194.0	145.0	3.0	6.0	148.0

Sources: U. S. Department of Commerce, *Foreign Commerce and Navigation of the United States, 1937;* U. S. Department of Commerce, *Foreign Commerce Yearbook, 1938;* U. S. Department of Commerce, *Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1939;* U. S. Bureau of Mines, *Minerals Yearbook, 1939;* League of Nations, *Raw Materials and Foodstuffs, 1939;* League of Nations, *Statistical Yearbook, 1938-39.*

HEMISPHERE SOURCES OF CRITICAL RAW MATERIALS
1937

	U. S. Production	*L. A. Production*		*Total U. S. and L. A. Production*	*Can. Production*		*W. H. Production*
	As % U. S. cons.	*As % U. S. cons.*	*As % U. S. imp.*	*As % U. S. cons.*	*As % U. S. cons.*	*As % U. S. imp.*	*As % U. S. cons.*
Mineral Products							
Asbestos	4.0	0.1	0.1	4.0	129.0	135.0	133.0
Cadmium	85.0	0.0	0.0	85.0	13.0	90.0	98.0
Cryolite	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	100.0[a]
Fluorspar	83.0	0.5	4.0	84.0	4.0	26.0	88.0
Graphite	....[b]	....	42.0	.....	.....	6.0	.....
Iodine	0.1	100.0+	100.0	100.0	0.0	0.0	100.0
Platinum	11.0[c]	21.0	23.0	32.0	97.0	109.0	129.0
Titanium	....[b]	.....	0.3	.....	.....	2.0	.....
Vanadium	47.0	60.0	112.0	107.0	0.0	0.0	107.0
Agricultural Products							
Coffee	0.0	176.0[d]	176.0	176.0	0.0	0.0	176.0
Cork	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Flaxseed	21.0	194.0	247.0	215.0	2.0	3.0	217.0
Hides	64.0	48.0[d]	130.0	112.0	5.0	14.0	117.0
Kapok	0.0	3.0	3.0	3.0	0.0	0.0	3.0
Nux Vomica	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Opium	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Tanning Materials	61.0	433.0[e]	433.0	494.0	0.0	0.0	494.0

[a] Total world supply of cryolite comes from Greenland.
[b] United States production figures are not published.
[c] This figure rose in 1938 to 32%.
[d] Based on Latin American exports.
[e] Expressed in total Latin American exports of quebracho; total production unknown.

Sources: Same as table on page 302.

is almost entirely exported and very little of the production is consumed in local industry. By the summer of 1941, a great many of the Latin American republics had adopted export control systems of greater or less stringency, and the majority of the states seemed willing to co-operate for hemisphere defense at least to the extent of preventing strategic raw materials from reaching the Axis powers. The fact that the United States is purchasing practically their total output and that the British fleet would catch cargoes destined for the continent of Europe, made this co-operation a good deal easier than it would be under conditions of German-Japanese victory in the Old World when the stronger economic pressure would be exerted by the fascist states. But even if the whole of the production of Latin America remained at the disposal of the United States, she would still be plagued by a number of serious procurement problems.

If the whole of the production of Latin America could be made available to the United States, her situation would be greatly improved, but the table suggests that there would remain none the less a number of serious procurement problems. There are some mineral products in which even the combined production of the United States and Latin America is far from adequate. In terms of the figures for 1937, the deficiencies expressed as percentages of consumption would be as follows: in the strategic list, chrome 82 per cent, manganese 54 per cent, mica 28 per cent, nickel 99 per cent, quicksilver 39 per cent, and tin 68 per cent, and in the critical list, asbestos 96 per cent, cadmium 15 per cent, cryolite 100 per cent, fluorspar 16 per cent, platinum 68 per cent, and graphite and titanium in fairly large amounts.

In case of hemisphere encirclement, the United States would undoubtedly find her closest collaborator not among the nations of South America, some of whom are far away, but across the border in Canada. Canada is herself an important industrial nation and is engaged in a great rearmament program and an expansion of war industry. The total Canadian mineral production could not be shipped to the United States, but in quite a number of cases there is an export surplus that would become available. In this group are aluminum,* asbestos, cadmium, copper, lead, nickel, platinum, and

* Partly manufactured from imported bauxite.

zinc. Greenland produces all the cryolite in the world, and this requirement can consequently also be satisfied from the north. In terms of hemisphere resources the question of providing the armament industry of the United States with the necessary minerals resolves itself finally into the problem of meeting shortages in ten products. Hemisphere production in 1937, in terms of the peace time requirements of that year, indicates the following deficiencies: in the strategic group, chrome (81%); manganese (54%); mica (25%); quicksilver (39%); and tin (69%); and in the critical list, cadmium (2%); fluorspar (12%); graphite, and titanium. How much more serious the deficiencies would be in terms of the requirements of 1942, it is impossible to predict with any accuracy, but that they would be far greater is indicated by the fact that increased production of minerals has nowhere been able to keep step with increased demand.

3. *Minerals*

The most serious problem would seem to be presented by the case of chrome. Estimated needs for 1942 are close to a million tons compared to imports of about 550,000 tons in 1937. This metal is one of the most important ingredients in certain alloy steels and goes into projectiles, rifle linings, armor plate, and high speed cutting tools. The principal sources in normal times have been Turkey and Africa across the Atlantic and the Philippines and New Caledonia across the Pacific. Only a few thousand tons are mined domestically in normal years, but it is possible to increase domestic production to about 20 per cent of war time needs provided the cost is disregarded. Cuba is the largest producer in the Western Hemisphere. Brazil is beginning to be an important source, and the production of Canada could be considerably increased. There are no satisfactory substitutes for the use of chrome in alloy steels, and all available sources will, therefore, have to be reserved for war production. But even with the metal excluded from most articles of civilian consumption, it would probably still be impossible to provide for all our military needs.

The next most important item, manganese, is another alloy used in steel-making for the purpose of purifying the metal and increasing its toughness. In regard to this mineral, the situation is fortunately less

serious. The United States is herself a producer, and Latin America contains extensive deposits. The estimates for 1942 requirements have gone as high as a million and a half tons which is more than three times the imports of 1937 when we imported ore equivalent to 450,000 metric tons of manganese. Of this amount approximately 600,000 tons would be needed for war industry. In recent years our principal sources of supply have been the Gold Coast, the U.S.S.R., Cuba, British India, and Brazil. But since the outbreak of the war, the U.S.S.R. has disappeared as a source, and the Gold Coast is sending its production exclusively to Great Britain. These losses have been compensated for by increased imports from British and Netherlands India, the Philippines, and Brazil. Hemisphere resources of manganese are much more adequate than those of chrome. There are large untapped reserves in Brazil and Cuba which could be made available by building railroads to known bodies of ore. The mines in the Argentine, Brazil, and Chile could also increase their present production. The recent discovery of a new type of flotation process and of reduction process by electrolysis will make it possible to use some of the large, low-grade ore deposits in the country that were formerly unworkable. Intensive exploitation of the resources of both continents combined with the system of priorities for war industries should make it possible to satisfy the armament requirements.

Mica is important for electrical installations and in the automobile and radio industries. As a heat-resistant and transparent medium, it has a wide variety of industrial and commercial uses. Domestic pro-

duction in 1937 supplied over 50 per cent of our needs for certain types of mica, and this could be further increased. Hemisphere sources are located in Canada, Brazil, and the Argentine, and deposits have also been reported in Bolivia, Chile, Peru, and Colombia. There is, however, no indication that these countries will be able to replace the sheet mica and splittings which so far have come from British India and Madagascar. Fortunately there are, in contrast with the metals mentioned above, a number of available substitutes for mica. Glass and synthetic plastics can be used in certain instances and Alsifilm, a product made from bentonite, has also been reported as a satisfactory alternative.

The procurement problem for quicksilver will be relatively easy to solve. More than 40 per cent of the consumption of this commodity is taken by the drug and chemical industry. This mineral also has important military uses, particularly in instruments and in detonators, percussion caps, and primers. In recent years the annual consumption has fluctuated around 35,000 flasks, and about 50 per cent of this amount is produced domestically. War time needs will probably increase the annual consumption to 50,000 flasks per year. Domestic production could be greatly expanded, and since the cessation of imports from Spain and Italy, Latin American sources, particularly Mexico, have already greatly increased their exports to the United States. There are other areas of potential production in Peru, Bolivia, and Ecuador. Geologists have reported the recent discovery of deposits in Venezuela which promise to be the largest and richest known. There are several substitutes for the principal uses of quicksilver, and there is, therefore, every reason to expect that hemisphere self-sufficiency can be achieved.

Very serious indeed would be the problem of tin procurement under conditions of hemisphere encirclement. The United States is the largest consumer of tin and takes, in normal times, over half of the world production, between 75,000 and 85,000 tons. She uses in addition between 20,000 and 30,000 tons of tin reclaimed from scrap. The metal goes into containers, automobile parts, roofing, metal furniture, and solder for joints and welding metals and has innumerable uses in the defense industries. The greater part of the tin consumed in the United States originates in the Dutch East Indies and

British Malaya and is smelted either in the Far East or in Europe. During the last war and for some time thereafter, Bolivian ores were smelted in the United States, but differential export duties in British Malaya and the policy of the International Tin Cartel prevented the growth of a domestic industry.

The United States government has once again embarked on a similar venture. A smelter is being constructed with government money in Texas City, Texas, a port with good terminal facilities and cheap fuel in the form of natural gas. The smelter will be operated by a subsidiary of the Dutch Biliton Company and is designed for a capacity of 18,000 tons, about 20 per cent of the normal consumption. The United States has agreed to purchase this amount of ore from Bolivia each year for the next five years. The rest of the Bolivian tin production still flows to Great Britain but might become available in case of an Axis victory in Europe. The total Bolivian output in recent years has been the equivalent of about 25,000 tons, and, if all of this reached the United States together with additional imports from Argentina and Mexico, a considerable part of our strictly military requirements could be fulfilled.

Most of the tin consumed goes into tin plate for canning, but the requirements of the food industry could be greatly reduced by a change in the manufacturing of tin plate and by a shift to other types of containers. It is possible to coat plates on one side by spraying instead of on two sides by dipping, to use plastics and other coatings for certain types of lining, and to substitute silver, cadmium, and lead for a number of other uses. An excellent opportunity has presented itself at last to dispose of the useless hoard of silver accumulated by the government as the result of its silver purchase plan. A strict system of priorities and reservation of tin for defense needs would probably make it possible for the United States to satisfy her war requirements in terms of the resources of the hemisphere.

The critical minerals fluorspar, graphite, and titanium represent no insurmountable difficulty. Fluorspar requirements, used chiefly as a flux in metallurgy, can be satisfied by increased production in the United States and larger imports from Mexico and Newfoundland. Graphite, indispensable as electrodes in electric furnaces, can be supplied by Canada and Mexico or made synthetically. Titanium, used

as an alloy in the steel industry, which adds hardness and increases toughness or tensile strength, is imported mainly from British India, but there are possibilities of increased domestic production and substitute sources in Canada and Brazil.

4. Agricultural Products

The New World has been known for its rich endowment in mineral resources, and it is, therefore, not surprising that, given the will to make sacrifices, a fair degree of independence from the Old World could be achieved. But the problem of dependence on the agricultural products of the transoceanic zones will be much more difficult to solve. In the strategic list there is only one commodity, namely wool, in which the hemisphere could be made self-sufficient. Adjustments would have to be made because certain qualities of wool are not available in the Americas, but quantitatively the South American exports cover the North American imports. In the critical list, there are four products in which the hemisphere is self-sufficient and in which Latin American exports could satisfy North American requirements, namely, coffee, flaxseed, hides, and tanning materials. The problem remains unsolved in regard to such products as Manila fiber, quinine, rubber, and silk in the strategic group and cork, kapok, nux vomica, and opium in the critical group.

Many of these products have their origin in the Asiatic Mediterranean and it has therefore been assumed that it would be comparatively simple to grow them in the tropical regions of the Western Hemisphere. This turns out not to be the case. Successful production of articles grown on the plantations of southeastern Asia requires a great deal more than a superficial similarity in climatological conditions. There are problems of labor and transport, the necessity of finding disease-resistant varieties suited for cultivation in the New World, and a host of other difficulties.

Manila fiber, used for naval cordage, is a strategic material because no other fiber is as resistant to the action of salt water and to alternative conditions of heat and cold. The entire supply comes from the Philippines, but if it could no longer be imported across the Pacific, it would be possible to grow the abacá plant, from which the fiber

is made, in Panama and other sections of the American tropics. The soil of abandoned banana plantations is eminently suited to its cultivation, and the yearly crop from 100,000 acres would satisfy all of the United States requirements. For uses other than cordage, there are innumerable substitutes such as paper, cotton, flax, henequen, and synthetic fibers.

Indispensable for public health, particularly in the fight against malaria and other tropical diseases, is quinine. The product is made from the bark of the cinchona tree grown on plantations in the Asiatic tropics, particularly in Java from which comes 95 per cent of the world's production and practically all of American imports. A central marketing organization controls output and has been able to maintain prices far above cost. Quinine was originally produced from the wild trees growing in the Andes mountain regions, and there is no reason why Ecuador, Peru, and Colombia could not introduce the plantation system if the problem of labor costs and labor shortage could be solved. This approach to the problem of hemisphere self-sufficiency is, however, a long and doubtful procedure. The Department of Agriculture of the United States has studied the problem of quinine production in its experiment station in Puerto Rico and has developed strains and methods of production that give a high yield not only of quinine but of other alkaloids. It still takes, however, seven years before the tree can be stripped of bark, and it would take probably ten years before there could be any approach to hemisphere self-sufficiency. More promising is the further development of substitutes now made by the drug industry such as atabrin, plasmochin, and chinacrine.

The American way of life would be radically changed if rubber were no longer available. Its countless everyday uses include automobile tires, hard rubber goods, insulation for wires and cables, drug and medical supplies, and clothing. It has important military uses in airplanes, balloons, and gas masks, and an army on wheels is an army on rubber. The United States is the world's largest consumer of rubber, taking nearly 700,000 tons a year. Of this 97 per cent is imported from the Asiatic Mediterranean, principally from British Malaya and the Netherlands East Indies. War time requirements may run up to one and a half million tons, of which at least 100,000

tons will be required for strictly military needs. The government is hurriedly investigating the possibility of producing rubber in Latin America and has sent agricultural specialists to different regions of the southern continent where rubber was originally gathered by tapping the wild trees in the Amazon forests. Several areas have been reported in the Amazon Basin, Colombia, Venezuela, and Central America, in which soil and climate are favorable and large-scale production probably feasible. But the climatological and purely agrarian phase of the problem are only half the story, and it is by no means clear that the introduction of a large-scale plantation system is the wisest social and economic solution. Some of the regions suggested lack an adequate labor supply, and the plantation system demands not only a large labor reserve but also a cheap one. The introduction below the Rio Grande of the type of economy that demands coolie wages is in the long run not going to be conducive to the success of the Good Neighbor Policy. American plantation rubber might successfully compete with Asiatic plantation rubber, but it could not possibly meet the price of rubber grown by the native population of the Dutch East Indies. Although the cost item would have no relevance under conditions of hemisphere blockade, it is bound to influence greatly the eagerness with which American capital will finance plantations in the Amazon Basin. More serious is the fact that the most successful tree, the Havea brasiliensis, takes seven years to grow before it comes into production and would, therefore, be of little help in the next few years.

There are, however, a number of available substitutes. Successful synthetics include Ameripol, Buna, Neoprene, Thiokol, and Butyl. Artificial rubber production was expected to reach 30,000 tons in 1941 which is less than 5 per cent of the normal yearly consumption, but Du Pont, Goodyear, Goodrich, and Firestone hope eventually to be able to satisfy a large part of the military needs through synthetic rubber. In the meantime, the United States government has tried to build a stock pile large enough to satisfy requirements during the period necessary to construct the factories needed to replace the plantation rubber of the east with the chemical products of American industry.

Silk has many important industrial and military uses. They include

the insulation of wires and cables, powder bags for large caliber artillery, and parachutes. We normally consume 50 million pounds annually, and it is estimated that war time consumption will increase this total to nearly 60 million pounds. Although the entire supply of silk comes from Japan and Japanese-controlled areas, there is an enormous stock pile on hand. Increased tension in the Western Pacific and the occupation of French Indo-China by Japan led President Roosevelt to freeze Japanese financial assets in the United States in August, 1941. As this step inevitably resulted in the cessation of Japanese silk imports, the government reserved all stocks on hand for exclusive military purposes. Private requirements had to be satisfied by substitutes. The chemical industry has made such strides in recent years in the development of synthetic fibers that it is safe to predict that all military requirements can eventually be filled by means of artificial products. Improved types of rayon and nylon are already available for parachutes, and the problem of finding a substitute material for the silk used in the powder bags for large guns is reported to be near solution.

The agricultural raw materials on the critical list, cork, kapok, nux vomica, and opium, present the United States with a difficult procurement problem. Cork comes from the bark of a species of oak tree that grows only in the European Mediterranean region, and there are no alternative sources of supply in the Western Hemisphere. Plastics can supply bottle caps, but for many uses of cork it will be exceedingly difficult to find substitutes. Kapok is used for life belts and comes from a tree widely grown in the Dutch East Indies. It is also grown in tropical Latin America and production could be increased, but in the meantime substitutes will have to serve. The United States obtains her strychnine requirements almost entirely from the seeds of a tree, strychnos nux vomica, which is grown in British India and French Indo-China. The entire import of opium comes from the Balkans, the Near East, and the Far East. The Federal Bureau of Narcotics has managed through confiscation of drugs to build up a stock pile adequate to supply the needs for morphine for three years. We must hope that our smugglers will continue to be as successful under war conditions as they have been in time of peace.

Hemisphere Self-sufficiency

Under conditions of hemisphere blockade the raw material deficiencies of the New World would be very serious. The problem of supplying the United States with sufficient raw material to allow her to support an adequate war industry would be almost insurmountable. The Americas produce an abundance of the agricultural products of the temperate zone. The flaxseed, hides, tanning materials, and wool which are required in the United States are plentiful in the La Plata region, and if the South American states are willing to sell them and the lines of communication can be kept open, they will be at our disposal. The same cannot be said about the agricultural products of the tropical world. Under present conditions, the American tropics are entirely inadequate as a source of raw materials for the two temperate zones of the hemisphere. What comes to us across the oceans from the equatorial regions of Africa and particularly the Asiatic Mediterranean will be exceedingly difficult to replace. Rubber, cinchona, and kapok trees must all grow at least seven years before they begin to produce, and the most suitable areas in the Americas lack the necessary labor supply.

In regard to mineral products the position is not quite so serious because the New World is an area of great mineral resources. If the Old World embargoed her former exports, the Western Hemisphere would be placed in an uncomfortable position which only great sacrifices could alleviate. But, granted the continued control of the necessary maritime communications along the coasts of the Americas, the fortitude to stand considerable economic dislocation, the willingness to risk large-scale investments, and the permission to build railroads and highways in Latin America, we could achieve eventually a fair approximation to hemisphere self-sufficiency.

This potential self-sufficiency is, however, merely an expression of geographic potential. It does not take into consideration all the economic and political conditions that must be fulfilled before Chilean copper and Argentinian tungsten can play their role in the building of the two-ocean navy and the new air force that must guard the American seas. Since we are not in actual military control of the

Western Hemisphere, the independent states of Latin America must co-operate to the extent of being willing to send us their products. It is a safe prediction that Germany will do everything she can to force them to withhold from us the basic elements of our military strength. Not economic geography but the relative economic and military power of Germany and the United States in the countries below the Rio Grande will determine to what extent the products necessary for our armament will actually flow to our factory doors. We cannot be sure that the essential products of Latin America will reach us unless we can neutralize the power of a victorious Germany to dictate to our southern neighbors. Under conditions of a German-Japanese victory in the Old World, there can be no great war industry in North America without free access to the mines and fields of the southern continent, and a struggle for the hegemony of Latin America will therefore be one of the most important phases of the Second World War.

The position of the Western Hemisphere would, however, not only be awkward in regard to embargo and blockade; it would be even more vulnerable to the other weapons of economic warfare. The defeat of our allies would create a world in which there would be on the one hand gigantic commercial monopolies and on the other hand the Western Hemisphere consisting of twenty-two sovereign independent political units, each pursuing its own commercial policy.

It is part of the ideology of National Socialism that no state can be really free and independent unless its economic necessities are produced within the realm of its political control. Maximum self-sufficiency within that realm becomes, therefore, a basic principle of economic policy, particularly in regard to strategic raw materials and essential foodstuffs. Intercontinental trade would in the long run be permitted only to the extent that it did not create dependence for the German sphere. Its requirements would either have to be produced within the political realm or the countries in which they originate would have to be brought under political control. To the extent that Japan adopts the National Socialist philosophy of trade, the same applies to her. This implies that the more essential American raw materials are to the transoceanic zones the more likely is it that Germany and Japan will attempt to find substitutes or alternate sources

of supply. The Old World will trade with the Western Hemisphere only as long as it is necessary or as long as it can be done to great advantage.

According to the blueprints of the new order, Eastern Europe and the Ukraine are to be the agrarian sections that will ultimately replace the agricultural exports of temperate North and South America, and Africa will be developed to serve as a substitute for the American tropics. It is quite possible that American exports would be accepted during the period necessary to create the self-sufficiency of the German sphere, but this trade would take place under the constant threat of an early extinction of the European market, a weapon that would give Berlin a strong bargaining power. Unless the countries of the Western Hemisphere could create an adequate system of defense either through the development of alternative markets or through seller's monopolies as a bargaining weapon, they would be exposed to economic exploitation. The transatlantic monopoly would operate in terms of the purchasing power of the whole of Europe and of the controlled zones of Africa and the Near East. To the extent that the Western Hemisphere has to export beyond the seas it would have to operate in a buyers' market. Its products would move at prices so low that the producers would have to be subsidized by their governments, and imports, if they arrived at all, would be enormously expensive. Foreign trade could be manipulated as an instrument of exploitation for the benefit of Germany, and the power which it created over countries absolutely dependent on exports would be used as a weapon of intervention.

Countries dependent on Germany would be forced to detach themselves from the United States, and to withhold from her all strategic raw materials. Politically there would be insistence on Aryan laws, freedom of action for the Nazi party, special concessions for German newspapers and radio stations, air lines, and shipping companies. Freedom to apply all the destructive and disintegrating processes of the National Socialist propaganda technique would be the condition that must be fulfilled before a country would be permitted to send its exports to the monopoly market of Europe. The armed forces would have to be trained by German military instructors

and use German military equipment, and it is conceivable that there might be insistence on participation in the government by the leaders of the local Nazi parties. The chances of creating a system of defense against such economic warfare depends on the possibility of achieving economic integration of the Western Hemisphere.

XI. Economic Integration

Europe or the United States—that is the fateful question confronting Latin America. . . . The Europe of tomorrow with which Latin America will have to trade . . . will be totalitarian, under the aegis of the Axis. To co-operate with Europe in time is, therefore, an imperative task for Latin America.

Völkischer Beobachter—October 12, 1940

THE problem of the surplus exports of the New World has two distinct aspects. The first relates to the export of manufactured goods and concerns primarily the United States and Canada; the second relates to the export of minerals and agricultural raw materials and foodstuffs and concerns the whole hemisphere. The principal industrial nation in the Americas is the United States, and previous pages have indicated that about one-half of the value of her exports consists of manufactured goods. According to the plans of the New World Order, manufacturing for the transpacific zone will be done in Japan and North China, and manufacturing for the transatlantic zone in Europe. Under the doctrine of self-sufficiency, American products will, therefore, be excluded from the Old World if similar ones can be produced within the Japanese- and German-controlled spheres.

Once upon a time, this would have meant the loss of the most important market for American products, but since the outbreak of the war, our export of manufactured goods to transoceanic zones has increasingly become an export of ammunition and implements of war. The disappearance of this market under conditions of hemisphere encirclement would cause no serious difficulty. In 1941, with

the rearmament program still in its early stages, there were already clear indications of coming shortages in products formerly exported. Iron and steel production was inadequate for the demands of our new war industry; automobile output was already being curtailed to a point far below American consumption; and the machine industry was incapable of satisfying the enlarged requirements. It is not likely that a German victory over our allies would curtail American defense preparation, and the problem of finding a market for our principal manufactures would, therefore, solve itself. Increased domestic consumption would absorb the whole productive capacity of industry. The semi-manufactures exported from Canada are, however, in a different category from those of the United States, and the loss of overseas markets, particularly the loss of the British market, would be much more serious and the problem of adjustment, therefore, more difficult.

More serious would be the effect of a German-Japanese victory abroad on our position in the Western Hemisphere. If the New World should remain divided into twenty-two separate independent economies, Latin America would become a field of competition for the products of Germany, Japan, and the United States. Only under a customs union or a system of reciprocal preferential treatment could we maintain our position in the southern markets and this only if import prohibitions of products from transoceanic zones could prevent entrance of subsidized commodities. Without such protection, the Axis partners could send our southern neighbors their products at a price below our cost for a period just long enough to break up the customs union or preferential system.

The problem of adjusting the mineral exports of North America would not be serious. In the United States the principal items are oil and coal, both sources of energy, and it is quite likely that a considerable percentage of the production previously exported would be absorbed by the increased war demands. The same applies to the mineral exports of Canada. The main items in this category are asbestos, aluminum, copper, lead, nickel, platinum, and zinc, all essential raw materials for the new war industry and all of them commodities in which the United States is faced with a shortage.

A very different situation prevails in regard to the agricultural

exports of North America. We have already mentioned that, notwithstanding the importance of manufactures in our export trade, very large percentages of our agricultural products had to find a market abroad and that for most of them the destination was Europe. More than 80 per cent of the tobacco exports, roughly 70 per cent of the wheat, cotton, and hog products moved across the Atlantic, and the same is true for a very large percentage of the fruit exports. An identical situation prevails in Canada which used to send to eastern Atlantic ports the greater part of her exports of wheat, barley, and meat products.

The disappearance of the entire European market would cause a most profound dislocation of the agrarian economy of North America. The effect of the present war has already been sketched, and the result of the blockade of Continental Europe noted, but today Great Britain is still an important purchaser of North American agricultural products. With her collapse all transatlantic exports might cease with disastrous effects on this side of the ocean. A much more extensive and far-reaching crop restriction program than the one at present in operation in the United States would then become necessary for the whole continent. Limitations on the production of beef and hog products would primarily affect the central part of the continent, further reduction in cotton and tobacco exports would hurt the south, and restrictions on the growth of wheat would disturb the economy of the west. The latter would probably cause the most serious disturbance and the most difficult problem of adjustment. The regions which specialize in wheat and grow most of it for export —the northwest and the southwest of the United States and the prairie provinces of Canada—would have great difficulty in finding substitute crops.

The countries below the Rio Grande lack even an approximation to a balanced economy; they live, notwithstanding the beginning of industrialization in the A.B.C. countries, primarily in terms of an extractive economy as producers of minerals, agricultural foodstuffs, and raw materials for which they must find a market or perish. For the American Mediterranean that market is principally North America; for the countries farther south it is mainly Europe, and its surplus products are such that North America cannot absorb them. Dis-

appearance of the markets of Continental Europe has already caused great hardships and financial difficulties, and the final integration of the British economy in the German sphere would transfer the control of the economic life of our "southern neighbors" from their respective capitals to Berlin. The effect of an Axis victory would be serious for the American Mediterranean, very serious for North America, and fatal for the temperate zone of South America.

Pan American Economic Co-operation

Ever since the outbreak of the present war and particularly since the defeat of France, there has hovered over Pan American gatherings this specter of German domination of the economic life of the hemisphere. It is, therefore, not surprising that the problem of economic defense should have become a vital topic. There has been much talk of late about economic co-operation, financial collaboration, and co-ordination of policies and a constant reiteration of the non-existent fact of continental solidarity. Mr. Hitler has, for the time being, brought North and South America closer together, an accomplishment previously achieved only by another great German war lord, the Kaiser.

Economic co-operation is not a new ideal in this hemisphere; on the contrary it has been one of the main topics on the agenda of most of the Pan American Conferences. It was trade that inspired the Harrison administration to arrange the first meeting in Washington in 1889. The principal subject for discussion at that early meeting was a topic which has again received attention in recent years, "customs union." Blaine's proposal for a single tariff wall for the Western Hemisphere inspired no enthusiasm among the Latin American delegates. A customs union was one of the instruments through which Prussia had established her hegemony over the rest of Germany, and they feared that its effect in the Americas might be identical. A *Zollverein* with the industrialized powerful United States of North America could only result in eternal economic dependence, and the South American representatives, therefore, graciously declined Mr. Blaine's invitation.

There were other great schemes inspired by the early visions of

closer economic co-operation between the North and the South. Plans for a Currency Union, a Pan American Bank, a Pan American Railroad, and Pan American Steamship Lines were considered and approved. A large collection of almost lyrical resolutions gave expression to the unanimous conviction that they were eminently desirable, but they never materialized. After an early devotion to great dreams, the conference of American Republics took a prosaic turn. It began to devote itself to economic projects less broad and far-reaching and started working on customs nomenclature, quarantine regulations, and the registration of trade-marks.

1. *The First World War*

The First World War was again to pose problems of a more serious nature. That conflict caused a dislocation in the economic life of the Western Hemisphere almost as serious as the disruption brought about by the present war. Much of Europe was blockaded, shipping shortages appeared, normal trade routes were disrupted, the flow of capital ceased, banking systems were disorganized, exchange rates fluctuated widely and currencies were endangered. The first effect of the war was a sharp depression in both North and South America. It was inevitable that a predominantly extractive economy, geared so closely to the markets of the Old World as were the Americas in 1914, should suffer deeply from the calamity of war in Europe. South America turned north for some of the products formerly bought in Europe, and North America began to look south for a substitute market. Once more there was talk of economic co-operation, the unity of the Americas, and their common fate.

To deal with the dislocations caused by the European hostilities in the economic life of the New World there assembled in Washington in 1915, at the invitation of the United States, the First Pan American Financial Conference. In the last week of May, South American ministers and North American bankers and business men conferred and debated the economic issues before the Americas. The conference resulted in a number of reports all clearly indicating that there was a fairly unanimous agreement on the nature of the problem and the most adequate remedies. Latin America had traded almost entirely

with Europe, moved her trade in European vessels, and relied almost exclusively on Europe for her financial requirements, both commercial credits and long-term loans. If the Latin American countries were to be aided in their difficulties and the United States were to avail herself of the splendid opportunity to replace European exports below the Rio Grande, it was necessary to create adequate steamship facilities and to set up an organization through which North American credit could flow to our sister republics.

To aid and promote concurrent legislation and uniformity in commercial law, it was agreed to create a permanent International High Commission on Uniformity of Laws, consisting of national subcommittees sitting in the different capitals. At their first general meeting in Buenos Aires the following April, they immediately moved beyond the mere technical aspects of customs questions and passed a resolution to the effect that the next Pan American Financial Conference should discuss an American customs agreement. Our old friend, the customs union, had once again made an appearance. The second conference which met in Washington in 1920 did little about the customs agreement, but it expressed the hope that the United States would open a constantly widening market for the long-term securities of American countries. That suggestion was followed with enthusiasm. The republic of the north threw herself whole-heartedly into her new role of international banker and inaugurated a golden era for the bond salesmen of the United States and the empty treasuries below the Rio Grande.

The first Washington Conference had been called to explore the possibility of increased export trade for the United States and to deal with problems created by the war in Europe. Its main topic was, therefore, economic and financial, but it would not have been a Pan American conference if it had not begun its deliberations about freight rates and loans with an eloquent tribute to higher things. Mr. McAdoo knew the language appropriate to the occasion and gave expression to the following beautiful sentiments in his opening address to the second session:

"It is not from selfish motive or sordid desire for material gain that this conference draws its inspiration. It has a deeper and a finer meaning. We meet for the purpose of considering how and in what manner the

great Republics of the Western Hemisphere, representing as they do common ideals of liberty, justice, and self-government, and dedicated as they are to the highest and best interest of humanity, may, through common action and interest, not only conserve their material welfare, but become a more homogeneous and powerful moral force for the preservation of peace and the good of humanity."

The Secretary of the Treasury suggested that the distress and discomfort which the American republics suffered through the hostilities in Europe made the war period an opportune time "for the development of the spirit at least of continental solidarity." Mr. McAdoo clearly recognized the relation between war and hemisphere co-operation. His words were prophetic. The spirit of solidarity did not survive the peace.

The first rift came during the war itself. American moral force was apparently not quite strong enough to restore peace in Europe, and two years after the conference the United States felt called upon to become a full belligerent. The decision once made, she tried to seduce the Latin American republics away from their neutrality, an attempt which was only partly successful. But the real disintegration of the American economic front came with the end of the war. Economic geography reasserted itself, and the complementary economies resumed their trading. The United States manufacturer lost interest in South America when his home market began to expand. The South American importer was no longer exclusively dependent on the United States for his needs and was glad to cease trading with a merchant whose terms were cash and delivery uncertain. Europe was eager to resume exporting, and Uncle Sam lost his monopoly. Our southern neighbors found it a pleasure to do business again with people who spoke their language, understood their customs, and were ready to give long-term credits. Pan American co-operation in the economic field became largely a matter of granting and accepting loans. These loans did not lay a foundation for solidarity and understanding as the conferences had piously hoped, but rather a foundation for defaults, expropriations, and interventions which were to embitter relations between north and south for long years to come.

2. *The Second World War*

Not until the beginning of the Second World War were meetings of American statesmen to echo again with resolutions on economic co-operation and continental solidarity. The growing clouds of war in Europe created anxiety about the economic future of the hemisphere. Even before the actual outbreak of the war, we had become dismayed by the inroads German trade was making in Latin America and by the effect of National Socialist trade methods on the economies of our neighbors. The United States began her third attempt to create a common economic front.

At her suggestion the Pan American Conference, which met in Lima in 1938, passed a unanimous resolution in which the delegates expressed their love and admiration for the beauties of free and unhampered international trade. It was a strange resolution for the United States to propose and a strange resolution for the Latin Americans to accept. Nobody was apparently disturbed that most of our sisters below the Rio Grande were actually operating in terms of subsidies, barter systems, and clearing agreements. Courtesy not only overlooked this discrepancy but also the fact that the cause for which Mr. Hull pleaded so eloquently had apparently not yet been accepted by the members of his own government. The commercial policy favored by the United States Department of Agriculture was in complete contradiction to the commercial policy desired by the Department of State.

Europe burst into flames in 1939, and the American states found it wise to confer again about the special economic problems created by the troublesome continent across the ocean. Pursuant to a resolution providing for consultation which had been passed at the Lima Conference, the United States called two Meetings of Foreign Ministers of American Republics, one in Panama in 1939 and one in Havana in 1940. They were called to formulate plans for co-operation in the face of a definite threat, the nature of which was clearly realized. It was defined by Mr. Hull in his account of the Havana meeting in which he explained the need for common action and presented the problem in measured language.

"Surpluses of commodities, the exportation of which is essential to the economic life of the American Republics, have accumulated and continue to accumulate because Europe at war is unable to absorb them. Their existence is a matter of serious concern throughout the continent. In addition, we must envisage the possibility that, after the termination of hostilities, many important European markets for these commodities may be directed and controlled by governments which regard international commerce as an instrument of domination rather than as a means of enabling all nations to share fully and on a basis of equality in a mutually beneficial exchange of their surplus products." *

In spite of this challenge the first meeting continued to pay verbal tribute to the eternal principles of laissez-faire and to express hope and faith in an economic free trade heaven. In a resolution favoring economic co-operation, the twenty-one American republics reaffirmed their adherence to liberal principles of international trade—those of equal treatment, of fair practices, and of peaceful motives. They declared their determination to apply these principles in their relations with each other as fully as present circumstances permitted and their readiness to conduct trade according to these principles with any non-American country prepared to do likewise.

As an answer to the problem formulated by Mr. Hull, the resolution was either an irrelevant expression of admiration for a dead past or an inspired formula for a suicide pact. Economic mobilization for self-defense in a world in which the Axis might be victorious cannot be conducted on the principles of laissez-faire and the practices of the nineteenth century. Faced by the planned economies of two National Socialist regimes in the continents across the oceans, there can be a chance of economic survival in the Western Hemisphere only if we surrender individual freedom of action within the state and national freedom as between states.

Fortunately for the spirit of continental solidarity, the Panama meeting managed to agree on a number of additional resolutions. It set up an Inter-American Financial and Economic Advisory Committee with headquarters in Washington to suggest remedies for the dislocation of trade resulting from the war and to inquire particularly

* Statement by Secretary of State Hull, July 30, 1940, reprinted in *International Conciliation*, No. 362, p. 316, September, 1940.

into the possibility of achieving a customs truce and an international bank for the Western Hemisphere. The Havana Conference held in 1940 implemented these instructions further. The Committee was asked to devise methods which would aid in the disposal of surplus commodities through relief and in other ways. It was invited to make a study of and to prepare detailed plans for production and marketing agreements for surplus crops. The Conference also suggested that the committee consider the possibility of a broader system of inter-American co-operation in the field of trade, credit, currency, and foreign exchange.

To explore the possibility of new investment became the task of an Inter-American Development Committee and of an Inter-American Bank. The convention establishing the bank was signed in May, 1940, by the representatives of nine American republics, and further developments await ratification and organization. Once in operation, it will undoubtedly take in hand the problem of international exchange and the possibility of creating a Pan American currency based perhaps on our useless gold hoard in the Kentucky hills.

The Meetings of the Foreign Ministers in Panama and Havana sounded very much like a transcription of the meeting of the First Pan American Financial Conference that met in Washington in 1915. The nature of the problem was still the same, and the remedies suggested had changed little in a quarter of a century. Even the old topics first mentioned in the meeting of 1889 were still on the list of unfinished business. The Pan American Railroad has become the Pan American Highway, transportation now involves airplanes as well as ships, communication now requires radio as well as cable, but our old friends the Customs Union, the Currency Union, and the Inter-American Bank are still with us for study, resolution, and recommendation.

United States and Argentine Opposition

As an expression of high purpose, the resolutions of the two conferences of the Foreign Ministers of the American Republics were impressive, but in terms of actual accomplishment the meetings were hardly a success. Continental solidarity is a noble phrase, but the old

difficulties remain. Among them is the economic geography of the hemisphere, the momentum of peace time relations with the trans-oceanic zones, and the inherent distrust, competition, and opposition between the United States and the Argentine. Mr. Hull has tried for several years to obtain an expression of frank recognition of the need of building a common front against the time when the hemisphere might have to face the power of a united Europe. The Argentine has constantly and systematically refused to co-operate in economic as well as in ideological defense. The very fact that there is a possibility of a German victory makes her determined not to displease the potential controller of her economic life.

The difference in outlook between the United States and the Argentine has toned down all resolutions which suggest a common front against Germany and has kept all policies adopted on the level of compromises and make-shift provisions. This attitude of Argentina is not only due to a desire to assert her freedom and independence from the "Colossus of the North," but also to sound economic reasons. Could the United States take her surplus exports? Was Mr. Hull really ready to buy the surplus wheat, corn, and linseed that must be exported if Argentina is to survive? Until such time as the United States could replace Europe as the principal market, the Argentine would refrain from displeasing the actual and potential rulers of the Old World. If that were a policy of appeasement, let North Americans make the most of it.

The opposition between the Argentine and the United States was responsible for the inability of the two conferences to work out a comprehensive scheme of co-operation, but it did not prevent the adoption of a series of recommendations on specific points. Broadly speaking, these recommendations cover two fields: stimulation of inter-American trade, and common action in regard to the trans-oceanic zones. Under the first heading fall the suggestions for increased Latin American purchases in the United States, expansion of tourist trade, and extension of credit and loans; and in the second category fall the suggestions regarding the creation of marketing agreements for surplus commodities. In how far these recommendations can be translated into reality will depend to a large extent on

the policies pursued by the United States and the effect of the war on her economy.

An important obstacle to increased inter-American trade, particularly between the United States and the Atlantic region of the temperate zone of South America, lies in the present American tariff. The commercial policy of the United States has been predominantly protectionist from the very beginning. It was behind tariff walls that the young industries of the independent nation grew into full manhood, sheltered from the competition of the better-established industry of Great Britain and the Continent. Opposition to this commercial policy, designed primarily to foster the interests of industry, was organized first in the agrarian South and later in the agrarian West, but it proved to be of no avail. The influence of industrial groups remained predominant, and the country continued to act as a devout neo-mercantilist, a firm believer in the doctrine that exports are good and imports evil. Eventually, the farmers also learned the art of organization and lobbying with the result that agrarian interest groups were able to exert strong pressure on Congress. They were unable to bring down the tariff on articles the farmer consumed, but they did the next best thing and got subsidies and a tariff on articles that the farmer produced.

With both industry and agriculture lobbying for protection, the high point in tariff rates was reached in 1930 with the passage of the Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act. It added protection of the farmer to protection of industry and initiated a long series of attempts to solve the depression problems in international trade by means of economic isolation. The new tariff rates were so high and so detrimental to foreign countries that the law aroused intense opposition abroad, particularly in the Argentine. This great agricultural state was badly hurt by increased rates on wheat, corn, hides, wool, tallow, and casein. The rider to the bill which prohibited the importation of fresh meat from countries partially affected by foot and mouth disease of cattle also caused considerable irritation and was taken as a dishonest device for depriving the Argentine meat industry of the great northern market for beef.

The Hull Trade Agreement Program, initiated during the admin-

istration of President Roosevelt, was an attempt to liberate international trade by reciprocal concessions. It recognized quite frankly that trade was a process of exchange and that without imports there could be no exports. A considerable number of bilateral treaties were signed with Latin American countries. As might be expected, the negotiations with the Argentine proved most difficult. There was a basic difference in approach to trade between the two parties. Argentina had been forced into bilateralism and clearing agreements, and the United States still tried to adhere to the principles of reciprocal tariff concessions and the unconditional most-favored-nation clause. Not until the fall of 1941 was a treaty finally signed. It liberated trade to the extent that it provided for reciprocal reductions on many items. The United States lowered duties on many of the products on which rates had been increased in the Smoot-Hawley Tariff, and the Argentine made concessions on such items as fruits and machinery. The agreement did not provide for unconditional most-favored-nation treatment. On the contrary, the United States was forced to accept the right of the Argentine to grant preferences not only to her neighbors but also to Great Britain. This fact and certain other clauses in the treaty which tie many of its provisions to the specific war situation seem to indicate that the agreement was more important as a gesture than as a promise of basic changes in the future commercial policies of the two nations.

When negotiations were first begun, the rumor that the United States government contemplated making concessions to the Argentine and lowering rates on agricultural products raised a furious opposition in the agrarian states of the Middle West and the cattle states of the Rockies. There were threats in Congress that the whole trade agreement program would be abolished if the farmers were forced to accept increased South American competition. This suggests that notwithstanding the reduction of rates in the Argentine treaty, the United States government will not be permitted to change the protectionist policy of the country as a contribution to increased inter-American trade and as a sacrifice for the sake of a common economic front in the Western Hemisphere.

Increased Inter-American Trade

The war has fortunately made it possible to increase imports into the United States without the need for any particular sacrifice on the part of the American farmer. It has created a larger demand for Latin American products, and we are again repeating the experience of the First World War when imports from the countries to the south rose almost 150 per cent between 1914 and 1918. The most important factor in this development is the armament program with its demand for materials formerly obtained elsewhere. It has benefited in the first place the mineral producers in the American Mediterranean and on the west coast of South America. The United States agreed to buy from Chile 250,000 tons of copper and 300,000 tons of nitrate, from Bolivia 90,000 tons of tin concentrate, and the entire production of tungsten from both Bolivia and the Argentine. There were also enlarged purchases of antimony, chrome, lead, manganese, platinum, quicksilver, and zinc. Among the agricultural products, imports of wool and hides were greatly augmented.

Figures released by the government indicate that in the first four months of 1941 the United States bought from Latin America approximately 350 million dollars' worth of goods, an increase of 50 per cent over a similar period in the previous year and 100 per cent over the year 1939. The result is a reversal of the recent trade balance between the United States and the republics to the south, producing for the first time in four years an export surplus for the Latin American republics. If purchases could continue at this rate, they would begin to absorb, in terms of dollar values, the loss suffered through the blockade of the European Continent.

These developments took place while the United States still had access to large parts of the Old World. Under conditions of hemisphere blockade, deprived of contacts with the transoceanic world, the need for Latin American products as substitutes for raw materials from other regions would be even greater. We would be deprived of Far Eastern sources of tin and other minerals now still available and would consequently be obliged to take the total Bolivian tin production as well as the entire output of the strategic raw materials

of some of the other countries. We would have to use a larger supply of Latin American cacao to replace imports from Africa and greater quantities of wool and hides. Hemisphere isolation would undoubtedly lead us to induce our neighbors to start the production of goods formerly obtained from the Asiatic and African tropics, in particular copra, jute, Manila hemp, and palm oil. Total purchases from Latin America would, therefore, increase not only because of absorption of her traditional exports but because she would become a substitute source of supply for products formerly imported from the transoceanic zones.

Loans and Credits

Ever since the first Pan American Conference, there has been a great deal of discussion about loans and credits as important instruments for building a hemisphere economy. It is well to remind ourselves that many of the popular ideas of the nineteenth century about loans have become the popular fallacies of the twentieth. Loans create neither gratitude nor dependence, and they can be repudiated with the greatest of ease. Not favors already received, but favors still to be received create for the donor a position of influence and power. The ability to grant or withhold access to a market, the opportunity to veto ever anew the outflow of the mines or the export of a yearly crop creates a position of power which no creditor can match. In the political struggle for the Danubian region, rich France extended loans and poor Germany offered markets. It was the natural exchange of trade between agrarian Danubia and industrial Germany that proved to be an unbreakable bond and an opportunity for Germany to create an instrument of power which French high finance was unable to defeat.

Capital export from the United States to Latin America would not be a new story. It was the First Pan American Financial Conference held in Washington in 1915 and inspired by the First World War that laid the foundations for our present creditor position. We have mentioned already that our role as an international banker was hardly a financial success, and that it failed to contribute to Pan American good will. The total dollar obligations of our friends below the Rio Grande as of August 1, 1940, amounted to about 1,600 mil-

lion dollars, not counting direct investments. Of this sum about 75 per cent was in total or partial default. The reasons for the failure of our loans have been many. In a number of cases money was not loaned for purposes which increased the productivity of the national economy of the borrower. Even if it did increase the national productivity, it was seldom in terms of commodities for which there was a market in the United States. This meant that the real character of the transfer problem was misunderstood. Some of the increased productivity flowed to Europe and might have eventually come back to us in the form of triangular trade, but our commercial policy prevented this by maintaining an export surplus in regard to Europe.

Our investment policy in Latin America has, therefore, had an unfortunate history. The indirect investments in the form of loans which were welcomed by eager governments are mostly in default, and the direct investments which have been sound from an economic point of view and intelligent from a transfer point of view have created resentment as forms of imperialist exploitation. These are the investments in oil production in the American Mediterranean, Ecuador, and Bolivia, in copper mines in Chile and Peru, in iron deposits in Chile and Cuba, and in banana and sugar plantations in Central America and Cuba.

Since the outbreak of the war in 1939, the United States through the Export-Import Bank and through the Stabilization Fund has made a number of loans to aid South American governments in the emergencies that have arisen as a result of the disappearance of the European continental market. These credits have been useful as emergency measures because they have supported currencies during the period of violent disturbances in the balance of trade, but most of them have made no contribution to the solution of long-term problems. The purpose of credits was to help finance essential current imports from the United States, particularly machinery and transportation or construction equipment; to clear current accumulation of dollar drafts; to afford the means for carrying through internal development projects; and to stabilize local currencies. Their primary effect has been to maintain and enlarge exports from the United States to South America instead of exports from South America to the United States.

As a result of these investments the economic productivity of our southern neighbors is going to be increased but not in terms of commodities that we are going to buy, and the loans are, therefore, unsound from a direct transfer point of view. There is room for sound investment in financing increased output of mineral and agricultural products which we will have to buy under conditions of hemisphere isolation. But large-scale export of capital will not be resumed unless a compromise can be worked out between the legitimate demand of economic nationalism that a large part of the new wealth remain in the debtor country and the legitimate demand of capitalist creditors for a fair return on investment. There is also room for government financing, for the payment of large sums free from all considerations of profit and loss which operate in a private economy. Such subsidies should be made, not as an investment, but because of the frank realization that states must be willing to spend the taxpayers' money for the purpose of economic defense as freely as for military defense.

Cartels

Increased war purchases of Latin American products will greatly strengthen the economy of many of our southern neighbors, but they will not solve the basic problem of the hemisphere economy which lies in a surplus of agrarian productivity that the United States could never absorb. The New World produces an abundance of wheat, corn, beef, and meat products, cotton, coffee, wool, and sugar that must find a market in Europe. In times of permanent economic warfare when trade is an instrument of power politics, these surplus products represent a vulnerable spot in hemisphere economy. If German-Europe should refuse to buy them and by that decision destroy their only foreign market, the economic dislocation of the hemisphere would be almost irreparable. If a German-Europe were willing to take these products, but only on the basis of competitive bidding and individual clearing agreements, it could force the Americas to sell below cost and subsidize German reconstruction. Germany could then make these purchases the instrument of political intervention in large parts of the hemisphere.

Only by placing a single seller over the single purchaser is there

a possibility of a fair deal. Only by balancing the Euro-African sphere by a Pan American sphere, which includes Canada, and by creating a selling monopoly to deal with the German buying monopoly can the destruction of the agrarian economy of the Western Hemisphere be avoided and political domination of Germany prevented. The search for an answer has been in the direction of inter-American cartels, either in the form of agreements for single commodities or in terms of a single cartel for the group of staple export products as a whole. The early enthusiasm for cartels as a solution of the American problem has, however, abated and the subject seems to have been dropped. There is a growing skepticism in the United States about the possibility of making such a program work, and some of the Latin American states which would be the chief beneficiaries have become most reluctant to join.

In the north, it is realized that such a program would involve us in enormous expenditures and great risks. The other states would undoubtedly demand as the price of their participation that we undertake to finance the cultivation and storage of crops by means of crop loans or credits against warehouse receipts. This would force us to gamble on the chance that we might sell the surplus abroad at a price that would clear our investment. Such an arrangement would be nice for our fellow agriculturalists, but with the United States carrying the entire burden it could hardly be called a co-operative enterprise. It is also clear from past experience both here and abroad that a program of price stabilization cannot operate without crop control. The inter-American agreements would, therefore, have to provide not only for a central marketing organization, but also for an allocation of production quotas. This would give Uncle Sam the unenviable task of supervising acreage reduction in the fields of his Latin American neighbors.

In the south, lack of enthusiasm for cartel agreements is due in part to a realization that they would give the United States too much power. The Republic of the North would have to take the active leadership, assume financial responsibility and would, therefore, have to insist on adequate control. If the cartel is to work at all, the participating countries must agree to make it the sole receiver of their products. This means that it becomes in fact, in so far as they are

concerned, a monopoly buyer. In order to protect themselves from the danger inherent in a situation in which Germany would be a monopoly buyer they would have to consent to control by the United States. Our South American neighbors would probably be willing to have us finance their crops, but there is no likelihood that they would be willing to intrust us with such power over their economic life. Only if it were possible to design a form of agreement which will retain a good deal of power in the hands of the participating members can we hope for the full co-operation of our southern friends, and the workability of such an agreement would then remain to be proved.

A convention has been signed providing for the allocation of quotas for the coffee which the United States shall buy from each Latin American country. Canada and the United States have begun preliminary negotiations in regard to the establishment of a marketing agreement for wheat, but there are no indications that real cartel arrangements for the main surplus products could be established in the near future. Before we grieve too deeply about the failure to achieve this important link in the system of common defense, it is well to pause a moment and to ask whether cartels would really be adequate to deal with the problems of the hemisphere under conditions of Axis victory.

International cartels in agricultural products have been only relatively successful in the past and usually in a seller's market, not in a buyer's market. There is no way of predicting whether they could survive a determined attack by a monopoly buyer with a firm determination to destroy them. Germany's achievement both in the economic and in the political field rests in large part on her successful strategy of bilateralism. She has seduced or forced individual states into bilateral trade agreements and bilateral non-aggression pacts and has always fought the establishment of combinations against her, whether in Geneva or in Lima. It is, therefore, safe to predict that unless the cartel controlled an absolutely indispensable strategic raw material, Germany would place before the participating members the alternative of selling to her direct or not selling at all.

The agricultural products which need the protection of cartel agreements do not fall in the category of indispensable raw materials

so far as Europe is concerned. If the German-Japanese Alliance continued to co-operate in the economic sphere, there could be no possibility of using Western Hemisphere cartel agreements to coerce the Old World. By means of the application of now existing agrarian techniques, it is possible to increase the wheat production of Eastern Europe and the Ukraine sufficiently to satisfy the import requirement of Western Europe, and the same applies to corn and other feed crops. On the basis of the latter, it would, therefore, be possible to maintain if not to increase the production of meat and dairy products in Western Europe supplementing the deficit from South Africa, Australia, and New Zealand. The same areas could probably also increase their wool production sufficiently to replace the wool imports from South America. Cotton, to the extent that it could not be replaced by artificial fibers, could come from increased production in China, British India, and Africa. Coffee would again be Java coffee and the product of the berry from Arabia, Ethiopia, and the tablelands of East Africa in Kenya and Tanganyika. Shortage of beet sugar could be overcome by increased cane production in British India and in the Dutch East Indies. The Old World has a supplementary temperate zone in South Africa and in Australia and New Zealand and a tropical zone in Africa and Asia. It would be inconvenient to live without the products of the Western Hemisphere, but in an age of large-scale economic planning there are no insuperable obstacles to prevent the European and Asiatic totalitarian regimes from making themselves independent of the agrarian products of the New World if they so desire.

It is clear, therefore, that cartels would be a weak weapon of coercion and it may be doubted if they could survive a determined German attack. But even if they were actually created and permitted to exist for a number of years or until such time as the Old World had become self-sufficient, they would still be an inadequate protection against the other weapons of economic warfare. If the individual currency systems of the states of the New World are preserved, there will inevitably be individual clearing agreements and opportunities for economic pressure which no cartel can counteract. Exploitation through blocked marks and the refusal to deliver goods ordered could not be prevented. To face the economic might implied in the

centralized control of the European market, it is not enough to create a number of more or less loose cartel agreements. Nothing less than the creation of a single *Grossraumwirtschaft* incorporating the whole hemisphere and administered on the basis of a planned economy with regulation of production and central control of international trade could stand up against such concentration of power.

The Possibility of an Economic Front

What would be the chances that such a transformation could be brought about by voluntary co-operation? From the indications to date, it is safe to predict that the chances are very small indeed. "Customs Union" has been a topic for Pan American conferences since 1889, but we are no further now than when Blaine called the first meeting. The Western Hemisphere developed its economy in a period of relatively free trade and specialized in terms of geography and natural resources in products for the European market. The United States has now become industrialized, but she is still unable to absorb her own agrarian productivity, let alone that of her neighbors. It is true that half the population of the hemisphere is probably underfed in terms of modern standards of nutrition, but even a considerable increase in the standard of living would not immediately absorb the surplus commodities normally taken by Europe.

With two highly productive agrarian regions in the temperate zones and but a single industrialized area on the Atlantic coast of the United States, there is no hope for a closed economy except at the cost of a complete transformation of economic life in different parts of the hemisphere. The United States has already embarked on a program which will attempt to change the basic character of her agrarian system, reduce the cultivation of wheat, cotton, and tobacco, and increase that of meat, dairy products, fruits, and vegetables. But it is doubtful whether the other states of the hemisphere are in any position to go through similar transformations. The greatest sacrifices would have to be made in the prairie provinces of Canada and the fertile regions of the La Plata. Canada would have to reduce her wheat production and the Argentine her output of wheat, corn, flaxseed, and meat.

The changes necessary to create such a closed hemisphere economy would involve sacrifices that nobody would be willing to make voluntarily, a difficulty due in part to the prevailing economic ideology. It is true that the economy of Europe is being transformed, but it is being transformed by a conqueror and against the wishes of its population. There is by now, as the result of a hundred years of inculcated nationalism, an acceptance of the need for individual sacrifice for national defense in military terms, but there is no comparable acceptance of sacrifice for defense in economic terms. On the contrary nationalism combined with individualism and "laissez-faire" have produced an ideology which gives special interest groups a vested and preferred position in the national markets. That individuals may have to fight and be killed is accepted, that certain cities may have to be bombed and destroyed is taken for granted, but that a certain section of the country should have to be economically reconstructed seems unreasonable.

Voluntary co-operation is not going to create the system of economic defense necessary to meet the power of Europe in case of a German victory. This means that the United States will have to face quite frankly the possibility of achieving a common economic front by means of coercion. In regard to economic pressure our strength varies considerably in different areas. In Canada, where coercion would not be needed, we could exert the necessary pressure because we are the most important market. The same applies to the American Mediterranean and the intermediate zones. Increased mineral purchases would shift our position along the west coast of South America. With the whole of Bolivian tin exports moving to the United States and a very large percentage of Peruvian and Chilean copper, as well as other strategic raw materials, the percentage of exports to us would be raised well beyond 50 per cent. This would bring the economic life of the mountain states within the orbit of the North American republic and give us a powerful voice in their political life and commercial policy.

In the temperate zone on the east coast of South America, our position is much less strong. Through increased purchases incidental to our rearmament, we could greatly improve our position in Brazil but it is doubtful that we could become the principal market unless

we invented additional uses for coffee beans. But nothing can make us the principal purchaser of the products of the La Plata drainage basin. There are possibilities of coercion which the United States has so far refused to use, a reticence which Germany under similar circumstances would not have shown. We could, by a whole-hearted acceptance of bilateralism, force other Latin American countries to buy our wheat instead of that of the Argentine, and so cut off an important part of her export market in this hemisphere.

It is, however, by no means certain that this policy of coercion would be successful or obtain results commensurate with its costs. Under conditions of hemisphere blockade, the position of the Argentine in relation to the United States would have considerable strength. With Europe and Asia closed to us, it would be a secondary source of antimony, fluorspar, manganese, mica, tin, tungsten, and the only region from which we could make up our deficiencies in wool, hides, linseed, and quebracho for tanning materials. We cannot take the principal export crops of the La Plata region, and the products we do buy are equally welcome in Europe. Refusal to purchase would, therefore, not constitute coercion. On the contrary, it is quite likely that the shoe would be on the other foot. Hitler would probably trade with the Argentine only on condition that she ship all her products to Europe and withhold all strategic raw materials from us. We would then have to face the possibility that the economic system at the basis of hemisphere defense would have to operate without the Argentine. Without her the export problem would be simpler, but her absence would aggravate the problem of procuring strategic raw materials for the war industries of the United States.

Our analysis of the economic pattern of the Western Hemisphere shows more weakness than strength. Even if the area could be integrated, it would still be unable to resist the Old World, although it could put up at least a partial defense. Unfortunately, both geography and economic history have conspired to make the Americas a region unsuited for integration. They could not be transformed into a *Grossraumwirtschaft* that would be self-sufficient in terms of essential raw materials, or independent of transoceanic markets. In a period of totalitarian warfare, economic dependence means political dependence and the Western Hemisphere would, therefore, inevi-

tably have to submit to extra-regional control. Integration being impossible except through conquest, the New World would continue to operate as twenty-two independent sovereign states, each pursuing an economic policy of its own. This means that, once the totalitarian empires have achieved their victory abroad and established their commercial monopolies, they would be able to break up whatever limited co-operation had been achieved by detaching the South American nations from the United States through economic pressure.

In the struggle for hegemony over South America, the power of economic coercion possessed by the United States would be inadequate to neutralize the strength of a German-controlled transatlantic zone. When the German-Japanese Alliance obtains control over the transoceanic zone, we have lost the battle for South America. On that day, many of the hemisphere sources of raw material for our armament program would cease to be available. We could continue to control the states of the American Mediterranean and might attempt for a while to buy the co-operation of nations farther south by the purchase of exports we could not consume, but this program could not last indefinitely. Only if the German-Japanese Alliance can be denied victory abroad, the balance of power preserved, and the creation of gigantic monopolies prevented, can there be independent states below the Amazon and a war potential for the United States.

XII. The Political Pattern of the New World

CONSIDERING:

That the peoples of America have achieved spiritual unity through the similarity of their republican institutions, their unshakeable will for peace, their profound sentiment of humanity and tolerance, and through their absolute adherence to the principles of international law, of the equal sovereignty of States and of individual liberty without religious or racial prejudices; . . .

The Governments of the American States

DECLARE:

First. That they reaffirm their continental solidarity and their purpose to collaborate in the maintenance of the principles upon which the said solidarity is based.

DECLARATION OF LIMA

THE previous chapters have enumerated the ideological, social, and economic resources of the Western Hemisphere and indicated the degree to which they could be used in a policy of political integration. This chapter will have to analyze the political make-up of the New World and the relation of the larger states to the transoceanic zones in order to estimate the probable political resistance to such a policy of integration. Notwithstanding the competitive courtesy and mutual admiration of the statesmen of North and South America, the hemisphere is still composed of twenty-two independent sovereign states each pursuing a foreign policy of its own. What are the chances of transforming this multiplicity of operating units into a single compact group devoted to a common policy of defense against the German-Japanese Alliance?

The great success of the Third Reich in her program of expansion and conquest in the Old World has been due in large measure to her thorough understanding of the nature of power politics and the efficiency and skill with which her diplomacy prevented collective action against her. The countries of Europe, infinitely stronger in military power and economic resources than Germany in 1936, not only failed to prevent her rearmament but they were unable to combine for the purpose of stopping her first overt acts of conquest. By playing on isolationism, nationalist antagonism, and historical distrusts, Germany prevented the creation of a united Europe and the use of whatever was left of the Geneva system of collective security. Nothing could bring about a united stand until it was too late. The enemies of Germany remained divided and suspicious of each other, and the Third Reich could conquer them one by one, making each conquest the starting point for a new movement of encirclement around the flanks of the next victim. Unable to stand together, the states of Europe had to hang separately.

There is no particular reason to assume that the New World can learn from the experience of the Old and combine into a single bloc for self-preservation. The Western Hemisphere contains the same distrusts, the same oppositions, the same national ambitions as Europe and the same opportunity for a policy of "divide et impera." After the Wars of Independence and the liberation from the Old World, men of vision hoped for a common political front in the Americas against the dangers of Europe, but the colonies of Spain could not even remain together and build the federation that was the dream of Bolívar. Political development in Anglo-Saxon America has been accompanied by expansion and unification, in Latin America by differentiation and separation. Some of these ruptures followed the lines of the old administrative divisions of the Spanish Empire; others resulted from local particularism, difficulties of communication, and absence of strong central government. Spain and Portugal were ultimately replaced by twenty independent states.

The Spanish crown had divided its empire into four great Viceroyalties, largely on the basis of geographic factors. The Viceroyalty of New Spain became Mexico and the five republics of Central America and the Viceroyalty of New Granada evolved into four sepa-

rate political units. Venezuela seceded in 1830, leaving the remaining territory to the Republic of Colombia. The Viceroyalty of Peru became Chile and Peru and the Viceroyalty of the La Plata developed into four states. It had originally covered the whole territory between the Andes and Brazil and between the Andes and the Southern Atlantic. The larger part became the Republic of Argentina and the rest was divided into three buffer states between Brazil and the republic to the south, Bolivia, Paraguay, and Uruguay.

A hundred years of independence have accentuated the differences. To a vivid memory of old conflicts has been added a fierce local patriotism, a pride in national distinctness, and an acute awareness of present oppositions. Argentinians and Chileans react traditionally and emotionally in terms of a national flag not in terms of an abstract symbol for a continent, and the same applies to the north. The inhabitants of Canada and the United States are more aware of their national differences than of their similarities as Anglo-Saxon Americans.

Conflict Areas

The basic pattern in the political constellation of the western world does not differ from that of Europe. It contains the same elements that make for conflict in international relations: boundary disputes, economic competition, and struggle for power. The New World has had wars in the past and there is no reason to assume that it will have no bloody conflicts in the future. In the thirties of the last century the Argentine and Chile were involved in a struggle for power against the confederation of Bolivia and Peru created by Andres Santa Cruz, the Bolivian dictator. Chile fought her neighbors to the north once more in 1879 and conquered from Peru the rich nitrate province of Tarapacá and from Bolivia the coastal province of Atacama, thereby cutting off her only access to the coast. The Argentine and Brazil have fought two wars over Uruguay and all three countries were involved in a fierce and bitter struggle with Paraguay which lasted from 1865 to 1870 and which cost that small inland republic more than half of her male population. There was another bitter contest in the same region sixty years later when Paraguay and Bolivia fought between 1932 and 1935 for the possession of the

Gran Chaco. In addition to these wars there have been innumerable border conflicts of lesser importance.

In the north our Indian wars were not considered wars and the occupation of Indian territory was not considered conquest, but the United States managed to fight in Canada in 1812, in Mexico in 1848, and in Cuba in 1898 and to practice innumerable marine landings in the American Mediterranean, most of them unopposed merely because our opponents were too weak to resist. It is true that the nineteenth century saw perhaps fewer conflicts in the Western Hemisphere than in Europe, but the history of the New World has by no means been as peaceful as we like to believe, notwithstanding an impressive record of pacific settlement by arbitration.

History and geography have created the present oppositions and alignments that shape the political configuration of the Western Hemisphere. Along the west coast of South America there remains the traditional opposition between Chile and Peru, the unsolved problem of Bolivia's access to the sea, and a century-old conflict between Ecuador and Peru. The Chilean-Peruvian opposition contains the usual elements of friction that develops between neighbors and in addition a heritage of bitterness left from the War of the Pacific. By the Treaty of Ancón, ratified in 1883, Peru was not only deprived of the province of Tarapacá, with its rich nitrate deposits, but forced to accept occupation of the districts of Tacna and Arica for a ten-year period after which a plebiscite was to settle the fate of the provinces. This popular referendum was never held and the issue remained unsettled between the two nations. The United States attempted to mediate the dispute in 1925 but was not successful.

Apart from the natural nitrate deposits, once a source of great wealth but much less important since the invention of artificial processes for making nitrates, the area in dispute is nothing but arid desert and of no value whatsoever. Officially the issue is now closed as the result of direct negotiation between the two parties. This produced an agreement in 1929 in which Chile kept the province of Arica but returned to Peru the province of Tacna as well as a compensation of six million dollars. In spite of this settlement, the memory of the bitter controversy remains and there is little love between the two peoples. Chile is by far the stronger of the two states and could un-

doubtedly conquer additional territory from her northern neighbor, but fortunately for the future peace of the west coast, the southern part of Peru is hardly worth the cost of a military campaign.

Bolivia has failed so far to get any redress from the conditions which the War of the Pacific imposed upon her. She is not strong enough to challenge Chile and she has, therefore, addressed appeals to the United States, to the Argentine, and to the League of Nations, but all her efforts have been in vain. She remains a land-locked state albeit with a legal right to use the railroad from Arica to La Paz. During the Chaco War with Paraguay, this line served her as the Burma Road is serving China in the present conflict, as the only line of communication with the outside world. But its use remains dependent on the good will of Chile. A similar dependence applies to all her other routes of communication with the sea. A second exit to the Pacific is dependent on Peru and the Atlantic can only be reached by way of the Argentine or Brazil.

Another old conflict remains unsettled between the states of the west coast, that between Peru and Ecuador. The zone in dispute is one of the two great conflict areas in South America, the upper region of the Amazon Basin. The territory drained by western tributaries of the Amazon River consists of a large thinly populated tropical forest zone in which Brazil meets Venezuela, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, and Bolivia. None of the Andean states has the water-shed between the Pacific and the Atlantic as an eastern frontier and all of them occupy the eastern slopes of the mountains which contain the headwaters of the Amazon. Until after the First World War, the principal product of this tropical zone was rubber, which had an ultimate destination in the industrial centers around the North Atlantic, most easily reached by way of the Amazon. It is, therefore, not surprising that the western states should have tried to push their eastern boundaries downstream along the tributaries of the great river. Steam navigation was opening the enormous Amazon Basin to penetration from the east and Brazilian expansion upstream met the western states coming downstream.

The series of boundary disputes which arose between Brazil and her neighbors because of these conflicting lines of expansion have now been settled, but friction continues among the western states

themselves. In recent years, the most vigorous eastern expansion has come from Peru, who is favored by geography with better routes across the Andes Mountains into the tropical lowland. Iquitos on the Amazon River is a Peruvian settlement which serves as the center of commercial activities and a point of dispersion for Peruvian pressure in the upper Amazon Basin. This expansion led to border hostilities with Colombia a number of years ago, the so-called Leticia dispute which was finally settled by the League of Nations. More serious and by no means settled is the dispute between Peru and Ecuador over a territory which forms almost the whole of the east Andean zone of Ecuador. The latter claims title to the country on the basis of history by reference to the fact that the area in Spanish times was always governed from Quito. The Peruvians base their claim on their actual penetration into the territory, and on the fact that it is geographically part of a natural region tributary to Iquitos as a center.

The power relation between Peru and Ecuador is all in favor of the former and unless some third party intervenes in the struggle it is quite conceivable that Ecuador will eventually lose not only the eastern slopes in the Amazon Basin but the highlands on the Pacific coast as well. In these Andean highlands, Ecuador is a buffer state between Peru and Colombia, but in the Oriente country the two states have a long common border on the Putumayo River. The recent Leticia dispute indicates that this is by no means a settled boundary. It is of course in the interests of Colombia to support the continued existence of Ecuador, but it is doubtful if topography, relative strength, and political orientation, which is mainly toward the Caribbean, will create a desire to protect this interest up to the point where a war with Peru becomes necessary. The regional balance of forces is not conducive to the preservation of peace and if the survival of Ecuador is of value, Peru may have to be restrained by distant states or international action. The recent hostilities have led to offers of mediation and both parties, Peru reluctantly, have accepted the good offices of the Argentine, Brazil, and the United States.

More important for the future of South America is the power struggle in the other great conflict area of the southern continent, the drainage basin of the La Plata River. The protagonists here are the two most powerful states of Latin America, and the prize is lead-

ership and dominion over the southern continent. On the one side is Argentine, mostly in the temperate zone, in possession of the richest agricultural land of the continent, with an energetic white population dreaming of empire. On the other side is Brazil, the largest state in Latin America with a population more than three times as large as that of her southern neighbor and richer in mineral resources. This opposition has the same significance for the political constellation of the southern continent as the German-French opposition in Western Europe and the former Austrian-Russian opposition in Eastern Europe.

The Viceroyalty of the La Plata once included not only Argentina but also Bolivia, Paraguay, and Uruguay, and there are patriots in Buenos Aires who dream of the day when their city shall again be the economic and political capital of the whole area. Such an expansion would destroy the buffer states, give her a long contiguous frontier with Brazil, and greatly increase her relative strength. Expansion to date has been primarily in the form of economic penetration. Argentinian capital is flowing into Uruguay and Paraguay and business firms with headquarters in Buenos Aires are becoming increasingly important in Bolivia. The great republic of the La Plata has shown a very special interest in the oil resources in the Bolivian part of the Gran Chaco which, in order to reach valuable markets, will need a combination of pipe-lines, railroads, and river transportation, all of which are in the control of Argentina.

Realization of the Argentine dream of expansion would destroy Brazilian hopes to tap large parts of eastern Bolivia through the railroad from Corumba to São Paulo and shift the balance of power against her. She is, therefore, firmly opposed to the aspirations of her southern neighbor. This opposition and preoccupation with power considerations color all aspects of life, even those far removed from immediate factors in the struggle. It is, therefore, quite understandable that, when the United States proposed in 1937 that Brazil should become the recipient of a number of over-age destroyers, the opposition in the Argentine was vigorous and articulate. It requires, however, some knowledge of the Latin American temperament and of the significance which our southern neighbors attribute to questions of honor and prestige to be able to appreciate the jealousy and irri-

tation with which either of the two competitors react to the United States if the other becomes the recipient of more loans, more military good will missions, or more honorary degrees.

Oppositions and Alignments

Out of historical conflicts and present geography emerges the political pattern of South American international relations. It has not yet crystallized in a fixed, solid system of alliances, but in terms of attraction and repulsion it shows a configuration not dissimilar to that of Europe. The central core is the opposition between the Argentine and Brazil and around this center are grouped the other alignments. Because there is a secondary opposition between Chile and Peru, these two states tend to place themselves in logical relation to the main conflict. Peru is anti-Chilean and pro-Argentinian, Chile is anti-Peruvian and pro-Brazilian. This alignment, although not expressed in formal treaties, contains the political potential of a four-power opposition similar to the German-Austrian and French-Russian rivalry in Europe in 1914.

It must be remembered that in South America, the struggle for power on the international plane is not yet fought with the same intensity as it has been in Europe. The principal reason for this is not the more peaceful nature of its inhabitants. It is due in part to the fact that the well-known opposition of the United States to violence is often a deterring influence, but much more to the fact that no large country has as yet fully developed the economic resources available inside its domain. No state is as yet in a position where it can claim the need for more *lebensraum* on the theory that its population density and economic productivity create an uncontrollable outward pressure on its boundaries. The fact remains, however, that with further development, increase in population, and more intensive exploitation, the general pattern of the continent will begin to resemble Europe more closely and that, with that trend, there will inevitably be a sharpening and intensifying of political issues and of the struggle for power.

The political constellation of the Western Hemisphere takes form not only from the relations between the four great powers of South

America, but also from the relation of these powers to the United States and from the relations of the great republic in the north to the countries around the American Mediterranean. In these relations opposition is at least as prominent as co-operation. It contains two elements frequently referred to in this book: an economic aspect resulting from the conflict of interests between a capitalist imperialist creditor and a pre-capitalist nationalist debtor; and a political aspect which derives from the great inequality of power between the United States and the other countries of the Western Hemisphere.

The conflict of interest between debtor and creditor has led to bitterness and friction and hampered good relations between the Anglo-Saxon and the Latin American section of the Western Hemisphere. The desire to protect these investments, combined with the specific strategic significance of the zone, has been the inspiration for many of the interventions in the internal affairs of the neighboring republics in the American Mediterranean that came to an end only after the inauguration of the "Good Neighbor Policy."

Apart from the problem inherent in the relation between creditor and debtor, the relations between the United States and the Latin American countries are disturbed by fear and suspicion below the Rio Grande of the Colossus of the North. Most of the time that superiority of strength has been a cause for anxiety and worry, but during one period at least Latin American states had reason to deplore its weakness. During the American Civil War the European powers used our inability to resist infringements of the Monroe Doctrine to expand their position in the American Mediterranean and to threaten states farther south. The French moved into Mexico, the Spaniards into Santo Domingo and their actions against Chile and Peru seemed to some a foreboding of new attempts at reconquest.

Since that time the strength of the United States has grown enormously and she herself has become the threat most feared by Latin American states. Filibustering expeditions in Central America, the war with Spain, the dollar diplomacy of Taft and Knox, and Theodore Roosevelt's interpretation of the Monroe Doctrine all contributed to create a legitimate fear of our power. For the states on the littoral of the American Mediterranean, there can be no other policy than an acceptance of our hegemonic position with the prayer

that we will show more restraint in the future than in the past. For the four great states of South America, there are in theory two alternative policies, but neither has proved workable in the past. Our sister republics have failed to create a continental alliance against us and their dream of balancing Europe against the Colossus of the North has so far failed to materialize.

Extra-hemisphere Orientations

The existence of conflicts and opposition, boundary disputes and economic competitions, and struggles for power and prestige are all part of the political life of this hemisphere as of any other. As such, they explain in part why the states of the New World have been no more successful in preserving the peace than the states of Europe, but their existence is a reason for international organization, not an explanation of its failure. There are other reasons far more significant for an understanding of the political problems of the Western Hemisphere. Except in years of immediate and obvious threats of transoceanic aggression, the American republics have always been more occupied with Europe and Asia than with each other, more closely tied to developments across the seas than to events in the life of their neighbors across the mountains. Neither Canada, nor the United States, nor Argentina is interested in a Pan American unification in time of peace, a fact which throws serious doubt on the geographic validity of the Western Hemisphere as a region for political integration.

Canada has never participated in any of the Pan American Conferences. As a member of the British Commonwealth of Nations, she has been a practically free and independent state since the passage of the Statute of Westminster in 1931, but she has remained, because of tradition and economic bonds, more closely integrated with the British Empire than with any other political unit. Recent developments have also brought intimate economic relations with the United States, but she maintains almost no contact with the rest of the hemisphere. This predominantly transoceanic orientation rather than the fact of her ineligibility under the present constitution of the Pan American

Union, which restricts membership to republics, is the explanation for her absence from its gatherings.

The great republic at the extreme south of the hemisphere has been almost equally reluctant to participate in common action leading to political integration. She rejects on principle the concept of the Western Hemisphere as a logical area for political organization. There has been some interest in the concept in literary circles, but throughout its history successive governments of the Republic on the La Plata have opposed plans for union. There was no enthusiasm for the League of American Nations which Bolívar, the great liberator, had visualized for the New World, and none has developed to this day. Argentina opposed the United States in her attempts to revive Pan Americanism, fought her proposals in the conference which Blaine called in 1898, and has been non-co-operative ever since. The reasons are clear and specific and the position is perfectly understandable. The Argentine stresses in the first place the fact that her most intimate relations are with Europe and not with her fellow republics either in North or South America. She objects to a Pan American grouping including both continents, partly because it runs counter to her natural transatlantic contacts and orientation, and more specifically because such a grouping would in the long run strengthen the hegemonic position of the United States over Latin America. Because of her close economic ties with Europe and a certain sense of racial superiority over some of her fellow republics, less white in composition, she objects with almost equal strength to a political integration of South American states. In so far as she envisages a supernational world on the southern continent, it is not in terms of an organization based on the democratic principle of the equality of states, but in terms of a hegemonic structure with herself as leader.

A similar transoceanic orientation has been characteristic of the foreign policy of the United States. Even the Monroe Doctrine, a policy apparently focused on this hemisphere, is in reality oriented toward Europe. The most important contacts are with the transatlantic and transpacific zones of the Old World. Developments in those areas shape the political fate of the world and determine the power position of the United States. Because the Latin American states are weak, they cannot threaten the security of the northern

republic directly and because of that fact, their relations to Washington can never be as important as those of the great powers of Europe and Asia.

Latin America was for the United States partly a buffer zone that needed to be protected to assure her own safety, partly a market and a source of raw materials. It is true that the United States has been the inspiration and the principal guiding force in the contemporary Pan American movement, but it should not be forgotten that this policy was originally inspired not by political but by economic considerations and by a desire for preferential treatment in the markets of our southern neighbors. If she thought of political integration at all, it was in terms of a hegemonic system that covered the North American Continent and the American Mediterranean, a system in which she assumed the role of leader with a right of intervention based on her strength and the protective function which she had assumed under the Monroe Doctrine. Her conversion to the advantages of a political system that would cover the whole hemisphere and be based on the legal equality of rights instead of on the factual inequalities of power is of very recent date. It began in the latter years of the Hoover administration and blossomed under Franklin D. Roosevelt in the form of the much-heralded Good Neighbor Policy. It antedates the emergence of the latest threat to the New World but it has been greatly stimulated by the dangers which are implied in German-Japanese victories across the oceans.

The Union of American Republics

In spite of the fears and distrusts, the frictions and oppositions, and the transoceanic orientation of the great powers, the states of the New World have managed to achieve a modest political collaboration. Its instrument has been the Union of American republics created by simple resolution on April 14, 1890, at a meeting of the countries of the New World then assembled at Washington. This loose organization operates through periodic conferences and through a permanent secretariat at Washington known as the Pan American Union which is under the control of a governing board composed of one representative from each government.

1. *International Administration*

A large number of conferences has been held since 1890 and they have dealt with practically all the phases of international intercourse between the states of the western world. To the long list of topics already mentioned in our discussion of economic co-operation must be added transportation and communication as well as eugenics, sanitation, education, journalism, and several aspects of international cultural contact. Some of these meetings led to the establishment of special bureaus and commissions with the result that there have emerged a great many international administrative agencies in addition to the Pan American Union, some closely affiliated with it, others fully autonomous and separate.

2. *Pacific Settlement of Disputes*

If wars can be prevented by declarations of good intentions and self-denying ordinances, the future of the Western Hemisphere is bright. There have been few conferences in which the American states have not expressed their devotion to peace, declared their pacific intentions, and added to the existing provisions for conciliation and arbitration. It is true that in the New World there is many a slip between signature and ratification, but even with that minor failing the paper framework for peace remains impressive. In 1920 the majority of Latin American states became members of the League of Nations. By that token they accepted the obligations of the Covenant to refrain from armed conflict except under special and clearly defined circumstances. In 1928 most of them adhered to the Kellogg-Briand Treaty in which they solemnly renounced war as an instrument of national policy and undertook to settle disputes only by peaceful means. In 1933 they signed the Argentine Anti-War Pact which condemned wars of aggression and pledged non-recognition of territorial arrangements not obtained by pacific means.

The development of procedures for the peaceful settlement of disputes has long been of special interest to the American states. They have signed numerous bilateral treaties for that purpose and to this

framework has been added in recent years a whole series of multilateral treaties. If some of our neighbors in the south have been a little hesitant of late in relying on mediation, this can probably be explained by "embarras du choix." There are so many conventions to choose from that it is difficult to decide which one to use. The first important multilateral treaty of this nature was the Gondra Convention signed in 1923, which provided that the disputes not settled by diplomacy would be submitted to conciliation. Special committees were to be created *ad hoc* for each dispute, but their formation was to be aided by two permanent commissions, one at Washington and one at Montevideo. This was supplemented in 1929 with a General Convention for Inter-American Conciliation, which reduced the number of exceptions allowed in the Gondra Convention and gave a more important role to the two permanent commissions.

At the occasion of the Seventh Conference at Montevideo in 1933, the American states reaffirmed their devotion to the peaceful settlement of disputes in Article 10 of the Convention on the Rights and Duties of States, and strengthened the peace machinery by accepting an additional Protocol to the Pan American Conciliation Treaty of 1929 which transformed the bilateral *ad hoc* commissions of investigation and conciliation into permanent bodies. This protocol apparently remained a dead letter because the special conference in Buenos Aires in 1936 found it necessary to reiterate, in the treaty on the Prevention of Controversies, the identical obligation to establish permanent bilateral commissions. It seemed to the delegates at that meeting that the opportunities for states of the New World to give expression to their passionate devotion to conciliation were still inadequate and to remedy this deficiency they added another convention, the Inter-American Treaty on Good Offices and Mediation. It offered the signatories an opportunity to have recourse to the good offices and mediation of "eminent citizens" if all other forms of peaceful settlement failed.

Even greater than the devotion to conciliation has been the interest in arbitration. A legalistic approach to international relations and faith in the possibility of creating an adequate body of international law has been one of the characteristics of the New World. There has come into existence a large network of bilateral arbitration treaties

supplemented by several multilateral conventions. The Second Conference of American Republics, assembled in Mexico in 1902, adopted a multilateral treaty of compulsory arbitration that was ratified by Mexico and several of the states of the American Mediterranean. The Republics of Central America, far ahead of their time, created in 1907 the Central American Court of Justice. It was established for a ten-year period but it was not reconstituted after the expiration of the term. The court had the unfortunate experience of becoming the instrument through which international law tried to contest the operation of power politics and the court had to go.

The difficulty arose over the fact that Nicaragua had granted the United States, in the Bryan-Chamorra Treaty of 1914, the right to construct a trans-isthmian canal and leased to her a naval base on the Gulf of Fonseca as well as coaling stations on the Great Corn and Little Corn islands. Salvador and Honduras had denied Nicaragua the right to dispose of Fonseca Bay because, as successors to the old Central American Federation, they claimed joint ownership over the gulf. Costa Rica had objected because, in a treaty with Nicaragua in 1858, the latter had agreed to consult her before granting any concession for the construction of an interoceanic canal. The Senate agreed to ratification with a reservation stating that nothing in the agreement was intended to affect the rights of these three states. This reservation, however, did not satisfy Costa Rica and Salvador, and they took their case to the Central American Court, requesting that Nicaragua be enjoined from carrying out the provisions of the treaty. The court's decision confirmed the claim that Nicaragua had violated the rights of Costa Rica and Salvador, but neither Nicaragua nor the United States paid any attention to the verdict. The strategic needs of the United States prevailed over international law.

The period following the First World War saw the beginning of a renewed interest in arbitration in the Western Hemisphere. A General Treaty of Inter-American Arbitration negotiated in Washington in 1929, which provided for the creation of *ad hoc* tribunals in case of disputes, was accepted by the majority of states although in many cases with reservations. Notwithstanding the fact that most of the Latin American states, as members of the League of Nations, were

signatories to the statute of the Permanent Court of International Justice at The Hague, there have repeatedly been demands for the creation of a tribunal for the Western Hemisphere. The majority of states was, however, of the opinion that one court of international justice was quite adequate and that a special tribunal for the Western Hemisphere would merely tend to develop a special inter-American international law. Proposals for a Pan American Court have, therefore, been transferred to the Pan American Union with the request that they be given study and consideration, very careful study and very prolonged consideration.

Compared with the simplicity achieved in the Covenant of the League of Nations, the treaty structure of the peace system of the Western Hemisphere seems a labyrinth of confusing conventions. The fact that very few states, if any, have ratified all the treaties, makes it extremely difficult to know what the peace structure actually amounts to at any given time in terms of actually accepted legal obligation. It is, therefore, not surprising that attempts should have been made at co-ordination and simplification. Mexico presented a proposal for this purpose at the Montevideo Conference in 1933, and the United States delegation introduced a draft for the consolidation of American peace agreements at the meeting at Lima. No action was taken at the conference but hope was expressed that the project might be taken up at the next conference to be held in Bogota in 1943. In the meantime, the proposals of Mexico and the United States together with certain related projects have been sent on a slight detour. They are going to the Pan American Union for classification and transmission to individual governments. After a short sojourn in the respective foreign offices, they are expected to return to the Union in Washington, accompanied by comments and observations. From there they will go to the International Conference of American Jurists who are expected to draft the "American peace code" that is to be presented at Bogota. Up to that time, the American states will have to prevent war in the New World as best they can with the unco-ordinated agglomeration of conventions that make up the peace system of the Western Hemisphere.

3. Disarmament

The magic incantation of resolutions, the solemn promises of peaceful intent, and the elaborate provisions for pacific settlement provide impressive testimony to the good will of the American states, but the real test of international organization lies not in the declarations of good intention but in the method by which force is organized in the international community. Unless there is disarmament by individual states, provision for international executive action, and the collective application of sanctions, there is no progress from individual to collective security. In that respect, the hemisphere has accomplished little if anything and, in terms of legal obligation, the Union of American Republics represents far less political integration than the League of Nations.

There have actually been two cases of successful limitation of armament in certain restricted regions of the hemisphere but they merely illustrate the almost insoluble nature of the problem. Argentina and Chile, inspired by the First Hague Conference, agreed in 1902 to limit their respective naval forces for a period of five years, but the agreement was not renewed after its expiration. Attempts to negotiate a similar agreement in the years following the World War proved a failure. Chile, in financial difficulties because of the decline in nitrate exports, was very anxious to reduce her armament expenditures and introduced a proposal for naval limitation at the Fifth Conference of American Republics at Santiago in 1923. The government of the Argentine was willing to consider the proposal but Brazil refused and all three states became involved in naval competition.

Achievement in the field of naval limitation has been modest, and it must be confessed that reduction in the realm of land armaments has also not been overwhelming. It is true that the New World actually achieved a multilateral agreement for the reduction of armies, which is more than was accomplished by Europe, but it was limited to the five Central American republics. These states signed a convention in 1922 limiting their respective land forces for a period of five years, but this treaty was also not renewed.

Outside these temporary agreements, applicable to restricted re-

gions, there has been no attempt to achieve disarmament on a broader scale either in terms of one of the continents or in terms of the hemisphere. The struggle for power between the Argentine and Brazil is an obstacle to the former; the power relations between North and South America and the fact that the New World is not an isolated land mass are barriers to the latter. The purpose of a disarmament conference, as suggested in Chapter VI, is to increase the security of the participating members. They will accept equality of armament if they cannot achieve consent for the really desired status which is that of relative supremacy. The disparity in strength between the United States and the countries of South America is so great that equality of security could not possibly be achieved and there is, therefore, in the prevailing power relations no basis for a disarmament agreement. Even if the states on the southern continent succeeded in combining and joining their forces, they still could not match the strength of their northern neighbor because of the inadequacy of their power potential. It is theoretically possible to conceive a treaty which would reduce the actual armament of the United States to the level of that of the A.B.C. powers, but such a treaty could not affect the inequality inherent in the difference of power potential. Although it would strengthen temporarily the position of the southern states in relation to the north, it would also weaken the hemisphere as a whole vis-à-vis Europe and Asia.

The United States arms in response to transoceanic zones, not in terms of intra-hemisphere zones. Limitation of armaments was for her a problem of adjustment to the naval forces of Britain and Japan as the Washington Conference in 1921 indicated. The British threat has been replaced by a German threat and the Japanese danger at some future time may be exchanged for a Chinese danger, but the size of the United States navy will continue to be measured in terms of the potential thrusts from across the seas; the basic pattern will remain a transoceanic one.

The disappearance of the balance of power in Europe and Asia must inevitably result in an enormous increase in the military establishment of the United States. To the extent that the power relations between her and the countries of South America influence their sense of security, this development is bound to increase their anxiety. They

cannot match the armaments of the north; they can find protection against the northern neighbor only by using his enemies across the oceans as a balance against him. The temptation to do this will be almost irresistible notwithstanding the extraordinary dangers involved. Political integration of the hemisphere in terms of isolation from the Old World would inevitably mean hegemony for the United States and insecurity for the others. Only by preventing this type of integration and by preserving a transoceanic and triangular political pattern with North America can they balance its strength and obtain equality of security with the United States.

4. Collective Action

So far the states of the New World have been unable to provide the legal framework for collective action in case individual states should forget their solemn promises and resort to war. The Pan American system contains no guaranties of territorial security and political independence and makes no provision for coercion by the Pan American community. It may be that in the light of the actual performance of the League of Nations this is a reason for rejoicing, but the fact remains that, notwithstanding the constant reiteration of unity and solidarity, the New World has preserved as much international anarchy and achieved no more political integration than despised Europe.

In addition to the normal obstacles involved in the transfer of authority from independent states to an international body, there has been in the Western Hemisphere the additional difficulty just referred to, the complete absence of a balance of power and the fear and distrust of the United States. Authorizing international action would be in fact, whatever its name or formula, authorizing action by the United States. This would lead to the very thing which our Latin American neighbors have tried to prevent by their insistence on the principle of non-intervention, as was suggested in a previous chapter. This problem is responsible for the extraordinary phraseology and tortuous logic that characterize many of the Pan American conventions; it has created an impasse from which the peace movement of the Western Hemisphere cannot extricate itself. In the

Argentine Anti-War Pact of 1933, the parties promised to "exercise the political, juridical, or economic means authorized by international law" to maintain the peace, but in no case to resort to intervention either diplomatic or armed. International government without interfering with the complete independence of the individual state is a problem that even the distinguished jurists of the New World have found difficult to solve.

Some of the states of the Western Hemisphere have been willing to accept a system of international coercion and have proposed an organization comparable to the League of Nations. Such a league was advocated by Uruguay in the early twenties, and Colombia, seconded by the Dominican Republic, presented a proposal for such a form of organization at the conference in Buenos Aires in 1936. The Mexican Peace Code, proposed in Montevideo, contained provisions for a definition of the aggressor and a procedure for the application of sanctions, and it implied a development of the Pan-American peace system along similar lines. With both the United States and the Argentine firmly determined to prevent any such development, all proposals of this nature have been kept from the floor of the meetings and graciously interred in the bureau of the Pan American Union.

There was complete accord between the United States and the Argentine that there should be no League of Nations of the Western Hemisphere, but that is about the limit of their agreement on what is desirable in the political structure of the New World. The United States has continued to dislike sanctions and territorial guaranties, but she has, in recent years, gone through an extraordinary conversion in the matter of consultation. She has pleaded the need of a permanent consultative committee that could be called in session at a moment's notice to deal with any emergency that might arise. Argentina continued to object to even this minimum of political integration with the result that there began in 1936 a struggle between the two countries over the issue of whether the hemisphere was to have a permanent consultative council. The conflict developed into a long up-hill fight which the United States finally won, not by the methods of blitzkrieg, but by a process of attrition.

In the Declaration of Lima, accepted in 1938, the signatories

agreed that a meeting of the ministers of foreign affairs could be called, at the initiative of any one of them, to act as an instrument of consultation. Two such conferences have since been held, one in Panama in 1939 and one in Havana in 1940, and the latter provided additional machinery for consultation. A third conference was scheduled for January, 1942, to be held at Rio de Janeiro. The Havana meeting designated the Governing Board of the Pan American Union as the proper organization to be addressed if states wished to initiate consultative meetings. The meeting also passed a resolution recommending to the Governing Board the appointment of a permanent committee composed of representatives of five countries which would have the duty of watching existing or threatening disputes and initiating action to achieve pacific settlement. The committee was to submit a report to each Meeting of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs and to each International Conference of the American Republics regarding the status of such conflicts and the steps which may have been taken to bring about a solution.

By 1940, the states of the Western Hemisphere had achieved political collaboration to the extent of accepting a permanent consultative committee, the American equivalent to the Council of the League of Nations. There were, however, important differences between these two organs of international government. The League Council derived its authority and power directly from the Covenant. The Conference of Ministers of Foreign Affairs and the Permanent Committee of Vigilance have no powers except in so far as they have been granted specifically in the multiplicity of conventions that make up the American peace system. Among these there is none that guarantees territorial security and independence and none that provides for the application of international sanctions. The American states are willing to explore the possibility of collaboration but are firmly determined to prevent any form of political integration that might restrict their independence. The political pattern of the hemisphere remains that of international anarchy. The New World continues to be full of oppositions and conflict patterns that provide an excellent opportunity for the German policy of sowing distrust and suspicion, and the technique of inflaming potential conflict. The Pan American move-

ment has improved international administration in the Western Hemisphere, contributed to the development of international law, and encouraged conciliation and arbitration, but it has not solved the problem of war. The attempt to create out of twenty-two independent sovereign states an effective system of collective security has proved no more successful than in Europe.

XIII. The New World versus the Old

> *. . . the occasion has been judged proper for asserting, as a principle in which the rights and interests of the United States are involved, that the American continents, by the free and independent condition which they have assumed and maintain, are henceforth not to be considered as subjects for future colonization by any European powers.*
>
> THE MONROE DOCTRINE

DISAGREEMENT between Argentina and the United States over the merits of a consultative committee was only to a very minor degree a conflict of opinion about the ideal internal organization of the Western Hemisphere. It was much more a struggle about the nature of the political relations that should prevail between the New World and the Old. The United States wanted to organize a common front against Europe and the Argentine wanted to preserve complete freedom of action by the individual states. Because of this fact, the campaign for political integration conducted by the United States became inevitably a struggle for the allegiance of South America in the fight against encirclement by the Old World.

The Buenos Aires Conference of 1936, in which this conflict came to the fore and which had been called to explore the possibilities of a common policy in the face of threatening developments in Europe, was by no means the first meeting called for such a purpose. The dream of collaboration among the states of the New World is as old as the states themselves. In periods when danger threatens from across the oceans and when co-operation in the form of self-defense attains a special meaning, it becomes of interest not only to the poets and writers but also to the soldiers and statesmen.

France and the Holy Alliance

The first serious threat to the safety and independence of the Americas came in 1822 when France appealed to the Holy Alliance for aid in the reconquest of the former Spanish colonies. To that threat the hemisphere responded in a manner not dissimilar to that displayed at later occasions of the same nature. It combined resolutions on solidarity with divergence of action.

At that time unity was being discussed and advocated on both continents as natural and inevitable. The provincial differences, that had developed in colonial times and that were later to become the basis of the national distinctness of the people of Spanish America, had not yet erased their similarity of outlook. The thirteen colonies still vividly remembered their fight for independence and their struggle with Great Britain for the freedom of the seas. They were convinced that they were creating a new world free from the tyranny of the Old where no political repression would be permitted to prevent man from realizing the full possibilities of his divine nature. They had welcomed the struggle for independence in South America, and rejoiced that their republican form of government had become the great model for the new republics of the southern continent. It was, therefore, natural that there should arise the conception of a common interest and a common destiny for the Americas.

Both continents had begun as colonies of European people, fought for liberty and independence, affirmed the rights of man, created republican forms of government, and announced their devotion to the welfare of the people instead of to the glory of princes. Jefferson spoke of the hemisphere as one continent and in a letter written October 24, 1823, to President Monroe, declared that "America North and South has a set of interests distinct from those of Europe and peculiarly her own." Alexander Hamilton advocated an American policy which would unite the efforts of the people of the hemisphere and suggested a strict and indissoluble union.

Notwithstanding these widely held convictions, the spirit of solidarity failed to express itself in a practical program of political collaboration. To the danger of action from across the oceans, the United

States replied with the Monroe Doctrine, a unilateral declaration of policy. The South American states responded with a call to a conference to be held in the city of Panama in 1826 to explore the possibility of union, but common action between north and south was not achieved.

The Conference of Panama was called to explore the possibility of achieving the dream of Simon Bolívar, the Great Liberator. This dream, certain modern distortions to the contrary notwithstanding, was not of a political integration of the Western Hemisphere but of the formation of a League of American States by the former Spanish colonies. The league was to be under the protection, not of the country that had so generously offered its aid by announcing the Monroe Doctrine, but under the protection of Great Britain. The General was apparently of the opinion that British sea power might be a more adequate defense against dangers from the European mainland than the military strength of the young republic on the Atlantic coast of North America.

The United States had been invited to the conference by Mexico against the strong opposition of the other Spanish American states. John Quincy Adams accepted the invitation with enthusiasm and promptly ran into difficulties with Congress. The Senate had to confirm the appointment of the delegates and the House had to provide the appropriations, and in both chambers there was vigorous opposition against participation in the meeting. Congress was afraid of conferences which seemed to the senators to lead inevitably to alliances and hostilities, and they were particularly wary of the proposed meeting because they had no intention of translating the Monroe Doctrine, which was a mere declaration of intention, into a treaty obligation that would bind the United States. Adams fought his battle with brilliance and perseverance and finally obtained the consent of both houses. The American delegates set out for Panama and arrived shortly after the conference had concluded its labors and the delegates had departed for their respective homes.

John Quincy Adams had instructed his delegation to work for a convention which was to state that each signatory would guard by its own means against the establishment of any future European colony within its borders. The advantage of such an agreement, it

seemed to the Secretary of State, would be that each party would bind itself to do only what was in its best interests. It would lead to a multilateral agreement which would be neither a guaranty nor an alliance, but would generalize the Monroe Doctrine and enhance its prestige without involving any commitments for the United States. Secretary Adams was convinced that such an agreement would be a powerful instrument and that the moral effect of such a joint declaration would be to deter Europe from action in this hemisphere. Here was an excellent precedent for later attempts to frighten the European powers by the moral strength of Pan American joint declarations.

The first threat to the territorial security and political independence of the republics of the Western Hemisphere produced no common action. When the threat disappeared, concern with hemisphere solidarity disappeared with it. The United States began her western expansion and in that process she began to absorb large sections of Spanish American territory. This danger stimulated renewed interest in common action among the Latin American states and much discussion about the necessity of defensive alliances against the Colossus of the North. Several conferences were called for the purpose but nothing definite was accomplished. The archives of the foreign offices were enriched with innumerable treaties of alliance, federation, union, and eternal peace, but the conventions were never ratified and the continent continued to develop along lines of separatism and national opposition.

The First World War

The second time serious attempts were made to explore the possibility of a common front against dangers from the Old World was during the time of the First World War. In the fall of 1914, Washington felt serious concern about the outcome of the war in Europe. The German armies had made their victorious sweep through Belgium and France and, although the Battle of the Marne had saved Paris, there were at that time no indications that the Allies would win the war. German interests in Latin America had always been a matter of grave concern to the United States. There were unpleasant memories of the Venezuela incident. The interest of the German

Admiralty in the islands of the American Mediterranean was well known, and the large German colonies in South America seemed too good an excuse for intervention to visualize with any comfort the possibility of German victory.

Statesmen began to think again about the problem of common defense and the possibilities of collaboration. Colonel House suggested to President Wilson as early as December, 1914, the advantages that might accrue from a generalization of the Monroe Doctrine. He was instructed by the President to start informal negotiations with the diplomatic representatives of the A.B.C. powers in Washington for a convention that would contain guaranties of territorial integrity and the republican form of government and make defense against a possible European attack the common concern of the whole hemisphere. The first responses from Argentina and Brazil were favorable but Chile's answer was evasive. The Tacna-Arica dispute was still embittering relations with her northern neighbor and she had no particular desire to guarantee the territorial integrity of Peru. Whether Chile could ultimately have been won over and at what price, we shall never know because, in the larger preoccupation with the world conflict, the whole project was dropped.

Soon after the opening of the negotiations, a series of unfortunate incidents led to interventions in the littoral states of the American Mediterranean; Haiti, Santo Domingo, Nicaragua, Mexico, Cuba, and Panama all received visits from the armed forces of the United States. Our young men did get an opportunity to see the world, but the results did not create an atmosphere conducive to Pan-American solidarity and collaboration. It was, however, not the development of friction in the Western Hemisphere that was primarily responsible for the abandonment of the project, but increased concern on the part of the United States with developments in the transoceanic zones. Japan was using the withdrawal of the European powers from the Far East as an opportunity to present China with the "Twenty-One Demands" which, if accepted, would have destroyed all remnants of the balance of power in Asia, and the course of the war in Europe inevitably kept attention focused on that continent. Public opinion, at first insistent on isolation, became more and more interventionist, and the government followed a parallel course by changing from

neutrality to a policy distinctly pro-Ally, and finally to full belligerency. The concept of hemisphere protection through common defense on this side of the water was rejected and replaced by a policy of defending the New World by preserving the balance of power in Europe and Asia.

After the United States became a full belligerent, she tried once again to achieve acceptance of a common policy for the Americas by asking her fellow republics to declare war on Germany. The response was quite remarkable in the light of the existing difficulties between Washington and the southern neighbors, but it was none the less a clear indication that there was no hemisphere solidarity in fact but instead a real cleavage between the United States and the larger states of the extreme south. In the region of the American Mediterranean, fully controlled by the United States, participation was most complete among the small states. Cuba, Costa Rica, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Nicaragua, and Panama declared war, and the Dominican Republic severed diplomatic relations, while El Salvador and the larger states, Colombia, Mexico, and Venezuela, remained neutral. In the intermediate zone on the west coast, Ecuador and Peru broke off diplomatic relations but did not declare war, a policy also followed by Bolivia and Uruguay while Paraguay preserved her neutrality. Among the A.B.C. states, Brazil became a belligerent while Argentina and Chile remained neutral.

Victory for the Allies meant a peace treaty that preserved the balance of power in Europe and Asia. It removed for twenty years the danger of a transoceanic threat to the territorial integrity and political independence of the states of the New World. History repeated itself and with the disappearance of this second threat, interest in hemisphere solidarity again vanished. The strength of the north once more seemed primarily a threat to the south and not a protection, and intra-hemisphere oppositions came to the fore. In one respect, however, the situation was different. The concept of hemisphere integration did not simply dissolve; it was replaced by a concept of world organization.

In his preoccupation with the larger issues of the war, President Wilson dropped his earlier idea of a regional approach to territorial security. In 1914, he thought of a Monroe Doctrine extended and

generalized to become the public law of the New World; in 1917, he thought of it as a fundamental principle of world government. Collective security was to embrace not only the Americas, but the other hemisphere as well. Because of the influential position of the United States at the Peace Conference, Wilson's idea was incorporated in the settlement and the Covenant of the League of Nations became an integral part of the peace structure.

The new approach was received with enthusiasm in Latin America and most of the states became members. For a brief period, there was a happy solidarity, but curiously enough, the point on which a Pan American consensus of opinion was achieved was the idea that the correct approach to peace and collective security should be a world approach and not a regional approach in terms of the hemisphere. This happy state, however, was not to last. The Senate did not ratify the peace treaty and the United States refused to join the League. The north and the south again pursued a divergent course of action.

In becoming members of the League of Nations, the Latin American states were motivated by many different factors. Some joined for special reasons. Peru and Bolivia hoped to bring to Geneva the Tacna-Arica dispute with their southern neighbor and this caused Chile to join, if only for the sake of preventing such action. There were in addition motivations of a more general character. The idea of the League appealed to the idealism of the Latin American countries, to their traditional interest in the development of international law and their devotion to conciliation and arbitration, but it appealed in particular because the organization seemed to offer an opportunity for counterbalancing the United States. The League Covenant contained a guaranty of territorial integrity and political independence that sounded like a very useful protection against the interventionist tendencies of the "Colossus of the North."

From the point of view of honor and prestige, League membership was a great success for the Latin American states. Certain European powers made obvious efforts to win their good will and, by acting as a bloc and applying delicate methods of log-rolling, they made the most of their opportunities. In the Assembly Halls at Geneva

the representatives of the Latin American states found true equality, a courtesy as gracious as their own, and an inexhaustible number of distinguished and honorable positions on innumerable League committees. Their statesmen, thoroughly at home in this largely French-speaking organization, found it a field for their talents in diplomacy and international law, a world-wide forum in which to express their hopes and grievances.

From the practical point of view, League membership proved less fruitful. It produced neither the specific things that some of them hoped for, nor the general protection which they all sought. While Wilson was negotiating the peace conference in Paris, he was informed that the Senate would never ratify the Covenant of the League unless it contained a specific reservation concerning the Monroe Doctrine. There was a good deal of opposition in Paris particularly among the Latin American delegation, but the wishes of the United States prevailed. The reservation proved extremely difficult to draft because the doctrine had actually never been defined. Attempts to achieve a formulation that would be acceptable to all parties were soon discovered to be hopeless and had to be abandoned. The doctrine was, therefore, made part of the Covenant without benefit of definition. Article 21 merely stated: "Nothing in this Covenant shall be deemed to affect the validity of international engagements, such as treaties of arbitration or regional understandings like the Monroe Doctrine, for securing the maintenance of peace."

The United States refused to join after having obtained acceptance of the reservation, with the ironic result that she remained free to pursue her traditional policy in Latin America according to her own definition of the Monroe Doctrine and that the League was legally prevented from challenging such a policy. The institution, which had been looked upon by our neighbors in the south as a protector against the Colossus of the North, turned out to be an organization that officially endorsed Yankee intervention.

The Second World War

When, for the third time in the history of the American states, developments in Europe began to imply possible dangers for the

New World, the search began once again for a common policy. Hemisphere solidarity was rediscovered, and an extensive literature sprang up in the United States to attest to the common interest and common attitudes of the American republics. As in the First World War, this country took the lead, and the attempt to achieve common action became inevitably an attempt to induce the Latin American states to adjust their foreign policy to that of the northern neighbor. Some refused flatly; others, quite eager to accept our leadership, found difficulty in following our shifts and changes.

The United States went through the same cycle that had characterized her attitude during the First World War, from a neutrality based on aloofness and a conviction that the conflict did not concern her, to increasing fear of the outcome and preparation for defense, and finally to actual participation. Some of our Latin American friends lagged behind in this evolution and were often in the position held six months previously by the republic of the north. If they then defended their attitude by the same arguments used in the United States in an earlier period, they were lectured about their inability to understand the meaning of the war and its implications for their safety.

When, in 1935, the United States first became concerned with the possibility of a new European conflict, public opinion still adhered to the theory that involvement in the First World War had been the result of our large trade in war materials and our financial interests in the victory of one of the belligerents. There was a demand that we should renounce our rights under international law to ship raw materials to belligerent states and prohibit the granting of financial aid and loans. Attempts by the advocates of collective security to obtain legislation which would have made it possible for the United States to discriminate between aggressor and defendant and to cooperate with the League of Nations were all defeated. The Neutrality Resolution of August 31, 1935, provided for a mandatory embargo on arms, munitions, and implements of war to apply equally to all belligerents and prohibited American ships from carrying such materials to belligerent ports. On February 29, 1936, the act was extended to May, 1937, and amended with additional articles which

prohibited loans and credits to belligerent governments. Proposals to give the President discretionary powers in regard to an embargo on raw materials again failed of acceptance.

1. A League of American Neutrals

The year 1936 was a year of gathering clouds: Germany had occupied the Rhineland, Italy had completed the occupation of Ethiopia, and the Spanish Civil War was threatening to draw the whole of Europe into an ideological war between democracy and totalitarianism. The special conference of American states called at the invitation of President Roosevelt, which was to meet in Buenos Aires in December, seemed an excellent opportunity to explore the possibilities of achieving a common neutrality for the countries of the Western Hemisphere in the face of the disturbed conditions in the Old World and the threat of a new world conflict. During the First World War, the United States had refused to respond to suggestions from South America for common action in the protection of neutral rights and had flatly turned down the proposal of Venezuela for a League of American Neutrals. This time it was the republic of the north that took the initiative.

The American delegation at the conference took as a starting point the Argentine Anti-War Pact, signed at Montevideo in 1933, which states that, in case of war, the signatories will adopt in their character as neutrals a common and solidary attitude. The United States proposed that the states of the Western Hemisphere should implement that declaration of intention by signing a neutrality convention. This agreement was to outline a common policy which was to apply equally to all belligerents and provide for a permanent consultative committee which was to meet regularly for the purpose of exchanging information and facilitating correlation of legislative and administrative action taken in pursuance of the neutrality articles of the treaty.

Our proposals were inspired in part by the neutrality legislation then in effect in the United States and they provided among other things for an embargo on arms and implements of war. It was, however, well known in South America that the administration in Wash-

ington would have preferred a different kind of neutrality law than Congress was willing to grant, one which gave the President discretionary power to place embargoes on raw materials. Because of this conflict of opinion in the matter of neutrality between the administrative and legislative branches of the United States government, our good neighbors were somewhat at a loss to understand the meanings and implications of our proposals in Buenos Aires. For the country that was potentially the greatest manufacturer of war materials to propose a multilateral treaty for an embargo on arms with twenty republics none of whom was in a position to manufacture even the simplest war materials for its own armies, seemed to make little sense. Was the proposal an indication that the United States eventually hoped to achieve a multilateral agreement for embargoes on foodstuffs and raw materials? Was somebody in Washington dreaming great dreams and hoping to create a League of American Neutrals that could control not only the industrial capacity of North America but also the raw material production of the entire hemisphere and thus be in a position to exert pressure on the course of events in Europe?

If this were the ultimate objective, our good neighbors begged to be excused. Their economic existence depended on the export of raw materials and foodstuffs, and they were as insistent as the western senators in the United States that there was not going to be an embargo on products which they had to export to survive. Blockade and submarines had done enough damage to their economic life during the First World War; they were not going to begin the Second World War with self-imposed restrictions. On that point, there was no hesitation. Not only did they water down the proposed convention, but Argentina and Paraguay added for good measure a reservation which stated quite clearly that foodstuffs and raw materials destined for civilian populations could in no case be considered contraband of war.

The proposed convention ran into other difficulties. Argentina's opposition killed the provision for a permanent consultative committee and there was widespread objection to the principle of equality of treatment of both belligerents. There were still several members

of the League of Nations in the Western Hemisphere and they were obliged, as signatories to the Covenant, to make the distinction between aggressor and victim of aggression. Equally objectionable to a few states was the attempt to draw a sharp distinction between conflicts in the Old World and conflicts in the Western Hemisphere and to provide a different treatment for each.

What finally emerged out of the conference was a Convention to Co-ordinate and Extend and Assure the Fulfillment of Existing Treaties between the American States. In this agreement, the signatories promised, in Article 6, that they would consult in case of hostilities and "*immediately endeavor to adopt* in their character as neutrals a common and solidary attitude." * The text also stated that "having in mind the diversity of cases and circumstances, *they may consider* the imposition of prohibitions or restrictions on the sale or shipment of arms, munitions, and implements of war, loans or other financial help to the states in conflict, and without detriment to their obligations derived from other treaties to which they are or may become parties." *

The American states were apparently afraid that this last phrase still did not leave enough freedom of action, for Article 7 provided that nothing contained in the Convention should be understood as affecting the rights and duties of the high contracting parties which are at the same time members of the League of Nations. In 1936, this applied to 18 of the 20 Latin American republics. Much was said in Buenos Aires about common solidarity but it failed to find expression in a common neutrality policy.

The next Conference of American States which met in Lima in December, 1938, devoted little time to the problem of neutrality and it was not until the Meeting of Foreign Ministers in Panama in September, 1939, that the issue again occupied the attention of the delegates. Hostilities had already broken out in Europe and the American states had declared themselves neutral. The conference gave birth to several pronouncements and the delegates seemed unshaken in their faith in the magic of words and their ability to impress the belligerents with their rights as neutrals by the poetic beauty of their declarations. They adopted the General Declaration

* Italics added.

of the Neutrality of the American Republics which reaffirmed their devotion to international law and provided for the appointment of an Inter-American Neutrality Committee composed of seven experts whose task it would be to formulate additional resolutions on the subject.

There was still a good deal of pretense about Pan American solidarity but the real fight for an actual common policy had been given up. The convention adopted at Panama began by admitting the existence of certain common standards, but it stated right in the first article that "it would be left *to each one of the signatories* to regulate *in their individual and sovereign capacity* the manner in which these standards are to be given complete application."

The attempt of the United States to create a League of American Neutrals had been a failure. In the light of the profound changes in American attitude toward the world conflict in the short span of four years, we owe perhaps a debt of gratitude to our good neighbor Argentina for having prevented us from incorporating our temporary views of 1936 into the public law of the Western Hemisphere, and thereby creating obligations which we would later have been forced to repudiate, when we adopted a policy of Lend-Lease aid.

2. *A Neutral Zone for the Americas*

At the time of the Panama meeting in 1939, no common attitude had been achieved toward the belligerents in Europe and Asia, but the American states found it quite easy to arrive at a consensus of opinion on the policy which they wanted the warring states to pursue toward the Western Hemisphere. They all felt that the conflict should be kept out of American waters and that the fighting should be done only on the other side of the oceans, a result which they hoped to achieve by isolating the Western Hemisphere behind a protective zone created by magic formula. The Meeting of Ministers of Foreign Affairs passed a unanimous resolution creating a neutral zone extending three hundred miles beyond the territorial waters of the Western Hemisphere, except in the immediate vicinity of Canada. It was stated that the American republics are "as of inherent right entitled to have those waters free from the commission of any

hostile act by non-American belligerents," an assertion for which there was practically no basis in international law.

The European belligerents were not impressed. Both Great Britain and Germany felt that acceptance of such restrictions on their naval warfare was bound to hurt themselves more than their opponent, and they therefore refused voluntary acceptance. The states of the Western Hemisphere were, however, not dismayed. Meeting in Havana the year following, they passed another resolution in which they solemnly declared that hostilities within the security zone were "prejudicial to the votes and joint resolutions of the Republics of America for the preservation of peace on this Continent." This second declaration also failed to deter either the German raiders or the British cruisers in hot pursuit. Not a single Latin American state had a navy strong enough to enforce such a policy and no other forms of coercion were available. Because blockade had stopped German trade with Latin America, and because the republics were eager to continue shipments to Great Britain, economic pressure on either belligerent was out of the question. The United States was the only power in the New World with naval forces adequate to patrol the seas adjacent to her coasts, but even she could not undertake the enforcement of the policy for the whole hemisphere. The Declaration of Panama did indeed express Pan American solidarity but in words, not in action.

3. Common Defense

When the long-expected European War finally broke out in September, 1939, it was discovered fairly soon that the real problem facing the United States was not the co-ordination of American neutrality policies toward a struggle in which she could be an aloof and distant spectator, but the creation of a system of hemisphere defense. What loomed beyond the oceans was not a skirmish for a Polish Corridor or a Chinese railroad, but a world conflict for the control of Europe and Asia in which totalitarian victory might mean not only the encirclement of the Western Hemisphere but the conquest of South America and the imprisonment of the United States on the North American Continent. With this realization our policy shifted

from neutrality to intervention in the transoceanic zones and from a search for common neutrality to a search for common defense.

Previous chapters have indicated the attempts of the United States to create a united front against the various forms of attack used in totalitarian warfare. They have sketched the cultural obstacles to defense against German propaganda and the factors that weaken resistance to psychological assault. They have outlined the barriers to economic self-sufficiency and the obstacles to political integration. But it came to be realized that a German-Japanese victory in the Old World would permit the partners to add to the weapon of propaganda used in their struggle against the New World not only the full arsenal of economic warfare but also the whole weight of their armed strength. Political preparation of a system of common defense against such an emergency began therefore with an attempt to generalize the Monroe Doctrine and to achieve the acceptance by the community of American states of collective responsibility for the safety of individual members.

4. Generalizing the Monroe Doctrine

As a unilateral policy, the Monroe Doctrine announced the willingness of the United States to defend the sister republics of the New World against invasion from the seas. To generalize this promise into a multilateral agreement for common defense and a workable system of collective security proved exceedingly difficult. The problem had plagued earlier governments in Washington who were faced with similar threats from across the oceans. It had worried John Quincy Adams in 1826 when he wrote instructions to the delegates who were to arrive too late to present his proposals to the conference in Panama. It had troubled Colonel House when he tried to negotiate a multilateral agreement of territorial guarantee with the A.B.C. states in 1915. Franklin D. Roosevelt made valiant efforts to succeed where his predecessors had failed, but he too discovered that hemisphere solidarity was a phrase not a political reality.

No blame can be placed on the administration in Washington for tardiness in attacking the problem. Long before the actual outbreak of hostilities in Europe, at the meeting in Buenos Aires in 1936 where we began our fruitless attempt to achieve a common neutrality,

we supported efforts to lay a foundation for hemisphere solidarity and defense. The problem came before the conference in the form of a proposal sponsored by the Brazilian government. This consisted of a draft convention defining hemisphere defense as the concern of all the states of the New World and using the actual wording of the original message of President Monroe. The agreement declared that the interposition of a non-American state in this hemisphere would be considered an unfriendly act which would lead to immediate consultation among the contracting parties.

This comparatively mild proposal found our good neighbor Argentina once more firmly in opposition. She objected with her usual vigor to any treaty that created a Pan American grouping in opposition to the Old World and to any wording that seemed a direct challenge to a European state. The Republic of the La Plata prevailed and the outcome of the negotiations was a completely noncommittal document. The section in the Convention for the Maintenance, Preservation, and Re-establishment of Peace that dealt with extra-hemisphere threats, contains the following meaningless clause: in the event that an international war outside America should menace the peace of the American republics, consultation shall take place to determine "the proper time and manner in which the signatory states, *if they so desire, may eventually co-operate in some action tending to preserve* the peace of the American continent." *

The United States refused to be discouraged and two years later, at the occasion of the Eighth Conference of American Republics at Lima in 1938, she resumed her efforts. Her delegation sailed to the lovely capital of Peru determined to achieve on the west coast what they had failed to accomplish on the east coast, an expression of hemisphere solidarity against the growing fascist menace and of the firm determination of the states of the New World to oppose all forms of ideological, economic, and military penetration. It also hoped to obtain the Permanent Consultative Committee which Buenos Aires had not produced. The republic of the north, which for twenty years had steadfastly refused to consult with the Great Powers of Europe and Asia about ways to preserve the peace of the

* Italics added.

world, had suddenly developed an irresistible passion for consultation with its small neighbors to the south who could not have influenced the course of world events if they had tried.

But east coast or west coast, Buenos Aires or Lima, our friends from the Pampas were still present and still firmly determined to prevent acceptance of the program of the United States. Argentina assumed the leadership of the opposition, but she was by no means the only state hesitant to accept the demand of the northern republic for a ringing denunciation of European continental states that represented important markets for their products. The economic dependence of the extreme south of the hemisphere on Europe rather than on North America continued to be an obstacle to hemisphere integration and the creation of a common front whether ideological, economic, or political.

Out of the conference in the capital of Peru came the much-heralded, much-praised Declaration of Lima, announced to the world with great publicity as the symbol of Pan American solidarity. The preamble contained the traditional self-congratulations over the spiritual unity, the unshakable devotion to law, peace, tolerance, and the principles of racial and religious liberty which are considered characteristic of the American republics. With this introduction, the governments of the American states reaffirmed their continental solidarity and stated that, faithful to their absolute sovereignty, they would proclaim their *common concern* in case the peace, security, or territorial integrity of any American republic were threatened and that, under such circumstances *they would consult* and "*act independently* in their individual capacities, recognizing fully their juridical equality as sovereign states." *

Translated into simple language, the Declaration of Lima announced that the American states were concerned about the safety of the hemisphere and that in common defense each would protect its own territory. What Adams had hoped from Panama in 1826, Hull brought back from Lima in 1938. It can be viewed as a tribute to the perseverance and the consistency of our foreign policy, but not as an adequate political preparation for the common defense of the

* Italics added.

New World in the twentieth century. There is a wide margin between common concern and collective security.

Notwithstanding the attendant publicity, the results of Lima fooled nobody, least of all the Germans. The wording of the Declaration clearly indicated that the relations between the states of the Western Hemisphere expressed not solidarity, but opposition; not uniformity of outlook, but profound divergence of orientation. The Conference at Lima registered once again the basic antagonism between the United States and the Argentine and the failure of the geographic region called the Western Hemisphere to arrive at any approximation to political unity.

There has been a tendency in the United States to judge the Argentine quite harshly for her opposition. But her attitude was in one respect much more realistic than that of the United States. The administration in Washington was still under the illusion that powerful states could be impressed with a ringing denunciation by a Pan American Conference. It believed, as Adams had at an earlier date, that governments could be restrained by the moral force of multilateral declarations containing no provisions for either alliance or guarantee. This was a strange illusion in the light of Mr. Hitler's achievements in the Rhineland, Austria, and the Sudetenland notwithstanding the Covenant of the League, the Locarno Treaties, and the French system of alliances, all of which provided for military resistance in addition to moral force. The Argentinians understood that words alone would be wasted and that the Germans were fully aware of the hollow nature of the so-called Pan American solidarity. Besides, Buenos Aires was not convinced that in an emergency the United States could really defend the region of the La Plata.

The quiet persistence of the United States had, however, produced one important result. In Lima she obtained acceptance of a procedure for consultation by conferences of Ministers of Foreign Affairs. This facilitated calling a meeting in Panama three weeks after the outbreak of war in Europe and a second important gathering in Havana a year later. Panama produced a Joint Declaration of Continental Solidarity which was merely a reiteration of the Declaration of Lima, but Havana proved more successful.

5. *Bilateral Agreements*

When the Ministers of Foreign Affairs met on the island of Cuba in July, 1940, the European conflict was no longer a future contingency. Hostilities had been in progress for almost a year and Germany had nearly completed her conquest of the Continent of Europe. Developments in the Old World had once again produced a serious threat to the freedom and the independence of the states of the Western Hemisphere. Under these circumstances, the American states were willing to go considerably farther toward a generalization of the Monroe Doctrine than they had been two years previously, but this fact by no means overcame all the difficulties inherent in the problem.

In regard to common defense against the Old World as in regard to other aspects of political integration, the power pattern of the New World presents an almost insoluble problem. The Western Hemisphere contains one great state surrounded by weak countries completely unable to defend themselves, let alone defend others. The possibility of true reciprocity is, therefore, excluded and any multilateral treaty containing reciprocal guaranties would be in conflict with the power realities. The Americas must, therefore, necessarily operate on the basis of bilateral agreements between the United States and her neighbors and, because of the enormous discrepancy in power between the parties in such agreements, they must inevitably remain one-sided and assume more the character of provisions for the defense of protectorates and buffer zones than of alliances between equals. The Monroe Doctrine is actually a truer expression of the power realities of the Western Hemisphere than a treaty of collective security containing provisions for reciprocal guaranties, but its effectiveness as a system of hemisphere defense is marred by the fact that it irritates the sensibilities of our southern neighbors.

The delegates at Havana were, therefore, faced with a difficult task. They had to consider the attachment of the Latin American states to matters of honor and prestige and they had to reconcile the idea of the legal equality of states with the fact of their inequality in power. In addition to this, they had to find a formula for relating

the principle of collective security, expressed in a general convention, to bilateral treaties of mutual assistance, which are the only form in which that principle can be translated into a workable military co-operation. The latter aspect of the problem was somewhat easier of solution than the comparable difficulty experienced in Europe in the attempts to relate the Covenant of the League to bilateral treaties of mutual assistance. Military support from the United States was to be available only in case of extra-hemisphere aggression and the bilateral treaties would, therefore, presumably not affect the power relations of the Latin American states among themselves.

The Havana Conference managed to solve most of these difficulties. Its deliberations produced the Declaration of Reciprocal Assistance and Co-operation for the Defense of the Nations of the Americas which provided for consultation in case of danger and stated that "any attempt on the part of a non-American state against the integrity or inviolability of the territory, the sovereignty, or the political independence of an American state shall be considered as an act of aggression against the states which sign this declaration." This statement was a considerable advance over the mere expression of common concern contained in the Lima Declaration. It did not express acceptance of a general and reciprocal obligation to defend, and to that extent it still fell short of creating a true system of collective security, but it did set up a legal framework for effective co-operation.

In the last paragraph of the Declaration, provision is made for bilateral treaties. It contains the following clause: "All signatory nations, or two or more of them, according to circumstances, shall proceed to negotiate the necessary complementary agreements so as to organize co-operation for defense and the assistance that they shall lend each other in the event of aggressions such as those referred to in this declaration." It is from this article that the United States received a Pan American mandate for the military agreements necessary to make her strength effective in the defense of the hemisphere.

In addition to the Declaration of Reciprocal Assistance, the meeting at Havana produced another notable document, a generalization of the "non-transfer clause" of the Monroe Doctrine. The danger implied in the acquisition of the European colonies in the Western

Hemisphere by the victorious German-Japanese combination was recognized at an early date. The Panama Meeting of Foreign Ministers in 1939 expressed its concern and declared the possibility of such a transfer to be a matter of interest to all the American states. It passed a resolution which provided for consultation in case a change of sovereignty should endanger the security of the Americas.

What had been discussed as a contingency at the meeting in Panama had already become a reality when the foreign ministers met again in Havana a year later. Holland and France had been defeated and conquered, and the governments in The Hague and in Vichy had come under complete German domination. If the administration of these colonies were to come under the control of the puppet governments in the mother countries, they might well become dangerous centers for propaganda and ideological warfare against the Western Hemisphere and, in case of totalitarian victory, starting points for military operations.

In response to this threat, the Havana Conference provided for common action through the Convention for the Provisional Administration of European Colonies and Possessions which incorporated some of the basic principles of the mandate system of the League of Nations. It declared that the American republics would not recognize any transfer of sovereignty or control and that they would provide a provisional administration if they felt that any development in the colonies might endanger the security of the New World. This administration was to be exercised by one or more American states on the principle of collective trusteeship, and the administrators were to report to an Inter-American Commission on Territorial Administration composed of the representatives of the states which ratified the convention.

The principle of common concern having been recognized, the next problem was to devise a practical procedure. Common action is notoriously slow, especially if it can be taken only after due deliberation and it is, therefore, not very well suited for campaigns in which delay may spell defeat. In the Western Hemisphere the United States is obviously the only country in a position to provide the armed forces necessary to place a "provisional administration" in power against military resistance by the colonial governments. If the

need for such an undertaking really arose, it would be folly to postpone action until after an international conference had met and deliberated and it was, therefore, necessary to find a way to let the United States act first and consult later. This was achieved by recognizing in the convention the possibility of "emergency situations." Under such circumstances, "any of the American republics, acting individually or jointly with others, shall have the right to act in the manner which its own defense or that of the continent requires," provided the matter is subsequently placed before the Inter-American Committee for approval. It was presumably under the provision of this convention that President Roosevelt, after consultation with the Netherlands Government-in-Exile, sent American troops into Dutch Guiana in November, 1941.

The Convention for the Provisional Administration of Colonies and the Declaration of Reciprocal Assistance are, in contradistinction to some other Pan American agreements, models of realism and common sense. They provide for collective responsibility but preserve the possibility of quick unilateral action by the United States, the only country in the New World in a position to move effectively. It is well to remember, however, that the merit of these agreements lies in their acceptance of the fact that the hemisphere lacks a basis for political solidarity in the matter of defense as well as in other aspects. The larger countries in the extreme south that have some war potential are most reluctant to enter a system of collective security and those that are willing have nothing to contribute. Havana found a way to hide that fact without interfering with the bilateral treaties that the power relations made possible.

The fact that a Pan American conference found a formula for relating bilateral treaties of military assistance to a general convention did not mean, however, that all obstacles to successful negotiation had been removed. There was little difficulty in arriving at an agreement with our northern neighbor, Canada, which has a considerable war potential, but the great inequalities in military strength between ourselves and the Latin American states remained a stumbling block. Old suspicions as well as the fear that such bilateral agreements might transform their weakness into a permanent status of protectorate made them hesitant. Military operations by the Old

World against the New will probably come by way of Africa and a considerable part of South America has, therefore, been placed in the position of buffer zone between Europe and the United States. The smaller countries have very little to offer in terms of military strength and their principal contribution is consequently restricted to providing bases of operation for the armed forces of the northern neighbor.

No Latin American government is financially in a position to build such bases and they must consequently be constructed with financial as well as technical aid from the United States. In the light of the well-known proclivity for fascism of certain conservative circles in South America and the strong pro-German attitude of several army cliques, there is, of course, no assurance that when the emergency arose these bases would be at the disposal of the United States instead of at the disposal of the European forces. The only protection against such a contingency would be the actual occupation of the bases. It would seem obvious at first that permission for such occupation should, therefore, be made the prerequisite of a promise of military aid. It is, however, equally obvious that it would be extremely difficult, if not impossible, for most Latin American governments to accept such conditions. A foreign state strong in air power, in control of one or two strategically located airports in a country, inevitably obtains such power to dictate national policy that legal independence becomes an idle phrase.

Temporary occupation of a strategic location has a notorious tendency to become permanent, as is illustrated by the case of Egypt. It is, therefore, not surprising that the Latin American states should have shown reluctance to enter into agreements on that basis. They have been very willing to receive financial and technical aid for the enlargement of their military establishments and the improvement of naval and air bases, but so far they have declined to play host to armies of occupation. In the fall of 1941, our southern neighbors felt themselves in somewhat the same position as Poland in the summer of 1939. That unhappy country could never decide whether she was more afraid of Moscow or of Berlin. Because she feared that her Russian defenders might want to remain in her territory after their protective function against the German threat had been performed,

she refused assistance when it was offered. Our neighbors seem at times more afraid of the protection of the United States than of the threat of the German war machine. Bilateral treaties for common defense are undoubtedly more promising than Pan American conventions, but even these, under the peculiar conditions of American power relations, could not guarantee that full co-operation would really be available when the emergency arose. The response below the Rio Grande to the declaration of war on the United States by Germany and Japan was very similar to the action taken in 1917 after our entry into the First World War. By the end of 1941, the small states in the American Mediterranean such as Costa Rica, Cuba, the Dominican Republic, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Nicaragua, Panama, and El Salvador had declared war; the larger states, Colombia, Mexico, and Venezuela, had broken diplomatic relations with Germany. Our good neighbors in South America gave expression to their feeling of solidarity but maintained their neutrality. They did, however, indicate that their interpretation of that status did not preclude us from enjoying special privileges and facilities. The republics of the New World preserved their differences and divergencies of outlook and even the attack on the United States did not produce common action. The Conference of Ministers of Foreign Affairs held at Rio de Janeiro in January, 1942, produced no unanimity. Argentina and Chile, although willing to be partial toward the United States in the application of their neutrality policy, refused to break diplomatic relations with the Axis powers.

The Myth of Solidarity

The states of the Western Hemisphere have so far failed to create a common political front in the face of threats from the Old World. When, early in the nineteenth century, there loomed the possibility of an encirclement by French action from Europe and Russian action from Asia, there was much discussion of solidarity but nothing was achieved. When, a century later, during the First World War, it seemed as if a German victory might forever destroy the balance of power in Europe, the United States explored without success the possibility of creating a system of collective security. When she became

a belligerent, the states of the temperate zone of South America preserved their neutrality and the post-war period continued to demonstrate not common interest but political opposition between North and South America. The encirclement of the Western Hemisphere that might follow from a German-Japanese victory in the Second World War has so far produced a few bilateral agreements with the smaller states on the littoral of the American Mediterranean, but no general system of co-operation covering the whole of the New World.

It has proved as hard to achieve a political integration of the Americas for purposes of common defense against external aggression as to establish a system of collective security for the preservation of peace within the hemisphere. Differences in cultural, economic, and political orientation have made co-operation difficult, and there seems to prevail in many sections a greater awareness of local oppositions than of common danger. German propaganda, notwithstanding its mistakes and failures, has made skillful use of the elements that could be exploited to counteract the attempts to create a common front and has constantly warned the A.B.C. countries that their economic welfare must inevitably depend on the power that controls Europe and not on the government of the United States. The outcome of the battle between Washington and Berlin for the allegiance of South America remains undecided. Hemisphere solidarity is still a dream. There is no indication that a German-Japanese victory in the Old World would find us any less divided than Europe, any more difficult to defeat one by one than the states of that unhappy continent. Hemisphere defense will continue to rest, as in the past, not on the united efforts of the American republics, but on the armed forces of the United States.

XIV. The Military Front

If a free government cannot organize and maintain armies and navies which can and will fight as well as those of an autocracy or a despotism, it will not survive.

THEODORE ROOSEVELT

VICTORY of the German-Japanese Alliance in Europe and Asia would have been a serious threat to the security of the United States even if we had not become a full belligerent in the fall of 1941. It would have meant the encirclement of the New World by the Old. Japan would have obtained control of the opposite coast of the Pacific from Bering Strait to Tasmania, and Germany, the opposite shore of the Atlantic from the North Cape to the Cape of Good Hope. There is nothing in the history of international relations or in the nature of power politics that permitted us to assume that, in case the conquest of the Old World by the Eurasian alliance were achieved, the struggle for power would automatically cease. On the contrary, there was every reason to believe that it would continue and German policies in Latin America had already clearly indicated that, in the Nazi conception of the New World Order, there was no room for an independent regional organization of the Western Hemisphere. It was to be split up into a southern continent to be controlled from Berlin and a northern continent within which the United States was to be fully isolated. Our entry into the war did not change this aspect of world politics, it merely gave us an opportunity to defend ourselves before the domination of the Old World had been achieved. But if, notwithstanding our participation, our allies should be defeated abroad, complete encirclement would still become a reality.

Propaganda, psychological warfare, and economic pressure which have been used by the Third Reich in the past would still be applied to undermine the will to resist her domination in the individual countries of the New World, to destroy whatever practical solidarity had been achieved, and to prevent co-operation for common defense. With the encirclement of the New World, American sea power would be reduced to coastal navigation along the shores of the Western Hemisphere, and transoceanic products could be denied to us by the simple expedient of an embargo enforced by port authorities. If the victorious alliance remained effective, the partners could detach a large proportion of their military strength for operations against the Western Hemisphere because neither would be obliged to balance hostile power in its sphere of influence. The New World would be a blockaded and invested zone and there is little likelihood that, under such circumstances, all the American states would align themselves with the United States. Influential circles in the A.B.C. countries doubt that the Western Hemisphere is viable as an economic and political region and consider that large sections of South America belong naturally with Europe and not with the United States. This thought is influenced in part by doubt as to whether all of the hemisphere could actually be defended in case of encirclement, a task which would fall primarily to the armed forces of the United States.

The New World as a whole is an island realm surrounded by the Pacific, Atlantic, and Arctic Oceans. An insular state can be brought under military pressure in three ways—by blockade, by coastal bombardment, and by invasion. The implications of blockade and embargo have been treated in the chapter dealing with the natural resources of the hemisphere. The problem whether the surrender of a state can be achieved merely by bombardment of coastal cities has long been a topic of debate, but it has taken on a new significance under conditions of aerial warfare. History is replete with instances in which small and weak states have been forced to submit to the will of even minor naval powers because of their inability to prevent the bombardment and destruction of coastal towns important to the economic life of the nation. States which have a minimum of coastal defenses for their more important ports, however, have seldom been subdued merely by bombardment of their shores, and in

most wars it has been necessary to supplement naval action not only by bombardment but by blockade and invasion.

The development of aerial warfare has made it possible, within the radius of operations, to bomb not only the coastal towns, but large sections of the interior. The coast, which serves as a barrier to ships, is no obstacle to planes which can lay waste much larger sections of the country than a fleet. This has led to suggestions in certain quarters that air power alone is capable of bringing a decision and forcing surrender by the mere fact of its destructive power. The history of Great Britain in the Second World War has so far not borne out this contention and even the conquest of Crete, which seems at first sight a convincing case, does not prove the point. The island was forced to surrender but the success was achieved not merely by aerial bombardment but by the action of air-borne troops. Invasion was still needed even though the army arrived not in the traditional manner, by ship, but as parachute troops and as passengers in air transports and gliders.

The Problem of Invasion

Crete proved that a small island can be conquered from the air provided the bases of the invader are near enough to permit him to establish air superiority over its flying fields and to fly in his first land troops. Significant for the defense of the Western Hemisphere is the fact that the larger part of it still lies well beyond the effective range of land-based aircraft operating from Europe and Asia. Except in the extreme north, all approaches to the Western Hemisphere involve over-water flights of at least 1,800 miles. Both the northern crossing of the Atlantic by way of Iceland and Newfoundland and the southern route by way of Africa and Brazil were regularly flown by commercial planes and long-range bombers, and the mid-Pacific is spanned by Pan American Airways by means of intermediate stations. But there are as yet no planes in operation that can cover oceanic distances with a load of bombs and return, and no fighters that can operate at such long range. In terms of present-day technology, transoceanic air power cannot be a serious threat unless it can count on friendly air bases on this side of the water ready to welcome and service the invader. Bombing attacks by planes from carriers

can probably not be prevented entirely but because of the limited capacity of carriers, the damage caused by such raids will be smaller than that inflicted by large land-based bomber fleets.

Future developments will undoubtedly change this picture and reduce the protective value of distance. The range of the new Boeing Clippers, which will fly a pay-load to Lisbon non-stop, the fact that the new Flying Fortresses can carry a bomb-load about 3,500 miles and return, and that the Consolidated Patrol Bombers will have a range of over 5,000 miles, all clearly indicate that in a few years it will be possible for Europe to build an air fleet capable of dropping its explosives on the Western Hemisphere and of carrying enough fuel for a return journey. But even when this is achieved, the bombers will still have to come over without the protection of accompanying fighter planes. If the strategic zones are prepared with well-defended air bases, and held by strong concentrations of long-range pursuit planes, the air defense of the hemisphere can be made fairly secure. Air invasion of the American mainland and attack by means of land-based aircraft is still a thing of the future, and, until that time, invasion must come in ships in the traditional form of an overseas expeditionary force.

Invasion by water is, however, no longer as easy as it used to be. The present war demonstrates once again the deterring effect of even small bodies of water on operations against strongly held coasts. The English Channel performs no barrier function in air warfare, but it still represents an obstacle to the movement of troops which both opponents find it difficult to overcome. Germany's mechanized army rolled victoriously to the Pyrenees and to Moscow, but the narrow moat between Calais and Dover barred its triumphant progress and created an entirely new military problem for Hitler's war machine. The British on their side seem to have been equally reluctant to attempt an invasion of the Continent of Europe notwithstanding the fact that the Russian campaign forced the Germans to concentrate their military strength in Eastern Europe. Invasion under modern conditions requires a large merchant fleet to carry the enormous equipment of modern armies; it is handicapped without the use of special harbor facilities for the unloading of heavy matériel; and it demands either naval and air protection strong enough to overcome

all possible resistance or a previous destruction of the naval and air forces of the defense.

In the good old days armies carried little equipment and could live off the land. This meant that they could be landed in small boats on beaches and open coasts and, once ashore, could establish bridgeheads and move inland. All of this has changed. A modern army carries a large amount of heavy machinery which takes up a great deal of cargo space and can be landed with ease only in ports with adequate docking facilities, and, because it does not live off the land, it must be able to maintain an uninterrupted line of oceanic communication with its home base. Constantly increasing motorization and mechanization have brought the tonnage requirement of a modern expeditionary force up to approximately ten tons per man. This means that an army of fifty thousand men would require at least half a million tons of shipping. After the army is safely landed, it must be assured of a constant stream of supplies and the tonnage requirements for this purpose may again run up to ten tons per soldier per month. The size of the fleet necessary to keep such expeditionary forces supplied would depend on how far the theater of operations was removed from the home base, on the speed of the vessels, and on the existing port facilities. For transatlantic operations with cargo vessels of average speed making one complete turn-around every two months, the tonnage required would be a million tons, twice as large as was necessary for the initial expedition. For transpacific operations, the requirement would be much greater.

1. *Naval Protection*

It would, of course, be suicidal to move such a force unless the freedom of the sea lanes were assured, which means that its departure must be postponed until naval action has defeated the defending fleet or that it must be accompanied by a naval force large enough to assure supremacy in the zone of transit. Overseas expeditions are, therefore, dependent on the limitations inherent in naval warfare of which the most important is again communications. In the days of sailing vessels, operations could be undertaken at enormous distances because motive power was provided by the wind. Since the develop-

ment of steam power, whether based on coal or oil, a navy must carry a fuel supply, with the result that it becomes dependent on bases for replenishment. This means that there exists a limit to the effective combat radius of battle fleets. It is determined not by the steaming range of the larger units, but by the limits of tactical efficiency for the smallest ones, namely, the destroyers. The combat radius differs for different fleets; for the United States Navy it is approximately 2,500 miles, for the British slightly less, for the Japanese about 1,500 miles.

This radius applies to a battle fleet only; cruiser or submarine detachments can operate at far greater distances. It does not even mean that there is no possibility of battle fleet action at greater distances from a home base, but under such circumstances the fleet must be accompanied by the train, which consists of the supply ships and the tankers. The train can extend the radius another 2,000 miles but because of the protection which it requires and the slow speed at which it moves it will detract from the mobility and effectiveness of the battle units. That fleet fights under the most advantageous circumstances which can operate without the train and which has its land establishments consisting of dockyards, arsenals, and fuel depots close at hand. The result is that fleet commanders like to reach their destination by the shortest route consistent with security and prefer to do their fighting within reach of the services of a base.

Because of this dependence on shore establishments, the tactical strength of a fleet is in inverse ratio to the distance from its base. Navies of countries which are separated by oceanic distances will, therefore, each have a zone of naval operations in the vicinity of their shores in which they possess all the advantages. Such zones can be held by a weaker navy against a stronger one that must operate from a distance, and under such circumstances a strategic defensive means economy of force. This fact has little significance for European waters where countries are close together. There, all potential enemies lie within each other's effective combat zones, and significant and telling victories can be achieved at relatively short distances from home bases. The United States, however, is separated from her potential enemies by oceanic distances which permit her, at least in

theory, to select the battle area which gives her the greatest advantage.

It should be remembered, however, that in contradistinction to land warfare, there is no opportunity for achieving economy of force by means of defense tactics. On land a position can be held with less strength than is necessary to take it. But the type of protection that land forces can receive from the nature of the terrain is available to naval forces only rarely and mostly in coastal waters or restricted areas in marginal seas. In the open ocean there are no positions, and a naval force of inferior strength cannot fight a defensive action and be successful. On the sea, withdrawal is the only alternative to attack. There are only two types of protection available: territorial waters defended by land-based aircraft and the anchorage behind the fortifications of the naval base. By remaining in port and refusing battle, an inferior fleet can survive against a stronger opponent as the Italian fleet is now doing in the Mediterranean. Such a withdrawal, however, means tactical surrender, yielding the maritime zone to the enemy and losing the lines of communication which pass through it.

The theory of the "fleet in being" which suggests that the mere existence of a fleet, even an inferior fleet, in the combat zone precludes the sending of expeditionary forces may be a counsel of wisdom, but it is not a description of past practice and, therefore, not something to be counted on. The Japanese refused to be deterred by the doctrine when they landed their troops on the Liao-tung peninsula during the Russo-Japanese War. In the First World War the British transferred expeditionary forces across the channel notwithstanding the existence of a German fleet, and in the present war they also moved troops through the Mediterranean and into Greece in the face of the Italian fleet. The Germans conducted their Norwegian expedition across the Kattegat in spite of the British navy, and in several instances sent troops from Sicily to Tripoli. It is true that, under modern conditions of aerial reconnaissance and protection, such expeditions have become much easier, but able and bold commanders refused to be frightened by a "fleet in being" long before there was an airplane.

Not "being" but fighting and winning battles is the function of a fleet, and, because battles on the sea can be won only by superior

forces, the principle of concentration is even more important in sea warfare than in land warfare. It does not require that the whole fleet be kept in one port, but it does require that the distribution be such that the sections can continue to give each other support and be united in a short period of time. A fleet divided in parts and dispersed runs the risk of having each section defeated in succession by an opponent weaker in total strength but keeping his forces concentrated. The fleet in each zone of operation must be strong enough to meet the whole strength of the probable opponents. Only after that has been achieved for one zone can supplementary strength be used for the building of a second fleet to operate in another theater of war.

Naval operations during the First and Second World Wars throw some doubt on the theory that the conflict of sea powers must inevitably lead to great decisive battles between opposing fleets. This fact, together with the development of aviation, has led to new conceptions of naval strategy which seem at first to contradict the principle of concentration. The British navy has used capital ships detached from the main fleet in a special striking force composed of one or two aircraft carriers protected by fast battleships, cruisers, and destroyers, to be sent on special missions. Aerial observation now makes it possible to spot the approach of a stronger fleet long before it can become dangerous and such detachments can, therefore, be used more freely than formerly. It is, however, well to remember that this development does not really connote a repudiation of the principle of concentration, and that the new approach has been influenced, at least in part, by the fact that Mr. Hitler's navy has no battle line. In a naval war in which the two opponents are more equally matched in capital ships, detachments which detract from the strength of the main fleet will have to be used with great caution.

2. Coastal Defense

In case of invasion, the first defense would be the navy operating far out at sea. If the fleet were not available because it was engaged elsewhere, or because it had been defeated, then defense against invasion would take the form of coastal defense. The zone of coastal

defense has progressively widened under modern technological development as the result of the improvement of old weapons and the invention of new ones. Originally defined by the range of the coast artillery, it is now expanded by the use of submarines, motor torpedo boats, minefields, and land-based aircraft. It is particularly the latter that has created almost insurmountable difficulties for expeditionary forces destined for the invasion of enemy country. No fleet can enter a hostile coastal zone with any security unless it has established air supremacy.

The attacking fleet is dependent on its carriers to transport its planes, and the largest of these carry only from seventy to a hundred planes. Against this the defending country can throw the whole of its land-based aircraft. The approaching fleet should be sighted by one of the long-range patrol bombers of the navy or one of the great four-engined bombers of the air force when it is still a long steaming distance from the shore and this reconnaissance, if successful, offers plenty of opportunity to concentrate an overwhelming land-based air force on the exposed shore. The defending air squadrons need not be located in the vicinity. They can be brought from great distances in plenty of time because of the difference in speed of travel between ships and planes. No carrier-borne air force can be a match for land-based forces, and fleets move, therefore, into more and more dangerous zones as they approach an enemy coast. The effective radius of bombers is constantly increasing, and it is not impossible that the near future will see coastal zones in which land-based aircraft will operate up to a thousand miles from shore.

Air power has made coastal waters extremely dangerous to an enemy fleet and each navy will, therefore, try to select for a combat zone the area in which it can be supported by shore-based planes. This means that in attempting landing operations against enemy territory it is more imperative than ever to try to establish an advance base between the home country and the zone of landing. The possession of such a base would bring several advantages, but in order to be useful it must provide not only a sheltered and defensible harbor but also an air base from which to protect the fleet from air attacks. Japan used the Elliot Islands as an advance base for her invasion of Manchuria during the Russo-Japanese War; Great Britain used

Lemnos Island as a base for operations against the Dardanelles; and countries contemplating an invasion of the Western Hemisphere would undoubtedly like to find a similar advanced position near our shores. But areas within the effective radius of the shore-based aircraft of the defender cannot serve as advanced bases for overseas operations. With the increasing radius of effective bombing action it has, therefore, become increasingly difficult to find positions suited for this purpose.

It would be the function of the armed forces of the defender, particularly the navy and the air force, to prevent the establishment of such a base, or to dislodge the enemy if he had obtained a footing. But much wiser than trying to dislodge an enemy is to occupy the spot before he does. That permits defense in terms of local action. The selection, occupation, and preparation of such strategic positions is part of the preparation for war in peace time. Where the areas are part of the national domain, they can simply be transformed into military establishments by the expenditure of money and the erection of the necessary structures, but, if the zones are in the territory of other states, they must either be leased or made available by means of special political agreements.

If the enemy has succeeded in establishing an advance base and escaped the action of land-based aircraft, he can attempt a landing in defiance of the coastal defenses. But his opportunities are still very limited. The heavy gun and field equipment that accompanies a large modern army cannot be put ashore without adequate docking and unloading facilities. The number of ports available for the quick transformation of an exceedingly vulnerable mass of human beings cooped up in transports into a field army with power to strike is very limited. Therefore the areas that demand heavy coastal fortification are largely restricted to first-class harbors and entrances to gulfs and bays. Should defense fail to prevent a landing, it would remain the task of the army to surround the enemy and destroy him before he has had time to deploy and seize vital areas. At this stage the problem of defense would become one of adequate communication with coastal cities and of a modernized army of high mobility.

Invasion means approach in terms of ships or in terms of planes

if distances are small, but the ultimate decision is sought in terms of a land attack on the economic and political heart of the country. Defense against invasion—territorial defense in the narrow sense of the term—is, therefore, in the first place, naval action, then air action, then coast defense, and finally land warfare. The vulnerability of a country to invasion is dependent on its strategic location, the nature of its coast, the location of its vital centers, and the strength of its naval, air, and land forces.

The Armed Strength of the New World

From the point of view of distribution of military strength, as well as from the point of view of strategic significance, the Western Hemisphere divides into six different zones, the North American Buffer Zone, the North American Continental Zone, the American Mediterranean, the West Coast of South America, the South American Buffer Zone, and the South American Equidistant Zone. They differ in degree of exposure to overseas attack, in distance from the United States, in their regional war potential, and in the size of their military establishment.

1. The North American Buffer Zone

The most northern strategic zone of the hemisphere is the broad belt that stretches from the Bering Strait to eastern Greenland and from the Pacific outposts in the Aleutian Islands to the Atlantic outposts in Iceland. It contains not only the long Arctic front but also the northern sections of the Pacific and the Atlantic fronts. In terms of approaches from Asia and Europe it functions as an enormous buffer zone between the Arctic and the fiftieth parallel which passes through British Columbia in the west and Newfoundland in the east.

This buffer zone, extremely important because of its strategic location, contains no war potential and has no inherent strength. It represents, in military terms, an outpost of the continental mass which lies just to the south. Northern Canada is mainly grassy tundra and a broad coniferous forest belt which extends all the way across Canada from Alaska to Labrador. The area is, because of climate and other

limitations, extremely sparsely populated and economic activities are limited to trapping, lumbering, and mining. The western and eastern outposts of the zone are benefited by warm currents: the Aleutian Islands and the Alaskan Peninsula in the Pacific by the Japan Current, and southwestern Greenland and Iceland by branches of the Gulf Stream. This gives them a very much milder climate than prevails in the Arctic waste in the interior of the mainland. As suggested previously, the Arctic front itself can represent no naval threat and only an insignificant air threat. This means that the buffer zone operates primarily in terms of approaches by the North Pacific and the North Atlantic, and that its most important zones are the coastal regions between the Alaskan Peninsula and Prince Rupert Island, and between Iceland and Newfoundland.

2. *The North American Continental Zone*

To the south of the northern buffer zone lies the true continental area which extends from about fifty degrees north latitude to about twenty degrees north latitude and includes the southern belt of Canada and most of the United States. In this region lies the highly productive national economy of our own country and that of our northern neighbor. It contains in the Great Plains an area of extraordinary fertility and large agricultural surpluses and in the eastern part the most highly industrialized economy in the world. It is the only area in the Western Hemisphere that produces the steel and heavy machinery indispensable to a large war industry. The North American Continental Zone is the only region that can build matériel for hemisphere defense.

This area is the only part of the New World that has an adequate system of overland communication from coast to coast. Only here are railroad and highway nets and systems of inland waterways sufficiently dense to permit effective economic integration of different areas into a continental economy. Difference in freight costs between land and water traffic preserves, as in all other countries, a great deal of coastal shipping. Such navigation is of particular importance because of the width of the continent, the cost of hauling across the Rockies and the Sierras, and the fact that the connecting link, the

Panama Canal, lies far outside the continental zone. In case of necessity, the overland railroads could, however, take care of the coastal traffic from Atlantic to Pacific ports ordinarily flowing through the canal.

In the north continental zone a great war industry is working at top speed to build the armed forces for the prosecution of the war. The Dominion of Canada has greatly expanded her military establishment which was originally designed for a minimum of coast defense. A small navy consisting of about thirteen destroyers, a number of corvettes, mine sweepers, and other small craft participates in patrol and convoy work across the North Atlantic. An army of approximately 220,000 volunteers has been raised and trained for service overseas and another force based on compulsory military training for short periods is being organized for home defense. One of the most valuable contributions which Canada will be able to make to the common war effort derives from the British Commonwealth Air Training Plan which has provided the Dominion with approximately ninety schools for pilot training and a sound foundation for the building of an effective air force.

The most important source of military strength in the Western Hemisphere is of course the United States. Since the outbreak of the Second World War she has been engaged in a gigantic armament program that envisages the creation of a two-ocean navy, a large air force, and an army of millions. Until the recent threat of encirclement by a European-Asiatic alliance, the naval policy of the United States rested on the assumption that the country would only have to fight in one ocean. When she had obtained assurances at the Washington Conference that the British-Japanese Alliance would not be renewed, the United States agreed to the famous 5:5:3 ratio as an expression of the relative strength of the naval powers. The policy pursued at the Washington Conference and later in Geneva and London to obtain limitation in categories other than battleships and aircraft carriers was based on the conception of a one-ocean navy. Control of the Panama Canal permitted us to concentrate our naval forces in either ocean in a relatively short period of time, and we felt, therefore, that parity with the strongest naval power was enough to assure us an adequate defensive position.

The naval needs of the United States continued to be conceived in terms of a one-ocean fleet until after the fall of France in 1940. Congress authorized, in 1934, a building program that would bring the navy to actual treaty strength and provide replacements for over-age vessels. In December, 1936, the London Treaty and the Washington Treaty expired and the United States obtained complete freedom of action. Her response to the war in China and the increasing tension in Europe was legislation in 1938 providing for an eventual increase in naval strength of about 20 per cent, but the concept of a one-ocean navy was still retained. The fall of France and the establishment of German power on the mainland of Europe from the North Cape to the Pyrenees as well as developments in the Far East demonstrated, however, that the outcome of the Second World War might be another threat of encirclement. In July, 1940, Congress authorized a program for an additional 1,325,000 tons, an increase of more than 70 per cent over the existing fleet. A two-ocean navy had become the accepted goal of our naval policy. As in Great Britain the first response to the new threat of air power was the building of more battleships.

In the fall of 1941, the navy consisted of 17 battleships, 6 aircraft carriers, 37 cruisers, 171 destroyers, 113 submarines, as well as mine sweepers, corvettes, airplane tenders, and innumerable auxiliary craft. Upon completion of the great building program begun in 1940, the United States will have at her disposal 32 battleships, 18 carriers, 91 cruisers, 364 destroyers, and 185 submarines. Navy yards, both private and government, and the industries related to shipbuilding, were working overtime in order that the two-ocean navy might be available before the date originally set for its completion in 1947. Naval aviation was expected to keep step with the rest of the program and to acquire eventually about 10,000 planes. If the United States can build ships faster than the enemy sinks them, she may look forward to controlling eventually the greatest mass of fighting power ever to fly one flag.

When hostilities began in December, 1941, American naval strength in the western ocean was still divided between an Asiatic and a Pacific Fleet. The former was stationed at Manila and represented our direct contribution to the common defense of the Asiatic

Mediterranean. It consisted of approximately 2 cruisers, 13 destroyers, 18 submarines, 2 mine layers, auxiliary vessels, and the gun boats used in Chinese waters. The Pacific Fleet was based on Pearl Harbor. It represented the main strength of the United States Navy and earlier in the year had been composed of approximately the following units: 12 battleships, 4 airplane carriers, about 30 cruisers, 100 destroyers, 60 submarines, as well as several tenders for long-range patrol bombers. During the summer, a number of the smaller craft had been transferred to the Atlantic to participate in patrol and convoy work but the main fleet remained in the Hawaiian Islands.

With the main strength in the Pacific, the Atlantic Fleet must inevitably remain an inferior force until the two-ocean building program is completed. In the late summer of 1941, it consisted of 3 old battleships, 2 carriers, and approximately 14 cruisers, 60 destroyers, 24 submarines, and at least 10 squadrons of patrol bombers. The capital ships were slow and had not been modernized. Gun elevation was low and the range short, and the fleet therefore lacked battle strength. Two new battleships had been commissioned during the summer, the *North Carolina* and the *Washington*. They would lose much of their value if they were placed in line with the old ships but they made an admirable nucleus for a special striking force when combined with carriers and cruisers. The weakness of the battle line in the Atlantic is not serious so long as the British fleet remains interposed between the Western Hemisphere and the sea power of the Continent of Europe. But if the American Atlantic Fleet were to take over that protective function, it would have to be greatly augmented. The principle of concentration demands that we continue to reinforce our Pacific naval strength enough to replace losses and to balance the new additions to the Japanese fleet. But if Great Britain should fall, both our naval strength in the Pacific and our newly constructed ships would have to be transferred to the Atlantic.

The year 1940 saw not only the acceptance of a new orientation in regard to naval policy but also a completely new point of view in regard to military preparedness. In September of that year, the representatives of the people in Washington approved, for the first time in our history, compulsory military service in peace time. A program was adopted which envisaged an army eventually to be

composed of forty-five divisions with ten armored and a large number motorized. By October, 1941, approximately a million and a quarter men were under arms, a force which, if fully equipped and fully trained, was considered adequate for the defense of the northern continent and the American Mediterranean. Defense of the entire hemisphere was felt in certain army circles to require at least double this strength and can, therefore, presumably not be successfully undertaken until conscription has built sufficient trained reserves to permit the formation of an army of that size.

The United States has no independent air force; naval aviation operates as a branch of the navy, military aviation as a branch of the army. In response to persistent demands for a separate organization for the air force, a compromise solution was worked out in 1941 giving the "Army Air Forces" a semi-independent status with headquarters and a staff of their own. The Second World War proved that those who had stressed the coming importance of aviation in warfare had correctly prophesied the trend but it also confirmed that, in the whole field of matériel, nothing becomes obsolete so quickly as the plane. The goal set for the army air force has been constantly revised upward and there has been increasing emphasis on long-distance bombers and on long-range fighters. By October, 1941, the armament program envisaged an air force of approximately 84 combat groups with 50,000 planes in active units and reserves, 25,000 pilots, and approximately 400,000 men. Production capacity was constantly being increased and it was hoped to push the total upward eventually to 80,000 planes a year of which 12,000 would be heavy four-motored bombers.

3. *The American Mediterranean*

To the south of the continental zone lies the strategic area of the American Mediterranean. As described in different sections of this study, it includes the littoral of the Mexican Gulf and the Caribbean Sea and consists of Mexico, Central America, Colombia, Venezuela, and the belt of islands which stretch from Trinidad to the tip of Florida. From a geo-political point of view, the division between North and South America does not come at Panama but at the

southern border of Colombia and Venezuela. Both of these countries are in much more intimate contact with the opposite shore of the northern continent than with the other states of South America beyond their thickly wooded and mountainous southern borders. As in the case of the Old World, the middle sea does not divide but unites.

In the American Mediterranean, the war potential is exceedingly low. There is no heavy industry, and existing military establishments are, therefore, dependent on either Europe or the United States for all armaments except rifles and other small arms. The region is an area of small units and scattered force and is quite incapable of putting up any effective defense against extra-hemisphere aggression without the aid of the United States. The greatest military strength in 1941 was represented by the Mexican army which in peace time contains about 50,000 men and in war time about 150,000. Equipment was poor and largely obsolete; and although modernization had begun, mechanization was still in its infancy. The armed forces of Central America were insignificant. Colombia had a small navy of some destroyers and gun boats, a peace time army of 16,000 men, and a miniature air force. Its neighbor Venezuela was satisfied with an army less than half that size and had practically no navy at all. The eastern littoral of the middle sea was held by small detachments of Dutch and British forces in their respective West Indian colonies and by a small French unit in Martinique owing allegiance to the Vichy government. Haiti and Santo Domingo had very small armies of a few thousand men and some coastal patrol vessels while Cuba maintained a fairly well-equipped establishment of about 15,000 men and a small navy composed of one cruiser and several gun boats and coast guard ships. The real military power of the American Mediterranean is the United States operating from Panama and a series of bases on the eastern rim.

4. The West Coast of South America

The Pacific littoral of South America consists of narrow coastal valleys and the ranges and plateau country of the Andes Mountains. It contains the republics of Ecuador, Peru, and Chile, and the western

section of Bolivia. Ecuador, the smallest of the Pacific coast states, and the one nearest the Panama Canal, had a small army of about 7,500 men with a potential war strength of about 50,000. Peru, her neighbor to the south, who would like to absorb her eventually, had about 12,000 men under arms and much larger population to draw from. There is also a small navy of 2 cruisers, 3 destroyers, 4 submarines and coastal patrol vessels, and a small air force. Chile, the largest and strongest of the west coast states, had a peace time army of approximately 20,000 men and can count on almost 200,000 for reserves. The air force consisted of about 100 planes and was rapidly expanding as the result of the purchase of both bombers and pursuit planes in the United States. The Chilean fleet far outranked in strength that of any other west coast state. It consisted of 1 battleship, which dated from 1913, 3 obsolete cruisers, which dated from 1898, and smaller craft of more recent vintage, 8 destroyers, 9 submarines, and 20 patrol vessels. The west coast of the southern continent, like the American Mediterranean, is an area of exceedingly low war potential, although important as a source of minerals for the United States war economy. The littoral states have, in the past, counted on distance and the Monroe Doctrine to protect them against overseas threats, and these same factors remain today the two pillars of their territorial security.

5. The South American Buffer Zone

Below the land frontiers of Colombia and Venezuela, the southern littoral states of the American Mediterranean, lies an enormous tropical forest zone which includes the great Amazon drainage basin and the coastal plain of northeastern Brazil. This area has an excellent system of east-west communication in the Amazon River and its tributaries, but it represents an almost insurmountable obstacle for movement in a north-south direction. Because of this it forms an enormous buffer zone beyond the American Mediterranean with only its coastal region a dangerous and exposed belt.

The buffer zone of South America is, like its counterpart in North America, devoid of any war potential or inherent strength, but in this case, equatorial heat and not arctic cold is responsible for the low

level of productivity. The area is, politically, a part of Brazil, but without effective integration with the economic and political center of that country in the neighborhood of Rio de Janeiro. The limited military strength that can be developed in southeastern Brazil cannot be made effective in the buffer zone which lies 2,000 miles away from the capital.

6. The South American Equidistant Zone

Pernambuco, on the bulge of Brazil, is approximately the same distance from Norfolk, Virginia, as from Brest in France. The journey from Bahia Blanca in the Argentine to the Virginian port by way of the Pacific and the Panama Canal is as long as that to the French port by way of the Atlantic. This means that the Atlantic drainage area of South America between Cape San Roque and Patagonia is a zone equidistant from the centers of military power in North America and Europe, in terms of an approach by sea. In terms of an approach by air, the United States would have a slight advantage in the southwestern section of the zone, because the air route along the west coast, in contradistinction to the sea route, involves no detour around Cape Horn or through the Strait of Magellan.

This equidistant zone is the most important area of all South America. It contains the most productive agricultural regions, 75 per cent of the population, the capitals of the two most important republics, and the centers of their infant industries. The mining states, the coffee, cotton, and cattle states of southeastern Brazil are all within the territory, and it includes as well the La Plata drainage basin and, therefore, the richest section of the Argentine. It is the region that has the closest economic ties with Europe, and is most skeptical about hemisphere solidarity.

The southeastern section of the southern continent is the only area which contains a war potential of any dimensions. Brazil and the Argentine, whose economic centers lie in this zone, are, apart from Chile, the only states wealthy enough to afford a real military establishment. Brazil is the largest of the two, both in area and in population, and, because she is better endowed for industrialization, she has the advantage of a larger war potential. Her naval establishment in 1941

was, however, by no means superior to that of her southern neighbor. It consisted of 2 old battleships, 2 cruisers, 8 torpedo boats, 4 submarines, and 26 other vessels, and the United States was aiding in a program of naval expansion and in the construction of a number of destroyers in Brazilian yards. The army had a peace time strength of 112,000 men with about 200,000 reserves, but was rapidly being expanded, as was the air force, which in 1941 consisted of about 300 planes. The Argentine had the best navy on the southern continent. It consisted of 2 old battleships, 3 cruisers, 16 destroyers, 3 submarines, and several mine sweepers and coastal defense vessels. Her army had a peace time strength of 50,000 and disposed of about 300,000 reserves. In the fall of 1941, the air force of about 120 planes in combat units was being enlarged as were all other branches of the military establishment. Although these figures of military strength are not impressive in comparison with the might of the great powers of Europe and Asia, they demonstrate none the less quite clearly that the equidistant zone was relatively better prepared for territorial defense against extra-hemisphere aggression than any other region of the New World outside of the United States.

South America has no truly continental zone comparable to that of North America. The states not only face outward toward the sea as do most littoral states, but communication across their land boundaries is unimportant. The inland waterways of the Amazon and the La Plata basins are of limited usefulness; a transcontinental railroad exists only in the south; and topographical and climatological obstacles will continue to retard the development of highways and railroads. Intra-continental transportation is primarily coastal navigation except for airlines. This means that in a system of common defense these states can support each other economically only by means of maritime communication and in a military sense only by sea power and air power of which they have little to spare.

With the reaffirmation of the Monroe Doctrine, and the acceptance of hemisphere defense as the policy of the United States, the products of the war industries of the North American Continental Zone were being placed at the disposal of the Latin American states. The government in Washington decided that the good neighbors to the south were eligible to receive aid under the Lend-Lease program

but the previous demands of our British, Russian, and Chinese allies, as well as our own rearmament, pre-empted most of the new output of planes, artillery, and other equipment. Today, the amount of aid that moves south is extremely limited but it was hoped that in 1942, when arms production would be in full swing, the United States would be able to assist more effectively in building up the local forces for hemisphere defense.

The Strategic Pattern

The problem of hemisphere defense under conditions of encirclement is defined by the location of its strategic zones in relation to the transatlantic and the transpacific coasts. The core of the strategic pattern is shaped by the lines which connect military centers and vital areas. For sea power, military centers are the great naval bases in the vicinity of regions of high industrial productivity. The Western threat to the New World can, therefore, come only from the region between the Bonin Islands and Hokkaido, specifically from the main island of Japan. The threat from the east can come only from Western Europe, from the region between Liverpool and Marseilles. In the continental zone of North America the base line for naval operations lies between Vancouver and San Diego for action in the Pacific and between Boston and Charleston for action in the Atlantic.

The defense problem of the Western Hemisphere can best be represented on a map of the world with the Americas in the center. It should indicate the transpacific and the transatlantic areas that are the base zones of the encircling naval powers, and the effective combat range of the United States fleet as well as the maritime zones covered by land-based aircraft. On the map at the beginning of this volume, the combat range of the battle fleet is an area 2,500 miles * from the principal naval bases and the zone of operations for land-based aircraft is an area 1,000 miles * from the coast. These zones indicate where the defender begins to obtain advantages of position as against the invader. In the outer section naval operations can take place without greatly detracting from the tactical efficiency of the defending fleet; in the inner belt naval action begins to obtain support from land-based

* Statute miles.

aircraft; and, if the enemy approaches closer, he will find himself in the area of air supremacy of the defender. In the North Pacific, the outer zone thrusts forward a salient westward from the Hawaiian Islands up to the International Date Line at the 180th meridian. In the North Atlantic it reaches out beyond the middle of the ocean and approaches Europe near Ireland, and in the South Atlantic its location will depend on the naval and air bases that can be made available to the military forces of the United States on the bulge of Brazil.

The relation of the two American base zones on the Pacific and the Atlantic coasts to the comparable Asiatic and European zones and the relative distance of all four of them to the other strategic zones of the Western Hemisphere define the problem of defense of the New World. If the German-Japanese Alliance were successful in Europe and Asia, it could detach large forces for action in the Western Hemisphere. The defense of the Americas would then necessitate making the war of the North American Continental Zone effective not only in that zone itself, but overseas, in the exposed regions in the north, on the rimlands of the American Mediterranean, and in the coastal regions of South America. Could we, in terms of relative distances, add sufficient military strength to the local forces in every part of the Western Hemisphere to deter an enemy from attempts at invasion? Could we, operating from the two coastal zones from which flow our strength and using the advance bases at our disposal, defeat him if he should try?

XV. Hemisphere Defense

The first and most obvious light in which the sea presents itself from the political and social point of view is that of a great highway; or better, perhaps, of a wide common, over which men may pass in all directions.

ALFRED THAYER MAHAN

THE Western Hemisphere is an enormous insular land mass of approximately 15 million square miles which faces the Old World across three ocean fronts, the Arctic, the Pacific, and the Atlantic. The Americas are, however, as previously suggested, not a single island of continental dimensions but a world of at least three distinct geo-political regions, the northern continent, the southern continent, and the American Mediterranean. North America has the shape of an inverted triangle with the apex at Panama. The Pacific and the Atlantic coasts flare out toward Alaska and Greenland, placing points farther north nearer to Asia and Europe. The third side of the triangle is the Arctic front which runs from the western insular outpost in the Aleutian Islands across the barren coastal zone of Alaska, Canada, and Greenland to the eastern insular outpost in Iceland. South America is also shaped like an inverted triangle with its apex in the south in the vicinity of Cape Horn. One front of this triangle is along the Pacific from Cape Horn to Panama and two sides face the Atlantic. The first, which runs from Panama to Cape San Roque on the bulge of Brazil, turns southeast and the second, which extends from this cape to Cape Horn, turns southwest. The axis of the southern continent lies much farther east than that of North America with the result that the second triangle protrudes farther out into the

Atlantic and approaches the shoulder of Africa. In between the bulk of the continental masses lies the American Mediterranean and the continents themselves divide into the strategic zones mentioned in the previous chapter.

We have noted that invasion under conditions of modern warfare is very difficult if the defender is a highly industrialized nation with a modern and effective navy, air force, and army at her disposal and an adequate system of coastal defense. Under such conditions, actual landings need not even constitute serious threats because mechanized and motorized divisions moving over efficient railroad and highway systems could quickly surround and destroy the beach heads established by the enemy. In the Western Hemisphere, these conditions prevail only in the North American Continental Zone, the area which includes the United States and southern Canada. They do not exist in the North American Buffer Zone; and neither is the description applicable to the American Mediterranean nor to the countries of South America, most of which have no fleets, no modern airforces, no mobile armies, and no network of railways or motor roads.

The outposts in Alaska and the Aleutian Islands in the northwest and in Greenland and Iceland in the northeast are not connected with the heart of the continent by means of overland communication. There has been much discussion of late about the wisdom of building a road through British Columbia from Seattle to Alaska, but the advantages of such a route, that could be kept open only part of the year, would seem hardly commensurate with the expense involved even in a period in which cost is no object. In any case, the road would take years to construct and, for the time being, Alaska must remain an overseas outpost. The same applies to the American Mediterranean and the coastal areas of the strategic zones in South America. There are no highways through Central America and no first-class roads from Colombia to Ecuador or across the Colombian and Venezuelan borders to Brazil. The great Pan American highway is still more a vision than a reality and even after it is completed it will not greatly change the basic strategic pattern. Communication between the continental zone of North America and the other strategic areas of the Western Hemisphere must continue to take place in terms of sea routes.

The hub of the system of intra-hemisphere communication is the Panama Canal from which radiate the great coastal routes whose distances are indicative of the size of the hemisphere and of the nature of the defense problem. From Panama to the Strait of Magellan by way of the west coast is about 4,500 miles, and by way of the east coast approximately 7,500 miles, with Pernambuco on the bulge of Brazil at the halfway point. From the Isthmus to Nome is roughly 7,000 miles and to Reykjavik approximately 5,000 miles with Boston at the halfway point. Hemisphere defense by the United States is in a large measure defense of overseas territory by means of naval and air operations in areas far distant from the home bases.

Invasion from across the Pacific

One aspect of the problem of defending the Americas is the protection of the Pacific coast against invasion by Japan. An attack in force against the New World would be extremely dangerous unless the Japanese position in the Western Pacific had been fully secured, and it must therefore be assumed that the Nipponese government would consolidate its conquests in Asia before undertaking large-scale transoceanic ventures. It is probable that serious attacks against the Western Hemisphere will be postponed until the Western Powers have been driven out of the Asiatic Mediterranean, the Russian Maritime Provinces conquered, and the United States driven out of the Western Pacific and thrown back to Hawaii. Japan would then be master of the eastern Siberian land mass opposite Alaska, dominate the Chinese coast, hold the Asiatic Mediterranean, and, from Singapore and the Dutch East Indies, control the sea routes to Australia and the Indian Ocean.

It was impossible to predict what military forces might be at the disposal of Japan for activities against the Western Hemisphere. The area under her control represented an almost inexhaustible supply of man power, but its war potential in minerals and heavy industry was far below that of North America or Europe. Plane production was believed to be far less than the output achieved in the United States and there was no reason to assume that the ratio would change in Japan's favor. The principal instrument of attack would, of course, have to


be the fleet, which, in the fall of 1941, consisted of 10 battleships, 6 carriers, 44 cruisers, 125 destroyers, and about 70 submarines. The secrecy which had surrounded the Japanese building program since 1936 made it, however, impossible to check the validity of these estimates. The Japanese navy is faster than that of the United States but it has a smaller combat radius, less armor, and is not so heavily gunned. Nobody knew whether, in the conquest of the Asiatic Mediterranean, she would lose more ships than she might gain from her enemies, and the effect of that venture on her naval position was, therefore, unpredictable.

1. The Outposts

The most significant strategic aspect of the Pacific Ocean, already referred to in several instances, is its enormous size. In this great ocean, the United States holds two insular outposts of the utmost strategic significance. One is located in the north, the island of Unalaska near the protruding flange of the mainland, in the zone where the Arctic and the North Pacific fronts meet. The other is located in the Hawaiian Islands which lie in mid-ocean in the neighborhood of the Tropic of Cancer. Operating from these two points as bases, it is possible to patrol the approaches to the Western Hemisphere from across the Pacific.

The Aleutian Islands

The great circle route from Yokohama to San Francisco runs north toward the Bering Straits and then bends east and south and extends to within 300 miles of the Aleutians. The route to more southern destinations is farther away from these islands, but ships sailing from Yokohama to the Panama Canal following the great circle would still pass well to the north and east of the Hawaiian Islands. The Aleutian Islands offer innumerable sheltered harbors and inlets which in enemy hands might serve as advance bases for an attack on the American mainland. The warm Japan Current moderates the climate and provides ice-free harbors, but in combination with cold air moving from Alaska it also creates rough seas and cold bleak fogs, con-


Fairbanks
Anchorage
Kodiak
Sitka
Aleutian Is.
Dutch Harbor
Petropavlovsk
Attu
Esquimalt
Bremerton
Seattle
GREAT CIRCLE ROUTE
Vladivostok
San Francisco
Los Angeles
San Diego
Tokyo
Chungking
Midway
Hawaiian Islands
Pearl Harbor
Magdalena Bay
Mazatlan
Calcutta
Rangoon
Bankok
Wake
Johnston I.
Salina Cruz
Acapulco
Fonseca Bay
Palmyra
Cocos I.
Howland
Baker
Canton
Galapagos
Guayaquil
Marquesas
Callao
Melbourne
PACIFIC DEFENSE
Naval bases
Suggested naval bases
Air bases
Suggested air bases
Bombing fleet combat zone ~ radius 1,000 land miles
Battle fleet combat zone ~ radius 2,500 land miles
Opposing axis coastlines
Aitoff's equal-area projection

ditions very similar to those off Newfoundland. This means that the northern area is a zone of low visibility and difficult navigation.

Attu, the westernmost possession of the United States, is less than 800 miles from what is today the Russian naval and air base at Petropavlovsk on the Kamchatka Peninsula and less than 1,000 miles from the Japanese naval station in the Kuril Islands. Since the expiration of the Washington Treaty on December 31, 1936, with its provisions for unfortified zones, nothing prevents the full development of the inherent possibilities of this area for defense purposes, and the United States government has, therefore, embarked on a program of naval and air base construction. At Kiska, one of the western islands of the chain, there is a listening post for the navy. On the island of Unalaska the government is developing Dutch Harbor as a naval base for small craft as well as a naval air station, from which the approaches to the northwest mainland can be guarded.

The Hawaiian Islands

The second insular outpost in the Pacific is the great naval base at Pearl Harbor, projecting like a salient toward Asia. It is the operating base of the Pacific Fleet and one of the strongest fortresses in the world in terms of the surface operations of old-fashioned two-dimensional warfare. Oahu, the island on which Pearl Harbor is located, is about 25 miles in diameter. A wide valley, open at both ends, runs through the center. Mountain ranges on each side shield the valley from the sea; and the few passes between the mountains can be held easily by a small force. At one end of the valley there are a small town and some secondary defenses. Honolulu lies at the other end and, in a fine land-locked harbor about 15 miles away, is the fleet base. Heavily fortified, the shore establishments comprise a large dry-dock, full repair facilities, fuel storage, ammunition dump, and other supplies and facilities to serve the fleet and the garrison. Supplementary bases and installations are now being built on the other islands of the Hawaiian group. The elements of weakness in the strategic pattern are an inadequate anti-aircraft defense, the dependence of the island on food imports, and the presence of a large Japanese population, almost one hundred and fifty thousand in the Territory

of Hawaii with at least seventy thousand concentrated in the City and County of Honolulu.

This great central Pacific naval base, being on an island in the middle of the ocean, offers a much greater operating area than the base in the Aleutians which is pressed against the mainland. The distance from Dutch Harbor is 2,400 miles and from the Panama Canal 5,000 miles. It lies approximately 2,500 miles from San Francisco but is still 4,000 miles from Yokohama. Pearl Harbor flanks the great circle route from Asia to North America on the south as Dutch Harbor flanks it on the north, but it also flanks all approaches to South America. As long as there is a strong fleet on the islands, an enemy can move beyond this base toward the continental mainland only at his peril and risk.

The enormous distances in the Pacific create special problems in naval warfare, particularly in connection with reconnaissance. Because of the vast areas, this ocean, more than any other, provides opportunity for surprise, as was demonstrated in the First World War. It was again evident in the successful attack on Pearl Harbor with which the Japanese opened hostilities on December 7, 1941. Pearl Harbor can perform its functions as flanking base to continental approaches only if it is served by an excellent system of scouting. The United States had an opportunity to make full use of the new possibilities which technological improvements have brought to aviation. The long-range patrol bomber is an ideal instrument for reconnaissance, and the possession of a chain of islands made it possible to create a string of observation posts all the way from the Aleutian Islands to Samoa. By patrol flights from Dutch Harbor, Midway, Johnston, Palmyra, Canton, and Samoa, we could create an observation screen in the neighborhood of the International Date Line through which almost all practical routes to the Eastern Pacific must pass. The screen failed to perform its function at the outbreak of the war and Midway, the most important pivot in the line, was made useless for some time through Japanese action. Unpatrolled was the line from Samoa to the Panama Canal, a distance of almost 6,500 miles, but it is most unlikely that an expeditionary force would choose this 9,000 mile detour to the North American west coast. The strategic situation would be improved if the United States could obtain

the two island groups on the line from Samoa to the Canal, namely, the Marquesas and the Galapagos Islands, the latter about 1,000 miles from the Panama Canal and about 600 miles from Ecuador.

As long as the Pacific Fleet is in Pearl Harbor, there is likely to be little action in the coastal waters off the mainland. But if the British fleet were defeated before the completion of our two-ocean navy, our Pacific Fleet might have to be transferred wholly or in part to the other ocean or withdrawn to west coast mainland bases. Withdrawal from Pearl Harbor to California bases or to the Canal Zone would make the coastal zone the principal area of operations. The Japanese navy would still be under the almost insuperable difficulties of transoceanic distance, but the fact that there was no longer a fleet in Hawaii to cut off its retreat might lead it to venture into the Northern Pacific along the great circle route. Defense would then be the task of the submarines, flotilla craft, and the motor torpedo boats of the coast defense and those units of the fleet not transferred to the Atlantic.

2. *The Mainland*

The outstanding feature of the military geography of the Pacific coast of the Western Hemisphere is the fact that it represents a fairly unbroken shore moving in an almost straight line in a southeasterly direction from Kodiak in Alaska to Cape Horn. This means that, by traveling southward, one moves farther and farther away from Asia and that each naval base beginning with Dutch Harbor flanks the approach to the next following base and consequently protects the next zone farther south. This fact and the configuration of the coast line create certain similarities in the strategic aspects of the defense problems of the different zones and make it possible to treat the protection of both North and South America in similar terms.

Coastal Defense

Coastal defense must begin high up in the north because the Aleutian Islands and Alaska are tempting stepping stones for a journey across the Pacific. In addition to Dutch Harbor, the United States has developed bases for light craft and naval air stations on Kodiak Island and in Sitka on the Alaskan Panhandle. For defensive action

and protection of the approaches to the Canadian northwest, our fleet would also have at its disposal the Dominion port of Prince Rupert. The southern section of this coastal region could also be defended from the northern limits of the continental zone. Defense of the North American Buffer Zone is primarily for the purpose of preventing the enemy from establishing advance bases for movements farther south. The western coastal strip has no inherent value and in sharp contrast to the eastern shore offers no easy access to the heart of the continent.

South of the buffer area lies the continental zone of North America which stretches from Vancouver to the Mexican border. The United States section of the continental zone has a coast line of 1,366 miles. It has fewer deep-water harbors suitable for naval bases than the Atlantic shore. The area is divided into three naval districts with headquarters at San Diego, San Francisco, and Seattle. In contrast to the seven navy yards on the eastern ocean, there are only two on the Pacific, Mare Island at San Francisco and Bremerton at Puget Sound, Washington. The port of Vancouver and the Canadian base at Esquimalt would also be available but, because of their proximity to Bremerton, they could not extend the range of naval operations. Both Mare Island and Bremerton are primary yards in every sense of the word, with the northern establishment the larger of the two and capable of taking battleships and carriers for overhaul. In addition to the navy yards the fleet has at its disposal two operating bases, San Diego and San Pedro. There are also seven large commercial shipbuilding and repair establishments. Seacoast artillery fortifications and other defense installations cover the five major naval districts which include many of the smaller ports.

San Diego represents the last naval establishment in the truly continental zone. The next stretch of coast from the Mexican border to the Colombia-Ecuador border in South America represents the Pacific side of the American Mediterranean Zone, and includes Mexico, Central America, Panama, and Colombia. Balboa, at the Pacific entrance of the Panama Canal, provides a strong system of fortifications as well as naval and air stations and is, consequently, not only a protection for the Canal itself but also a base for naval operations. A fleet operating from here could provide protection for most of the coastal

section but the distance between San Diego and Panama is over 3,000 miles and consequently uncomfortably long. It would, therefore, be of great help if an agreement with Mexico could make available Magdalena Bay, Acapulco, and other ports. Under the treaty with Nicaragua, ratified in 1916, the United States has the right to build a naval base in the Gulf of Fonseca which also touches Honduras and Salvador, but so far the United States has not availed herself of this opportunity.

Only if the Panama Canal continues to operate can the American Mediterranean perform its great function as transit zone between north and south and east and west. If the war had been postponed until after 1947, the Canal might have lost some of its importance as a route of transit for the navy, although its economic importance would have remained. Without the Canal the flow of essential minerals from the west coast of South America to the industrial regions of the Atlantic coast of North America would be interrupted and forced to take a much longer route around Cape Horn. But until the new fleet is built and in operation, defense of the hemisphere is the task of a one-ocean navy and that navy must be able to use the Canal for quick transit and save the additional five weeks which the route around Cape Horn would involve. For another five years all strategic plans depend on the availability of the Canal, the most vulnerable element in our defense.

The Canal can be rendered useless in many ways: by sabotage, fleet attack, air assault from plane carriers, and bombing operations from air fields in the vicinity. In addition to the contingency of damage to the locks, there is the ever-present possibility of landslides from natural causes or by hostile action, and the danger that the destruction of dams and spillways will drain the lakes that create the artificial waterway almost a hundred feet above sea level. Direct assault by fleet action is least likely to succeed. The naval base contains not only the great dock at Balboa, capable of taking care of the largest battleships, but also stations for submarines and mine layers to defend the waters at each end of the Canal. Heavy batteries of long-range guns will keep an enemy fleet at sufficient distance if the local air force has not already discouraged it from approaching. The most serious danger is that of air attack, and guarding against

that danger becomes more difficult as the effective range of the bomber increases. Air attack from carriers coming from the Atlantic has become difficult since the new air bases on the rim of the Caribbean make it possible to patrol all available entrances. On the Pacific side, however, such surprises are still possible, and this threat will remain until the United States is able to create a better protective screen.

Because of the very grave results that would flow from an interruption of canal traffic through destruction of the installations, serious consideration has been given to the building of a second canal providing for an alternative route through Nicaragua. This plan has been abandoned partly because of cost, partly because of the time involved in the construction, and as a substitute the government has started the construction of a third set of locks for the Panama Canal sufficiently far removed from the present ones to minimize the chances of being damaged by the same cause. They will be made large enough to carry the five 65,000 ton battleships planned in the new building program and expected to be ready in 1946.

Since the construction of the Panama Canal, the west coast of South America is closer to the United States than to any other source of power, both in terms of air routes and in terms of sea routes. Naval action from Panama could extend almost as far south as the Tropic of Capricorn and make it possible to protect the coast down to the border of Chile. It would be very difficult to extend the range farther south because there are practically no harbors suited for naval bases along this coast. The heart and center of Chile lies well beyond the combat radius of an American fleet operating from Panama and will, therefore, have to remain dependent on local defense forces. The German Far Eastern Cruiser Division of Von Spee based on Tsingtao managed to cross the Pacific in 1914 by coaling from colliers in the South Sea Islands and fought a successful action against the British cruiser squadron under Cradock off the coast opposite Coronel south of Valparaiso. We may, therefore, assume that the Japanese could also bring naval action to the coast of Chile, but such action could hardly be the starting point of an invasion. There is still an important difference between coming across the Pacific with a cruiser squadron

and maintaining a supply route for an expeditionary force across 10,000 miles of water.

The position of Chile at the apex of the South American Continent and along the Strait of Magellan gives her control of a strategic location that might well become of great interest to the United States in case of an emergency. If the Panama Canal should ever cease to be available, the route through the Strait of Magellan or around Cape Horn would be the only way to transfer units of the United States Navy from Norfolk to San Diego or vice versa. This would involve at least the benevolent neutrality of Chile and the services of her ports. It is also conceivable that the west coast routes from Panama might under special circumstances become the only sea route by which supplies could be sent to the La Plata region. If a victorious Germany obtained control not only of Dakar but also of Natal on the bulge of Brazil, the eastern coast route might well become impossible.

Land-Based Aircraft

The defense which sea power can bring to this long coast must obviously be supplemented by air power in the form of land-based aircraft. This is important not only in order that the defending fleet may have the assurance of air superiority in its engagements in the coastal zone, but also in order that enemy forces may be kept away from coastal sections where naval forces are not available, either because they are engaged in another part of the ocean or because the bulk of the navy has been transferred to the Atlantic. In order that air power may perform this function there should be available a string of air bases all the way from Alaska to Chile. In terms of the now existing facilities a great deal of this coastal zone is adequately served, but there are still serious gaps, particularly between San Diego and the Panama Canal and between Colombia and Chile.

The government of the United States is speeding work on the new air bases in Fairbanks and Anchorage in Alaska; the Canadian government under the agreement for common defense has made available existing and future bases in British Columbia. Our own Pacific states have a great many air fields of which the most important center around Seattle, Portland, San Francisco, and Los Angeles. The existing airports in Mexico are at the disposal of the United States under

a reciprocal arrangement permitting their use for planes on their way to the Panama Canal provided they make the transit over Mexican territory within twenty-four hours. This agreement is of great help to the United States and facilitates the defense of the Panama Canal, but it does not provide for operating bases along the exposed 2,000 miles of Mexican coast line. It is, therefore, to be hoped that Mexico will develop her western fields into fully equipped establishments and have them available for the United States in case Mexico should need the assistance of the air power of her northern neighbor. The Central American section of the west coast could be served from Panama and the range of this action could be greatly extended by basing a tender and a squadron of patrol bombers in Fonseca Bay.

Geography is not as favorable for air defense of the Panama Canal on the Pacific side as on the Atlantic side, but it is not impossible to create an air patrol over a considerable segment of the coastal waters. The inner line could be handled from points on the Bay of Panama and the outer line, from Fonseca Bay or Costa Rica, the Cocos Islands, Galapagos, and a station on the coast of Colombia or Ecuador. The Republic of Panama has permitted the United States to construct air fields on her territory but concessions for the other bases have not yet been granted. Bombing squadrons operating from the canal bases would be effective for quite a distance along the coast of Colombia, but Ecuador and Peru lie outside the range of action from Panama. Our position on this section of the west coast of South America would, therefore, be greatly strengthened if we could obtain the use of air fields at Buenaventura in Colombia, near Guayaquil in Ecuador and near Callao in Peru. This would bring the outer range of land-based bombing action to the limit of the naval combat zone.

The problem of creating the facilities necessary for the United States to support the air defenses of the southern section of this coastal zone has been complicated by regional conflicts. To Ecuador, a Japanese invasion is something slightly remote and unreal in contrast to the Peruvian army on its territory which is very real indeed. The threat of an attack from Asia has seemed a worry for future generations but the threat of conquest by her southern neighbor has always been present. There were circles in that unhappy country perfectly willing to grant us the necessary facilities in the Galapagos

Islands and on the mainland, even at the risk which that involved, provided we undertook to protect her territorial integrity and political independence against her southern neighbor. Guaranteeing uncertain boundaries is risky business at best but in this case it would certainly have killed the chances of obtaining air bases in Peru. Until this problem is solved the defense of the region south of Colombia will have to rest on distance, the weak local forces, and the United States Navy.

If the enemy should succeed in achieving a landing on the Pacific coast of the New World notwithstanding the available naval and air defenses, the effect would be serious but by no means fatal. Most damaging would be an occupation of southern California with its heavy concentration of oil and aircraft production. From the point of view of hemisphere defense the west coast is the least important coast, and topography precludes it from becoming the starting point for an approach to vital centers. In Canada the Coastal Range and the Rocky Mountains, in the United States the Sierras and the Rockies, in Mexico and Central America the Sierra Madre, and in South America the Andes, all offer barriers to an eastern march into the really vital zones of the hemisphere. The mountain barrier would offer some obstruction to an eastward drive by air, but topography alone could not prevent the landing zone from becoming the starting point for such air action. However, this could become serious only if the enemy were left in possession of a fairly large area for a long time and managed to create a transoceanic supply route to feed his bases. On the North American Continent he could be blasted out of his occupied zone by overwhelming air forces converging on the point of landing from the east and would be surrounded by an army far greater than his transports could possibly bring. On the South American Continent, the Atlantic area would not be in a position to exert military pressure across the Andes because of the lack of air power and the absence of intermediate bases, and the action to neutralize the beach head would, therefore, have to come from the north.


The defensive position of the Western Hemisphere in regard to the Far East is exceedingly strong. Its vital zones lie far beyond the bombing range of land-based aircraft and far beyond the effective combat range of sea power. Even by the shortest route from Van-

couver to Yokohama, the distance is still about 5,000 miles. It would be as difficult for Japan to land an army in San Francisco as for the United States to land one in Yokohama. As long as the naval bases in Alaska and Hawaii are available as operating centers and a fleet of approximately the same size as the Japanese fleet is stationed at Pearl Harbor, the Eastern Pacific would be secure except for submarine and surface raiding and perhaps a rare bombing attack from protected carriers. The direction of the American coast line enables each coastal base to flank the next; and a string of air bases is ready to support the fleet with land-based aircraft. Against Japan alone, we could defend a zone from Alaska to Peru. Chile would not be as well protected as the rest of the continent, but her distance from Japan makes her the least vulnerable. Distance, configuration, and the location of the Hawaiian Islands all contribute to make the Pacific the less dangerous of the two oceans that separate us from the Old World.

Invasion from across the Atlantic

In the Pacific, our own fleet stands between the coast and the Japanese danger. In the Atlantic, the protective shield in the Second World War is, in the first place, the British navy. If that fleet should be defeated, the transatlantic zone would represent a much more serious threat of invasion than the Far East. The German-dominated sphere would include Europe and Africa, and therefore Norway, Ireland, and Dakar, the points opposite the shortest transatlantic crossings. This German world, although much smaller in population than Japanese Asia, has a much larger war potential owing to a greater endowment in natural resources and industrial capacity. It could create an army far larger than anything the New World might hope to achieve, and meet the latter in quality of equipment. It is probably a safe prediction that a victorious Germany would have an air force as large as that of the United States if not larger and a capacity for plane production not far below that of the North American Continental Zone.

It is as difficult to predict the probable naval strength of the Atlantic partner of the totalitarian alliance as to prophesy the future strength of the Japanese navy. If one takes the existing naval forces


NORTH
AMERICA
SOUTH
AMERICA
EUROPE
AFRICA
Atlantic
Greenland
Iceland
Cartwright
Botwood
St. Johns
Halifax
Wetmore
Mitchel
Boston
New York
Philadelphia
Langley
Norfolk
Charleston
Jacksonville
Bermuda
Azores
Berlin
Alexandria
Key West
Miami
Bahamas
Guantánamo
Jamaica
Puerto Rico
Antigua
Martinique
St. Lucia
Trinidad
Canal
Georgetown
Cape Verde Islands
Dakar
Freetown
São Paulo
Fernando de Noronha
Belém (Pará)
San Luiz
Natal
Recife (Pernambuco)
Ascension
St. Helena
Baia
Trindade
Rio de Janeiro
Buenos Aires
Montevideo
60°
50°
40°
30°
20°
10°
0°
80°
70°
60°
50°
40°
30°
20°
10°
ATLANTIC DEFENSE
Naval bases
Suggested naval bases
Air bases
Suggested air bases
Bombing fleet combat zone – radius 1,000 land miles
Battle fleet combat zone – radius 2,500 land miles
Opposing axis coastlines

of Germany, France, and Italy as of January, 1941, and adds to these figures the number of ships then building, one arrives at a combined strength for our Atlantic opponent of 23 battleships, 5 aircraft carriers, 64 cruisers, 261 destroyers, and 500 submarines. But no one can foresee how many of these ships will be lost before the assumed victory, nor what will be the fate of the British fleet which, at the outbreak of the war, had about the same strength as that of the United States. Will it go down fighting, will it surrender, will it be scuttled, will it come under the control of a London Vichy, or will it escape? All this lies outside the realm of calculation, and the probable Atlantic naval power of the Eurasian alliance remains, therefore, pure conjecture.

1. The Outposts

The strategic picture of the Atlantic from the point of view of hemisphere defense by the United States differs profoundly from that of the Pacific. The ocean is very much smaller and this places the potential enemy much nearer to the eastern American shore on which lie all the vital areas of the New World. The base zone for enemy naval operations, the area between Liverpool and Marseilles, lies relatively much farther north than the comparable area in the Pacific, and the configuration of the coast line of the Western Hemisphere creates at least two zones of serious exposure instead of a single one as in the western ocean.

Iceland

The occupation of Iceland has given us a position in the North Atlantic in some ways comparable to that of Dutch Harbor in the Pacific. It lies at the meeting point of the Arctic and the North Atlantic fronts, on the great circle route from New York to Moscow and on the shipping lane from Boston to Archangel. The great circle routes from British and French ports to the Atlantic coast of the United States turn north toward Greenland and then bend west and south to Newfoundland. Reykjavik, the capital of Iceland, flanks from the north all approaches to the North American Continent. It is located near the narrowest crossing in the North Atlantic between Greenland and Norway, about 500 miles from the former and 850

miles from the latter. From the Faeroe Islands to Iceland is only 450 miles and the island would, therefore, be an attractive stepping stone to the Western Hemisphere for air power.

Occupation of the island was inspired principally by a desire to provide a naval base for patrol and convoy duty for ships across the northern Atlantic. Under conditions of German victory in Europe, there would be no question of patrol or convoy and the island would then function exclusively as a protection for Greenland and as a base on the northern flank of possible attacks on the mainland. Because of its proximity to Norway, the Faeroes, and Scotland, and its distance from Newfoundland and Boston, its position would be extremely vulnerable. Its own life line to the base zone between Boston and Charleston is outflanked by the ports of Ireland. But, although vulnerable, its value as an outpost is unquestioned and it would, therefore, be worth some effort to hold it.

The Azores

Iceland offers facilities similar to Dutch Harbor but we have in the Atlantic no position in mid-ocean comparable to that of the Hawaiian Islands in the Pacific. It is true that there are at great distances from the shore of the New World a number of islands which, at first sight, seem to offer strategic advantages comparable to the Sandwich group in the other ocean, but closer analysis demonstrates that their location is quite different. The Cape Verde Islands are approximately 3,000 miles from New York and slightly to the south of the Tropic of Cancer, but they are too far to the south for control of North Atlantic routes and they have none of the natural resources necessary for the creation of a great base. Harbor facilities are practically non-existent and would be almost impossible to create. The climate is unhealthy and there is not enough fresh water for the requirements of a naval station. But even if nature had endowed them generously, the islands would still be unsuited as a base. What should give Pearl Harbor its great defensive strength is in part its distance from Japan. The islands in the Atlantic have no such depth of ocean front before them. The coast of the Old World is very near, in the case of the Cape Verde Islands less than 500 miles. With a victorious Germany in control of the mainland, an American base would be in

the position of Manila, not in the position of Hawaii. It would represent an Achilles heel, not a tower of strength.

Better suited from the point of view of location in relation to the transatlantic routes, would be the Azores. These islands lie near the fortieth parallel opposite the entrance to the European Mediterranean, approximately 2,500 miles from New York, 2,000 miles from Bermuda. They flank all approaches to North America from the south as Iceland flanks them from the north, and in addition they also flank all approaches to South America. If the United States could base a strong fleet in this archipelago, an enemy could move beyond this base toward the Western Hemisphere only at considerable risk and peril. But the Azores, although better endowed than the Cape Verde Islands, also lack the natural resources necessary for the creation of a major fleet base. In terms of relative distances, they would not be quite as difficult to defend as the more southern group but the advantages would still be on the European side. The shortest distance from the New World is from Newfoundland, about 1,400 miles. The center of the North American Continental Zone lies about 2,500 miles away. Distances from the island to the mainland of the Old World are about 1,200 miles for Brest and about 1,000 miles for the zone Lisbon-Gibraltar-Casablanca. This means that a base on the islands would lie within the range of land-based aircraft operating from this concentric zone. To defend this base from the Western Hemisphere against attack from Europe would be as difficult as defending Crete from Egypt against attacks from Greece.

President Roosevelt, in his speech on May 27, 1941, laid stress on the importance of the Azores and the Cape Verde Islands as strategic outposts for the defense of the hemisphere. This statement caused considerable consternation in Lisbon particularly when it became known that another strategic outpost, namely Iceland, had been occupied by the United States forces. The Portuguese government delicately inquired in Washington if the United States contemplated similar steps in regard to the Portuguese possessions. The answer was apparently in the negative. The Portuguese minister in Washington, in a press release on July 14, 1941, announced that the government of the United States had informed him that it planned no move to occupy the Azores and the Cape Verde Islands.

In the military geography of the Atlantic, the analogy to the line Dutch Harbor-Midway-Pearl Harbor-Samoa is not the line Iceland-Azores-Cape Verde, but Iceland-Newfoundland-Bermuda-Puerto Rico. It encloses a much narrower belt of ocean and, because of the eastern position of South America, it protects only the northern continent. The mainland coast of the southern continent, instead of being a simple prolongation of the coast of North America and moving farther away from Europe, turns sharply eastward to approach Africa. There is one Pacific but there is a North and a South Atlantic and three distinct problems of hemisphere defense in the eastern ocean. The first problem is the defense of the coastal area from Greenland to Miami which includes the North American Buffer Zone and the North American Continental Zone. The second is the defense of the line from Miami to Natal, a line which runs at right angles to the former. It includes the eastern rim of the American Mediterranean and the coast of the South American Buffer Zone. The third problem is the line from Natal to Cape Horn which runs parallel to the North American coast and includes the Equidistant Zone of South America.

2. *The North American Buffer Zone*

The most exposed region in the North Atlantic is the North American Buffer Zone from Greenland to the southern tip of Labrador. It is the region nearest to Europe and although without intrinsic value it has strategic significance because it flanks the great circle route and because its southern border lies in close proximity to an easy approach to the heart of the continent, the St. Lawrence basin. Labrador and Greenland have little to attract the visitor but also little to offer that could serve as a base, and the defense of this exposed zone can, therefore, be best undertaken from the insular positions at the two extremes, Iceland in the north and Newfoundland in the south. Julianehaab, at the southern tip of Greenland near Cape Farewell, is about halfway between Iceland and Newfoundland and would be a logical stop for air communication from Europe via the Iceland route. In the agreement made for a temporary protectorate over Greenland, the United States received the right to

build and maintain landing fields, sea plane bases, radio and weather stations. The latter may well turn out to be the most valuable concession. The northern air approach, although theoretically possible, is not a very practical route. Climatological conditions in the North Atlantic make bad flying weather, and Greenland's fjord-indented coast can offer a sheltered anchorage only part of the year. Heavy fog shrouds much of the shore from March to September, and the ports on the east coast remain covered with ice until late August. The west coast, which turns toward Labrador and Hudson Bay, is more hospitable but even here the facilities for bases are extremely limited.

3. *The North American Continental Zone*

The North American Continental Zone derives the same advantages from the direction of its shore as the west coast. It points towards the southwest which means that all harbors farther away from Newfoundland are also farther away from Europe. The coast line is thus practically a prolongation of the sea route from Ireland and every base or potential base flanks all ports farther south. The nearer to Florida an enemy puts his objective the longer and more exposed will be his lines of communication, and the greater will be the number of bases that he must capture or neutralize.

The section of the continental coast belonging to the United States is about 2,000 miles long and generously dotted with excellent harbors suited for naval bases. It is ice-free all the year and lies beyond the combat zone of European fleets. Near this coast is the economic heart of the country and the important centers of heavy industry on which all war efforts ultimately rest. For naval purposes it is divided into five naval districts with headquarters in Boston, New York, Philadelphia, Norfolk, and Charleston, each containing a naval yard, the most important being Norfolk. This port is connected with a large operating base on Chesapeake Bay and gives protected access to the naval gun factory and the naval powder factory at Washington. In addition to these government yards, there are numerous private ones capable of building and repairing the largest battleships. The naval yards, together with a number of supplementary establish-

ments, provide the fleet with a string of operating bases from Maine to Key West. In addition to the naval air bases connected with the fleet stations, there is also a chain of army air bases from the Canadian border to Florida thus assuring the navy the support of land-based aircraft in the whole coastal zone.

The defense of the continental zone of North America is not dependent on mainland bases alone. A wise diplomacy has made it possible to obtain valuable stations in advance of the mainland shores in addition to those available on United States possessions. The result is the line of outposts, Newfoundland-Bermuda-Puerto Rico. The significance of Newfoundland in connection with the defense of the North American Buffer Zone has already been mentioned. It is even more important for the defense of the continental zone. The island is only 2,000 miles from Ireland and, therefore, on the periphery of the combat zone of European battle fleets. In the two wars which the United States has fought with European sea power, St. John's on the tip of Newfoundland was the advance base for the invading British armies. Newfoundland is the point nearest to the enemy and it lies on the northern flank of all practical approaches to the continent. Shallow water and climatic conditions make the area very difficult for navigation, especially in winter, but its significance in terms of position is unquestioned.

In pre-war days, Newfoundland was the starting point for the overseas journey of Pan American Airways and since the beginning of the conflict, the route from there to England is flown regularly by American bombers. The acquisition of bases on Newfoundland has moved the limit of naval and air operations by the United States far out into the ocean and increased the depth of the defensive zone. The island is within easy reach of the mainland from bases in Halifax, New Brunswick, and Prince Edward Island, and patrols from St. John's can cover the coast of Labrador and southern Greenland and watch both the northern air route and the great circle route to Ireland.

Newfoundland, with the related mainland area on Labrador and New Brunswick, is the most exposed region of the whole Western Hemisphere. If, after the fall of Great Britain, we were forced to withdraw from Iceland, which is quite likely, Newfoundland would

remain as the first important base for defense against an approach across the North Atlantic since Greenland would then be useless. Because the Atlantic Fleet may be inadequate, or occupied elsewhere, the island must be protected by a heavy concentration of air power in spite of poor flying conditions during much of the year. With a large number of long-range bombing squadrons on Newfoundland to deal with an approaching fleet and numerous long-range fighters to deal with an approaching air force, the northeastern section of the continental zone can be adequately secured.

The next insular outpost is Bermuda, within five hours' flying time from New York and a popular vacation spot where American tourists display the latest beach wear and indulge their nostalgia for the bicycle as a form of transportation. Held as an enemy air base, Bermuda would be far less charming. A thousand mile radius would give the enemy an opportunity to cover most of the mainland coast from Halifax to the Virgin Islands. Fortunately, the strategic advantage of its location is at our disposal and not at that of the enemy. Harbor facilities are being improved to take care of cruisers and other flotilla craft, barracks are being built for anti-aircraft units, and air bases are under construction for the planes that will patrol the Western Atlantic.

The first insular base to the southeast of the continental zone is on Cuba. On the eastern part of the island near the Windward Passage the United States has available, through lease, an excellent location on Guantánamo Bay which provides a large, well-sheltered, easily defended harbor with sufficient depth to anchor the battle fleet. The problem of supplying this base is greatly simplified by its branch line with the Cuban railroad net which is connected with the mainland railroads through car ferry from Havana to Florida. Guantánamo has at present neither permanent fortifications nor docking or repair facilities, and battleships have to move to Norfolk for repair and smaller vessels must go to San Juan. A large air field provides a base of operations for both navy and army planes and a stepping stone to the next outpost in Puerto Rico. The destroyer deal with Great Britain enabled us to set up a small base for patrol planes in the Bahamas, thereby removing much of the threat of surprise

action from that labyrinth of islands against the Florida passage, the Cuban base, and the route to Puerto Rico.

The strategic location of Puerto Rico in regard to the east coast of the North American Continent has certain similarities to the location of Hawaii in regard to the west coast, although it projects only 1,000 miles instead of 2,000 miles into the ocean. It flanks all approaches to the continental zone from the south as Newfoundland flanks them from the north. The island does not possess harbor facilities comparable to Pearl Harbor, but the government is engaged in building out of the available natural features of the island itself and Culebra and the Virgin Islands in the immediate vicinity a base worthy of its strategic location. There will be fortifications, dock and repair facilities at San Juan, a large anchorage in Culebra and in Vieques Sound, and both naval and army air bases from which the patrol boats and long-range bombers can start their flights in the direction of the Cape Verde Islands.

Newfoundland, Bermuda, the Bahamas, and Puerto Rico provide an opportunity for an observation screen that covers all approaches to the continental zone. It lies much nearer to the coast than its equivalent in the western ocean, but although this may be a disadvantage from the point of view of scouting and early warning, it is a great advantage from the point of view of bombing operations. The whole moon-shaped section of the Western Atlantic between Newfoundland, Puerto Rico, and the mainland shore can now be covered by land-based aircraft. As long as the ends and the middle of the straight line, Newfoundland-Bermuda-Puerto Rico, are safely in American hands, penetration by an enemy fleet west of this line, except for hit-and-run raids, would be suicidal. The threat of invasion of the North American Continent from Europe is more serious than the threat of invasion from Asia because the Atlantic is much narrower, but as long as the United States maintains a strong air force of long-range planes, the danger can be reduced to a minimum.

4. The American Mediterranean

The second strategic zone on the Atlantic side of the hemisphere is the American Mediterranean. It consists of the Gulf of Mexico and

the Caribbean with a mainland littoral and an eastern rim of islands. Even before the destroyer deal with Great Britain this area was comparatively safe against threats coming from the northeast, but it was dangerously exposed to threats coming from the southeast.

The stations on the Greater Antilles already referred to in connection with the defense of the North American coast line are, of course, equally valuable as outposts against attempts to penetrate into the Mexican Gulf or the Caribbean. The Florida Strait between Florida and Cuba is controlled from the mainland positions, Pensacola and Key West; the Windward Passage, from Guantánamo Bay; the Mona Passage, from Culebra and Puerto Rico; and the Anegada Passage, from St. Thomas in the Virgin Islands.

Stretching in a great circle beyond the Virgin Islands and bending south toward the mainland of South America, lie the Lesser Antilles, possessions of the British, the French, and the Dutch, remnants of their former colonial position in the Western Hemisphere. The United States owns no islands in this region, and her strategic position in regard to the southeastern approaches to the Caribbean was formerly very weak. This has now been remedied by the agreement for the lease of bases on the British West Indies which closes the remaining gap. It makes possible the creation of an important operating base on Trinidad at the southern entrance to the American Mediterranean and the connection of this base with the operating base in Puerto Rico by means of intermediate stations in St. Lucia and Antigua.

The base on the Gulf of Paria between Venezuela and Trinidad controls the important passage between this island and Tobago and alternative entrances from the east. It also permits the extension of aerial scouting operations along the South American coast and out to sea another thousand miles beyond the approaches to the Panama Canal. The Gulf of Paria possesses the great advantage of having two exits, and the island of Trinidad has excellent natural resources and is in close proximity to the oil-producing regions of Venezuela and the oil refineries on the Dutch Islands of Aruba and Curaçao. The naval base is supplemented by an army air base from which the striking force of the great bombers can be made effective in a

wide zone. In between this base and Puerto Rico will be the relay stations on St. Lucia and Antigua.

In addition to the new bases on the rim, the United States has also obtained permission to operate from Jamaica which has a strategic position in the Caribbean comparable to that of Malta in the European Mediterranean. It lies immediately behind the Windward Passage and in front of all approaches to the Isthmus. Like its European sister, it has lost much of its significance as the result of the development of the surrounding bases, in this case those of the United States, and its main function is, therefore, to serve as an intermediate base between the Canal Zone and the advanced outpost on the rim of the middle sea.

5. *The South American Buffer Zone*

The North American Continent and the American Mediterranean have a strategic position in the Atlantic almost as favorable as in the Pacific, but the same is not true of the northern part of the southern continent. The coastal area of the South American Buffer Zone from Trinidad to Cape San Roque moves in a southeasterly direction. Points farther east remain the same distance from Europe, but they move nearer and nearer to Africa and farther and farther from Norfolk and the base area of United States naval power. In this zone the most important region lies near its southern border at the bulge of Brazil, 1,800 miles from Dakar in West Africa, approximately the same distance as between Ireland and Newfoundland. Pernambuco, the port just beyond Cape San Roque, is the first South American port for steamers from Europe to Rio de Janeiro and the La Plata, and Natal is the landing field for commercial airlines by way of Dakar. It is now the starting point of the South Atlantic crossing to Cape Town of Pan American Airways and of the bomber ferry service, run by the same company, to the Sudan. The bulge of Brazil is, for approaches to the North American Continental Zone from Africa, what Newfoundland is for approaches from Europe.

Because the military strength of Brazil is inadequate for the enormous size of the country and weakest in the north, the defense of the buffer zone must inevitably be the responsibility of the United

States. This corner of Brazil is to all intents and purposes for the United States, as well as for German Europe, overseas territory. We must both move our armies by ships; we are both bothered by the size of transports which modern equipment requires; we are both limited in the choice of ports. Because the Brazilian bulge is distant territory for both of us, the problem of its defense becomes, therefore, a problem of relative distances and advanced bases.

In regard to distances, the positions of the United States and Germany are exactly the same. Pernambuco is equally far from the American base zone between Charleston and Boston and from the European base zone between Liverpool and Marseilles, and the core of the strategic problem can be expressed in terms of an equilateral triangle with the points at Norfolk, Brest, and Pernambuco, each side about 4,000 miles long. Along the two sides of the triangle from the mainland base zones to Pernambuco both parties have intermediate and advance bases. German Europe will move by way of Gibraltar, Casablanca, and along the west coast of Africa to the outpost at Dakar. If Dakar or Freetown in Sierra Leone were developed as an operating base for battleships, the 2,500 mile combat range would bring European naval action well beyond the bulge up toward the American Mediterranean and down toward the La Plata. The route from Europe to Dakar could be made a well-protected route behind a screen of aerial observation operating from the Azores, Madeira, the Canary Islands, and Cape Verde Islands, and it could also be patrolled and defended with land-based aircraft from the mainland.

The European fleet could count on land-based air support only part of the way beyond Dakar unless the Germans managed to establish an air base on the Brazilian side. The distance from Dakar to Natal is too long for effective air bombardment, but if airports were available in Brazil, there would be nothing to prevent the Germans from flying over a special army division in troop carriers. With the airports assured on both shores, air support could be provided for the whole of the South Atlantic crossing. To achieve the use of these air fields there is a choice of methods all of which have proved feasible: tourists landing from cruise ships, a fifth column made up from

the local German community, or a coup d'état by a faction in the army or the local government.

The United States, starting from Norfolk, could use Guantánamo Bay, Puerto Rico, and Trinidad. Combat radius from Trinidad reaches just up to Cape San Roque, but it does not blanket the South Atlantic crossing. Under the existing arrangements with no base beyond Trinidad the United States is at a distinct disadvantage in regard to the strategic zone near the bulge of Brazil. But the truth of the matter is that there is not a single port on the whole coast of Brazil that could serve a battle fleet under conditions of modern warfare. The nearest approximation to a port that could be made into an adequate operating base is Bahia, about 450 miles beyond the shoulder. It is the only land-locked bay of sufficient size to anchor a fleet without crowding, a condition indispensable in the days of aerial warfare. Natal and Pernambuco have the best location, but they will remain inferior harbors even after development of all their resources. They could, however, be made to serve a more limited purpose and together with Pará, near the mouth of the Amazon River, could function as intermediate bases on the route between Trinidad and Bahia.

It would certainly be unwise to send the American navy out for action along the Brazilian shore unless there was assurance of air supremacy in the combat zone. This means that the fleet must be supported by land-based aircraft. It is, therefore, imperative that the naval bases on the Brazilian coast be supplemented by air bases, particularly near Natal, the point closest to Africa, and that a string of intermediate fields between Trinidad and Natal be made available.

At the outbreak of hostilities in December, 1941, Brazil had not yet placed at the disposal of the United States the necessary air bases to permit our bombers and long-range fighting squadrons to reach the exposed zone on the bulge, but progress had been made in the direction of closer co-operation. Pan American Airways has been authorized to improve the air fields used on her route along the coast, and construction work has begun in Amapá, Pará (Belem), São Luiz, Fortaleza (Ceara), Natal, Pernambuco (Recife), Maceio, and Bahia (Salvador). The government of the United States is aiding in the financing of the improvement of these "commercial fields." If the

Pan American airports should actually be available when the emergency arose, and the United States had the necessary planes to spare, the sea route to South America could be made, like the route to Norway from Germany, although on an entirely different scale, a route along a relatively protected coastal zone covered by land-based aircraft. In that case the United States would obtain a decided advantage because we could fly to the bulge overland in easy stages while the Germans would have to make a 1,800 mile ocean hop from Dakar or Sierra Leone. If the air bases were not available, the expedition would have to be protected by carrier-borne planes and would become an exceedingly risky undertaking. If perchance the Brazilian coastal air bases had by some means or other already been taken over by the enemy, then the sending of an expeditionary force from the United States would be suicidal.

The defense of the bulge of Brazil must be envisaged as a problem for air power and solved as such or it cannot be solved at all. The struggle for air supremacy over the strategic region will precede and not follow the naval action. If action is undertaken against this territory from Europe, it will not come in the form of a well-advertised and slow-moving expeditionary force starting at Brest but in swift surprise action from Dakar. The United States has created a special striking force out of a mechanized division of marines ready to embark and steam out to action in rebuilt over-age destroyers. Twenty-five knots an hour may be fast if the destination is a nearby Caribbean island, but it is not enough for a future war in which space in measured in continents and time in the speed of bombers. Only with the development of air-borne divisions of special troops can we begin to solve the strategic problem of hemisphere defense.

6. The South American Equidistant Zone

In the South Atlantic, the problem of hemisphere defense has many points of similarity to the pattern of defense in the North Atlantic. The coast of the New World slopes away in a southwesterly direction, placing every point farther south, farther away from West Africa. The great circle route from Dakar to the La Plata parallels this coast and every base is, therefore, on the flank of the approach

to the next port farther south. The location of the shoulder of Africa is like that of the area Liverpool-Marseilles, and the corner of Brazil is the equivalent of Newfoundland-New Brunswick. The bulge is the most exposed region in South America and the key to its defense problem. It is a buffer not only for movement northward toward the United States, but also for movement southward to Rio de Janeiro and the La Plata.

Besides the similarities in the strategic pattern in these two parts of the Western Hemisphere, there are also profound differences. The ratio of power potentials and actual military strength varies considerably between the two. The equidistant zone is not a truly continental zone, and it is held by two states engaged in a struggle for power. It is also true that both the bulge of Brazil and the shoulder of Africa are at great distances from the base zones of the North American and European powers. Though it is correct to state that each base on the southern continent flanks the approaches to the next base, the bases are few and far between and their facilities are extremely limited. Absence of overland communications between many of the ports would make it difficult to surround a base which had been taken and in which a beach head had been established.

Only the future can tell whether Brazil and Argentina would be able to co-operate effectively for common defense or whether their natural opposition would keep them apart even in the face of danger. The old difficulty between the United States and the Argentine has so far hampered full co-operation in defense. The attempt of Uruguay to lay the political groundwork for a Pan American defense of the equidistant zone had by 1941 produced no satisfactory result. Both her multilateral and her bilateral approach were firmly blocked by her southern neighbor. In June of 1940, Uruguay announced that she would like to place her ports at the disposal of any American state engaged in war with an extra-hemisphere Power, and that she would like to see her sister republics apply the same principle and sign a convention for that purpose. Argentina objected and the plan was dropped, notwithstanding favorable replies from many nations. Informal discussions had also been begun between Uruguay and the United States about the possibility of placing certain base facilities at the disposal of the northern republic. But a base near Montevideo,

which lies about 150 miles below Buenos Aires on the La Plata River, would control the access of Argentina to the sea. The thought that the United States might thus obtain an absolute power over her economic life was extremely distasteful and Argentina insisted, therefore, that the defense of the river area was a regional problem that should be settled by the riparian states, meaning that it should be settled by herself. Her attitude was not unlike that of the early settlers along the Ohio and the Mississippi who considered that the mouth of their river should not be in the hands of an alien power. The United States has therefore no naval bases under her control in the South American Equidistant Zone, but this does not mean that her forces are entirely excluded from the region. After the outbreak of hostilities, Argentina and Uruguay, as well as Brazil, declared that our navy would be granted the privileges of a nonbelligerent power in the ports and territorial waters of their respective countries.

The South American Equidistant Zone, as was mentioned in the last chapter, is the only region in South America that has any war potential at all and both Brazil and the Argentine are expanding their naval, military, and air forces. Compared with the power potential of the Old World, the military strength of the southern zone must, however, inevitably remain insignificant. The two states lack the natural resources and the financial strength necessary to create a military establishment adequate to deal with the threat that would emerge across the oceans in case of a German-Japanese victory. Notwithstanding their relative superiority over other South American states, they remain dependent on the United States for aid.

Naval action in the southern Atlantic in support of the fleets of Brazil and the Argentine would be exceedingly difficult because of distance. The La Plata is more than 6,500 miles from our Atlantic base zone and more than 4,500 miles beyond Trinidad, the most southern outpost. Until such time as adequate naval bases become available, in the southern region, our help will have to be limited largely to aid in the expansion of their own fleets. The naval defense of the South Atlantic raises the same problem as the defense of the Philippines. Both lie not only beyond combat range from the base zones, but beyond combat range from the outposts. Placing a fleet

in the southern Atlantic based on Pernambuco is not unlike placing a fleet in the Asiatic Mediterranean based on Singapore. From Brest to Newfoundland is a distance of about 2,000 miles and from Pernambuco the distance is almost doubled. If we concentrated our Atlantic Fleet in the southern half of the eastern ocean, we would deprive the most vital zone of the whole hemisphere of naval support and leave it to defend itself with coastal defenses and land-based aircraft.

Until it is clear that defense against invasion can be achieved exclusively in terms of land-based air power, the logical base of the Atlantic Fleet will have to remain in the neighborhood of Puerto Rico which is approximately the same distance from Newfoundland and the bulge of Brazil. From this position, naval aid can reach the whole coastal triangle of the Western Hemisphere in the North Atlantic from Halifax to Natal. But this disposition inevitably leaves the South American Equidistant Zone very largely to its own devices unless one accepts the theory of the fleet in being and maintains that the presence of our forces on the flank of the route from Europe to the La Plata will deter the Old World from military action.

Because of the location of the bulge of Brazil in relation to Africa and the equidistant zone, a large concentration of United States air power on the southern border of the South American Buffer Zone would be the most valuable contribution to the aerial defense of the equidistant region. This would discourage naval attacks from Dakar on the northern extremity of the zone, although it would have little or no effect on approaches farther south, particularly not on attacks coming from Cape Town. Under the conditions assumed, namely, the German control of the Old World, South Africa would have a great many advantages over West Africa as the starting point of an expedition to South America, although the actual ocean crossing would be longer and land-based air support impossible. The natural resources and the climate of South Africa would be much better suited for the creation and maintenance of a large military establishment and this advanced base could be reached in perfect safety by way of the Indian Ocean.

The Possibility of Hemisphere Defense

The previous pages represent an analysis of the problem of hemisphere defense against a military threat from Japanese Greater East Asia and a German Eurafrica. The relative exposure of the Western Hemisphere to threats from Asia and Europe depends on the relative war potential of the two transoceanic zones and the width of the oceans. Distance is protection in all forms of warfare, even the most modern, and the centers of power of Asia are much farther away than those of Europe. Both a lower war potential and a greater distance combine to make the Asiatic threat much less dangerous than the European one. The New World can be struck a mortal blow only in the east, not in the west. The Atlantic drainage area of the continents could continue to resist an invader of the west coast, but the west coast could not continue the struggle against an enemy in possession of the east coast.

If our allies in Europe and Asia should be defeated, the Western Hemisphere would be encircled from three sides. We would then be reduced to the defense of the hemisphere and the protection of its coastal routes of maritime communication. Under such circumstances, how much of the New World could the United States defend? The answer depends on the nature of the defense problem as defined by the military geography sketched in these pages and on the relative military strength of the Old World and the New when the final test comes. In terms of power potential alone, the Western Hemisphere can be no match for the Old World but the United States could create, in terms of resources plus distance, a defensive system of considerable strength.

If the British fleet were destroyed in the defense of the British homeland, the Americas would have to depend for naval protection on the ships of the United States navy. How much of the United States fleet would be left when we withdrew to American ports is pure conjecture but whatever it was, it would have to be stationed in the Atlantic except for the ships needed for convoy duty and coastal defense in the west. This means that the defense of the Pacific

would become almost exclusively the responsibility of the air force and the army. The Atlantic front would also have to depend heavily on air power both for coast defense and for the plane support which the fleet itself needs. It is therefore obvious that the extent to which the United States can defend the hemisphere would depend on the speed with which she could learn the implications of three-dimensional warfare and make up for her early neglect of air power.

The course of the Second World War seems to indicate that air superiority at the point of landing has become an indispensable element in successful invasion. The German conquest of Norway and Crete in the face of British naval supremacy in coastal waters in both cases indicates this development and the failure of the British counter-invasion of Norwegian ports merely confirms it. Military operations in the Asiatic Mediterranean point in the same direction. The tactical possibilities of land-based aircraft against fleets in coastal waters and narrow seas clearly indicate that naval supremacy alone can no longer assure routes of communication or the establishment of a beach head and it has therefore become possible to conceive of hemisphere defense largely in terms of land power supplemented by air power.

Such a strategic conception demands emphasis in the armament program on long-range bombers and long-range fighters. We will need not only a powerful air force for the protection of North America and the American Mediterranean, the two great regions in which we possess adequate bases, but also a very large air fleet of bombers and fighters ready to move to prepared bases in South America. Such an air fleet would, however, have to be completely self-contained and move its ground troops and anti-aircraft personnel as well as its fuel and equipment by plane before it could become independent of the coastal route for supplies and supplementary naval protection for its convoys. It is also extremely unlikely that land-based aircraft alone could provide adequate protection for merchant shipping over the great maritime routes between North and South America along which must flow the strategic raw material of the war industries of the United States. The day that the airplane can replace all other instruments of warfare is still far off. Hemisphere defense will con-

tinue to depend on the harmonious co-operation of land, air, and sea power and size, location, relative distance, configuration of coast line, and distribution of power potentials will define the extent to which the great strategic zones of the New World can be protected.

Under conditions of complete encirclement, the United States could not disperse her military strength over the whole hemisphere. She would be forced to guard against over-extension, to shorten the supply lines from the North American Continental Zone, and to concentrate on positions in the vicinity of the national base. The northern belt of the North American Buffer Zone would inevitably be lost and the Aleutian-Alaskan outpost in the northwest and the Iceland-Greenland position in the northeast would have to be sacrificed. The former could be taken by the Japanese without too great an effort and the latter by the Germans with comparative ease. After the conquest of the Russian Maritime Provinces and Eastern Siberia, the Nipponese would have all the advantages of proximity in military operations in the contact area between the Polar and the Pacific fronts. The same would apply to the Germans in the contact zone between the Polar and the Atlantic fronts. After the conquest of Great Britain, the position of Iceland close to Scotland and Norway would be untenable and the same would apply to Northern Greenland. The defeat of our allies across the oceans would bring our northern defense line down to the inner belt of the buffer zone from Prince Rupert Island to Newfoundland.

The North American Continental Zone could undoubtedly be held against the invader. Here all the advantages are on the side of the defense: proximity to war industries, well-prepared bases, and a truly continental system of communications that permits quick concentration of forces in any section. The American Mediterranean immediately to the south could also be defended with considerable success. It is, however, not a continental but an insular and maritime zone and can be reached only overseas. This means a great many disadvantages which do not prevail in the home territory. But relative distance favors the United States, the geographic configuration makes control relatively easy, and the strategic points are already in the control of the American navy. If the new bases can be finished

in time, this zone can be held and protected and the flow of its products to northern ports assured.

In regard to South America beyond the Mediterranean, the position of relative advantage between the United States and her opponents begins to change. The northern end of the great South American Buffer Zone is still closer to the American center of power than to the European center and, provided Peru and Brazil want to be defended and place the necessary bases at our disposal, we might be able to hold this section of the southern continent as far as the Tropic of Cancer in the west and the bulge of Brazil in the east. But beyond this lies Chile and the equidistant zone. Because the distance from Norfolk and from Brest to points beyond Natal is about equal, relative military strength would be a more decisive factor in this region than in any other. Under conditions of encirclement and with a one-ocean navy, we could never match the force which our enemies could direct against this area. An attack on the southern continent would certainly be accompanied by military pressure on both fronts of the North American Buffer Zone in order to oblige us to keep our forces concentrated in the north. In the military, as in all other phases of hemisphere relations, the southern part of South America stands out as a distinct unit less integrated with the rest of the New World than any other section. If the great pincer movement against the Western Hemisphere which encirclement would permit should begin to be exerted in full measure, we could not defend this region and its strategic raw materials would be lost to us.

The United States, with the aid of local co-operation, would be able to protect a large part of the New World but not all of it. It is true that the insular character of the Western Hemisphere remains a strategic advantage but, as a geographic region, it is no more a single strategic zone than it is a single culture area or a single economic unit. If the German-Japanese Alliance should be victorious on the Eurasian land mass and become free to turn its whole strength against the New World, the United States could not defend the hemisphere. Lower South America, consisting of Chile and the equidistant zone, would lie outside the range of our protection. The defeat of our allies in the Old World would not permit us to with-

draw to a position of hemisphere defense. We would be obliged to surrender the outer belts of the North and South American Buffer Zones and forced to make a last stand in terms of quarter sphere defense in the North American Continental Zone and the American Mediterranean.

Conclusion

The use of alliances . . . has in the last age been too much experienced to be contested; it is by leagues well concerted and strictly observed that the weak are defended against the strong, that bounds are set to the turbulence of ambition, that the torrent of power is restrained, and empires preserved from those inundations of war that, in former times, laid the world in ruins. By alliances . . . the equipoise of power is maintained, and those alarms and apprehensions avoided, which must arise from vicissitudes of empire and the fluctuations of perpetual contest.

ROBERT WALPOLE

IF the foreign policy of a state is to be practical, it should be designed not in terms of some dream world but in terms of the realities of international relations, in terms of power politics. The international community is without government, without a central authority to preserve law and order, and it does not guarantee the member states either their territorial integrity, their political independence, or their rights under international law. States exist, therefore, primarily in terms of their own strength or that of their protector states and, if they wish to maintain their independence, they must make the preservation or improvement of their power position the principal objective of foreign policy. Nations which renounce the power struggle and deliberately choose impotence will cease to influence international relations either for evil or for good and risk eventual absorption by more powerful neighbors.

A sound foreign policy must not only be geared to the realities of power politics, it must also be adjusted to the specific position

which a state occupies in the world. It is the geographic location of a country and its relation to centers of military power that define its problem of security. The international community is a world in which war is an instrument of national policy and the national domain is the military base from which the state fights and prepares for war during the temporary armistice called peace. In terms of that location, it must conduct its military strategy in war time, and in terms of that location, it should conduct its political strategy in peace time.

The Geographic Location of the United States

The territory of the United States is located on the northern land mass of the Western Hemisphere between Canada and Mexico. Our state is unique in that its base is of continental dimensions and fronts on two oceans. It represents an immense area in the temperate zone with large sections of fertile soil and a rich endowment of mineral resources. The national economy, in which a highly developed industrial structure supplements an extensive agriculture of great productivity, sustains a high standard of living for about 135 million people. No other country in the Western Hemisphere has a war potential equal to our own. Our power position is one of unquestioned hegemony over a large part of the New World. We are far stronger than our neighbors to the north and south, we dominate completely the American Mediterranean, and we are able to exert effective pressure on the northern part of South America. The remoteness of the economic and political centers of the A.B.C. countries has given them a relative degree of independence and they represent the only region in the hemisphere where our strength could not be exerted with ease.

The Western Hemisphere is surrounded by the Old World across three ocean fronts, the Pacific, the Arctic, and the Atlantic, and, because the earth is a globe, the same applies in reverse, the New World also surrounds the Old. It is the power potential of these two worlds and the internal distribution of forces in each sphere that define the geo-political significance of this geographic fact. The Old World is 2½ times as large as the New World and contains 7 times the population. It is true that, at present, industrial produc-

tivity is almost equally divided, but, in terms of relative self-sufficiency, the Eurasian Continent with the related continents of Africa and Australia is in a much stronger position. If the three land masses of the Old World can be brought under the control of a few states and so organized that large unbalanced forces are available for pressure across the ocean fronts, the Americas will be politically and strategically encircled. There is no war potential of any size in any of the southern continents and South American can, therefore, offer the United States no compensation for the loss of the balance of power in Europe and Asia.

It is true that the Western Hemisphere is separated from the Old World by large bodies of water, but oceans do not isolate. Since the Renaissance and the development of modern navigation, they have been not barriers but highways. The world has become a single field of forces. Because power is effective in inverse ratio to the distance from its source, widely separated regions can function as relatively autonomous power zones, but no area in the world can be completely independent of the others. Only if the available military forces within a zone balance each other out, will the area be inert and unable to influence other regions, but in that case the explanation lies in the power equilibrium, not in the geographic distance. If power is free, unbalanced, unabsorbed, it can be used in distant regions.

Originally, the center of military and political power was in Europe and it was the European balance that was reflected in other sections of the world. Later, relatively autonomous power zones emerged in the Western Hemisphere and in the Far East, but they have all continued to influence each other. The New World, notwithstanding its insular character, has not been an isolated sphere in which political forces found their natural balance without interference from outside. On the contrary, European power relations have influenced the political life of the people of this hemisphere from the beginning of their history. The growth and expansion of the United States has been challenged by every great power in Europe except Italy. We achieved our position of hegemony only because the states of that continent were never able to combine against us and because preoccupation with the balance of power at home

prevented them from ever detaching more than a small part of their strength for action across the Atlantic.

Since the states of the Western Hemisphere have achieved their independence, there has never been a time in which the transatlantic and transpacific regions have been in the hands of a single state or a single coalition of states. Balanced power in Europe and Asia has been characteristic of most of the period of our growth. But four times in our history there has been a threat of encirclement and of destruction of the balance of power across the oceans. The first threat was the appeal of France to the Holy Alliance for co-operation in the reconquest of the Spanish colonies. Our reply was the Monroe Doctrine. The second threat came in 1917 when the defeat of Russia, the demoralization of the French army, and the success of the submarine campaign suggested that Germany might win the First World War. Japan was using the golden opportunity presented by European withdrawal from Asia to make herself the dominant power in the Far East. Our answer to the danger in Europe was full participation in the war. The completeness of the victory made the existing British-Japanese Alliance a minor danger to our security. In terms of geography, the agreement did mean encirclement and both partners had come out of the war with greatly increased naval strength, practically unbalanced in their respective spheres. We, therefore, made the termination of their alliance the condition of our participation in disarmament in 1921.

The fourth threat has emerged since 1940 and this time it is in a form more serious than ever before. The German-Japanese Alliance, signed in that year, provided for co-operation against the Western Hemisphere. By the fall of 1941, Germany had conquered most of Europe; Japan most of the coastal regions of the Far East. Only Great Britain and Russia in Europe and China and the Dutch East Indies in Asia stood between them and the complete conquest of the Old World. Victory would have meant for Germany the realization of her dream of a great Euro-African sphere controlled from Berlin. Victory would have meant for Japan the transformation of her island state into a unit of continental dimensions. For the New World, such a situation would have meant encirclement by two gigantic empires controlling huge war potentials.

Hemisphere Defense?

In the face of this contingency, what was the correct policy for the United States to pursue? Public debate followed the traditional pattern of intervention versus isolation. Those interventionists who were impressed with the importance of power relations, contended that the first line of defense was of necessity the preservation of a balance of power in Europe and Asia. Those isolationists who were impressed with oceanic distances, felt convinced that we could disengage ourselves from the power struggles across the oceans and rely on hemisphere defense.

During the progress of the war, the interventionist position found wider and wider acceptance and the policy of the United States became one of increasing support to the Allies. The American people were spared the necessity of deciding on the last step, the transition from Lend-Lease Aid to full belligerency. The German-Japanese Alliance decided to strike before our war industries went into full production and large quantities of material became available for our allies. We are now full participants in the Second World War and our opponents have begun their attack on the outposts of the Western Hemisphere before their victory in the Old World is complete.

Isolation versus intervention is no longer a debate over war participation but the two geo-political theories which these attitudes represent will continue to influence our thinking about the principles of grand strategy that should guide us in the conduct of the war and in the formulation of the conditions of peace. There is still a danger that the erroneous ideas regarding the nature of the Western Hemisphere inherent in the isolationist position may tempt people to urge a defensive strategy in the belief that the New World could survive a German-Japanese victory abroad.

It should be remembered at the outset that our attempt to achieve effective solidarity with the nations below the Rio Grande will be opposed by the German-Japanese Alliance with all the power at their command. The struggle for South America is an inherent part of the Second World War and will become more, not less, important if victory in the Old World should be achieved. The campaign

will be fought by the fascist powers with all the weapons of totalitarian warfare, ideological, psychological, economic, political, and military. Their purpose will be to hinder the political integration of the New World, which is a prerequisite for common defense, and to prevent at all costs the creation of a system of collective security.

A political integration of the New World would be difficult not only because of the effective opposition of our enemies, but also because of a number of difficulties inherent in the project itself. The Western Hemisphere is devoid of most of the elements necessary for effective integration and successful defense. There is a wide divergence in ideological orientation between Anglo-Saxon America and Latin America. They represent two worlds that are different in racial and ethnic composition, different in economic and social structure, different in political experience, moral values, and cultural orientation; and the Latin American half is, in terms of historical tradition and present practice, much more predisposed toward dictatorship than toward democracy.

Economically, the Western Hemisphere is dependent on the products of the Old World for the strategic raw materials for its war industries, and the same applies to many of the articles necessary to preserve its standard of living. It is impossible to create, in any reasonable length of time, within the New World itself, an adequate raw material basis for the quantity of armament production that encirclement would impose, and the modest self-sufficiency that might be attained after ten years could be achieved only at an exorbitant cost and too late to do any good in the present conflict.

In case of German-Japanese victory, the dependence of the New World on exports would be an even greater weakness than its dependence on imports. Under the regional specialization which accompanied nineteenth-century free trade, the Americas developed as a colonial economy producing foodstuffs and raw materials for the Old World. Political independence and the industrialization of the United States have altered the relationship only in a minor degree. Twenty-two independent sovereign states could not defend themselves against the economic power represented by a commercial monopoly of the European market. Nothing short of a single hemisphere economy with centralized control of international trade could

provide the possibility of defense against the economic power of a victorious Germany. No American state would, however, be willing voluntarily to make the changes necessary to create such a regional economy. It could be achieved only by the same process which is now being used to transform the national economies of Europe into a Greater German Co-Prosperity Sphere. Only the conquest of the hemisphere by the United States and the ruthless destruction of existing regional economies could bring the necessary integration.

The Western Hemisphere is, like Europe and Asia, a world of power politics full of inherent conflicts and oppositions in which individual states pursue their national interests and not the higher interests of some super-continent. The pursuit of these interests and preoccupation with the balance of power produce two outstanding conflict patterns in the political constellation of the New World. The first is the basic opposition between the United States and South America, which would like to balance the strength of the Colossus of the North. The second derives from the struggle for power between Brazil and Argentina, which provides the core of the political alignments of the southern continent. These conflicts and oppositions offer the German-Japanese Alliance an ideal ground for political intrigue and it is extremely doubtful whether, in the face of its destructive activities, hemisphere solidarity could be preserved.

Through the Union of American Republics, the New World has made some halting steps toward political integration, but it has not moved much beyond platonic resolutions on the beauty of solidarity. It has also failed to create the political framework for a system of common defense against threats from across the ocean. There has been a great deal of phrase-making about the continentalizing of the Monroe Doctrine but no state has yet accepted a treaty obligation to defend anybody else. The enormous differences in war potential between the states make it impossible to create a multilateral system of defense based on equality and reciprocity. A formula has finally been found which preserves the legal equality of states, but protection continues to depend wholly on the military strength of the United States.

The military establishment of the United States would find the task of defending 15 million square miles of territory by no means

easy. The Americas contain at least six strategic zones of which only one, the North American Continental Zone, has a respectable war potential. There is not a single state in the whole of South America that is not, in military terms, a liability instead of an asset. It is true that certain regions of the Western Hemisphere must be defended because of their strategic significance to the security of the United States, but the weak states in those regions cannot compensate us for the loss of strong allies across the water.

The amount of territory which the United States would be able to defend against invasion would depend on the relative naval and air power still at our disposal after the defeat of our allies across the ocean. It is impossible to predict how much of the United States fleet would be available for the Pacific and how much of the British fleet would be at our disposal for defensive action in the Atlantic. The United States would probably be able to defend the continental domain of North America and the North American Buffer Zone, except perhaps the outposts in the Aleutians and Alaska in the west, and Greenland and Iceland in the east. She would in all likelihood be able to protect the American Mediterranean and the South American Buffer Zone provided that Brazil grants the use of the necessary air and naval bases. It is, however, not possible for the United States to defend the Equidistant Zone of South America, which extends from Patagonia to the bulge of Brazil and which is as far away from the centers of power in North America as from the centers of power in Europe, and very much nearer to Africa.

But even if the whole hemisphere could be protected from actual invasion, encirclement by a victorious German-Japanese Alliance would still mean ultimate defeat. In an era of totalitarian warfare invasion is not the only form of coercion. The New World would be surrounded by enemy territory and submitted to economic strangulation by the simple process of blockade through embargo. It does not control strategic raw materials indispensable to the Old World and it could not, therefore, break this economic strangulation through counter-embargo. Military action would be necessary, and effective military action would be impossible. Encirclement would preclude all possibility of a military front for a counter-offensive across the

seas. The Western Hemisphere would be in the same position in regard to the Old World as Great Britain would be in regard to the Continent of Europe if Russia should be defeated. She might not be invaded but, without the possibility of a front on the Continent, she could not hope to win the war. Allies across the oceans are as indispensable to us as allies across the Channel have been to Great Britain.

There is however little likelihood that the New World would remain united long enough to have an opportunity to practice common defense. Hemisphere solidarity would have been broken up by the other weapons long before the final military assault. With a social and ideological structure in Latin America predisposed in many ways toward the fascist ideology, with an abundance of ancient hatreds and present conflict patterns, and a complete dependence in many sections on the European market, propaganda, the psychological attack, and economic warfare would have a much better chance of success. Germany might obtain dominion over the southern part of the Equidistant Zone, without having to send an expeditionary force, by the simple device of dictating the conditions under which products of the Argentine would be permitted to enter the European markets. It is quite likely that the acceptance of a fascist regime friendly to Germany would be one of those conditions and that the Argentine would be asked to have her armies trained by a large force of German military instructors accompanied by the necessary aides and technicians. In that case, military occupation would simply register the result of surrender induced by economic warfare. It would not be the result of actual military operations against the southern continent. As in other regions of the world, military occupation would be merely the last step in a campaign of total warfare.

Such German intervention would bring into power a puppet government controlled from Berlin and a fascist party devoted to a program of national expansion and the re-establishment of the historic boundaries of the Viceroyalty of the La Plata. Uruguay, southern Brazil, Paraguay, Bolivia, and Chile would all become candidates for absorption into a Greater South American Co-Prosperity Sphere.

The struggle for power, which normally lies just below the surface, would burst into open conflict and the southern continent would enter a period of long and bloody wars.

Quarter-Sphere Defense?

The establishment of a Berlin-inspired fascist government on the La Plata would explode the myth of hemisphere solidarity and the possibility of hemisphere defense. The United States would be obliged to limit herself to quarter-sphere defense and to adapt her policy to the realities of South American power politics. If she acted immediately when the threat first emerged, the logical response would be an alliance with Chile and Brazil. If Chile, either voluntarily or under duress, joined the Argentine before we could prevent her, an alliance with Brazil and Peru would be indicated.

The territorial security of the continental domain of North America does not demand that the temperate zone of South America be in friendly hands. All that is required is that we hold the South American Buffer Zone. The La Plata, as a starting point for military operations against North America, is actually less dangerous than the Rhine or West Africa. A German naval base in Argentina is considerably less of a threat than a German naval base in France. Buenos Aires is 6,500 miles from Norfolk, and Brest is about 3,800 miles, approximately half the distance. The La Plata region as the starting point of a great military movement overland should cause no anxiety. The area between Montevideo and the Panama Canal Zone is comparable neither to the plains of Poland and Russia nor to the flat lands of Belgium and northern France. The new German mechanized divisions have won the admiration of the world, but they are not yet quite good enough for an overland journey from Buenos Aires to the Panama Canal. To ask them to swing north along the Paraguay River, cut through the tropical forests of the Matto Grosso, wallow through the mud swamps of the Amazon river lands, and scoot along the roller-coaster profiles of the Andes Mountains, is asking too much. The interior of South America is a wilderness without means of transportation, a true buffer zone. The only feasible route from the La Plata to the Panama Canal is a sea route longer

than that from Europe or from Africa, and it must round the bulge of Brazil. As long as the United States can keep her air power on the bulge, Buenos Aires cannot be more dangerous than Dakar.

There is also an exaggerated fear about the possibility of making the southern region the starting point for a series of hops, each one of which would establish an air base nearer to the Canal. It must be remembered that those bases would use material originating, not in the Argentine, but in western Europe and that the route is, therefore, slightly indirect. Because of the absence of transportation in the interior of the continent, the bases would have to be moved north by means of air-supported naval power. Again the bulge would have to be taken or neutralized. A German foothold in the Argentine or southern Brazil may be very undesirable for political reasons, but its military implications are not by any means disastrous. Strategically it is the bulge of Brazil, not the country farther south, that must be defended in the interests of the territorial security of the United States.

From the purely military point of view, quarter-sphere defense is a feasible policy, but from an economic point of view, the restricted area is even less viable than the hemisphere as a whole. It is true that economic integration would be a little easier because there would be no need of finding a market for the agricultural products of the La Plata, but the problem of the surplus agricultural commodities of North America would still remain. Much more serious, however, would be the question of imports. It has been suggested that, on the basis of the whole hemisphere, with all the resources of all the countries at our disposal, we might eventually arrive, after years of labor and great sacrifice, at an approximation of self-sufficiency in strategic raw materials. But this is not possible without the full participation of the temperate zone of South America. Without the tin and the tungsten of Bolivia, the copper of Chile, and the tungsten, wool, and tanning products of the Argentine, our war industries would be seriously crippled even if we could produce in northern Brazil the materials which now come from the tropical zones of Asia and Africa. The quarter-sphere does not contain the power potential necessary for an adequate system of defense against the complete encirclement which would then prevail.

There is no possibility of achieving an adequate integration of the states of the New World in the face of German opposition, and even if there were, the power potential of the Americas would still be inadequate to balance the Old World. Because of the distribution of land masses and military potentials, a balance of power in the transatlantic and transpacific zones is an absolute prerequisite for the independence of the New World and the preservation of the power position of the United States. There is no safe defensive position on this side of the oceans. Hemisphere defense is no defense at all. The Second World War will be lost or won in Europe and Asia. The strategic picture demands that we conduct our military operations in the form of a great offensive across the oceans. If our allies in the Old World are defeated, we cannot hold South America; if we defeat the German-Japanese Alliance abroad, our good neighbors will need no protection.

The Post-War World

In the first world conflict of the twentieth century, the United States won the war, but lost the peace. If this mistake is to be avoided, it must be remembered, once and for all, that the end of a war is not the end of the power struggle. It will be immediately resumed by other means, and the defeated powers will continue to challenge the victors. The interest of the United States demands not only victory in the war, but also continued participation in the peace.

The importance of the voice of the United States in the peace settlement will depend on the size of her military contribution to victory and her power position on the day of the armistice. Discussion about the type of international society to be created after the war has already begun. It will become more widespread as our participation in the war becomes greater and sacrifice and suffering begin to turn men's minds increasingly to the problem of shaping a better world order. The discussion will then inevitably have to consider the question of the role of the United States in the post-war period, and the old problem of isolation versus intervention will reappear in the form in which it was debated in 1919.

Although it is quite possible to conceive of a great variety of forms of political organization for the international community, there are in

reality only a few basic types of power distribution. International society might disappear as such and the individual states might become incorporated into a single world state, or the world might be ruled through the hegemony of one or two large empires. On the other hand, the international community might continue to operate through an unstable equilibrium of a number of large powers. All of these plans will be discussed and the more they differ from past practice, the greater will be their appeal. Plans for far-reaching changes in the character of international society are an intellectual by-product of all great wars, but, when fighting ceases, the actual peace structure usually represents a return to balanced power. This is not surprising because it is the preservation of that balance that inspires the great powers to participate in world conflicts.

World Federation

Abolition of the individual states and their merger into a world federation would involve the most basic transformation of international society. The struggle for power between regional groups would then change its character and international wars as such would disappear. This fact explains the appeal which this radical solution has for a great many persons. The people who have the most progressive ideas about the problems of peace are, however, seldom the ones in positions of political power. World federation is still far off. This is perhaps just as well because the world-state would probably be a great disappointment to its advocates and very different from what they had anticipated. Brotherly love would not automatically replace conflict, and the struggle for power would continue. Diplomacy would become lobbying and log-rolling, and international wars would become civil wars and insurrections, but man would continue to fight for what he thought worth while and violence would not disappear from the earth.

American-British Hegemony

Both in England and in the United States, there is talk of a world order based on American-British hegemony. The theme appears in several variations, from Mr. Streit's Anglo-American union to looser

forms of alliance and entente. The Anglo-American federalists present their program as a first stage in the creation of a world federation and they concede that other states, upon certificate of good behavior, will eventually be permitted to join. The fact remains, however, that in the meantime the union is expected to function as a hegemony. It is undoubtedly true that, immediately after the armistice, the United States and Great Britain could exert great power through control of the seas, particularly if they had previously destroyed Japanese sea power. But it is highly problematical whether American-British hegemony could be translated into a permanent form of world organization, and it would be a mistake to assume that this program would appeal to any but a limited number of Anglo-Saxons as an ideal substitute for German-Japanese hegemony.

American-British dominion is particularly appealing to people who have a nostalgic attachment to the eighteenth century and consider that the American Declaration of Independence was a mistake. The new imperium is expected to rest on sea power and financial strength, but the analogy which inspires it is faulty. Great Britain never ruled the world because of her sea power alone, the pupils of Admiral Mahan to the contrary notwithstanding. Great Britain was dominant during the period when Europe was the only center of power and when the European Continent could be neutralized by balancing its forces. The world of today contains three centers of power. The United States, which represents one, is to be part of the new hegemony, but a scheme for ruling the world by sea power would have to include Japan as a third partner unless she were destroyed first.

The response to any plan for a permanent Japanese-American-British hegemony based on sea power would inevitably be the creation of a counter-alliance by the great land powers. The integration of the Eurasian land mass by force, which the Second World War was fought to prevent, would then take place through voluntary co-operation because Germany, Russia, and China would find themselves encircled and in need of combining their strength. An alliance of the insular continent of North America with the two off-shore islands facing the Eurasian land mass would have great merits from the point of view of the territorial defense of the Western Hemisphere, but it would not be strong enough to rule the world and it

would leave England and Japan in extremely exposed positions. The Second World War has so far given no indication that, in a period of three-dimensional warfare, when land-based aircraft has an advantage over ships in narrow seas, sea power could dominate the world.

The Balance of Power

The difficulty with speculations about the merits of world federation or American-British hegemony is that they provide very little guidance for the practical problems which will face the United States on the day of the armistice. On that day, there will be neither world-state nor hegemony but many large and small powers. If the Allies are victorious, Russia and China will be operating as independent units; and there is a fair probability that there will also be a Japan and even a Germany. Strange though it may seem at this moment, it is quite conceivable that the British government would not relish the idea of a Germany so completely defeated that it could not defend itself against the invasion of victorious Russian armies. It is even conceivable that Washington might become convinced of the cogency of the British argument that asks for the continued existence of a powerful Germany. A Russian state from the Urals to the North Sea can be no great improvement over a German state from the North Sea to the Urals. Russian air fields on the Channel are as dangerous as German air fields to British territorial security. The present war effort is undoubtedly directed against the destruction of Hitler and the National Socialist Party, but this does not necessarily imply that it is directed at the destruction of Germany as a military power. Similar reasoning is applicable to the Far East. The danger of another Japanese conquest of Asia must be removed, but this does not inevitably mean the complete elimination of the military strength of Japan and the surrender of the Western Pacific to China or Russia.

Armistice day will find us, therefore, with an international society composed of at least six great powers and a number of small ones. It is well to remember that, whatever may ultimately be achieved in the form of integration and federation, we will start more or less where we left off when war broke out. Unless the United States con-

tinues the struggle until she has defeated not only her enemies but also her former allies, the post-war period will begin with an international society composed of numerous independent states.

There will be other similarities between the post-war and the pre-war world in the power pattern of international society. To the extent that geographic factors determine international relations, they will be present in both periods. The distribution of the land masses, the location of strategic raw materials, and the relative distances between countries will not change. The post-war world is still going to be a world of decentralization of power with autonomous zones in the Far East, North America, and Europe, and the relations between these three zones will continue to dominate world politics. Basically, the new order will not differ from the old, and international society will continue to operate with the same fundamental power patterns. It will be a world of power politics in which the interests of the United States will continue to demand the preservation of a balance in Europe and Asia. The same considerations of political strategy that once led us to aid the Allies and that should guide our conduct of the war, will continue to demand our participation in the political life of the transoceanic zones in peace time.

Territorial Security and Peaceful Change

The post-war period is going to begin with a small number of large states and a large number of small states, and the architects of the New World Order will, therefore, again be faced with the old problem of territorial security and peaceful change. In the light of the technical developments of modern warfare and the character of total war, this problem is going to present special difficulties. Territorial security and political independence have traditionally rested on the power of individual states or, in the case of small states, on the strength of more powerful neighbors. Interest in the survival of small states because they served as buffer states or as weights in the balance of power has preserved them notwithstanding the power differential between the strong and the weak.

Mechanized warfare, with its emphasis on mobility and speed, and the development of air fighting, which has made war three-dimen-

sional, have greatly complicated the problem of security. In the days of two-dimensional warfare, defense rested in the first place on frontier fortifications. Certain types of geographic frontier gave more protection than others, but the border always offered an opportunity to create some kind of defensive front. The retarding influence of frontier fortifications gave time for full mobilization and permitted allies to come to the aid of the invaded state. Blitzkrieg and aerial warfare have changed all this. The blitz technique conquers small states without giving the protector time to offer effective aid. Air power ignores the linear front at the border, makes it possible to fly over fortifications, and drop bombs on the interior of the country. There is still some geographic protection against mechanized warfare in an insular position and in extremely high mountain ranges, but survival is now possible only when great size permits defense in depth.

The League of Nations, created at the end of the last World War, was expected to neutralize the differential in strength between weak and strong states and to provide protection for the smaller members of the international community. Article 10 of the Covenant clearly established the principle of collective security, the right of the individual state to receive protection from the international community against aggression and the threat of aggression. As it turned out in practice, the right to protection proved illusory and the doctrine of collective security a pious fraud. This was due in part to the failure of the power structure. The League envisaged international sanctions both in the form of economic measures and in the form of military action, but the Council did not have at its disposal the organized force of the international community. Collective action depended not on an international police force, but on ad hoc co-operation of the military forces of the individual states. The League was not a federation, it was not even a confederation, it was merely an organization for the improved application of balance of power principles.

Economic sanctions were applied in the Italo-Ethiopian dispute and proved ineffective. Applied alone, they can be a deterrent only if aggressor and defendant are so equally matched that economic pressure could determine the outcome of the struggle. Where there is great inequality in military strength and victory is easy and quick, the only conditions under which aggression is likely, they are useless.

They did not save Ethiopia, and they would not have saved Holland or Belgium. If military sanctions had ever been tried, they would probably have been equally ineffective. They cannot provide protection comparable to that of an old-fashioned military alliance. The process of collective action is slow, cumbersome, and uncertain; it cannot work out strategic plans in advance of action. In the days of blitzkrieg and aerial warfare, collective security cannot neutralize the power differential between the weak and the strong. The policy of the *fait accompli* and the quick thrust against the small foe can still be profitably pursued. As in the case of economic sanctions, military sanctions are helpful only if aggressor and victim are fairly evenly matched.

The result is that there can be no security in an international society in which there are wide differences in strength between individual units. Small states have become even less viable than they were already and they have ceased to perform buffer functions for the larger states. They are more than ever a power vacuum in a high-pressure area and a temptation to ambitious neighbors. Whatever may have been their great historical contributions to thought and civilization, in days of three-dimensional warfare they are a political hazard to the whole international community. The builders of the post-war order will do well to attempt to eliminate great differences in military strength between states within the same power zone.

Approximate equality of strength between members of regional groups might also simplify the problem of so-called "peaceful change," which the League of Nations equally failed to solve. The Covenant stated in Article 19 that the Assembly might advise the reconsideration of treaties which have become inapplicable and of conditions which might endanger the peace. But the League was even less prepared to use force to induce change, even change that was considered necessary and just, than to use force to protect the status quo. Both are, however, indispensable to any ordered society. The first step from anarchy to order is not the disappearance of force, but its use by the community instead of by the individual members.

In this respect, the Concert of Europe, as it operated during the first half of the nineteenth century, represented a much more realistic system than the League of Nations. It accepted as a matter of course

that force should be available not only for the preservation of the status quo but also for its transformation. Collective action was used not only in cases where maintenance of a specific situation was desired, but also in cases where it was necessary to force a change upon a reluctant state. Holland and Turkey were forced by collective action to accept Belgian and Greek independence.

The replacement of the force of litigants by the force of the community is the first step toward international order. This transfer would be facilitated if individual states were of approximately the same strength and neutralized each other's power. The overwhelming force necessary to discourage resort to arms could then be much more easily created. No single state would be so small that it would have to hesitate to participate in common action, for fear of becoming a special victim of revenge. Difference in geographic location would still mean difference in exposure to aggression, but, when combined with equality of strength, proximity does not necessarily mean danger.

The United States and the Peace Settlement

If the last World War was an indication of what we may expect, there will be no dearth of statesmen fully aware of the dangers implied in a return to isolation and fully capable of visualizing the problems of the post-war world. But whether public opinion will be ready to support them remains to be seen. When the armistice approaches, the American public will probably be thoroughly sick of Europe and Asia and profoundly disgusted with its allies. The temptation will be almost irresistible to repeat the fatal blunders of 1919 and to believe that, the war having been won, we can return to our insular domain. But international life is dynamic, and preserving the balance of power is a permanent job. It cannot be solved once and for all by making the perfect treaty, not even by making a "just" treaty.

It might be more in harmony with the nature of totalitarian warfare and provide a better transition to other forms of power struggle, if a scheme could be devised for the termination of the military conflict without a peace treaty. But, if we must have a peace treaty, it is more important that it provide procedures for revision than

that it be a just treaty. The only practical criterion of the justice of a treaty is the intensity of the desire to change it. A defeated nation that has not lost its vitality inevitably adopts a revisionist policy because national pride demands that the symbol of its defeat be destroyed. The desire for treaty revision is, however, by no means limited to the vanquished. Many dynamic and expanding states have later felt restrained and hampered by a peace structure that registered earlier victories.

In a dynamic world in which forces shift and ideas change, no legal structure can remain acceptable for any length of time. Preserving order within the state is not a question of designing once and for all the final and permanent solution of all problems, but a question of making daily decisions that will adjust human frictions, balance social forces, and compromise political conflicts. It involves deciding ever anew in the light of changing circumstances what should be preserved and what should be changed. Preserving order in the international society is a problem of the same nature, although complicated by the decentralization of power in individual states. It can be handled on different planes of organization, by diplomacy, by ad hoc conferences, or by permanent consultative committees, but as long as the community remains composed of individual states, the nature of the political decision remains the same. It means deciding on which side of a dispute the military power of the state shall be placed.

The United States and Europe

The post-war policy of the United States will have to operate in a world of power politics under conditions very similar to those that prevailed before the outbreak of the conflict. It should be guided by a political strategy which demands the preservation of a balance of power in Europe and in Asia, and by the consideration that territorial security and peaceful change are more likely to be achieved if the individual states in the different power zones do not differ too widely in their relative strength.

For the European Continent, as for the world at large, it is possible to envisage three different types of power pattern, a United States of Europe, a hegemony by one or two great states, and an

unstable equilibrium of forces. A European federation is not a power constellation that the United States should encourage. Balanced power, not integrated power, is in our interest. From the point of view of power politics, it is immaterial in the long run whether the economic and military potential of a region becomes integrated into a single unit by a process of conquest or by a process of federation. The United States did not start her career as the result of the conquest of twelve colonies by Massachusetts, but she is none the less today a danger to the states of Latin America because of the mere fact of her size and power. A federal Europe would constitute an agglomeration of force that would completely alter our significance as an Atlantic power and greatly weaken our position in the Western Hemisphere. If the peace objective of the United States is the creation of a united Europe, she is fighting on the wrong side. All-out aid to Mr. Hitler would be the quickest way to achieve an integrated transatlantic zone.

If the interests of the United States demand the prevention of a federal Europe, they also demand the prevention of the establishment of hegemony over Europe by one or two states. Fortunately neither of these two contingencies is likely to face us at the outset. Post-war Europe, as suggested, will begin with at least two and probably three great powers, Great Britain, Russia, and Germany; a number of smaller ones, Portugal, Spain, France, and Italy; Sweden and Switzerland; and the refugee governments operating from London. The practical problem will be to design a workable grouping that will create both a balanced continent and achieve a maximum equality of strength among the individual units. To achieve this, it will be necessary either to break up the large powers such as Russia and Germany, or to combine the smaller ones into large federations which will preserve the cultural autonomy of the component parts, but which will be strong enough to discourage thoughts of easy conquest. The latter is bound to be a more satisfactory procedure in the long run.

The greatest difficulty will be that of balancing Germany and Russia. In case of Allied victory, the Soviet Union will come out of the war as one of the great industrial nations of the world with an enormous war potential. Germany, unless destroyed, will continue to

represent an impressive military strength as demonstrated in the First and Second World Wars. The easiest solution would be to give them a common frontier. But if this should prove impossible, then the political unit between them should be a great eastern European federation from the Baltic to the Mediterranean, not a series of small buffer states. More troublesome is going to be the problem of Holland and Belgium, the old buffer states that have ceased to perform their protective function and that can neither shield Great Britain from bombing nor France from invasion under conditions of modern warfare. It is possible to conceive of several different combinations in addition to an eastern European federation, such as a British-Scandinavian group around the North Sea and the Baltic, and a Latin group around the Mediterranean. The Versailles settlement sacrificed economic and power considerations to the exclusive demands of the principle of self-determination with the result that the whole power structure came to rest on two weak crutches, a disarmed Germany and a non-fortified Rhineland. The new peace will not only have to correct the Balkanization of Europe, which was introduced after the First World War, but it will also have to achieve the integration of other states into a few large units.

The ideal of units of approximate equality in military strength and power potential is, however, not likely to be fully realized. But even if it were, it would still not permit the United States to withdraw from Europe. Third party strength will continue to be needed to neutralize differentials, and a balance of power is essentially an unstable equilibrium that needs constant attention and adjustment. Twice in one generation we have gone through the cycle of isolation, neutrality, intervention, and war, the same cycle which Great Britain has repeated many times. It should be clear by now to both nations that their respective moats do not protect and that there can be security only in balanced power. The efforts and sacrifices of the Second World War should remind us that it is easier to balance a power differential when it is small than when it is large. The world conflict might well have been avoided by the expenditure of 20 million dollars and the employment of an army of 50,000 men in March, 1936. It will be cheaper in the long run to remain a working member of the European power zone than to withdraw for short intermis-

sions to our insular domain only to be forced to apply later the whole of our national strength to redress a balance that might have needed but a slight weight at the beginning.

It is to be hoped that this European power zone can be organized in the form of a regional League of Nations with the United States as an extra-regional member. This suggestion is made in the full realization that a league system is merely an improved balance of power system. From the American point of view, that is an advantage, not a disadvantage. Such a league offers the only effective method for permanent participation in the political affairs of Europe. Our strength must remain available to preserve the balance of power. This means that it cannot be tied up in a one-sided alliance with one or two states. Such a procedure would force us to play the power politics of our allies instead of our own, and to aid in the establishment and maintenance of their hegemonic position in Europe. The only form in which the United States can both protect her interests in the preservation of a European balance and aid in the maintenance of order and political justice, is through participation in a league based on states of approximately equal strength with a covenant that provides for a revitalized Article 10 and a really effective system of "peaceful change."

The United States and Asia

The United States has been interested in the preservation of a balance of power in the Far East primarily for the protection of her position as an Asiatic power. But even if she were to withdraw from Asia and grant independence to the Philippines, she would still remain interested in the power relations of the transpacific zone. The Asiatic Mediterranean is perhaps the most important single source of strategic raw materials for the United States, and its control by a single power would endanger the basis of our military strength. The Far East was the last area to become an autonomous power zone and it is still inferior to both Europe and the United States as a source of political power. Advanced technology will however sooner or later translate the inherent power potential of the region into actual military strength, and, when that occurs, its relative importance com-

pared to the two other zones will increase. The preservation of a balance will then be necessary not only because of our interest in strategic raw materials but also because of what unbalanced power in this region could do to the rest of the world.

The end of the Second World War will also find in existence in the Far East a number of independent units: Russia, China, and perhaps Japan; Great Britain, the Dutch East Indies, Australia, and New Zealand. The problem of building out of these units a balanced power structure in terms of states of approximately equal strength is going to be even more difficult than in Europe, and the main difficulty of the post-war period will be not Japan but China. The power potential of the former Celestial Kingdom is infinitely greater than that of the Land of the Cherry Blossom and once that power potential begins to express itself in actual military strength, the position of a defeated Japan as a small off-shore island near the Asiatic mainland is going to be very uncomfortable. When long-range bombing squadrons can operate from the tip of the Shan-tung peninsula as well as from Vladivostok, fire insurance rates in the Japanese paper cities will undoubtedly go up.

A modern, vitalized, and militarized China of 400 million people is going to be a threat not only to Japan, but also to the position of the Western Powers in the Asiatic Mediterranean. China will be a continental power of huge dimensions in control of a large section of the littoral of that middle sea. Her geographic position will be similar to that of the United States in regard to the American Mediterranean. When China becomes strong, her present economic penetration in that region will undoubtedly take on political overtones. It is quite possible to envisage the day when this body of water will be controlled not by British, American, or Japanese sea power but by Chinese air power.

It will be difficult to find public support in the United States for a Far Eastern policy based on these realities of power politics. It is true that intervention in Far Eastern affairs is traditionally much more acceptable than intervention in Europe, but this tradition is also tied up with a pro-Chinese and anti-Japanese orientation which the war itself will greatly intensify. Public opinion will probably continue to see Japan as the great danger, long after the balance has

shifted in favor of China and it has become necessary to pursue in the Far East the same policy that we have pursued in regard to Europe. Twice in one generation we have come to the aid of Great Britain in order that the small off-shore island might not have to face a single gigantic military state in control of the opposite coast of the mainland. If the balance of power in the Far East is to be preserved in the future as well as in the present, the United States will have to adopt a similar protective policy toward Japan. The present inconsistency in American policy will have to be removed. It is illogical to insist that Japan accept a Chinese empire from Vladivostok to Canton and at the same time to support Great Britain in her wars for the preservation of buffer states across the North Sea. In the Far East, as in Europe, such protection can only be provided by participation in a regional League of Nations. A one-sided treaty of alliance with Japan would be unwise. Only by generalizing our commitment and thus maintaining our freedom of action can we serve our best interests and aid in the maintenance of order and peace in Asia.

The United States in the Western Hemisphere

If the Allies are victorious, the position of the United States in the Western Hemisphere will remain unchanged. That means a position of hegemony over a very large part of the New World. From the point of view of a desirable regional organization, it would obviously be an advantage if some of the South American states could federate into larger units. But even an alliance between the A.B.C. states, in itself unlikely, could not balance the strength of the Colossus of the North. Our hegemonic position rests in large measure on a difference in power potential between North and South America which no amount of political combination within the zone can overcome. To transform existing power relations in the Western Hemisphere into a political structure composed of units of about equal strength will involve even greater difficulties than a similar program for Europe and Asia. Our position in the New World can be neutralized only by means of extra-regional influences and our good neighbors must, therefore, inevitably continue their efforts to balance our power by means of European or Asiatic affiliations.

There is already in existence a political organization of the American Republics. The Pan American Union is an obvious starting point for a league of the Western Hemisphere and it should not be difficult to make a place for Canada. It has suffered in the past and will continue to suffer from the unbalanced position of the Colossus of the North. There are people in the United States firmly convinced that all power corrupts. They feel that the United States should be balanced just like other states. Their conviction may well lead them to advocate that we please our Latin American friends by accepting an extra-regional member in the political organization of the Western Hemisphere. Such a member would then occupy a position similar to the one which we envisage for ourselves in the Asiatic and European political constellations. In the light of our devotion to the principles of the Monroe Doctrine and the fact that we are fighting German intervention in South America, it is, however, not likely that such a program would find wide support.

The United States in the World

International life, as well as national life, has problems that can be solved only in terms of a functional approach. The post-war world will therefore need organizations such as the Universal Postal Union and the International Labor Office that must, of necessity, operate in terms of the world as a whole. The regional approach remains, however, the best way to deal with political problems. The quest for universality that characterized the League of Nations only led to weakness. The Scandinavian states were not interested in the boundary and power problems of the La Plata region, and the Latin American states were not interested in the questions that confronted eastern Europe. For a long time to come, international organization must provide both for many states whose field of operations and political activity is inevitably regional, and for a few world powers which must have an opportunity to participate in the politics of more than one region.

This program does not promise the end of international strife. It accepts the fact that there will always be conflict, and that war will remain a necessary instrument in the preservation of a balance of

power. An equilibrium of forces inherently unstable, always shifting, always changing, is certainly not an ideal power pattern for an international society. But while we can deplore its shortcomings, we shall do well to remember that it is an indispensable element of an international order based on independent states. It encourages co-operation, conciliation, and the growth of law and is more likely to preserve peace and maintain justice than any other type of power distribution. The founders of the United States were impressed with the value and importance of balanced power. They created for this nation a government of checks and balances in the profound conviction that only in that manner could tyranny be avoided. Our government has been criticized for being slow and cumbersome, and it has irritated many who prefer quick and efficient response to executive command, but it has lived up to the hopes of its founders and preserved the political and civil liberties perhaps better than any other government. A similar merit extends to balanced power in international society.

The League of Nations was offered to the world as an instrument of international co-operation. As such, it was conceived in terms of the liberal ideology of the nineteenth century. But the new institution did not protect the status quo, it did not provide for orderly change, and it failed to create, through voluntary delegation of power, the new levels of integration which modern industrial and technological development make necessary. The German-Japanese Alliance hopes to achieve world order through conquest, a program which has been thoroughly rejected by most of the nations of the world. America can offer a third approach, one that provides possibilities both for integration and for the protection of the rights of individual states. The program suggested does not preclude the eventual development of federal patterns of political organization. It does not require permanent opposition to the trend toward political and economic co-ordination. It merely asks that the geographic pattern of integration shall not be such as to exclude us from the transoceanic zones, thereby exposing us once again to the danger of encirclement.

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APPENDICES

Appendix I

NOTES ON MAPS

MAP I—HEMISPHERE DEFENSE

The front endpaper map is designed to illustrate the position of the Western Hemisphere on the earth's surface. The projection used is an azimuthal equidistant projection centered on St. Louis. Distances along radial lines drawn through St. Louis are true to scale. The disadvantage of this type of projection, namely, the great distortion along the outer rim, is not a serious drawback for the function which this particular map is designed to perform. The projection was selected because it permits the indication on one map of a number of factors in the location of the United States which would otherwise have required several distinct charts. It presents a global picture and makes it clear that the New World is separated from the Old along three fronts, the Polar, the Pacific, and the Atlantic. This projection illustrates better than any other the strategic location of the Aleutian-Alaskan zone in relation to the great circle route from Japan to San Francisco and the location of the Iceland-Greenland zone in relation to the great circle route from Western Europe to Norfolk.

MAPS II AND III—ENCIRCLEMENT OF THE NEW WORLD *and* ENCIRCLEMENT OF THE OLD WORLD

These maps are designed to illustrate the reciprocal encirclement of the Old World and the New which is due to the global character of the earth. The projection selected is Gall's stereographic, a cylindrical projection which touches the sphere at 45° north and 45° south. It has most of the advantages of the Mercator projection and is without the extreme distortion in high latitudes. The principal advantage is that it shows the whole surface of the earth in one chart and that it can be prolonged in either an easterly or a westerly direction.

MAP IV—STRATEGIC RAW MATERIALS IN LATIN AMERICA

The map of South America and the American Mediterranean which is used to depict the source of hemisphere raw materials was sketched on a special projection designed by Messrs. O. M. Miller and William A. Briesemeister of the staff of the American Geographical Society. It is called a "Bi-polar, Oblique, Conic, Conformal Projection." The poles are 104° apart on the sphere, one located in the South Pacific west of Chile, the other in the North Atlantic east of Labrador. The advantage of this projection is that it permits drawing both the northern and the southern continents on one chart with a minimum of distortion.

MAPS V AND VI—PACIFIC DEFENSE *and* ATLANTIC DEFENSE

These maps are designed to illustrate some of the strategic implications of the geographic location of the New World in regard to attacks coming from Asia and Europe. The projection selected is an Aitoff equal area projection. It is true that, in this projection, shapes are badly distorted in the far-off quadrants, but neither of the two maps covers the whole globe and the areas of extreme distortion are therefore not included. Besides, in illustrating broad strategic problems, it is more important that ocean surfaces should be everywhere true to scale than that coast lines should be true to form.

Appendix II

THE COUNTRIES OF THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE

Country	*Area in 1,000 sq. miles*	*Population in 1,000; estimate as of Dec. 1938*	*Government expenditure 1937*		*Armament expenditure 1937*	
			Year	*In millions of dollars*	*In millions of dollars*	*As % of total expenditure*
United States (& Alaska)	3,613	130,363	1937/38	7,691.3	1,032.9	13.4
Canada (& Newfoundland & Labrador)	3,858	11,551	1937/38	548.0	32.4	5.9
The American Mediterranean						
Colombia	440	8,800	1937	48.6	7.3	15.0
Costa Rica	19	623	1937	6.2	0.5	8.1
Cuba	44	4,228	1937/38	71.9	18.5	25.7
Dominican Republic	19	1,617	1937	11.6	2.0	17.2
Guatemala	42	3,045	1937/38	11.0	1.8	16.4
Haiti	10	2,600	1937/38	5.8	1.5	25.9
Honduras	59	1,040	1937/38	5.9	1.1	18.6
Mexico	760	19,640	1937	127.4	22.5	17.7
Nicaragua	49	900	1937/38	2.1		(0.3)
Panama	29	560	1937	9.6	0.1	1.0
Salvador	13	1,704	1937/38	8.9	1.4	15.7
Venezuela	352	3,580	1937/38	98.6	31.1	31.5
West Indies						
British (incl. Honduras)	21	2,361				
French	1	565				
Dutch	.4	101				

Intermediate Zone						
Ecuador	176	3,000	1937	7.5	1.9	25.3
Peru	482	7,200	1937	42.3	8.8	20.8
Guianas						
British	90	338				
French	35	37				
Dutch	60	174				
Lower South America						
Argentina	1,078	12,957	1937	403.1	90.1	22.4
Bolivia	421	3,350	1937	13.8	3.0	21.7
Brazil	3,286	44,116	1937	358.2	110.2	30.8
Chile	286	4,635	1937	76.4	21.7	28.4
Paraguay	151	1,000	1937/38	6.7	1.9	28.4
Uruguay	72	2,123	1937	69.7	8.6	12.3
Total	15,469	272,200		9,624.6	1,399.3	14.5

SOURCES: *Area:* Statistical Yearbook of the League of Nations 1939/40, pp. 15-16 (square kilometers converted into square miles 1 $km^2 = .3861$ sq. mi.).

Population: Statistical Yearbook of the League of Nations 1939/40, pp. 15-16.

Budget Expenditure: Statistical Yearbook of the League of Nations 1938/39 and 1939/40.

Armament Expenditure: Armament Yearbook of the League of Nations 1939. Figures converted into United States Dollars by official exchange rates (averages of the period in question).

Appendix III

DESTINATION OF HEMISPHERE EXPORTS IN 1937

Country of origin	*United States % of total*	*Canada and Newfound-land % of total*	*Latin America % of total*	*Total Western Hemisphere % of total*	*Transatlantic % of total*	*Transpacific % of total*	*Total export $1,000*	*Total import $1,000*
The United States		15.2	19.1	34.3	47.5	18.2	3,298,929	3,009,852
Canada	36.1	.9	4.0	41.0	50.5	8.5	997,407	808,928
Newfoundland	22.4	9.3	11.0	42.7	57.1	.2	28,058	23,925
St. Pierre and Miquelon	25.0	50.0	10.0	85.0	15.0		590	800
Sub-total 1.	35.8 [1]	15.4 [2]	15.6	35.9	48.3	15.8	4,324,984	3,843,505
The American Mediterranean								
Colombia	64.2	5.5	10.9	80.6	19.3	.1	104,592	95,972
Costa Rica	45.1	.6	4.2	49.9	49.4	.7	11,512	11,879
Cuba	80.7	.4	1.1	82.2	17.7	.1	186,071	129,572
Dominican Republic	32.2		5.9	38.1	58.5	3.4	18,120	11,692
Guatemala	64.2	1.4	.8	66.4	33.4	.2	16,109	20,929
Haiti	27.9	.6	1.0	29.5	68.4	2.1	8,971	9,215
Honduras	88.8	.2	2.1	91.1	8.9		9,641	10,387
Mexico	56.2		7.5	63.8	34.2	2.0	247,638	107,317
Nicaragua	55.4		4.6	60.0	35.2	4.8	7,038	5,621
Panama	90.9	.4	4.5	95.8	4.0	.2	4,070	21,828
Salvador	61.5	3.6	2.8	67.9	32.1		15,516	10,416
Venezuela	16.4	2.0	68.5	86.9	13.0	.1	172,271	86,029

West Indies								
British	9.2	16.9	9.3	35.4	64.2	.4	69,870	105,165
French	.7		.8	1.5	98.5		21,260	16,529
Dutch	14.0	.1	12.9	27.0	71.8	1.2	145,785	163,641
Sub-total 2.	44.4	2.2	17.2	63.8	35.3	.9	1,038,464	869,192
Intermediate Zone								
Ecuador	33.2		15.8	49.0	47.0	4.0	14,928	11,979
Peru	22.6	7.3	17.1	47.0	51.5	1.5	96,850	59,272
Guianas								
British	6.0	44.8	8.6	59.4	40.6		13,532	11,888
French	1.5		1.5	3.0	97.0		1,490	2,130
Dutch	65.2		7.3	72.5	27.5		4,790	3,780
Sub-total 3.	23.2	10.0	15.6	48.8	49.6	1.6	130,990	89,049
Lower South America								
Argentina	12.8	2.8	8.5	24.1	74.7	1.2	713,174	479,767
Bolivia	7.3		2.9	10.2	89.8		45,479	21,621
Brazil	36.3	.3	7.2	43.8	51.0	5.2	347,584	330,565
Chile	32.1	.1	3.8	36.0	61.8	2.2	195,231	88,346
Paraguay	13.0	.6	21.2	34.7	64.9	.4	8,490	8,726
Uruguay	16.0	.5	4.7	21.2	67.6	11.2	55,352	58,098
Falkland Islands			4.0	4.0	96.0		3,020	1,503
Sub-total 4.	21.4	1.6	7.2	30.2	67.1	2.7	1,368,330	988,626
Grand Total	32.3 [1]	9.7 [2]	14.2	39.3	50.1	10.6	6,862,768	5,790,372

[1] Percentage of total exports excluding exports of the United States.
[2] Percentage of total exports excluding exports of Canada.

Appendix IV

ORIGIN OF HEMISPHERE IMPORTS IN 1937

Country of destination	*United States % of total*	*Canada and Newfoundland % of total*	*Latin America % of total*	*Total Western Hemisphere % of total*	*Transatlantic % of total*	*Transpacific % of total*	*Total imports $1,000*
The United States		13.3	22.9	36.2	34.5	29.3	3,009,852
Canada	60.7	.3	4.8	65.8	27.1	7.1	808,928
Newfoundland	31.1	37.1	1.3	69.5	28.8	1.7	23,925
St. Pierre and Miquelon	25.0	50.0	6.0	81.0	19.0		800
Sub-total 1.	59.8 [1]	13.6 [2]	19.0	42.7	32.9	24.4	3,843,505
The American Mediterranean							
Colombia	48.4	1.1	3.4	52.9	46.5	.6	95,972
Costa Rica	42.5	.4	6.1	49.0	40.4	10.6	11,879
Cuba	68.6	.8	4.5	73.9	21.6	4.5	129,572
Dominican Republic	52.3	1.7	4.5	58.5	27.3	14.2	11,692
Guatemala	45.3	.4	4.6	50.3	49.2	.5	20,929
Haiti	51.0	2.1	3.6	56.7	35.7	7.6	9,215
Honduras	58.0	1.3	9.8	69.2	16.2	14.6	10,387
Mexico	62.1	1.1	2.1	65.3	32.5	2.2	170,317
Nicaragua	54.2		10.6	64.8	30.8	4.4	5,621
Panama	52.0	.5	7.3	59.8	20.2	20.0	21,828
Salvador	40.4	.6	5.7	46.7	53.1	.2	10,416
Venezuela	52.8	.1	1.9	54.8	41.5	3.7	86,029

West Indies							
British	23.6	14.9	9.9	48.4	46.1	5.5	105,165
French	16.2	.5	7.2	23.9	76.1		16,529
Dutch	12.8		80.7	93.5	5.4	1.1	163,641
Sub-total 2.	44.3	2.4	18.9	65.6	30.9	3.5	869,192
Intermediate Zone							
Ecuador	39.6	.6	6.5	46.7	49.6	3.7	11,979
Peru	35.4	2.3	11.2	48.9	45.4	5.7	59,272
Guianas							
British	9.8	14.3	5.7	29.8	64.9	5.3	11,888
French	5.0		20.0	25.0	75.0		2,130
Dutch	22.7	1.4	9.6	33.7	55.9	10.4	3,780
Sub-total 3.	31.3	3.5	10.0	44.8	49.7	5.5	89,049
Lower South America							
Argentina	16.1	1.5	11.0	28.6	66.0	5.4	479,767
Bolivia	27.7		34.1	61.8	33.4	4.8	21,621
Brazil	23.1	1.4	18.8	43.3	54.9	1.8	330,565
Chile	29.1	.6	17.3	47.0	48.6	4.4	88,346
Paraguay	7.6	.1	44.2	51.8	33.2	15.0	8,726
Uruguay	13.6	.6	31.0	45.2	49.7	5.1	58,098
Falkland Islands			43.9	43.9	55.4	.7	1,503
Sub-total 4.	19.6	1.3	16.2	37.1	58.8	4.1	988,626
Grand Total	39.7 [1]	9.0 [2]	18.4	45.2	37.3	17.5	5,790,372

[1] Percentage of total imports excluding imports of the United States.
[2] Percentage of total imports excluding imports of Canada.

Appendix V

PRINCIPAL TRANSOCEANIC SOURCES OF UNITED STATES IMPORTS OF STRATEGIC AND CRITICAL RAW MATERIALS 1937

As Per Cent of Total Imports by Value

	Country	*Per cent*	*Country*	*Per cent*	*Country*	*Per cent*
STRATEGIC						
Minerals						
Aluminum (Bauxite)						
Antimony	China	9.5				
Chrome	South Africa	55.0	Turkey	10.0	Philippines	6.5
Manganese	Russia	30.8	West Africa	22.8	Norway	11.2
Mica	British India	73.3	Madagascar	7.5	United Kingdom	4.8
Nickel	United Kingdom	1.2				
Quartz Crystal						
Quicksilver	Italy	52.9	Spain	35.9	United Kingdom	2.7
Tin	British Malaya	76.1	United Kingdom	8.1	China	4.9
Tungsten	China	65.7	British Malaya	15.9	Australia	6.3
Agricultural Products						
Coconut Shell Char	Other transp.	.1				
Manila Fiber	Philippines	98.0				
Quinine	Dutch East Indies	76.9	Netherlands	22.7		
Rubber	British Malaya	60.7	Dutch East Indies	25.9	Ceylon	5.1
Silk	Japan	92.4	China	5.5	Italy	2.0
Wool	Australia	25.8	New Zealand	10.0	China	8.1

CRITICAL							
Minerals							
Asbestos	South Africa	12.3	Russia	4.4	Malta	3.0
Cadmium	Belgium	28.1	United Kingdom	18.6	Norway	10.9
Cryolite							
Fluorspar	Germany	55.2	France	20.3	South Africa	2.8
Graphite	Ceylon	44.8	Madagascar	10.7	France	5.7
Iodine							
Platinum	United Kingdom	68.4	Russia	11.7	Norway	2.6
Titanium	British India	90.0	United Kingdom	2.0		
Vanadium							
Agricultural Products							
Coffee	Dutch East Indies	2.2	Br. East Africa	1.1	Portuguese Africa	0.5
Cork	Portugal	61.6	French North Africa	21.4	Spain	14.7
Flaxseed	British India	2.0	China	0.6		
Hides	British India	12.2	New Zealand	9.4	China	7.8
Kapok	Dutch East Indies	94.0	Philippines	3.2	British India	0.2
Nux vomica	French Indo-China	72.9	British India	26.1	United Kingdom	1.0
Opium	United Kingdom	58.2	Turkey	24.7	Yugoslavia	15.3
Tanning Materials	British India	6.0	Turkey	5.0	Philippines	4.3

SOURCE: *Foreign Commerce and Navigation of the United States, 1937.*

Appendix VI

REGIONAL ORIGIN OF RAW MATERIALS

1937

As Per Cent of Total Imports by Value

	Transpacific	*Transatlantic*	*Total*	*Western Hemisphere*	*Grand total*
Strategic	77.0	12.0	89.0	11.0	100
Critical	8.0	17.0	25.0	75.0	100

Appendix VII

MILITARY ESTABLISHMENTS OF THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE

At the Outbreak of the Second World War

		Navy							*Army*		*Air*
	YEAR	*Battleships*	*Aircraft carriers*	*Cruisers*	*Destroyers*	*Submarines*	*Coast defense*	*Miscel-laneous*	*Effectives*	*Reserves*	*Planes*
The United States	1939	15	5	37	221	94		335	185,000		2,320
Canada	1939				6				6,000		210

The American Mediterranean										
Colombia	1940			2			21	16,000	100,000	15
Costa Rica	1939							500		
Cuba	1939		1				13	15,000	30,000	20
Dominican Republic	1939						5	2,000	10,000	
Guatemala	1939							6,000	27,000	31
Haiti	1939						2	3,000	500	
Honduras	1939							1,500	2,600	3
Mexico	1938						21	50,000	65,000	51
Nicaragua	1939						1	2,500	600	
Panama	1939									3
Salvador	1939							3,000	700	8
Venezuela	1939		1	1			6	6,000	5,000	30
The Intermediate Zone										
Ecuador	1939		1				1	7,500	40,000	12
Peru	1939		2	3	4		10	12,000	20,000	80
Lower South America										
Argentina	1938	2	2	16	3	4	32	50,000	280,000	200
Bolivia	1939							24,000	80,000	20
Brazil	1938	2	2	8	4		26	85,000 [1]	200,000	200
Chile	1939	1	3	8	9	1	16	20,000	210,000	100
Paraguay	1939						4	8,000	90,000	
Uruguay	1939					3	10	8,000	25,000	45

[1] Figure for 1940.

SOURCES: *League of Nations Armaments Year Book, 1939-40.*
Jane, F. T., *Jane's Fighting Ships*, 1939.
Baldwin, Hanson W., *United We Stand* (New York, 1941).