Sayyid Jamálu'd-Dín "al-Afghán"
(died March 9, 1897)

THE PERSIAN REVOLUTION

OF 1905—1909

BY

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DEDICATION

To all who by their thought, or word, or deed
Have aided Persia in her hour of need,
Whether by tongue, or pen, or sword they wrought,
Whether they strove or suffered, spoke or fought,
Whether their services were small or great,
This book of mine I humbly dedicate.
May these approve my poor attempt to trace
This final effort of an ancient race
To burst its bondage, cast aside its chain,
And rise to life 'a Nation once again.'

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ERRATA

p. xiv, l. 17. *'Abu'lláh* should, of course, be *'Abdu'lláh*.

p. 109, l. 9. Omit *George*. Mr George Churchill was never Vice-Consul at Rasht. It was one of his brothers.

p. 120, l. 25, and p. 121, ll. 3, 10, and 24. *'Aynu'd-Dawla* was Prime Minister, but never had the title of *Atábak*.

p. 156, l. 12. Ṭáhir Pasha was not a General, but was the President of the Turkish Frontier Commission.

p. 161, 5 lines from the bottom. *Aujumans* is, of course, a misprint for *anjumans*.

p. 162, l. 30. I am informed on good authority that the *Náṣiru'l-Mulk* was not put in a cell.

p. 163, n. 1 *ad calc.* The *Náṣiru'l-Mulk* left for Europe on the evening of his deliverance, not the next day.

p. 198, ll. 18–19. The Sháh's automobile was empty, except for the *chauffeur*. See p. 110 of the *Blue Book* (Persia, No. 1, 1909).

p. 207, l. 1. "Six" appears to be an exaggeration: three is the more probable number.

p. 207, ll. 19–20. It appears doubtful whether the Russian officers actually shot any of their own men.

p. 208, ll. 3–4. I am informed on good authority that "reduced to ruins" is too strong an expression, and that the Sipahsálár Mosque was not very much damaged, while the Baháristán was wrecked not so much by the artillery fire as by the men who looted it after the bombardment was over.

p. 210, ll. 13–20. The "Race-course incident" to which reference is here made took place on Sept. 16, 1908. Its introduction at this point in the book is, perhaps, misleading.

p. 255, ll. 3 and 15. For *Castello* read *Castelli*.

p. 265, l. 31. I am informed that *Bínáb* is a mistake for *Mínáb*.

POSTSCRIPT

Although incidental mention is made of a few matters (such as the trial and execution of the *Muwaqqaru's Salṭana*) which belong to the earlier part of this current year (1910), the systematic narrative ceases with the restoration of the Constitution and the occurrences immediately connected therewith. No attempt has been made to deal with the most recent events, of which the assassination of Sayyid 'Abdu'lláh-i-Bahbahání (July 15); the withdrawal of Taqí-záda from the capital to Tabríz (about August 1); the bombardment and forcible disarmament of the *fidá'ís* (August 7, 1910); the wounding of Sattár Khán and the pensioning of him and Báqir Khán; the intrigues of the *Sipahdár-i-A'ẓam*; the recent attempt of the Russians to extort concessions as the price of the withdrawal of their troops (an attempt at blackmailing against which even the *Times* has protested); and the death of the late Regent, *'Aẓudu'l-Mulk*, on Sept. 22, are the most important. The accession of Sulṭán Aḥmad Sháh and the restoration of the Constitution mark the beginning of a new epoch, which in the future may fitly form the subject of a new volume.

PREFACE

بایران مباد آنچنان روزِ بد، که کشور به بیگانگان اوفتد،
نخواهم زمانی که این نو عروس، بیفتد بزیرِ جوانانِ روس،
بگیتی مباد آنکه این حور دیس، شود همسرِ لُرْدی از انگلیس،

"Ne'er may that evil-omened day befall
When Írán shall become the stranger's thrall!
Ne'er may I see that virgin fair and pure
Fall victim to some Russian gallant's lure!
And ne'er may Fate this angel-bride award
As serving-maiden to some English lord!"

(Verses written in prison at Trebizonde by Mírza Áqá Khán of Kirmán in 1896, shortly before he suffered death.)

It is always, I think, helpful to the reader if at the very threshold of his book the author will indicate in general terms the thought which underlies it and the point of view from which it has been written. Now this book, though, in view of the difficulty of fully examining or impartially criticising contemporary events, I have not ventured to entitle it a history, is in fact intended for such; and I have naturally endeavoured first to collect, co-ordinate and weigh all available information, and then to present as faithful a summary of the conclusions to which it has led me as I have been able to frame. It is a truism, but likewise a truth, and a truth, moreover, often overlooked in practice, that, even when there is agreement as to the facts of a case, there will be differences of opinion not only as to their interpretation in matters of detail, but as to the verdict to which they lead. Argument can only be fruitful when there is

a basis of agreement. If two travellers wish to go to Penzance they can discuss with profit the best way of getting there; but if one wishes to go to Penzance and the other to John o'Groat's House, such discussion is obviously futile.

To apply this principle to the present case. In all that I have written in this book I have implicitly assumed:

(1) That in this world diversity, not uniformity, is the higher law and the more desirable state.

(2) That everything in this world has its own generic perfection, or, as the Bábís quaintly phrase it, its own Paradise, which is only attainable by the realization of its own highest potentialities, not by the adoption or attempted adoption of the attributes of something else.

(3) That, whether it be a question of individuals or nations, the destruction of a distinctive type is a loss to the universe and therefore an evil.

These doctrines or dogmas, like all dogmas which rest on a philosophical conception of the universe and have been not only accepted but assimilated, necessarily colour one's whole view of the many questions to which they relate. But they are, perhaps, rather "the choice of a soul" than matters susceptible of proof. Suppose I have a beautiful garden filled with flowers of innumerable kinds which I love and which fills me with gladness and pride, and suppose some utilitarian bids me dig up and cast away these beautiful flowers, and plant the garden with potatoes or cabbages, or even with one kind of beautiful flower only, on the ground that I shall thereby make more money, or produce a more useful crop, I cannot argue with him, I can only oppose him with all my strength. And when people say (as, unhappily, many people in this country do say) that Persia is a backward country, which, in the hands of its own people cannot be "developed," or only very slowly, and that the best thing that can happen is that some European Power, whether England or Russia, should step in and "develop" it, whether its people like it or not, I feel as I do about the flower-garden, that no material prosperity, no amount of railways, mines, gaols, gas, or drainage can compensate the world, spiritually and intellectually, for the loss of Persia. And this is what the occupation and adminis-

tration of Persia by foreigners would inevitably mean, if it endured long; and experience shews that "temporary" occupations of the territories of weak peoples by great European Powers can only be called "temporary" in the sense that they will presumably not be eternal.

To discuss the general question of the value of small nationalities would, however, unduly enlarge this Preface; but, even those (and in these days they are, alas! many) who would deny this value will perhaps admit that certain exceptional races, such as the Greeks in Europe, have contributed so much to the spiritual, intellectual and artistic wealth of the human race that they have an exceptional claim on our sympathies, and that their submergence must be reckoned a calamity which no expediency can justify. What Greece owes to this feeling is known to all, and I suppose that few would deny that modern Greece owes her independence to her ancient glories. And Persia, I venture to think, stands, in this respect, in the same category. Of all the ancient nations whose names are familiar to us Persia is almost the only one which still exists as an independent political unit within her old frontiers (sadly contracted, it is true, since Darius the Great caused to be engraved on the rocks of Bagastâna or Bisutún, in characters still legible, the long list of the provinces which obeyed him and brought him tribute), inhabited by a people still wonderfully homogeneous, considering the vicissitudes through which they have passed, and still singularly resembling their ancient forbears. Again and again Persia has been apparently submerged by Greeks, Parthians, Arabs, Mongols, Tartars, Turks and Afghans; again and again she has been broken up into petty states ruled by tribal chiefs; and yet she has hitherto always re-emerged as a distinct nation with peculiar and well-marked idiosyncrasies.

But it is not so much on the political *rôle* which she has played in the world's history that I wish to insist as on her intellectual influence. In the sphere of religion she gave us Zoroaster, to whose system Judaism, Christianity and Islám alike are indebted in different degrees; Manes, who, if not of Persian blood, was a Persian subject, and made Persia the centre

of that strange and original creed which for many centuries so profoundly affected both Christianity and Islám, and of which recent excavations in the sand-buried cities of Chinese Turkistán have revealed such wonderful literary remains; Mazdak, the earliest philosophical Communist; Bábak called *al-Khurramí*, who for so many years defied the armies of the 'Abbásid Caliphs; *al-Muqanna'*, "the Veiled Prophet of Khurásán," made familiar to English readers by Thomas Moore and a host of others, whose very heresies and extravagances testify to the fertile mind of the nation which produced them. What Islám, both orthodox and heterodox, owed to Persia it is almost impossible to exaggerate; Ṣúfís, Isma'ílís, the Shí'a, the Ḥurúfís, the Bábís, all alike reflect the subtle metaphysics of the Persian mind. Throughout the wide lands of Islám we are met, almost at every turn, by something which has its roots in Persian history, whether in Tunis, where the now decaying port of al-Mahdiyya recalls the dream of 'Abu'lláh ibn Maymún of the ruin of the Arabian and the restoration of the Persian power; or in Cairo, where the thousand-year-old University of al-Azhar reminds us of the fulfilment of that wild dream; or in Syria, where the ancient fastnesses of the "Old Man of the Mountain" still hold a remnant of his followers, while hard by Acre sends forth the eager missionaries of a new Persian faith to the New World. In Turkey, and thence eastwards to India and Turkistán, the signs of Persian influence increase, and alike the language, the thought and the culture of the Turkish and Indian Muslim are redolent of Persia.

On the value of Persian art and Persian literature it is hardly necessary to insist, for the beautiful carpets, tiles, pottery and paintings of Persia are esteemed by all who value such things, and though the vast realms of Persian literature have been systematically explored by only a few in Europe, the names of some of her poets at least, Firdawsí, Sa'dí, Ḥáfiẓ, and in these latter days, especially in the Anglo-Saxon world, 'Umar Khayyám, are known to all educated people, and are reckoned amongst the great poets of the world. Nor, in considering what literature owes to Persia, must we limit our attention to Persian literature, for Arabic literature too, if deprived of the con-

tributions made to it by Persians, would lose much of what is best in it. And if modern science owes little to Persia, the name of Avicenna alone is sufficient to remind us how deeply medieval Europe, as well as Asia, was indebted to one of her sons for nearly all that was then known of Philosophy and Medicine. In short so conspicuous was the pre-eminence of the Persians in all branches of knowledge that a tradition of the Prophet Muḥammad (reported amongst others by Ibn Khaldún) runs:

لَوْ كَانَ ٱلْعِلْمُ بِٱلثُّرَيَّا لَنَالَهُ رِجَالٌ مِنَ ٱلْفُرْسِ

"*Were knowledge in the Pleiades, some of the Persians would reach it.*"

So much for the intellectual and artistic gifts of the Persians. As to their character, opinions have varied, for while all who know them have admitted their wit, their quickness of mind, their pleasant manners, their agreeable address, their amusing conversation, their hospitality and dignity, they have been charged with falsehood, treachery, cowardice, cruelty, subserviency, lack of principles, instability of purpose, and corrupt morals. These vices were undeniably common amongst the creatures of the Court, with whom naturally Europeans having official positions in Persia come most in contact, but few who have mixed on intimate terms with all classes of the people, and especially the middle class, will assert that these vices are general, or will deny that where they exist they are largely the outcome of the intolerable system of government against which the movement described in these pages is a protest. Conventional falsehoods, or "white lies," which deceive nobody, are not confined to the Persians: we also say that we are "not at home" when we are in, and "much regret" having to decline invitations which nothing would induce us to accept. That the Persians are by no means devoid of courage is admitted even by those who have criticised them very harshly in some respects. R. G. Watson (*A History of Persia in...the Nineteenth Century*, p. 10) says that "they ride courageously at full speed over the very worst ground, and by the very brinks of the most appalling precipices"; that "they are utter strangers to the fear that comes of physical nervousness"; and that "when their courage fails them, as it too often

does, the fact is to be attributed to moral causes." Their soldiers he describes (p. 24) as "remarkably hardy, patient and enduring, requiring scarcely any baggage, and able to march thirty miles a day for many successive days, while living on nothing but bread and onions." "No troops in the world," he says in another place (p. 200), "it may be safely asserted, are capable of so much continued endurance of fatigue as are the veteran soldiers of Persia." So again (p. 218), in speaking of the defeat of the Persians by the Russians at the battle of Ganja in 1826, he says, "Could the Sháh have convinced himself of the fact that in his hardy and obedient subjects he possessed the material for an army capable at any time of defending his dominions against invaders, provided that his troops should be properly drilled, the lesson would have been cheaply paid for by the disaster of Ganja." Again (p. 283), he describes "a forced march which only Persian troops could accomplish," in which (in 1835) they traversed a distance of eighty miles in little more than thirty hours. And once more (on p. 387) he asserts that "Persian soldiers are beyond comparison the most hardy, enduring and patient troops in the world," and adds that "had the administration of the *Amír-i-Niẓám* (Mírzá Taqí Khán) been prolonged, the King of Persia would have been the master of an army of one hundred thousand men, regularly drilled and accoutred." And in describing the battle of Muḥammara (March 26, 1857), when the Persians were defeated by the English, he says (p. 451):—"The Persian artillery and the troops in the batteries had acted as well as they could have been expected to behave; they had served their guns well, and had not shrunk from exposure and labour."

But it is not in the conscript soldiers of a despotic Sháh that we must look for the highest manifestations of Persian courage. It is when the Persian is inspired by that enthusiasm for a person, a doctrine or a cause of which he is so susceptible that his heroism becomes transcendental. If the Bábís have done nothing else, they have at least shewn how Persians, when exalted by enthusiasm, can meet death and the most horrible tortures imaginable, not merely with stoicism but with ecstasy. Every student of their history, from Gobineau, Kazim

Beg and Renan onwards, has been equally impressed by this phenomenon. Without dwelling anew on the history of the earlier martyrs of 1850 and 1852; of the Báb's companion in death resisting the prayers of his wife and children that he would save his life by a simple recantation; of Mullá Isma'íl of Qum laughing and the aged dervish Mírzá Qurbán-'Alí reciting poetry under the headsman's knife; of Sulaymán Khán, his body flaming with lighted wicks, going with dancing and song to his death; of the patient endurance of abominable sufferings by the beautiful Qurratu'l-'Ayn, and of a hundred others, let us see what a missionary in Yazd, writing five years ago, has to say on this subject[1]. "Persians have very strong notions of loyalty both to causes and to individuals," he says (p. 138). "Nothing has brought this out more than the history of the Bábí movement, which has certainly exhibited the strength of Persian character. Boys and young men have in this movement willingly undergone the most terrible tortures in the service of their spiritual teachers and the common cause." "Passive courage," he says in another place (p. 155), "the Yazdí possesses to a very high degree, but he must have a cause for which he cares sufficiently, if this courage is to be called out. If the terrible Bábí massacres that have taken place from time to time in Persia have proved nothing else, they have at least shewn that there is grit somewhere in Persian character. The way in which mere lads in Yazd went to their death in that ghastly summer of 1903 was wonderful....The early Bábís shewed good fighting qualities in the north of Persia, as well as passive courage, and, as they were chiefly townsmen, we may presume that there are military possibilities in the Persian people, even amongst those who dwell in cities." And again (p. 176), "the thing which has opened people's eyes to the enormous strength of Persian character under partially favourable moral conditions, is the way in which the Bábís have exposed themselves to martyrdom, and have stood firm to their beliefs and cause under tortures too horrible for description." And though this writer, who knew the Persians well, is by no means sparing in his criticism of certain sides of their character, he concludes his discussion of

[1] *Five Years in a Persian Town*, by Napier Malcolm, London, 1905.

it (p. 185) as follows: "Most Europeans who have lived in Persia find it rather difficult to explain why they like the people. In the Yazdí there is certainly much to lament, but there is something to admire, and very much more to like. A people who are open-handed, good-natured, affectionate, not always extravagantly conceited, and above all intensely human, are a people one cannot help getting to like when one lives among them for any time."

Such quotations might be multiplied indefinitely, but I think that those already given will suffice to shew that I am not alone in believing that the Persians possess very real virtues, and are capable, under happier conditions than those which till lately prevailed, of recovering the position to which their talents entitle them. It will be observed that those who speak slightingly and contemptuously of them are generally either exponents of *Welt-Politik*, who, because they aspire to "think in continents," cannot spare time to investigate with patience and form an independent judgement of national character; or globe-trotters, who, after a hasty journey from the Persian Gulf to the Caspian Sea, retail the stories and opinions they have picked up from Europeans whom they have met on the way, always with a view to the entertainment of their readers, and often with preconceived ideas derived from experiences of other Eastern lands which differ as much from Persia as Norway does from Portugal; or disappointed *concessionnaires*; or cynical and blasé diplomatists. Those, on the other hand, who have had intimate relations with the Persians and are acquainted with their language have generally found, as Mr Napier Malcolm found, much that is loveable and not a little that is admirable in their character. Speaking for myself, I confess to a very sincere affection for them, and a conviction that the best type of Persian is not only the most delightful companion imaginable, but can be one of the most faithful and devoted friends whom it is possible to meet with.

The supporters of the movement whereof I have attempted in the following pages to describe the genesis and trace the development and history are indifferently spoken of as "Constitutionalists" (*Mashrúṭa-khwáh*) and "Nationalists" (*Millatí*). *Mashrúṭa* means "conditioned" as opposed to "absolute" govern-

ment, and *Mashrúṭa-khwáh* means one who desires such "conditioned" or constitutional rule, instead of the old autocracy or absolutism (*Istibdád*), which made the King the uncontrolled arbiter of his people's destinies, and the unquestioned master of their lives, honour and possessions. *Millat* means "the People" or "the Nation," and is opposed to *Dawlat*, "the State," "the Government," or practically, under the old *régime*, "the Court." The *Mashrúṭa-khwáh*, or Constitutionalist, is opposed to the *Mustabidd*, or partisan of the Autocracy, and perhaps these terms might best be rendered by "Parliamentarian" and "Royalist." Here the antithesis is natural and familiar enough, but the antithesis between the *Millatí* and the *Dawlatí* needs a few words of comment. Under ideal conditions it is evident that there should be no such antithesis, and that the interests of the State (*Dawlat*) and of the People or Nation (*Millat*) should be identical, or at least closely related. And the Persians are by nature so obedient and so loyal to their Kings ("*Sháh-parast*," "King-worshippers," as they say) that I do not myself believe that the demand for popular or constitutional government would have arisen at all, or at any rate in our time, if recent Sháhs of Persia had shewn themselves even moderately patriotic, or just, or far-sighted. Against a Sháh Isma'íl, an 'Abbás the Great, or a Karím Khán the Persians would never have revolted. It was when they became convinced that their country was despised abroad, that their interests were betrayed for a vile price, and that their religion and their independent existence as a nation were alike threatened with destruction, that they began to demand a share in the government of their country. Many European journalists and other writers have made merry over the idea of a Persian Parliament, repeating like so many parrots the expression "comic opera" on almost every page. Yet I venture to think that there was more reality and more grim determination in this Persian struggle than in our own English politics, with their lack of guiding principles, their conferences, their coalitions, and their sham conflicts. Throughout the struggle the Persians have consciously been fighting for their very existence as a Nation, and in this sense the popular or constitutional party may very

properly be termed "Nationalists." Yet having regard to prejudices existing in England, especially at the present time, the term is not altogether a happy one, and has undoubtedly done much to prejudice a considerable section of English opinion against those to whom it is applied. Most men are ruled by names rather than by ideas, and I have no doubt that many a staunch Unionist and many an Anglo-Indian or Anglo-Egyptian official has transferred to the so-called "Nationalists" of Persia all the prejudices with which this term is associated in his mind. The main point, however, on which I wish to insist is that in Persia the party which is variously termed "Nationalist," "Constitutionalist" and "Popular" is essentially the patriotic party, which stands for progress, freedom, tolerance, and above all for national independence and "Persia for the Persians," and that it was primarily called into existence, as will be fully set forth in the following pages, by the short-sighted, selfish and unpatriotic policy inaugurated by Náṣiru'd-Dín Sháh under the malign influence of the *Amínu's-Sulṭán*, and carried still further by his grandson the ex-Sháh Muḥammad 'Alí.

And now a few words as to this book. Not willingly or without regret have I forsaken for a while the pleasant paths of Persian literature to enter into the arid deserts of international politics. But the call was imperious and the summons urgent to neglect nothing of that little which lay in my power in order to arouse in the hearts of my countrymen some sympathy for a people who have, in my opinion, hitherto received less than they deserve. Powerful interests and prejudices have been against them, and misapprehensions as to their aims and motives have prevailed. These misapprehensions I trust that this book may serve in some measure to dispel.

There are, as I am well aware, others who could, if they would, write a much better and more authoritative account of the Persian Revolution than this, but to most of them is applicable Sa'dí's well-known line:

آن‌را که خبر شد خبرش باز نیآمد'

"*He who possesses information, repeats it not*";

or the equally familiar verse:

ستاند زبان از رقیبان راز' که تا راز سلطان نگویند باز'

"*He takes the tongue from the guardians of the secret,*
Lest they should repeat the secret of the King."

That I have not myself been privileged to witness the events here described is, I readily admit, a serious disqualification. But, on the other hand, I have seen and conversed with not a few of the principal actors in these events, while many correspondents in Persia, both Persians and Europeans, friends and strangers, knowing the intensity of my interest in all that touches Persia's welfare, have been kind enough to communicate to me a mass of information, out of which, in addition to what has been published in Blue Books and White Books and in the Persian and European newspapers, I have endeavoured to construct a coherent, and, I trust, a critical narrative. And inasmuch as from my eighteenth year onwards, that is for thirty years, hardly a day has passed on which I have not read, written or spoken Persian, striving always to penetrate further into the spirit of the language and the mind of the people of Persia, it is possible that I may have entered more fully into their thoughts, hopes and ideals than many foreigners who have spent a much longer time in the country than myself. Moreover the publication of this book will certainly elicit information which would otherwise remain hidden and eventually be lost, just as the publication in January, 1909, of my *Short Account of Recent Events in Persia* led directly to the publication of the excellent "History of the Awakening of the Persians" (*Ta'ríkh-i-Bídáriy-i-Írániyán*) which I have so often had occasion to cite in these pages.

The system of transliteration of Persian names and words adopted in this book is essentially the same as that which I have employed in previous works, but I have been more consistent (some of my critics will, no doubt, say "more pedantic") in its application than heretofore. Persian phonetics are very simple—simpler than Arabic, where the hard or "coarse" consonants modify the vowel-sounds, and much simpler than Turkish—and there is no occasion to complicate them by

adopting on the one hand Arabic and Turkish pronunciations such as "Moḥammed" ("Mahommed," and, still worse, "Mahomed," "Mahomet," "Mehmed," and the like, are monstrosities of which no Orientalist should countenance the use), or, on the other hand, usages based upon the phonetics of French and German. There are in Persian only three vowel-sounds, each of which may be long or short; and it is essential, both to correct pronunciation and to correct comprehension, to distinguish the long vowels either by a long mark, or (which I prefer) by an acute accent. These vowels are:

a (short) as in "man";		*á* (long) as in "all";	
i (short)	„ "sin";	*í* (long)	„ "machine";
u (short)	„ "pull";	*ú* (long)	„ "rule" or "pool."

There are also two so-called diphthongs, consisting of the short *a* followed by one or other of the weak consonants *w* and *y*. Of these *aw* is pronounced exactly as the same combination is pronounced in Welsh ("mawr"), or like the English *ou* ("house," "out"), or like the German *au* ("auf," "aus"); while *ay* is pronounced like the English *ay* in "hay," "may." There is therefore no occasion to use *e* and *o* at all, nor, as a matter of fact, do those who use them do so consistently. Those who write "Yezd," "Resht," "Enzeli," and the like (to indicate, presumably, that the vowel is short), should, to be consistent, also write "Tebriz," "Hemedan," and "Isfehan." And if it be said that some of these inconsistencies are sanctioned by usage, and that they ought not to be altered, the answer is that it is both easier and more philosophical to transliterate on a fixed and definite principle than to decide in each case whether a given spelling has or has not been sanctioned by usage. Therefore even in the case of the most familiar place-names I have rigorously applied the system which I have adopted, writing always "Ṭihrán" (not "Teherán"), "Anzalí" (not "Enzeli"), "Najaf" and "Karbalá" (not "Nejef" and "Kerbelá"). Similarly, in speaking of the Bábís, I have abandoned the spellings "Ezelí" and "Behá'í," which I formerly used, in favour of "Azalí" and "Bahá'í." It must also be borne in mind that in the case of Arabic derivatives, which are of constant occurrence in Persian

and enter into almost all Persian titles, not only the *pronunciation* but also the *meaning* is often altered by an alteration in the quantity of a vowel. Thus from the root *naṣara*, "to help," we have the verbal noun *naṣr*, "help"; the active participle *náṣir*, "helper"; and a passive form *naṣír*, "helped"; and each of these forms commonly occurs as a component part of such names or titles as *Naṣru'd-Dín* ("the Help of Religion"), *Náṣiru'd-Dín* ("the Helper of Religion"), and *Naṣíru'd-Dín* ("Helped by Religion"). Were there only the one form, it would not so much matter if it were inaccurately spelt, since any scholar who wished to look the word up in the index of an Oriental history or biography would know what the correct spelling was; but in the case under consideration the slovenly transliteration "Nassr-ed-Din" (favoured by the *Times*) leaves it quite uncertain (apart from particular knowledge of the person alluded to) which of these equally possible names or titles is meant, and so, in consulting an Oriental index, the three possibilities must all be kept in view, a circumstance which causes needless embarrassment to anyone using Oriental as well as European books. It is not, therefore, mere pedantry which demands an adequate discrimination.

Although the Persian alphabet comprises 32 letters (*i.e.* the 28 letters of the Arabic alphabet with four additional letters, *p*, *ch*, *zh* and hard *g*, required to express sounds occurring in Persian but not in Arabic), the number of consonantal sounds actually distinguishable does not exceed, if it reaches, 24, since the modern Persians (as their own grammarians admit) do not (unless they affect, as some of the learned do, somewhat of the Arabian pronunciation) distinguish between ث (*th*), س (*s*) and ص (*ṣ*), all of which they pronounce like English *s* in "sin" (never like *z*); or between ت (*t*) and ط (*ṭ*); or between ذ (*dh*), ز (*z*), ض (*ẓ*) and ظ (*ẓ* or *dh*); or between ح (*ḥ*) and ه (*h*); while the guttural consonant *'ayn* (') is pronounced feebly, if at all, save by those who have been influenced by Arabic. Leaving this out of account, the following 23 symbols represent all the consonantal sounds actually employed in Persian: *b*, *p*, *d*, *t*, *j* (as in "jam"), *ch* (as in "church"), *h* (always aspirated, not only at the beginning but in the middle and at the end of words), *kh* (like

Welsh or German *ch*, Spanish *j* or *x*, or modern Greek χ, *never* like *k*), *z*, *zh* (French *j*, or the *z* in "azure"), *s*, *sh*, *k*, *g* (always hard, as in "garden"), *gh* (like modern Greek γ, something like the Northumbrian *r* or French *r grasseyé*), *q* (much harder and produced much more deeply in the throat than *k*), *f*, *r* (always trilled, as in Italian, and never affecting the quality or quantity of the preceding vowel, as in English), *l*, *m*, *n*, *w* (inclining to *v* when placed between two vowels), and *y*. Of these sounds the gutturals *kh*, *gh* and especially *q* are the only ones which present any difficulty to an Englishman, and a correct pronunciation of these is most important if it be desired to avoid some very grotesque and awkward confusions of words. It is best for one who cannot master the correct pronunciation of these letters to pronounce *kh* like *h*, not like *k*; and *gh* and *q* like hard *g*, as in "gold," but these are, of course, only approximations. The aspiration of the *h* in the middle and at the end of words also needs attention.

Something must also be said concerning Persian names and titles, which are very confusing to foreigners. There are in Persia no surnames, and the number of names in general use is not very large, the commonest being those of the Prophet and the twelve Imáms; the same with a prefix or suffix indicating "servant of..." (*e.g.* Ghulám 'Alí, 'Alí-qulí, Ḥusayn-qulí, Mahdi-qulí, etc.); the combination of '*Abd* (servant or slave) with one of the Names or Attributes of God (*e.g.* 'Abdu'lláh, 'Abdu'r-Raḥmán, 'Abdu'l-Wahháb, etc.); some names of months (*e.g.* Ramaẓán, Ṣafar, Rajab, generally in combination with a name like 'Alí, such as Rajab 'Alí, Ṣafar 'Alí); and some old Persian names, like Rustam, Isfandiyár, Bahrám, Bahman, etc. Thus the number of Persians bearing names like Muḥammad 'Alí, 'Alí Muḥammad, Muḥammad Ḥasan, Muḥammad Ḥusayn, etc., is so large that further distinction is essential, and this is effected partly by prefixing such titles as Ustá, Áqá, Mírzá (which, however, if it *follows* the name instead of preceding it, means "Prince"), Mullá, Sayyid, Ḥájji, Karbalá'i, Mashhadí, and the like; partly by adding after the name an epithet indicating the town to which the person in question belongs (as Iṣfahání, Shírází, Yazdí) or the trade which he follows (as *Kitáb-furúsh*, "the

bookseller," *Nukhúd-biríz*, "the pea-parcher," *Pína-dúz*, "the cobbler," *Sarráj*, "the saddler"), or a nick-name, derived from some personal peculiarity (as *Kaj-kuláh*, "Crooked-cap").

A large proportion of Persians belonging to the official and learned classes have a title as well as a name, and the multitude and grandiloquence of these titles were severely criticized even in the eleventh century of our era by the great historian, antiquary and mathematician Abú Rayḥán al-Bírúní. Those conferred on officials are generally compounded with the words *Mulk* ("Kingdom"), *Dawla* ("State"), *Salṭana* ("Sovereignty"), *Sulṭán* ("Sovereign"), etc., *e.g.* *Amínu's-Sulṭán* ("the Trusted of the King"), *Amínu'd-Dawla* ("the Trusted of the State"), *Náṣiru'l-Mulk* ("the Helper of the Kingdom"), *'Aynu'd-Dawla* ("the Eye of the State"), *Mushíru'd-Salṭana* ("the Counsellor of the Sovereignty"), *Sa'du'd-Dawla* ("the Fortune of the State"), *Mu'tamad-i-Kháqán* ("the Confidant of the Prince"), and the like. Military officers have such titles as *Sardár-i-As'ad* ("the Most Fortunate Captain") and *Sipahdár-i-A'ẓam* ("the Most Mighty General"), while for doctors of Divinity titles like *Shamsu'l-'Ulamá* ("the Sun of the Learned"), and for physicians titles like *Fakhru'l-Aṭibbá* ("the Pride of Physicians") are deemed more appropriate. One who possesses a title is generally known by it rather than by his name, but if he dies, or is disgraced, or promoted to a higher title, his original title becomes free, and may be conferred on somebody else. This adds greatly to the difficulty of studying Persian history, for we shall generally find, at any period, a *Niẓámu'l-Mulk*, a *Mu'tamadu'd-Dawla*, etc., and it is always necessary to consider what particular person bore that title at the time in question. To make matters quite clear, the whole name and title of each person ought to be given, but this not only conduces to undue prolixity, but has a somewhat forbidding effect on the foreign reader. Thus the name of my friend the *Waḥídu'l-Mulk* ("Unique one of the Kingdom"), who was for a time Persian teacher at Cambridge, is 'Abdu'l-Ḥusayn; he is originally of the town of Káshán; he has made the Pilgrimage to Mecca; he has the title of *Mírza* (corresponding roughly to "Esquire" when placed *before* the name); and also the higher title of *Khán* (which always follows the name);

so that his full designation is "Ḥájji Mírzá 'Abdu'l-Ḥusayn Khán-i-Káshání *Waḥídu'l-Mulk*." This appalling complexity of nomenclature is no doubt one of the great obstacles to the popularization of Persian history. Nor are the titles easily remembered unless their signification be understood, and the only alternative would appear to be to translate them and use their English equivalents, though the effect of this would be rather quaint, as may be seen by applying this operation to five lines (14–18) on p. 165 of this book, which would then read:

"The King then moderated his demands, merely asking for the expulsion of some of the deputies (Taqí's son, He-whose-counsel-is-sought-by-the-State, and Master Help-of-God), and the great preachers Master Beauty-of-the-Faith and Pilgrim King-of-the-Orators."

Throughout this book I have, as a rule, placed titles in italics, but not always, else the name of the lately deposed Sháh, Muḥammad 'Alí, would have been in roman type, and that of his grandfather *Náṣiru'd-Dín* ("the Helper of the Faith") in *italics*, which seemed to me incongruous.

I should like in conclusion to thank the numerous friends who have aided me in the compilation of this work, and especially Mírzá Muḥammad of Qazwín, who read all the proofs and supplied me with numerous valuable notes and corrections; Shaykh Ḥasan of Tabríz, who gave me similar assistance for part of the book; and Mr Alfred Rogers, who kindly undertook the laborious task of preparing the Index. My thanks are also due to the University Press for the care and taste to which this book, and the illustrations which it contains, owe so much, and to many friends and correspondents in Persia who have supplied me with information, suggestions and illustrative materials. The warm sympathy with the Persians by which several of them are animated has done much to kindle and sustain my own enthusiasm, and it is my earnest hope that this book may do the same for others.

EDWARD G. BROWNE.

September 3, 1910.

CHAPTER I.

SAYYID JAMÁLU'D-DÍN, THE PROTAGONIST OF PAN-ISLAMISM.

IN the summer of 1902 I was requested to deliver a lecture on Pan-Islamism to the University Extensionists who were then visiting Cambridge. In that lecture I expressed some doubts as to the existence of Pan-Islamism, which I defined, somewhat flippantly perhaps, in the words of a Muhammadan friend, as "a mare's nest discovered by the Vienna correspondent of the *Times*." I still think the term open to objection, since Pan-Islamism is generally understood in the West as connoting a certain quality of "fanaticism," and it is certainly no more fanatical than Pan-Germanism, or Pan-Slavism, or British Imperialism, and, indeed, much less so, being, in the first place, defensive, and, in the second, based on the more rational ground of a common faith, not on the less rational ground of a common race. But without doubt recent events have done much to create amongst the Muslim nations a sense of brotherhood and community of interests. Just as the activity of Trades Unions led to the formation of Masters' Unions, so the threatened spoliation of the few remaining independent Muhammadan States (Turkey, Persia and Morocco) by European Powers, acting singly or in conjunction, has awakened these states to a sense of their common dangers, and is gradually but inevitably leading them towards a certain solidarity. In this sense we may, if we choose, speak of a Pan-Islamic movement.

The awakening of the Muslim world, of which more or less striking manifestations, political or religious, have taken place within the last thirty or forty years in Turkey, Persia, Egypt, Morocco, the Caucasus, the Crimea and India, was, without

doubt, greatly accelerated and accentuated by the Japanese victory over Russia, which demonstrated that, equally armed and equipped, Asiatics were perfectly capable of holding their own in the field against even the most formidable armies of Europe. But that awakening goes back very much further. The Turkish reform movement, inaugurated by Shinásí Efendi, Ẓiyá Pasha and Kemál Bey, the first of the so-called "Young Turks" (*Yeñi Turkler*, more correctly "New Turks"), goes back nearly fifty years[1], culminated in the granting of the Constitution on December 23, 1876, languished during the dark days of the Russo-Turkish war, and appeared to have been completely stifled under the repressive rule of Sultan 'Abdu'l-Ḥamíd until its sudden, glorious and utterly unexpected revival on July 24, 1908, almost exactly a month after the destruction by the Shah and his Russian mercenaries of the first Persian Parliament. The Egyptian national movement, which began about 1871 and culminated in the revolt of 'Arábí Pasha and the British Occupation of Egypt in 1882, is still very far from extinction, and has shown various signs of activity during the last few years. The Persian "Risorgimento," which culminated in the granting of the Constitution by the late Muẓaffaru'd-Dín Sháh on August 5, 1906, and was checked, though only for a time, by the *coup d'état* of June 23, 1908, really dates back, so far as its outward manifestations are concerned, to the successful agitation against the Tobacco Monopoly in 1891, while the ideas which gave rise to that unexpected outburst of popular discontent began to be promulgated in Persia, at least five or six years earlier, by the remarkable man of whom I propose to give some brief account in this chapter.

It is a matter still open to discussion whether great men give rise to great movements, or great movements to great men, but at least the two are inseparable, and in this movement towards the unity and freedom of the Muslim peoples none played so conspicuous a *rôle* as Sayyid Jamálu'd-Dín, a man of enormous force of character, prodigious learning, untiring activity, dauntless

[1] For an excellent account of the literary aspects of the "Young Turkish" movement, see Vol. V of the late Mr E. J. W. Gibb's *History of Ottoman Poetry* (London: Luzac, 1907), especially Chapter I on "The Dawn of a New Era."

courage, extraordinary eloquence both in speech and writing, and an appearance equally striking and majestic. He was at once philosopher, writer, orator and journalist, but above all politician, and was regarded by his admirers as a great patriot and by his antagonists as a dangerous agitator. He visited, at one time or another, most of the lands of Islám and a great many European capitals, and came into close relations, sometimes friendly, more often hostile, with many of the leading men of his time, both in the East and the West.

The materials for his biography are fortunately copious, but are mostly in Arabic[1]. There is a short account of his life prefixed to the Arabic translation of his *Refutation of the Materialists* (originally composed in Persian at Ḥaydar-ábád in the Deccan about 1880), published at Beyrout in 1885–6 (A.H. 1303). Another biography, carried down to his death in 1897, is given in the second part of Jurjí Zaydán's *Masháhíru'sh-Sharq* ("Eastern Celebrities"), pp. 54–66, published at Cairo in 1903. Still more recently the Egyptian magazine *al-Manár* has published, and is still publishing, new and copious materials illustrating almost every phase of his active and eventful career. His greatest and most eminent disciple was Shaykh Muḥammad 'Abduh, the late Grand Muftí of Egypt, who, though undoubtedly one of the greatest Muhammadan thinkers and teachers of our time, was proud to call Sayyid Jamálu'd-Dín his master. They first met in Egypt about 1871, and from this date onwards we have ample and trustworthy materials for the Sayyid's biography, but for his early life and adventures we have practically but one account, which is not only somewhat meagre, but presents this difficulty, that while it represents Afghánistán as his birth-place and the scene of his youthful achievements, it is affirmed by all Persians, and by so great an authority on Persian affairs as General Houtum Schindler,

[1] Since this chapter was written I have received from Persia the opening portion of a most admirable *History of the Awakening of the Persians* (*Ta'ríkh-i-Bídárí-i-Íráníyán*), compiled by *Náẓimu'l-Islám* of Kirmán, and enriched with numerous documents of great historical importance. The Introduction to this work, of which 112 pages are now in my hands, contains a long account of Sayyid Jamálu'd-Dín. I shall refer to it in the foot-notes as "*the Awakening*," and shall quote more fully from it in a Note at the end of the volume.

that he was in reality born not at As'ad-ábád near Kábul, but at Asad-ábád near Hamadán in Persia, in which case he can hardly have been so closely associated with Afghan politics in 1857–68 as he asserts. It has been suggested that, being in reality a Persian, he claimed to be an Afghan, partly in order to be able to pass more conveniently as an orthodox Sunní Muhammadan, and partly in order to withdraw himself from the dubious "protection" accorded by the Persian government to its subjects[1].

According to his own account, then, Sayyid Muḥammad Jamálu'd-Dín was born in the village of As'ad-ábád near Kanar, a dependency of Kábul, in the year A.H. 1254 (= A.D. 1838–9). His father was Sayyid Ṣafdar, who claimed to be descended from the great traditionist Sayyid 'Alí at-Tirmidhí, and ultimately from the Prophet's grandson al-Ḥusayn, the son of 'Alí, the son of Abú Ṭálib. While he was still a child, his father moved to Kábul[2], the capital of Afghánistán. From his childhood he shewed great intelligence and quickness of apprehension, and when he was eight years old his father himself undertook his education[3]. During the succeeding ten years his studies embraced almost the whole range of Muslim sciences, namely, Arabic grammar, philology and rhetoric in all their branches,

[1] This question is fully discussed in the *Awakening of the Persians* (pp. 96–97, etc.). The author of that work gives a Persian translation of the account which appears in the Arabic sources here cited, and then produces evidence to show that Sayyid Jamálu'd-Dín was really a Persian, and only assumed the title of Afghan from the motives which I have suggested in the text, regarding Persian nationality as but a poor guarantee of security.

[2] It is stated in one of the biographies that Dúst Muḥammad Khán, the grandfather of the Amír 'Abdu'r-Raḥmán Khán, confiscated Sayyid Ṣafdar's property and compelled him to reside at Kábul, presumably in order that he might keep him under closer supervision.

[3] According to the *Awakening of the Persians*, Sayyid Jamálu'd-Dín's birth-place, Asad-ábád, is situated 7 parasangs from Hamadán and 5 from Kangawar, and contains about 800 households comprising some 4000 souls. Many of Jamálu'd-Dín's relations still live there. His father, Sayyid Ṣafdar, was poor and illiterate. From his fifth to his tenth year Sayyid Jamálu'd-Dín studied in the local school, and at eight could read and write Persian and also knew Turkish. At the age of ten he ran away from his father, and went successively to Hamadán, Isfahán, and Mashhad, and later to Afghánistán, where he learned some English. He refused, however, to admit his Persian nationality, and disliked any reference to his connection with Asad-ábád near Hamadán.

history, Muslim theology in all its branches, Ṣúfíism, logic, philosophy, practical and theoretical, physics and metaphysics, mathematics, astronomy, medicine, anatomy, etc.

At the age of eighteen he visited India, where he remained for a year and some months, during which time he learned something of the European sciences and their methods. From India he performed the pilgrimage to Mecca, whither he journeyed in a leisurely fashion, ultimately reaching the sacred city in A.H. 1273 (= A.D. 1857). He then returned to his own country and entered the service of Dúst Muḥammad Khán, whom he accompanied in his campaign against Herát, which was occupied by his cousin and son-in-law, Sulṭán Aḥmad Sháh.

Dúst Muḥammad died and was succeeded by Shír 'Alí in A.H. 1280 (= A.D. 1864). At the advice of his *wazír*, Muḥammad Rafíq Khán, the new Amír prepared to seize and imprison his three brothers, Muḥammad A'ẓam, Muḥammad Aslam, and Muḥammad Amín, to the first-named of whom Sayyid Jamálu'd-Dín had attached himself. The brothers fled, each to his own province; civil war ensued; and ultimately Muḥammad A'ẓam and his nephew, 'Abdu'r-Raḥmán (the late Amír), occupied the capital, released Muḥammad Afẓal, the father of 'Abdu'r-Raḥmán, from the prison in which he was confined at Ghazna, and proclaimed him Amír. He died, however, about a year later, and was succeeded by Muḥammad A'ẓam, who made Sayyid Jamálu'd-Dín his prime minister, and, guided by the Sayyid's wise statecraft, might have succeeded in bringing the whole country under his control but for his jealousy of his relatives and his unwillingness to employ any of them, save the youngest and most inexperienced of his own sons, in his service.

Meanwhile the rival Amír, Shír 'Alí, continued to occupy Qandahár, where he was presently attacked by one of his nephews, a son of Muḥammad A'ẓam, who hoped by some doughty deed to secure his father's special favour. Instead of this, however, he rashly isolated himself, with some two hundred of his men, from the bulk of his army, and was taken prisoner by Ya'qúb Khán, one of Shír 'Alí's generals. Thus encouraged, Shír

Alí renewed the war with vigour, and, supported by the English, who supplied him liberally with money, he ultimately succeeded in vanquishing his brother, Muḥammad A'ẓam and his nephew 'Abdu'r-Raḥmán, of whom the former escaped to Níshápúr in Persia, where he died a few months later, and the latter to Bukhárá.

Sayyid Jamálu'd-Dín, however, remained at Kábul, protected from Shír 'Alí's vengeance alike by his holy descent and his personal influence with the people; but after a while he deemed it prudent to leave his country, and so asked and obtained permission to perform again the pilgrimage to Mecca. This was accorded to him, on condition that he avoided passing through Persia, where it was feared that he might foregather with his late master Muḥammad A'ẓam, and he accordingly set out for Mecca by way of India in A.H. 1285 (A.D. 1869). There he was received with honour by the Indian government, which, however, prevented him from meeting the leaders of Muslim opinion save under its supervision, and, a month after his arrival, sent him in one of its ships to Suez. Thence he visited Cairo for the first time, and remained there forty days, frequenting the great University of al-Azhar, holding converse with many of its teachers and students, and lecturing to a chosen few in his own lodging.

Instead of proceeding to Mecca, Sayyid Jamálu'd-Dín decided to visit Constantinople, where he was well received by 'Álí Pasha, the Grand Wazír, and other notables of the Ottoman capital. Six months after his arrival he was elected a member of the *Anjuman-i-Dánish*, or Turkish Academy, and in Ramaẓán, A.H. 1287 (Nov.–Dec., 1870) he was invited by Taḥsín Efendi, the director of the *Dáru'l-Funún* or University, to deliver an address to the students. At first he excused himself, on the ground of his inadequate knowledge of Turkish, but ultimately he consented. He wrote out his speech in Turkish and submitted it to Ṣafvet Pasha, who was at that time Minister of Public Instruction, and also to Shirváni-Zádé, the Minister of Police, and Muníf Pasha, all of whom approved it. Unhappily the Shaykhu'l-Islám, Ḥasan Fehmí Efendi, was jealous of the Sayyid, whose influence he was eager to destroy, and when

the latter delivered his address to a large and distinguished audience, which included many eminent Turkish statesmen and journalists, he was watching carefully for some expression on account of which he might be able to impugn the speaker's orthodoxy. Now the Sayyid in his address compared the body politic to a living organism, of which the limbs were the different crafts and professions, and he described the king, for instance, as corresponding to the brain, iron-workers to the arms, farmers to the liver, sailors to the feet, and so on. Then he said: "Thus is the body of human society compounded. But a body cannot live without a soul, and the soul of this body is either the prophetic or the philosophic faculty, though these two are distinguished by the fact that the former is a divine gift, not to be attained by endeavour, but vouchsafed by God to such of his servants as He pleases..., while the latter is attainable by thought and study. They are also distinguished by this, that the prophet is immaculate and faultless, while the philosopher may go astray and fall into error...."

The Shaykhu'l-Islám, Ḥasan Fehmí Efendi, seized upon these words, and accused Sayyid Jamálu'd-Dín of describing the prophetic office as an "art" or "craft," and the prophet as an "artificer" or "craftsman." The matter was taken up in the pulpit and the press, and warmly debated on both sides, the Sayyid insisting upon defending himself and refusing to let the agitation work itself out, until finally, for the sake of peace and quietude, the Turkish Government ordered him to leave Constantinople for a time. Thereupon he again returned to Egypt, where he arrived on March 22, 1871.

Sayyid Jamálu'd-Dín's original intention was to remain in Egypt only a short while, but Riyáẓ Pasha met him, was greatly impressed by his abilities, and obtained for him a government allowance of a thousand piastres a month, "not for any specific services, but to do honour to an illustrious visitor." Students and others whom his fame had reached flocked to him and persuaded him to lecture to them in his house, and he expounded to enthusiastic audiences some of the most advanced text-books on various branches of Muhammadan theology, philosophy, jurisprudence, astronomy and mysticism. His in-

fluence and fame continued to increase in Egypt, and he began to direct his attention to teaching his students the art of literary expression, encouraging them to write essays and articles on various subjects, literary, philosophical, religious and political. Hitherto there had been but few capable writers in Egypt, the most eminent at that time being 'Abdu'lláh Pasha Fikrí, Khayrí Pasha, Muḥammad Pasha, Muṣṭafá Pasha Wahbí and a few others; but now, thanks to the Sayyid's efforts, the number of able young writers increased rapidly.

Here again, however, he aroused enmity and jealousy in certain quarters. The old-fashioned theologians reprobated his attempts to revive the study of philosophy, while Mr (afterwards Lord) Vivian, the British Consul-General, suspicious of his political activities, succeeded in inducing Tawfíq Pasha, who had recently succeeded as Khedive, to order his expulsion from Egypt, together with that of his faithful disciple, Abú Turáb[1]. This happened in September, 1879, and the Sayyid again made his way to India, and took up his abode at Ḥaydar-ábád in the Deccan, where, as has been already mentioned, he composed his *Refutation of the Materialists*, of which the original Persian text was lithographed in A.H. 1298 (= A.D. 1881).

In 1882 the "Young Egyptian" movement, with which Sayyid Jamálu'd-Dín had identified himself, and which aimed primarily at limiting the Khedive's extravagance and autocratic power and checking foreign intervention and control, culminated in the revolt of 'Arábí Pasha, the bombardment of Alexandria, the battle of Tel-el-Kebír and the British occupation. Before hostilities broke out Sayyid Jamálu'd-Dín was summoned by the Indian Government from Ḥaydar-ábád to Calcutta, and there detained until the struggle was over and the Egyptian Nationalists were defeated, when he was permitted to leave India. He came first to London, where he remained only a few days, and then went to Paris, where he abode for three years.

While at Paris he was joined by his friend and disciple

[1] According to the *Awakening of the Persians* (p. 98), Abú Turáb was originally in the service of the great *Mujtahid* Áqá Sayyid Muḥammad Ṭabáṭabá'í but was led by his devotion to Sayyid Jamálu'd-Dín to attach himself to him and accompany him on his journeys.

Shaykh Muḥammad 'Abduh, the late Muftí of Egypt[1], who had been exiled from his country on account of his participation in the Nationalist struggle of 1882, and these two started an Arabic weekly newspaper entitled *al-'Urwatu'l-Wuthqá*, mainly political and strongly anti-English. Of this paper, which also bore the French title *le Lien Indissoluble*, and was edited from No. 6 in the Rue Martel, I possess only one copy, No. 17, dated September 25, 1884, from which date it may be inferred that it was founded about May of that year. The next number (No. 18) was the last, for the British Government, alarmed at the fierceness of its attacks, and at its growing influence, stopped its entrance into India and probably employed other means to put an end to its existence. While in Paris, Sayyid Jamálu'd-Dín, who had succeeded in learning a certain amount of French, gave publicity to his views in the European Press, and also carried on a philosophical controversy with Renan on "Islam and Science." His political articles on England, Russia, Turkey and Egypt were largely quoted in the English Press, and he was regarded by the leading English politicians of that time as a personality equally remarkable and formidable. In spite of this, he came to London during this period (in 1885) and was interviewed by Lord Randolph Churchill, Sir Drummond Wolff, and I think Lord Salisbury, who wished to learn his views as to the Mahdí who had appeared in the Súdán, and especially, as would appear from Mr Wilfrid Blunt's narrative, as to the possibility of coming to terms with him.

On the collapse of *al-'Urwatu'l-Wuthqá*, Sayyid Jamálu'd-Dín left Paris for Moscow and St Petersburg, where he was accorded a very favourable reception, and where he remained four years[2]. During this period he rendered a great service

[1] An excellent and very full biography of the late Muftí by his friend and disciple Sayyid Muḥammad Rashíd Riẓá, editor of the monthly Arabic review *al-Manár*, was published at Cairo in A.H. 1324 (A.D. 1906). I possess only Vols. II and III, of which the former contains 560 and the latter 428 pages.

[2] He appears to have visited Russia twice at least, once in 1885, after his failure to arrive at any satisfactory understanding with the English Government, and again in 1889, after his meeting with Náṣiru'd-Dín Sháh at Munich, when the Amínu's-Sulṭán entrusted him with a confidential mission to the Russian Foreign Office. According to the biography in the *Mashháhíru'sh-Sharq* (p. 62), the Sayyid first visited Persia in response to a telegraphic invitation from Náṣiru'd-Dín Sháh early in 1886, was made

to the Muslim subjects of Russia by inducing the Tsar to allow them to print the *Qur'án* and other religious books.

While the Sayyid was still resident at the Russian capital, it was visited by Násiru'd-Dín Sháh of Persia, who expressed a desire to meet him, but he ignored the royal intimation, though shortly afterwards a meeting between the two took place at Munich. The Sháh urged the Sayyid to return with him to Persia, offering to make him Prime Minister, but he at first declined, on the ground that he wished to visit the Paris Exhibition, until he was finally overcome by the Sháh's insistence, in spite of the warnings of his friend Shaykh 'Abdu'l-Qádir al-Maghribí, who said to him, "How can he invite you to fill such a position, seeing that you are notorious for your efforts to strengthen the Sunní faith?" To this the Sayyid replied, "Mere fancy and folly on his part," but nevertheless he accompanied the Sháh to Persia and remained there for some time. After a while, however, observing an unfavourable change in the Sháh's attitude towards him, he asked permission to return to Europe, which was refused him with some discourtesy. Thereupon he took *bast* in the Shrine of Sháh 'Abdu'l-'Aẓím, where he remained seven months. His hostility to the Sháh was now declared: he denounced him in speech and writing, advocated his deposition, and gathered round himself a number of disciples, of whom twelve were especially prominent. Amongst these were included Shaykh 'Alí of Qazwín, one of the chief judges (*qáḍí-i-'Adliyya*) in the time of the first National Assembly of Persia, and one of the captives in the Bágh-i-Sháh, on whom the ex-Sháh's wrath fell most heavily; Mírzá Áqá Khán, afterwards sub-editor of the Persian *Akhtar* ("Star") at Constantinople, ultimately put to death secretly at Tabríz with Shaykh Aḥmad of Kirmán on July 17, 1896; Mírzá Rizá of Kirmán, who shot Náṣiru'd-Dín Sháh on May 1, 1896, and was hanged at Ṭihrán on August 12 of the same year; and Mírzá Muḥammad 'Alí Khán of Ṭihrán, who composed a work in refutation of religions (*Radd-i-Madháhib*). Finally the Sháh decided on deporting him from the country,

Minister of War, visited the Ẓillu's-Sulṭán at Isfahán, and was finally "permitted to leave the country for change of air," whereupon he went to Russia. His second visit to Persia was in 1889, and his second expulsion in 1890.

though it involved the serious step of violating the renowned sanctuary in which he had taken refuge, and sent a body of 500 horsemen to arrest him (though he was at the time confined to his bed by illness), and convey him under escort to the Turkish frontier. This act caused great indignation amongst the Sayyid's admirers, and, as will appear from a later chapter, was one of the chief causes which brought about the death of Náṣiru'd-Dín Sháh in 1896.

I do not know the date of Sayyid Jamálu'd-Dín's expulsion from Persia, but it must have been about the end of 1890 or in the early part of 1891. In the autumn of 1891 he was in London, and I met him by invitation of the late Prince Malkom Khán at the house in Holland Park which, until that eminent diplomatist's quarrel with the Sháh in 1889, was the Persian Legation. My personal impressions of the Sayyid will be given in the subsequent chapter dealing with the Tobacco Concession. During his stay in London he addressed several meetings and wrote sundry articles on "the Reign of Terror in Persia," attacking the Sháh's character, and even his sanity, with great violence.

In 1892 the Sayyid again went to Constantinople, where the remaining five years of his life were spent. The Sultan 'Abdu'l-Ḥamíd, with whom he stood in high favour, at any rate until a year before his death, asked him to discontinue his attacks on the Sháh of Persia, saying that the Persian Ambassador had thrice approached him on the subject, and that, though he had excused himself from intervening on the first two occasions, he had finally promised to use his influence in the way proposed. To this the Sayyid replied, "In obedience to the commands of the Caliph of the age, I forgive the Sháh of Persia, I forgive the Sháh of Persia." Then the Sultan said, "Verily the Sháh of Persia stands in great fear of you." This fear, as subsequent events showed, was not unfounded.

On the assassination of Náṣiru'd-Dín Sháh on May 1, 1896, by Mírzá Muḥammad Riẓá of Kirmán, suspicion, which had at first (unjustly enough) fallen on the Bábís, soon fell on Sayyid Jamálu'd-Dín, on another of his disciples, Mírzá Áqá Khán, and on Shaykh Aḥmad of Kirmán and Ḥájji Mírzá Ḥasan Khán

Khabíru'l-Mulk, and the extradition of these four was demanded by the Persian from the Turkish government. The three last-named were finally surrendered to the Persian authorities, and were secretly put to death at Tabríz, as will be more fully narrated in the subsequent chapter dealing with the assassination of Náṣiru'd-Dín Sháh, but the Sultan refused to surrender Sayyid Jamálu'd-Dín. The question of his nationality was raised at this time, for if he had been really an Afghán, he would have been entitled to claim protection, or at least a fair trial, from the British Embassy, since Afghánistán has no representatives abroad, and England is responsible for safeguarding the interests of her subjects in foreign countries. The Sayyid, however, whether because he was not really an Afghán, or because he did not wish to be indebted for his safety to a Power of which he had consistently proclaimed his detestation, seems to have left himself in the Sultan's hands, and the Sultan, as already said, declined to give him up.

Towards the end of 1896 he was attacked by cancer of the jaw, which soon spread to the neck and proved fatal on March 9, 1897, and he was buried with great pomp and circumstance in the "Shaykhs' Cemetery" (*Sheykhler Mezárlighi*) near Nishán Tásh. It is asserted by most Persians, and denied by most Turks, that he did not die a natural death, but was inoculated in the lip with some poisonous matter, which caused a pathological condition superficially resembling cancer, by one of the Sultan's courtiers named Abu'l-Hudá. *Al-'ilmu 'inda'lláh*—"God alone knoweth!"

Such, in brief outline, was the career of this remarkable man, who, during a period of at least twenty years, probably influenced the course of events in the Muhammadan East more than any other of his contemporaries. To write his history in full would be to write a history of the whole Eastern Question in recent times, including in this survey Afghánistán and India, and, in a much greater degree, Turkey, Egypt, and Persia, in which latter countries his influence is still, in different ways, a living force. A bare record of the events of his life does not adequately reveal him. Having striven to describe his career impartially, concealing nothing that I know, and extenuating

nothing, I am conscious that a majority of those of my countrymen who have read this chapter thus far will unhesitatingly put him down as a singularly dangerous and unscrupulous intriguer, who was prepared to go to any length to attain his ends. Before discussing more fully his political ideas, and the one deep and passionate conception which consistently underlay them, I shall, in order to pourtray the man more clearly, give in an abridged form the account of his personal characteristics which concludes his biography in the *Mashâhiru'sh-Sharq*.

In appearance he was of dark complexion, like an Arab of the Ḥijáz, squarely built, thick-set and sturdy, with flashing black eyes. His glance was penetrating, notwithstanding the fact that he was short-sighted, and, since he would not wear glasses, he was obliged to hold any book which he read close to his eyes. He wore his hair long, did not shave, and habitually dressed in the fashion prevalent amongst the *'ulamá* of Constantinople. He ate sparingly, generally once a day, but drank tea, in true Persian fashion, continually. He was also a confirmed smoker, and so particular as to the quality of his tobacco that he always bought it himself. Unlike most Asiatics, he preferred cigars to cigarettes. During his final residence in Constantinople he received £75 T. a month from the Sultan, who also provided him with a house at Nishán Tásh, with furniture, and a carriage and horses from the Royal stables. He generally stayed at home all day, and only drove out to the Sweet Waters of Europe (*Kyághid-Kháné*), or some other pleasure-resort of the Turkish capital, towards evening. He slept little, retiring late and rising early. He received those who came to visit him with kindness and courtesy, the humblest as much as the most distinguished, but was chary of paying visits, especially to persons of high rank. In speech he was clear and eloquent, always expressing himself in choice language, and avoiding colloquial and vulgar idioms, but carefully adapting his words to the capacity of his hearers. As a public speaker he had hardly a rival in the East. He was serious and earnest in speech and little given to jesting or frivolous talk. He was abstemious in his life, caring little for the things of this world; bold and fearless in face of danger, frank and genial, but hot-tempered, affable

towards all, but independent in his dealings with the great. It is related that when he was expelled from Egypt, he arrived at Suez with empty pockets. The Persian Consul, accompanied by several Persian merchants, offered him a sum of money, either as a loan or a gift, but he refused it, saying, "Keep your money, for you need it more than I do. The lion, whithersoever he goes, will find the wherewithal to eat." His intellectual powers and his quick insight and discernment were equally remarkable, so that he seemed able to read men's thoughts before they had spoken. He possessed a wonderful personal magnetism and power of carrying his hearers with him. His knowledge was extensive, and he was especially versed in ancient philosophy, the philosophy of history, the history and civilization of Islám, and all the Muhammadan sciences. He was a good linguist, and learned French in three months without a master sufficiently well to read and translate. He knew the Arabic, Turkish, Persian and Afghan languages well, together with a little English and Russian[1]. He was a voracious reader, especially of Arabic and Persian books. He appears never to have married, and to have been indifferent to female charms.

The concluding paragraph of his biography in the *Mashá-híru'sh-Sharq*, which summarizes his political aspirations, runs as follows (pp. 65, 66):

"It will be gathered from this brief summary of his life and deeds that the goal towards which all his actions were directed, and the pivot on which all his hopes turned, was the unanimity of Islám and the bringing together of all Muslims in all parts of the world into one Islamic Empire under the protection of one Supreme Caliph[2]. In this endeavour he spent all his energies, and for this end he abandoned all worldly ambitions, taking to himself no wife and adopting no profession. Yet withal he failed in his endeavour, and died without leaving any written

[1] So also in the *Awakening of the Persians* (p. 98) it is stated that he knew these seven languages, and of Turkish two dialects, that of the Ottoman Empire, and the Persian-Turkish dialect of Hamadán.

[2] According to the *Awakening* (p. 102) he founded at Mecca a Pan-Islamic Society named *Ummu'l-Qurá*, which aimed at creating one Caliph of the whole Muslim world, either at Constantinople or Kúfa. It printed and circulated its rules and constitution, but was suppressed by Sulṭán 'Abdu'l-Ḥamíd within a year of its foundation.

record of his thoughts and aspirations save his treatise in refutation of the materialists and sundry isolated letters and pamphlets on various subjects, of some of which mention has been already made. But he raised up a living spirit in the hearts of his friends and disciples which stirred their energies and sharpened their pens, and the East has profited and will profit by their labours[1]."

Sayyid Muḥammad Rashíd, the editor of *al-Manár*, has published three noteworthy documents from the pen of Sayyid Jamálu'd-Dín, which illustrate in a remarkable manner both the nature and the extent of the influence exerted by him on the course of the events in Persia which will be dealt with in the following chapters. The first of these documents is the letter which he addressed to Ḥájji Mírzá Ḥasan-i-Shírází, one of the chief *Mujtahids* at Sámarrá[2], whereby that high ecclesiastic was stirred to take action in the matter of the Tobacco Concession, and so to take the first step in identifying the powerful clergy of Persia with the popular or Nationalist party. The two others are articles contributed in February and March, 1892, to an Arabic periodical entitled *Ẓiyá'u'l-Kháfiqayn* ("The Light of the Two Hemispheres"), both of which deal with the state of Persia at that time. To each of these the editor has added a few pregnant remarks, which I shall translate, together with selected portions of Sayyid Jamálu'd-Dín's letters, since these are too long to be translated here in full.

LETTER TO THE CHIEF MUJTAHID, WRITTEN FROM BAṢRA TO SÁMARRÁ[3].

In the Name of God the Merciful the Forgiving.

"The truth I tell: verily this letter is an invocation to the spirit of the Muhammadan Law, wherever it is found and

[1] It is worth noting that these words were written by a Syrian Christian, not by a Muslim. They were published five years ago, since when it has been abundantly shown—especially in Persia—that the forces set in motion by Sayyid Jamálu'd-Dín are still actively at work.

[2] He died in March, 1895.

[3] The text of this letter, which must have been written immediately after Sayyid Jamálu'd-Dín's expulsion from Persia in 1891, is also given in the *Awakening of the Persians* (pp. 108 *et seqq.*). The *mujtahid's fatwá*, ordering all true believers to abstain from tobacco until the Concession was withdrawn, was issued early in

wherever it dwells, and an appeal made by the people to all true souls who believe in this Law and strive to give it effect, whencesoever they have arisen and wheresoever they flourish, to wit the doctors (*'ulamá*) of Islám. And this appeal I desire to make unto all of these, though it be addressed to one in particular.

"Pontiff of the people, Ray of the Imáms' Light, Pillar of the edifice of Religion, Tongue attuned to the exposition of the Perspicuous Law, Your Reverence Ḥájji Mírzá Muḥammad Ḥasan of Shíráz—may God protect by your means the fold of Islám, and avert the plots of the vile unbelievers!—

"God hath set thee apart for this supreme vice-gerency, to represent the Most Great Proof, and hath chosen thee out of the true communion, and hath committed to thy hands the reins to control the people conformably to the most luminous Law, and to protect their rights thereby, and to guard their hearts from errors and doubts therein. He hath entrusted to thee of all mankind (so that thou art become the heir of the Prophets) the care of those weighty interests whereby the people shall prosper in this world and attain happiness hereafter. He hath assigned to thee the throne of authority, and hath bestowed on thee such supremacy over his people as empowers thee to save and defend their country and testify for them to the ways of those who have gone before.

"Verily the people, high and low, settled and nomad, noble and simple, have submitted themselves to this thy high and divine authority on bended knees and with prostrate bodies, their souls looking towards thee in every emergency which befalls them, their glances fixed on thee in every calamity which overtakes them, believing that their happiness and welfare are from thee, and their salvation and deliverance by thee, and their security and the accomplishment of their hopes in thee."

The writer then goes on to say that the Persian people are rendered desperate by the oppressions which they suffer and the sight of their country—"the Home of Religion" (*Baytu'd-Dín*)—sold to and overrun by foreigners and unbelievers, but that, in

December in that year, but the agitation against the Concession was already violent in the preceding June. The text of this brief but important *fatwá* is given on p. 16 of the *Awakening*.

the absence of a leader, they are distracted, divided and impotent, and that they begin to murmur and lose faith because no sign or direction comes from the *Mujtahid* whom they regard, and have a right to regard, as their guide and leader in all things touching the welfare of Islám. "They think," he adds, "and this is the truth, that thine is the word which will unite them and thine the proof which shall decide, that thy command is effective, and that none will contest thy authority, and that, didst thou so desire, thou couldst combine their scattered units by a word on thy part..., thereby filling with fear God's enemy and theirs, guard them from the malice of the infidels, dispel the trouble and misery which surround them, and raise them from their hard life to what is more ample and easy. So shall the Faith be defended and protected by its adherents, and Islám exalted and uplifted."

He then continues, after an intervening paragraph :—

"O most mighty Pontiff! Verily the King's[1] purpose wavereth, his character is vitiated, his perceptions are failing and his heart is corrupt. He is incapable of governing the land, or managing the affairs of his people, and hath entrusted the reins of government in all things great and small to the hands of a wicked freethinker[2], a tyrant and usurper, who revileth the Prophets openly, and heedeth not God's Law, who accounteth as naught the religious authorities, curseth the doctors of the Law, rejecteth the pious, contemneth honourable Sayyids[3] and treateth preachers as one would treat the vilest of mankind. Moreover since his return from the lands of the Franks he hath taken the bit between his teeth, drinks wine openly, associates with unbelievers and displays enmity towards the virtuous. Such is his private conduct; but in addition to this he hath sold to the foes of our Faith the greater part of the Persian lands and the profits accruing therefrom, to wit the mines[4], the ways leading thereunto, the roads connecting them

[1] *i.e.* Náṣiru'd-Dín Sháh.

[2] *i.e.* the *Amínu's-Sulṭán*, who was at this time Prime Minister of Persia.

[3] *i.e.* descendants of the Prophet.

[4] The concession granted to Baron Julius de Reuter in January, 1889, included the right of exploiting the mineral wealth of Persia, though this was ceded in the following year to the Persian Bank Mining Rights Corporation.

with the frontiers of the country, the inns about to be built by the side of these extensive arteries of communication which will ramify through all parts of the kingdom, and the gardens and fields surrounding them. Also the river Kárún[1] and the guest-houses which will arise on its banks up to its very source, and the gardens and meadows which adjoin it, and the highway from Ahwáz to Ṭihrán, with the buildings, inns, gardens and fields surrounding it. Also the tobacco (*tunbákú*)[2], with the chief centres of its cultivation, the lands on which it is grown, and the dwellings of the custodians, carriers and sellers, wherever these are found. He has similarly disposed of the grapes used for making wine, and the shops, factories and wine-presses appertaining to this trade throughout the whole of Persia; and so likewise soap, candles and sugar, and the factories connected therewith. Lastly there is the Bank: and what shall cause thee to understand what is the Bank? It means the complete handing over of the reins of government to the enemy of Islám[3], the enslaving of the people to that enemy, the surrendering of them and of all dominion and authority into the hands of the foreign foe.

"Thereafter the ignorant traitor, desiring to pacify the people by his futile arguments, pretended that these agreements were temporary, and these compacts only for a limited period which would not exceed a hundred years! God! what an argument, the weakness of which amazed even the traitors!

"Then he offered what was left to Russia[4] as the price of her silence and acquiescence (if indeed she will consent to be silent), namely the Murdáb (lagoon) of Rasht, the rivers of Ṭabaristán, and the road from Anzalí to Khurásán, with the houses, inns and fields appertaining thereto. But Russia turned up her nose at this offer, and declined to accept such a present; for she is bent on the annexation of Khurásán and the occupation of

[1] The boasts uttered by Lord Salisbury at the Guildhall Banquet on Nov. 9, 1888, concerning the Kárún River Concession greatly alarmed the Persian Government, and caused some restrictions to be introduced into the original scheme.

[2] The Tobacco Concession was granted on March 8, 1890, and registered at the British Legation on May 9 of the same year.

[3] He means England.

[4] This refers to the concessions made to Prince Dolgorouky in February, 1889.

Ázarbáyján and Mázandarán, unless these agreements be cancelled and these compacts rescinded—agreements, namely, which involve the entire surrender of the kingdom of Persia into the hands of that most contentious foe. Such is the first result of the policy of this madman.

"In short this criminal has offered the provinces of the Persian land to auction amongst the Powers, and is selling the realms of Islám and the abodes of Muḥammad and his household (on whom be greeting and salutation) to foreigners. But by reason of the vileness of his nature and meanness of his understanding he sells them for a paltry sum and at a wretched price. (Yea, thus it is when meanness and avarice are mingled with treason and folly!)

"And thou, O Proof, if thou wilt not arise to help this people, and wilt not unite them in purpose, and pluck them forth, by the power of the Holy Law, from the hands of this sinner, verily the realms of Islám will soon be under the control of foreigners, who will rule therein as they please and do what they will. If this opportunity is lost by thee, O Pontiff, and this thing befalls while thou art alive, verily thou wilt not leave behind thee a fair record in the register of time and on the pages of history. And thou knowest that the *'ulamá* of Persia and the people thereof with one accord (their spirits being straitened and their hearts distressed) await a word from thee wherein they shall behold their happiness and whereby their deliverance shall be effected. How then can it beseem one on whom God hath bestowed such power as this to be so chary of using it or to leave it in abeyance?

"I further assure Your Eminence, speaking as one who knoweth and seeth, that the Ottoman Government will rejoice in your undertaking of this effort and will aid you therein, for it is well aware that the intervention of Europeans in the Persian domains and their ascendancy therein will assuredly prove injurious to its own dominions. Moreover all the ministers and lords of Persia will rejoice in a word in this sense uttered by thee, seeing that all of them naturally detest these innovations and are constitutionally averse from these agreements, which your endeavour will give them the opportunity to annul, that perchance

they may restrain this evil of covetousness which hath been sanctioned and approved....All is from thee, by thee and in thee, and thou art responsible for all before God and men....

"No doubt the Pontiff of the people hath heard what the ring-leaders of infidelity and the confederates of unbelief have done to that learned, accomplished and virtuous Ḥájji Mullá Fayẓu'lláh of Darband; and thou wilt shortly hear what these cruel miscreants did to the learned, pious and righteous *mujtahid* Ḥájji Sayyid 'Alí Akbar of Shíráz. Thou wilt also learn what killing, beating, branding and bonds have been inflicted on the defenders of their country and their faith. Of such victims was that virtuous youth Mírzá Muḥammad Riẓá of Kirmán[1], whom that apostate [*i.e.* the *Amínu's-Sulṭán*] killed in prison[2], and the eminent and virtuous Ḥájji Sayyáḥ (Maḥallátí), the cultured and accomplished Mírzá Furúghí, the noble and talented Mírzá Muḥammad 'Alí Khán, the well-proved and accomplished *I'timádu's-Salṭana*[3] and others.

"As for my own story and what that ungrateful tyrant did to me...the wretch commanded me to be dragged, when I was in sanctuary in the shrine of Sháh 'Abdu'l-'Aẓím and grievously ill, through the snow to the capital with such circumstances of disrespect, humiliation and disgrace as cannot be imagined for wickedness (and all this after I had been plundered and despoiled). Verily we belong to God and verily unto Him do we return!

"Thereafter his miserable satellites mounted me, notwithstanding my illness, on a pack-saddle, loading me with chains, and this in the winter season, amidst the snow-drifts and bitter, icy blasts, and a company of horsemen conveyed me to Khániqín[4], guarded by an escort. And he had previously

[1] The same who afterwards killed Náṣiru'd-Dín Sháh, as will be fully set forth in the next chapter but one.

[2] This is, of course, an error, but it is not easy to ascertain the fate of political prisoners in Persia until long after their arrest.

[3] Muḥammad Ḥasan Khán *I'timádu's-Salṭana*, one of Sayyid Jamálu'd-Dín's disciples, was a man of letters, and was for a time Minister of the Press and of the Translation Bureau. He wrote several useful works, such as the *Kitábu'l-Ma'áthir wa'l-Áthár* (on the Institutions of Náṣiru'd-Dín Sháh, the chief events and most notable men of his reign, etc.), lithographed at Ṭihrán in A.H. 1306 (A.D. 1888–9).

[4] This is the Turkish frontier-post on the road between Persia and Baghdád.

written to the *Wálí* (Turkish governor), requesting him to remove me to Baṣra, knowing well that, if he left me alone, I should come to thee, O Pontiff, and inform thee of his doings and of the state of the people [of Persia], and explain to thee what had befallen the lands of Islám through the evil deeds of this infidel, and would invoke thy help, O Proof, for the True Faith, and induce thee to come to the succour of the Muslims. For he knew for a certainty that, should I succeed in meeting thee, it would not be possible for him to continue in his office, involving as it does the ruin of the country, the destruction of the people, and the encouragement of unbelief....Moreover his conduct was made more culpable and mean in that, in order to avert a general revolt and appease the popular agitation, he accused the party whom zeal for religion and patriotism had impelled to defend the sanctuary of Islám and the rights of the people of belonging to the Bábí sect. So also (may God cut out his tongue!) he spread it abroad amongst the people that I was uncircumcised (alas for Islám!). What is this weakness? What this cowardice? How is it possible that a low-born vagabond and contemptible fool should be able to sell the Muslims and their lands for a vile price and a paltry sum, contemn the *'ulamá*, treat with disrespect the descendants of the Prophet, and slander in such fashion Sayyids of the House of 'Alí? Is there no hand able to pluck up this evil root and so to appease the wrathful indignation of the Muslims, and avenge the descendants of the Chief of God's Apostles (upon whom and whose household be blessings and salutation)?

"Wherefore, seeing myself remote from that high presence, I refrained from uttering my complaint....But when that learned leader and *mujtahid* Ḥájji Sayyid 'Alí Akbar came to Baṣra, he urged me to write to that most high Pontiff a letter setting forth these events, misfortunes and afflictions, and I hastened to obey his command, knowing that God will effect something by thy hand.

"Peace be upon thee, and the Mercy of God, and His Blessings."

And in truth Sayyid Jamálu'd-Dín's hopes and expectations were not deceived, for it was apparently this letter which induced

the great *mujtahid*, Ḥájji Mírzá Ḥasan of Shíráz, to issue his *fatwá* declaring the use of tobacco to be unlawful until the obnoxious concession was withdrawn; it was this *fatwá* which gave to the popular resentment the sanction of Religion, thus enabling it to triumph over the Sháh, the Amínu's-Sulṭán and the foreign governments and *concessionaires*; and amongst the ultimate results of all this were the violent deaths of Náṣiru'd-Dín Sháh and the Amínu's-Sulṭán, the successful demand for a Constitution, rendered possible only by the alliance between the clergy and the people, and the whole momentous struggle which has convulsed Persia during the last four years, and of which the history will be traced in these pages.

The remarks appended by Sayyid Muḥammad Rashíd to the text of this letter are worth quoting, and run as follows:—

"This letter inspired a spirit of heroism and enthusiasm in that great doctor, who possessed so strong a spiritual influence over the Persian people, and he accordingly issued an edict (*fatwá*) forbidding the use and cultivation of tobacco[1]. The *'ulamá* published his *fatwá* abroad with lightning speed, and the people bowed their necks to it to such a degree that it is related that on the morning of the day succeeding the arrival of the *fatwá* at Ṭihrán the Sháh called for a *nárgilé* (*qalyán*, or water-pipe), and was told that there was no tobacco in the Palace, for it had all been destroyed. He demanded with amazement the reason of this, and was informed of the *fatwá* of the Proof of Islám (*i.e.* Ḥájji Mírzá Ḥasan-i-Shírází, the *mujtahid*); and when he asked why they had not asked his permission first, they replied, 'It is a religious question concerning which there was no need to seek such permission!' Thereafter the Sháh was compelled to rescind the concession and satisfy the English company by a payment of half a million pounds. Thus did Sayyid Jamálu'd-Dín save Persia from an English occupation by abolishing the cause which would have led to this, namely this

[1] See the *Awakening of the Persians*, p. 16. The translation of the *fatwá*, as there given, runs as follows:—"In the Name of God the Merciful, the Forgiving. To-day the use of *tunbáku* and tobacco, in whatever fashion, is reckoned as war against the Imám of the Age (may God hasten his glad Advent!)." This *fatwá* was published in Persia by Ḥájjí Mírzá Ḥasan-i-Áshtiyání, and, though confirmed later by Mírzá Ḥasan-i-Shírází, it has been asserted that it originally emanated from him.

concession, and the other concessions of which you have read the description in his letter. Such are true men and such are true *'ulamá*!

"Now[1] the effect of the influence of the clergy is fully manifested in Persia, inasmuch as it hath changed the order of government and converted it from despotic to constitutional rule. Perhaps this event is the first intimation to the *'ulamá* that the matter is in their hands. Yet none the less Sayyid Jamálu'd-Dín was the prime mover in this revolution, as he was also the cause of the revolution which took place in Egypt, where the action of his Society was the first effort made to resist and destroy the authority of Isma'íl Pasha, and to inspire in Tawfíq the spirit of progress, so that he assured the Sayyid and his supporters that, if he succeeded to the throne, he would establish a Chamber of Deputies and effect other reforms. But thereafter the intervention of the army in politics brought the plan to naught.

"But the success of the *'ulamá*, prompted by his efforts and guided by him, in hindering foreign intervention in Persia, was not the only indication that the power of the clergy and the people transcended the power of kings; the warning was completed thereafter by the killing of the Sháh, and what was asserted as to the slayer being one of the followers of Sayyid Jamálu'd-Dín.

"The Sayyid did not content himself with urging the chief *mujtahid* and the other *'ulamá* to withstand the Sháh and his Minister, nor with his success in arousing them against him. He went from Baṣra to Europe and began to censure them in speech and writing. He founded, or helped to found, there a bilingual monthly magazine, published in Arabic and English, named *Ẓiyâ'u'l-Kháfiqayn* ('the Light of the two Hemispheres'), to each number of which he used to contribute an article on Persian affairs, over the well-known signature 'the Sayyid,' or 'the Ḥusayní Sayyid.' Its remarks on Egypt were also amongst its most important topics.

"In his articles on Persia he used to censure unsparingly its

[1] These words were written about the beginning of the year 1908. I received the sheet in which they occur on March 7 of that year.

government and Sháh, so that the Persian Minister in London sought him out and strove to win him over and pacify him, that perchance he might desist from speaking and writing about this, offering him a large sum of money to do so. But the Sayyid said to him, 'Naught will content me save that the Sháh shall be killed, and his belly ripped open, and his body consigned to the tomb.' This saying of his lends colour to the belief that the Sháh's assassin was one of the Sayyid's followers.

"Here we shall reproduce," the editor concludes, "some of what he wrote about Persia in the '*Light of the two Hemispheres*,' in order to immortalize him in history. This is what he wrote in the second number of that periodical, published on March 1, 1892, urging the '*ulamá* to depose the Sháh and devote themselves to the interests of the people."

The article to which reference is made above is addressed to a number of the principal '*ulamá* of Persia, who are mentioned by name in the exordium. They are the Chief *mujtahid* of Karbalá, Ḥájji Mírzá Muḥammad Ḥasan of Shíráz, Ḥájji Mírzá Ḥabíbu'lláh of Rasht, Ḥájji Mírzá Abu'l-Qásim of Karbalá, Áqá Ḥájji Mírzá Jawád of Tabríz, Ḥájji Sayyid 'Alí Akbar of Shíráz, Ḥájji Shaykh Hádí of Najmábád, Mírzá Ḥasan of Áshtiyán, the *Ṣadru'l-'Ulamá*, Ḥájji Áqá Muḥsin of 'Iráq, Ḥájji Shaykh Muḥammad Taqí of Isfahán, Ḥájji Mullá Muḥammad Taqí of Bujnúrd, and others not specified.

Sayyid Jamálu'd-Dín begins by emphasising the danger to which Muslim countries are exposed by the greed of European Powers, to whose sinister designs, he declares, the '*ulamá* offer the chief obstacle. Where their power was restricted or broken by the rulers of the country, as in India and Transoxiana, Europeans easily succeeded in intervening in the affairs of the country, and finally taking possession of it; while, on the other hand, the strength of Afghánistán in resisting the attacks of the English time after time is due to the influence wielded by the *mullás* in that country. He then proceeds to describe the policy of Náṣiru'd-Dín Sháh as follows:—

"When this Sháh, this viper and man of sin, obtained control of the kingdom [of Persia], he began gradually to infringe the rights of the '*ulamá*, lower their status, and diminish their

influence, on account of his desire to exercise despotic authority in his vain commands and prohibitions, and to extend the scope of his tyranny and oppression. So he drove forth many from the country in disgrace, and by contempt prevented others from maintaining the Holy Law, and brought others from their homes to the Abode of Tyranny and Abuses (Ṭihrán), where he compelled them to abide in humiliation. Thus the air was cleared for him, and he crushed down the people, ruined the country, ran through a whole cycle of shameful deeds, publicly indulged in all manner of vices, and expended on his vile pleasures and beastly indulgences what he had wrung from the blood of the poor and needy and extracted by force from the tears of widows and orphans. (Alas for Islám!)

"Then when his folly had increased in all its various forms, he choose as his Minister[1] a foolish wretch, who had neither religion to control him, understanding to check him, nor personal honour to restrain him. No sooner had this man of sin become invested with authority than he set himself to destroy religion and make war on the Muslims, while his low origin and mean extraction impelled him to sell the lands of Islám for a paltry price.

"So the Franks supposed that the time had come to take possession of the Persian realm, without opposition or war, and imagined that the power of the *'ulamá*, who used to defend the citadel of Islám, had waned, and their influence departed, and all rushed open-mouthed, eager to gobble up a portion of this kingdom.

"Then the Truth arose, angered against the False, and crushed it, disappointing its endeavour and humbling each obstinate tyrant. I speak truly: you, O leaders, have glorified Islám by your resolve, have exalted its authority, and have filled men's hearts with fear and awe. All foreigners have learned that yours is an authority not to be resisted, a strength not to be overcome and a word not to be ignored; that you are the salt of the earth and that you control the people. But the danger is now great and the emergency critical, for the devils have

[1] Mírzá 'Alí Aṣghar Khán *Amínu's-Sulṭán*, on whom at a later date was conferred the higher title of *Atábak-i-A'ẓam*.

combined to repair the hurt which they have sustained, and are eager to attain their end, and they are determined to mislead that man of sin into the expulsion of all the *'ulamá* from the country. So they have explained to him that only by the obedience of the officers of his army can effect be given to his commands, and that these officers [being at present Persians and Muslims] will not act contrary to any command emanating from the *'ulamá*, and will not consent to inflict on them any injury, so that, in order to establish the authority of the government, they must be replaced by European officers; and they have exhibited to that foolish traitor as a specimen [of what they propose] the command of the Royal Body-guard and the control of the Cossack Brigade[1]. So now this infidel and his counsellors in heresy are exerting themselves to introduce foreign officers, and the Sháh in his chronic madness approves this plan and is filled with delight thereat.

"By God's Life! Madness and infidelity are leagued together, and folly and greed are allied to destroy religion, to abrogate the Holy Law, and to hand over the Home of Islám to foreigners without striking a blow or offering the least resistance.

"O guides of the people! If you leave this wretched Pharaoh, or suffer him to continue on his throne of madness, and do not hasten to depose him from the high place of his error, then the matter is finished, and will be hard to cure and difficult to remedy."

The remainder of the article deals with the deposition of Náṣiru'd-Dín Sháh, an achievement which it declares to be not difficult of accomplishment on account of the general discontent at his rule and the prestige enjoyed by the *'ulamá* since they espoused the cause of the people in opposing the obnoxious Tobacco Monopoly. The editor, Muḥammad Rashíd, adds a note on the great influence wielded by the *'ulamá* in Persia, and observes how necessary it is for the welfare of Islám that they should not receive payment or pensions from the government.

[1] It says much for the Sayyid's foresight that Colonel Liakhoff and the other Russian officers in the service of the present Sháh should have been the instruments wherewith the deplorable *coup d'état* of June 23, 1908, was effected. The Cossack Brigade was originally instituted in 1882, and Colonel Kozakofski was the first officer to command it.

"Islám cannot prosper," he concludes, "unless the *'ulamá* be independent, and not obliged to rely for their daily bread, in learning, teaching and directing, on kings and nobles, as has hitherto been the case."

The last article quoted is from the February number of the above-mentioned *Ẓiyá'u'l-Kháfiqayn* for 1892. Though shorter than the two preceding documents, it is too long to quote in full, and a short specimen must suffice. It deals with the miserable condition of Persia, the tyranny and exactions of the governing classes, which are depopulating the country and driving numbers of its people into exile, the corruption of all branches of the administration, the sale of governments and government offices, the absence of all law, the prevalence of every kind of cruelty and torture, and the lack of discipline amongst the unpaid and vagabond soldiery, who live by plunder and robbery, and are dangerous only to their peaceful and industrious compatriots.

"The government has over-ridden and destroyed the Holy Law, detests and repudiates civilized administration, despises and ignores the laws of reason and common sense. Passion alone holds sway, greed alone dominates, violence and brute force alone rule. The sword, the scourge and the branding-iron only govern. It delights in the shedding of blood, glories in dishonour, and exults in robbing widows and orphans of their possessions. In those lands is no security, and their inhabitants see no means to save their life from the teeth of tyranny save by flight.

"A fifth of the Persians have fled into Turkish or Russian territory, where you may see them wandering through the streets and markets as porters, sweepers, scavengers and water-carriers, rejoicing in spite of their tattered garments, their sombre countenances, and the meanness of their avocations, in their deliverance, and thanking God for sparing their lives....

"The governor and his satellites, in order to recover what they disbursed at first [in bribes to the Court] and to obtain what they have undertaken to remit [to the capital], during the whole period of their authority (which is undetermined) leave no foul deed, or disgraceful act, or horrid iniquity undone....They hang up women by their hair, put men in sacks with savage

dogs, nail their ears to wooden boards, or put a leading-rein through their noses and then parade the wretched victim in such pitiful plight through the streets and markets. Their lightest punishments are branding and scourging with whips."

The editor adds that he has heard of, but not seen, another letter in which the Sayyid advocates the deposition of both Sultans (*i.e.* of Turkey and Persia), which he declares to be "easier than taking off one's boots"!

The following extract from an undated letter[1] written by Sayyid Jamálu'd-Dín to one of his friends (unnamed) is given in the *History of the Awakening of the Persians* (pp. 107–108). This letter is written in Persian, and the translation is as follows:—

"I write this letter to my own dear friend, being a captive in prison and debarred from meeting my friends, neither expecting deliverance nor hoping for life, neither afflicted by my captivity nor fearful of being slain. Nay, I rejoice at my captivity and impending death, for my imprisonment is for the freeing of my kind, and I shall be slain for the life of my people. Only on this account am I grieved, that I have not lived to reap what I have sown, and that I have not fully attained to that which I desired. The sword of unrighteousness has not suffered me to see the awakening of the peoples of the East, and the hand of ignorance has not granted me the opportunity to hear the call of Freedom from the throats of the nations of the Orient. Would that I had sown all the seed of my ideas in the receptive ground of the people's thoughts! Well would it have been had I not wasted this fruitful and beneficent seed of mine in the salt and sterile soil of that effete Sovereignty! For what I sowed in that soil never grew, and what I planted in that brackish earth perished away. During all this time none of my well-intentioned counsels sank into the ears of the rulers of the East, whose selfishness and ignorance prevented them from accepting my words. I had hopes of Persia, but the reward of my labours was entrusted to the public executioner! With a thousand threats and promises they summoned me to Turkey, and then

[1] From internal evidence it would appear to have been written from Constantinople a little before the writer's death.

fettered and constrained me thus, regardless of the fact that to destroy the messenger is not to destroy the message, and that the page of Time preserves the word of Truth.

"At all events I desire my honoured friend to submit this my last letter to the eyes of my dear Persian friends and fellow-workers, and to communicate to them verbally this message:—'You, who are the ripe fruit of Persia, and who have zealously girded up your skirts for the awakening of the Persians, fear neither imprisonment nor slaughter! Be not wearied by Persian ignorance! Be not frightened by the ferocious acts of Sultans! Strive with the utmost speed, and endeavour with the greatest swiftness! Nature is your friend, and the Creator of Nature your ally. The stream of renovation flows quickly towards the East. The edifice of despotic government totters to its fall. Strive so far as you can to destroy the foundations of this despotism, not to pluck up and cast out its individual agents. Strive so far as in you lies to abolish those practices which stand between the Persians and their happiness, not to annihilate those who employ these practices. If you merely strive to oppose individuals, your time will only be lost. If you seek only to prevail against them, the evil practice will draw to itself others. Endeavour to remove those obstacles which prevent your friendship with other nations.'"

Much more might be written concerning this remarkable man, who, a wandering scholar with no material resources save only an eloquent tongue and pen, learning both wide and deep combined with considerable political insight and knowledge of affairs, and a sincere and passionate love of Islám, of which he acutely felt the present decadence, literally made kings tremble on their thrones and defeated the well-laid plans of statesmen by setting in motion forces which he knew how to evoke and with which secular politicians, both European and Asiatic, had utterly failed to reckon. He it was, as has been already said, who was the chief agent in bringing about the Egyptian Nationalist movement, which, though defeated in 1882, is still a force to be reckoned with; and he it was to whom the present Constitutional Movement in Persia in large measure owes its

inception. He also did much to awaken the independent Muslim States to a sense of their imminent peril and the urgent need of combination to withstand the constant aggressions of the great European Powers, and he might with justice be termed the founder of Pan-Islamism in the sense in which I have defined it. He might have effected much more had he been able to find a Muslim sovereign sufficiently intelligent to understand the full scope of his ideas, and sufficiently inspired by patriotism and enthusiasm for Islám to carry them out. Of Náṣiru'd-Dín Sháh, a selfish and cruel despot, caring only for his personal authority and material pleasures, he must needs despair after a brief trial. Of the Sultan of Turkey he had greater hopes, and he set on foot a real movement, which still counts influential supporters in Persia, to bring about a working understanding between the Turkish Sunnís and the Persian Shí'a, based on the recognition by the Persians of the Ottoman Caliphate, and a recognition by the Turks of the King of Persia as head of the Shí'ites, and including the abolition of sundry practices on both sides tending to keep alive the existing hostility between these two great divisions of Muslims. For he saw clearly that the same dangers threatened the two Empires, and that only by uniting against the common foe, instead of wasting their strength in vain bickerings and occasional armed conflicts, could they hope to escape the impending doom. Even some influential *mujtahids* and *mullás* were gained over to this policy, but when these, in the recent revolution in Persia, partly from choice and natural sympathy, partly from necessity, threw in their lot with the Constitutional movement, Sulṭán 'Abdu'l-Ḥamíd, in whose presence, until July, 1908, none dared breathe the hated word "Constitution" (*Mashrúṭiyyat*), broke off all relations with them, and, by permitting his troops to cross the North-West frontier of Persia, added to her difficulties and distress. Yet in the new and brighter era which has now dawned in Turkey the ideas of Sayyid Jamálu'd-Dín may perhaps find a fuller measure of success.

CHAPTER II.

THE TOBACCO CONCESSION AND ITS CONSEQUENCES.

THE misfortunes of Persia which overshadowed the last six years of Náṣiru'd-Dín Sháh's reign, and ultimately led to his destruction, may be said to date from the granting of the Tobacco Concession to an English company on March 8, 1890.

During the preceding summer the Sháh had visited Europe for the third time[1]. Hitherto these journeys, though costly and useless (for no benefit to his subjects accrued from them), had done no particular harm. But this year was a year of evil: even before he left Persia in April, the Sháh had granted (in January, 1889) to Baron Julius de Reuter a concession for the formation of a State Bank, with exclusive rights of issuing bank-notes and exploiting the mineral resources of the country, and a month later Prince Dolgorouky obtained for Russia the first refusal of any railway concession which might be granted during the five succeeding years. As if this did not suffice, the Sháh further granted to a Persian subject (of whose identity I am ignorant) a Lottery concession, which was subsequently bought by a British Syndicate for £40,000. This was shortly afterwards revoked, but the money paid by the Syndicate was not refunded, and this had the effect of discrediting Persia on the Stock Exchange; a result, perhaps, not wholly to be regretted from the Persian point of view, since the interest of the Stock Exchange is often of a somewhat sinister character, and by no means wholly to be desired. On September 2 the Persian State Bank, under the title of the Imperial Bank of Persia, was established by British Royal Charter.

[1] The first journey was in 1873, the second in 1878, and the third in 1889.

The circumstances surrounding these concessions, and especially the Lottery Concession, are obscure to me, but one effect of this last, which had several important consequences, was a quarrel between the Sháh and Prince Malkom Khán, who had, since 1872, represented Persia at the Court of St James's. As a result of this quarrel Malkom Khán ceased, in November, 1889, to be Persian Minister in London[1], and was replaced by Muḥammad 'Alí Khán *'Alá'u's-Salṭana*[2]. On October 20, 1889, the Sháh re-entered his capital, having re-crossed the Persian frontier on September 13, bringing with him his new French physician, Dr Feuvrier (to whom we owe a singularly illuminating account of events in the Persian capital during the next three years, entitled *Trois Ans à la Cour de Perse*) and the celebrated protagonist of "Pan-Islamism," Sayyid Jamálu'd-Dín al-Afghán, the former from Paris, the latter from Munich.

We now come to the year 1890, from which especially, as I have already observed, the dangers and disasters which still threaten Persia may be said to date. "*De concession en concession*," wrote Dr Feuvrier under the date April 14 of this year, "*la Perse sera bientôt tout entière entre les mains des étrangers*." The Imperial Bank of Persia took up the scheme of constructing a carriage-road from Ahwáz to Ṭihrán, and ceded its mineral rights to a new company called the "Persian Bank Mining Corporation," which, however, collapsed four years later. Other concessions, all tending towards the same evil result of placing in foreign hands, for a relatively small immediate benefit to the Sháh and his courtiers, and to the great detriment of the Persian people, the sources of Persia's actual or potential wealth, belong to about the same period, and will be found fully discussed in Lorini's excellent work, *La Persia Economica contemporanea e la sua questione monetaria* (Rome, 1900). But it was the Tobacco Concession which led to the most momentous results, and it is this especially which will now be discussed.

This Concession, as already stated, was granted on March 8,

[1] The *Times* of March 16, 1891, announced, on the authority of the Persian *Írán*, that Malkom Khán had been deprived of all his titles by the Sháh. A spirited reply from Malkom Khán was published on March 20, 1891, in the same paper.

[2] Till recently (Feb. 1910) the Persian Minister for Foreign Affairs. He resigned on Feb. 6 in consequence of a vote of censure.

1890, but the preliminary negotiations of which it was the outcome very probably began in the preceding year, while the Sháh was in Europe. The *concessionnaire*, Mr G. F. Talbot, was thereby granted full control over the production, sale and export of all tobacco in Persia for a period of fifty years, in return for which monopoly he undertook to pay to the Sháh, or the Persian Government, an annual rent of £15,000, in addition to one-quarter of the annual profits, after the payment of all working expenses and a five per cent. dividend on the capital. The capital of the Company, which, under the title of "the Imperial Tobacco Corporation of Persia," was subsequently formed, consisted of £650,000 in 64,740 ordinary shares of £10 each, and 2600 founders' shares at £1 each. That good profits were expected is sufficiently shewn by the following statement in the Prospectus, dated November 3, 1890: "the Founders' Shares will not receive dividends in any year until the Ordinary Shares shall have received 15 per cent. dividend for that year. The remaining profits will then be divided in equal moieties between the Ordinary Shares and the Founders' Shares." The expectations of the *concessionnaires* are still more clearly set forth in the prospectus, where the net annual profits are estimated at £500,000, and the total net annual profits to the Corporation at £371,875. "Advantage was taken," says the prospectus, "of the experience gained in the working and administration of the Turkish Tobacco Régie...established in the year 1884..., and inasmuch as the rent payable by them (*i.e.* the Persian Tobacco Corporation) is only £15,000 per annum, as against £630,000 per annum payable by the Turkish Régie, and the term of their concession is for 50 years as against the term of only 30 years in the case of the Turkish Concession, their business will be entered on under much more favourable conditions." The Persian Government undertook "to support and protect the Corporation in carrying on their business," in which undertaking, adds this alluring document, "it has a direct interest, as it will share in the profits realized." It is interesting to observe that "should any difference arise between the Imperial Government and the Corporation, it shall be determined by an Arbitrator to be appointed, in default of agreement, by one of

the representatives of the United States of America, or of Germany or Austria, resident at Ṭihrán." For this was before the days when we had bound ourselves by *ententes* and *rapprochements* to our dear friends France and Russia.

With the Prospectus from which the above information is derived was enclosed a glowing account, dated August 2, 1890, of the vast possibilities now lying open before the *concessionnaires*, drawn up by a gentleman named Antoine Kitabji (who, if my memory serves me right, was responsible for that strange and heterogeneous conglomeration of Levantine Christians and Syrian Jews which constituted the cast of the so-called "Persian Theatre" at the Paris Exhibition), describing himself as "Directeur Général des Douanes en Perse." It is hard to resist the temptation of quoting this egregious document in full, but we must content ourselves with the following majestic, if somewhat cryptic, utterances.

"Moreover, the mere fact of the reservation made by the Government of His Imperial Majesty the Sháh, which, while accepting a minimum rent of £15,000 sterling per annum to encourage the enterprise, has reserved for itself one-quarter of the profits, proves to you at once the importance of the approximate estimate of experienced persons in the country, who, by this indirect means, and without being a charge on your Company, have been able to secure so important a part for the Government.

"Now, as to the population, they will benefit by the Régie, because at present the Tambakou passes through three or four hands before reaching the consumers....The Octroi and internal conveyance duties at present existing...are of little importance...: therefore it is certainly not these duties which are now the cause of the relatively large overcharge of merchants and dealers; but the reason is—these merchants, with the small capital they possess, are desirous of gaining much, and even make mixtures to raise their profits still higher. I say, therefore, that the population will be a true partisan of your Régie because they will buy cheaper, and without admixture.

"The growers will be the most favoured in this matter, because the merchants do them great injury by depreciating

their goods, in order to purchase at reduced prices and long terms, whilst your Company will be careful to encourage the production of the better qualities by paying remunerative prices, and by making advances.

"To sum up, the Régie has a very brilliant future before it. It will realize large profits from the beginning; and all the parties interested, such as the Government, your Company, the consumers and the growers, will certainly find their share in the profits. Of this I am convinced."

Thus everybody was to be happy and pleased, and to derive a profit from this beneficent Corporation (which itself was to be rewarded by a conscious sense of rectitude and a profit of anything over 50 per cent. on its capital) except the wicked Persian tobacco-vendors, who, "with the small capital they possess," were apparently regarded as unworthy of serious consideration. The Concession was duly registered at the British Legation at Ṭihrán on May 9, 1890; the subscription-list was opened on November 4–6; and all preparations were made to "take up" the Concession in the following year.

Here I must for a moment break the thread of my narrative to speak of a literary enterprise which undoubtedly was not without its effect in increasing the dissatisfaction at the Sháh's extravagances and disregard of the interests of his people which began to prevail in Persia. Malkom Khán, having quarrelled with the Sháh and his ministers (especially with the *Amínu's-Sulṭán*, afterwards entitled *Atbák-i-A'ẓam*), began to publish in London and to distribute in the East a Persian newspaper entitled *Qánún* ("Law"), of which No. 1 was issued on February 20, 1890, No. 2 on March 22, No. 3 on April 20, No. 4 on May 20, No. 5 on June 18, and No. 6 on July 18. The remaining numbers (7, 8, 9 and 19) which I possess[1] are, unfortunately, undated, but since 41 numbers at least were issued, it is to be presumed that the paper was continued for nearly three and a half years. It was vehemently resented by the Sháh, and those unfortunate Persians who were known to have received it or to be in possession of it were arrested, and in several cases

[1] Since writing this I have received, through the kindness of Prince Malkom Khán's widow, an almost complete set of the 41 numbers of the *Qánún*.

severely punished. Amongst these were two of my intimate friends, one an ex-secretary of the Persian Legation in London, the other my old teacher and Mr (now Sir) Arthur Wollaston's coadjutor in the production of his two English-Persian Dictionaries, Mírzá Muḥammad Báqir. The latter delivered himself out of the hands of Prince Ná'ibu's-Salṭana (the son of Náṣiru'd-Dín and uncle of the ex-Sháh) by recitations from his mystical and religious "Islamo-Christian" poems which made the Prince glad to be quit of him at any price; but the former suffered a harsh and prolonged imprisonment.

The first number of the *Qánún* was published, as already stated, on February 20, 1890. It was entirely Islamic in tone, beginning with a brief prayer in Arabic, and ending with a hope that any opinion which should prove erroneous or contrary to the truths of Islám might be forgiven. The greatest respect was expressed for Náṣiru'd-Dín Sháh, whose justice and clemency were extolled, and for the *mullás* and *mujtahids*. Emphasis was laid on the disordered and corrupt condition of Persia, which was ascribed, firstly to the absence of any law, and secondly to the misdeeds of the Prime Minister, the *Amínu's-Sulṭán*, who was described as a "muleteer's son" (*bacha-i-qáṭirjí*), and who is throughout the special target of the paper's vituperations. "We must begin by writing very gently," observed the editor; but, so far as the *Amínu's-Sulṭán* was concerned, the degree of this "gentleness" may be judged by the following:—

"The Prime Minister will leap half a yard out of his seat as soon as he sees the *Qánún*. He will hurl his cap (*kuláh*) on the ground, tear his collar, and, after various other womanish outbursts of anger, will run off to the foreign ambassadors, kiss their feet, and pledge them whatever is still left of the rights of the State, so that perhaps, by their help, the *Qánún* may be put on the proscribed list. So much the better! In Persia a newspaper which is not proscribed means nothing. The more violently he behaves, the more important will the matter become, and the more eager will the people of Persia grow to obtain and circulate such a warrant of salvation."

The next number, dated March 22, 1890, contains the following summary of complaints, in the course of a long description of the woes of Persia:—

"The control of all affairs of State in the hands of ignorant and base-born persons.

"The rights of the State bartered to please Legation dragomans.

"The titles and offices of the State the playthings of successful knaveries.

"Our army the laughing-stock of the world.

"Our princes deserving of the pity of beggars.

"Our *mujtahids* and doctors craving the justice of the unbelievers.

"Our towns each a metropolis of dirt.

"Our roads worse than the tracks of animals."

To the cry for a fixed Code of Laws is now added a demand for a Parliament representing the people, free to discuss all matters connected with the welfare of the State, the members of which shall enjoy the privilege of immunity, whatever they may lawfully say or do in the discharge of their functions.

"The number of councillors in the Council of State is now very small," writes the editor; "as far as possible this Assembly must be enlarged. Great divines, eminent men of learning, capable *mullás*, and the chief men of every province—even young men possessed of learning—must be members of this supreme Council.

"The leaders of Church and State, and all persons of intelligence, must, in response to the demands of this time for increased watchfulness, unite to support this Assembly, and seek by every means to make the Persian people understand that the regeneration of Persia depends on carrying out the Law, and that carrying out the Law depends on the consideration and authority enjoyed by this Assembly."

The third number of the *Qánún*, dated April 20, 1890, emphasizes the veneration of law shewn elsewhere, even by the rulers of the most autocratic states, such as Turkey and Russia, and deplores anew the insecurity of life, property and honour in Persia. It congratulates its contemporary, the Persian *Akhtar* ("Star"), published at Constantinople, for its services to the cause of Persian freedom, and warns the Sháh's sons that while

they are jealously watching each other, each hoping that he may one day succeed to the throne, "the ignorance of the Prime Minister (*i.e.* the *Amínu's-Sulṭán*), which has overshadowed Persia, will soon leave nothing worth quarrelling about."

Certain passages, viewed in the light of later events, have an almost prophetic strain, as, for example, the following, from No. 4, issued on May 20, 1890:—

"Certain nerveless and poor-spirited beings, who always judge the character of others by their own base nature, say that Persia has lost all feeling and perception, and that these words can no longer produce any effect. It is true that our small-minded grandees have, so far as they were able, established the market of shamelessness in these our days; but they will shortly see that Persia is not quite desolate, and that the spirit of manhood still survives in it."

Mr Wilfrid Blunt, in his interesting *Secret History of the English Occupation of Egypt* (pp. 82–87), gives an account of the impression produced on him by Malkom Khán, whom he met on June 27, 1880, and whom he describes as "a little old man with a long nose and very black eyes." "I left him," adds the writer, "with the impression that he was the most remarkable man I had ever met, and more convinced than ever of the superior intelligence of the Eastern mind." He also repeats some part of the account given him by Malkom Khán of his doctrines and adventures, and of the "religion of humanity" which he endeavoured to found in Persia, and for which he claimed to have gained 30,000 proselytes, until finally the Sháh, jealous of his increasing power, granted him "permission to travel," and conferred on him "the position of Ambassador-General to all the Courts of Europe." It was some four or five years later that I myself made the acquaintance of this eminent diplomatist, but he talked to me less about the "religion of humanity" than about a new plan for printing Persian, Turkish and Arabic with unjoined letters, in the elaboration and perfecting of which he was then engaged. The types for this experiment were actually cut under his supervision, and a small printing-press, worked by an ingenious Persian named, I think, Ḥájji Muḥammad Khán, was established in Notting Hill Gate, not far from Holland

Prince Malkom Khán

Park, where the Persian Legation was at that time situated. The *Gulistán* of Sa'dí and several small primers, of which I possess copies, were printed there, and the types were also occasionally used for an article in Ṣábúnjí's Arabic journal *an-Naḥla* ("the Bee") which was then appearing in London[1], but, so far as I know, they never obtained a more extended use, and I have not heard of anything being printed with them for the last twenty years.

Mr Blunt, in his account of Prince Malkom Khán's views, represents the Prince, according to his own narrative, as exhorting his disciples not to be content with the name *ádam* ("homo"), but to become worthy of the higher title of *insán* ("vir"). In the *Qánún*, however, it is the first, and, according to Mr Blunt, the lower of these two designations, which is applied to the body of sympathisers and helpers in Persia at whose existence the paper hints. The following extracts (from No. 4, dated May 20, 1890) are typical:—

"A merchant of Tabríz writes from Erzeroum, 'May I be the sacrifice of Law! Tell me what I can do!' Our answer is this. 'Obtain possession of the book of Humanity (*ádamiyyat*). Read it. Become a man (*ádam*), and strive to further the cause of Humanity according to the measure of your understanding.'

"One of the *'ulamá* of Fárs writes, 'You are continually repeating the words "man" (*ádam*) and "Humanity" (*ádamiyyat*). What do you mean by them? We, who thirst for justice and are the foes of oppression, and who, by God's grace, consider ourselves to be "men," in order that, even in what concerns the name, we may differ from beasts of prey, proclaim ourselves everywhere as "men."'

"Whoever seeks after justice, is zealous for honour, loves knowledge, protects the oppressed, supports progress, and wishes well to the community is a 'man.'

"One writes from 'Iráq, 'I regard myself as a "man," but from the "humanity" of me alone what practical result can follow?'

[1] See Blunt, *op. cit.* pp. 86, 87. A copy of this paper which I possess, published in 1887, describes that year as the seventeenth of the paper's existence, so that it would appear to have been founded about 1870.

"If you are really a 'man,' the very moment that you open your eyes and ears a little you will see that you are not alone in Persia."

In the following passage from the same number Sayyid Jamálu'd-Dín, who, as we have already seen, returned to Persia with Náṣiru'd-Dín Sháh in the autumn of 1889, is probably intended:—

"A certain eminent preacher, who has a minute knowledge of the dispositions and characters of each individual servant of the Court, and who has for some time been occupied in promoting the cause of 'humanity' with enlightened discrimination and ripe experience, writes, in the course of other communications:—

"'You have without doubt by this time received information from a thousand quarters that most persons of intelligence in Persia, to a far greater extent than can be imagined abroad, are eagerly thirsting for the advent of the reign of Law. Do not doubt that the people of this country, great and small alike, will both inwardly and outwardly help, sustain and strengthen you. But I regard it as incumbent on myself to inform you particularly that you must carefully avoid one class of animals in Persia....' (He alludes to the place-hunting sycophants who, devoid of principles, ideals and honour, are ready to abase themselves before the most detestable tyrants to gain money or decorations.)

"What, then," this number concludes, "must one do?
"One must be a man, find men, unite with men.
"What men and what union?
"Those who know will teach you.
"Who are 'those who know'?
"If you have not yet found them, they will find you!"

The most notable points mentioned in the remaining numbers of the *Qánún* are as follows.

In No. 5 (June 18, 1890) a high tribute is paid to the then Crown Prince (*Walí-'ahd*), afterwards Muẓaffaru'd-Dín Sháh, who is described as "concentrating in himself the hopes of Persia, and beloved by all his subjects." A description, purporting to be by an intelligent and observant European traveller, unofficially encouraged by one of the great Western Powers to

visit and report on the state of Persia, is given of the new movement in favour of Law and Constitution "called in the current terminology 'the World of Humanity' (*'Álam-i-Ádamiyyat*)." Some account is here given of the organization, wide distribution, enthusiasm and methods of proselytising of this quasi-masonic organization, and of the funds raised for its support.

In No. 6 (July 18, 1890) occurs the following denunciation (ascribed to a merchant of Qazwín) of the ever-multiplying concessions to foreigners which are the chief characteristic of this period:—

"Is there none to ask of this noble youth[1], 'By what law do you sell these rights and privileges of our State to foreign adventurers? According to the Holy Law of Islám and the law of all States, these commercial transactions are the rightful property of the people of this country. They are the means whereby and the capital whereon we subsist. How do you dare to sell to unbelievers the means of livelihood of the Muslims? Are the people of Persia, then, really dead that you thus put up their inheritance to auction?'"

"Respected merchant," replies the editor, "these persons have reason to consider us dead. In a country where one scintilla of life is visible, and amongst a people in whom one sensory nerve remains, what noble minister could impose the burden of all this misery and disorder?"

No. 7 (undated, but presumably issued about August 18, 1890) contains a plea for the higher education of women, which concludes: "Now that in Persia many men have become women, it is proper that the women should give their husbands some lessons in manhood." Tribute is also paid to Mírzá Yaḥyá Khán *Mushíru'd-Dawla.*

No. 8 (presumably published about September 18, 1890) contains a letter purporting to be from a young man of a noble family of Kirmán, in which for the first time the Sháh himself is blamed for the prevailing disorder. The writer censures the *Qánún* for not abandoning the habit of flattery, although it is printed in a free country, and for continuing to praise the Sháh and criticize only his ministers. "Who and

[1] I presume that this is meant ironically, and that the *Amínu's-Sulṭán* is intended.

what are these ministers?" he asks: "who chose them, and who except the Sháh could find such ministers in the world?" "We have no right," he adds, "to find fault with the Amínu's-Sulṭán. If he were to disappear, the Sháh himself would certainly produce someone of even more obscure origin and detestable attributes. The Sháh undoubtedly dislikes worthy and capable men." As the editor prints this letter without comment, it may be presumed that his own attitude towards the Sháh has begun to undergo a change.

Of the two remaining numbers of the *Qánún*, Nos. 9 and 19, which I possess[1], there is nothing special to be said. The last was probably published about August 1891, but as No. 6 is the last dated number, it is impossible to be precise. As remarked in a previous foot-note, the paper seems to have lasted at any rate until about the middle of 1893, but certain allusions in the later numbers would suggest that it continued until the reign of Muẓaffaru'd-Dín Sháh, *i.e.* until 1896.

It is difficult to determine the importance of the *rôle* played by the *Qánún* in the national awakening. We have seen that it did circulate in Persia to some extent, that it alarmed the Sháh and his ministers, and that men of good position were imprisoned and punished for reading it or having it in their possession. How far there really did exist in Persia such an organized society of reformers (the "World of Humanity"), with pass-words and secret assemblies, as is hinted at in the pages of the *Qánún*, is another matter. But there was certainly at work in Persia another influence far more potent, that of Sayyid Jamálu'd-Dín al-Afghán, who, though he had been expelled from Persia about 1886 or 1887, returned thither, as we have seen, at the Sháh's invitation in the autumn of 1889.

Of this incident in his career the following account is given in Zaydán's *Mashāhíru'sh-Sharq* ("Eastern Celebrities"), part II, p. 62:—

"It happened at this juncture that the Paris Exhibition of 1889 was opened, and Sayyid Jamálu'd-Dín visited it, and met the Sháh at Munich, the capital of Bavaria, as he was returning from Paris. And the Sháh invited the Sayyid to

[1] See p. 35, *supra*, note *ad calc.*

accompany him, and the invitation was accepted. So he journeyed with the Sháh to Persia, and had scarcely reached Ṭihrán when the people again began to gather round him, seeking to profit by his learning, while the Sháh displayed no suspicion about his doings, as though his journey in Europe had dispelled many of his doubts. Indeed, he brought him near to himself, and employed him in discharging many important functions in his government, consulting him as to the codifying of laws and the like. Now this was grievous to those who had hitherto enjoyed supreme influence, and especially to the Prime Minister (*i.e.* the *Amínu's-Sulṭán*), who secretly suggested to the Sháh that these laws, even though they might not be devoid of advantage, yet were not adapted to the actual state of the country, apart from what was likely to result from them as regards the passing of the Sháh's influence into other hands. These suggestions were not without their effect on the Sháh, until his sentiments began to shew themselves on his countenance, and Sayyid Jamálu'd-Dín, perceiving the state of the case, asked the Royal permission to retire to Sháh 'Abdu'l-'Aẓím, at a distance of 20 kilometres from Ṭihrán. This permission was accorded, and there followed him a great multitude of the *'ulamá* and notables, and the Sayyid used to preach to them and exhort them to reform their government. And ere eight months had passed his fame was spread throughout the remotest parts of Persia, and it became generally reported that he proposed to reform Persia. Then Náṣiru'd-Dín Sháh, fearing the outcome of this, sent five hundred horsemen to Sháh 'Abdu'l-'Aẓím, and they arrested Jamálu'd-Dín, who was ill at the time, and dragged him from his bed, and removed him, guarded by fifty horsemen, to the frontiers of the Ottoman Empire[1]. This was grievous to his disciples in Persia, and they revolted in such manner that the Sháh was afraid for his life."

An interesting sidelight is thrown on the event last described by a passage occurring in the cross-examination of

[1] The expulsion of Sayyid Jamálu'd-Dín from Ṭihrán was announced in the *Times* of Jan. 12, 1891. He himself describes some of its circumstances in his article on "the Reign of Terror in Persia" in the *Contemporary Review* for Feb. 1892, pp. 238–248. See also pp. 11, 15, etc., *supra*.

Mírzá Muḥammad Riẓá, published in No. 9 (July 7, 1907) of the Persian newspaper entitled *Ṣúr-i-Isráfíl* ("the Trumpet of Isráfíl"). Being asked why he had killed Náṣiru'd-Dín Sháh, seeing that the sufferings which he had undergone on account of his participation in the tobacco riots were primarily due to the *Ná'ibu's-Salṭana*, Prince Kámrán Mírzá, and the Wakílu'd-Dawla, he replied:—

"Justice exempt from prejudice required of the Sháh that he should send a third unprejudiced investigator to ascertain the truth of the matter which lay between me and my antagonists, and his omission to do this rendered him culpable. What had Sayyid Jamálu'd-Dín, that descendant of the Prophet, that great and eminent man, done that he should be dragged forth with such ignominy from the sacred precincts of Sháh 'Abdu'l-'Aẓím, [and that so roughly] that his underclothing was torn? All this ignominy did he suffer, yet what had he said except the truth?"

A little further on, in reply to another question, Mírzá Riẓá confirms what has been reported from another independent source as to Sayyid Jamálu'd-Dín's influence in Persia. Asked who his associates and sympathisers were, he replied: "Those who share my beliefs in this city and country are many in all classes, amongst the *'ulamá*, the ministers, the nobles, the merchants, the artisans and tradesfolk. You know that when Sayyid Jamálu'd-Dín came to this city all the people, of every class and condition, alike in Ṭihrán and in Sháh 'Abdu'l-'Aẓím, came to visit and see him, and hearkened to his discourses. And since all that he said was for God, and was dictated solely by a desire for the public welfare, everyone benefited by, and was charmed by, his discourses. So he sowed the seed of these lofty ideals in the ground of men's hearts[1], and they awoke and came to their senses. Now everyone holds the same views that I do; but I swear by God Most High and Almighty, who is the Creator of Sayyid Jamálu'd-Dín and of all mankind, that none save myself and the Sayyid was aware of my purpose or intention to kill the Sháh. The Sayyid is in Constantinople: do whatever you can to him.

[1] This is the Sayyid's own expression. See his letter translated on p. 28, *supra*.

The proof of what I say, moreover, is clear: for had I divulged to anyone so great a matter, he would certainly have disclosed it, and my object would have been defeated. Besides, I have discovered by experience of what weak stuff these men are made, and how they cling to life and position. At that time when the tobacco question and other matters were toward, and when it was merely a question of reforming the state of things, and there was no talk of killing the Sháh or anybody else, all these titled gentlemen—these '*Mulks*,' '*Dawlas*,' *Salṭanas*[1], etc., who had all bound themselves to common action with pen, personal service and money, saying that they were ready at any time—no sooner saw that I was arrested than they all drew back. But I, notwithstanding my arrest and all that followed thereon, mentioned no names, and had I gone round after my release I might have obtained large sums of money from them in return for having kept their secret; but, seeing that they were less than men, I endured hunger and abasement, and would not stretch forth my hand to anyone."

I myself only met Sayyid Jamálu'd-Dín once, I think in the autumn of 1891, when he visited England after his second expulsion from Persia. It was at Prince Malkom Khán's house in Holland Park, and I have still a vivid recollection of that commanding personality. We talked a good deal about the Bábís, as to whom he was very well informed (he wrote an excellent, but unsympathetic, account of them in Buṭrus al-Bustání's Arabic Encyclopaedia, the *Dá'iratu'l-Ma'árif*), though he had no great opinion of them. In the course of conversation I asked him about the state of Persia, and he answered, so far as I can recollect, that no reform was to be hoped for until six or seven heads had been cut off; "the first," he added, "must be Náṣiru'd-Dín Sháh's, and the second the Amínu's-Sulṭán's." It is curious to note that both of these were assassinated, though Sayyid Jamálu'd-Dín survived the Sháh less than ten months, and was survived by the Amínu's-Sulṭán for ten years.

[1] Everybody of any consequence in Persia has a title, and these titles are generally compounded with one of these three words, *e.g. Mushíru'd-Dawla* ("Counsellor of the Empire"), *Náṣiru'l-Mulk* ("Helper of the Kingdom"), *Iḥtishámu's-Salṭana* ("Pomp of the Sovereignty"), etc.

We must now return to the Tobacco Concession, of which, as we have seen, the subscription-list was issued on Nov. 4–6, 1890. Soon after this date, I think about Nov. 20, I was invited by one of the chief promoters of this adventure to visit him in London. Just as I was leaving Cambridge I received by post from Constantinople several numbers of the *Akhtar* ("Star"), to which excellent Persian paper I was then a subscriber. And as I travelled up to London I read the following article (*Akhtar* for Tuesday, Nov. 11, 1890, No. 13 of the 17th year, pp. 99, 100):—

"THE TOBACCO CONCESSION IN PERSIA.

"The [Turkish] newspaper *Ṣabáḥ* ('Morning') in the course of the *Summary of News* contained in its issue No. 430, dated 25 Rabí'u'l-Awwal [A.H. 1308 = Nov. 9, 1890], gives a detailed account, taken from the European Press, of the Tobacco Concession in Persia, to which it has added some very just observations on its own behalf. Finding these to be prompted by desire for the welfare of Persia, we offer the following translation of them.

"*Translation.*

"The above-mentioned newspaper says:—'We have seen in the European newspapers an advertisement concerning the allotment of shares in the Persian Tobacco Monopoly Company, setting forth the fundamental provisions of the Monopoly Concession and some further information on this subject. Since matters touching the welfare of Muslim States are always worth an attentive examination, we reproduce these details here, together with some observations of our own.

"According to the contents of the above-mentioned advertisement, on the ninth of Ayár (March), A.D. 1890, in accordance with the will of the Sháh of Persia, a concession was granted according to the provisions of which all the tobacco produced in Persia, with the selling and buying thereof, has been given into the hands of one individual, under the title of a monopoly. This concession is for a period of fifty

years. The *concessionnaire* will pay yearly into the Persian treasury fifteen thousand English pounds, in addition to which one quarter of the profits will accrue to the Persian Government.

"The *concessionnaire* has formed in London a Company of Englishmen having a capital of £650,000, which capital will be raised by the allotment of shares.

"The Controller-General of the Customs of Persia estimates the amount of tobacco consumed yearly in Persia at about 5,400,000 kilograms, and the amount of what is exported at about 4,000,000 kilograms. According to this calculation, the *concessionnaire* expects to make a net yearly profit of at least £500,000, and, after deducting from this the fixed minimum interest of the shares, and one quarter of the profits, which accrues to the Persian Government, hopes to pay out of the remainder 15 per cent. interest as a premium to the shareholders, after which the remainder will be equally divided between them and the *concessionnaire*.'"

The writer then repeats the comparison between the Turkish Régie and the Persian monopoly given in the Company's Prospectus, and admits that, if, as is implied, the Concession includes the *tunbákú*[1] as well as the ordinary tobacco grown in Persia, the figures as to amounts are probably not exaggerated; but that even in that case he is very doubtful whether such large profits as the *concessionnaire* expects will be realized. Even in France, says the writer, where the tobacco monopoly has been established for fifty years, and the frontiers are well guarded, and the custom-houses efficient, smuggling takes place, and in Persia, under the conditions actually prevailing, this smuggling is likely to assume far greater proportions, and to falsify the optimistic expectations of the *concessionnaire*. Notwithstanding this, he blames the Persian Government for granting privileges so valuable for so paltry a consideration as £15,000 a year *plus* one quarter of the profits, especially as the Concession includes all the export as well as the internal trade in tobacco. "Bearing in mind this point," he adds, "one may say that all the tobacco and *tunbákú* of Persia have been

[1] This is the tobacco used in the Persian *qalyán*, or water-pipe, and is grown largely at Isfahán and other places in the south of Persia.

handed over to a foreign company, in which case the real gravity of the matter exceeds anything that can be imagined."

"This truth," he continues, "is obvious to all, that the exports of every country are reckoned as one of the principal sources of its wealth, and that consequently the ruler of every country ought, by all possible means and in every practicable way, to facilitate and promote them, and keep them free from every restriction and obstacle. But this concession and monopoly which the Persian Government has granted to the English Company is diametrically opposed to these general considerations, so that the tobacco-growers are left helpless and defenceless in the hands of the Company, and will be unable to sell the produce of their toil at a remunerative price, or to profit by trade competition. Consequently a large number of Persians whose earnings and livelihood are exclusively derived from this source will be injured, and extraordinary damage will accrue to the mercantile interests of the country."

The writer points out that the Turkish Régie only controls internal consumption, and that exports are exempted from its operation, a point which the culpable negligence of the Persian Government has caused them to overlook; and he further indicates several important factors in the case which entirely differentiate the French Government monopoly from that which it is proposed to establish in Persia. If the Persian Government desired to raise an additional revenue from the tobacco-trade equivalent to the sum which it will obtain from the foreign *concessionnaire*, it could, with a little trouble, easily have done so without foreign intervention, and without laying on its subjects an intolerable and unnecessary burden.

"Since," the *Ṣabáḥ* concludes, "we are actuated by a sincere desire for the welfare of Persia, and hope that she may attain the highest summits of progress, and enjoy as she should do the advantages of her natural wealth, we feel ourselves compelled to offer these observations; and we trust that the provisions and conditions of the above-mentioned monopoly may prove to be other than the *concessionnaire* has proclaimed, and that the ministers of the State in question have safeguarded the true advantages of their country better than we have described."

To this translation the *Akhtar* adds the following paragraph on its own behalf:—

"Hitherto no detailed information has reached us as to the conditions of the Tobacco Monopoly Concession in the Persian Empire, but the notice published by the *concessionnaire* in the European Press is in substance as above described. For the present we can only say that if the conditions of the Monopoly are as advertised, then the observations of our respected contemporary the *Ṣabáḥ* are perfectly correct, and are a proof of its friendly intentions. If they be otherwise, then the door is open for discussion as to what the provisions of the *farmán* granting the Concession really are.

"We hope at any rate that our respected Ṭihrán correspondent will ere now have written us a detailed account of them, so that we may publish his letter in our next issue, and add thereto our own observations."

This article gave me some food for reflection, for in those days it was not common to find such unqualified censure of the Persian Government in a Persian newspaper intended to circulate without let or hindrance in the realms of Náṣiru'd-Dín Sháh. It was clear that the Concession would be very unwelcome to the Persian people; and when I was asked later on in the day by its representative whether I was disposed to accept a post in the new Régie, other objections which I felt to this course were enormously strengthened by what I had read that morning in the *Akhtar*, and it did not take me long to decide on a negative answer; a thing for which I have ever since been profoundly thankful.

We now come to the year 1891, which saw the actual inauguration in Persia of the obnoxious Concession. On February 23 a representative body of Persian merchants, for whom the *Amínu'd-Dawla* (a far more patriotic minister, so far as one can judge, than his rival the *Amínu's-Sulṭán*) acted as spokesman, appealed to the Sháh, though without effect, against the Monopoly. Signs of the Corporation's activity soon began to appear. "Dès le printemps de 1891,"

writes Dr Feuvrier (p. 309)[1], "une nuée de sujets ou employés anglais venus d'un peu partout, levantins et autres, s'abat sur la Perse. C'est une trop bonne aubaine pour que l'on perde du temps."

Hitherto, owing to the absence in Persia at this period of any independent and public-spirited Press, it is probable that the nature and scope of the Tobacco Monopoly had been but little realized. As soon as it was realized, however, it was bitterly and violently resented throughout the length and breadth of the land. There were, according to Dr Feuvrier, to whose excellent book I am chiefly indebted for this portion of my narrative, risings in the south[2], especially at Yazd, while at Ṭihrán considerable excitement and disturbance prevailed, and many prominent opponents of the Concession were arrested, amongst whom, apparently, was Mírzá Muḥammad Riẓá, who afterwards attained notoriety as the assassin of Náṣiru'd-Dín Sháh.

The matter, as Dr Feuvrier very justly remarks (p. 310), concerned all, for everyone, man and woman, smokes in Persia. "Under these conditions," he says, "how could they be brought to understand the advantages of the Tobacco Concession? The Persians could not, without resistance, submit to being obliged to buy from the English the tobacco which they themselves grow and gather in. They will never reconcile themselves to the idea that their tobacco should pass through the hands of Christians, who, in their eyes, render impure what they touch.

"It is said that the clergy (*i.e.* the *mujtahids* and *mullás*) are at the head of the movement, and that the word of command comes from the *mujtahid*[3] at Karbalá. This is not astonishing. In my opinion it does not often fall to the lot of the clergy to champion so popular a cause."

[1] The *Times* of April 1, 1891, chronicles the departure from Constantinople of Mr Arnstein, the Director of the Persian Tobacco Monopoly, with part of his staff, on March 30.

[2] The expulsion of the *mujtahid* Ḥájji Sayyid 'Alí Akbar from Shíráz about the middle of May for "anti-European fanaticism" gave rise to riots in which several persons were killed, including a woman and a little girl. See the references to this event in Sayyid Jamálu'd-Dín's letter, p. 20, *supra*.

[3] The *mujtahid* in question was Ḥájji Mírzá Ḥasan of Shíráz, who died, I think, in March, 1895. He actually resided at Sámarrá, not Karbalá.

During the middle of the summer Dr Feuvrier appears to have accompanied the Sháh on his customary hunting expedition, and thus not to have been in a position to watch the progress of events at the capital; but from August 21, 1891, till the repeal of the obnoxious Concession on January 5, 1892, and the final settlement of the indemnity to be paid by Persia to the Tobacco Corporation at the beginning of April, 1892, he has given us a fairly continuous narrative of the course of these momentous events.

In these riots of the later summer Tabríz played the chief part. The placards of the Tobacco Corporation were torn down and replaced by revolutionary proclamations. The *Amír Niẓám*, unable to agree with the Crown Prince (*Walí-'ahd*)[1] as to the measures required, resigned, and was replaced by the *Amín-i-Ḥuẓúr*. The Tabrízís protested to the Sháh by telegraph against the bartering of their rights to foreigners and unbelievers, and announced their intention of defending these rights by force. Consultations took place between the *Amínu's-Sulṭán* and the British Minister (Sir H. Drummond Wolff) on the one hand, and between the Mushíru'd-Dawla and the Russian Minister on the other, and between both these Persian Ministers and the Sháh. The Russian Government was apparently invited by the Sháh to intervene for the restoration of order at Tabríz, but it wisely and properly confined itself to endeavouring to effect the abolition of the Concession. The Sháh then endeavoured to temporize by encouraging an idea suggested by the Régie that Persians should be employed by it instead of foreigners in Tabríz and throughout the province of Ázarbáyján, but the Tabrízís, now thoroughly roused, would hear of nothing but the immediate abolition of the Régie, of which the operation was suspended, so far as that province was concerned, about the end of September. This naturally encouraged the other cities of Persia, especially Isfahán and Shíráz, to adopt the same course as Tabríz, and the popular movement against the Régie was strengthened by the action of Hájji Mírzá Ḥasan of Shíráz, the *mujtahid* of Sámarrá, who wrote a long letter to the Sháh to prove that the Concession

[1] Muẓaffaru'd-Dín Mírzá, afterwards Sháh.

granted by him to foreigners was contrary to the *Qur'án* and to the spirit of Islám. Towards the end of October a certain Sayyid 'Álamgír of Kalár-Dasht began to preach revolt, and was soon at the head of several hundred followers. Sa'du'd-Dawla was despatched against him with five hundred horsemen on November 2. About a fortnight later the Sayyid was defeated and some two hundred of his followers killed. He was brought captive to Ṭihrán under a strong escort, his hands manacled, to the joyful strains of a military band; and his captor, Sa'du'd-Dawla, on the strength of this heroic exploit, received the title of general.

At the beginning of December, 1891, a letter arrived from the *mujtahid* of Sámarrá, Ḥájji Mírzá Ḥasan of Shíráz, enjoining on the people the complete abandonment of tobacco until the Concession should be repealed. One cannot sufficiently admire either the wisdom of this master-stroke, which, without any act of rebellion, rendered worthless the monopoly of an article now declared unlawful, or the loyalty and self-abnegation with which the people followed the lead of their spiritual guide. "Suddenly, with perfect accord," says Dr Feuvrier, "all the tobacco-merchants have closed their shops, all the *qalyáns* (water-pipes) have been put aside, and no one smokes any longer, either in the city, or in the Sháh's *entourage*, or even in the women's apartments. What discipline, what obedience, when it is a question of submission to the counsels—or rather the orders—of an influential *mullá*, or of a *mujtahid* of some celebrity!

"The *mullás*," continues Dr Feuvrier, "are really the masters of the situation. It is all very well to make the Chief of the Merchants, Ḥájji Muḥammad Ḥasan, responsible for the closure of the shops, and to exile him to Qazwín: everyone knows that one must strike elsewhere if one wishes to cut the root of the evil. None the less is the Tobacco Concession sadly compromised, to such a degree that its natural defenders [*i.e.* the British Legation] seem anxious to abandon it to its fate. I have heard the director himself speak of it in terms of despair, while the British Minister[1] on his part is reported to have said that,

[1] Sir Frank Lascelles, who arrived to replace Sir H. Drummond Wolff at Ṭihrán on Nov. 14, 1891.

in face of this new attitude of the Persians, of this resistance of which he had not judged them capable, he considered that it was no longer possible to sustain with advantage the work of his predecessor."

Throughout the month of December, 1891, matters continued to get worse. On December 3, says Dr Feuvrier, the Sháh, "whether unwilling to change his habits, or in order to escape from his nightmare, the Tobacco Question," decided to go for a tour in the country surrounding the capital, leaving the *Amínu's-Sulṭán* to deal with the situation in Ṭihrán, where "the storm had begun to growl"; nor would he return at the request of the Russian Minister, who "regarded the moment as critical, and considered that there was ground to fear for the lives of the Europeans." In Tabríz also the agitation, which had been temporarily calmed by the promise that the Régie should not take immediate effect, broke out again, apparently in sympathy with the general protest of the nation. The *mullás* grew bolder, and in a conference convened by the *Amínu's-Sulṭán* to discuss the amount of the compensation which would have to be paid to the Corporation to rescind the Concession, one of them told the Prime Minister that those who had received bribes to obtain the Sháh's consent (and he mentioned their names) should first of all be compelled to disgorge their ill-gotten gains. "At Qazwín another *mullá*, seeing a man smoking, requested him to stop, and, on his refusal, broke his *qalyán*. The smoker complained to the Governor, who sent to summon the *mullá*; but he had stirred up the populace to such an extent that the Governor, threatened in his palace, left the town and escaped to Ṭihrán. It is even said that he owed his safety only to his prisoner, the Chief of the Merchants[1], the crowd having allowed the carriage containing the two to pass, believing that it carried the pardoned Ḥájji Muḥammad Ḥasan and one of his friends."

On the night of Christmas Day the walls were placarded with notices threatening foreigners with death unless the Tobacco Concession was rescinded within forty-eight hours. The anxiety of the European community and especially of the

[1] Who, as remarked on the preceding page, had been banished to Qazwín.

Legations increased to an intolerable extent, and all sorts of rumours were current. On December 28 soldiers were posted at different points in the European quarter, and a proclamation announcing the withdrawal of the Concession was published by the Sháh. The people were somewhat tranquillized, but Ḥájji Mírzá Ḥasan-i-Shírází, the *mujtahid* of Sámarrá, still refused to withdraw the prohibition against the use of tobacco until it was certain that effect had been given to the Sháh's promises.

On January 1, 1892, a telegram at length arrived from Ḥájji Mírzá Ḥasan-i-Shírází, who congratulated the Sháh on having withdrawn the Tobacco Concession, and urged him to withdraw likewise all the other concessions accorded to foreigners; but made no allusion to the prohibition against smoking of which he was the author, and which, as he was well aware, profoundly troubled the habits of the Persians. The shares of the Imperial Bank fell to half their value. On January 3 the Sháh sent a message to the *mujtahid* Ḥájji Mírzá Ḥasan-i-Áshtiyání bidding him either set the example of smoking, or leave the country. He chose the latter alternative, but took no steps to carry it out. Great excitement was manifested by the people on learning this, and soon a crowd, headed by a Sayyid in his dark blue turban, surrounded the Sháh's Palace, uttering loud cries of anger, and throwing stones. The troops fired on the crowd, of whom several fell, including the Sayyid. Seven persons were killed and about twenty more wounded, but the crowd was dispersed. Two days later the *mujtahid* Ḥájji Mírzá Ḥasan-i-Áshtiyání, who had neither smoked nor left the town, received from the Sháh a diamond ring as a sign of reconciliation; but he would not accept it until he was assured of the withdrawal of the Tobacco Concession by the issue on the part of the director[1] of a declaration formally stating that the Monopoly was at an end, and inviting those who had sold tobacco to the Régie to come and reclaim it. But it was not until January 26 that the public crier announced in the streets the definite withdrawal of the

[1] Mr Arnstein. The text of this proclamation is given on p. 34 of the *Awakening of the Persians*.

mullás' interdict on smoking, an announcement received with universal joy. Two days later some forty of the *employés* of the late Imperial Tobacco Corporation, their occupation gone, started for their homes. "Most of them," says Dr Feuvrier, "will doubtless not forget for many a long day the crises through which they have passed since they arrived in Persia, especially those who were here on the day of the riot. Handsomely compensated, they depart well pleased, to seek their fortune elsewhere, to the equally great satisfaction of the Persians."

The Tobacco Concession was ended, but not its consequences, and amongst these consequences was undoubtedly a great loss of prestige to England, which had certainly not played the most admirable *rôle* in this deplorable episode, and a corresponding gain of prestige to Russia. The following entry in Dr Feuvrier's diary under the dates February 10 and 11 is too significant to be omitted.

"There is no doubt that the action of Russia has counted for much in the events which have just taken place[1]. It is the eternal struggle for influence between the Russians and the English. This time the Russians have won beyond all hopes, for the *Amínu's-Sulṭán*, understanding that the policy he has hitherto followed is condemned, has been clever enough to change it in time to avoid his fall, and to arrive at a good understanding with them. This very day the Prime Minister has effected his conversion, a fortunate result of the withdrawal of the Tobacco Concession, which, it may be hoped, will secure the tranquillity of the country.

"The *Amínu's-Sulṭán* has returned from the Russian Legation, where he has had an interview with M. de Butzof lasting not less than three hours. He has given to the Russian Minister the most formal assurances of his change of attitude, adding, 'You may not believe my words, but my acts will soon prove their sincerity.'

"The Russians ought to congratulate themselves on this

[1] A very curious account of a speech made by the Russian Minister at a banquet given by him about this time to the principal European residents at Ṭihrán, including Mr Arnstein, the manager of the Concession, will be found on pp. 65–68 of the *Awakening of the Persians*.

result, greatly to be preferred to the fall of the Prime Minister, whom, moreover, the Sháh is eager to keep in office. And so M. de Butzof must have been not less sincere than the *Amínu's-Sulṭán* when he promised him the support of Russia and his own personal assistance in the accomplishment of his task.

"My Russian sympathies are a secret to no one here: they date from Montenegro, from nearly twenty years ago. Nor is anyone ignorant of my affection for the *Amínu's-Sulṭán* or my devotion to His Majesty. May I therefore be permitted, although I never meddle in politics, to express all the pleasure which this reconciliation causes me, and how earnestly I hope that it may prove complete and lasting?

"It may not be superfluous to add that this step was taken by the Prime Minister after the receipt by the Sháh from his representatives at St Petersburg and Constantinople of news which has not failed to touch him. The Tsar is said to have promised to intervene with the Sultan to settle the frontier difficulty, and, which is much more important, to arrange the question of the exportation of *tunbákú*.

"Feb. 11. His Majesty has received the Russian Minister, and has confirmed the words of his Prime Minister, while expressing his satisfaction at the good understanding arrived at between the Governments of Persia and Russia."

Dr Feuvrier's last entry on this topic, dated April 5, 1892, runs as follows:—

"At last an understanding has been arrived at as to the compensation due to the late Tobacco Corporation. After interminable discussions there has to-day been signed an agreement between the Persian Government and the British Legation, whereby the first undertakes to pay, within four months, the sum of £500,000 to the Corporation, which, in return, renounces its Concession, and abandons all its immoveable property and its tobacco destined for internal consumption in the country; for it cannot so dispose of a certain quantity of *tunbákú* for which a contract has been made with Turkey, through intermediary agents, until this contract is rescinded or an arrangement arrived at between the persons interested.

"Thus has been settled a serious affair which has deeply stirred the country, driving it to the verge of rebellion. The Persians, after a few days of Ramazán[1], can observe their fast with minds free from this nightmare."

That the prestige of England should suffer heavily through the tobacco fiasco was natural and inevitable. The Concession was iniquitous, and reflected the greatest discredit on all concerned in it. The Sháh, for a comparatively insignificant personal profit, needlessly and recklessly saddled his long-suffering subjects with an intolerable burden and exposed his country to dangers against which she is still struggling, with what success remains to be seen. The actual loss of life resulting from the conflict between him and his people was considerable, and the amount of suffering and inconvenience caused still greater. The Persian Government offered £300,000 compensation to the *concessionnaires*, who demanded £650,000, and ultimately obtained £500,000, which was borrowed by the Government at 6 per cent. interest from the Imperial Bank of Persia on April 27, 1892, thus gratuitously imposing on the Persian people, who had been entirely ignored by both parties to the original agreement, an utterly unremunerative additional yearly expenditure of £30,000. The customs of the Persian Gulf were pledged as a guarantee for the payment of this interest, and the capital was repayable at the end of forty years. And all this for the enrichment of a few greedy English speculators and a handful of traitorous Persian courtiers and ministers!

Only one great and good thing came out of all this wretched business. The Persian people, led by their spiritual guides, and led, moreover, on the whole with wonderful wisdom and self-restraint, had shown that there was a limit to what they would endure, that they were not the spiritless creatures which they had been supposed to be, and that henceforth they would have to be reckoned with. From that time especially, as I believe, dates the national awakening of which we are still watching the development.

[1] Ramazán in this year (1892) began on March 30 and ended on April 28.

One does not care to go further into the question of responsibility for this disastrous Concession, which was severely criticised in Parliament in February and May, 1892, when several very disagreeable points were brought out by various speakers, such as Sir G. Trevelyan and Messrs Cunninghame Graham, Healy and Labouchere, whose strictures were but weakly repelled from the Treasury Bench. Such as are curious to follow the matter further may turn to the reports in Hansard of the debates of February 22 and May 2, 23 and 26, 1892.

Such a chapter of folly as the history of the Tobacco Concession cannot be more fitly concluded than by the following fatuous paragraph from the *Tablet* of Saturday, May 21, 1892:—

"THE PERSIAN LOAN.

"It is satisfactory to be able to record that the Persian Government has thought twice over the proposal to borrow half a million sterling from the Government of the Tsar. She has preferred to owe the money she is called upon to pay as an indemnity to the Tobacco Corporation to British capitalists. A loan is to be raised in the London market and brought out by the Imperial Bank of Persia. This happy ending of the negotiations carried on by Sir Frank Lascelles, our representative at Teheran, releases the Sháh from what promised to be a very embarrassing situation, whether regarded financially or politically. The terms of the loan have not yet been made public, but it is satisfactory to learn that payment is to be secured on the customs duties of South Persia and the Persian Gulf. This arrangement may be pretty confidently relied upon to extend the area over which British commerce is supreme. Most satisfactory advances have been made by British traders in recent years throughout the whole of Southern Persia. From Ispahán to the sea the British merchant is the dominant factor in the commercial world; while the great ports of the Persian Gulf, Bandar-i-'Abbás, Linga[1], and Bushire, are almost wholly supplied by vessels either from England or Bombay."

[1] I have corrected the spelling of the place-names, which are sadly mutilated in the original, *Linga*, for instance, appearing as "Singah."

Náṣiru'd-Dín Sháh Qájár

Born July 17, 1831: succeeded to the Throne Sept. 17, 1848: assassinated May 1, 1896

CHAPTER III.

THE ASSASSINATION OF NÁṢIRU'D-DÍN SHÁH.

Náṣiru'd-Dín Sháh, the fourth king of the Qájár dynasty, succeeded to the throne of Persia on Dhu'l-Qa'da 22, A.H. 1264 (= September 20, A.D. 1848), and would therefore enter on the fiftieth year of his reign on the same date of the year 1313 of the Muhammadan era, equivalent in our reckoning to May 6, 1896. Great preparations had been made to celebrate his Jubilee, alike in Persia, and in every place where Persia had an official representative, when, only three days before these celebrations were to have taken place, the world was startled by the news of his assassination. About 2 o'clock on the afternoon of Friday, May 1st, 1896 (= Dhu'l-Qa'da 18, A.H. 1313), His Majesty, while visiting the Mosque of Sháh 'Abdu'l-'Aẓím, situated some six or eight miles to the south of Ṭihrán, was shot dead by a certain Mírzá Muḥammad Riẓá of Kirmán. The *Times* asserted, on the authority of its correspondent, that he was brought back, still alive, to the Palace, and did not expire until 4 o'clock in the afternoon; but a well-informed Persian friend tells me that it was his dead body which was driven back to his capital, propped up in the royal carriage by the side of the Prime Minister the *Amínu's-Sulṭán.* The Crown Prince, or *Walí-'ahd*, Muẓaffaru'd-Dín Mírzá, was instantly summoned by telegraph from Tabríz, where he was proclaimed Sháh on the morrow of his father's death; and shortly afterwards he was peaceably crowned at Ṭihrán.

To the student of contemporary history nothing is more entertaining than to preserve the numerous leading articles, letters and paragraphs which such an event as this evokes in the daily Press, and examine them again after the lapse of some years, by which time how many confident predictions have been falsified, how many ingenious theories disproved, how many

"well-informed authorities" discredited! It was at first asserted by the *Times* (May 2), *Scotsman* (May 3), *Elgin Courier* (May 3), *Manchester Guardian* (May 4), *Pioneer* (May 7), *Graphic* (May 9), *Spectator* (May 9), *Morning Post* (May 11), and many other papers, that the Sháh's assassin was one of the Bábís, who were variously described as "a secret society and criminal association" (*Elgin Courier*), "a sort of religious... crusade against the corruption of public and private manners" (*Times*), and "a sect...who bear to ordinary Mussulmans the relation which the Covenanters bore to ordinary Protestants" (*Spectator*). The illustrated paper *St Paul's* (May 16) even went so far as to publish a portrait of I know not what hashish-eating dervish, with long hair and glassy, staring eyes, and label it "A Babi, one of the sect to which the Shah's assassin belongs."

This prevalent idea, which was on the face of it extremely improbable to anyone acquainted with the actual state of Bábí doctrines, ethics and policy, I endeavoured to refute in letters written on May 3 and published in the *Times* of May 6 and in the *Daily News* of May 12, and I gave a further account of what I then believed (and what has since been proved) to be the true explanation of the murder in the *New Review* for June, 1896, pp. 651–659. I was at first nearly, but not quite, alone in my view, but credit is due both to the Vienna correspondent of the *Standard*, and to an Armenian correspondent of the *Manchester Guardian* named Andreasian, both of whom made a correct diagnosis of the case. The latter wrote on May 2, "I much fear Russian and English rivalry in Persia may indirectly be accountable for his (the Sháh's) untimely death at the hands of an assassin," while the former, who evidently derived his information from sources much more trustworthy than most of his prolific colleagues, sent the following communication to the *Standard* of May 12, 1896:—

VIENNA, *Monday Night.*

"Immediately on the receipt of the news of the late Shah's assassination, I ventured a suggestion that the crime would prove to be connected with the plan favoured by the Sultan of Turkey for the unification of the two branches of Islam. This

now seems really to be the case. The murderer, the Mollah (*sic*) Riza, is not a Babist (*sic*), and the great secret society which was at the bottom of former attempts[1] (?) upon the late Shah had this time nothing to do with the matter, much as the priests in Persia would like to fasten the crime upon their arch-enemies. It is now known that Riza was for several months last year an inmate of the Muzafirhane (read *Musáfir-Kháné*) near Constantinople kept by the Sultan for passing Mollahs and Sheiks, who received a regular allowance from His Majesty's Civil List. The Sultan, the Sheik and the Mollah had frequent conferences on the subject of the union of the Shiites with the Sunnites in the interests of the Caliphate. The true reasons why Riza committed the murder will not be known for some time, if at all, as hardly anything will transpire from the torture-chamber in Persia, but this much is certain, that the Sultan is terribly annoyed, to say the least, that the man who was more than once received by him in audience on a matter affecting the Persian sect of Mohammedanism should have perpetrated the crime."

A few days later the *Daily Graphic* (May 15) published "a chat with Moulvi Rafiuddin Ahmad" on the "Persian Question," in which, speaking of the Bábís, that eloquent and versatile Indian writer said:—

"The Bábís? No, I don't think they have had anything to do with it. The crime was due to personal spite. If it is true that the Sheik Djemal-ed-Din was the instigator, we need not seek far for the motives. Djemal has been perfectly frank about them. He hated the Shah for personal reasons, and he said as much in his *Contemporary Review*[2] article four years ago."

"Will the Sultan extradite him?" enquired the interviewer.

"If his complicity is proved," answered the Indian, "he should be surrendered, or perhaps the Sultan might have him tried in Turkey...just as you are trying Jameson in London."

[1] The only attempt on the life of Náṣiru'd-Dín Sháh by Bábís (three in number, and acting, apparently, entirely on their own responsibility) was made on August 15, 1852. The three were Mullá Fatḥu'lláh of Qum, Mírzá Muḥammad of Níríz, and Sádiq of Zanján, a servant of Mullá Shaykh 'Alí. This attempt gave rise to the horrible persecution of the Bábís of that period.

[2] That is, his article on "The Reign of Terror in Persia," published in that review in Feb. 1892, pp. 238–248.

It is, perhaps, not worth while saying much more about the views expressed by the British Press at this time. There was a good article by Sir Lepel Griffin in the *Nineteenth Century* for July, in which he spoke well of the new Sháh, Muẓaffaru'd-Dín, and expressed the admirable sentiment that it was England's policy "not, as has been suggested, to come to terms with Russia for a partition of the country, which would be as wicked as the partition of Poland, but to work for Persian regeneration, which is by no means hopeless." In another article of the same issue of the same magazine Mr J. D. Rees, C.I.E., also strove to exculpate the Bábís, and indeed the theory that they had anything to do with the death of Náṣiru'd-Dín Sháh was soon abandoned, even by the Persian Government. There was a leader in the *Morning Post* of May 11 which revealed an extraordinary mixture of ignorance (Sayyid Jamálu'd-Dín being described as "the Afghan who is the recognized leader of the Babi") and shrewdness. There was the usual inane dissertation in the *Spectator* of May 9, concluding "Friendship with Russia, were it only possible, would at all events remove a burden which is now almost as widespread as is the Queen's dominion or our trade." The *Pioneer*, though considering "Reuter's announcement that the assassin of the Shah was a Babi fanatic...enough to deprive that tragic event at once of any suspicion of political significance," maintained, what I still believe to be the true view, notwithstanding recent jubilations over the Anglo-Russian Agreement, that Russia's aim "is to secure in Eastern Persia a base for her advance upon Afghanistan and India, to say nothing of the further projects she cherishes for eventually reaching the Persian Gulf."

Let us turn, however, from these flowery fields of romance and rhetoric to the actual facts elicited by cross-examination from the Sháh's assassin, Mírzá Muḥammad Riẓá. The *procès-verbal* of this examination, preserved in the Ministry of Justice at Ṭihrán, has only recently been made public in the *Súr-i-Isráfíl* ("Trumpet-blast of Isráfíl")[1], in my opinion one of the best of the many excellent Persian newspapers which the Constitutional Movement brought into existence during the first period (Aug.

[1] It has since been reprinted in the *Awakening*, pp. 125 *et seqq.*

Mírzá Muḥammad Riẓá of Kirmán,

who shot Náṣiru'd-Dín Sháh on May 1, 1896, and was hanged on August 12, 1896

1906—June 1908) of its triumph. This *procès-verbal* begins in No. 9 of the aforesaid paper, dated July 7, 1907, runs through several numbers, and includes the cross-examination of others besides the actual culprit. The translation of it is as follows.

> "*Procès-verbal of the cross-examination of Mírzá Muḥammad Riẓá of Kirmán, son of Mullá Ḥusayn 'Aqdá'í*[1], *so far as he has voluntarily made his declaration in the first instance, without pressure or torture; and it is indubitable that after the necessary pressure has been applied he is likely to disclose his motives and ideas more fully.*"

Question.—"When did you leave Constantinople?"

Answer.—"On the 26th of Rajab, A.H. 1313" [= Jan. 14, 1896].

Q.—"When did you arrive at the Shrine of 'Abdu'l-'Aẓím?"

A.—"On the 2nd of Shawwál, A.H. 1313" [= March 17, 1896].

Q.—"Where did you stop on the way?"

A.—"At Bárfurúsh I stopped for forty-one days at the Caravanseray of Ḥájji Sayyid Ḥusayn, on account of the roads being obstructed."

Q.—"How many of you were there who started from Constantinople?"

A.—"Myself and Shaykh Abu'l-Qásim."

Q.—"Who is Shaykh Abu'l-Qásim?"

A.—"The brother of Shaykh Aḥmad-i-Rúḥí of Kirmán, aged eighteen years, a tailor by trade."

Q.—"What was his idea in accompanying you?"

A.—"To return to Kirmán. After they had arrested his brother with two others, Mírzá Áqá Khán and Ḥájji Mírzá Ḥasan Khán, in Constantinople in order to bring them to Persia, they detained them at Trebizonde. I do not know whether they are there now or not."

Q.—"After the arrest of his brother, he was frightened and left?"

A.—"No. When they arrested his brother, he set off for his native place with the idea of rejoining his other brother, who lives there. This brother, Shaykh Mahdí, the son of Mullá Muḥammad Ja'far, lives at the end of the Bágh-i-Lala."

Q.—"When you were in Constantinople for what crime and on what charge did they arrest these three persons?"

[1] 'Aqdá, commonly written *Aghda* on the maps, is a little village near Yazd.

A.—"The [Persian] Ambassador, 'Alá'u'l-Mulk, as was currently reported, had a grudge against these three persons, because they paid no attention to him. Since two of these persons (*i.e.* Shaykh Aḥmad and Mírzá Áqá Khán) were teachers, and knew four languages, they used, in the pursuit of their profession, to frequent the houses of Muslims, Armenians and Franks. They used to go to the house of anyone who wanted to learn. It was asserted that they collected gossip and made mischief in Persia, so they were accused and arrested. This was the crime of these two. As for Ḥájji Mírzá Ḥasan Khán, [he was arrested] on account of certain letters which he was alleged to have written to the *mullás* of Najaf and Káẓimayn. It was said that these letters, written at the instigation of Sayyid Jamálu'd-Dín and by his instructions, and urging the above-mentioned *mullás* to support the [Ottoman] Caliphate, fell into the hands of the [Persian] Prime Minister, and were the cause of the Ambassador's grudge against them which led to their arrest."

Q.—"Certain information has reached us here that, on the occasion of your departure [from Constantinople], you had another fellow-traveller with you besides Shaykh Abu'l-Qásim, and that certain instructions had been given to you on the part of Sayyid Jamálu'd-Dín. What are the facts about this?"

A.—"There was no one with me except Abu'l-Qásim. To this Ghulám Riẓá, the servant of *Káshifu's-Salṭana*, can testify. In the coffee-house kept by Ḥájji Muḥammad Riẓá at Báṭúm, where there are always a number of Persians, this Ghulám Riẓá, who had started from Constantinople from twenty to twenty-five days, more or less, before us, was lodging, carrying on the trade of a tailor, when we arrived, since several bridges on the road between Báṭúm and Bákú had been destroyed. Again on the road this side of Tiflís we were joined by a young man of Urúmiyya named Amír Khán, and his brother, who held the rank of an officer in the cavalry, and, as he informed us, occupied a house adjoining the mansion of 'Alá'u'd-Dawla. These fell in with us on the railway, and we travelled together to Bákú, whence Abu'l-Qásim went in the mail-boat by way of Úzún-Áda, meaning to proceed thence by 'Ishq-ábád (Askabad) and through Khurásán to Kirmán, whilst I and Ghulám Riẓá and

the two other Persians, to wit Amír Khán and his brother, travelled from Bákú to Mashhad-i-Sar, and thence to Bárfurúsh. Ghulám Riẓá, after alighting in the caravansaray and unloading his luggage, went to the house of Intiẓámu'd-Dawla, whence he returned, collected his luggage, and went back to the Intiẓámu'd-Dawla's house in the Bágh-i-Sháh (King's Garden). Three or four days later he came, dressed in his travelling clothes, embraced me, and set out for Ṭihrán, while I continued to lodge in the caravansaray of Ḥájji Sayyid Ḥusayn. Amír Khán also remained in Bárfurúsh for twenty-four hours, and then likewise started for Ṭihrán. That is all."

Q.—"You have not mentioned the instructions which you are said to have brought thence" [*i.e.* from Constantinople].

A.—"I had no special instructions, but the Sayyid's attitude is known to all, and likewise his manner of speech. He is devoid of caution. He says that they [*i.e.* the Sháh and his ministers and governors] are tyrants. That is the way he talks."

Q.—"How, then, did you conceive the idea of murdering His martyred Majesty?"

A.—"There needs no 'how.' By reason of the stocks and chains which I suffered unjustly; the stripes that I endured, so that I ripped open my belly [in order to escape torture by suicide]; the agonies that I endured in the house of the *Nâ'ibu's-Salṭana* at the Amíriyya Palace, at Qazwín, in the gaol, and once again in the gaol. For four years and four months I was in chains and in the stocks, though according to my own convictions I only sought to serve and benefit the State. Before the occurrence of the Tobacco Riots I had never meddled in politics. I gave my information only when they summoned me [for that purpose]."

Q.—"No one had any personal spite or grudge against you. If so be that it was as you allege, you would have rendered service, and then no signs of sedition or mischief-making would have been detected in you. There was no reason for them to inflict such punishment upon you in return for the service you had rendered them. It is therefore clear that even at that time they detected in you signs of sedition and mischievous activity."

A.—"Even now, after all this time, I am ready to meet my accusers, and to let some unprejudiced person investigate the matter and decide whether I made my true representations out of love for my country, my nation and the State, albeit interested persons, in order to establish a claim for services rendered and to obtain distinctions, salaries, orders, decorations, etc., endeavoured to make the contrary appear. Even now I am ready for such investigation."

Q.—"Who were these 'interested persons'?"

A.—"A low-minded, ignoble, base-born, vile person, unworthy of any of these distinctions, to wit, Bálá Khán[1] *Wakílu'd-Dawla*, for whom the *Ná'ibu's-Salṭana* entertained an excessive affection."

Q.—"The *Wakílu'd-Dawla* asserts that even at that time he caused you to be arrested on the ground of seditious documents and letters known to all; and adds that, had he not arrested you then, you had already formed this project, as appeared from the examination conducted at the time, and would perhaps have done this deed then."

A.—"Then it will be capable of proof in the presence of the *Wakílu'd-Dawla*."

Q.—"Seeing that you yourself admit that all these sufferings befell you by reason of the *Wakílu'd-Dawla*, who hoped thereby to earn distinction, and the *Ná'ibu's-Salṭana*, on account of his affection for him, what fault had His martyred Majesty committed? At most they so represented the affair to him. You should have sought reparation and revenge from these, who were the cause of your afflictions, and not have plunged a whole nation into mourning."

A.—"A king to whom, after he has reigned for fifty years, affairs can be misrepresented in this fashion, and who does not investigate them—; a tree whereof the fruits, after all these years, are such as the *Wakílu'd-Dawla*, the *'Azízu's-Sulṭán*, the *Amín-i-Kháqán*, and such low-born rogues and scoundrels, who are the plagues of the lives of the Muslim community—; such a tree, I say, bearing such fruits, ought to be cut down, that it

[1] According to the *Awakening* (p. 122) Bálá Khán's original title was *Mu'íni Niẓám*, then *Wakílu'd-Dawla*, and finally *Sardár-i-Afkham*.

may bear such fruits no longer. '*The fish begins to stink at the head, not at the tail*[1].' If wrong were done, it was from above."

Q.—"Even if this were the case, as you assert, still, so far as you personally were concerned, the *Wakílu'd-Dawla* and *Ná'ibu's-Salṭana* were most to blame. The late Sháh was not immaculate[2], and had not knowledge of things unseen. When a man like the *Ná'ibu's-Salṭana*[3], who was both the Sháh's son and one of the chief servants of the State, had represented a matter, especially with such documentary evidence as that which he had obtained from you, the Sháh could not hesitate [to accept his account as true]. These persons who were the cause [of your misfortunes] should have been the objects of your revenge. This argument which you have advanced is not a sound one. You are a logician, and a man of philosophical character; you should support your answer with [better] proofs."

A.—"They had no documentary evidence against me, except that they produced writing-materials, and by force and violence extracted the document in question from me in the *Wakílu'd-Dawla's* house, under threats of the triangle and the branding-iron. Two other persons were present, to wit, the Governor, and a certain Sayyid, who, in order to annoy the Prime Minister, had on one occasion removed his turban in his presence, and who was a guest at breakfast[4] that night, and witnessed what happened then. I had also been taken before the *Ná'ibu's-Salṭana* on the previous evening."

Q.—"You, being a sensible man, knew that you ought not to furnish them with such documentary evidence. On what pretext did they obtain it from you, and what did they say?"

A.—"The pretext whereby they obtained the document was this. After I had informed them that there was talk and murmuring amongst all classes of the people, and that they

[1] This is a quotation from the *Mathnawí* of Jalálu'd-Dín Rúmí. The same proverb exists in Turkish.

[2] *Ma'ṣúm*, a term applied to the Imáms, meaning exempt from all human frailties.

[3] Kámrán Mírzá, son of Náṣiru'd-Dín Sháh, a leading reactionary in these recent times. He was born on Dhu'l-Qa'da 19, A.H. 1272 (=July 22, 1856).

[4] "Breakfast" (*iftár*) means the meal at which those who are fasting in Ramaẓán break their fast after sunset. See also p. 87 *infra*.

would soon proceed to riot and rebellion on account of the Tobacco Question, and that this discontent ought to be dealt with before it reached a climax, I said to the *Ná'ibu's-Salṭana*, 'Thou art the heir to the kingdom, thou art the son of the Sháh and his truest friend; the ship of State is about to strike on a rock, and this roof will fall down on thy head; it is not unlikely that the Sovereignty of Persia, which has endured for several thousand years, may be imperilled, and that this Muslim nation may suddenly be blotted out.' Then he swore an oath, saying, 'I am without prejudice; I only desire reform. Do you then write a paper to the following effect:—"O true believers and Muslims! The Tobacco Concession has been given! The Bank has been created! The tramway, in despite of the Muslims, is running! The monopoly of wine has been granted! The mineral rights have been assigned! Sugar-monopolies and match-monopolies have been accorded! We Muslims will fall entirely into the hands of foreigners! Little by little Religion will disappear! Now that our Sháh no longer takes thought for us, do you exert yourselves and show your spirit! Unite and combine, be brave, defend yourselves!"' This was approximately the substance of the writing. Such a letter they gave me as a model, saying, 'Write these things, and we will show the letter to the Sháh, telling him that we found it in the Masjid-i-Sháh, where it had been dropped, so that we may try to bring about some reform.' The *Ná'ibu's-Salṭana* also swore that the writing of this document would involve me in no danger, but would rather place the Government under an obligation to me, so that I should receive an allowance and be the object of its regard. Then, when I went from the *Ná'ibu's-Salṭana's* presence to the *Wakílu'd-Dawla's* house, I was again compelled by violence and threats to write the same words; and when they had obtained the document from me, it was as though God had given them the whole world. They gathered up the writing materials, brought out the instruments for branding and torturing, produced the soldier's triangle, and prepared to strip me and tie me to the triangle and question me, saying, 'Tell us [the names of] your associates. Where is their meeting-place? Where are your accomplices?' And though I asked,

'What meeting-place? What associates? I associate with all men, and have heard rumours from all. Now what Musulmán shall I betray?' they sought to compel me [to make a confession]. Then I saw that it was now time to take my life in my hands, and that the occasion was come for me to sacrifice it for the honour, security and lives of my fellow Muslims. The pen-knife and scissors, which, in their excessive joy and delight, they had forgotten to replace in the pen-case, were lying in the centre of the room. I looked towards the knife. Rajab-'Alí Khán noticed this, and picked up the knife. The scissors, however, still lay by the hearth. The Governor was seated facing the *qibla*, repeating his prayers. I said to him, 'I adjure you, by this *qibla*, and by the prayer which you are repeating, tell me what is your object!' At this moment a letter was brought to them from the *Nâ'ibu's-Salṭana*, and they read it and then laid it face downwards. The Governor said, 'This letter says that it is the Sháh's command that you must without fail divulge your meeting-place and the names of your associates, or else these instruments of branding and torture are ready, and the whip is waiting.' Seeing the scissors lying by the grate, I said, intending to get at it, 'The branding-iron and bradawl are not needed: sit on the sofa, so that I may lay the details of the matter before you.' I then seized the Governor's hand, drew him towards the fire-place, and so reached the scissors, wherewith I wounded myself in the belly. The blood poured down, and, as it ran, I fell to reviling them. Then they were sorely vexed, and caused me to be treated medically, and my wound to be stitched up. It was after this ordeal that poor, innocent I, who, according to my own ideas, had rendered a service to the State, was, for four years and a half, carried in chains from this prison to that prison, from Ṭihrán to Qazwín, from Qazwín to the common gaol. During these two (*sic:* ? four) years and a half I was released two or three times, but altogether during this period I was not at liberty for more than forty days. I had become the Nawrúz 'Alí Khán-i-Qal'a-Maḥmúdí, or the Sabz 'Alí Khán-i-Maydán-Qal'a'í of the *Nâ'ibu's-Salṭana* and Bálá Khán."

Q.—"Who was Nawrúz 'Alí Khán-i-Qal'a-Maḥmúdí?"

A.—"Muḥammad Isma'íl *Wakílu'l-Mulk*, the Governor of Kirmán, in order to run up a bill of costs, and to increase his salary and rank, used daily to invent, for the deceiving of the Government, a pretender to the throne or a rebellious chief; and for a long while he preoccupied the Government with the pretended doings of Nawrúz 'Alí Khán-i-Qal'a-Maḥmúdí. So likewise the *Ná'ibu's-Salṭana*, whenever he had failed in obtaining some distinction, used to arrest me. My wife obtained a divorce from me. My eight year old son became a scullion. My unweaned child was cast out into the streets. The first time, after two years' imprisonment, that they brought us from Qazwín, they released ten of us, of whom two were Bábís, one Ḥájji Mullá 'Alí Akbar-i-Shimrzádí, and the other Ḥájji Amín. It was arranged that they should be placed in the gaol, but, since one of these Bábís was wealthy, he sent to His Royal Highness [the *Ná'ibu's-Salṭana*] a sum of money, so they released him, and in his place sent me to the gaol. Evidently [under such treatment] a man grows sick of life, and, having renounced life, does whatever he will. When I went to Constantinople and described my case in the presence of great men and in the assemblies of the learned, they blamed me because, in face of all this oppression and injustice, I had not washed my hand of life and delivered the world from the hands of tyrants."

Q.—"All these details which you give do but add point to my first question. I demand justice from yourself: had you been in the place of the late Sháh, and had the *Ná'ibu's-Salṭana* and the *Wakílu'd-Dawla* laid before you a document so worded, supplementing it with these details, would you have had any choice as to believing it or not? Then in this case those two persons were to blame, and were more deserving of death. Why was it that you did not resolve to kill them, but rather set your hand to this grievous deed?"

A.—"The duty of the Sháh, had he been devoid of prejudice, was to send a third unprejudiced examiner to investigate the truth of the matter as between me and them; and, since he did not do so, he was to blame. For years the flood of injustice has engulfed all his subjects. What had Sayyid

Jamálu'd-Dín, that holy man and true descendant of the Prophet, done to be dragged forth with such ignominy from the sanctuary of Sháh 'Abdu'l-'Aẓím? They tore his under-clothing, they treated him with all this ignominy, yet what had he said except the truth? That lame *ákhúnd* of Shíráz, who, instigated by Sayyid 'Alí Akbar-i-Fál-asírí, denounced the —— —— Qiwám as an infidel, of what consequence was he that they should come into the gaol and first strangle him and then cut off his head? I myself was in the gaol at the time, and saw what they did to him. Does God tolerate such deeds? Are they not tyranny? Are they not oppression? If there be a discerning eye it will not fail to observe that it was in that very same place whence they dragged the Sayyid that the Sháh was shot. Are not these poor folk, and this handful of Persian people a trust from God? Step forth for a moment from this land of Persia, and you will see in 'Iráq-i-'Arab [Mesopotamia], the Caucasus, 'Ishq-ábád [Askabad], and the border-lands of Russia, thousands of poor Persian subjects who have fled from their own dear country from the hands of oppression and tyranny, and have perforce adopted the most miserable means of earning a livelihood. The porters, sweepers, donkey-men and labourers whom you see in those regions are all Persians[1]. After all, these flocks of your sheep need a pasture in which they may graze, so that their milk may increase, and they may be able both to suckle their young and to support your milking; not that you should constantly milk them as long as they have milk to give, and, when they have none, should devour the flesh from their bodies. Your sheep are all gone and scattered: this is the result of tyranny which you see. What and wherefore is this boundless tyranny and oppression, and what can exceed this? They strip the very flesh from the bodies to devour it, and to feed therewith their hawks and birds of venery. From such-and-such an unprincipled wretch they accept [a bribe of] a hundred thousand *túmáns*, and [in return for this] give him complete control over the lives, property, honour and security of a city or a province. Under the burden of their oppressions they do so constrain the poor, captive, helpless people that men are compelled to

[1] See p. 27 *supra*.

divorce their own wives so that these their lords may take to wife a hundred. Every year they spend on the *'Azízu's-Sulṭán*[1], who is of no use to the State or the nation, nor serves for the personal gratification of any one, half a million *túmáns* wrung from the people by this bloodthirsty and merciless tyranny. These are matters known to all the people of this city, though they do not dare to utter them aloud. Now that, as was fated and predestined, this great deed has been accomplished by my hands, a heavy burden has been lifted from the hearts of all. Men are relieved, and all are waiting to see what the new Sháh, lately the Crown Prince (*Walí-'ahd*), will do, and whether he will heal men's broken hearts by justice, clemency and uprightness, or not. If, as men hope and expect, he vouchsafes to his people some degree of peace and ease, becomes the means of his people's tranquillity of mind, and bases his rule on justice and equity, assuredly all the people will be ready to die for him, his sovereignty will be firmly established, and his good name will remain inscribed eternally on the page of history, while it will further conduce to the prolongation of his days and the good of his health. If, on the other hand, he likewise adopts this practice and conduct, then this crooked load will never reach the halting-place. Now is the time when, as soon as he arrives [at the capital], he should declare and proclaim, saying, 'O people! Indeed it hath gone ill with you during this period, and trouble hath pressed sorely upon you, but this state of things is now at an end. Now the carpet of justice is unrolled, and justice shall be our basis. Our scattered people shall be gathered together, hope shall be given them, and proper arrangements shall be made for the collection of the taxes under the superintendence of the elders of the people, so that these may know what is required of them, and may bring and pay over their taxes at a fixed and specified time. Tax-gatherer shall no longer follow tax-gatherer to add to an original demand for one *túmán* subsidiary exactions raising the amount to ten *túmáns*, and so forth.'"

[1] Náṣiru'd-Dín Sháh's favourite, a boy of Kurdish extraction, named Maníjak, who was very unpopular on account of his humble origin and bad manners. He was the subject of a good deal of attention in the Press when the Sháh visited this country in 1889.

Q.—"Supposing that your idea was really to benefit the public, and that you did this deed to remove oppression from all the people, you must at least allow that if your objects could have been attained without bloodshed it would certainly have been better. Now we are anxious to apply ourselves forthwith to the reform of these abuses, and our minds must be set at ease on certain points, so that we may tranquilly undertake the establishment of a new order of things. This being so, we must know who these persons are who are allied with you, and what ideas they entertain. Know also that, with the sole exception of yourself, who are the perpetrator of this crime, and who will be put to death (or perhaps, since your idea was to serve the public welfare, will escape death), the Government will make no reprisals, since it is not to its interest to do so. We only want to know those persons who hold the same views as yourself, since perhaps at some time we may stand in need of their advice in our work of reform."

A.—"You make a good point, and I, as I assured you before, do now swear by my honour, good name and manhood that I will not lie to you. Those who share my views in this city and in this country are many, alike amongst the *'ulamá*, the ministers, the nobles, the merchants, the trades-people and all other classes. You know how, when Sayyid Jamálu'd-Dín came to this city, all the people, of every class and kind, alike in Ṭihrán and in Sháh 'Abdu'l-'Aẓím, came to see him and wait upon him, and how they listened to his discourses. And since all that he said was said for God and for the public good, everyone profited and was charmed by his words. Thus did he sow the seed of these high ideas in the fallow ground of men's hearts, and the people awoke and came to their senses. Now everyone holds the same views that I do; but I swear by God Most High and Almighty, who is the Creator of Sayyid Jamálu'd-Dín and of all mankind, that no one, save myself and the Sayyid, was aware of this idea of mine or of my intention to kill the Sháh. The Sayyid is in Constantinople: do what you can to him. The proof of what I say is, moreover, self-evident, for had I communicated to anyone so great a design, he would certainly have divulged it, and my object would have been frustrated. Besides, I have discovered by

experience of how feeble a texture these people are, and how they love life and position. At the time when the Tobacco Concession and other matters were toward, when it was a question only of reforming abuses, and there was no talk of killing the Sháh or anyone else, all these titled gentlemen, these *-Mulks* and *-Dawlas* and *-Salṭanas*[1], who had promised concurrence with pen, endeavour and money, declaring themselves to be ready whenever occasion should demand, no sooner saw that I had suffered arrest than they all stood aloof. But I, notwithstanding that long captivity, mentioned not a single name; so that if, after my release, I had gone round [to those people], I could have obtained large sums of money from them for this concealment of their names; but, seeing them to be cowards, I suffered hunger and misery without stretching out my hand for help to anyone."

Q.—"Amongst those persons who, on that earlier occasion, were notorious as your sympathisers and abettors, Ḥájji Sayyáḥ appears to have been the most substantial?"

A.—"No, Ḥájji Sayyáḥ is an irresolute egotist: he never rendered me any help or service, though he profited by the occasion to make the water muddy so that he might catch fish for the *Ẓillu's-Sulṭán*. His idea was that perhaps this Prince might become King, and the *Amínu'd-Dawla* Prime Minister, and that he himself might accumulate some wealth, even as he has now nearly sixteen thousand *túmáns'* worth of property in Maḥallát. At this time he obtained from the *Ẓillu's-Sulṭán* three thousand *túmáns*, nominally for Sayyid Jamálu'd-Dín, of which he gave nine hundred *túmáns* to the Sayyid and kept the rest himself."

Q.—"Before attempting this deed, you might have sought some protector after your release [from prison], or attached yourself to some third person, such as the *Ṣadr-i-A'ẓam* (Prime Minister), as is the practice of our Persian folk, who take sanctuary in time of stress, and so fortify themselves, until at length they are able to give a true account of themselves and so escape from chastisement. You too should have acted thus, and then, had your efforts not been crowned with success, you could still have done this deed. To kill a great King is, after all, no small matter."

[1] Cf. p. 45 *supra* and foot-note.

A.—"Yes, but there is no justification for him who makes this assertion, inasmuch as on this second occasion I did actually go to represent my case to the Prime Minister, whereupon the *Ná'ibu's-Salṭana* again arrested me, saying, 'Why did you go to the Prime Minister's house?' Besides, you all know that as soon as the *Ná'ibu's-Salṭana's* foot enters into any matter, the Prime Minister and the others become very careful, and dare not speak; or, if they speak, the Sháh pays no attention."

Q.—"Was this a six-chambered revolver which you had?"

A.—"No, a Russian five-chambered revolver."

Q.—"Where did you obtain it?"

A.—"I bought it, in addition to five cartridges, for three *túmáns* and two *qráns*, in Bárfurúsh, from a fruit-seller who exported fruit to Bákú."

Q.—"When you bought it, did you buy it with this intention?"

A.—"No, I bought it for self-defence, though I was also thinking of the *Ná'ibu's-Salṭana.*"

Q.—"When you used to describe your adventures to the Sayyid in Constantinople, what answer used he to give?"

A.—"He used to answer: 'In the face of all those wrongs which you describe as having befallen you, it would have been a good thing if you had killed the *Ná'ibu's-Salṭana.* What a poor spirit you had, and how great a love of life! Such a tyrant who exercises such tyranny ought to be killed.'"

Q.—"In face of so explicit a command from the Sayyid, why then did you not kill him, and why did you instead kill the Sháh?"

A.—"I thought that if I killed him, Náṣiru'd-Dín Sháh, with that power which he possessed, would kill thousands of people; and that therefore it was better to cut the root of this tree of tyranny, not merely its branches and leaves. Thus it was that I conceived the matter, and set myself to accomplish it."

Q.—"I have heard that you had expressed your intention of doing this deed on the night when the city would be illuminated on the occasion of the late Sháh's [Jubilee] festival, when he was to have gone for a walk [through the streets]."

A.—"No, I had no such intention, and this is no saying of mine. I did not even know that the Sháh would go for a walk in the city, nor did I suspect the existence in myself of such resolution. On Thursday I heard that the Sháh was coming to Sháh 'Abdu'l-'Aẓím. I was then thinking of presenting a petition to the Prime Minister to ask for an assurance that I should not be molested. I had even written the petition and had it in my pocket, and had gone out into the *bázár* to await the Prime Minister. Then my heart was turned aside from the idea of presenting the petition, and all of a sudden I was possessed by this [new] idea, and went to my room, picked up the pistol, and passed through the door of the Imám-záda Ḥamza into the Sanctuary before the arrival of the Sháh. Then the Sháh arrived, entered the Sanctuary, recited a short form of Visitation, and was preparing to approach the Imám-záda Ḥamza. He was within a step of the entrance to this when I fired the pistol[1]."

Q.—"Was His martyred Majesty advancing towards you, and did he see you or not?"

A.—"Yes, he saw me and started when the pistol was fired. I did not perceive [what happened afterwards]."

Q.—"Do you really not know what happened to the pistol? They say that there was a woman there who seized the pistol and carried it off."

A.—"No, there was no woman there, and these stories are nonsense. Has this Persia of ours suddenly turned Nihilist that such lion-hearted women should appear amongst us?"

Q.—"I have heard, and it is currently reported, that when the Sayyid commissioned you to do this deed he composed a Prayer of Visitation for you, telling you that you would die a martyr's death, and that your tomb and resting-place would—

'be of every libertine
Throughout the world the favourite shrine[2].'"

A.—"The Sayyid regards the worship of all things made by hands as sheer idolatry, and says that one should worship

[1] Here ends the portion contained in No. 9 of the *Ṣúr-i-Isráfíl.* The continuation is from No. 10, dated Aug. 15, 1907.

[2] This is a quotation from Ḥáfiẓ.

only the Creator and prostrate one's self before Him only, not before the creature. He does not believe in covering shrines and tombs with gold and silver, and regards a man's life as really nothing and of no importance if given for the sake of a good cause. Although I suffered all these misfortunes and hardships for his sake, and he could even hear the sound of the blows inflicted on me, whenever I used to talk about or recall my sufferings he used to say, 'Be silent, and do not play the *rawẓa-khwán*[1]! Was your father a *rawẓa-khwán*? Why do you frown and whine? Tell your story with the utmost cheerfulness and dignity, even as the Franks relate those misfortunes which they endure for a good cause with the most complete cheerfulness.'"

Q.—"When you were in Sháh 'Abdu'l-'Aẓím, did Shaykh Muḥammad Andarmání visit you as he did on the occasion of your former journey? Used he to see you and talk to you, or not?"

A.—"No, by Alláh! and indeed the people who were there used to blame him because he neither saluted me nor recognized me. So also the other inhabitants of Sháh 'Abdu'l-'Aẓím neither spoke with me nor showed any signs of friendship towards me."

Q.—"Shaykh Ḥusayn, the cousin of Shaykh Muḥammad, said himself that on two occasions he held casual conversation with you."

A.—"Yes, that is true."

Q.—"What sort of services had Mullá Ḥusayn, the son of Mírzá Muḥammad 'Alí, rendered you? For he himself said that he had served you for some time, and that you gave him nothing."

A.—"He had not rendered me any service: he only wrote out for me three letters and two advertisements which I had written about my own surgical practice. I had advertised a cure which I knew of for the Baghdad boil and for scald-head."

Q.—"On that day when this Shaykh had gone out for a

[1] A *rawẓa-khwán* is a kind of professional mourner who moves men to tears by reciting the woes of the Imáms.

picnic with you, and you had regaled yourself on lettuces and oxymel, what remark had you made which led him to recite the verse—

'To win the world it is not worth to vex a human heart'?"

A.—"It would be a very extraordinary thing that I should make to one so weak of understanding any observation in connection with which he should repeat [such] a verse of poetry."

Q.—"That same day, when you returned after eating the lettuces and oxymel, he said that three persons came to see you, a Sayyid, a Mullá, and another wearing the *kuláh* (lamb-skin hat), and talked apart with you in whispers for about three-quarters of an hour. Afterwards they departed, and you came back to your lodging. Ḥájji Sayyid Ja'far also said that he was sitting at the door of the house when he saw them coming, and got up and went inside. Who were those three persons?"

A.—"Ḥájji Mírzá Aḥmad of Kirmán, together with a Sayyid whom I did not know. They departed on a journey with a hundred *dínárs* which he had concealed in his turban."

Q.—"Do you know whither they went? It is said that they went towards Hamadán."

A.—"No, by Alláh! I do not know in what direction they went. I only know that they took an augury at the parting of two roads as to which direction they should take. Their augury indicated that they should take the upper road towards Kahrízak, and they set off in that direction."

Q.—"From their acting thus, in reliance on God, it would appear that they knew something of your intention, and that, being known as acquaintances of yours, and fearing that you might do something for which they might be arrested, they departed."

A.—"Let there be no mistake: I regard Ḥájji Mírzá Aḥmad as a fool. A man like me, intending to do so great a deed, would not impart his intention to a man like Ḥájji Mírzá Aḥmad."

Q.—"I have heard that you repeatedly told some of your friends that you would kill the Prime Minister. What enmity had you towards him?"

A.—"No, these statements are lies. It is true that in the

beginning, when they persecuted the Sayyid and drove him into exile, he conceived a spite against him, believing him to have been the cause of this vexation, humiliation and banishment. But afterwards, in Constantinople, he was convinced by concurrent reports that the Prime Minister had nothing to do with this matter, but that the *Ná'ibu's-Salṭana* was responsible. I was not, therefore, intending to kill him."

Q.—"During this period when, having come from Constantinople, you were lodging at Sháh 'Abdu'l-'Aẓím, did you never come to the city?"

A.—"Certainly I did. Once I came here and went straight to the house of Ḥájji Shaykh Hádí Najmábádí, whose guest I was for two nights. He entertained me, and I got from him one *túmán* towards my expenses. Then I again returned to Sháh 'Abdu'l-'Aẓím secretly, as I had come to the city."

Q.—"You did not again visit the city or meet anyone?"

A.—"No, I never returned."

Q.—"Then where did you meet your son?"

A.—"I sent a message, and they brought my son to Sháh 'Abdu'l-'Aẓím, where I kept him with me for some days."

Q.—"Who came to Sháh 'Abdu'l-'Aẓím with your son?"

A.—"His mother, who was divorced from me some time ago, brought him, and then returned whence she came. Some days later she came back and took him home."

Q.—"Wherefore out of all this city did you choose Ḥájji Shaykh Hádí and go to his house? Had you some former acquaintance or special connection with him?"

A.—"Had I not had such former acquaintance and special connection with him, he would not have entertained me. Ḥájji Shaykh Hádí cares for nobody. He receives everyone in the street or at his door [without ceremony]."

Q.—"Does Ḥájji Shaykh Hádí, then, share your opinions and ideas?"

A.—"If he did not, I would not go to his house."

Q.—"Then it is certain that you gave him some hint of your intention to compass the death of the Sháh?"

A.—"No, it was not necessary to give him any hint."

Q.—"Had you any message or letter from Sayyid Jamálu'd-Dín for him?"

A.—"Is there such a dearth of post-offices and other means of communication that letters should be entrusted for transmission to me, who am known and suspected everywhere? And then what is this that you say? Is Ḥájji Shaykh Hádí alone in sharing my ideas? The people have become men, and their eyes and ears are opened."

Q.—"If everyone shares your views, then why does every individual, great or small, man or woman, weep like one who has lost a child at this catastrophe? There is not a house which is not filled with mourning!"

A.—"This organized mourning naturally affects people, and moves them to pity. But go and look at the miserable condition of the people outside. Now answer me truly, let me see, after this occurrence was there disorder in the country? Are the roads and highways insecure? For this, were it so, would indeed be the cause of great vexation, sorrow and grief, lest in the eyes of the Franks and other foreigners we should become notorious for savagery and disorder, and lest they should say that we are still barbarians."

Q.—"You, who are so anxious about the country, and think so much of the honour of the kingdom, why did you not consider this before? Did you not know that so great a matter would assuredly cause disorder and confusion? If this has not actually happened, it is only by God's will and the [new] King's good fortune."

A.—"Yes, that is true, but look at the histories of the Franks: so long as blood was not shed to accomplish lofty aims, the object in view was not attained."

Q.—"On the day when the *Imám-Jum'a* visited Sháh 'Abdu'l-'Aẓím and you went and kissed his hand, what did you say to him, and what did he say to you?"

A.—"The *Imám-Jum'a* came with his sons and the *Mu'tamadu'sh-Sharí'a.* I went into the court-yard [of the Shrine] and kissed his hand. He treated me graciously and kindly, saying, 'When didst thou come? And with what purpose?' I answered, 'I came that perhaps in some way I might obtain security, and so go to the city.' I specially asked him to intercede for me with the Prime Minister, and to put my affair right, so that I might be secure from the malice of the

Ná'ibu's-Salṭana and the *Wakílu'd-Dawla*. But the *Imám-Jum'a's* sons told me that it was no time to come to the city, where there were sure to be disturbances in these days, on account of [the scarcity and dearness of] bread and meat and copper money, and where riots would occur. The *Imám-Jum'a* himself gave me hope and reassured me."

Q.—"What did you say to the *Mu'tamadu'sh-Sharí'a*, and what did you whisper to him?"

A.—"I only asked him to represent my case to the *Imám-Jum'a*, and to urge him to intercede for me."

Q.—"What business had Sayyid 'Alí Akbar's secretary, Mullá Ṣádiq-i-Kúsa, with you? I hear that he visited your lodging in Sháh 'Abdu'l-'Aẓím several times."

A.—"Sayyid 'Alí Akbar also came in person to Sháh 'Abdu'l-'Aẓím, and I talked with him for about half an hour, begging him to obtain for me in some way assurances of safety, so that I might be secure against the malice of those persons [whom I mentioned before], and might come into the city. Sayyid 'Alí Akbar said, 'I will have nothing to do with these matters.' His secretary, Mullá Ṣádiq, also came once or twice, and we talked in this fashion. I likewise made the same request of Ḥájji Shaykh Hádí the night I went to his house. He answered, 'These people are not fit for me to ask favours from, and this is a thing I will never do.'"

Q.—"Tell us the real truth. How was it that, with all your fear of coming to the city, where, moreover, you had nowhere to go except the house of Ḥájji Shaykh Hádí [you still ventured there]? Perhaps you had a letter or message for him?"

A.—"No, I had no letter or message. It was only that I regarded him as more human than others, so that it was possible to say two words to him."

Q.—"For example, what sort of discourse did you hold with him?"

A.—"By Alláh! The character of Ḥájji Shaykh Hádí is well known, and after what fashion he talks. On the days when he sits on the ground by the side of the Avenue, he is always occupied in making 'men.' He has made, up to the present time,

at least twenty thousand 'men,' has lifted the veil from their eyes so that all have awakened and understood the matter."

Q.—"Is he also on intimate terms and in constant correspondence with Sayyid Jamálu'd-Dín?"

A.—"What can I say? I do not rightly know whether he corresponds with the Sayyid or not, but he has a firm belief in him, and regards him as a great man. Whoever has even a little perception understands that the Sayyid stands quite apart from the men of this age. The realities of all things lie open before him; the necks of all the greatest philosophers and thinkers of Europe and all the world are bowed in obeisance to him. Not one of the wisest of the age is worthy to be his servant or his disciple. Evidently, too, Ḥájji Shaykh Hádí has sense: he is not like some of these senseless *mullás*.... Whoever appears with these signs and tokens is...[1] himself. The Persian Government did not appreciate his worth, and could not derive advantages and benefits from his honoured being. They banished him with contempt and disrespect. Now go and see how the Sultan of Turkey appreciates his value. When the Sayyid went from Persia to London, the Sultan telegraphed to him several times, saying, 'It is a pity that your auspicious existence should be passed far from the lands of Islám, and that the Muslims should not derive benefit from it. Come to the metropolis of Islám, let the Muslim call to prayer sound in thine ears, and let us live together.' At first the Sayyid would not consent, but at length Prince Malkom Khán and some others said to him, 'When such a King is so urgent with thee, it is surely right to go.' So the Sayyid came to Constantinople, and the Sultan gave him a lofty mansion, assigned him two hundred pounds a month for his expenses, sent him supper and luncheon from the royal kitchen, and always placed at his disposal and orders the royal horses and carriages. On that day when the Sultan invited him to the Palace of Yildiz, and kissed his face as they sat together in the steam-yacht which plies on the lake in his garden, they discoursed together; and the Sayyid undertook that in a short while he would unite all the States of Islám, draw them all towards the Caliphate, and make the Sultan the

[1] Omission in the original. The word *Mahdí* is probably to be understood.

Commander of the Faithful over all the Muslims. Thus it came about that he entered into correspondence with all the Shí'ite divines of Karbalá, Najaf and all parts of Persia, and convinced them by promises, hopes and logical demonstrations that if the Muḥammadan nations would only unite, all the nations on earth could not prevail against them. They must put aside their verbal differences concerning 'Alí and 'Umar, and look at the question of the Caliphate..., and do this and that.... Just at this juncture the trouble at Sámarrá, and the dispute as to the relations of the late *Ḥujjatu'l-Islám* Mírzá-yi-Shírází with the inhabitants of Sámarrá and the Sunnís, broke out. The Sultan of Turkey, imagining that the Sháh of Persia had specially fomented this trouble so as to disturb the Ottoman dominions, held consultations and discussions on this subject with the Sayyid. He said, 'By reason of the long duration of his reign and his venerable age, Náṣiru'd-Dín Sháh has acquired a power and prestige such that, if he is firm, the Shí'ite divines and the people of Persia will not move to support our ideas or accomplish our aims. We must therefore think of some plan for dealing with him personally.' Then he said to the Sayyid, 'Do whatever you can in regard to him, and be not anxious about anything.'"

Q.—"You were not present at the meeting of the Sultan and the Sayyid: whence, then, have you these details?"

A.—"None was more intimate with the Sayyid than I: he kept nothing from me. When I was in Constantinople he treated me with such respect that in the eyes of all men I passed as second only to him. Saving the Sayyid himself, none was so highly honoured as I. All these matters the Sayyid himself related to me, together with the substance of many other conversations of this sort, which, however, I do not remember. When he began to talk, he talked without check, as one winds a watch with a broken main-spring. How could I possibly recollect all that he said?"

Q.—"Seeing that you were thus honoured in Constantinople, why did you return to Persia again, to plead with this one and that one to obtain security for you?"

A.—"It was predestined that I should come, and that this

deed should be accomplished by my instrumentality. I only wanted to obtain security in order to carry out my idea."

Q.—"Well, we are wandering from the point. What happened then? Did the letters which the Sayyid wrote to the *'ulamá* of the Shí'a and of Persia have any effect?"

A.—"Yes, all answered, and expressed their desire to serve him. Do not you know some of these greedy *ákhúnds* and *mullás*? Will they keep quiet when they hear promises of money or distinctions? But, to be brief, after the Sayyid had matured his plans and was about to obtain his results, some of the Sultan's favourites, those shifty hypocrites who surround and dominate him, such as Abu'l-Hudá and the like, intervened, desiring to take to themselves the credit of the Sayyid's services. They made the Sultan suspicious of him, on account of his meeting with the Khedive of Egypt, and suggested to His Majesty that the Sayyid, despairing of him, wished to make the Khedive Caliph. The Sultan, too, suffers from melancholy and madness: he is always fancying that his women will come and kill him. So he grew suspicious, set the secret police to watch the Sayyid, and deprived him of the horses and carriages which were at his disposal. The Sayyid was annoyed, and declared and insisted that he would go to London. Thus it was that they became reconciled again, and the police were stopped from following him, and he was again provided with horses and carriages. After the reconciliation, the Sayyid used to say, 'Alas that this man (meaning the Sultan) is mad, otherwise I would secure for him the allegiance of all the nations of Islám; but since his name is great in men's minds, this thing must be done in his name.' Whoever has seen the Sayyid knows how headstrong he is, and that he never thinks of himself, neither seeking money, nor privileges, nor honours. He is the most abstemious of men: he only desires to glorify Islám. Even now let His Majesty Muẓaffaru'd-Dín Sháh be inspired with this truth, and summon the Sayyid, and conciliate him, and he will do this thing in his illustrious name."

Q.—"You mean that, after all these details which you have mentioned, [you still believe that] the Sayyid will feel secure enough to come to Persia?"

A.—"Yes, I know the Sayyid. If the Sháh will only suffer

one of the foreign states to guarantee the safety of his life, he will care for nothing else: he will come, and will perhaps render a great service to Islám. Besides he knows that his life is of no small account, and [that his blood, if shed,] would not dry up until the Resurrection."

(*Copy of the writing of Mírzá Abú Turáb Khán Naẓmu'd-Dawla which he wrote at the end of this cross-examination and sealed with his seal.*)

"This is the record of the questions and answers, and of the preliminary examination of Mírzá Muḥammad Riẓá, carried out with gentleness and politeness, in several sittings, in the presence of this house-born slave Abú Turáb, and of Ḥájji Ḥusayn Khán, captain of the guard of the auspicious Royal Precincts. It is, however, certain that under torture, and the pressure proper to such investigation, he will better reveal his aims and intentions. For the present what appears to this servant from these several sittings of interrogation conducted by him is this, that he was never, as he everywhere pretends, thinking of the public welfare and advantage, but had heard all these vain and absurd ideas from Sayyid Jamálu'd-Dín, and was only misled by the Sayyid and became his *fidá'í* (devoted instrument) through his excessive ignorance, and came to do this deed solely at the Sayyid's instigation, on account of the sufferings which had befallen him. Now if the Sayyid's ideas are inspired from some other source, that is a separate question. As regards those absurdities which he represents as based on his desire for the public weal, it is not improbable that he had some sympathisers amongst the people. But in this accursed purpose which he harboured he seems to have had no accomplice; and if he informed anyone of his intention beforehand, this too will transpire under torture and other methods of pressure."

[Signed and sealed by Abú Turáb *Naẓmu'd-Dawla.*]

(*Copy of the declarations of Mírzá Muḥammad Riẓá, made by him on the afternoon of Tuesday, the first of Rabí'u'l-Awwal, in the year* 1314 *of the Flight* [= August 10 or 11, 1896][1] *in*

[1] This was practically the dying statement of Mírzá Riẓá, for he was hanged on the next day, or the next day but one.

the Gulistán Garden, in the presence of the Farmán-farmá, the Mukhbiru'd-Dawla, the Minister of Sciences, the Mushíru'd-Dawla, the Minister of Justice and Commerce, the Sardár-i-Kull, the Naẓmu'd-Dawla, the Amín-i-Humáyún, and Ḥájji Ḥusayn 'Alí Khán, Brigadier-General.)

"My father is Mullá Ḥusayn 'Aqdá'í, known as Mullá Ḥusayn-i-Pidar. I myself, at the beginning of my career, went from Kirmán to Yazd in consequence of the aggressions of Muḥammad Ismá'íl Khán *Wakílu'l-Mulk*, who seized my property and gave it to Mullá Abú Ja'far. At Yazd I became a student and studied for some time. Afterwards I came to Ṭihrán, and presently embarked on the business of selling second-hand articles. Five or six years before my first arrest the *Ná'ibu's-Salṭana* bought from me nearly eleven hundred *túmáns'* worth of shawls and furs. For a long while I ran after the money for these, and finally began to demand it with violent language, until, after he had reduced the sum I demanded by nearly 300 *túmáns*, and after I had received many thrashings and cuffs, I got my money, and did not again go near the *Ná'ibu's-Salṭana*, until five or six years ago, when the discontent about the Régie caused the people to murmur. Then the *Wakílu'd-Dawla* sent for me, saying, 'Come, His Royal Highness [the *Ná'ibu's-Salṭana*] wants to meet you.' So I went, and first he asked me, 'Shall I become King?' I replied, 'If you win men's hearts, you will become King.' He said, 'There are foreign ministers here who will not agree to it.' I replied, 'When the nation has done a thing, what can foreigners say?'"

It was asked:—"We have heard that you promised His Royal Highness that he should reign, saying, 'If you come forward, I will gather round you seventy thousand men, and you will become King.'"

He answered:—"Well, the *Wakílu'd-Dawla* had said to me, 'His Royal Highness has made this great reception-hall for receiving the people in audience, and aspires to the Throne. Speak after this fashion, and he will be pleased.' So I spoke thus.

"Then His Royal Highness said, 'I hear that you have some information serviceable to the Government and the Nation.'

"I replied, 'Yes, amongst all classes of the people, ministers, *mullás*, merchants and others, such talk prevails. You must consider it and take measures to stop it.' After many promises and oaths, whereby His Royal Highness sought to inspire me with confidence, I was taken to the *Wakílu'd-Dawla's* house. 'Abdu'lláh Khán the Governor was there, together with that Sayyid who had once insulted the Prime Minister and had been deprived of his turban. They bade me write a document to this effect:—

"'O believers! O Muslims! The Tobacco Concession is gone. The Kárún River is gone. The manufacture of sugar is gone. The Ahwáz Road is gone. The Bank is come. The Tramway is come. The country is fallen into the hands of foreigners. Now that the Sháh is heedless [of our interests], let us take the matter into our own hands.'"

Here it was asked:—"All these things were means of progress. If you seek the progress of the Nation, which of these items gave you cause for complaint?"

He answered:—"Yes, if they had been effected by our own hands they would have conduced to progress, but not by the hands of foreigners.

"To be brief, they said:—'Write the document, and we will give it to the Sháh, telling him that it was dropped in the Masjid-i-Sháh, where we found it. Then he will effect some reform.' I would not write it, but they persisted, and finally I wrote it. I had hardly finished doing so when they snatched it from my hands as though they had found a treasure. They collected the writing-materials into the *qalam-dán* (pen-case), but in the excess of their joy they forgot the pen-knife and scissors. Then they began to threaten, saying, 'Tell us the names of thy associates.' They brought a branding-iron, and in vain did I cry, 'None are my associates. This talk is current amongst all. Whom shall I get into trouble? Every poor wretch who has one day wished me good morrow?'

"So I saw that it was now the time to sacrifice myself. I cast a glance at the pen-knife. Rajab 'Alí Khán noticed this, and picked it up. I looked and saw the scissors lying by the

fire-place. I said to 'Abdu'lláh Khán: 'By this *qibla* which thou art facing I adjure thee to tell me what is thy object!' He answered, 'Our object is this, that thou shouldest tell us who are thy associates.' I said, 'Come here, that I may tell thee'; and so saying I drew him towards the fire-place. Then I picked up the scissors and ripped open my belly. The blood poured down; and they came and brought a surgeon to stitch up the wound. I was never in the company of those persons who wrote and circulated [seditious] proclamations. When Sayyid Jamálu'd-Dín came here, some persons heard his denunciations, and were moved to enthusiasm thereby, like Mírzá 'Abdu'lláh the physician, Mírzá Naṣru'lláh Khán and Mírzá Faraju'lláh Khán. These went and wrote certain papers which they sent into the provinces, so that they came back stamped with the provincial post-marks. Mírzá Ḥasan Khán, grandson of the *Ṣáḥib-Díwán*, enthusiastically supported this association, because he had seen the Sayyid and heard his words. Some of his associates were frying their own fish. Of these was Ḥájji Sayyáḥ, who wished to make the *Ẓillu's-Sulṭán* King and someone else Prime Minister. In short, after they had arrested these persons, they came one day and said, 'Come to the Amíriyya Palace: His Royal Highness wishes to see you.' So they put me in a carriage and brought me to the Amíriyya Palace, where they assembled us all in the great audience-hall. Suddenly we saw the soldiers of the guard enter. We being then overwhelmed with consternation, Mírzá Naṣru'lláh Khán and Mírzá Faraju'lláh Khán began to bid one another farewell. There was a terrible commotion. Then they again put us in carriages, and brought us to Qazwín, escorted by cavalry with pomp and circumstance. They conveyed us to Qazwín in nine hours. There the *Sa'du's-Salṭana*, though he dealt very hardly with us, did nevertheless provide us with sufficient means of livelihood. Whilst we were there, the agitation against the Régie broke out. After sixteen months they brought us the good news of our release. A tailor came to measure each of us for a suit of clothes. Then they sent us to Ṭihrán, where we went straight to the Amíriyya Palace. There they took something for His Royal Highness from such as had money. Amongst us were two Bábís, one

of whom was wealthy. He gave money and was set at liberty, as were also the others, but again they removed unfortunate me together with another Bábí to the gaol, where I was confined for fourteen months. One day I began to cry and shout within the gaol, saying, 'If I am to be put to death, let them kill me, and if I am to be forgiven, let them forgive me! What sort of Muhammadanism is this?' Thereupon the *Ḥájibu'd-Dawla*[1] came in with a body of his *mír-ghaẓabs* (executioners), and, instead of soothing me, tied me to the sticks and gave me a sound thrashing. At length I was released from the gaol. After much reflection, I finally came to the conclusion that I should go and place myself under the protection of the *Imám-Jum'a*, he being both a chief man amongst the people, and also connected with the court. There, at the *Imám-Jum'a's* house, I met the Prime Minister, and presented to him a petition. Some days later I saw that Ná'ib Maḥmúd had sent the chief *farrásh-báshí* to say to the *Imám-Jum'a*, 'Tell Mírzá Muḥammad Riẓá to come, for our master wants him to give him money.' I refused to go, but the *Imám-Jum'a* said, 'Go, no harm will come to thee.' So I went to His Royal Highness. First he said to me, 'Why did you go to the Prime Minister's house?' I answered, 'I did not go.' Then Ná'ib Maḥmúd said, 'Come to the treasury and get your money.' I went there, and saw Ḥusayn Khán the treasurer whisper something into the ear of Ná'ib Maḥmúd Khán. Then he said [to me], 'Come, let us go to the Caravansaray of the *Wazír-i-Niẓám*, and I will give you an order to obtain the money from one of the merchants.' So we went out, and I found that they were taking me back to the gaol. In short, without reason or crime, I was in fetters and bonds, now in the gaol, now in Qazwín. What sufferings I endured! Why should a man [under such conditions] continue to desire life? On this last occasion [of release], His Royal Highness gave me ten *túmáns*, and the *Wakílu'd-Dawla* fifteen *túmáns*. I went to Constantinople. Sayyid Jamálu'd-Dín, when he heard the account of my adventures, said, 'How poor-spirited wert thou! Why didst thou not kill [one of thy tormentors]?'

[1] This title, which means "the Chamberlain of the State," is, so far as I know, always given to the Chief Executioner.

On my return [to Persia], I came to Bárfurúsh, and stayed in the Caravansaray of Ḥájji Sayyid Ḥusayn. Then I bought from a fruit-seller a Russian five-chambered revolver with five cartridges for three *túmáns* and two *qráns*. I was then thinking of the *Ná'ibu's-Salṭana*, until, two days before the Nawrúz, I came to Sháh 'Abdu'l-'Aẓím. There I remained, save for two nights which I passed in the city at the house of Ḥájji Shaykh Hádí. I asked him to give me a letter of recommendation to the *Amín-i-Humáyún*, whom I had heard spoken of as a 'man[1],' and who I thought would protect me. Ḥájji Shaykh Hádí said, 'I have no confidence in him, and I will not write.' I returned [to him] twice. I went absolutely nowhere else. [The stories about] my going to Surkh-Hiṣár and Zarganda by the garden of *Naṣru's-Salṭana* are all lies. While I was in Sháh 'Abdu'l-'Aẓím I sought protection from all the 'masters' and *'ulamá*—from the *Imám* [*-Jum'a*], Sayyid 'Alí Akbar, and the rest—begging them to obtain an amnesty for me, but not one of them paid any heed to my words. One day, moreover, the Prime Minister came to Ṣafá'iyya. I had written a petition, intending to present it, but after all he did not visit Sháh 'Abdu'l-'Aẓím."

Here it was asked:—"Is it true that the servants of the *andarún* (women's apartments) were in accord with you, and used to give you information?"

He answered:—"What words are these? How were they capable of giving me information? On Thursday it was rumoured in Sháh 'Abdu'l-'Aẓím that on the morrow the Sháh would visit the shrine. They watered and swept the ground. In the morning I heard that the Prime Minister would come before the Sháh. I had written a petition, and came out into the *bázár* to present it. I know not how it was that there this idea took possession of me. I said to myself, 'Mírzá Muḥammad Riẓá, turn back! Perhaps this day your main object may be accomplished!' I went and got the pistol, and went into the Sanctuary through the door of the Imám-záda Ḥamza, and stood there until the Sháh arrived, and what happened happened. I am a fatalist: I believe that not a leaf falls from the tree save in accordance with the decree of Destiny. Now in my own

[1] *i.e.* one of Prince Malkom Khán's "men." See p. 39 *supra*.

opinion I have rendered a service to all creatures, and to the Nation and the State alike. I have watered this seed, and it is beginning to sprout. All men were asleep, and they are now awakening. I have uprooted a dry and fruitless tree under which all sorts of noxious animals and ravenous beasts were gathered together, and I have dispersed these animals. Now, beside the spot where that tree stood, there hath arisen a young sapling like Muẓaffaru'd-Dín Sháh, verdant, cheerful and vigorous, from whom all manner of good fruits may be hoped.

"Do you now be in sympathy with your subjects. All have gone, all are finished. I have seen something of foreign lands. See what others have done, and do likewise. Nor is it necessary that you should construct a Code of Laws now. To construct such a Code in Persia at present would be like thrusting a mouthful of bread and roasted meat into the throat of a newly born child; it would certainly be suffocated. But take counsel with the people. Ask, for instance, such-and-such a head-man of such-and-such a village how the taxes should be collected from him, and how he should be treated, so that he should be content. As he answers you, so deal with him. Thus shall the distribution of bread be duly ordered, and oppression be brought to an end."

Here it was asked:—"You, being a fatalist, should know that it is not ordained by Fate that these things should yet be in this country."

He answered:—"That is not so. Do you, then, not sweep your house because it is not ordained by Fate?"

It was asked:—"Did you ever think, during this period, of killing the Prime Minister?"

He answered:—"I had no such thought. Now that I have done this deed I have no further hope of life, since it would need a magnanimity but one degree short of the magnanimity of God to pardon me."

He was questioned concerning the instructions given to him by Sayyid Jamálu'd-Dín, and of the Sultan's conversations with the Sayyid.

He answered:—"When the disturbance at Sámarrá broke out, and disputation and strife arose between the Shí'ite followers of

the late Mírzá-yi-Shírází and the inhabitants of Sámarrá, the Sultan believed that it was all caused by the instigation of Náṣiru'd-Dín Sháh. So he said to the Sayyid, 'Do whatever you can about the Sháh, and be under no apprehension.' So when I described to the Sayyid my misfortunes, sufferings, imprisonments, and torments, he said to me, 'How poor-spirited you were, and how great was your love of life! You should have killed the tyrant. Why did you not kill him?' Now there was in question no tyrant except the Sháh and Prince *Ná'ibu's-Salṭana*; and though I was thinking of the latter also, yet on that day my mind decided that it should be the Sháh. I said to myself, 'The Tree of Tyranny must be cut down at the roots, and then its branches and leaves will wither in the natural course of things.'"

It was asked:—"On the thirteenth day after the Festival [of the *Nawrúz*] did you see the *I'timádu's-Salṭana* at Sháh 'Abdu'l-'Aẓím, or not?"

He answered:—"Yes, I saw him with the *Shamsu'l-'Ulamá*, but did not speak with him. He was a cunning fellow, and pretended great devotion to the Sayyid, who, however, used to say of him, 'He is a bad-hearted man, and no confidence should be reposed in him.'"

It was asked:—"What kith and kin have you?"

He answered:—"I have a wife, who is the Mírzá's sister, two children, and one aged sister in Kirmán, whose son, named Mashhadí [Muḥammad] 'Alí, I have left under the care of Ḥájji Sayyid Khalaf."

It was asked:—"What was the reason and the occasion of your acquaintance with Sayyid Jamálu'd-Dín?"

He answered:—"I was with Ḥájji Muḥammad Ḥasan, and when the Sayyid came to Ṭihrán and stayed at the Ḥájji's house, I was deputed to entertain him, and so I became acquainted with him."

It was said:—"It is commonly reported that you murdered a sister of yours at Kirmán."

He answered:—"God caused her death, but they suspected me, and said I had killed her."

Here ends the interrogation of Mírzá Muḥammad Riẓá, who

was publicly hanged on the next day, or the next day but one, August 12, 1896. Such as take pleasure in what is gruesome will find reproduced (facing p. 216) a photograph of the execution in Dr Walter Schulz's *Das Reisebuch Ibrahim Begs, oder die Nachteiligen Folgen seines Patriotismus, aus dem Persischen übersetzt.* He could, and, as his cross-examination shews, did expect no better fate; and indeed it says much for the milder character of Muẓaffaru'd-Dín Sháh that a more horrible death was not inflicted. I am assured, moreover, not by Persian officials, but by Persians somewhat of Mírzá Riẓá's own standing, who in some cases, perhaps, felt something of sympathy and even of admiration for him, that he was not subjected to torture. Three other victims, all of whom he mentions (p. 63 *supra*) as amongst his associates at Constantinople, were extradited thence on the demand of the Persian Government, and were, as already narrated, secretly put to death in the prison at Tabríz on July 17, 1896, though for a long while their fate remained uncertain. Of these the most notable was Ḥájji Shaykh Aḥmad of Kirmán, a man of much learning and imposing appearance, with whom I maintained for some time a literary correspondence, begun by him on October 8, 1890, and continued, I think, intermittently until January 3, 1894. He obtained or caused to be copied for me many rare and precious books, and that at a very moderate price, and, though I never saw him, I formed a high opinion of his ability and integrity. This was, apparently, shared by Major D. C. Phillott, who edited his clever translation into Persian of Morier's *Adventures of Hájí Bábá of Ispahan* (Calcutta, 1905), to which his portrait is prefixed as the frontispiece. Of him and his friend and fellow-sufferer, Mírzá Áqá Khán, Major Phillott gives the following account in his English Introduction to the work in question (pp. vii–viii):—

"The Persian translator of this work, whose portrait forms the frontispiece[1], is the late Ḥájji Shaykh Aḥmad-i-Kirmání, son of Mullá Muḥammad Ja'far-i-Písh-namáz. His story is

[1] The tablet which Shaykh Aḥmad is supporting in the photograph bears the inscription (in Turkish) *Ṭabi'at-dan dígar yoq*, "There is nothing besides Nature."

simple but tragic. He belonged to the Bábí sect[1]. After studying Arabic in Kirmán, he removed to Ispahán, where he was joined by Mírzá Áqá Khán of Kirmán, also of the same obnoxious sect. In A.H. 1305 [= A.D. 1887–8] the two went to Constantinople[2] for the purpose of studying foreign languages[3]. In this city Ḥájji Shaykh Aḥmad, while earning his living as a teacher of eastern languages, is said to have acquired a knowledge of English, French and Western Turkish. Assisted by Mírzá Ḥabíb, a poet from Ispahán[4], he translated into Persian several French and English works, including *Ḥájji Bábá* and *Gil Blas*. He was also the author of several works on *Ḥikmat*[5]. His companion, Áqá Khán, was the capable editor of the now defunct *Akhtar*[6], a newspaper which, though printed in Constantinople, had a wide circulation in India and Persia.

"The two companions married sisters, daughters of the Bábí leader, Mírzá Yaḥyá of Mázandarán, better known by the Bábí title of *Ṣubḥ-i-Azal*.

"While in Constantinople, Ḥájji Shaykh Aḥmad and Mírzá Áqá Khán were accused by the Persian authorities of conspiracy, tried by order of the Turkish Sultan, and acquitted. The Sultan, it is said, made them a grant of five hundred *túmáns* as a compensation for their sufferings.

"The companions next appear as followers of Sayyid Jamálu'd-Dín, a Bábí leader (*sic!*)[7], afterwards suspected of

[1] In the *Catalogue and Description of 27 Bábí* MSS., which I published in the *J.R.A.S.* for 1892 (Vol. XXIV, pp. 433–499 and 637–710) he is the person described on p. 435 as "Shaykh A—, a learned Azalí resident in Constantinople, who is in constant communication with Ṣubḥ-i-Azal, and is implicitly trusted by him, and of whose learning and integrity alike I have had good proof," and he was the sender of all the MSS. in the class-marks of which the letters *B B C.* are employed.

[2] My correspondence with him, as I have already said, began in October, 1890.

[3] Cf. Mírzá Riẓá's statement on p. 64 *supra*.

[4] Mírzá Ḥabíb was a fine scholar as well as a poet. He wrote an excellent treatise on Persian grammar intitled *Dastúr-i-Sukhan*, and a *History of Calligraphy and Calligraphists*, the former in Persian, the latter in Turkish.

[5] Probably his *Hasht Bihisht*, a manuscript in 2 volumes, described by me on pp. 680–697 of the above-mentioned article, is intended.

[6] It was suspended in February, 1891. The chief editor, Mírzá Muḥammad Ṭáhir of Iṣfahán, is still living at Constantinople.

[7] I have already pointed out (p. 45 *supra*) that Sayyid Jamálu'd-Dín was not a Bábí, and had little sympathy with the Bábís, though well acquainted with their history and doctrines.

Shaykh Aḥmad "Rúḥí" of Kirmán
(born about 1855)

Mírzá Áqá Khán of Kirmán
(born 1853)

Mírzá Ḥasan Khán *Khabíru'l-Mulk*

THREE OF SAYYID JAMÁLU'D-DÍN'S DISCIPLES, SECRETLY PUT TO DEATH AT TABRÍZ ON JULY 17, 1896

being the instigator of the assassination of Náṣiru'd-Dín Sháh. While followers of this religious teacher, they wrote letters to various *mujtahids* in Persia, exhorting them to cast away sectarian differences, to make common cause with the Sunnís, and to join Turkey in resisting 'the oppression of foreigners.' The correspondence was seized by the Persian officials in Persia, who demanded from the Sultan the surrender of the writers[1]. The offenders were being conveyed to Persia when the Sultan wired to have them detained in Trebizonde[2]. Ḥaníf [? Muníf] Pasha, the Turkish Ambassador, then starting for the Court of Ṭihrán to convey to the Sháh on his attaining to the 50th year of his reign the congratulations of the Sultan, was to take the opportunity of soliciting from the Sháh the release of the offenders. The request was not preferred, for a few days before the celebration of his Jubilee, the unfortunate Náṣiru'd-Dín Sháh was assassinated in the Shrine of Sháh 'Abdu'l-'Aẓím.

"This assassination sealed the fate of the unfortunate Shaykh Aḥmad and of his equally unfortunate comrade, and orders were issued to have them forwarded from Trebizonde to Ṭihrán. They never reached their destination.

"A wire from Ṭihrán to Tabríz, and the two suspects were secretly butchered in a kitchen, in the presence of the Governor, who—so it is said—while superintending the execution was moved to tears. The butchery was carried out on the 4th of Ṣafar, A.H. 1314 [= July 15, 1896][3]. The bodies were afterwards thrown into a well.

"The mothers of Shaykh Aḥmad and his comrade, two illiterate old women, are still [November, 1902] in Kirmán in ignorance of the fate of their sons; in ignorance of the fact that they are no longer in Constantinople alive and well and 'too busy to write[4].'

"The fate of the Sháh alarmed the Sultan, and Sayyid

[1] See the cross-examination of Mírzá Muḥammad Riẓá, p. 64 *supra*.

[2] This detail of the first arrest of these men explains a statement by Mírzá Riẓá (p. 63 *supra*) which was obscure to me.

[3] *i.e.* nearly a month before the execution of the Sháh's assassin, Mírzá Muḥammad Riẓá.

[4] Since most of the inhabitants of Kirmán must have known the truth, this kindly reticence speaks volumes as to the ability of the Persians to keep a secret, even when it is known to many.

Jamálu'd-Dín, the Bábí leader mentioned above, died suddenly 'from drinking a cup of coffee[1].'

"Such is the brief outline of the translator's history, a history told to the writer in secret and in bits by Persians whose evidence is entitled to every consideration. For obvious reasons names and some details are omitted."

The third Persian incriminated at Constantinople, Mírzá Ḥasan Khán *Khabíru'l-Mulk*, suffered death with his two companions. Sayyid Jamálu'd-Dín, the greatest of those on whom suspicion of complicity in the Sháh's death fell, was arrested on or about May 5, 1896, and examined at Yildiz Palace, but nothing incriminating was found in his papers, and he was released. His extradition was demanded by the Persian Government, but, though it is notorious in Persia that he was a Persian and a native of Hamadán, it was claimed and maintained that he was an Afghan (as he himself asserted), and his extradition was refused by the Turkish authorities. It is admitted that he died in the following March of cancer in the lip, but many Persians believe that he was inoculated with this disease by Sultan 'Abdu'l-Ḥamíd's astrologer Abu'l-Hudá, by means of a poisoned tooth-pick. The Turks deny this, and indeed I am doubtful whether the thing is possible; at any rate the truth of the matter can hardly be discovered now. He was buried, according to the biography of him given in Part II of Jurjí Zaydán's *Masháhíru'sh-Sharq* (p. 64), in the cemetery of *Sheykhler Mezárlighi*, near Nishán Tásh, at Constantinople[2].

The cross-examinations of Mírzá Muḥammad Riẓá's divorced wife, of his son Taqí, and of other persons connected with him is also given in succeeding numbers of the *Ṣúr-i-Isráfíl* (Nos. 11, 13 and 17). They throw little fresh light on the matter, and do not seem to me worth translation. The son either was, or feigned to be, both stupid and unobservant, and only indicated the name of a certain Ná'ib Ghulám Ḥusayn who associated

[1] Sayyid Jamálu'd-Dín was attacked by cancer of the lip towards the end of 1896, and died on March 9, 1897, ten months after the assassination of the Sháh. A photograph of him, taken in his last illness, is reproduced at p. 63 of Jurjí Zaydán's *Masháhíru'sh-Sharq* ("Eastern Celebrities"), Part II (Cairo, 1903).

[2] These matters have been already discussed in Chapter I. See p. 12 *supra*.

with Mírzá Riẓá. The wife (Taqí's mother) testified to his infatuation for Sayyid Jamálu'd-Dín, and added that when the Sayyid was deported from Persia "he used to weep night and day, and became like one demented." Mullá Ḥusayn, the son of Mírzá Muḥammad 'Alí, the custodian of the tomb of the *Surúru's-Salṭana*, and Shaykh Muḥammad were also examined with little result. The main facts, however, were clear enough, and, I think, fairly agree with the account which I published a month after the event in the *New Review* for June, 1896, pp. 651–9. "Shaykh Jamálu'd-Dín," I concluded, "apart from his personal enmities, has without doubt a great ideal—the desire to unite in one mighty nation all Muhammadan peoples, and to restore the ancient power and glory of Islám. To check European encroachment in the East is a necessary part of this scheme; and any Muhammadan potentate who encourages, or acquiesces in, an extension of Western influence in his domains must be regarded by the promoters of this movement as an enemy to their cause. Thus, the blood of Náṣiru'd-Dín Sháh is the price paid for successive triumphs of English and Russian diplomacy in Persia.

'That Royal blood which leaves its crimson stain
There in the mosque, beyond the inner chain,
Thou deemest shed by Eastern lust of blood:
Not so! 'twas shed by Western greed for gain!'"

CHAPTER IV.

THE GRANTING OF THE CONSTITUTION BY MUẒAFFARU'D-DÍN SHÁH.

(Crowned June 8, 1896; died January 4, 1907.)

THE character of Muẓaffaru'd-Dín Sháh, whose relatively short reign will be ever memorable for the granting of the Constitution, differed greatly from that of his father and predecessor. Of kindly nature, weak health, and melancholic disposition, averse from cruelty and bloodshed, disliking to refuse requests or incur unpopularity, and lacking initiative and self-reliance, he suffered rather than caused the government of Persia to grow steadily worse, while refusing, or at least omitting, to follow those methods of repression whereby his father had to a considerable extent held in check overt manifestations of the discontent which was universally prevalent.

We have already seen (pp. 55–6 *supra*) how, after the fiasco of the Imperial Tobacco Corporation, the *Amínu's-Sulṭán*, renouncing the sympathy for England which he had formerly professed, declared himself henceforth the friend of Russia. For the moment, however, he was not in a position to give effect to his new aims, since in November, 1896, he fell from favour and had to retire to Qum, being replaced by his rival, the more liberal and patriotic *Amínu'd-Dawla*, who was recalled from Tabríz by the new Sháh in February, 1897, and made Minister of the Interior and President of the Council of Ministers. In June he was made Prime Minister, and in August he was confirmed in this post and received the title of *Ṣadr-i-*

Muẓaffaru'd-Dín Sháh Qájár

Born March 25, 1853: crowned June 8, 1896: died January 4, 1907

A'ẓam, or Grand Wazír. The hopes of reform aroused by this appointment were further strengthened when the able and upright *Náṣiru'l-Mulk* (a graduate of Balliol College, Oxford, and, so far as I know, the only Persian statesman educated at an English University) was appointed Minister of Finance, and began to apply himself seriously to schemes of fiscal reform. Unhappily Muẓaffaru'd-Dín Sháh, whose health gave rise to serious anxiety, was advised by his physicians to visit Europe and try the effects of a course of mineral waters. Money was needed for the Royal journey, and attempts were made to float a loan of £1,000,000 in London. This proved impracticable, and the *Amínu'd-Dawla* was obliged to retire from the Premiership. Muḥsin Khán, the *Mushíru'd-Dawla*, formerly Ambassador at Constantinople, was appointed President of the Council of Ministers, but he also failed to negotiate the loan, and the Sháh was consequently compelled to abandon his projected trip to Europe.

To obtain ready money was now the chief preoccupation of the Sháh, and in July, 1898, the *Amínu's-Sulṭán* was recalled from his exile at Qum, and reinstated as *Ṣadr-i-A'ẓam* on August 10. In the following month three Belgian custom-house officials were invited to draw up a scheme for raising money on the Persian customs, and in March, 1899, the custom-houses of Ázarbáyján and Kirmánsháh were handed over to them as a *corpus vile* on which to experiment.

We now reach the year 1900, memorable in the history of Persia's misfortunes on account of the negotiation of the first Russian loan of 22½ millions of roubles (£2,400,000). This sum, lent at the rate of 5 %, and guaranteed by all the customs' receipts with the exception of those of Fárs and the Persian Gulf, was repayable in 75 years, and it was further stipulated that the loan of £500,000 at 6 % made to the Persian Government in 1892 by the Imperial Bank of Persia, in order to pay off the indemnity exacted by the Imperial Tobacco Corporation, should be paid off immediately, so that Russia should become Persia's sole creditor, and England should no longer have any claim on the Persian revenues. This loan, concluded on January 20, 1900, was the first great blow to British material

prestige, as the unfortunate Tobacco Concession was to her moral prestige. From this period, and from the handing over of all the customs-houses of Persia to Belgian control (the Belgians being in this matter the jackals of Russia), England's declining influence and Persia's increasing misery and disorder may be said to date. Shortly after the conclusion of this loan Sir Mortimer Durand, who had succeeded Sir Frank Lascelles as British Minister in 1894, left Persia, and was succeeded in turn by Sir Arthur Hardinge, who reached Ṭihrán in August, 1900.

Although only a portion of the first Russian loan actually passed into the Persian Treasury, the Sháh was able, in the summer of 1900, to set out on his European tour. He visited Contrexéville, St Petersburg, Paris (where his life was attempted by an anarchist on August 2) and Constantinople (Sept. 30—Oct. 8), but his projected visits to England, Italy and Germany were abandoned, these courts being in mourning on account of the death of the Duke of Saxe Coburg Gotha at the time when the proposed visits were to have been paid. The *Amínu's-Sulṭán* accompanied the Sháh, and, displaying considerable self-possession on the occasion of the abortive attempt on his master's life in Paris, rose still higher in favour and received the high-sounding title of *Atábak-i-A'ẓam.*

In the latter part of 1900, after the Sháh's return to Persia, some rumours of projected reforms reached the Press of this country. Thus the *Times* of December 14, 1900, contained a brief account of the Sháh's farewell address to twenty young Persians whom he was sending to Europe to study in London, Paris, Berlin, Vienna, Moscow and Constantinople, while the issue of the same journal for December 25 contained, after the text of an address of thanks presented to him at Ostend by Armenians domiciled in London, a statement that since His Majesty's return to Persia many additional privileges in the way of schools and commercial societies had been granted.

These roseate visions, unfortunately, no longer hover round the Persian news published from time to time in the English Press during the year 1901. To take the *Times* again, which is the most accessible by reason of the Index with which it is provided, we find the following items of news.

April 13, 1901. Since March 21 the pioneer steamer of the Russian line recently opened between the Black Sea and Southern Persia had been lying at Bushire, having previously visited Muscat, Bandar-i-'Abbás, Linga, and other ports of the Persian Gulf. Her agents had distributed circulars offering to carry freight free, and to guarantee consigners against loss up to 20 °/₀ of the value of their goods. The same issue announced the devastation of Southern Persia by locusts, and the discovery of a conspiracy to murder the Shaykh of Muḥammara by two of his nephews.

April 27, 1901. The *Kölnische Zeitung* was reported as publishing a telegram from St Petersburg, dated April 24, according to which the Sháh's condition had become more serious, while the rivalry between the Prime Minister, the *Amínu's-Sulṭán*, on the one hand, and the Sháh's favourite physician, the *Ḥakímu'l-Mulk*, on the other, continued. (The latter had the reputation of being an Anglophil, as the former was undoubtedly at this period a Russophil.) A heavy tax had also been imposed on the most necessary articles of food, such as meat, and this had caused great exasperation in Ṭihrán, popular feeling being especially directed against the Belgian and other foreign tax-collectors.

May 25, 1901. The Sístán-Quetta trade-route was declared open, and Captain Webbe Ware was appointed political assistant at Chagai.

August 1, 1901. In place of previously existing inland customs dues, since April 3 a uniform *ad valorem* duty of 5 °/₀ for import and export, and a road-tax of 22 *sháhís* per mule-load, irrespective of the nature of the goods, had been imposed.

Sept. 3, 1901. The *Kölnische Zeitung* of August 31 reported a wide-spread revolutionary movement, fostered by growing discontent with the Government, especially on account of the negotiations for a new loan which it had opened with Russia. A minor state of siege had been proclaimed in Tihrán. The agitation was said to proceed from persons in the immediate *entourage* of the Sháh, who was continually finding threatening letters on his writing-table, and was especially directed against

the *Amínu's-Sulṭán*, the Grand Wazír, who was accused of selling his country and failing to introduce any reforms. This rumour was officially denied by the Persian Government on Sept. 14, but on Oct. 7 the *Ṭihrán Gazette* was reported as admitting that revolutionary pamphlets and placards had been distributed, though it minimised their importance, and declared that four persons accused of their authorship had been arrested and exiled.

Oct. 9, 1901. The *Times* contained a long article on Great Britain in the Persian Gulf, declaring that England had assumed the responsibility of policing these seas, and could not allow Turkey to assert sovereign rights over Koweyt and Baḥrayn. In another part of the paper it was reported that Russia was preparing to connect the Trans-Caspian Railway with Khurásán, *viâ* Askabad (*'Ishq-ábád*) and Mashhad; that a branch of the Russian Bank was to be opened almost immediately at the latter city; and that great uneasiness was prevalent there amongst the official classes.

Oct. 10, 1901. The Vienna correspondent of the *Times* reported the substance of an article from the *Birzheviya Viedomosti* of St Petersburg, which is supposed to be the mouth-piece of M. de Witte, on the Persian Gulf question. It was aggressive in tone, and, after discussing the Anglo-Turkish conflict about Koweyt, declared boldly "that the final decision rests neither with England, nor Germany, nor Turkey (which reckons on Germany's support) but with Russia, whose merchant-navy is now in regular communication with the ports of the Persian Gulf." "It was not," continued the Russian organ, "in order to secure for the British Fleet this important strategic point on the Persian Gulf that Russia has lately devoted immense capital to the economic revival of Persia, and that Russian diplomacy has done so much to emancipate Western Persia from British servitude. Inasmuch as Russia's diplomacy has roused her neighbour Persia to a new existence and strengthened the moral and economic link between that country and Russia, *it has put an end once and for all to the idle talk about dividing Persia into a northern sphere of influence belonging to Russia and a southern sphere belonging to England. There can be no*

division of spheres of influence in Persia, which, together with the waters which bathe its shores, must remain the object of Russian material and moral protection." Then follows an extract from the *Novosti*, declaring that the establishment of the English on the Persian Gulf is prejudicial to Russia; that the interests of the two countries are completely at variance and can hardly be reconciled; and that Russia should on no account omit to take timely precautions against the designs of the English.

Oct. 28, 1901. According to a telegram from St Petersburg to the *Frankfurter Zeitung*, two brothers of the Sháh who were amongst the most violent opponents of the Prime Minister (the *Amínu's-Sulṭán*), and were leaders of the movement against the Government, had been arrested and banished to Ardabíl. The Sháh's brother-in-law, who had been condemned to death, was pardoned at the last moment when he was actually on the scaffold. A favourite of the Sháh (whose title appears in the hopelessly corrupt form of "Hawame-ed-Dauleh," perhaps intended for *Qiwámu'd-Dawla*, the Russian *g* standing in foreign words both for *g* and *h*) was also taken from the scaffold back to prison, where he is said to have been subsequently tortured to death. Amongst the persons arrested there were, it was stated, many dignitaries, ecclesiastics (*'ulamá*) and young men of education. A further communication from Bombay declared that the authors of the plot apparently relied on popular support, in consequence of the wide-spread resentment felt at the Sháh's proposal to raise a fresh loan for a pilgrimage to Mashhad and another trip to Europe.

Nov. 9, 1901. A communication from Bombay asserted that the second trip of the Russian steamer *Korniloff* to the Persian Gulf had proved a failure, and that her cargo of kerosine and sugar had been sold at a heavy loss. Notwithstanding this, however, M. Radloff, the Director of the Russian Steam Navigation Company, had assured M. Witte, about the end of October, that his Company was willing to maintain its recently installed direct service between Odessa and the Persian Gulf.

During the remainder of this year the Persian Gulf question was much in evidence in the English Press, and the opinions (mostly adverse to any understanding with Russia which should

admit her influence into Southern Persia) of such authorities as Captains Mahon and Bell, Major Sykes, Colonel [now Sir Francis] Younghusband and Mr H. F. B. Lynch were freely cited. The *National Review* for this year contained articles on *Some Consequences of an Anglo-Russian Understanding*, and on *British Foreign Policy* which dealt largely with this question. The Koweyt question, with the consequent friction between England and Turkey, and the more immediate collisions between Mubárak, the Shaykh of Koweyt, and Ibn Rashíd, the great and noble Amír of Najd, also continued more or less acute, and some of the Russian newspapers advocated (Dec. 25, 1901) the seizure by Russia of Bandar-i-'Abbás, as a counterstroke to England's pretensions at Koweyt.

We now reach the year 1902, chiefly noteworthy in the annals of Persia for the conclusion of the second of those disastrous Russian loans which now hang like a millstone round her neck. Rumours of this loan, which was for 10,000,000 roubles at 4 °/₀, and was accompanied by a concession granted to Russia to construct a new road from Julfá on the Araxes (the Perso-Russian frontier) to Ṭihrán, *viâ* Tabríz and Qazwín, reached London on March 21, 1902, though the loan was not, apparently, actually concluded until April. The proceedings of the Russian steamer *Korniloff* in the Persian Gulf continued to attract attention. In spite of her alleged failure to sell her goods in the Gulf ports in the preceding November, she started "not at all discouraged" on a fresh trip from Odessa, on Feb. 1, 1902; and in July the British Consul at Baṣra reported that she was subsidized by the Russian Government to the extent of £5000 per round voyage, on condition of her making three voyages a year.

Having got his money, however, the Sháh set off again this summer for another tour in Europe, and on this occasion succeeded in reaching England on August 17. He and his suite were lodged in Marlborough House, and on Monday, August 18, a state banquet, over which the Prince of Wales presided, was given at Buckingham Palace. He stayed only a week (August 17–24), and the *Times* naturally indulged in an appropriate leader alike on the eve of his arrival and of his departure. In

the latter (August 23) it enunciated the admirable sentiment that "the interests of England were best served by a strong, contented and independent Persia." Meanwhile the Russian *Novoe Vremya* was warning Persia against England's greed and lust of conquest, but at the same time talking of division into spheres of influence. A few days later, on Sept. 17, three days after the Sháh had left Paris for Warsaw, the same newspaper wrote that Persia should preserve her independence, and firmly maintain her freedom from every sort of foreign intervention. "One of the roads by which it is possible to reach the open ocean," it continued, "lies through Persia, but this does not imply that we wish to absorb the Sháh's dominions." It concluded by expressing a doubt as to whether England's intentions were equally disinterested.

As throwing light on the cost to the Persian taxpayer of the Sháh's journeys in Europe, a note of his expenditure from Paris, dated Sept. 17, 1902, is of interest. According to this note his hotel-bill, apart from purchases and other outside expenses, amounted to 6000 francs (£240) a day. The same communication described his suite as divided into a Franco-Russian party, headed by Naẓar Áqá, the Persian minister at Paris, and an Anglophil party, headed by Mírzá Muḥammad Khán[1].

At the end of this year (Dec. 30, 1902) a telegram from St Petersburg was published in the *Times*, according to which the Persian Government undertook to make various financial reforms under the direction of Belgian officials, thirty of whom had already arrived in Persia. The Crown Prince (*Walí-'ahd*), who was stated to be strongly influenced by his Russian tutor, was reported to intend the establishment of a Russian school in Ázarbáyján.

The first important news of the following year (*Times*, Jan. 7, 1903) consisted of a telegram from St Petersburg stating that the Sháh, fearing a revolution under the leadership of the *'Aynu'd-Dawla*, who was alleged to be under British influence, had removed him from his post of Governor of Ṭihrán, and appointed him Governor of 'Arabistán, a province lying within the British sphere of influence. Other officials in Ṭihrán

[1] Mírzá Maḥmúd Khán *Ḥakímu'l-Mulk* seems to be meant.

suspected of Anglophil sentiments had been similarly transferred to the provinces. This report was, however, categorically denied by the Persian Legation in London on Jan. 19, 1903.

Meanwhile England, as she recovered gradually from the effects of the South African War, began to exert herself more strenuously to recover her lost position in Persia. It was generally understood that the Sháh, when he visited England in August of the preceding year, was animated by the hope of receiving the Order of the Garter, which had been conferred on his father Náṣiru'd-Dín, and which he also was very eager to possess. And although, for some reason or other, it was not given to him then, it was decided a few months later to gratify his desire, and a special mission, under Viscount Downe, was despatched to Persia for this purpose and reached Ṭihrán on Feb. 1, 1903. But just as in 1887–8 the honour conferred on Prince *Ẓillu's-Sulṭán* by the English Government was at once met by the Russian counter-stroke which caused his dismissal from all his governments save the city of Iṣfahán, so in this case also the English move almost synchronized with the publication of a Russo-Persian Commercial Agreement, which heavily penalized British imports, especially Indian tea, and of which the effects were only partially mitigated by an Anglo-Persian Commercial Convention signed on Feb. 9, ratified on May 27, and finally published in July, 1903.

Meanwhile discontent with the new tariffs continued and increased, culminating in serious riots at Ṭihrán and Yazd. These were at their height in the latter town in June, and were there combined with, or led to, a furious persecution of the Bábís, of which the Rev. Napier Malcolm gives some particulars at pp. 87–89 and 186 of his book entitled *Five Years in a Persian Town* (London, 1905). In April the *Novoe Vremya* and other papers reproduced an article from the *Kavkas* stating that the new tariff had caused considerable dissatisfaction in Persia, especially amongst the *'ulamá* or ecclesiastics, and that the chief *mujtahid* of Tabríz[1], who had preached against it and incited the people to resist it, had been arrested and banished. Early

[1] So far as I can ascertain, the name of this *mujtahid* was Áqá Sayyid 'Alí of Yazd.

in May Lord Lansdowne, in one of his speeches, enunciated what the *Times* described (May 7, 1903) as the "Munroe Doctrine in the Persian Gulf"; that is to say, he declared that England could not possibly permit any other Power to have stations or railways on the Persian Gulf, and that the attempt to establish such by any Power would be regarded by England as a *casus belli*, and would be resisted by force of arms.

In August and September, 1903, there were fresh manifestations of discontent, and, incidentally, a fresh persecution of the Bábís at Yazd and Iṣfahán. The *Mujtahid* Ḥájji Mírzá Ḥasan of Tabríz announced that he had received letters from the great Shí'ite doctors of the *'Atabát* (*i.e.* Karbalá and Najaf) authorizing and enjoining a movement against the new customs dues and trade regulations, and, on the strength of these, he urged the Governor of Tabríz to remove the Belgian custom-house officials, abolish the new tariff, and close the schools recently established on European lines, and the Armenian and European shops. It subsequently appeared that these letters were not genuine, and Ḥájji Mírzá Ḥasan and his followers were expelled, while M. Priem, the Belgian Chief of Customs, who had fled from the city, was brought back, and the new tariff remained in force[1]. The persecution of the Bábís was instigated by Áqá-yi-Najafí, and was at its height on July 27 and 28, when all Bábís who fell into the hands of the mob were killed[2]. Shortly after this there were bread-riots in Shíráz, and *'Alá'u'd-Dawla* was sent to replace the governor against whom they were directed. It was further stated (*Times*, Aug. 3) that the question of recognizing the Sultan of Turkey as Caliph, or Commander of the Faithful, had been raised by some influential *mullás*, who, inspired, probably, by the Pan-Islamic teachings of Sayyid Jamálu'd-Dín, hoped to effect a reconciliation of Sunní and Shí'a Muhammadans. A letter from Berlin, dated Aug. 20, and published in the *Times* of Aug. 21, 1903, described the outlook in Persia as gloomy, the disturbances as continuing, and the Government as helpless for lack of troops and money; and concluded by

[1] *Times* of July 13, 1903.

[2] *Ibid.*, July 30, 1903. The issue of Aug. 3 stated further that 3,200 Bábís were expelled from Iṣfahán to save their lives from the mob, while 120 were killed at Yazd, of whom two were blown from the mouths of cannon.

declaring that "events were imminent in Persia which might have serious consequences for that country, these being chiefly due to unbearable economic conditions." There were also current[1] rumours of a plot on the part of the Anglophil and Russophobe party (headed, apparently, by the *Ḥakímu'l-Mulk* and others of the Tabrízís), to depose the Sháh and crown his second son, Malik Manṣúr Mírzá *Shu'a'u's-Salṭana*, in his stead; but this plot (if, indeed, it ever existed) was detected, and the Prince arrested as he was attempting to escape to Russia. This plot was ascribed by the German newspapers to English intrigues, but all these reports of Aug. 21 and the five or six succeeding days were officially denied by the Persian Legation. A Russian correspondent's letter from Ṭihrán, published in the *Viestnik* in Astrakhan at the end of August, declared that the "present tranquillity was but the lull before the storm," and that the *mujtahids* of Karbalá and Najaf had addressed to the Sháh a letter in which they reproached him for handing over his country to foreigners, reminding him that his succession was only tolerated. The Sháh's reply was unconciliatory, and the chief *mujtahid* thereupon declared that he felt himself compelled to invite the Sultan of Turkey to take the country under his protection[2].

On Sept. 15, 1903, disaffection was said to be spreading in an alarming manner, and the *Amínu's-Sulṭán* resigned his post of Prime Minister. Five Ministers were at first appointed to carry on the Government, but about a fortnight later the *'Aynu'd-Dawla*, a grandson of Fatḥ-'Alí Sháh, was appointed Minister of the Interior. About a fortnight before the resignation of the *Amínu's-Sulṭán* (*i.e.* about the beginning of September) the Sháh's favourite physician, the *Ḥakímu'l-Mulk*, who, as has been already mentioned, was reputed an Anglophil, died at Rasht, together with one of his confidential servants, under highly suspicious circumstances, and it was generally believed that his rival had caused him to be poisoned.

During the remainder of this year the references to Persia in the Press deal chiefly with the rivalry of England and Russia in their trade with Persia. In October a new steamer was sub-

[1] See *Times* of Aug. 27, 1903.

[2] *Ibid.*, Sept. 5, 1903.

sidized by the Russian Government to run regularly from Odessa to the Persian Gulf, while two new vessels were said to be in process of construction for the same service[1]. Russia also proposed to station a warship permanently in the Persian Gulf[2]. On the other hand Lord Curzon made a tour of the Persian Gulf, interviewed local magnates and loudly proclaimed the paramount rights and interests of Great Britain in that region; the Sístán Boundary Commission began its labours under Colonel McMahon; and Mr George Churchill, at that time acting Vice-Consul at Rasht, made a hopeful report, in the course of which he declared that on the whole English goods held their own well, and that the Russian trade was chiefly confined to articles of inferior quality and price[3]. Finally, on Christmas Day, 1903, it was announced that the Persian Government had appointed six more Belgian officials to various posts in the Excise, and that M. Naus had been made Director of Customs.

We now enter the year 1904, of which the chief events connected with Persia are as follows. On Jan. 24 the subsequently notorious *'Aynu'd-Dawla*, whose nomination as Minister of the Interior in Sept. 1903 has been already mentioned, was appointed *Ṣadr-i-A'ẓam* or Prime Minister, and continued in this office for three years, until August, 1906[4]. About the same time it was reported from St Petersburg that a number of leaflets, written in Persian, were being circulated in Tihrán, warning the Persians against England and her alleged design of "reducing Persia to the state of India[5]." *À propos* of this report, the *Novoe Vremya* warned Russia not to relax her efforts in Persia on account of the complications with Japan[5], which resulted a few days later in the night attack on Port Arthur and the outbreak of the Russo-Japanese War. Two days previous to the former event, it was announced that a Russian commercial mission was about to start for Persia[6]. In the first quarter of this year the Turkmáns adopted an aggressive action against the Persians[7], and the Shah issued an edict com-

[1] *Times*, Oct. 21, 1903. [2] *Ibid.*, Nov. 2, 1903. [3] *Ibid.*, Dec. 21, 1903.
[4] *Ibid.*, Jan. 25, 1904. [5] *Ibid.*, Jan. 29, 1904. [6] *Ibid.*, Feb. 10, 1904.
[7] *Ibid.*, Jan. 21, 1904.

manding the *Walí-'ahd* (Crown Prince) and the *Amír Niẓám* to return to Ṭihrán by Feb. 9.

In July, 1904, was inaugurated a paper entitled the *Revue Transcaspienne*, published in Persian at Askabad ('Ishq-ábád) and distributed in Khurásán, of which paper the chief object was to put forward the Russian version of the news from the Far East, and to counteract the alleged false reports of Russian disasters spread by the English[1]. On July 15 it was reported, on the authority of the *Dnievnik* of Warsaw, that Persia was in so disturbed a condition that no more goods would be despatched thither, and that Persian merchants had stopped exporting their goods. A few days later appeared the English Blue Book, Cd. 2146, which gave an account of English trade with Persia for the preceding five years (1899–1904). Three months later (Sept. 12, 1904) the *Étoile Belge* published a communication from M. Hennibicq, for four years legal adviser to the Persian Government, expatiating on the expansion and consolidation of Belgian influence in Persia. So far, indeed, had this gone that M. Naus was raised to the important position of Minister of Posts and Director of Customs.

On July 25 Sir Arthur Hardinge, the British Minister at Ṭihrán, issued a warning to Persian *concessionnaires* not to transfer their concessions to, or enter into partnership with, Europeans without permission from the Persian Government[2]. On Oct. 18 a British commercial mission to Southern Persia left Bombay for a six months' tour, to include the towns and districts of Sa'íd-ábád, Rafsinján, Kirmán, Bam, Narmashír, etc.[3] This mission, to which Mr P. Ryan acted as secretary, completed its work and returned to the coast about the end of April 1905[4]. At the end of 1904 the Government of India decided to issue a gazetteer of the Persian Gulf, and despatched Messrs Lorimer and Gabriel thither for that purpose. About the same time, but a little earlier, a special mission, headed by Mírzá Riẓá Khán *Arfa'u'd-Dawla* (until lately Persian Ambassador at Constantinople) was sent to St Petersburg, and was received by the Tsar on Dec. 8[5]. A few days previously, on Dec. 4, the British mails

[1] *Times*, July 11, 1904. [2] *Ibid.*, Sept. 16, 1904. [3] *Ibid.*, Oct. 18, 1904.
[4] *Ibid.*, March 7, 1905, May 1, 1905, May 15, 1905. [5] *Ibid.*, Dec. 9, 1904.

were seized at Bushire, and detained for a week, by Belgian officials[1].

On the *Nawrúz*, or Persian New Year's day (March 21, 1905), the Sháh issued a proclamation decreeing the re-organization of the army, and also announced his intention of making a pilgrimage to Mashhad. April 23, 1905, was fixed as the date of his departure; his son, the *Walí-'ahd*, or Crown Prince (Muḥammad 'Alí, the ex-Sháh), was empowered to act as Regent during his absence[2], and M. Kochanovski, the Russian Commissioner for frontier relations with Persia, was to meet him at Ástárá on his entry into Russian territory, and accompany him on his journey through Russia[3]. The Sháh's journey created a bad impression in his capital: many merchants retired to Sháh 'Abdu'l-'Azím, and the *bázárs* were closed for five days[4].

In the early spring of this year (1905) a new Belgian Director of Customs, M. Heynssen, arrived at Bushire, and began to enforce the tariff with greater severity; in consequence of which the Persian merchants refused to clear their goods, and telegraphed to the Sháh declining to forward them up country until the new regulations should be withdrawn[5]. They also telegraphed to India to stop the shipment of further goods from thence. There were also disturbances at Kirmán in August, and a threatened plague of locusts[6]. Some annoyance seems to have been caused in Russia by the publication there of exaggerated and garbled accounts both of the British mission to Sístán under Colonel McMahon (Feb. 1903—May 1905), and of Sir Arthur Hardinge's tour to Mashhad[7]. In November of this year the Turkmáns began to cross the border and harry the neighbouring Persian territory, especially Qúchán, where they killed some dozen peasants, wounded four or five more, and carried off some threescore persons as captives.

Thus far we trace a growing discontent at the Sháh's ever-increasing extravagance and love of foreign travel, at the new Belgian tariffs and the arrogance of the Belgian officials, at the

[1] *Times*, Jan. 2, 1905 and Feb. 1, 1905.
[2] *Ibid.*, April 10, 1905.
[3] *Ibid.*, April 28, 1905.
[4] *Ibid.*, May 6, 1905.
[5] *Ibid.*, May 22, 1905.
[6] *Ibid.*, Aug. 15, 1905.
[7] *Ibid.*, Sept. 29, 1905.

exploitation of the country by foreign *concessionnaires*, and at the tyranny of *'Aynu'd-Dawla*, who, widely as he differed in character from the *Amínu's-Sulṭán*, was equally unpopular. The latter, suave, genial, resourceful and unscrupulous, was on the best of terms with the new Belgian officials, received M. Naus weekly, and was currently reported to have profited to the extent of 30,000 *túmáns* a year by the new arrangements concerning the custom-houses. *'Aynu'd-Dawla*, on the other hand, was an old-fashioned Persian nobleman, arrogant, ignorant, hating foreigners and at first but little susceptible to their advances, though later he seems to have come to some understanding with the Belgians and Russians, and suffered M. Naus to combine in himself some five or six different functions of importance, so that he finally became not merely Director-General of the Customs, but Minister of Posts and Telegraphs, High Treasurer, Head of the Passport Department, and Member of the Supreme Council of State.

To these general causes of discontent certain special grievances were now added. The indignation aroused by the arbitrary and tyrannical conduct of M. Naus was increased—especially in religious circles—by the appearance of a photograph of him dressed as a *mullá*. In Fárs the rule of Prince *Shu'á'u-s-Salṭana* (who, having been driven out by an explosion of popular discontent, had been reappointed to this important government in September, 1904) weighed heavily on the people. At Mashhad *Áṣafu'd-Dawla's* rule was equally oppressive, and he had further outraged public opinion by ordering his soldiers to fire on a crowd of people who, protesting against his exactions, had taken refuge in the holy precincts of the Shrine of Imám Riẓá. At Kirmán *Ẓafaru's-Salṭana* had inflicted the bastinado on one of the principal *mujtahids* of that town, Ḥájji Mírzá Muḥammad Riẓá. At Qazwín the *Wazír-i-Akram* had treated another *mullá* in like manner; and finally some seven or eight respected merchants of Ṭihrán had been bastinadoed by the Governor, *'Alá'u'd-Dawla*, on the charge of putting up the price of sugar.

As a result of all these grievances, especially the last, a large number of merchants took sanctuary in the Masjid-i-Sháh, or Royal Mosque, where they were shortly joined by many of the

chief *mullás*, including the afterwards celebrated popular leaders Sayyid 'Abdu'lláh Bahbahání and Sayyid Muḥammad Ṭabáṭabá'í, and the orator Áqá Sayyid Jamálu'd-Dín, who was one of the chief promoters of the Revolution, and who was amongst those who perished after the *coup d'état* of June, 1908. The *Imám-Jum'a*, Mírzá Abu'l-Qásim, a wealthy reactionary related by marriage to the Sháh, had been requested by *'Aynu'd-Dawla* to take steps to disperse the refugees, and had accordingly collected a number of his followers armed with sticks and other weapons which they had concealed under their coats and cloaks, ready at a sign to take action, and when Áqá Sayyid Jamál ascended the pulpit and began to speak with vehemence against the intolerable tyranny to which they were subjected, the *Imám-Jum'a* rose up, denounced his utterances as treasonable, and called on his men to expel the refugees by force, which they proceeded to do. That night a few of them, including the *mullás*, retired from the city to the holy shrine of Sháh 'Abdu'l-'Aẓím, and there took refuge. Here after a while they were joined by many others, *mullás* and students, amongst the former by the afterwards celebrated Shaykh Faẓlu'lláh, who was at that time regarded by the people as one of the "three Proofs" or "Founders" of the Constitutional Movement, the other two being Sayyid 'Abdu'lláh and Sayyid Muḥammad Ṭabáṭabá'í, to whom in point of learning he was greatly superior. His subsequent defection from the Party of Reform and support of Muḥammad 'Alí's reactionary designs has been ascribed with probability to jealousy at their superior influence.

At this time, however, there was no talk of a Constitution or a National Assembly, but only of the dismissal of the obnoxious *'Aynu'd-Dawla*, and so it happened oddly enough that the refugees received substantial support from several prominent persons who, though perfectly indifferent to reform, and violently opposed to any form of constitutional government, were anxious to get rid of the *'Aynu'd-Dawla*. Most conspicuous amongst these were Muḥammad 'Alí Mírzá (then Crown Prince, afterwards Sháh), and the *Amínu's-Sulṭán*, who, with a third person unknown to me by name, contributed some 30,000 *túmáns*

(£6000) to the maintenance of the *bastís*, in spite of the efforts of *'Aynu'd-Dawla* to prevent them from being reinforced by sympathisers or aided with money or supplies. To this end he picketed the shops and streets and stopped the road from the city to the sanctuary with his troops, but in spite of these precautions the number of the *bastís* continued steadily to increase, and they were joined by numerous recruits, amongst whom were included not only *mullás* and theological students, but merchants and tradesfolk. In vain did the Sháh endeavour by threats and promises to induce them to return to the city, and when the Amír Bahádur Jang, accompanied by 300 horsemen, went to Sháh 'Abdu'l-'Aẓím and endeavoured to bring them back to Ṭihrán, he had to return, after a lively exchange of recriminations, without accomplishing his object. At length the scandal became so grave and the inconvenience so intolerable that the Sháh sent them a *dast-khaṭṭ*, or autograph letter, promising to dismiss *'Aynu'd-Dawla*; to convene the *'Adálat-khána*, or "House of Justice," which they now demanded, and which was to consist of representatives elected by the clergy, merchants and landed proprietors, and presided over by the Sháh himself; to abolish favouritism; and to make all Persian subjects equal in the eyes of the Law. This *dast-khaṭṭ* was photographed, and copies of it were circulated throughout the country, and the refugees then returned to the city with great pomp and circumstance and were received by the Sháh, who verbally renewed the promises which he had already made in writing. News of this, telegraphed from St Petersburg on January 22, 1906, was published in the *Times* of the following day, and the message concluded with the expression of a fear that the representatives of the people would demand the dismissal of the Belgian custom-house officials and of the chief of them, M. Naus, also Minister of Customs and Posts. To this report the Persian Legation in London published a *démenti* on Feb. 2, declaring that the nature of the proposed "House of Justice" had been entirely misunderstood, and that it was intended to be a purely judicial court, not a Legislative Assembly.

Before pursuing the further developments which ultimately led to the granting of the Constitution and the establishment of

The Mujtahid Sayyid Muḥammad-i-Ṭabáṭabá'í

The Mujtahid Sayyid 'Abdu'lláh-i-Bahbahání

TWO OF THE CHIEF ECCLESIASTICAL SUPPORTERS OF THE CONSTITUTION

the National Assembly or *Majlis*, allusion must be made to some minor events of the February and March of this year. The report of the British commercial mission of 1904–5, edited by Colonel Gleadowe-Newcomen, appeared in February[1]. At the beginning of March the Turkish Government promised to withdraw its troops from the Persian frontier, which they were already threatening[2]. On March 3 the Sháh's brother, the *Ná'ibu's-Salṭana*, was reappointed Minister of War, a post which he had formerly held for twelve years (1884–96), but of which for the last ten years he had been deprived[3]. There were also about this time currency troubles, of which the following account is given in a communication from St Petersburg dated March 20, 1906. The high price of silver had induced speculators to buy up Persian silver coins, export them in large quantities to India, and recoin them as rupees. In consequence of the shortage in silver thus produced, the Mint at Ṭihrán suspended operations, while, on the other hand, the country was flooded, according to this Russian correspondent, with the notes of which the (English) Imperial Bank of Persia had a monopoly. The Persian merchants, it was added, were already refusing to accept these notes, and it was feared that the result might be a run on the Bank and a demand for coin in exchange for paper money[4]. Early in April there was a bread-riot at Mashhad in which three persons lost their lives.

Towards the end of April the *mullás* of Ṭihrán presented to the Sháh a petition (also published, apparently, in the official Journal or Gazette) regarding the disturbances of December, 1905, praying His Majesty to give effect to his promised reforms, and to exercise the executive power in accordance with the laws[5]. This petition produced no effect, and, indeed, so far from improving, matters got steadily worse. Spies were everywhere; the streets were full of Cossacks and soldiers; and no one was allowed to go about the streets later than three hours after sunset. Sayyid 'Abdu'lláh and Sayyid Muḥammad continued to address fruitless remonstrances to *'Aynu'd-Dawla*, and,

[1] *Times*, Feb. 27, 1906.
[2] *Ibid.*, March 2, 1906.
[3] *Ibid.*, March 5, 1906.
[4] *Ibid.*, March 22, 1906.
[5] *Ibid.*, April 28, 1906.

together with Áqá Sayyid Jamál, Shaykh Muḥammad the Preacher (*Wá'iẓ*), and others, began to denounce autocracy and tyranny in the pulpit, especially during the month of Muḥarram (Feb. 25—March 26, 1906). Sayyid Jamál was particularly active, and had an enormous influence with the "*kuláh-namadís*," or felt-capped artisans and humble folk of the *bázárs*, to whom he spoke in graphic and forcible language which they could understand, and who loved him accordingly. Thus he would relate to them, as an illustration of the sort of selfishness and inhumanity which Persian absolutism involved, how one night, when the Sháh was on a hunting-expedition, a snow-storm came on, accompanied by a violent wind which threatened to blow down the royal tent, and how, to prevent this, certain soldiers were sent out into the storm to hold the tent-ropes, and were found in the morning frozen to death—"a sacrifice," as he said, "to the person of His Most Sacred Majesty."

Other influences were also at work, notably a secret society known as the *Anjuman-i-Makhfí*, and a National Library, or *Kitáb-khána-i-Millí*. The latter was essentially a free library designed to educate the people in patriotic ideas, and was founded amongst others by Ḥájji Sayyid Naṣru'lláh Akhawí, an upright man and true patriot, who is now Vice-President of the *Majlis*. This library was situated opposite to the *Arg* or citadel, and, to quote the picturesque expression employed by Taqí-záda (to whom I am indebted for this information) "everyone whose head ached went there." Amongst its other supporters were Mírzá Áqá of Iṣfahán, afterwards one of the Deputies for Tabríz; Ḥájji Mírzá Ḥasan Rushdiyya, and Majdu'l-Islám of Kirmán, afterwards editor of the *Nidá-yi-Waṭan*, or "Country's Call." These three, who were all exiled by *'Aynu'd-Dawla* to Kalát-i-Nádirí, were of more doubtful integrity. The first by his double-dealing incurred alike the suspicion of his comrades, who expelled him from the library, and of *'Aynu'd-Dawla*, with whom he had at first ingratiated himself by articles which he contributed to the Calcutta *Ḥablu'l-Matín*. Later, when brought back from Kalát-i-Nádirí, he was elected one of the Members for Tabríz, but was subsequently held up to obloquy in the columns of an illustrated Tabríz paper entitled "Reptiles

Cartoons from
No. 12 of the *Ḥasharátu'l-Arẓ* ("Reptiles of the Earth"),
of which the lower one represents
"*The political Arena in Central Asia*"

of the Earth" (*Ḥasharátu'l-Arẓ*), and was repudiated by his constituents and expelled from the *Majlis*. He afterwards came to London in the summer of 1908, and defended in the *Westminster Gazette* (August 25)[1] the destruction of the National Assembly by Muḥammad 'Alí Sháh, and he appears subsequently to have visited Karbalá and Najaf with a view to inducing the *mujtahids* to withdraw their support from the constitutional cause, in which attempt he was happily quite unsuccessful. Majdu'l-Islám was also suspected of taking bribes.

'Aynu'd-Dawla, annoyed by the preachers' denunciations, expelled Áqá Sayyid Jamál, who retired to Qum, and after a while decided to expel Shaykh Muḥammad also. He was seized by the soldiers, mounted on an ass, and hurried away, but a crowd of people collected and opposed his removal. The officer in command of the soldiers thereupon conveyed his prisoner to a guard-house near at hand, shut him up in a cell, and ordered the troops to fire on the crowd if they advanced. A student named Sayyid Ḥusayn, in spite of this warning, rushed on the door of the guard-house and tried to break it down. The officer ordered the soldiers to fire, but they refused. Thereupon the officer himself shot the Sayyid dead, and a furious conflict at once ensued. The officer fled, and Shaykh Muḥammad was rescued by the people from his captivity. This happened on the 28th of Rabí' ii, A.H. 1324 (June 21, 1906), almost exactly two years before that bloodier and more cruel day of the *coup d'état*.

The body of the dead Sayyid was carried through the streets and *bázárs* amidst the lamentations of the onlookers, and further conflicts took place between the people and the soldiers, who tried to stop the procession and again fired on the crowd, killing some fifteen persons, amongst whom was another Sayyid named 'Abdu'l-Majíd. The death of the two Sayyids was added to the long account of the misdeeds of *'Aynu'd-Dawla*, whose name was 'Abdu'l-Ḥamíd, and the following verses were composed in commemoration of this event:

[1] The article was entitled "What happened in Persia." I replied to it in the issue of Sept. 4, 1908.

از نو حسین شهید بمیل یزید شد ' عبد المجید کشتهٔ عبد الحمید شد '
بادا هزار مرتبه نزد خدا قبول ' قربانی جدید تو یا ایّها الرسول '

"Once more Ḥusayn hath died to please Yazíd;
'Abdu'l-Ḥamíd hath slain 'Abdu'l-Majíd.
May God accept anew, O Prophet mine,
A thousand-fold this sacrifice of thine!"

Finally the soldiers dispersed the people, cleared the streets, and occupied the whole town, while a large number of *mullás*, *rawẓa-khwáns*[1], students, merchants, tradesmen, artisans, and people of yet humbler rank took refuge in the Masjid-i-Jámi', a Mosque situated in the centre of the city, and there buried the body of the murdered Sayyid[2]. Being besieged there by the soldiers for three or four days they asked and obtained the Sháh's permission to leave the city and retire to Qum, whither they were accompanied and followed by such numbers of people that, as Taqí-záda expressed it, the road between Ṭihrán and Qum "was like the street of a town." This event, which took place about July 21, is known amongst the Persians as "the Great Exodus" (*Hijrat-i-Kubrá*).

Meanwhile *'Aynu'd-Dawla* ordered the *bázárs* and shops, which had been closed in protest, to be opened, threatening, if this were not done, to have them looted by his soldiers. Thereupon, about Thursday, July 19, a few representatives of the merchants and bankers waited upon Mr Grant Duff, the British Chargé d'Affaires, at Qulhak, the summer quarters of the Legation, and enquired whether, if they took refuge in the British Legation in the town, they would be expelled or allowed to remain under its protection. On receiving a reassuring reply, a few of them at once proceeded to the Legation garden and encamped there. By the following Monday, July 23, their numbers had increased to 858, and three days later to 5000. They demanded, as the conditions of their return to their homes and avocations, the dismissal of *'Aynu'd-Dawla*, the promulgation of a Code of Laws, and the recall of the ecclesiastical

[1] Professional reciters of narratives in verse and prose about the sufferings and martyrdoms of the Imáms.

[2] It was, however, exhumed, by order of Muḥammad 'Alí Sháh, after the *coup d'état* of June 23, 1908.

leaders from Qum. The Sháh, greatly vexed and perplexed, decided on July 30 so far to yield to the popular demands as to dismiss *'Aynu'd-Dawla*, appoint in his place the popular and liberal Mírzá Naṣru'lláh Khán, *Mushíru'd-Dawla*, and invite the *mullás* to return from Qum to the capital; but the people, no longer content with these concessions, and profoundly mistrustful of the Government, now demanded a regular Constitution and a representative National Assembly, with satisfactory guarantees of the Sháh's good faith. By August 1 the number of refugees at the British Legation was stated in the *Times* to amount to 13,000 souls, and, on the same authority, to have reached within the next few days the enormous total of 16,000, though this estimate appears to be excessive, 12,000 or 14,000 being probably nearer the truth. Finally on August 5 (14 Jumáda ii, which happened to be the Sháh's birthday) Muẓaffaru'd-Dín granted all the demands of the *bastís*, who thereupon quitted the Legation. The following graphic account of these occurrences was written by an eye-witness at the very time of their happening, in August, 1906.

"I do not know whether you are aware of the great events which have been taking place in Ṭihrán. The English papers practically ignore the 'Land of the Lion and the Sun,' and Persian news is generally relegated to small, out-of-the-way paragraphs. I feel sure that these events will interest you, and am therefore writing this letter to give you some description of what has happened.

"About a month ago [*i.e.* in July, 1906] it was rumoured that a number of people intended to take *bast* [sanctuary] at the British Legation in town....I went down and found some forty and odd merchants and *mullás* in the Legation garden....On the following day their numbers increased largely....I stayed there three weeks, and it was certainly a unique experience. The number of *bastís* increased by leaps and bounds, until the *bázárs* were all closed, and some 12,000 refugees were encamped in the Legation. It was a most curious sight, and I am sure would have delighted you....Imagine the Legation Garden with tents in every available place, and crammed with thousands of

all classes, merchants, *'ulamá*, members of all the guilds, etc., sitting there day after day with stubborn patience, determined not to leave the shelter of the British flag until their demands were satisfied. They policed themselves in a most remarkable manner, and, considering their numbers, gave little trouble. Their kitchens and feeding arrangements were a model of order. They extemporised a rough kitchen behind the guard-room, and every day a circle of enormous cauldrons was to be seen cooking the meals of this vast multitude. The meals were served by guilds, and each meal took three hours to serve[1].

"Perhaps the scene was most picturesque at night. Nearly every tent used to have a *rawẓa-khwán*, and it was really an admirable tableau, these tents with their circles of listeners and the *rawẓa-khwán* at one end, relating the old, old stories of Ḥasan and Ḥusayn. At the tragic parts, the audience would weep in that extraordinary Persian manner, and beat their heads in sign of grief. I used to stroll round the tents every evening to witness this curious sight. I really believe that in those three weeks I learned more Persian than during all the months I have been in Persia. Every day the leaders of the people used to pay me visits and ask for news or advice. In spite of the heat and the putrid air from the garden, I was really quite sorry when it was over.

"I will try to put before you briefly the essential points of this popular uprising. Under the late Atábak, *'Aynu'd-Dawla*, the country has been going to rack and ruin. The Persians can stand a great deal of misgovernment, but even they could no longer support the tyranny and mismanagement of this Minister. Moreover the Russian Revolution has had a most astounding effect here. Events in Russia have been watched with great attention, and a new spirit would seem to have come over the people. They are tired of their rulers, and, taking example of Russia, have come to think that it is possible to have another and better form of government. The discontent culminated in December (1905), when the whole body of the *'ulamá* left the town and took *bast* at Sháh 'Abdu'l-'Aẓím, as a protest against

[1] The expenses of the commissariat were defrayed by a fund of some 30,000 *túmáns* (£6000) raised by subscription by the merchants and *mullás*.

the Government. After a six weeks' stay they were induced to return on being promised a *Majlis* [*i.e.* a *Majlis-i-'Adálat*] and Courts of Justice. Needless to say, the Atábak had no intention of carrying out his promises. Contrary to expectation, Muḥarram [Feb. 25—March 26, 1906] passed quietly, and there was comparative calm until the middle of June, when the people, seeing that none of the Sháh's promises were being carried out, became restless, and finally, at the beginning of July, serious riots took place. The *bázárs* were closed, and some 5000 of the people took refuge in the Masjid-i-Jum'a. The Atábak surrounded the Mosque with troops, thus cutting off their supplies and forcing them to come out. A fight took place outside the Mosque, and two Sayyids, Qur'án in hand, were killed. The soldiers, however, chiefly owing to the high pay given them during the riots, proved unexpectedly loyal, and the resistance collapsed. The ringleaders and several important *mujtahids* were expelled from the town, and all seemed quiet again. But it was only the lull before the storm. Finding that they were unable to oppose armed resistance to the Government, the people decided to take *bast* in the British Legation, and this proved a very successful method of attaining their ends. The Sháh sent several envoys down to the Legation with *dast-khaṭṭs* [autograph letters], but the people refused to receive them. Finally, the Sháh was compelled to dismiss the Atábak, and the *Mushíru'd-Dawla* became *Ṣadr-i-A'ẓam.* He, at any rate, is not an obstinate old fool like his predecessor, and, seeing how dangerous the situation had become, induced the Sháh to make large concessions. After endless discussion, the people at last accepted a Royal *dast-khaṭṭ*, granting them a Parliament to be composed of all classes, Princes, Qájárs, Nobles, landed proprietors, merchants, tradesmen, etc. Blood-money was promised to the relatives of the murdered Sayyids; the exiled *mullás* have been asked to return, and will be brought back in triumph, and the Courts of Justice are to be established.

"The question every one is now asking is, 'Are we witnessing the Dawn of Liberty in Persia, or the beginning of a sorry farce?' I think it unlikely that the people will have any real power in this Parliament. The Government will be sure to pack

it so that it may but endorse the views of the Court. But I believe that in the end the people will win. They are, of course, absolutely ignorant of the principles of government, with the exception, perhaps, of a few of their chiefs[1]. When I was in the Ṭihrán Legation, they used to come and asked me how our constitution was worked, and would show a *naïveté* which was almost pathetic. They see clearly the object in view, but they are very hazy as to the means of attaining it. Undoubtedly it will be many years before this Parliament can become really effective. But many of the chiefs, amongst whom is a celebrated Bábí, have really a very clear conception of what is needed. If only they will remain united, and not let the Government sow dissensions amongst them, they should carry the day. *Qui vivra verra!*

"It seems to me that a change must be coming over the East. The victory of Japan has, it would appear, had a remarkable influence all over the East. Even here in Persia it has not been without effect....From the little study I have devoted to the question, it almost seems to me that the East is stirring in its sleep. In China there is a marked movement against the foreigners, and a tendency towards the ideal of 'China for the Chinese.' In Persia, owing to its proximity to Russia, the awakening would appear to take the form of a movement towards democratic reform. In Egypt and North Africa it is signalized by a remarkable increase of fanaticism, coupled with the spread of the Pan-Islamic movement. The simultaneousness of these symptoms of unrest is too remarkable to be attributed solely to coincidence. Who knows? Perhaps the East is really awakening from its secular slumber, and we

[1] Taqí-záda told me that a Commission was formed amongst the *bastís* in the Legation, which was advised by certain more or less Europeanized Persians of the educated official class, and was also in communication with the ecclesiastical leaders at Qum, who, in turn, were in touch with the Provinces. When the Sháh promised to dismiss *'Aynu'd-Dawla* (who, on his dismissal, retired to Pusht-i-Kúh), some of the more simple-minded *bastís* wished to leave the shelter of the Legation, but this Commission induced them to remain, pointing out that only a fundamental reform of the methods of government would guarantee them against the tyranny and maladministration of other ministers as bad as the *'Aynu'd-Dawla*. Thus the demand for a "House of Justice" (*'Adálat-khána*) developed into the demand for a Parliament or National Assembly (*Majlis-i-Millí*).

are about to witness the rising of these patient millions against the exploitation of an unscrupulous West.

"One remarkable feature of this revolution here—for it is surely worthy to be called a revolution—is that the priesthood have found themselves on the side of progress and freedom. This, I should think, is almost unexampled in the world's history. If the reforms which the people, with their help, have fought for become a reality, nearly all their power will be gone. The causes of this remarkable phenomenon are not without their explanation, and are very interesting, but the subject is a lengthy one, and I feel that I have already transgressed all reasonable limits as regards prolixity...."

The return of the ecclesiastical leaders from Qum to the capital, escorted by *'Aẓudu'l-Mulk* and Ḥájji Niẓámu'd-Dawla, which took place a day or two after the Sháh had yielded and the *bastís* had left the British Legation, *i.e.* about August 15 or 16, was made the occasion for great rejoicings over the "National Victory" (*Fatḥ-i-Milli*), in which, according to a St Petersburg telegram dated Aug. 17 (published in the *Times* of Aug. 18), the Russian colony bore a conspicuous part. Some doubt is cast on their sincerity, however, by an article which appeared in the St Petersburg *Birzheviya Viedomosti* of Sept. 13, 1906, which said that "it was becoming obvious that Persia would succeed in obtaining reforms and even a Constitution, *thanks to the benevolent co-operation of England*, and that this would be *another heavy blow to Russian prestige in Asia*[1]." On August 19 took place the solemn official opening of the new House of Parliament, in presence of the high ecclesiastical authorities, who were entertained as the Sháh's guests for three days. The proclamation announcing the establishment of the "National Consultative Assembly" (*Majlis-i-Shúrá-yi-milli*) was issued four or five days earlier, and a translation of it was published in the *Times* for Sept. 1, 1906.

Fresh friction seems to have arisen about Sept. 8, when the *mullás* refused to accept the ordinances drafted by the Prime Minister, and the Sháh declined to allow the modifications they

[1] *Times*, Sept. 14, 1906.

demanded. Thereupon a crowded meeting was held, the *bázárs* were again closed, and the British Legation was again invaded by *bastís*. The popular demand was (1) that Persia should be divided into eleven [or thirteen] electoral areas; (2) that the *Majlis* should consist of 200 members; and (3) that any male person between the ages of 30 and 70, being neither a Government servant nor a convict, and able to read and write, should be eligible for membership. These demands the Sháh was ultimately obliged to accept; the *'Aynu'd-Dawla* was sent away from the capital, and business was resumed. Muḥammad 'Alí-Khán, *'Alá'u's-Salṭana*, formerly Persian Minister in London, was appointed Minister for Foreign Affairs, and the *Muḥtashamu's-Salṭana* was nominated to succeed him in his former post. On Sept. 17 the Sháh had accepted the proposed ordinance as to the constitution of the *Majlis*, which was to consist of 156 members, 60 representing Ṭihrán and 96 the provinces, elections were to take place every two years, and deputies were to be inviolable. The voting in Ṭihrán was to be direct, but in the provinces by means of colleges of electors. The Sháh was enthusiastically welcomed by the people on his return from the country to the capital, the Parliament was announced to meet in a month, and by the beginning of October the elections had begun, four deputies representing the Royal House had been chosen, the *mullás* of Tabríz and Rasht were pacified, and the *bastís* had again left the British Legation. Arbáb Jamshíd was elected a few days later to represent the Zoroastrians: *Ṣaní'u'd-Dawla* was chosen President, and the *Majlis*, or National Assembly, was opened on Oct. 7 without waiting for the arrival of the provincial deputies, the Sháh's Speech from the throne being read out by the *Niẓámu'l-Mulk*.

The joy inspired by the realization of the popular hopes was, however, dimmed by several ominous clouds on the political horizon. The financial condition of Persia was critical in the extreme, and there was talk of a fresh external loan of £400,000 from England and Russia. This project was announced, on the authority of Reuter's agency, in the *Times* of Oct. 20, 1906, while on the following day there appeared in the same newspaper an article foreshadowing an agreement between England

Members of the First *Majlis*

(Oct. 7, 1906—June 23, 1908)

and Russia on certain matters of dispute in Asia, amongst which Persia figured prominently. On Nov. 12 it was announced in the same journal "that the contract for the Anglo-Russian loan, which was ready last week, will be signed shortly, but the opposition of the priesthood and popular party causes delay." The proposal was submitted to the *Majlis* on Nov. 23 by the *Náṣiru'l-Mulk*, but objection was raised to it on the ground that it would endanger Persia's independence, and it was opposed by some sixty deputies, who advocated instead an internal loan, an alternative plan which was unanimously approved a week later. This important decision at once made it clear that the new Parliament had no intention of being a mere tool in the hands of the Sháh and the Court Party, and that it was thoroughly alive to the danger of foreign intervention, and the absolute necessity of checking the foreign influences which had grown with such appalling rapidity during the last 17 or 18 years.

The conduct of Turkey also began to give grave cause for anxiety, not only on the N.W. frontier, but at Karbalá, which town, though situated in Turkish territory, is almost entirely populated by Persians, drawn thither by the sanctity of the place. This latter trouble began about the end of October, when, in consequence of an attempt on the part of the Turkish authorities to collect a disputed tax, some two thousand Persians attempted to take refuge in the British Consulate. They were refused admittance, and the doors were barred against them, whereupon they endeavoured to break open the doors with iron bars, and a conflict occurred between them and the Turkish soldiery, in which, apparently, some score of the soldiers and twice the number of Persians were killed and wounded. As regards the frontier dispute, which was going on at least as early as the beginning of 1906 and was still acute in July, 1908, the Turks were clearly the aggressors, claiming and occupying points on the Persian side of the mountains between Salmás and Margawar, west of Urmiya, to which they had no shadow of right. Added to all this was the Sháh's illness, which continually grew more serious, and the dissensions which began to appear between the clerical and non-clerical elements of the popular party, the latter publicly

accusing the former of pursuing their own interests and seeking their own aggrandisement. The elections in the provinces also continued to be subjected to various delays which aroused suspicions as to the *bona fides* of the Sháh, who, moreover, still postponed the actual signing of the Constitution[1].

On November 29, 1906, the correspondent whom I have already quoted wrote as follows on the general situation:—

"The Reform Party seem to be marking time here. The National Assembly was opened with a brilliant ceremony at the Royal Palace, to which all the Corps Diplomatique was invited. Only the Ṭihrán deputies have been elected, but the Assembly has begun its deliberations without awaiting the arrival of its provincial colleagues. Although the reactionaries would seem to be recovering some of the ground they have lost, I think the popular party is too well organised to be entirely suppressed. The movement is being skilfully engineered all over the provinces. You no doubt saw in the papers that the Tabríz and Rasht Consulates were invaded in a manner similar to that in which the Legation was. They have extracted a promise from the *Walí-'ahd* [*i.e.* the ex-Sháh Muḥammad 'Alí, then Crown Prince] that he endorses the concessions made by his father, and, although the oaths of Princes are seldom worth much, he may find some difficulty in ignoring this one."

My next letter, in Persian, is from a Persian friend, who had recently returned to his country after a long absence in India and England. It was written on Dec. 29, 1906, and the translation of it is as follows:—

"My respected, accomplished and dear friend: may I be thy sacrifice! On the eighth of this month I safely reached Ṭihrán. Praise be to God, I and my relatives are in the best of health, and I am very glad to have the good fortune of spending a few days with my family, that is, my mother, sister and brother, after these long years of separation. The condition of Ṭihrán is, for the moment, very good. A strange eagerness and enthusiasm is observable in the people. The National Assembly is at present sitting, and yesterday, after

[1] See *Times* of Dec. 10, 1906.

much discussion, which lasted until midnight, they agreed, and it has been settled, that to-morrow the Charter of the Nation's Rights [*Nizám-náma-i-Ḥuqúq-i-Millat*] shall be ratified by the Sháh and the Crown Prince. So far as is known, this Charter is rigidly drafted, and closely resembles that of England. The Cabinet are responsible to the Parliament: the Assembly of Notables [or Senate] will consist of 35 representatives of the People and 25 representatives of the Government; and the Members of the National Parliament will amount to two hundred, who will have the right of criticising the financial arrangements of the Government. The poor Sháh lies on his death-bed, and his death is momentarily expected. If the popular party do not become violent, and if they act wisely, the Assembly's position will be a very strong one. There is a Republican party [*dasta-í jumhúrí-talab*] who have assumed the title of *Fidá'iyyín* ('self-devoted'). These meet by night and swear on the Qur'án that so long as they live they will struggle against Absolutism. A certain builder came to the house of a Minister to repair an iron fire-place. On entering, he saluted the Minister. The Minister's servant bade him do obeisance. He replied, 'Knave, do you not know that we now have a Constitution, and that under a Constitution obeisances no longer exist?' A strange independence and freedom are observable in the people, and it is impossible to say how this change in their character has been so suddenly effected. The *mullás* and the more Europeanized classes are on the best and most cordial terms."

One of the most remarkable features of the Constitutional Movement was the rapid development of journalism, which was, however, most marked in 1907, when the total number of newspapers appearing in Persia was said to be about 90. Some of these papers—notably the *Súr-i-Isráfíl*, or "Trumpet-call of Isráfíl" (the Angel of the Resurrection), the *Hablu'l-Matín*, or "Firm Cable," and the *Musáwát*, or "Equality," were of a very high order, and afford examples of a prose style, forcible, nervous, and concise, hitherto almost unknown. The first, and, in some ways, the most important of these papers, was the

Majlis, or "Assembly," which gave full reports of the debates in the National Assembly, and of which No. 1 appeared on Nov. 25, 1906. It was followed about a month later (on Dec. 27, 1906) by the *Nidá-yi-Waṭan*, or "Country's Call." The *Ḥablu'l-Matín*, published at Calcutta since about 1892, did not inaugurate its Persian edition until April 29, 1907, and the weekly *Ṣúr-i-Isráfíl* first appeared on May 30, 1907. The *Tamaddun*, or "Civilization," also a weekly, preceded it by three months, No. 1 appearing on Feb. 1, 1907. Some 25 of these newspapers are known to me by name or by isolated numbers, while some six or seven I used to receive regularly and read with attention: and I desire to put on record a protest against the malicious and unjustifiable assertion made in a leader on "the situation in Persia" in the *Times* of July 2, 1908, that "the free Press of Persia...proved to be as mischievous and as dangerous as it has proved to be in other Oriental lands." At its best the free Persian Press reached a very high level, and at its worst it was superior to certain English, French and American papers; but the marked hostility of the *Times* to the spread of liberal ideas in the East easily explains such utterances to those who have followed its comments on Asiatic and North African affairs.

Let us return, however, to the history of the *Majlis*. The popular leaders did not allow the grass to grow under their feet, but immediately set to work to draft the Electoral Law (*Nizám-náma-i-Intikhábát*), which is the second of the four documents translated in the Appendix. For this purpose a Committee was appointed, which completed its labours in 36 days, and the result of these labours, concluded on Sept. 8, 1906, was duly ratified by the Sháh on the following day. Two of the most prominent members of this Committee were the son of the old *Mushíru'd-Dawla*, then entitled *Mushíru'l-Mulk*, but afterwards known by his father's title, and the *Mukhbiru's-Salṭana*, a grandson of that eminent man of letters, the late Riẓá-qulí Khán, poetically called *Hidáyat*, and commonly known as *Lálá-báshí*. The latter belonged to a large and influential family (comprising some forty living members), all of whom were well educated, and several of whom had studied in Europe.

The following genealogical tree shews the more important members of the family.



This family played a great *rôle* in the constitutional movement, especially the three brothers *Ṣaní'u'd-Dawla*, *Mukhbiru's-Salṭana* and *Mukhbiru'l-Mulk*, who lived together in a large house and had always refused to take office during the days of tyranny. Now, however, they were prominent in the new movement, and, as stated above, helped to draft the first Electoral Law, of which, so soon as it was ratified, some 50,000 copies were printed and distributed throughout the country.

Certain features of the Electoral Law, such as the very large proportion of representatives (60 out of 156) accorded to the capital, were certainly not intended to be permanent, but it was felt, with justice, that no time must be lost in getting the National Assembly to work, lest the Sháh should change his mind and revoke his rescript. This consideration also explains Article 19 of the Electoral Law, whereby it was enacted that the Assembly should begin its work as soon as the elections were concluded in the metropolis, without waiting for the arrival of the provincial deputies. This provision was a very necessary one, for little news had yet reached the provinces of what was happening in the capital, and in several cases where attempts were made to hold provincial elections the local governor interfered, even violently, to stop it. As it was, the Assembly actually met and began its deliberations on October 7, 1906. One of its earliest important actions was to refuse to sanction a new loan of £400,000, to be provided in equal moieties by Russia and England on terms not made public, which was on the point of being concluded by the Sháh and his advisers. Thus, even from the first, it shewed that it would

not become the docile instrument of the Court, but was capable of acting with independence and patriotism.

Meanwhile Tabríz, where the constitutional movement was strong, was in an uproar, owing to the tyranny of the *Walí-'ahd* or Crown-Prince, Muḥammad 'Alí (the ex-Sháh), who allowed nothing to transpire as to the progress of events at the capital, and who, with the aid of his Russian tutor, the notorious Shapshál Khán, and his reactionary aide-de-camp, 'Alí Beg, had organized a system of espionage comparable to that which prevailed in Turkey under the old *régime*. Finally, on Rajab 29 (Sept. 18, 1906), the disturbance culminated in a number of the citizens taking refuge in the precincts of the British Consulate, while the shops were closed, the tyranny of the *Walí-'ahd* was denounced, and energetic demands were made for freedom and constitutional government. On Sha'bán 8 (= Sept. 27, 1906) a telegram arrived at the Consulate from Mr Grant Duff, the British Chargé d'Affaires, announcing that the Sháh had granted a Constitution, whereupon the refugees left the Consulate and formed an association known as the *Anjuman-i-Nuẓẓár*, or "Council of Overseers," to superintend the elections, which began forthwith and lasted until Ramaẓán 15 (= Nov. 2, 1906). Amongst the Deputies elected was the young Sayyid Ḥasan, the son of Taqí, commonly known as Taqí-záda, who, despairing of Tabríz, had already started for Ṭihrán on Sept. 3, and who was destined to play a very leading as well as a very noble part in subsequent events.

During the latter part of October and the beginning of November, 1906, two other disturbances occurred in Tabríz, the first directed against a very mischievous and scheming Sayyid named Mír Háshim[1], who was finally expelled from the city, together with the *Imám-Jum'a*, a reactionary and tyrannical ecclesiastic. The second disturbance, which took place about November 5, was caused by the *Walí-'ahd's* attempt to dissolve the *Anjuman-i-Nuẓẓár* as soon as the elections were over; an attempt which was strenuously and successfully resisted by the popular party. Disturbances also occurred early in

[1] After the capture of Ṭihrán by the Nationalists he was arrested and hanged on August 9, 1909.

Sayyid Ḥasan ibn Taqí (Taqí-záda)
One of the Deputies for Tabríz

October at Rasht, Shíráz, Iṣfahán and Zanján, where the British Consulates, or, in the case of the town last-named, the telegraph office, served as places of refuge for the oppressed. The popularity of Great Britain amongst the Persian people was, indeed, now at its zenith, and to her representatives they instinctively turned for help, protection and counsel.

The provincial deputies, as already stated, came in slowly, the first to take his seat being the *Wakílu'r-Ri'áyá* from Hamadán, and the second Sayyid Taqí-záda, who was elected shortly after his arrival in Ṭihrán, his *I'tibár-náma*, or Certificate of Election, being sent after him to the capital. The Assembly sat for the first three weeks of its existence in the building named *'Imárat-i-Khurshíd*, but afterwards moved to the *Bahár-istán*, which, together with the adjacent Mosque, was originally built by Mirzá Muḥammad Ḥusayn Khán *Mushíru'd-Dawla* in A.H. 1287 (A.D. 1870), but was appropriated by Náṣiru'd-Dín Sháh on the death of that statesman. The return of political exiles, such as *Sa'du'd-Dawla* from Yazd, and Mírzá Áqá of Iṣfahán, Ḥájji Mírzá Ḥasan-i-Rushdiyya and *Majdu'l-Islám* from Kalát-i-Nádirí, was demanded and conceded, and *Sa'du'd-Dawla*, who had been elected in his absence, entered Ṭihrán in triumph and took his seat shortly afterwards. Hitherto the Assembly had acted with calmness, but he inaugurated extremist views and utterances, and created an organized Opposition.

The matters which chiefly occupied the attention of the Assembly at this period were the question of the Fundamental Law (*Qánún-i-Asásí*) and the question of creating a National Bank. The Fundamental Law was ready for the Sháh's approval before the end of October, but he desired sundry trivial alterations in it, and owing to the delays to which this gave rise it was not finally ratified until December 30, 1906, only five days before his death. It was also signed by the Crown Prince, Muḥammad 'Alí Mírzá (the ex-Sháh), who had arrived in the capital from Tabríz two or three weeks previously. It is the third of the four documents of which translations are given in the Appendix.

The question of the National Bank progressed less favourably, though gallant efforts were made to raise the required

capital by subscription. A hundred persons subscribed 5000 *túmáns* (about £1000) each, while some gave yet larger sums, up to 30,000 *túmáns*. The poor also contributed: students sold their books and women their ornaments to support the Bank: a million *túmáns* were subscribed in Tihrán alone, while Tabríz promised another million from itself and the province of Ázarbáyján. But the Sháh made his agreement conditional on an immediate loan of two million *túmáns*, while other difficulties were thrown in the way by the existing English and Russian Banks, which, as far as possible, strove to render money scarce and difficult to obtain, believing, it is asserted, that if a National Bank with a capital of six million *túmáns* should be created in Persia they would sooner or later find their business gone and be compelled to retire in its favour.

To return, however, to the *Majlis*, which had been sitting since October 7. On December 10 it demanded from Muẓaffaru'd-Dín Sháh an immediate answer as to whether the Constitution was to be signed or not. On December 17 Muḥammad 'Alí Mírzá, the *Walí-'ahd* or Crown-Prince (the ex-Sháh), arrived from Tabríz at the capital, and on the morning of December 30 he signed the Constitution, and also a separate document promising not to dissolve the existing Parliament for at least two years. How he kept that promise, and many similar ones, is known to all, and will be discussed in succeeding chapters.

Muḥammad ʻAlí Sháh Qájár

Born 1872: crowned January 19, 1907: deposed July 16, 1909

CHAPTER V.

MUḤAMMAD 'ALÍ SHÁH AND THE CONSTITUTION, FROM HIS ACCESSION UNTIL THE ABORTIVE COUP D'ÉTAT OF DEC., 1907.

ON New Year's Day, 1907, the Constitution, signed at last by the dying Sháh, under the strong suasion of the clergy (who bade him remember that he was about to meet his God, and should strive to take with him into that awful Presence some deed of great merit which might counterbalance his sins of omission and commission), was taken to the National Assembly by the Prime Minister *Mushíru'd-Dawla*. Not only the *Bahárístán*, which almost from the first inception of the Assembly had served as the House of Parliament, but all its approaches and the gardens surrounding it were thronged with an enthusiastic concourse of spectators, many of whom wept with joy as they exchanged embraces. Commemorative poems by the *Shaykhu'r-Ra'ís* and others were recited, the city was illuminated for two successive nights, and joy and gratitude reigned supreme[1].

A week later, on Jan. 8, 1907, Muẓaffaru'd-Dín Sháh was gathered to his fathers, and was succeeded by his son Muḥammad 'Alí Mírzá, who was duly crowned on Jan. 19, and whose second son, Sulṭán Aḥmad Mírzá, was proclaimed *Walí-'ahd* (Crown-Prince) on Jan. 25. That the new Sháh should dislike the Constitution and regard the *Majlis* with suspicion and aversion was perhaps natural enough, for he had looked forward to exercising the same autocratic and irresponsible powers as his predecessors had been wont to enjoy, and it could hardly be expected that he would welcome the limitations of his authority laid down

[1] See No. 2 of the *Nidá-yi-Waṭan* ("The Country's Call"), dated Thursday, 18 Dhu'l-Qa'da, A.H. 1324 (= Jan. 3, 1907).

by the Constitution, which limitations, it was clear from the beginning, the National Assembly intended to enforce. He manifested this dislike by not inviting the Deputies to be present at his Coronation (of which brilliant ceremony a description is given in No. 5 of the *Nidá-yi-Waṭan*). This omission, the first of a series of slights put upon the *Majlis* by the Sháh, was greatly resented by the Deputies, and their anger was increased by the refusal of the responsible Ministers to appear in the House and answer questions. For it was provided by the Constitution that, though the Ministers were to be nominated by the Sháh, they were to be responsible to the Assembly, and that without its consent no tax should be imposed, no expenditure incurred, and no foreign loan or concession allowed. Now at this juncture not only did the responsible Ministers absent themselves from the Assembly, but the raising of a fresh loan of £400,000 in equal moieties from Russia and England, on certain conditions not made public, was still in contemplation[1]. The project for this loan had been drafted in Russia and the draft had been approved by England, while the Sháh's one object was to obtain money, regardless of Persia's future well-being. But at the last moment the Assembly, which nobody seems to have taken into account, came to the rescue and absolutely refused to sanction this transaction, which the *mullás*, with a wise and far-sighted patriotism, denounced as the final sale of Persia's independence. So convinced was the Prime Minister that the people were in earnest that he refused to go forward with the matter, understanding that if he did so his life would not be safe. And although he still refrained from appearing in the Assembly in person, he caused the other Ministers, including the *Náṣiru'l-Mulk*, to be present at its deliberations.

Thus it became apparent from the very first that the *Majlis* had no intention of becoming a cypher. As Áqá Mírzá Maḥmúd, one of the Deputies, said in the debate of January 19 (the day of the Coronation) in the course of the discussion which arose on the absence of any notification to the Assembly as to

[1] In Hazell's *Annual* for 1907 this Anglo-Russian loan is spoken of as a *fait accompli*.

the important ceremony which was then taking place, "Now that the *Majlis* is at the beginning of its career, let it demand its rights if it can[1], otherwise it will hereafter be unable to do anything." "We should have been content," added Áqá Sayyid Ḥusayn, "to be represented by our President alone: the point is that the Assembly was disregarded."

Although it was politely assumed at this period that the Sháh was the friend and supporter of the Assembly, his Ministers and governors were freely criticised. In several cases the progress of provincial elections had been hampered or even arrested by the local governor, as in Khurásán by the *Áṣafu'd-Dawla*, and at Tunkábun, where Amír As'ad had actually inflicted the bastinado on Shaykh Muḥammad for endeavouring to carry out the election. The punishment of these autocratic tyrants ("*istibdádís*") was demanded by several Deputies, and Ḥájji Sayyid Naṣru'lláh remarked that "these matters clearly shewed that the Government did not co-operate with the Nation, and that the same autocratic and wilful conduct which had formerly existed in the ruling class still characterized their actions," and he then proceeded to criticize the irregular attendance and unsatisfactory replies of the Ministers of Finance and Education. "These Ministers," observed another Deputy, Sayyid Háshim, "do not at all like the Assembly. They are the same men who wrought all this mischief in the kingdom, who slew some of its people, drove some into exile, suffered many to be shot at Karbalá[2], and wasted men's honour and property." "Why do ye sit here?" he concluded: "What sort of Assembly is this? What work is this? We must put a stop to the depredations of these traitors and give effect to the laws." "The Sháh is surrounded by persons," resumed Ḥájji Sayyid Naṣru'lláh, "who are opposed to the success of the Assembly, and who do not want a law; else, if they desired reform, it would be well that they should entrust the artillery, for example, to some more capable person, and so with other departments. And though these things are not the business of the Assembly, I must observe that affairs cannot be permitted to revert to their

[1] See No. 30 of the *Majlis*, p. 1.
[2] This alludes to the event described on p. 125, *supra*.

previous condition, when such offices were merely nominal: henceforth they must be assigned in accordance with merit and capacity." And these utterances, culled from the debate of Jan. 19, 1907, fairly represent the general tone and feeling of the Assembly.

The Assembly, whatever its defects may have been, saw quite clearly where reform was most needed. Warned by the experience of other Muslim countries, such as Egypt and Tunis, which have suffered from European intervention, they clearly perceived the danger of being indebted for even so comparatively small a sum as three or four millions of pounds to one, and still more to two, of the great European Powers; and they saw that the extravagance of the Sháh and his Court was the primary source of this danger. They were also thoroughly alive to the evils inherent in the abominable system of farming the revenues, whereby of ten *túmáns* extorted by every species of tyranny from the peasantry hardly one ultimately reached the State Treasury. Hence their efforts were at an early stage directed:

(1) To preventing any fresh loans from Russia or England;

(2) To fixing the Sháh's Civil List, and vigorously limiting him to that amount;

(3) To the establishment of a National Bank;

(4) To the abolition of *madákhil*, or irregular and illegal profits, especially in the collection of the revenues;

(5) To getting rid of the Belgians and other foreigners who, originally introduced to organize the Customs, had latterly increased in power to a most dangerous extent, and whose object was rather to encourage than to check the extravagance of the Court. Amongst these Belgians M. Naus and his co-adjutor M. Priem were specially obnoxious.

The National Bank Concession was granted on Feb. 1, 1907, and the Loan and Current Accounts Agreement with the Government passed the House on March 16. On Feb. 10 the Sháh was compelled to dismiss M. Naus, who, however, was detained in Ṭihrán until May 30, in order that he might be compelled to render an account of his stewardship. His un-

popularity was increased by the knowledge that, in order to increase his own profits, he had advocated the obnoxious Anglo-Russian loan, and he was the object of a hostile demonstration on May 2. The leader of the agitation against him was the *Sa'du'd-Dawla*, formerly Persian Minister at Brussels, a personal enemy of *Ṣanī'u'd-Dawla*, then President of the Assembly, and professedly a staunch patriot and reformer. Of the five objects mentioned above, therefore, the Assembly was completely successful in the first and in the most vital part of the last. The establishment of the National Bank presented greater difficulties, for though poor men, women and children, moved by the eloquence of Áqá Sayyid Jamál and other preachers, came forward to offer their small savings to the Nation's need, the wealthy and great hung back. The sympathies of the rich Parsees, or Zoroastrians, of Bombay, who might have been both willing and able to afford efficient help, were unfortunately alienated by the cruel and unprovoked murder, on Feb. 13, at Yazd, of one of their co-religionists named Arbáb Parwíz, which, though deplored by the Press and the vast majority of the Persian people, including the *'ulamá* of Islám[1], nevertheless created a bad impression amongst the Zoroastrian community.

At this point I may with advantage quote the correspondent already cited, who, writing about the beginning of March, 1907, says:—

"The National Assembly is growing in strength and boldness. Their greatest triumph was, of course, the dismissal of M. Naus, which the Government accorded very unwillingly. They presented several demands of far-reaching consequences, amongst which this and the responsibility of Ministers [were the most important]. The Government refused, temporised, threatened, but in vain. The Sháh with his unarmed, unpaid, ragged, starving soldiers, what can he do in face of the menace of a general strike and riots? The Government had to climb down and grant all that was asked of them. It would be difficult to

[1] See No. 12 of the *Nidá-yi-Waṭan*, pp. 2–3. The promoter of this murder was believed to be *Ṣanī'-i-Ḥaẕrat*, who was protected by Muḥammad 'Alí Sháh, but who was executed for this and other crimes after the deposition of that monarch on July 29, 1909.

exaggerate the importance of this victory, especially in the case of M. Naus's dismissal. It will soon become known all over the country, even among the many tribes of Persia, that the real power in the land is no longer the Sháh, but the *Majlis*. The danger of this impression working on the simple, ignorant minds of the tribesmen is obvious. It is to be hoped that the *Majlis* will take prompt measures to provide the means to suppress any outbreaks amongst the turbulent tribesmen, who may be encouraged by the eclipse of the Royal Authority to give the reins to their freebooting instincts. So far the *Majlis* has been almost entirely destructive, and it has destroyed well! It has reduced the power of the Throne to a shadow of its former splendour; it has prevented Princes of the Blood from aspiring to Ministries; it has dismissed M. Naus, a work which three years' agitation had been powerless to accomplish; it has firmly established the principle of the responsibility of Ministers; it has rendered the purchase and sale of high posts a matter of extreme difficulty. There now remains for it to start on the mighty work of constructing on the ruins of the old system a new and invigorated Persia. Is it capable of this task? I am optimistic, though I must own that nearly all European opinion here is pessimistic. Of one thing I feel certain, namely, that this Dynasty can never destroy the *Majlis*. The members of that Assembly, slightly changing Mirabeau's famous words, might well say: 'We are here by the will of the People, and naught but the force of *foreign* bayonets will turn us out.' The epithet is a necessary addition, for it is difficult to see where any Sháh could find the native bayonets in sufficient force to crush this movement, which is a strong, deep, genuine and widespread impulse of a whole people, making one last, desperate struggle to shew to an astonished world '*ce que c'est qu'une nation qui ne veut pas périr.*'"

Writing again on April 22, 1907, the same correspondent says:—

"There would seem to be a pause in the struggle between King and People here, in which both parties are marking time. Unfortunately the Sháh's distrust of the National Assembly

is increasing, and the possibility of a durable understanding between two almost irreconcilable principles, Despotism and Democracy, is, I fear, remote. A great deal depends on the *Amínu's-Sulṭán*, who is expected every day. He has travelled much, and 'seen many men and cities' since his fall five years ago. Has he learned wisdom? Will he accept the inevitable and work whole-heartedly for a Constitutional State? That is the question. At any rate he is the last arrow in the Royal Quiver. If he fails, we may chant the *de Profundis* over the Qájár Dynasty!"

On March 17 the *Mushíru'd-Dawla* resigned the office of Premier, on grounds of health, as stated in the Persian Press (*e.g. Nidá-yi-Waṭan*, No. 18, p. 7), but more probably because he could not prevent, and would not further, the Sháh's selfish and unpatriotic policy of destroying the National Assembly, even at the price of foreign intervention. For the time being the office of Grand Wazír was left unfilled, but the *Wazír-i-Afkham* was made Minister of the Interior, and the *Farmán-farmá* Minister of Justice.

It was not, however, the Sháh's intention to leave vacant the important post which the *Mushíru'd-Dawla* had just resigned, and he was in communication with the *Amínu's-Sulṭán* (whom, to avoid confusion, we shall continue to speak of by this, his earlier title, not by the title of *Atábak-i-A'ẓam*). This experienced and wily statesman, suspected of compassing the death of his rival the *Ḥakímu'l-Mulk*[1], and denounced by the *mujtahids* as an infidel for his share in bringing about, in conjunction with M. Naus, the two Russian loans of 1899–1900 and 1902, had been compelled to flee the country at the end of 1903, and had for three years and a half been travelling far and wide in Europe and Asia. To him the Sháh now turned, inviting him to return and resume the office of Prime Minister. This, after some hesitation, he consented to do. In Russia, on his way to the Caspian, he was treated with conspicuous honour, was sent to Anzalí (Enzeli) in a Russian gunboat, and was received with a liberal display of flags and salutes. The *anjumans*, or political societies which had been so extensively developed in Persia since the

[1] See p. 108 *supra*.

Constitution was granted, and, indeed, all patriotic Persians regarded his return with the deepest misgivings, and the people of Rasht forcibly opposed his landing on Persian soil until he had solemnly sworn fidelity to the Constitution. He finally reached Ṭihrán on April 26, and within a week was appointed President of the Council of Ministers and Minister of the Interior.

The situation with which the *Amínu's-Sulṭán* was confronted was calculated to appal even that wary and resourceful minister. The finances of the country were in the utmost disorder: the Treasury was empty: the Sháh and his courtiers were resolved on the destruction of the Assembly and the restoration of the old *régime*, while the Assembly itself was divided into a moderate party led by the *Ṣani'u'd-Dawla*, a friend of the *Amínu's-Sulṭán*, and an extreme party led by his old enemy the *Sa'du'd-Dawla*. The former party was supported by most of the clergy, the latter by the more revolutionary *anjumans*, and it was the former party which the *Amínu's-Sulṭán* strove to win over to his view that in the circumstances a foreign loan afforded the only means of providing the money so urgently required on every side. Even he understood the violent feeling of the National Party against any fresh loan from abroad, and without a majority of the Assembly at his back he dared not venture on such a step. His chief opponent in the Assembly, the *Sa'du'd-Dawla*, whose sincerity began to be suspected by the National Party, ceased to attend the *Majlis* after the end of May, and for the next three months it looked as though the *Amínu's-Sulṭán* might succeed in carrying out his policy.

Meanwhile disturbances continued to occur in almost all parts of the country. In March the people of Iṣfahán revolted against the Sháh's uncle, the *Ẓillu's-Sulṭán*, who had to be dismissed, and at the end of the same month there were riots at Shíráz in the South, and at Tabríz in the North-West, where a large consignment of arms intended for the Sháh was seized and held by the people. In April disputes arose amongst the Bakhtiyárí chiefs; in May there were disorders at Sulṭánábád; in June more or less serious disturbances occurred at Kirmánsháh, Tabríz and Mákú, while Fárs continued in a state of turmoil,

Mírzá ʻAlí Aṣghar Khán *Amínu's-Sulṭán* and *Atábak-i-Aʻẓam*

Assassinated by ʻAbbás Áqá on August 31, 1907

and the Sháh's brother, the *Sálárú'd-Dawla*, claimed the throne, came out in open revolt, and was finally defeated and captured after a pitched battle lasting three days at Niháwand. He took refuge in the British Consulate at Kirmánsháh, but was ultimately, on satisfactory assurances of his safety being given, handed over to the *Ẓahírú'd-Dawla*, the Sháh's representative, on June 22.

More serious in its moral effects, as still further increasing the people's suspicions as to the Sháh's good faith, was an attempt made in May by the son of the afterwards notorious Raḥím Khán to remove by violence certain prominent reformers of the National Party in Ázarbáyján. Of this event and of the *Sálárú'd-Dawla's* rebellion the correspondent already quoted gives the following account in a letter dated June 19, 1907:—

"You have probably seen fragmentary accounts of the troubles going on in Persia. The *Majlis* and the people firmly believed that the Sháh had instigated Raḥím Khán's son to march on Tabríz, in spite of all official denials. Raḥím Khán is a robber chief, whom the Sháh, when *Walí-'ahd* (Crown-Prince), had imprisoned for various offences. According to the popular version, the Sháh arranged with Raḥím Khán that his son, who is at the head of a force of bandits in Ázarbáyján, should march on Ṭabríz, break up the local *anjuman*, and with fire and sword tame the unruly citizens of that turbulent town. Meanwhile, to create a diversion in his favour, hired assassins were sent to Tabríz to murder several prominent citizens of the *anjuman*, and throw the popular party into confusion. Unfortunately [for the success of the plot] these ruffians were caught while engaged on the royal errand. One was killed in the scuffle; the other two, under the influence of torture, confessed. Telegrams from Raḥím Khán to his son were intercepted, and the cat was out of the bag. Tabríz was up in arms; 8000 armed citizens patrolled the streets, swearing to exterminate Raḥím Khán's son and his bandits if they approached the town. That gentleman thought prudence the better part of valour, and stayed at a safe distance. In Ṭihrán the people's anger knew no bounds. The Sháh's representative went to the *Majlis* to deny any connection with

Raḥím Khán, but was greeted with loud angry cries of '*durúgh mí-gúyad*' ('he lies!'). It was Sunday, May 26, and according to Persian custom the Sháh's birthday began at sunset that day. The town was decorated, and illuminations everywhere prepared. By six o'clock in the evening, every decoration, every lamp had been taken down, even in the inner courts of the Royal Palace. The Sháh, to assuage the popular wrath, sacrificed his tools, and Raḥím Khán was given up to the Ministry of Justice to stand his trial....By these means the Sháh succeeded in patching up a sort of truce with his people, and the reception of the *Corps Diplomatique* and the official dinner given by the *Ná'ibu's-Salṭana*[1] were able to take place. But can the harm created by this criminal blunder be so easily repaired? The Sháh has officially denied any connection with Raḥím Khán and his bandits, but the people are sceptical[2]. Is it not a sorry spectacle, this of Muḥammad 'Alí Sháh, with his robber chiefs and his hired assassins, thinking to get the better of a movement of this magnitude, of a people in the throes of revolution, working out their inevitable destiny? Verily he is not worthy of our consideration, this Qájár Prince (if Qájár he be). He is no longer a serious factor. '*Guarda e passa.*'

"We have also had a sort of miniature civil war in which the *Sáláru'd-Dawla*, the Sháh's brother, played the leading part. He had been prancing round Hamadán with a few hundred Lurs, threatening to march on Ṭihrán and depose his brother. At last he had to be taken seriously, and an army was sent out to meet him. The two forces met at Niháwand, of historic memory. How the heroes of that great battle, in which Persia made her last stand against the Arabian hordes and perished nobly, must have laughed in their unhallowed graves[3]! Three days the *Sáláru'd-Dawla* and the royal forces engaged in bloody combat, and scarce two hundred casualties were reported! After that the *Sáláru'd-Dawla* retired. And that was all! But then ''twas a famous victory!'

"The National Assembly is at present stronger than ever,

[1] Kámrán Mírzá, son of Náṣiru'd-Dín Sháh and uncle of Muḥammad 'Alí Sháh.
[2] The subsequent career of Raḥím Khán fully justified this scepticism.
[3] The great Battle of Niháwand took place in A.D. 644.

Prince Abu'l-Fatḥ Mírzá *Sáláru'd-Dawla*

Born 1880: claimant to the throne of Persia: defeated at Níháwand, June 1907

largely owing to the folly of its enemies. It has passed at least one great constructive measure, which it has forced the Sháh to accept, namely the formation of local government all over Persia. It remains to be seen whether this measure will be satisfactorily carried out, but anyhow a great step has been made. Local Assemblies (*anjumans*) are to be elected in every province, and the administration will no longer be in the hands of arbitrary Governors. It has also, amongst other things, passed a law by which all *tuyúlát* (fiefs) return to the State. I need made no comment on the daring nature of this reform. It has now two formidable tasks before it, the reformation of the *máliyyát* (taxes), and the question of suppressing that enormous abuse, the *mustamirriyyát* (permanent pensions). The second of these reforms, if the Assembly dares to attempt it, will, as you know, be a very ticklish matter. But I believe in the *Majlis*. Its members are daily gaining experience, and the tone of the debates, the general procedure, is daily improving. The people are awake and slowly learning. The most remarkable manifestation of the popular awakening is the large increase in the number of newspapers[1]. Not the old, stilted, futile style of paper, but popular journals, written in comparatively simple language. Everyone seems to read a paper now. In many of the *Qahwa-khánas* (coffee-houses) professional readers are engaged, who, instead of reciting the legendary tales of the *Sháh-náma*, now regale their clients with political news."

On July 25, 1907, the Assembly celebrated, with great

[1] Of these modern papers, essentially connected with the constitutional movement, the earliest, so far as I can ascertain, was the *Majlis* ("Assembly"), of which No. 1 appeared on Nov. 25, 1906. This was followed by the *Nidá-yi-Watan* (Dec. 27, 1906); the *Tamaddun* (Feb. 1, 1907); the *Ḥablu'l-Matín* (April 29, 1907); the *Ṣúr-i-Isráfíl* (May 30, 1907); the *Musáwát* (Oct. 13, 1907); and the *Tiyátr* (May 5, 1908). Other papers, of which I do not know the dates of appearance, are, the *Ma'árif*, the *Faryád*, the *Khurshíd*, the *Muṣawwar*, the *'Adálat*, the *Tarbiyat*, the *Azád*, the *Waṭan*, the *Ḥurriyyat*, the *Anjuman*, the *Gulistán*, the *Kashkúl*, *al-Janáb*, the *Ṣubḥ-i-Ṣádiq*, the *Rúḥu'l-Qudus*, the *Taraqqí*, the *Chihra-numá*, the *Majalla-i-Istibdád*, etc. The weekly Calcutta *Ḥablu'l-Matín* was founded about 1892, and the younger homonymous Ṭihrán daily is an offshoot of it. See pp. 127—8, *supra*. The papers published in Persia before the granting of the Constitution (such as the *Írán*, *Sharaf*, *Iṭṭilá'*, etc.) were worthless.

pomp, the first anniversary of the Constitution[1]. Of this event the correspondent above cited, writing on August 14, gives the following account:—

"It is so difficult in the narrow confines of a letter to give you any idea of the progress of events. 'The old order changeth, giving place to the new.' Slowly but steadily Persia is working out her salvation. One by one the props of tyranny have been overturned, and the people are little by little gaining that sense of responsibility which is the beginning of wisdom. You probably saw in the papers some account of the National Festival, on the date of the granting of the Constitution. It was a magnificent *fête*, and it produced an excellent effect. It sealed, so to speak, the solemn compact of the Constitution. The National Assembly, with a wise prodigality, spared no expense, and arranged a *fête* worthy of the greatness of the occasion. A great reception was given in the Bahárístán (the House of Parliament) which lasted from 3 to 10 p.m. In the afternoon we strolled about in the gardens, and bands of school-children marched round reciting dithyrambs in praise of the *Majlis* and against despotism, etc. As soon as it became dark, we went up to a large tribune erected in front of the Bahárístán, dominating the whole *maydán*. This tribune was reserved for the *Corps Diplomatique*, the Ministers and Deputies. The whole *maydán* was brilliantly lit up, and on all sides were smaller tribunes erected by popular societies. The fireworks started by an inscription being lighted up in front of the tribune: '*Ín jashn az baráyi ahl-i-Írán mubárak-ast*' ('This festival is a blessed one for the people of Persia'). A *dast-khaṭṭ* (autograph letter) from the Sháh was read from the tribune and received with cheers. It was truly a strange spectacle, and my mind went back to the same time last year....when those 12,000 refugees were encamped in the garden of the British Legation. Much water has flowed under the bridge since then, and it is no longer the people who require to take *bast* anywhere. As I stood there, looking round now at the tribune, with its strange medley of foreign representatives, Persian Ministers and

[1] Called *Jashn-i-Millí*, "the National Festival."

Deputies, now at the seething crowd below shouting enthusiastically, 'Down with Despotism,' 'Long live Freedom,' etc., my last doubt vanished, and the belief I have held all along, that the people will win in the end, became a certainty. In spite of the appalling difficulties which encompass it, in spite of all the powers of darkness and tyranny leagued in unholy alliance against it, the National Assembly will triumph, for its cause is the cause of Justice and Progress. Every European standing there on that historic occasion who wishes well to Persia must have echoed in his heart the cry of the multitude which swelled from below, and, taken up in the tribunes, ran from end to end of the *maydán*: '*Zinda bád Majlis-i-Shúrá-yi millí-i-Írán!*' ('Long live the National Consultative Assembly of Persia!').

"I was greatly struck by the famous Tabríz member Taqí-záda, who was sitting quite close to me on the tribune. He has won deserved fame by his fearless independence and his wonderful grasp of political affairs. There is something so sympathetic in his face, so attractive, that it escapes all definition. Imagine a man of barely twenty-five years of age, slightly built, just over the middle height, with a handsome, boyish face and eyes sparkling with cheerful animation, but dimmed at times, especially as he leaned forward to look at the crowd, by that expression which belongs to the dreamer beneath the man of action. He was dressed, as a Persian should be, in a light, bluish-grey '*abá* (cloak), with a white and blue turban, the emblem of his birth (for he is a Sayyid). His clothes were spotlessly clean, but there was nothing of the '*Firangí-ma'áb*' (Europeanized Persian) about him. He has a cheerful face, a face which inspires confidence. If I am not mistaken, he is of those whose genius is capable of inspiring great enthusiasms, great sacrifices, and whose influence leaves a lasting impression on the history of nations. What was he doing, this boy of twenty-five, during the long, bitter years of humiliating despotism? Surely the mere presence of such men in the National Assembly effectively destroys the theory that Persia stumbled into liberty by accident. Did Taqí-záda only learn his political science after some twelve thousand of his

countrymen had taken *bast* in the British Legation?...I wish you would spend another year amongst the Persians, and, before it is too late, make known to the world the origins of this movement, which may, perhaps, be the greatest of modern times."

All competent observers seem to agree that the deputies from Ázarbáyján, and especially from Tabríz, constituted the salt of the Assembly. Their arrival at the capital on February 7, 1907, was hailed with enthusiasm; the people of Ṭihrán flocked to meet them, embraced them, congratulated them, and were lavish in their offers of hospitality. From their arrival, moreover, dated the growing strength and boldness of the Assembly, its determination to make its power felt and its voice heard, its refusal to be ignored or suppressed. These Tabríz deputies, who were regarded as being sincere patriots almost to a man, represented the more extreme or radical party, and seem to have been influenced by the ideas of the Russian reformers. Taqí-záda was spoken of as almost if not quite a socialist, and as being very well informed as to the political ideas current in Europe, sincere, resolute, eloquent and tactful—altogether a very remarkable man. Next to him in ability was placed his colleague Mírzá Faẓl-'Alí Áqá. Both of these, but especially the former, were said to have shown debating ability of a very high order, and a wonderful power of keeping the discussions to the point, or bringing them back to it when (as was too often the case) they tended to wander into irrelevancies.

Next to the National or Popular Party, the so-called "Clerical Party" was the most interesting and important. It was led by certain *mujtahids*, amongst whom Sayyid 'Abdu'lláh Bahbahání and Sayyid Muḥammad Ṭabáṭabá'í were the most prominent. Most of those who watched the Persian constitutional struggle were struck by the rare phenomenon of a popular movement in which the Clergy played so prominent a part, since this movement, if successful, could hardly fail to deprive them of a large part at least of their influence and power. It must be remembered, however, that, like the Irish priests, the Persian *mullás* are an essentially national class, sprung from the

people, knowing the people, and, if suspicious of administrative innovations, yet more suspicious of foreign interference. The movement which gradually became constitutional was, as we have seen, in its inception a popular protest led by the Clergy against the extravagance of the Court, which, to gratify its caprices, was ready to surrender the country into the hands of foreigners and unbelievers. Without the support of the Clergy the people could neither have broken down the Tobacco Monopoly nor have extorted from the Sháh a Constitution. On the other hand the Clergy certainly did not approve of all the democratic ideas of the Popular Party, and many conflicts took place between these two factions. Thus the democrats desired to make all Persian subjects equal in the eye of the Law, but the clericals strongly opposed any surrender of the privileges at present enjoyed by Muslims over the adherents of other religions, and demanded that no law agreed upon by the Assembly should become valid until it had been ratified by a clerical committee as being in conformity with the *Shar'*, or Ecclesiastical Law of Islám. Nor did the opposition of the clerical leaders confine itself to great questions of principle: they have in some cases objected to words and expressions savouring of neology, or suggesting foreign ideas.

Yet in spite of the almost inevitable conflict which must exist between democrats and clericals, in any country and in any age, these two parties have on the whole worked together in the Persian constitutional movement, the success of which is largely due to this co-operation. The democrats cannot afford to dispense with the influence of the Clergy, and are careful on all occasions to emphasize the fact that true Islám is democratic, and that their aims are inspired by and conformable with the Muhammadan religion. The clericals, on the other hand, know that, great as their influence is, they can only keep it by moving with the people, and that opposition to the popular feeling would seriously damage or even utterly destroy their power. And so these two parties, in spite of an occasional divergence of interests or ideals, are compelled to seek each other's support.

The Sháh and the Court Party desired nothing else than

to restore the old autocracy and the old corruption, and to effect this were prepared to submit to, nay, even to bring about, foreign intervention. In spite of the many oaths of fidelity to the Constitution which Muḥammad 'Alí Sháh had sworn, his enmity to the National Assembly was deadly and sleepless, and during his short reign manifested itself in a hundred ways. The plot of which Raḥím Khán was the agent has been already mentioned, and it was soon followed by another for the execution of which the clerical leader Shaykh Faẓlu'lláh was chosen as the instrument. This learned ecclesiastic, prompted certainly by jealousy of his associates, and probably bribed by the Court Party[1], retired about the end of June or the beginning of July to the Shrine of Sháh 'Abdu'l-'Aẓím, situated a few miles to the south of Ṭihrán, and commenced a reactionary propaganda, denouncing the popular leaders as atheists, freethinkers, Bábís and the like. On July 3 his "lambs" distinguished themselves by a cowardly and cruel assault on a certain Mírzá Ibráhím Khán, formerly a secretary in the French Legation at Ṭihrán, who had come out to meet a friend arriving from the South. He was severely man-handled, and it might have gone ill with him had he not fortunately been rescued from the hands of his persecutors by some members of one of the Ázarbáyjání *anjumans*. Assisted by two Sayyids of Yazd, named Muḥammad and 'Alí, Shaykh Faẓlu'lláh had contrived to produce certain forged documents purporting to emanate from the *anjumans* of Ázarbáyján and the Caucasus, in which occurred various heterodox or blasphemous expressions calculated to damage their reputations; and he had also forged letters from the Bábí leaders expressing approval and admiration of various prominent Nationalist deputies. His agents had succeeded in provoking more or less serious riots at Anzalí, Tabríz, Kirmán, and other places; and

[1] See the *Ṣúr-i-Israfíl* for June 26, 1907, where an imaginary conference of the reactionaries is described. It is there stated that Shaykh Faẓlu'lláh received the sum of 45,000 *túmans* (about £9,000). Some lesser clerical reactionaries, such as Akbar Sháh, the *rawẓa-khwán*, Sayyid Muḥammad and Shaykh Zaynu'd-Dín of Zanján, had made an abortive demonstration against the Constitution in Muḥarram (Feb.—March, 1907), and had then retired to Sháh 'Abdu'l-'Aẓím, where they formed a reactionary *anjuman*, which, it is stated, received material support from Muḥammad 'Alí Sháh.

Shaykh Faẓlu'lláh-i-Núrí

The celebrated reactionary Mujtahid who was hanged on July 31, 1909

finally his reactionary activities became so apparent that the supporters of the *Majlis* induced the *mujtahid* Sayyid Muḥammad Ṭabáṭabá'í to write and sign the following document:—

"*In the Name of God the Merciful, the Forgiving.*

"I guarantee that if His Reverence Ḥájji Shaykh Faẓlu'lláh should act contrary to the undertaking which he has given, I will in person expel him from Ṭihrán. Mullá Muḥammad of Ámul and Ḥájji Mírzá Luṭfu'lláh must also go."

"9 *Jumáda i*, *A.H.* 1325" (= June 20, 1907).

The undertaking in question was as follows:—

"He shall not perform any action contrary or opposed to the Sacred National Consultative Assembly; he shall not form *anjumans* or pitch tents; he shall everywhere support the Assembly."

Notwithstanding this, however, Shaykh Faẓlu'lláh and his hired myrmidons were destined to give a great deal more trouble, which culminated in the disturbances of December, 1907, synchronizing with the Sháh's attempted *coup d'état* of December 15.

To the internal troubles with which Persia was distracted, there were added in the month of August dangers from without. Russia, which had all along been suspected of aiding and encouraging the Sháh against the National Assembly, and of supplying him with the money he needed to foment disturbances, began to warn the Assembly through her Legation that she could not indefinitely allow the disorders in the provinces to continue, and appeared to be seeking a pretext for intervention. Turkey went still further, and her soldiers actually crossed the N.W. frontier, invaded Persian territory and occupied a number of towns and districts which undoubtedly belonged to Persia. Margawar was occupied on Aug 3, and three days later Urmiya was threatened by an array of 6,000 Turkish soldiers with artillery, while a Persian force sent to chastise the unruly Kurds was defeated by the Ottoman troops. The hostility of both Russia and Turkey is easily explicable by the detestation in which all popular and representative institutions and all

really constitutional forms of government are held by the Russian and were at that time held by the Turkish ruling classes, which desired nothing less than the establishment of a free and democratic Parliament in Persia. And even England, from which Persia had hitherto received sympathy at least, if not active help and encouragement, was now known to be engaged in an attempt (unhappily, as it proved, a successful attempt) to come to terms with Russia in the hope (a vain hope, as many of those who have most closely studied the question believe) of safeguarding her own interests in Asia.

Meanwhile the need for money became ever more urgent, for disorders were rampant, especially in Fárs, Gílán, and Ázarbáyján; the troops were few and ill paid, or not paid at all; the revenues were coming in slowly and irregularly; many governorships were vacant because few of the old governing class cared to take them, now that a stop had been put to illicit extortions; the enemy was within the gates; and the Persian General and Commissioner, the *Farmán-farmá*, who had been sent to remonstrate, and, if possible, negotiate with the Turks, was isolated and surrounded. The National Bank Scheme had failed; the proposed German loan had fallen through, owing to the unfavourable report of the German banker sent to investigate the practicability of the scheme; and the people remained invincibly opposed to another Russian loan. Yet this last was still the object towards which the *Amínu's-Sulṭán* continued to work, and, by means of his inexhaustible patience and rare powers of persuasion, he had almost succeeded in obtaining a majority in the Assembly, when, on August 31—the very day on which the ill-omened Anglo-Russian Agreement was signed at St Petersburg—he was shot as he was leaving the Bahárístán in the company of Sayyid 'Abdu'lláh Bahbahání by a young banker of Ázarbáyján, a member of one of the *anjumans* or political societies, named 'Abbás Áqá, who immediately afterwards shot himself, after stabbing a soldier who tried to arrest him. The *Amínu's-Sulṭán* was lifted from the ground where he lay, wrapped in his cloak, and driven to his town residence, where he died about half an hour later. On the body of the assassin were found four capsules of strychnine, a

'Abbás Áqá of Tabríz ("Fidá'í No. 41"),
who shot the *Amínu's-Sulṭán* first and himself afterwards on
August 31, 1907

piece of lunar caustic and a paper bearing the inscription: "'Abbás Áqá, banker, of Ázarbáyján, member of the *Anjuman*, national *fidá'í* No. 41." It did not appear to which *anjuman* he belonged, but the ominous re-appearance of the term *fidá'í* ("self-devoted"), originally applied to the assassins who wrought the behests of the "Old Man of the Mountain," and the fact that this one *anjuman* numbered at least forty other members ready to purchase a life for a life, could not fail to cause a deep impression[1].

Of course the assassination of this powerful and ambitious minister produced a great effect on men's minds. "The chief event of the last few months," writes a correspondent in a letter dated Dec. 5, 1907, "was the murder of the Atábak, which was the turning-point of the liberation movement. It showed that this was no child's play, that there was a grim determination somewhere, that Persians were ready to remove any Minister whom they believed to be plotting against their newly-won liberties. I am loath ever to approve of political assassination, but it is impossible not to recognize the immense good this murder did to the Reform Movement. Since then no one has dared to oppose the *Majlis* openly, and that Assembly has at last been able to achieve some useful work." At first, indeed, some horror was expressed by the Persian newspapers at this act of violence, but subsequently and more especially when the contents of the Anglo-Russian Agreement became known, popular sentiment veered strongly towards the assassin, and 'Abbás Áqá was venerated as a patriot who had given his life to rid his country of a traitor. On the fortieth day after his death, 'Abbás Áqá's grave was visited by crowds of persons who wished to do honour to his memory, and speeches praising his action and holding him up to admiration were delivered over his tomb. The following account of these celebrations is from No. 135 of the *Ḥablu'l-Matín*, dated October 8, 1907, pp. 5–6:—

"Every day and every hour acts and achievements are witnessed on the part of this noble and newly-awakened people

[1] Accounts of the assassination are given in No. 56 of the *Nidá-yi-Waṭan*, No. 106 of the *Ḥablu'l-Matín*, and No. 12 of the *Ṣúr-i-Isráfíl*.

which overwhelm the world with amazement, indicate the delicate perceptions of this race, and afford eloquent testimony to the extent of their appreciation of virtue and merit. The denizens of the whole world are filled with astonishment as to whence and by what teaching this nation has in so short a space of time travelled such a distance as other peoples have not been able to accomplish in a whole generation. We can only assume that spiritual help and divine inspiration continually support and aid them, and that they are the object of special regard to His Holiness the Imám of the Age.

"The proof of this statement is what happened on Sunday the 27th of Sha'bán [= Oct. 6, 1907], which indicates their sentiments and their alertness, proves their perfect patriotism and devotion to their country, and makes it clear to all that this nation appreciates its *fidá'ís* [those who sacrifice themselves for it], and assigns to each his proper rank and station. On that day the spirit of the late 'Abbás Áqá was gazing down with all joy and love upon his people, gladly accepting the handfulls of flowers which they strewed upon his grave, contemplating with joyful gaze the vast multitude which hastened headlong towards him, and uttering his thanks with words inaudible.

"Yea, every one who lays down his dear life for the salvation of his people and his Country's cause, and spends the coin of his existence for the ransom of the Nation and the Constitution, ought to be respected by his countrymen with a respect exceeding that due to their own spirits and bodies, and to be regarded as an evident Proof of God's Mercy.

"In truth, as a consequence of the blow struck by this brave youth, such a change has been wrought in the course of affairs in this Kingdom as could not have been accomplished by several millions of money or by fifty thousand soldiers. The Fundamental Law has been completed[1]; pickets have been set to watch the hypocrites who have occupied the Holy Shrine[2], and

[1] The 107 additional articles were signed on the day preceding the issue of this number, *viz.* Oct. 7, 1907.

[2] Allusion is made to the above-mentioned Shaykh Faẓlu'lláh and his followers who retired to the Shrine of Sháh 'Abdu'l-'Aẓím. See pp. 148–9, *supra*.

who have now withdrawn, baffled and disappointed, to the recesses of their hovels; all the towns of the interior are relatively safe and tranquil; all the nobles and barons have become constitutionalists and loyal servants, and have sworn the most solemn oaths of fidelity[1]; the National Assembly enjoys internal order, the Deputies are disciplined, the power of the disloyal is broken.

"It was decided to celebrate the fortieth day [of 'Abbás Áqá's death] on the above-mentioned Sunday. Most of the shops were closed, and the people, on foot and on horseback, flocked in crowds to the tomb, bearing flowers and sweet herbs. So crowded was the plain that there was scarcely room to pass. The number of those assembled was estimated at 100,000. All the *anjumans* and most of the students and school-children came in groups. Tents were erected and tea, coffee and other refreshments were freely offered by generous patriots. Companies of men beating their breasts recited soul-stirring verses. Eloquent orators and sweet-voiced poets made speeches or recited solemn elegies; while trays of sweet-meats exceeding computation were distributed gratuitously. In short, such zeal and enthusiasm were displayed by the people as were calculated to serve as an example to all nations. The *Shujá'u's-Salṭana* also brought with him in his carriage a great bouquet of flowers, which he laid on that honoured grave.

"For the moment we will content ourselves with the above brief description of the event, and of the many verses composed for the occasion will only cite the following few lines from an elegy composed by His Reverence the *Fakhru'l-Wá'iẓín* ('Pride of Preachers'):—

ای مزارِ محترم هرچند بزمِ ماتمی '
نیك ازین نو گل که خفت اندر تو شاد و خُرّمی '
جای دارد در تو آن گو عالمی‌را زنده کرد '
عیسیت خوابیده در دامن تو مانا مریمی '

[1] This alludes to the event of Oct. 1, when the reactionary Court Party, headed by the Sháh's cousin the *Jalálu'd-Dawla*, attended the Assembly in a body and swore to be faithful to the Constitution.

ای جهانِ غیرت ای عبّاس آقا کز شرف،
زخمِ قلبِ ملك و ملّت‌را تو شافی مرهمی،
ترك ایرانی نژاد ای آنکه همچون تهمتن،
مُعْلِیِ فرِّ فریدون مُحْیِیِ تاج جمی،
در رهِ یاجوجِ ظلم و فتنه دستِ غیرتت،
چون سکندر ساخت ز آهن پاره سدِّ مُحْکَمی،
گفت تاریخ عزایش‌را بزاری خاوری،
کرد از شش لول اِحْیَا عالَمی‌را آدمی،

'Honoured grave, though surrounded to-day by sorrow and sadness,
Thou art filled by this floweret within with pride and with gladness.
Yea, he who gave life to a world in slumber there dreameth,
'Tis Jesus asleep on the bosom of Mary, meseemeth.
O 'Abbás, O courage incarnate, who, guided by honour,
Saw'st thy country sore wounded, and laid healing ointment upon her!
O Turk of Íránian descent, who, like Rustam in story,
To Jam's crown and the throne of Firídún restored'st the glory!
The path of the Magog of strife and sedition and slander
Thou didst bar with a rampart of steel, like the Wall of Sikandar[1].
The date of his obsequies thus the poet inditeth:
"My ComraDe's Courageous suCCess the unIVerse rIghteth[2]*."'"*
1000 + 100 + 500 + 100 + 100 + 100 + 1 + 5 + 1 (= 1907).

The *Amínu's-Sulṭán* had, as we have seen, long been regarded with suspicion by his countrymen as one ready to sell his native land into foreign bondage, but the immediate cause of his death was the discovery by the *anjumans* of certain treasonable documents ostensibly emanating from him, and addressed to reactionaries in the provinces, inviting them to take action conducive to the overthrow of the Assembly. But it was darkly hinted that the real author of these incriminating documents was, not the *Amínu's-Sulṭán*, but his rival and foe the *Sa'du'd-Dawla*, who was playing a double game, and was in close

[1] Sikandar (Alexander the Great) is supposed by the Muslims to have kept back the savage hordes of Gog and Magog from devastating the world by building the Great Wall of China, which they therefore call *Sadd-i-Sikandar*, "the Rampart of Alexander."

[2] To make the chronogram I have had to change the sense of this last line. In the original it is: "A man with a six-shooter revivified a world."

relations with the Court on the one hand, and the *anjumans* on the other[1].

The death of the *Amínu's-Sulṭán* was the sign for the resignation of his Cabinet and of the President (*Ṣanī'u'd-Dawla*), and the wily *Sa'du'd-Dawla*, a *persona grata* alike to the Sháh and to the Russian Legation, attempted to form a new Cabinet composed of creatures of the Court. Against this attempt, however, the Assembly revolted, and on Sept. 10 chose as their new President the *Iḥtishámu's-Salṭana*. Three days later Naṣru'lláh Khán *Mushíru'd-Dawla*, formerly Prime Minister, who had been invited and had refused to co-operate with *Sa'du'd-Dawla*, died suddenly under most suspicious circumstances. On the same day *Sa'du'd-Dawla* was appointed Minister for Foreign Affairs, and for almost a fortnight the forces of reaction seemed to be in the ascendant. But soon even the Court Party began to realize that the Assembly was too strong for them, and urged the Sháh to become reconciled to the leaders of a movement which he could not resist, with the result already noticed, that on October 1 the Princes of the Blood and Nobles of the Court waited on the Assembly and swore an oath of allegiance to the Constitution. Next day *Sa'du'd-Dawla* resigned, or was dismissed, and before the end of October a new Cabinet had been formed under the presidency of the *Náṣiru'l-Mulk*. This Cabinet included the new *Mushíru'd-Dawla* as Minister of Foreign Affairs, *Ṣanī'u'd-Dawla*, *Mu'taminu'l-Mulk* and *Áṣafu'd-Dawla*, all of whom, with the exception of the last, enjoyed the esteem and confidence of the Constitutional Party.

The *Náṣiru'l-Mulk's* Cabinet remained in office for six or seven turbulent weeks, finally resigning in the middle of December, just before the Shah's *coup d'état* of Dec. 15. The political horizon continued dark as ever: the Anglo-Russian Agreement, which was not officially communicated to the Assembly until nearly a month had elapsed from the date of

[1] It was even stated on good authority that Muḥammad 'Alí Sháh, growing jealous of the *Amínu's-Sulṭán's* increasing influence, issued in his name the documents which caused his death, and which were designedly allowed to fall into the hands of the *anjumans*.

its ratification, filled the hearts of the Persians with misgivings; the Turks continued their advance in Ázarbáyján, occupying a line of country on the Persian side of the mountain-frontier extending southwards from Salmás to Margawar through Bárádúst and Targawar, and continually extending eastwards; Turkmáns raided the Ṭihrán-Mashhad road as they had been wont to do in the old days before Russia broke their power and annexed their country; and more or less serious disturbances prevailed in Fárs, Kirmán and elsewhere. On Nov. 4 the *Muḥtashamu's-Salṭana* left Ṭihrán for Úrmiya, but did not reach it until Dec. 22, and did not enter into communications with Ṭáhir Páshá, the Turkish General, until Dec. 29.

Towards the end of October the Sháh's conduct aroused great suspicion, and inflammatory harangues against him were delivered in some of the mosques, while a newspaper entitled *Rúḥu'l-Qudus* ("the Holy Spirit"), in its issue of Nov. 6, published so violent and threatening an article against him that it was at once suspended and proceedings were taken against the editor. This article, entitled "A Word from the Unseen, or an unambiguous Hint," opened with the quotation:—

مگر بگوشِ سلیمان ز من رساند باد
نصیحتی که در او خیرِ سلطنت باشد

"Will the breeze, then, convey from me to the ear of Solomon
A counsel wherein is the well-being of the kingdom?"

"We neither dream of authority," continued the writer, "nor think of office: we strive with our whole souls to guard our native land and protect our fellow-countrymen, nor will we disregard the duty of uttering the truth. There is a difference between subjects and slaves: to submit to selfish ambitions is incumbent on slaves, not on subjects, who are no slaves but free men, nay, even equal to the King himself. It is for them to reward the King's claims for his guardianship only when the King fulfils the duties of such guardianship and shepherdhood.

گوسفند از برای چوپان نیست، بلکه چوپان برای خدمت اوست،

"*The sheep does not exist for [the benefit of] the shepherd,*
Rather does the shepherd exist for its service[1]"

The writer then briefly reviews the history of Persia, recalling the names and deeds of Shápúr the Sásánian and other great Kings of Persia, who in their wars and conquests had in view the security of the lives and property of their subjects. The decadence which he deplores began, he declares, with the present Qájár dynasty, but, though territory was lost in the reigns of Fatḥ-'Alí Sháh and Muḥammad Sháh (A.D. 1797–1848), still Persia remained fairly secure and prosperous[2]. "But when the cycle of sovereignty reached Náṣiru'd-Dín Sháh," continued the writer, "the leaf was turned back, and the evil star of the nation was in the ascendant. A gang of pampered, poor-spirited courtiers, bereft of honour, encouraged the autocratic tendencies of the King, revealed their ingrained baseness of character, and stretched forth sacrilegious hands against the trust confided to them by God, to portion out the lives and possessions of an oppressed nation. In order to procure for themselves parks and carriages and fine houses, they plundered the people's property like robbers, and sold their homes piecemeal to foreigners....At length the King of tyrants and the Chief of traitors[3], overtaken by the sighs of an oppressed nation, each became the target for a patriot's bullet." After a few words of praise for the late Muẓaffaru'd-Dín Sháh, who granted the Constitution, the writer describes how, since the present Sháh ascended the throne, matters have gone from bad to worse, so that the people are not only plundered but destroyed, while Persian territory is occupied by foes and foreigners. He recalls the invasion of Ázarbáyján by the Turks and the depredations there committed by them; and the wrongs and bloodshed perpetrated by Persian officials, such as the *Iqbálu's-Salṭana*, the *Wazír-i-Niẓám* and Jahán-Sháh Khán; "until the nation, if it

[1] This well-known verse is from the *Gulistán* of Sa'dí (Book i, Story 29, ed. Platts, p. 39).

[2] Áqá Muḥammad Khán, the founder of the Qájár dynasty, undertook a campaign against Georgia and captured Tiflis in A.D. 1795. The humiliating treaties of Gulistán (Oct. 12, 1813) and Turkmáncháy (Feb. 21, 1828), which Persia was forced to conclude with Russia, both fell in the reign of Fatḥ-'Alí Sháh (A.D. 1797–1834).

[3] Náṣiru'd-Dín Sháh and the *Amínu's-Sulṭán* are meant.

seeks to save itself from the wolves within the fold, is overtaken by dogs and wolves from without."

Then he thus addresses the Sháh:—"It were well that, after this orgie of autocracy, thou shouldst somewhat recover thy senses, open thine eyes, and glance at thy kingdom and at other kingdoms. Have all the kings of the world neglected their duties and proper functions and turned their attention to butchery? Are all the nations of the world, like the unhappy nation of Persia, become thralls to the tyranny and selfish ambitions of their rulers? I know not why all other nations tend towards prosperity, expansion and increase of numbers, save only Persia, of which some part each year, nay, each month, becomes the portion of others, and some souls become the food of wolves, while what remains of its prosperity is turned into desolation." Why, he asks, does Muḥammad 'Alí Sháh so hate constitutional government and love absolutism, when he sees how the free nations, like England and Japan, prosper, and how the pride of Russian autocracy was humbled. "Is it not possible, then," he continues, "that the story of Louis the Sixteenth may be repeated in this kingdom? *Verily God is mighty and strong to avenge*:—

سرِ شب سرِ قتل و تاراج داشت'
سحرگه نه تن سر نه سر تاج داشت'

'Last night he was dreaming of plunder and slaughter: instead
'Twas himself on the morrow was headless and crownless and dead.'

"Does he not know for certain that from the blood of *Fidá'í No.* 41[1] there hath arisen a greater *Fidá'í* for a greater task, who waits to complete the proof? By his royal insight and discernment he should perceive and understand that it is unwise to play with snakes and vipers, which, despite their beautiful markings and spots, are filled within with deadly poison; and that it is not expedient privily to confer and take counsel with the despoilers of this kingdom and the representatives of foreign Powers[2]. For 'the thief loves confusion in the market,' and the

[1] 'Abbás Aqá, who shot the *Amínu's-Sulṭán*, as narrated above, on Aug. 31, 1907. See p. 151, *supra*, third line.

[2] Allusion is here made to the private interviews alleged to have taken place between Muḥammad 'Alí Sháh and the Russian Minister and his subordinates.

stranger seeks his own advantage. He must surely understand that there is no essential difference between the subjects of this state and of other states, and that their abasement must needs be changed to glory, but that no rule can endure to the King in the face of foreign dominion, under which he will have to exchange the dream of Empire for the dervish's horn, and the glory of sovereignty for the misery of subjection. If His Majesty the King and his family consider it a pride and an honour to become the attendants and servants of foreigners, we, the people, deem subjection to such dominion a shame and a disgrace. Patriotic zeal alone has caused the sceptre to continue in this family; else the garden of the Constitution, which has not been watered for two months[1], is athirst, and the time is come for it to be refreshed and regaled by means of that unknown and unseen *Fidá'í* who is its guardian, so that flowers and sweet herbs may blossom therein; or, in other words, the wise unknown surgeon will remove the gangrenous limb, so that the remaining members may be saved from that disease. 'Twere best that we should close our lips from speech and suffer this quatrain to suffice:—

ظالم ز ستم همیشه لات آمده است،
رُخ رفته پیاده با ثبات آمده است،
مشروطه طلب باسپ و پیلست سوار،
چون کُشته وزیر شاه مات آمده است،

'The tyrant falleth aye by self-wrought ill:
The Rook is lost: the Pawn advanceth still:
Bishop and Knight we to the task will bring:
The Premier's slain—'tis check-mate to the King[2]!'"

Threats more undisguised than this it would be hard to frame: that they could be printed and circulated at all in the Sháh's capital shows how embittered the strife had become, and how acute the crisis. On the one hand we see a King, selfish,

[1] *i.e.* since the blood of the *Amínu's-Sulṭán* was shed at the end of August, 1907.

[2] All the pieces in the game of Chess are here mentioned; the King (*Sháh*), the Queen (called *Farzín* or *Wazír*, "the Prime Minister"), the Rook or Castle (*Rukh*), the Pawn (*Piyáda*), the Bishop (called *Pil*, "the Elephant"), and the Knight (*Asp*, "the Horse").

obstinate, headstrong, who, having looked forward to enjoying one day the unrestricted power of his predecessors and indulging in his turn in their lavish extravagance, suddenly finds himself checked and thwarted in his aims by a young but sturdy Parliament, for the destruction of which he is willing to pay any price, even the price of Persia's freedom and independence. On the other hand we see an ancient and talented people, long oppressed and downtrodden, long schooled to servitude and silence, but now suddenly awakened to new hopes and conscious of new powers, and resolute not to suffer the cup of Freedom, as yet hardly tasted, to be dashed from their lips; a people clearly conscious of the manifold perils overshadowing them, betrayed by those to whom they had a right to look as their natural protectors against foreign invasion, half mad with anger and terror, yet resolutely groping their way through the triple darkness of Anarchy, Bankruptcy, and Chaos towards the Light which they would fain share with other happier nations. Can it be wondered at if, their anger growing at each fresh proof of their King's faithlessness and reckless enmity to the cause they held so dear, they should be betrayed from time to time into some action which, though we may deplore it, we cannot unreservedly condemn? To judge fairly the Persia of to-day, we must think of her as we think of England in the reign of Charles the First, or of France in the reign of Louis the Sixteenth, but an England without a Cromwell, a France without a Danton.

"To understand it" (viz. the above article from the *Rúḥu'l-Qudus*), wrote the correspondent last quoted, in a letter dated Dec. 5, 1907, "you should know that it was written a month ago during one of those terrible periods which have occurred from time to time during the last year, and in which things look most hopeless—disturbances everywhere, the Sháh plotting against his people, and the people, oppressed with the dread of the final disaster, mad with indignation against their sovereign, who prefers to be the king of a nation in foreign bondage rather than the constitutional monarch of a free people. The article, as you will see, is an open threat against the Sháh, a warning that a similar fate to that of his grandfather and the *Amínu's-*

Sulṭán is awaiting him, unless he amends his ways. The paper was suppressed by order of the National Assembly, and the case of the Editor is still *sub judice*."

It may be added that about the same time that the *Rúhu'l-Qudus* was threatening the Sháh, the *Hablu'l-Matín* was calling on the people to arm themselves and be prepared to shed the last drop of their blood in the defence of their country. These articles seem to have caused some alarm amongst the European residents, who regarded them as the preaching of a *jihád* and a manifestation of "fanaticism," though they would have called the same sentiment manifested in themselves in such a time of national peril by the prettier name of "patriotism." At all events the popular leaders were far too anxious to give no excuse for foreign intervention to suffer Europeans to be molested in any way, and, according to the judgment of the most competent observers, the Sháh owed his personal safety to similar considerations.

On Nov. 12 the Sháh visited the Assembly in state, and for the fourth time solemnly swore to be faithful to the Constitution, though at that very moment he was preparing fresh means for its overthrow. "At the time I write" (Dec. 5, 1907), says the correspondent just quoted, "one of those periodical waves of depression is passing over all. A great dread is walking up and down in men's hearts. The Sháh is believed to be making a supreme effort, to be planning a *coup d'état* against the Assembly. He has recalled the reactionary Court Minister of his father, and that worthy has under his command a fair force of *ghuláms*. These, with the Cossacks, would suffice to master the situation in Ṭihrán. But ——: there are many buts. Will the Cossacks fire on the people? No one knows. The *Majlis* and the countless *anjumans*, who form a force of public opinion which it is difficult to overestimate, are not idle. They will stop at naught to defend the Assembly. The Sháh owes his life to the mere fact that the *anjumans* dread the aftermath of a royal assassination in these troubled times. As in the past, I steadily refuse to give way to the prevailing depression. God grant I may be right as in the past!"

Of the *coup d'état* foreshadowed in the above letter ten days

before it actually happened, my correspondent spoke as follows in another letter written on New Year's Day of the year 1908:—

"It was apparent to all that during November things were approaching a crisis. The Sháh was doing his utmost to destroy the *Majlis*, and the people knew it. Under pressure of fear, caused by the growing anger of the people, expressed openly, seditiously, by their preachers and press, the Sháh went to the Assembly for the first time[1] in the beginning of November, and on the *Qur'án* took the solemn oath of fidelity to the Constitution, prescribed in Article 39 of the Constitutional Law."

[This oath in its entirety runs as follows:—

"I take God Almighty to witness, and I swear on the *Qur'án*, and by all that is dear to the Creator, that I will employ all my strength to maintain the integrity and independence of Persia, and to preserve the territory and the rights of the Nation; that I will maintain the fundamental articles of the Constitution and rule conformably to the established laws; that I will maintain the Shí'a faith; that I will never forget in my acts and conduct the presence and control of God Almighty; and that I will pursue no other aim than the greatness and well-being of this country. I ask the Almighty to aid me in the performance of those services which it is my duty to render to my people in the way of progress, and I call upon all the holy saints to aid me."]

"But this was merely a farce. Surrounded by his unworthy favourites, Amír Bahádur Jang, *Sa'du'd-Dawla* and others, the Sháh contrived to plot actively against the Assembly. The storm broke on Dec. 15, when the Sháh summoned the Cabinet, which had already resigned [on the preceding day], to the Palace, and imprisoned *Náṣiru'l-Mulk*, the Premier, in a cell with chains round his neck[2]. By the energetic intervention of the British Legation[3], *Náṣiru'l-Mulk* was rescued from the

[1] Though, as mentioned a few lines back, this was the fourth time that the Sháh had taken the oath, it was the first time he had visited the *Majlis* in person.

[2] At the same time he arrested *'Alá'u'd-Dawla* and *Mu'ínu'd-Dawla*, brothers of the *Iḥtishámu's-Salṭana*.

[3] The news was carried to the British Legation by a faithful servant of the Minister, who was warned by some of his acquaintances at the Palace, as he awaited his master, that the latter was doomed to die, and that he would do well to flee if he

Abu'l-Qásim Khán *Náṣiru'l-Mulk*

fate awaiting him, and escaped to Europe[1]. On the same day the hired ruffians of the Sháh, mostly muleteers, grooms, etc., were let loose on the town. They took up their quarters in the *Maydán-i-Túp-khána* ('Gun-Square'), where tents had been pitched for them, whence reactionary *mullás* preached to them, inciting them against the Assembly, composed, so they said, of Bábís, infidels, etc. A detachment of Cossacks was also stationed in the *Maydán*, to protect them and the approaches to the *Arg* (citadel). The blow came as a surprise to the Assembly, and both it and the *anjumans*, taken completely off their guard, made no resistance on that day. Heaven only knows what stopped the Sháh from following up his first *coup*, and dealing the decisive blow. Some say that his nerves gave way in the evening. Perhaps it was only a part of the irresolute policy of the wretched man. Perhaps, and this seems the true reason, he could not count on his troops. If the Cossacks had been reliable, and he had sent an armed force to occupy the Bahárístán that night to prevent the deputies from re-assembling there, he might have been for a time master of the situation in Ṭihrán. Instead of this he did nothing, and the precious moment slipped by for ever. On the morrow the *Majlis* and the *anjumans* recovered from their inaction[2]. The *bázárs* were closed and the people flocked round the Bahárístán, rifles were brought out, and soon riflemen were scattered over the roofs and walls of the Bahárístán and in the adjoining Masjid-i-Sipahsálár, which was connected with the Bahárístán by a gate in the wall. The *anjumans* collected in force and compelled the Assembly to sit, while they guarded all the

wished to avoid the same fate. Having found Mr George Churchill, the Oriental Secretary, he communicated his fears to him, urged him to hasten to the Palace without delay, and lent him his own horse. It appears that Mr Churchill was only just in time, and it is probable that when he arrived the Sháh himself believed that the Minister was already dead.

[1] He left for Europe on the following day, Dec. 16.

[2] The defence was well organized, and a leading part in it was taken by Mírzá Jahángír Khán, editor of the *Ṣúr-i-Isráfíl*, Sayyid Muḥammad Riẓá of Shíráz, editor of the *Musáwát*, and other men of letters. Four committees were appointed for the management of affairs, a General Committee of Control (*Idára-i-Riyásat*), a Council of War (*Idára-i-Niẓámí*), a Committee of Supply and Expenditure (*Idára-i-Ázúqa wa Maṣárif*), and a Publication Committee (*Idára-i-Maṭbú'át*).

approaches. It is typical of this movement that the rallying-point of the people should have been the House of Parliament and the Mosque, standing side by side. In and around these two buildings gathered the strangest throng which has ever been seen fighting the old, old battle against the powers of tyranny and darkness. Europeanized young men with white collars, white-turbaned *mullás*, Sayyids with the green and blue insignia of their holy descent, the *kuláh-namadís* (felt-capped peasants and workmen), the brown *'abás* (cloaks) of the humble trades-folk;—all in whose hearts glowed the sacred fire gathered there to do battle in the cause of freedom. Who does not instinctively remember Carlyle's fiery chapter on the Bastille day? 'This day, my sons, ye shall quit you like men! By the memory of your fathers' wrongs, by the hope of your children's rights! Tyranny impends in red wrath: help for you is none, if not in your own right hands. This day you must do or die!'

"I hope that I do not appear credulous in saying that some such noble passion fired the hearts of that Persian crowd, gathered there to defend all that was sacred to them on this earth, the Palace of their Liberty and the Temple of their God. I am no friend to religion, for to my mind it is everywhere the natural handmaid of tyranny. But give the Devil his due: in Persia religion has, by force of circumstances, perhaps, found itself on the side of Liberty, and it has not been found wanting. Seldom has a prouder or a stranger duty fallen to the lot of any Church than that of leading a democracy in the throes of Revolution. In the inevitable hour of the downfall of Persia's priesthood, it behoves us to stand reverently at the graveside, and, forgetting its many faults, remember only that, at the crisis of the nation's history, it threw the whole weight of its authority and learning on the side of liberty and progress, and made possible the regeneration of Persia in the way of Constitutional Liberty.

"As I said before, the Sháh missed his chance, and after that tragic Sunday, his fortune set its face towards decline. His ruffians might dominate the *Maydán-i-Túp-khána*, robbing and murdering, but their hired valour was not of the stuff to

induce them to attack the Assembly. Negotiations began between the two parties, the Sháh first trying to impose his terms, but gradually the tables were turned. On Monday, Dec. 16, he sent the head of the Qájár tribe[1] to the *Majlis* to request it to dissolve temporarily and allow the Sháh to restore order. The envoy got a stormy reception. The lion-hearted *Iḥtishámu's-Salṭana* interrupted him in the midst of his enumeration of the Sháh's demands, saying, 'This is not the point at issue: we have not to discuss this or that course of action: what we have to ask is this. What is our duty towards that person who has, on the Holy Qur'án, sworn the most solemn of oaths, and has broken it?' The *'Aẓudu'l-Mulk* looked uncomfortable, and reminded the *Iḥtishámu's-Salṭana* that he also was a Qájár, and should remember what he owed to the tribe. The Sháh then moderated his demands, merely asking for the expulsion of some of the deputies (Taqí-záda, Mustasháru'd-Dawla and Sayyid Naṣru'lláh) and the great preachers Sayyid Jamál and Ḥájji Maliku'l-Mutakallimín. But he soon had to give way all along the line. The news got to the provinces: Tabríz, Rasht, Qazwín, Mashhad, Iṣfahán and Kirmán...telegraphed to the *Majlis*, notifying their solidarity with the popular cause. Tabríz went further, and telegraphed to the *Majlis* and to all the foreign Legations, declaring that it no longer considered worthy to rule over Muslims a man who had broken an oath sworn on the Qur'án, and asking that he might be deposed and a successor appointed. It also sent telegrams to all the Sháh's courtiers and servants, and to the Ázarbáyján regiments in Ṭihrán, to the effect that if they raised a hand against the Constitution, their houses in Tabríz and Ázarbáyján would be burned to the ground, and their wives and children put to the sword. Then followed more solid offers of assistance, namely of armed contingents. In fact several hundred armed *mujáhidín*[2]

[1] The aged *'Aẓudu'l-Mulk*, now Regent.

[2] *i.e.* persons who undertake a *jihád*, or Sacred War. I shall allude in a later chapter to the extraordinary manner in which the Special Correspondent of the *Times* at Ṭihrán confused the terms *mujáhid* (from *jihád*, "a striving or fighting in a holy cause") and *mujtahid* (from *ijtihád*, "a striving to apprehend the ultimate bases of religious belief"). To talk, as he did (*Times* of Oct. 11 and 12, 1909) about the *mujtahids* (instead of the *mujáhids*) being disarmed is as though in English one should talk of the chaplains (instead of the captains) being deprived of their swords.

of Qazwín[1] have arrived in Ṭihrán, in spite of the efforts of the Assembly to keep them back. One thousand horsemen from Tabríz are now on their way to Ṭihrán, and will with difficulty be turned back. The Sháh was forced to give way, and peace was patched up between the two parties. The Sháh agreed to exile Sa'du'd-Dawla, dismiss Amír Bahádur Jang from all offices except that of chief of his body-guard, punish the *lúṭís*[2] guilty of outrages in the Maydán-i-Túp-khána, bring the Cossack Brigade and the Household troops under the Ministry of War, and send a sealed Qur'án to the *Majlis* with solemn oath to observe the Constitution; *Náṣiru'l-Mulk* to be given complete liberty of movement, *'Alá'u'd-Dawla* and *Mu'ínu'd-Dawla* to be recalled, etc. Peace has thus been made, but is felt to be a hollow truce. There is no longer any hope of the Assembly's trusting the Sháh, and the only end would seem to be the abdication or violent deposition of Muḥammad 'Alí *Mírzá*[3], as many of the telegrams from the provinces styled him!

"Many points of this drama will be apparent to the eye of history which we now, in too close connection with it, do but dimly perceive. One thing it has shewn beyond all doubt, viz. that the constitutional idea has taken firm hold of the whole people of Northern Persia. I am always fearful of letting my keen sympathies for the Persian people lead me into error, and I wish, therefore, to avoid all exaggeration. The people did not actually have to stand the shock of armed force, so that we cannot say how they would have acquitted themselves in that supreme trial. But this much we can say. The people of Ṭihrán and of all Northern Persia shewed that they would not give away their liberties without a struggle. No one a

[1] These *mujáhidín*, or National Volunteers, of Qazwín were commanded by Mírzá Ḥasan *Shaykhu'l-Islám*-i-Qazwíní, whose lieutenant was a young man named Mírzá Ghaffár Khán. The latter arrived as a fugitive in Cambridge a little while after the *coup d'état* of June 23, 1908, almost without money or clothes, and knowing hardly a word of any European language. He had the address of his cousin, who resides here, written down on a piece of paper, and on his arrival in London he placed this paper and his purse in the hands of one policeman after another (having heard of their honesty and helpfulness to strangers), each of whom set him a stage further on his journey.

[2] Roughs.

[3] *i.e. Prince* instead of *King* Muḥammad 'Alí.

Mírzá Ghaffár of Qazwín

One of the *Mujáhidín* or National Volunteers

year ago would have said that men from Qazwín and Tabríz would leave their homes and hasten to the capital to defend what they professed to hold dear. No one would have believed that the people of Ṭihrán would have stood their ground against the armed force of the Sháh, or that, in the face of such grave danger, the people would be as one man in defending the cause of the Constitution. No one who saw those riflemen scattered over the roofs, those crowds sitting in the Mosque, with rifles under their *'abás*, listening to the eloquence of Ḥájji Maliku'l-Mutakallimín and Sayyid Jamál, could have doubted that they were ready even to die for this cause, which Europe affects to treat as an 'immense blague.' Providence did not put them to the final test, but I am sure they would not have been found wanting. Much progress has been made in this year. Taqí-záda said in his beautiful speech, thanking the people after it was all over, 'Let us be thankful to-night that the curtain which went up last Sunday is now coming down on the scene, and in truth it has been a tragic and historic scene. We had, and still have, complete confidence in the people.... But now let us take leave of this scene.... We had forgotten a word of the prophet, namely, that "*the Hand of God is with the multitude*"[1]. And, glory be to God, we have seen that the union of the people made the whole world tremble. Now I will remind the people that a year ago they had not one by one this strength, and were under the yoke of tyranny and despotism. But from the time that they gave each other the hand and united, they have seized their rights; and we hope that this unity may last until the coming of the Twelfth Imám (may God hasten his glad advent!).' (Remark this quaint touch at the end of this so western speech. It may not inaptly be compared to the cock which Socrates ordered his disciples to sacrifice on the day of his death.)

"The *anjumans* were the cause of the victory. They had drawn the people together and united them in one common cause, and had organized their strength to such an extent that

[1] يَدُ ٱللهِ مَعَ ٱلْجَمَاعَةِ

in the day of trial tyranny found, to its surprise, a united front against it.

"I must refer to one other feature of the crisis. In the whole of Northern Persia, while the sovereign and his people were in open war and the capital was divided into two armed camps, not a single European was touched. This was no mere chance, but a set purpose of the popular party, who would not give any excuse for intervention—and this is an Oriental country, a Musalmán country, an 'uncivilized' (?) country! Can Europe furnish a similar example of such stern self-restraint?

"Fanaticism is dead in Persia. The reactionary *mullás*, with Shaykh Faẓlu'lláh at their head, raised the cry of 'Bábíism,' 'Islám in danger,' 'Infidels,' etc., etc., but their appeals to the popular fanaticism fell on deaf ears. Of a truth much progress has been made in this year. Given another year, who can prophesy what further progress will be made? To-day the people were ready (I am purposely understating the case) to put themselves to grave inconvenience and danger. In another year, they may be ready to die for the Fatherland, even as the 'canaille' in France, who routed the chivalry of Europe at Valmy. There is now in Persia that which can make her live: of this I am certain. It matters little how the object is attained, whether by the help of a dictator, or by the slow, ceaseless efforts of a Parliament. Írán is alive, and I do not believe that she is destined to die. However hopeless the situation may seem, we must always count somewhat on the unexpected when we are dealing with democracy, especially a democracy in revolution. '*The Hand of God is with the multitude.*'

"Well, I must now close this voluminous budget. I fear I have told you little, but perhaps even this imperfect sketch will give you some idea of the crisis through which we are now passing, though I have perhaps told the story with my heart, not my head. I will excuse myself with Taqí-záda's beautiful words in his speech on the *Sálár-i-Mufakhkham* and the prisoners sold by him to the Turkmáns. 'That excitement which appears in the people is inspired not by reason but by love.... Some say

that we should act in accordance with reason, but I say that in such matters our action should be inspired by love.'"

Through the kindness of another friend at Ṭihrán, two curious Persian documents belonging, apparently, to this period (they were enclosed in a letter dated Jan. 2, 1908) lie before me. The first is a warning to the Sháh, emanating, I presume, from one of the *anjumans*, and its translation is as follows:—

"WARNING.

"His Imperial Majesty has apparently forgotten that his accession to the Crown and Throne was heralded by nothing more than a telegram of two lines to summon him [to the capital] and five mounted men, and that he was not born by his mother possessed of crown and signet-ring, nor does he hold in his hand a warrant of absolute sovereignty from the Unseen World of Spirits. Assuredly if he had but reflected for a moment that this sovereignty depends only on the acceptance or rejection of the People, and that those who have elected him to this high position and acknowledged him [as King] are able also to elect another [in his place], he would never have swerved aside to this extent from the straight Path of Justice and the requirements of constitutional monarchy. Yet perhaps he has deigned to give full consideration to the matters above mentioned, but is confident in the erroneous opinion that the people are still unaware of this their right to dismiss and to elect.

"We, well-wishers to this kingdom and nation, guardians of the honour of Church and State, and protectors of the Crown and Throne of Sovereignty, do most respectfully submit this our last representation, whereby we divest ourselves, our nation, and our administration of all further responsibility, in order that henceforth we may not be accused by other nations of discourtesy or shamelessness.

"Let the ambassadors and ministers of friendly states, who are present in this capital, and have beheld the events which have taken place in this city, bear witness and give testimony as to how grievous are the affairs of this noble nation, and how near to the bone the knife has reached!

"*He [God] is the Avenger, the Exalted one!*"

The second document purports to be an account written by Muḥammad 'Alí's ex-tutor, the notorious Russian Jew, Shapshál Khán, for one of his Russian friends, of the jewels and other valuables on the security of which the Sháh was able to raise money from the Russian Bank[1] in order to pay his hired myrmidons to create the riot described above.

"The list of the things deposited in pawn in the Russian Loan Bank in Ṭihrán, by the intervention of Shapshál Khán, on behalf of His Majesty the Court Jester (*Lúṭí-báshí*) in order to borrow the sum of 60,000 *túmáns,* to be spent on entertainment and drink for, and other expenses connected with, his hired ruffians, and to be divided amongst several godless ecclesiastics, in order to destroy the foundations of the Sacred Consultative Assembly, is as follows:—

"On the personal insignia and orders of His Majesty, 5,000 *túmáns.*

"On the pendant of Her Majesty the Queen of the World and Empress of Persia, 20,000 *túmáns.*

"Three pearl rosaries, *per* the Keeper of the Privy Purse, *'Adlu's-Salṭana,* 20,300 *túmáns.*

"Three or four other pieces of jewelry, 15,000 *túmáns.*

"Total, 60,000 *túmáns* (= about £12,000).

"You must know also that after telegraphic consultations lasting from ten to twenty days, and much loss of self-respect and violation of the honour and dignity of Persia in the eyes of the Bank, the Manager of the Bank, and the Russian Minister, and a thousand statements unworthy of consideration on the part of the five-thousand-year-old sovereignty of Persia, the Russians were compelled to agree to accept the Queen of Persia's bodice, and lend to His Majesty Muḥammad 'Alí Sháh the sum in question.

"Shapshál Khán likewise added in the course of conversation that on the second day, when the progress of events in the *Maydán-i-Túp-khána* (Artillery Square) had begun to halt, and

[1] As will be set forth in Ch. XI it appeared, when Muḥammad 'Alí's financial obligations came to be investigated after his deposition, that he was indebted to the Russian Bank to the extent of £300,000, though unhappily the purposes to which this loan was applied are not specified.

the money was all ready at the Bank, and it had been settled that we should take the three pearl rosaries with *'Adlu's-Salṭana*, and receive the sum of 20,000 *túmáns*, on that day *'Adlu's-Salṭana* kept me waiting, and did not appear, and it wanted but little that he should disgrace me before the staff of the Bank.

"This is a true copy of the Report of this Russian, and this is the full-length portrait of our present sovereign, which faithfully pourtrays to us the dishonourable means whereby the five-thousand-year-old sovereignty of Persia acquires money, and in what discreditable and disgraceful ways it spends it."

CHAPTER VI.

THE ANGLO-RUSSIAN AGREEMENT AS SEEN THROUGH PERSIAN EYES.

THE Anglo-Russian Agreement concluded on August 31, 1907, has been only mentioned incidentally in the last chapter, where a fuller discussion of its scope would have interrupted the sequence of events. In brief it dealt with three countries of Asia which had long been the field of Anglo-Russian rivalries, to wit, Tibet, Afghánistán, and Persia. Its object was, so far as possible, to put an end to those rivalries, and establish a friendly understanding between England and Russia in regard to several questions which had in the past led to considerable friction between the two countries, and had at least once[1] brought them to the verge of war. The hope that this desirable result had at length been obtained caused the Agreement to be received with a considerable show of enthusiasm in both countries, though naturally there was a minority on either side who grumbled at an arrangement whereby, as they maintained, their country had given up more than it had gained.

In England the Agreement, though hailed as a triumph of statesmanship even by the leaders of the Opposition, was sharply criticized by some politicians, such as Lord Curzon and Mr H. F. B. Lynch, who were well acquainted with Persian affairs. But this criticism was, as a rule, directed not so much against the way in which Persia's fate appeared to have been settled, without consulting her feelings, as against the potential division of her lands between her two great neighbours which seemed to be foreshadowed. The Agreement was criticized not on the ground of its essential immorality, but on the ground that

[1] On the occasion of the "Panj-dih Incident."

England had got the worst of the bargain. Mr Lynch, however, in a very eloquent speech, which he was unable to deliver in its entirety in the House of Commons on February 14, 1908, but which was afterwards published in full in the *Imperial and Asiatic Quarterly Review* for the following April, dealt with both aspects of the Agreement. Speaking of his own work in Persia he said, "Of the three roads which my friends and myself have constructed in Persia, covering hundreds of miles, the two right honourable gentlemen in front of me have placed two—those from Qum to Ṭihrán, with right of extension to Iṣfahán, and from Qum to Sulṭánábád—bodily in the Russian sphere; while as regards the third, the road across the Bakhtiyárí Mountains from Ahwáz on the Kárún River to Iṣfahán they have treated Iṣfahán, the terminus of the road, in the same way. Any further facilities on these arteries of traffic we shall, I presume, be obliged to obtain through the Russian Government or with their consent." But he touched a nobler note when he came to discuss the effect of the Agreement on the people of Persia—"not the grandees and the reactionaries, who may have profited by the Anglo-Russian rivalry, but the leaders of the reform movement, and the men who are engaged in pouring new wine into the musty old bottles of Persian absolutism. This aspect of the Convention is a Liberal interest, and I think I shall be able to shew that it is also a British interest, perhaps the greatest of the British interests which are touched by the Convention." And after a masterly attack on the Agreement from both points of view, he concluded as follows:—

"Let us hope that this convention may lead to better relations with Russia, and that she may realize and respect the substantial grounds for our fears. I am afraid that it can scarcely tend to improve our relations with Persia. Persia is the ghost at the feast which we are celebrating with Russia in honour of this Convention. While the feasting is in progress and the toasts are being exchanged, this small nation—which has contributed so much to the artistic and intellectual wealth of the world, and whose prospects looked at least promising before this Convention was signed—is lying between life and death, parcelled out, almost dismembered, helpless and friendless at our feet."

That the Anglo-Russian Agreement, in so far as it affected Persia, was tantamount to a partition of that unfortunate country seems to have been at first the general impression, not only in Persia (when, after considerable delay, the contents of the Agreement became known), but also in England, and the cartoon which appeared in *Punch* on October 2, 1907, fairly represented this impression. The British lion and the Russian bear are represented as mauling between them an unhappy Persian cat, and the lion is saying, "You can play with his head, and I can play with his tail, and we can both stroke the small of his back," while the poor cat moans, "I don't remember having been consulted about this!"

Great Britain, owing to the shelter which her Legation had given to the 14,000 or 15,000 refugees in the summer of 1906, and the consequent granting of the Constitution by Muẓaffaru'd-Dín Sháh, enjoyed unbounded popularity amongst the party of reform, until it began to transpire that she was engaged in negotiations with Russia which dealt, amongst other matters, with Persia. Suspicion was at once aroused, for, as the Persians say, "enemies are of three sorts, enemies, the enemies of friends, and the friends of enemies." Russia, the home of unbridled despotism, the ancient foe of liberty in all its forms, the destroyer of so many once free nations, was regarded by the Constitutionalists as their most deadly enemy, and if England sought to make friends with her, how could she be regarded any longer as a trustworthy friend? And so suspicion grew, as more information leaked out as to the progress and nature of the Agreement, until it deepened into a hostility all the more bitter on account of the disappointment of those who hoped to find in England a powerful and sympathetic friend, if not an active supporter of the liberal movement, which owed so much to her example and her countenance. It is desirable that Englishmen should have before them the means of judging the effect of the Agreement on Persian public opinion—for since the growth of a free Press such opinion had come into existence where a few years ago no such thing existed—and therefore I shall here translate in full a series of leading articles on this subject published in the *Ḥablu'l-Matín* in September, 1907. The first article of this series began

in No. 112 of that important journal on September 9, before the contents of the Agreement were known, and is as follows:—

"*À propos of the Anglo-Russian Agreement.*

"For more than two years the question of an understanding between Russia and England in Asia has been the subject of discussion and consideration in political circles and newspapers, that is to say, ever since Russia sustained her disgraceful defeat in the Far East, in consequence of which she turned in despair from that quarter, incidentally convinced that England had arranged these tricks and troubles in Manchuria and China, and that, being no longer able, single-handed, in face of the pecuniary losses which she had sustained, to work alone, it was to her advantage to come to an understanding with England.

"Every one knows that England's favourite policy in other countries is to produce some extraordinary excitement and preoccupation which shall fully occupy those countries with their own affairs and prevent them from pursuing more ambitious schemes. Thus in recent years she has kept the Ottoman Empire so busy with its own troubles that the statesmen of that Power have been distracted with worry. First there was the war with Greece, and all the military preparations and operations which it involved; then the Armenian agitation and other internal troubles; then the Cretan affair; then the war with the Arabs in Yaman; then the Macedonian and Balkan questions. And while Turkey was thus preoccupied, England was enabled to fix her claws more firmly in Egypt, trample under foot the right of the Sultan, subdue the seventeen million inhabitants of the Súdán and take possession of its spacious cities, kill 'Abdu'lláh Ta'áyishí, the Khalífa of the pretended Mahdí, utterly defeat his army, seize his kingdom and plant the British flag in those lands. And it is clear that had not the Sultan of Turkey been confronted by such internal difficulties, he would not have been content to remain so quiet, or to disregard his established and admitted rights.

"Of a similar policy did Great Britain make use in her dealings with Russia. First she stirred up the war in the Far East, which caused Russia an infinity of trouble and distress;

then, by whatever means, she turned the thoughts of the Russian people towards freedom, so that no sooner was Russia released from her war with Japan than she was confronted with a revolution at home, during which, ere her rival was aware of it, England had firmly established her power and influence in Tibet.

"So again in the case of Persia, England kindled in the Persians an enthusiasm for a constitution, the formation of a National Assembly, liberty, and the like, and so secured for herself a field free from rivals wherein she might direct her course as she pleased.

"In the midst of this hocus-pocus[1], however, there intruded itself one disagreeable incident, which, quite unexpected by England, suddenly disclosed itself, viz. the Indian revolution, and the ideas which had begun to germinate in the brains of the Indians since they heard the news of what was happening in Russia and Persia, whereby they were somewhat awakened from their secular slumber, and began to demand the rights which they had lost. Now it is evident that these ideas may lead to a result highly distasteful to the English, just as the inhabitants of the Transvaal, so soon as they awoke, caused the British Empire endless trouble, inflicted on it heavy losses both in money and life, and disturbed the peaceful repose enjoyed by British statesmen for several years, until finally they succeeded in securing the formation of a Chamber of Deputies, so that now, although they are nominally British subjects, it is evident that from their subjection no advantage or profit accrues to the English, since they will neither give them their wealth nor aid them in time of distress, so that their subjection is a mere name not connoting any reality, though the English are perforce compelled to content themselves with this.

"Let us not, however, stray from our subject. The longer watchful States live, the more their experience and knowledge grows, and the more they profit by their former mistakes, against the recurrence of which in the future they seek to guard themselves. At the beginning of the last century the Powers of Europe persistently opposed and thwarted one another, and

[1] *Ḥayṣa-bayṣa.*

were constantly engaged in strife and contention, as is exemplified by the Napoleonic wars with England and Russia, and other similar wars between the different States. Thereby for the most part they sustained loss both material and moral, and were injured rather than benefited.

"The first country which appreciated this fact was England, which consequently ceased to make war against strong States and substituted a kind of political warfare, advancing her interests chiefly by skilful diplomacy. Gradually other countries also apprehended this policy, and, laying aside sword and gun, adopted in their place the pen and the tongue, confining their rivalries to diplomatic juggling and intrigues[1]. Lately France has apprehended the important truth that rivalry conduces to loss, since for years England and France have been busy in increasing their influence in Egypt and the Súdán on the one hand and Morocco on the other, with no result but mutual embarrassment which prevented the efforts of either from bearing fruit. For fear of France, England could not subdue Egypt, while, for fear of England, France could achieve no notable success in Morocco. So at last M. Delcassé started this idea of a *rapprochement*, telling both sides that, if matters continued as they were, for another century England would derive no benefit from Egypt nor France from Morocco, while both would be compelled to expend large sums every year in guarding against one another, France in bribing a number of the leading men, *'ulamá* and newspapers of Egypt to support her in opposing the English, and, *vice versâ*, the English pursuing a similar course in Morocco, while there always remained a possibility that while both sides were preoccupied with this rivalry, some event might happen which would leave the heads of both hatless, such as that the Egyptians might suddenly develop like the Japanese. 'So,' said he, 'it is better that we should confer together in a sensible manner, settle these questions in a brotherly fashion, and make a just division of the disputed territories, after which each may set about subjugating his own share, free from anxiety as to the action of the other, and refrain from interfering with the other.' Thus Egypt and the Súdán were assigned to the

[1] *Gurba-raqṣání*, "making the cats dance."

English and Morocco to the French, and by a fortunate coincidence an event happened at this juncture which served greatly to strengthen the bonds of union on both sides, and shewed them how advantageous to them both was this Convention and its loyal observance. This event was Germany's championship of Morocco; for it is certain that, had this Convention not been made, as soon as Germany intervened, England would also have had a finger in the matter, and France would have been checked in her schemes of conquest. *En revanche*, France would not have remained inactive, and would have done the same in Egypt, so that both nations would have remained portionless.

"Meanwhile the French told the Russians, who were their allies and confederates, that their tortuous diplomacy was not to their advantage, and that their policy should rather be to come to friendly terms with England. The English, too, were praying for this, and thus it was that both were well inclined towards one another. The idea was first whispered in a veiled manner, the Press on both sides setting forth the virtues of such an understanding, which gradually took definite form, until about a month ago telegraphic information reached us that, in the height of the hot weather, when most government offices are taking holiday, and most people have gone into the country, the British Ambassador and the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs were still in town, energetically sifting the matters to be dealt with in the Agreement, of which the most important portion bore reference to their dealings with Persia, while the remaining clauses had been already settled and done with, though the Persian question was still the subject of serious discussions. Incidentally hopes were expressed that by the beginning of autumn all the provisions of the Agreement would be settled, and that it would be duly signed by both parties. The interest in Persia manifested by Germany, and the concession obtained by her for the formation of a German Eastern Bank, increased the eagerness on both sides, since they knew that if much more time were wasted in discussion, a powerful rival would appear on the scene, and that France would then of necessity be involved, whereby the matter would be rendered difficult, and could no longer be regarded as concerning these two [*i.e.* England and Russia] only."

The second article of the series appeared in the next issue (No. 113), published on the following day (September 10), and ran as follows:—

"In these days it is rumoured that the above-mentioned Agreement has emerged from the realms of consideration and discussion, and that all its provisions and clauses have been arranged in their final form. All discriminating and well-informed persons suspect that, in view of our negligence and ignorance, the signing of this Agreement will be shortly followed by the end of Persia's independence and autonomy. For as soon as the Agreement is signed, the contracting Powers will at once begin to give it practical effect, and to pursue their respective ambitions. We do not complain so much of our own ministers, since these have for years been anointing themselves with this oil, and are so timid that they can do nothing in the presence of foreigners but submit and obey. One of our most patriotic ministers himself repeatedly said to the writer: 'Say whatever you like about the Sháh and his ministers, or the internal affairs of the country, but beware of discussing foreign affairs, or alluding disrespectfully even to the hoofs of their horses, or we shall get into trouble, and incur the anger of the ambassadors.' In the case of the *Maliku't-Tujjár* ('King of the Merchants'), when the *Ḥablu'l-Matín* wrote a few lines dictated by patriotic zeal and a desire for the recognition of the rights of the nation, it was punished in several ways, being first suspended, then required to apologise, and finally mulcted in a fine of fifty *túmáns*, while on the other hand it was agreed to send *Ḥájji Maliku't-Tujjár* to the Ministry of Justice, which has not yet been done. *Mullá Naṣru'd-Dín*, *Táza Ḥayát* ('New Life') and other [Muslim] newspapers published in Russia may say whatever they like and write whatever they choose about our King, our ministers and our deputies, and no one dares to remonstrate; but say only a word on the other side, and there is the Devil to pay! So, to be brief, we hope nothing from our ministers: all our hopes are centred in the deputies, who, after all this shouting and speechifying, ought in such emergencies to do their duty. In minor matters lying outside the scope of their duty and

business they wrangle incessantly, but say nothing to preserve the independence of their country....

"At all events the Assembly ought to make investigations, and should ask the Minister for Foreign Affairs whether the report is true that while we are living in our house others are arranging its disposal and making compacts and conventions with one another without even informing us of the matter. A strange rumour this, the like of which no one has seen! It is the duty of the members of the *Majlis* at once to summon the Ministers to appear before it in public, put a stop to the Committee-mongering and secret conclaves of the last three or four months, and investigate this matter openly, and to inform all the Powers officially that any such agreement concluded without our knowledge is invalid.

"Hitherto our knowledge as to the contents of this Agreement is confined to the following three points: (1) The integrity of Persia, that is to say, the preservation of its independence, so that no foreign power has the right to take possession of a single span of Persian ground. (2) Russia and England guarantee the personal independent sovereignty of the Sháh of Persia. (3) Iṣfahán and Kirmánsháh are included within the limits wherein Russia's political influence is to prevail.

"Now, although this Agreement ostensibly professes to aim at preserving the independence of Persia, whereby some of our deputies have been deceived and have declared in the Assembly that this Agreement will not hurt Persia, since its primary object is to safeguard her independence, yet such as are versed in the jargon of politics know very well that wherever one of these Powers has acquired influence, it has done so under the guise of just such specious and fair-seeming words. Now if these two Powers really desired the continuance of Persia's sovereignty, then there was no need for such an Agreement. Are the United States of America or Japan likely to come from the Far West or the Far East respectively in order to attack or subjugate Persia, that there should be any need for such an Agreement? It is clear that the danger which threatens Persia is precisely from these two Powers [which are parties to the Agreement], and that, if they had no sinister designs,

there would have been no need for any Agreement or Convention.

"Yes, it is precisely under cover of such words that they will interfere in a thousand ways in our country, as they have already done in Egypt and other lands. England's Agreement with Egypt also includes just such a clause, viz. that England guarantees the continuance of the Egyptian Government to the Khedive, but that by virtue of this very guarantee she must set in order the finances and organize the troops of Egypt. And since, moreover, she guarantees the preservation of the throne, she must also guarantee the preservation of public security, since the absence thereof would be injurious to the throne. For the same reason a number of English troops must be garrisoned in Egypt to preserve public order. Assuredly if it is written in this Agreement that the two Powers undertake to safeguard the right of the reigning sovereign, it necessarily follows that as soon as any rival or rebel appears in the country, these two kind friends, actuated by the purest affection, will bring in their troops to suppress him, and then it will be that the business will begin to produce consequences which will be prolonged until the Day of Judgment.

"In order to make this matter clearer, we will content ourselves with one illustration. Let us suppose that this Agreement had been concluded three or four months ago, and that the *Sáláru'd-Dawla's* rebellion had happened after it had been ratified. Reuter's Agency would immediately have informed the whole world that the *Sáláru'd-Dawla* aspired to the throne. The *Daily Mail* would have added an editorial note to the effect that, according to trustworthy information, a number of the notables and chief men of the country were favourably disposed towards his cause. The *Standard* would have said: 'Reliable information has reached us that several tribes in the South and West of Persia are following the Pretender, and it has been ascertained that his army now numbers thirty thousand men.' Next the British Ambassador would officially enquire of the Ministry as to the demands of the new Pretender, and our responsible Ministers would be obliged to reply that the *Sáláru'd-Dawla's* claim was to the Throne itself. 'Very well, then,' the

British Minister would answer, 'Why, then, do you not send troops against the enemy?' 'Well, we are preparing to do so,' they would answer. Some days later news would arrive that the *Sáláru'd-Dawla* had raided the environs of Niháwand and Maláyir and was besieging these two towns.

"The *Times* would instantly publish a long article saying that, in accordance with the guarantee given by the two Powers for the preservation of order and the sovereignty of the Sháh, the necessary preparations must be made to send troops, in case of necessity, to ensure the tranquillity of the country and to overcome and destroy the Pretender. And since the disturbed districts were nearer to Russian territory, troops should be brought from Russia, but that the expenses of the expedition would be equally borne by the two Powers. There would be a vote in Parliament, followed by a correspondence with St Petersburg. The troops would arrive. The *Sálár* would be taken prisoner. The troops would remain for some time in the district, detained by 'restoring order.' The expenses of all these proceedings would be calculated, and would be found to amount to about five million pounds sterling, which would have to be recovered from the Persian treasury (just as in China they demanded the expenses incurred in sending troops and also a fine). Well, the Persian treasury would practically be unable to pay this sum, so it would be found necessary that an official should be appointed on behalf of each of the two Powers to increase the revenues and supervise expenditure, and that the Russian official should watch over the North of Persia, and the English official over the South. After a while each would report to his government to the effect that, having in view the destitution of Persia, the revenue could not be increased, and that the payment of this sum was impossible; and that, in some way or other, the condition of Persia must be improved so that her revenues might be enlarged. Persia, they would add, only needed certain necessary reforms to become more prosperous. Roads and means of communication should be improved; railways were needed in certain places; dams must be constructed to increase agriculture; the erection of factories was greatly needed. Finally, after prolonged discussions, it would be agreed that a sum of at

least twenty million pounds sterling must be lent conjointly by the two Powers, of which sum part should be spent on irrigation, part on roads, part on mines, part for administrative purposes, and so on, and that with the remaining two millions a Bank should be established. The Persian Government would, under the circumstances, be compelled to submit to these conditions and sign the required bond, comforted by the assurance that the conditions were very light and easy, and comprised no more than ten clauses, that the loan would cause Persia to blossom like a garden of roses; and that her revenues would increase tenfold!"

The third article of the series appeared on the following day (Sept. 11, 1907) in No. 114 of the paper, and was as follows:—

"In our last number we reached this point, that the officials representing the two Powers concerned in the Agreement would declare that the well-being of Persia could only be secured by a new loan; and since on the one hand there would be a claim of perhaps five million pounds for restoring internal order, and also previous loans which must be extinguished, we should be compelled by these two claims already established to shew a certain compliancy and obedience. The terms of this new loan would comprise at least two clauses, the ratification of which would close for ever the charter of our independence....

"One of these conditions would be that the officials in control of all the financial departments of the Government must be appointed by the two Powers, and that they in turn must appoint the minor officials. These would assume control over all the frontier districts, possibly over the interior also, and would impose a complete check on the functions of the home officials. We need not remind our readers how much one single Belgian official, on obtaining complete control of the Persian Customs, increased the influence of foreigners, or how he caused Persian *employés* to be ignored and humiliated, and this notwithstanding the fact that we were able to dismiss him at any moment we pleased, and that he had no sort of independent authority in our country. Whoever has examined the new Customs Tariff [drawn up by him] knows of what treason to

our country this ungrateful wretch was guilty, how he increased Russian influence, and how he behaved towards the Persians. Hence it will be evident how the Russian and English officials, enjoying complete authority and unrestricted power, and representing Persia's creditors, are likely to conduct themselves. Every one who has read about the Denshawi incident in Egypt will understand our meaning: how on that occasion they hanged several Egyptians for killing one Englishman, and imprisoned a number more for various periods, and how Lord Cromer shewed a ruthlessness which will never be expunged from the page of history. Moreover since the borrowed capital will be under their own control, they will employ it in such a way that most of it will revert to their own countries.

"Another condition will be that all concessions granted by Persia, whether internal or external, must be approved, sanctioned and ratified by the two Powers. Accordingly a Persian subject will neither be able to obtain a concession for the manufacture of paper nor to set up a factory, since the granting of all such concessions will be in the hands of the above-mentioned functionaries, who, in one way or another, will prefer their compatriots to us, so that all commercial undertakings will pass into the hands of Russian and English merchants.

"Another condition will be that these officials shall receive their salaries from Persia, who will recognize their claims and rights, and, in return for their services to their governments, they will receive a yearly payment in cash from the Persian treasury. It will be the old story of Lord Cromer and Egypt, when it was said in Parliament that in return for securing Egypt for the English he ought to receive from the revenues of Egypt fifty thousand pounds.

"Another condition will be that all the material wealth of Persia must be handed over to guarantee the debt. This stipulation will include the mines, coasts, customs, ports, telegraphs and revenues, and since the debt must be paid out of these sources of wealth, and the Persians do not know how to manage them or put them to profitable use, therefore officials appointed by the two Powers must superintend them, and take such steps as may be required to render them productive. The Persian

Ministers must therefore be subordinated to these foreign officials, whose commands and prohibitions they will not have the slightest right to disregard.

"Some years ago I recollect that a certain Egyptian edited a classic work designed for use in the Egyptian schools, and forwarded it to the Egyptian Minister of Public Instruction, who approved it, and ordered that a certain number of copies should be bought and distributed amongst the Government schools. When news of this reached the Adviser to the Ministry appointed by the English, he angrily refused his consent, saying, 'If the Minister wants the book he must pay for it out of his own pocket.' His real object in displaying this outburst of temper was to weaken the Egyptian Minister's Power, in order that people might clearly understand who enjoyed the real authority, and who must be courted and flattered.

"Sooner or later, then, this loan would be effected, and the officials of the two Powers would arrive, and would enter into the control of all departments of the executive. They would then consider it desirable, in order that in the future they might have at their disposal more efficient men, to improve education in Persia, and an Englishman would be appointed Adviser to the Ministry of Public Instruction, who would make English the official language of the schools, as has been done in Egypt. Should Russia raise any objections, then Russian would be made the second language, just as in the Egyptian schools all instruction is given in English, while no attention is paid to Arabic. Thus our children too would be educated in English ways and fashions, and would become anglicized and anglophil, losing all national sentiments and becoming the friends and admirers of the English.

"However lack of space forbids us to pursue this theme further, and our meaning will be sufficiently apprehended from the above brief and summary sketch.

"Now the first two articles of the Agreement are at complete variance with the third, since the inclusion of Iṣfahán and Kirmánsháh within the Russian sphere of political influence clearly points to a partition and is incompatible with the independence of Persia; although to-day's telegrams assert the

contrary of this clause, declaring that the influence of the two Powers extends through the whole of Persia, and that they have agreed to regard the whole of Persia as open to their respective influences, and have abandoned the idea of its being divided. Our own belief, however, is that the earlier information is the more correct. Moreover, hitherto whenever they have talked of their 'influence' they have limited it to commercial influence, but now they have cast aside the veil and suddenly begin to talk in a quite different fashion, turning the talk to political influence. What this means precisely we do not know. If it merely means dictating and interfering, this is quite illegal and cannot be reckoned as a 'right' of any foreign nation. *Ḥájji Maliku't-Tujjár* embezzled other peoples' property and then took refuge in the Russian Legation, and the Ambassador, contrary to all international laws, protected him. This has nothing to do with the question: it is an isolated act of pure lawlessness and violence, and with such as this the Agreement has no connection. But if something else is intended, then it were well that it should be clearly explained.

"To-day's telegrams are deserving of close attention, and in particular those in authority should read them carefully, apprehend the essence of the matter, and take precautionary measures. As a sample we here reproduce several paragraphs from them."

[Here follow several quotations, describing the ratification of the Anglo-Russian Agreement, the satisfaction with which it has been hailed in the English Press, as affording a fresh guarantee of peace in the world, and some remarks of the *Standard's* St Petersburg correspondent, who represents each of the two Powers as consenting to the limitation of its political influence to a specified portion of Persia, while in commercial undertakings they shall be on an equal footing throughout the whole of Persia. Thus Russia has agreed that the gates of the northern provinces of Persia shall be open to English commerce and enterprise, while England, on the other hand, permits and approves Russian commerce in the southern provinces.] The article then continues:—

"The beauty of the thing is that Russia grants permission to England to open the doors of her commercial influence in the

North, while England kindly vouchsafes the same permission to Russia in the South! But what business has Russia in Persia either to grant or withhold such permission? From North to South Persia is ours: we are neither minors needing a guardian, nor lunatics needing a keeper. Although the *Mukhbiru'l-Mulk* declared in Parliament that 'Persia needed a tutor,' this is nonsense: the Persians have reached years of discretion and need no tutor. If they did, they would not have a Parliament, which implies the transference to the people of their power and rights, so that they may manage their own affairs, and elect from amongst themselves ministers to act for them. If they have not attained discretion, then they are also not entitled to elect deputies. At any rate we fail to perceive on what ground these two Powers give permission to one another to enter some one else's territory, or why they should 'spend money out of the guest's purse.' If they intended to take precautions in the matter of the German Bank, and were anxious to make a forcible protest, still what right have these two Powers to interfere? The matter did not go so far as to justify such a course.

"To-day it is necessary that the Foreign Minister of Persia should clearly inform the two Powers that no Agreement having reference to Persia and concluded without her knowledge is valid or entitled to the slightest consideration; and that any Power desiring to enter into relations with Persia must address itself directly to the Persians themselves, no one else having any right to intervene in any way; just as Persia would approach England directly in any matter concerning that country, so ought England to act in converse circumstances."

The fourth article of the series appeared on September 14, 1907, in No. 115 of the paper, and is followed by the text of a very important communication made by the British Minister at Ṭihrán to the Persian Minister for Foreign Affairs, with a view to allaying the disquietude caused in Persia by the Anglo-Russian Agreement.

"It is worthy of special note that this Agreement should take

place at this critical juncture, when the internal affairs of Persia are in such confusion that the wisest men in the country are utterly at a loss as to how to remedy them. First of all the most careful investigations are needed as to the actual articles of this Agreement, for it is evident that we must not suffer ourselves to be misled by the diplomatic utterances of the two Powers into neglecting to acquaint ourselves with the facts of the case, even though diplomatic etiquette may forbid us to enquire officially about the provisions of a secret treaty. Moreover, however desirous we may be to obtain the truth of the matter from the contracting Powers themselves, even this would not completely reassure us or set our minds at ease. So, for example, if England and France should conclude a treaty with one another, it would be Germany's duty to get possession by external means, whether by the expenditure of [secret service] money or otherwise, of the actual text of its clauses, while should she seek to inform herself by official correspondence of the real object of the covenanting states, she would be guilty of an error.

"In the second place, our primary duty is to be so watchful and wary, and to take such effective precautions against coming storms, that our watchfulness may put a stop to foreign designs against our country. It is not for the moment necessary for us to regard the real motives of the two Powers: we must assume that they actually intend to divide our country. In this case it is clear that their method of procedure will not be to bring in troops and forcibly take possession. They will rather insert their claws gradually, and adopt such means and methods as will result in finishing us off in another ten or twenty years. We, then, on our side, must make such preparations as will prove a counter-charm[1] to their actions. Henceforth, then, it is urgently necessary that we should earnestly and strenuously endeavour to set our house in order, put a stop to the increase of foreign influences, and make it so clear to them that we are alive and awake that they will leave us alone.

"Thus, for example, one of the principal means employed to

[1] *Báṭilu's-siḥr.*

weaken a nation is to set obstacles in the way of its commerce, so that it may be constrained by poverty to borrow money on any terms which may be dictated to it. Now we see with our own eyes how the foreigners are striving to empoverish us, and how every day the want of money makes itself more urgently felt amongst us. If we compare the present state of things with that which prevailed two months ago, we see that the dearth of money is much greater and capital much more embarrassed. The present state of things is such that by reason of lack of funds we are unable to mobilize a single regiment, or even one hundred Cossacks. Our merchants are at their wits' end, and do not know where to turn for two or three thousand *túmáns*. The Russian Bank, which in reality is one of the causes which have brought about this state of things, has ceased to do business, and is constantly pressing to recover its claims, gladly receiving even five *túmáns* from one on whom it has a claim of a thousand, since it knows that to remove from circulation even this small sum helps to impede the wheels of commerce. It is not improbable that hereafter it will not advance a single *dínár* to any one, and, on pretence of winding up its affairs, will exert pressure to recover its debts. On this matter we shall give fuller explanations presently.

"Let us now return to the first point, namely the interpretation of the provisions of the Agreement. It appears from to-day's telegrams, which consist entirely of reports of the opinions expressed by the Russian and English newspapers, that the English have got the best of the bargain, for their newspapers express great satisfaction and delight, while the Russian newspapers, on the contrary, are not so well pleased. It is not yet clear why the former are so pleased and the latter so dissatisfied, and our remarks are based on conjecture rather than certainty. Here is an epitome of to-day's telegrams, communicated to us by the Telegraph Company."

[Here follow extracts representing the views of the *Times*, *Standard*, *Morning Post*, and *Daily Telegraph*. "The Russian papers also," adds the writer, "generally express satisfaction, but their remarks are not inspired by any extraordinary gratification or enthusiasm."]

We now come to the very important communication made by the British Minister at Ṭihrán to the Persian Minister for Foreign Affairs, which is introduced by the following paragraph.

"The British Minister at Ṭihrán has also written an explanation on this subject, dated the 26th of Rajab last (= Sept. 5, 1907), that is eight days ago, to the Persian Ministry for Foreign Affairs. It appears from its contents that the British Minister is very anxious to remove the suspicion which has established itself in men's minds that the above-mentioned Agreement refers to the partition of Persia. With great difficulty we have obtained a copy of this document, which we here reproduce for the information of all our honoured readers. Thereafter we shall supplement it with an expression of our own personal opinions on the subject, and offer some suggestions as to how we should deal with this intractable malady, which suggestions may perhaps be considered by those in power, so that they may seek for some cure and remedy, whereby some light may dawn on our dark horizon."

Here follows the—

"COPY OF THE ABOVE-MENTIONED COMMUNICATION [from the British Minister] DATED RAJAB 26" [= Sept. 5, 1907].

"Information has reached me that it is rumoured in Persia that an Agreement has been concluded between England and Russia which will result in the intervention of these two Powers in Persia, and the partition of that country between them. Your Excellency is well aware that the negotiations between Russia and England are of a wholly different character; for the *Mushíru'l-Mulk* has recently been in St Petersburg and London and has conversed with the Russian and English Ministers for Foreign Affairs, who, on behalf of their respective governments, have clearly explained the aims of the two Powers in Persia, which explanations he will no doubt have reported.

"Sir Edward Grey, the British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, has informed me of the substance of his conversations with the *Mushíru'l-Mulk*, and also of the substance of his

communications with M. Isvolsky, which have been officially communicated to the British Government.

"Sir Edward Grey informs me that he has explained to the *Mushíru'l-Mulk* that he and M. Isvolsky are in perfect accord on two essential points.

"First, neither of the two Powers will interfere in Persian affairs unless some injury is inflicted on the property or persons of their subjects.

"Secondly, the negotiations connected with the Agreement between the two Powers must not violate the integrity and independence of Persia.

"Sir Edward Grey also explains that hitherto antagonism existed between Russia and England, each of which sought to prevent the continuance of the other in Persia; and that had this antagonism been prolonged in the present uncertain state of Persia, suspicion would have arisen on one side, or on both, that the other was interfering in the internal affairs of Persia to prevent its rival from profiting by the existing state of things, and to secure profit for itself at the expense of the other. The object of the present negotiations between England and Russia is to obviate the occurrence of such difficulties, and they are in truth in no way directed against Persia, as M. Isvolsky explained to the *Mushíru'l-Mulk*, saying, 'Neither of the two Powers demands anything of Persia, and so Persia can devote all her energies to the settlement of her internal affairs.' Both Ministers were in full accord as to non-intervention, and left no room for any doubt on this matter. M. Isvolsky's words, which likewise express the intentions of Great Britain, are as follows:

"'The Russian Government's rule will be that, so long as no injury accrues to its interests, it will avoid interfering in any way in the internal affairs of other countries. It is quite impossible that it should deviate from this rule in the present case.'

"As for the rumoured partition of Persia between England and Russia which is talked of, the two Powers above mentioned desire to define a limit of power for themselves. Sir Edward Grey and M. Isvolsky have explicitly declared that these rumours are absolutely devoid of foundation. What the two Powers desire is that an Agreement should be made to prevent future

difficulties and dissensions, by which Agreement neither Power aims at establishing its influence in those parts of Persia which are adjacent to the frontier of the other. The Agreement threatens neither Persia's own interests, nor those of any other foreign nation: it only binds Russia and England not to embark on any undertaking injurious to one another, and delivers Persia for the future from those demands which in the past have proved so hurtful to the advancement of her interests. M. Isvolsky's statement is as follows:—

"'The Agreement between the two European Powers which have the greatest interests in Persia, an Agreement based on a guarantee of the independence and integrity of Persia, will conduce to the advancement of Persia's interests, so that she, encouraged and aided by her two powerful neighbours, can henceforth concentrate all her energies on internal progress.'

"You will perceive from the above statements how unfounded are the reports recently put about in Persia concerning the political ambitions of England and Russia in that country. They have no sort of intention of attacking Persia's independence, which it is their object in concluding this Agreement to ensure for ever. Not only do they not seek a pretext for intervention, but their aim in these friendly negotiations is not to permit one another to intervene in Persia on the pretext of safeguarding their own interests. The two powers above mentioned hope that in the future Persia will be for ever delivered from the fear of foreign intervention, and will enjoy complete freedom to manage her affairs in her own way, whereby advantage will accrue both to herself and to the whole world."

The importance of this document can hardly be overestimated, for thereby Great Britain, speaking officially through her accredited representatives, not only declared that she herself had no intention of interfering in Persian affairs, but that Russia was equally innocent of such intention. Nothing can be more explicit than the statement that in this Agreement the common aim of the two contracting Powers was, not only to avoid any pretext for intervention, but "*not to permit one another to intervene in Persia* on the pretext of safeguarding their own interests."

Thus England pledged her honour not merely as regards her own course of conduct, but as regards Russia's—a rash pledge, as some may think, for what would England do if Russia should break her promise?—a contingency, if the history of her former proceedings in Central Asia be considered, which cannot be regarded as wholly impossible! She scarcely could, and certainly would not, go to war for a breach of an Agreement especially designed to secure peace; and her only other course would be to go on pretending that Russia was observing the Agreement as loyally as herself until the facts of the case could no longer be ignored, and then to declare that she could not consent to be bound by an Agreement which did not bind the other contracting party, and that henceforth the Agreement must be regarded as null and void. But in the meanwhile Russia would have enormously strengthened her position in Central Asia (how enormously is, perhaps, not generally realized), and, so far as Persia is concerned, "ere the antidote could be brought from 'Iráq, he whom the snake had bitten would be dead."

One thing, however, is clearly proved by the communication cited above, namely, that England repudiated any intention of interfering in Persia, and that consequently all the discussions as to the respective values of the spheres of influence indicated in the Agreement are founded on a complete misapprehension of its nature. The truth seems to be that, so far as the British Government was concerned, the Agreement was in reality of the nature of a renunciation, and was dictated:—

(1) By a genuine desire for peace in general.

(2) By a special desire for peace, and, more than that, increased friendliness with Russia, this being in some sense the outcome of the Anglo-French *entente*.

(3) By a genuine desire not to add to the responsibilities of the British empire, already heavy enough.

(4) By a desire to economize in military expenditure, especially in India, a condition of such economy being that the ancient bogey of a Russian invasion should be exorcised otherwise than by extensive armaments.

To attain these desirable objects it was necessary to do two things which must have been very distasteful to a Liberal

administration, viz. to whitewash the Russian Government and to throw over the Persian Constitutionalists. It was unfortunate that at this particular juncture the Russian Government was displaying its illiberal methods and barbarous cruelty towards its own subjects in a singularly conspicuous manner; that courts-martial, hangings, floggings and secret tortures in prison were not only matters of daily occurrence, but happened many times a day in many different places; and that the venerable Count Tolstoy, who had hitherto avoided political utterances, was at last moved to utter and publish a moving protest which threw these horrors into glaring relief[1]. It is unnecessary to discuss these horrors—far worse than anything done in Persia in recent years—in detail here, but according to the *Právo*, described as "the foremost legal paper in Russia," in twenty months from 1650 to 1700 people had been executed by court-martial, or an average of three a day[2]; while some idea of the ferocity with which martial law was administered in the Baltic provinces between December, 1905, and March 1, 1907, may be gleaned from a letter of Prince Kropotkine's on this subject published in the *Times* of July 28, 1908. Still, political exigencies must, apparently, even in the case of a Liberal Government, over-ride mere humanitarian sentiments, and the Government organs in the Press had to put the best face they could on the matter, gracefully ignore the courts-martial, the hangings, the farm-burnings and the prison tortures of their new ally, and simulate, at least, some enthusiasm for "Holy Russia," which seems to wield so strange a hypnotic influence over a certain number of prominent English Liberals.

As for Persia, well, she must look after herself. England had helped her, indirectly at least, to get her Constitution, and naturally had some sympathy for its supporters, but could not, of course, give them any material help, or suffer the *Ẓillu's-Sulṭán*, or any other rival of the reigning monarch whom the Constitutionalists might, in certain events, prefer, to contest the throne with Muḥammad 'Alí Sháh. All this, except, perhaps, the last item, was fair enough, and the complaint uttered by

[1] A translation of this protest was published in the *Daily Chronicle* of July 15, 1908.

[2] *Daily News*, June 4, 1908.

some of the Persian refugees, that England should not have helped them to obtain a Constitution unless she was prepared to give it continued support, is unjust, considering that England could not, if she would, maintain the National Assembly by armed force against the Sháh, and also that Persia would—with reason—have regarded such armed intervention as undesirable and dangerous. They had, on the other hand, a right to expect that England would, in view of the promises given by her Minister at Ṭihrán, require of Russia an equally scrupulous abstention from any interference, since any action taken by Russia subsequently to the conclusion of the Agreement would, unless formally and publicly repudiated by England, be supposed to have her support and approval.

It is not clear how far the Persian Constitutionalists were actually reassured by the British Minister's communication, but though the series of articles, of which the first four have been translated above, is continued in the next two numbers of the *Ḥablu'l-Matín*, its tone changes; the attacks on the Agreement cease, or take a quite subordinate place; and the themes treated, though still connected with the methods of European aggression in Eastern countries, especially through financial channels, become much more general, and, if the expression may be permitted, less personal. The remaining articles, therefore, though interesting enough in their way, have not a sufficiently direct bearing on the Anglo-Russian Agreement to render necessary their inclusion in this chapter.

The explanation given above of the motives which prompted the British Government to acquiesce in the principles embodied in the Anglo-Russian Agreement is the most favourable, and, it is to be hoped, the true one. But it must be remembered that many Persian and not a few Russian politicians conceive these motives as being of a much more cynical character, and assert that Great Britain's real object was to prevent the spread of Constitutional ideas in Asia, for fear of the influence they might exert on India and Egypt; to keep Persia weak and distracted; and to maintain in their present deserted and depopulated condition those provinces of Persia (Kirmán and Sístán) which lay nearest to her Indian frontier.

CHAPTER VII.

THE COUP D'ÉTAT OF JUNE 23, 1908, AND DESTRUCTION OF THE FIRST MAJLIS.

WE have seen how complete was the triumph of the *Majlis* and the popular party over the Sháh and the forces of reaction in the abortive *coup d'état* of December, 1907. The crisis on that occasion lasted only five or six days (December 13 or 14 to December 18 or 19). It began with the demand on the part of the *Majlis* (December 13) for the dismissal of the Sháh's reactionary advisers, especially the Amír Bahádur Jang and *Sa'du'd-Dawla*. It was acute from December 14–18, when the national volunteers (whose numbers at their maximum were estimated at 2,000 by the Persian correspondent of the *Times*) flocked to the defence of the Bahárístán, or House of Parliament, and the Sipahsálár Mosque, while the Sháh's "*lúṭís*" or roughs occupied the Artillery Square, or *Maydán-i-Túp-khána* (where they remained until Sunday, December 22), molesting passers-by and plundering the Jewish quarter. And its acute stage came to an end on December 18, when, after receiving visits from the French and Austrian Ministers and the Turkish Ambassador, the Sháh gave way, promising to punish the rioters whom he himself had incited to riot, and to dismiss his reactionary advisers. On December 19, Taqí-záda delivered his great speech in the National Assembly. On December 20 the Sháh nominated a new Cabinet with *Niẓámu's Salṭana* as Premier. Next day the Sháh's uncle, the *Ẓillu's-Sulṭán*, was ordered to leave the capital, but he received the message with contempt, beat the messenger, and caused him to be violently ejected from his house. Thereupon he was warned in threatening language by the British and Russian Ministers to keep quiet; an action comprehensible enough so far as the Russians were concerned,

Sulṭán Mas'úd Mírzá *Ẓillu's-Sulṭán*
(born January 5, 1850)

but less intelligible on the part of the English, to whom that Prince was so favourably disposed even so far back as 1888 that his dismissal from most of his governments early in that year was regarded as a blow to English influence and a triumph for Russian diplomacy. The *Ẓillu's-Sulṭán* was hated by the Persians, especially by the Iṣfahánís, who had had the best opportunities of knowing him, on account of his numerous acts of cruelty, and nothing could be more absurd and baseless than the theory advanced by Dr E. J. Dillon and other partisans of the Russian Government that he was "the brain of the revolutionary movement[1]," which aimed simply at putting him on the throne. But after the *Ẓillu's-Sulṭán* had been rejected by the Constitutionalists and mulcted in a large sum of money, Dr E. J. Dillon changed his tune, and ceased to speak of him as "an unprincipled claimant to the throne of absolutism," "a tyrant by temperament," and "an Oriental despot and human beast, whose cruelty of heart is but rarely tempered by his clearness of understanding," describing him instead as "one of the most influential members of the royal family," to whose charge "no crime was laid[2]."

After the *coup d'état* of December, 1907, great efforts were made by the National Assembly to improve the relations between the Sháh and the popular party, and a "Conciliation Committee" (*Majlis-i-Istiḥbáb*) was formed, which had this for its principal object. Their efforts were seconded by *Shu'á'u's-Salṭana*, the Sháh's brother, and *'Aẓudu'l-Mulk*, the head of the Qájár or royal tribe. They so far succeeded that on the occasion of the two festivals known as the *'Íd-i-Ghadír* and the *'Íd-i-Qurbán* the Sháh received deputations sent by the *Majlis* to offer him their congratulations.

In spite of these apparent improvements in the situation, however, the political horizon continued dark and threatening. The Turkish troops continued their advance across the North-West frontier, and entered Sáwúch Buláq, the Persians, commanded by the *Farmán-farmá*, being unable to offer any effective resistance, while the attitude of Russia on several

[1] *Contemporary Review*, for August, 1908, p. 251.
[2] *Ibid.*, October, 1909, p. 511.

matters continued to inspire the most lively anxiety. Soon, moreover, there arose fresh grounds of friction between the National Assembly and the Sháh. On December 18 a Zoroastrian banker named Arbáb Firídún was murdered in Ṭihrán, and it was proved to the satisfaction of the *Majlis* that the murder was instigated by the *Mujallalu's-Sulṭán*, one of the Sháh's reactionary courtiers, whom, accordingly, it was decided to punish. The Sháh, however, objected to this, taking up the position that his courtiers were sacrosanct, and should not be made amenable to the laws like ordinary mortals, and consequently it was not until May, five months after the perpetration of the crime, that he and his accomplices were punished with exile to Kalát, whence they were brought back in triumph by the Sháh four or five weeks later after the destruction of the *Majlis*.

About the end of February, 1908, a worse thing happened. While the Sháh was driving through the streets of the capital a bomb was thrown which wrecked his automobile and killed one of the occupants. The Sháh himself, who was in another carriage, was uninjured, but he was naturally very much alarmed, and thenceforth the hope of any sort of reconciliation became fainter and fainter. Next day another bomb exploded in a dust-heap near the same spot, killing two more men. The house from which the bomb was thrown was occupied by a goldsmith named Sayyid Ghulám Riẓá of Marand, who was arrested and cross-examined, but nothing definite transpired as to the perpetrators of the outrage, apparently three in number, who effected their escape. By the reactionaries it was, of course, represented as the work of revolutionaries; while the Nationalist leaders declared that it was engineered by the reactionary party in order to prevent any reconciliation between the Sháh and the National Assembly, and asserted that the bomb-throwers were known to have been in communication with the notorious Shapshál Khán, the Russian Jew who was the Sháh's tutor during his youth, and throughout his reign his evil genius[1]. The *Mudabbiru'l-Mulk*, sometime editor of the

[1] See, however, the disclaimer of "Adjutant-General Chapchal" published in the *Daily Telegraph* of January 25, 1909.

Husayn Páshá Khán *Amír Bahádur Jang*

One of the chief Reactionaries

Tamaddun, in a narrative of the *coup d'état* of June 23, 1908, which he contributed to the Calcutta (weekly) *Ḥablu'l-Matín* of September 14, 1908, goes even further, and states that the Sháh himself arranged, or was privy to, the bomb-throwing, hoping thereby to discredit the National Assembly.

About the beginning of April, 1908, the *Iḥtishámu's-Salṭana*, who became President of the Assembly at the beginning of September, 1907, on the resignation of *Ṣanʿu'd-Dawla*, resigned, and was succeeded by the *Mumtázu'd-Dawla*. He had made himself very unpopular by his endeavours to restrict the freedom of the Press and of public speakers, and by his opposition to the formation of a national militia. Under his successor matters progressed much more smoothly. About this time punishment was inflicted on four of the leaders of the roughs who had demonstrated against the Parliament in December. These were, the *Ṣanʿ-i-Ḥaẓrat*, *Muqtadir-i-Niẓám*, Ná'ib Ismaʿíl, and Sayyid Kamál, all of whom were bastinadoed and exiled to Kalát for ten years; and similar punishment was inflicted on those convicted of the murder of the Zoroastrian Arbáb Firídún about a month later.

The events which led up to the second and disastrous *coup d'état* began towards the end of May, 1908. The relations between the Sháh and the Assembly being still very strained, the aged *ʿAẓudu'l-Mulk* constituted himself the intermediary between the Court and the Assembly. The Sháh demanded that the newspapers and the popular orators should cease to speak against him, while the Assembly demanded the dismissal of six of the most stubborn reactionaries who were regarded as chiefly responsible for the Sháh's constant intrigues against the Constitution. These six were, the Amír Bahádur Jang, Shapshál Khán, the *Mufákhiru'l-Mulk*, the *Amínu'l-Mulk*, the *Muwaqqaru's-Salṭana* and the *Mujallalu's-Sulṭán*. The Sháh consented to this, insisting, however, that the Assembly should act first; but at length it was agreed that action on both sides should be simultaneous. Finally the Constitutionalists elected a Committee consisting of the great popular orator Áqá Sayyid Jamál, Jahángír Khán, editor of the *Ṣúr-i-Isráfíl*, Sayyid Muḥammad Riẓá of Shíráz, editor of the *Musáwát*,

and some deputies influential in swaying public opinion, and these so exerted themselves on the side of moderation that very soon a much more respectful tone was adopted towards the Sháh both in the Press and by the popular orators. But still the Sháh refused to dismiss the obnoxious courtiers until finally a number of the nobles and notables, headed by Prince *Jalálu'd-Dawla* (cousin to the Sháh and son of the *Ẓillu's-Sulṭán*), *'Alá'u'd-Dawla*, the *Mu'tamad-i-Kháqán*, the *Sardár-i-Manṣúr* and the *Wazír-i-Humáyún*, reinforced by the *anjumans* and the people, urged the point so strongly that the Sháh at last gave way on June 1, 1908. The dismissed courtiers, however, did not go far afield, and the Amír Bahádur Jang took refuge in the Russian Legation, while Shapshál Khán and also the Cossack Colonel Liakhoff continued to visit the Sháh, who feigned to be in fear of the Constitutionalists.

On the following day (June 2) took place an act of intervention by the Russian Minister (and, as Sayyid Taqí-záda confidently asserted, the British Chargé d'Affaires[1]) which greatly conduced to, if it did not actually cause, the miserable results which followed three weeks later. On the morning of that day, according to Sayyid Taqí-záda's narrative, these two diplomatists, who were then in their summer quarters, the one at Zarganda, the other at Qulhak, telegraphed in French to the Minister for Foreign Affairs informing him that they proposed to call on him at 4 p.m. that day, "pour discuter la situation actuelle, qui nous paraît très-alarmante," and requesting him to invite the *'Aẓudu'l-Mulk* and the *Mumtázu'd-Dawla* (the President of the Assembly) to meet them there. These two declined to come, on the ground that all communications from the representatives of foreign powers should be made through the Minister for Foreign Affairs. The diplomatists arrived at the time specified, and M. de Hartwig, the Russian Minister,

[1] Taqí-záda's assertion, when first made, was scouted by the *Times* as a "Persian fairy-tale" (see leading article of Nov. 28, 1908), but its truth was subsequently proved by the Blue Book (Persia, No. 1, 1909: Cd. 4581), No. 175, pp. 139–140. M. de Hartwig having expressed his anxiety about Muḥammad 'Alí Sháh, and his wish to point out to the Persian minister for Foreign Affairs "the grave consequences which might ensue to Persia should anything happen to the Sháh," Mr Marling, the British *Chargé d'Affaires*, said he "was quite willing to join him," and did so.

addressed a long remonstrance, concluding with a threat, to the Persian Minister for Foreign Affairs. "The life of the Sháh," he said, "is in jeopardy. What business have these Nationalists to interfere with His Majesty's personal servants, especially the old Amír Bahádur Jang, who watches over his master's safety like a faithful watch-dog? The *anjumans* and Nationalists have transgressed all bounds, and wish now to depose the Sháh. This we cannot tolerate, and, should it happen, Russia will be compelled to interfere, and will do so with the approval and sanction of England." This was the substance of what M. Hartwig said, and, when he had ceased, Mr Marling, the British Chargé d'Affaires, briefly endorsed his remarks. The two then went on to the house of the *'Aẓudu'l-Mulk*, with whom they found Prince *Jalálu'd-Dawla* and the *'Alá'u'd-Dawla*, and made the same communication to him.

The *Mushíru'd-Dawla*, the Persian Minister for Foreign Affairs, went immediately after the departure of M. de Hartwig and Mr Marling to the National Assembly, and reported the sinister message which he had just received to the President, *Mumtázu'd-Dawla*, and Sayyid Taqí-záda and the *Mustasháru'd-Dawla*, two of the Deputies for Tabríz, who, dreading foreign intervention more than anything else, and deeming "a sick nation better than a dead nation," decided that all thought of armed opposition to the Sháh must, in view of Russia's threats, be abandoned.

Early next day (June 3, 1908) took place the Sháh's sudden flight from the city, where he was afraid to remain, to the Bágh-i-Sháh ("King's Garden") outside the walls. This flight was carried out with great skill. First of all two regiments of Siláḥkhúrís (about 2,000 men) were suddenly let loose on the town, and rushed through the streets and *bázárs*, arms and legs bare, shooting, shouting and slashing, and creating a general panic throughout the city. Meanwhile a body of 300 Cossacks and two guns passed the Bahárístán, where the National Assembly was sitting, discussing the situation. Thither crowds flocked to learn the news or to prepare to defend the Assembly in case of need. While their attention was thus distracted the Sháh suddenly emerged from his Palace amidst a cloud of

Cossacks, Shapshál Khán, sword in hand, riding at his side, and went first to the Cossack barracks or *Qazzáq-khána*, entering by one gate and almost immediately emerging by another. There he was joined by Colonel Liakhoff and another body of Cossacks, who conducted him to the Bágh-i-Sháh, where his son, the *Walí-'ahd*, or Crown Prince, a boy of ten or eleven years of age, subsequently joined him. It was not until two hours after the flight had been accomplished that it became generally known to the people that the Sháh had left the city.

From the Bágh-i-Sháh the Sháh wrote to the Chief Minister (*Ra'ísu'l-Wuzará*), the *Mushíru's-Salṭana*, a reassuring letter, saying that he merely desired change of air and rest, and that no political importance was to be attached to his leaving the town. Notwithstanding this, great alarm and anxiety prevailed amongst the people, and the next day about a thousand armed volunteers assembled in and round about the Baháristán, demanding that the gates should be closed, the military stores seized, and the Shah's deposition proclaimed. Sayyid Taqízáda, however, accompanied by Ḥájji Mírzá Ibráhím Áqá, the Director of the *Anjuman-i-Muẓaffarí* (which had its rooms close to the entrance of the Baháristán, and served as a meeting-place for representatives of all the other *anjumans*) endeavoured to calm the people and persuade the Volunteers to lay down their arms or disperse, in which endeavour they ultimately succeeded, and tranquillity was re-established.

On June 4 the Sháh sent for the *'Aẓudu'l-Mulk*, and through him transmitted reassuring messages to the nobles and notables, requesting that a dozen or so of them, who had most urgently demanded the dismissal of Shapshál Khán, should wait upon him at the Bágh-i-Sháh to discuss the situation. The notables in question, amongst whom were included Prince *Jalálu'd-Dawla*, *'Alá'u'd-Dawla*, the *Wazír-i-Humáyún*, the *Mu'tamad-i-Khágán*, the *Sardár-i-Manṣúr*, the *Mu'áwinu'd-Dawla*, and the *Qá'im-Maqám*, very naturally mistrusted the Sháh, and at first declined to go, but on June 5 they were finally persuaded, by the assurances of *'Aẓudu'l-Mulk*, to repair to the Bágh-i-Sháh. On their arrival there they had an interview with the Sháh, but as they were leaving several of them were arrested by the

Cossacks and detained. The *Mu'tamad-i-Kháqán*, however, succeeded in effecting his escape, and hastened to the Assembly to inform the Deputies of what had taken place. He described how they had at first been well received by the Sháh, but how, at the close of the interview, as the Sháh retired into his *andarún*, a bugle was blown and all but himself (who hid behind the trees in the garden) were arrested; though only three, as afterwards transpired, viz. Prince *Jalálu'd-Dawla*, *'Alá'u'd-Dawla* and the *Sardár-i-Manṣúr* were detained, and subsequently exiled to Fírúzkúh.

The Assembly had been engaged in endeavours to tranquillize the people, to moderate the vehemence of the Press, the *anjumans* and the public speakers, and to bring about an understanding with the Sháh, and a committee of twelve had been appointed that very day for this purpose. The arrival of the *Mu'tamad-i-Kháqán* about sunset with this fresh news of the Sháh's treachery naturally caused the utmost consternation and excitement, and Sayyid 'Abdu'lláh and Sayyid Muḥammad at once wrote a letter to the Sháh demanding the release of the three captives.

Next day (June 6) the Sháh continued to collect troops, and seized all the telegraph-offices, which he placed under the charge of the *Mukhbiru'd-Dawla*, so that the National Assembly was now cut off from all communications with the provinces. The *Wazír-i-Akram*, who was the governor of Ṭihrán, was dismissed and replaced by Prince *Mu'ayyidu'd-Dawla*, an uncompromising reactionary. The Sháh also issued a manifesto in which he declared his intention of "extirpating certain mischief-makers" in the country; and a few days later the Director of the *Anjuman-i-Birádarán-i-Darwáza-i-Qazwín* ("Society of Brethren of the Qazwín Gate"), Mírzá Sulaymán Khán, who was also Assistant Minister of War, was arrested on the charge of supplying the supporters of the Constitution with arms from the Arsenal, and was carried captive to the Bágh-i-Sháh.

The Sháh now established martial law, filled the town with Cossack patrols, and put Colonel Liakhoff in command, besides disarming the people as far as possible. On June 11 he sent an officer and 25 Cossacks to the Assembly with an ultimatum,

saying that unless the people assembled in the Mosque dispersed within two hours, he would disperse them by force of arms, even if artillery had to be employed for this purpose. The Emergency Committee (which was practically the former Conciliation Committee, and consisted of the same twelve persons) unanimously agreed that, in the circumstances, their only course was to persuade the people to disperse, and the President of the Assembly, *Mumtázu'd-Dawla*, the *Mustasháru'd-Dawla*, and Sayyid Taqí-záda accordingly proceeded to the Mosque, where some 10,000 people were assembled, and advised them to depart to their homes. This at first they refused to do, nor was Sayyid 'Abdu'lláh, who afterwards addressed them, more successful. Finally Taqí-záda persuaded each of the *anjumans* to appoint one or two representatives to discuss the matter, and at length he and his colleague and fellow-townsman the *Mustasháru'd-Dawla* induced them to agree to disperse. The people departed, weeping and sorrowful, and one man, Mahdí "*Gáv-Kush*" killed himself, declaring that he could not go back and face his wife with the admission that, after all the brave show and brave talk of past days, the Assembly was to be abandoned without the National Volunteers striking a blow.

Next day (June 12) Taqí-záda and Ḥájji Mírzá Ibráhím succeeded in somewhat reassuring the *anjumans*, but the Sháh continued to make fresh demands, and now required the expulsion from the capital of the following eight persons: Mírzá Jahángír Khán, the editor of the *Ṣúr-i-Isráfíl*; Sayyid Muḥammad Riẓá of Shíráz, the editor of the *Musáwát*; the great Nationalist orators *Maliku'l-Mutakallimín* and Áqá Sayyid Jamál, both of Iṣfahán; Mírzá Dáwúd Khán; the *Ẓahíru's-Sulṭán*, a cousin of the Sháh, and a prominent officer of the National Volunteers; Ḥájji Mírzá Yaḥyá Dawlatábádí; and Mírzá 'Alí Muḥammad "*Birádar*." In addition to the expulsion of these leaders of the popular party, the Sháh demanded control of the Press and disarmament of the people. These demands were the subject of protracted negotiations, and all the while the Sháh was removing arms and ammunition as fast as he could from the town to his camp at Bágh-i-Sháh.

On or about June 17 the shops were closed, and the

Áqá Sayyid Jamálu'd-Dín of Iṣfahán

The *Maliku'l-Mutakallimín* ("King of Orators")

TWO GREAT POPULAR ORATORS WHO WERE VICTIMS OF THE COUP D'ÉTAT OF JUNE 23, 1908

merchants and guilds of craftsmen, accompanied by representatives of other *anjumans*, sent a deputation to the Assembly asking that a rallying-point, such as the Masjid-i-Jum'a, might be assigned to them, and ultimately they were permitted to use the Sipahsálár Mosque adjoining the Bahárístán for this purpose, on condition that the refugees should bring no arms with them. Thus during the day-time large numbers of persons gathered again in the precincts of the Bahárístán and Mosque, but at night they returned to their homes, leaving only their representatives and some hundred armed watchmen supplied by the *Anjuman-i-Muẓaffarí*. Meanwhile riots broke out in most of the provinces, especially at Rasht, Kirmán, Iṣfahán and Tabríz. The town last named appointed a Committee of Assistance, raised a subscription, and telegraphed that they had deposed the Sháh. Between noon and sunset 1300 *túmáns* (about £260) was collected in Tabríz from the poor, and next day, having collected 10,000 *túmáns* (£2000) they despatched 300 horsemen under the command of *Rashídu'l-Mulk* to Ṭihrán to the aid of the Constitution. Amongst these volunteers were 50 men under the command of Sattár Khán and 50 men under the command of Báqir Khán, the heroes of the later defence of Tabríz. Other towns promised volunteers for the defence of the Constitution (*e.g.* Iṣfahán promised 5000 men), but the Tabríz contingent was the only one actually sent off.

During these days messengers kept constantly coming from the Sháh to the *Majlis* with fresh demands and impossible proposals, and the *Mushíru's-Salṭana* was now the only Minister admitted to audience with the Sháh, while all representations from the Deputies were, according to the account given by the *Mudabbiru'l-Mulk* (Calcutta *Ḥablu'l-Matín*, September 14, 1908) at once translated and sent to the Russian Legation. On the evening of June 22, however (the eve of the fatal day), messengers from the Sháh brought reassurances designed to lull the Constitutionalists into a false security, and it was agreed between the two parties that all the matters in dispute between the Sháh and the people should be referred to a mixed Committee of *Dawlatís* and *Millatís*, *i.e.* Royalists and Nationalists. That night about 9 p.m. three of the Ministers, *Ṣani'u'd-*

Dawla (Finance), *Mushíru'd-Dawla* (Sciences and Arts) and *Mu'tamanu'l-Mulk* (Commerce), came to the Assembly and announced that the Sháh had accepted the proposal for a mixed Committee. After about an hour's discussion the Assembly dispersed, it being understood that in the morning some of the Sháh's representatives should come to the Assembly and settle all necessary details. At midnight the *Mushíru's-Salṭana*, the Chief Minister, sent a letter to the *Mumtázu'd-Dawla*, the President of the Assembly, announcing that the Sháh had accepted all their proposals. For the first time for more than three weeks anxiety was sensibly relieved and the prospects of a reconciliation seemed brighter.

Early on the morning of the fatal 23rd of June a number of Cossacks entered the court-yard of the Sipahsálár College, but the *tufankchís*, or Nationalist riflemen, induced them by friendly persuasion and exhortations to withdraw, whereupon the doors were closed. At this time the Bahárístán and Mosque were surrounded by some 1000 Cossacks and soldiers, while the street was also full of troops, and passage was interdicted. The eight persons whose expulsion had been demanded by the Sháh were in refuge in a room adjoining the Assembly. News of what was taking place was telephoned to the *'ulamá* and deputies, and the President of the Assembly, *Mumtázu'd-Dawla*, Mírzá Muḥammad Ṣádiq, editor of the *Majlis* newspaper, and three of the chief *'ulamá*, viz. the Imám-Jum'a of Khúy, Sayyid Muḥammad Ṭabáṭabá'í and Sayyid 'Abdu'lláh Bahbahání, at once hastened to the scene and were admitted. Sayyid Taqí-záda was indisposed and did not come until later, when he was unable to obtain admittance. At first all who wished were allowed by the Cossacks to enter, but none to come out; but afterwards both entrance and exit were stopped.

Sayyid 'Abdu'lláh Bahbahání and the *Mumtázu'd-Dawla* now sent for the Persian officer in command of the Cossacks assembled outside the Bahárístán, a man named Qásim Áqá, and asked him what they wanted. He replied that they were ordered to disperse the people. They then undertook to persuade them to disperse voluntarily, but the officer refused to listen to them. At this juncture (about an hour after sunrise)

Colonel Liakhoff, accompanied by six other Russian officers, drove up to the Bahárístán in a carriage, inspected the ground, divided and disposed his troops, and placed six guns in six different positions. Sayyid 'Abdu'lláh sent a message to the Colonel requesting speech with him, but was met by a refusal. Some of the National Volunteers asked permission to shoot Colonel Liakhoff, who had now mounted his horse, but were forbidden to do so, lest this should afford a pretext for Russian intervention. For the same reason Shapshál Khán, who was prominent, was allowed to escape without scathe or hurt.

Colonel Liakhoff now re-entered his carriage and drove away to the Khiyábán-i-Ẓillu's-Sulṭán, and as he passed the rooms of the *Anjuman-i-Ázarbáyján*, the guns, under the direction of the other Russian officers, opened fire on the Mosque and Bahárístán. Thereupon some fifty foot-soldiers, who were drawn up in front of the buildings just named, stripped off their red coats, handed over their rifles to the defenders of the *Majlis*, and, unarmed, entered the Nationalist garrison. Many of the mounted Cossacks also fled, but the Russian officers snatched their rifles from them and shot several of the fugitives, whereupon the rest reformed and opened fire, killing about a dozen of the Nationalist Volunteers (*Tufang-dárs*) at the first volley. Just before this volley one Cossack wheeled and manœuvred his horse in front of the *Anjuman-i-Ázarbáyján*, and discharged several shots from his rifle.

Hitherto the Nationalists had refrained from firing, and indeed there were not many more than a hundred of them provided with guns and from 50 to 100 cartridges apiece, but of these they now made good use, and succeeded in putting out of action three of the six pieces of artillery which had been set up to bombard the Parliament. A gallant attempt was also made by the *Anjuman-i-Muẓaffarí* and the *Anjuman-i-Ázarbáyján* to capture the other guns, but they were driven back by reinforcements of Cossacks. The gun which did most damage to them was to the north, in the Khiyábán-i-Darwáza-i-Shimrán. In spite of the shrapnel poured in on the defenders, however, the resistance was continued for seven or eight hours, until finally the two buildings which had for the best part of two years been

the centre of the Nation's hopes, and the focus of the new spirit which had stirred the dry bones of a seemingly dead people to new life, the Bahárístán and the Sipahsálár Mosque, were reduced to ruins, and the defenders either slain, taken captive, or put to flight. The number of the killed on either side is unknown. Of the leaders of the people, Sayyid Taqí-záda, the *Mu'ázidu's-Salṭana* and some thirty or forty others succeeded in reaching the shelter of the British Legation, which, however, was instructed to admit only such fugitives as were in danger of their lives. The eight Nationalists whose expulsion the Sháh had previously demanded, and who had taken refuge in the Sipahsálár College (see p. 204, *supra*), fled to the house of the *Amínu'd-Dawla*, which was close at hand, but this traitor at once telephoned news of their arrival to the Cossack head-quarters, and soldiers were immediately sent to arrest them. One, Ḥájjí Mírzá Ibráhím, was killed while resisting the soldiers' attempt to strip him, and the others were taken to the Sháh's camp at Bágh-i-Sháh, where next day Mirzá Jahángír Khán and the *Maliku'l-Mutakallimín* were strangled. The Sháh's cousin, Prince *Ẓahíru's-Sulṭán*, was also led out for execution, but was spared at the last moment, owing, it was said, to the declaration of his mother, the sister of the late Muẓaffaru'd-Dín Sháh, that she would kill herself if her son were put to death. After being cross-examined, he was finally released and allowed to go to Europe[1]. Of the remaining four, Sayyid Muḥammad Riẓá succeeded in escaping, and wandered about, enduring extreme hardships from hunger and exposure, in Mázandarán and Gílán, but ultimately had the good fortune to reach a place of safety. Áqá Sayyid Jamál also escaped from Ṭihrán, but is believed to have been captured in disguise near Hamadán and put to death. The *Mustasháru'd-Dawla*, the honest and fearless Tabríz deputy, and Prince Yaḥyá Mírzá[2] long lay in chains and captivity at the Bágh-i-Sháh, with many other

[1] He paid me a visit at Cambridge on November 20, 1908.

[2] Yaḥyá Mírzá, after several weeks' captivity in the Bágh-i-Sháh, was at length released, and lived to be re-elected a member of the new *Majlis*, but he died shortly after it was opened (in the latter half of 1909), as a result of his sufferings during his confinement.

Mírzá Jahángír Khán of Shíráz
Editor of the *Ṣúr-i-Isráfíl*

Ḥájji Mírzá Ibráhím Áqá
Deputy for Tabríz

VICTIMS OF THE COUP D'ÉTAT OF JUNE 23, 1908

prisoners, of whom the following twenty-two are included in a photograph in my possession dated Jumáda'l-úlá 23, A.H. 1326 (= July 4, 1908): (1) *Náṣiru'l-Mamálik*, brother-in-law of the *Sáláru'd-Dawla*; (2) *Ḥishmat-i-Niẓám*; (3) Mashhadí Báqir of Tabríz; (4) Mírzá Muḥammad 'Alí Khán, editor of the *Taraqqí*; (5) Muḥammad Sharíf, partner of No. 10; (6) Ibráhím Ṭabbál; (7) Faraju'lláh the tobacconist; (8) Shaykh Ibráhím; (9) Mírzá Ḥusayn; (10) *Sulṭánu'l-'ulamá*, editor of the *Rúḥu'l-Qudus*, which was suspended for publishing a strong article against the Sháh[1]; (11) Shaykh 'Alí Qáẓí-i-Qazwíní, judge of the Supreme Court, one of the few survivors out of Sayyid Jamálu'd-Dín's chosen band of twelve disciples[2]; (12) Mírzá Muḥammad 'Alí, son of the *Maliku'l-Mutakallimín* who was strangled, as already mentioned; (13) Mírzá 'Alí Akbar Khán, of the Supreme Court; (14) Mírzá 'Alí Akbar, brother of No. 11; (15) Ḥájji Muḥammad Taqí, a Deputy; (16) 'Alí Beg, servant of the *Mustasháru'd-Dawla*; (17) Ḥájji Khán, the tailor; (18) Shaykh Ibráhím of Ṭálaqán; (19) Áqá Buzurg Khán; (20) Yaḥyá Mírzá, editor of the *Ḥuqúq*; (21) Mírzá Dáwúd Khán, the partner of Mírzá Jahángír Khán who was strangled; and (22) Ná'ib Báqir Khán, the door-keeper of the National Assembly[3].

For several successive days the houses of persons obnoxious to the Sháh, including his uncle the Prince *Ẓillu's-Sulṭán*, and his cousin Prince *Jalálu'd-Dawla* (son of him last mentioned) and the *Ẓahíru'd-Dawla* (uncle by marriage to the Sháh, father of the *Ẓahíru's-Sulṭán*, and at this time governor of Rasht), were bombarded and looted by the soldiers, and priceless manuscripts and objects of art fell into the hands of Colonel Liakhoff and his myrmidons. The Bahárístán and adjoining Sipahsálár Mosque were reduced to ruins, and all the precious records of the National Assembly destroyed. Colonel Liakhoff was appointed military governor of Ṭihrán, which he placed under martial law. He surrounded the British Legation with his

[1] See pp. 156–161, *supra*. [2] See p. 10, *supra*.

[3] In the photograph, which is reproduced as a picture post-card with Persian inscriptions, the captives are arranged in two rows of eleven each, one standing, the other kneeling, all in chains and nearly all bare-headed. The numbers (added in the post-card) run from right to left, Nos. 1–11 being in the upper and Nos. 12–22 in the lower row.

Cossacks to prevent more fugitives from gaining its shelter, though these were removed a few days later in deference to British protests, and the *Persian* Minister for Foreign Affairs, *Alá'u's-Salṭana*, lately Persian Minister in London, was compelled to offer to the British Chargé d'Affaires a formal apology which would more aptly have come from Colonel Liakhoff or whatever *Russian* authority controlled his actions. Other disagreeable incidents occurred significant of the hostility felt by the Court party and its Russian aiders and abettors towards the English representatives, who, if they had finally left the Constitutionalists in the lurch, had none the less, by the support which they gave them in the summer of 1906, earned the hearty dislike and cordial mistrust of the reactionaries. An affray, which might have had fatal results, took place between some Cossacks and the Indian *suwárs* who constitute the guard of the British Legation, but news of this was prevented from appearing in most of the English papers except (I think) the *Daily Telegraph*, lest the "entente" should be damaged, and in this case Colonel Liakhoff was obliged to apologize, while the Cossacks who took part in the affray were punished. The following proclamation, originally issued and posted up all over Ṭihrán in Colonel Liakhoff's name, was also, in deference to British susceptibilities, and the desire to mask in some degree the active part played by Russian agents in the *coup d'état*, replaced in a few days by another signed by a dummy Persian governor nominated *ad hoc*, though Colonel Liakhoff remained practically dictator of Ṭihrán until the entrance of the Nationalist army on July 16, 1909. The text of the proclamation mentioned above, translated from the weekly Calcutta *Ḥablu'l-Matín* of Ramaẓán 2, A.H. 1326 (September 28, 1908), pp. 8 *et seqq.*, is as follows:—

"PROCLAMATION.

"Agreeably to the Command of His Royal and Imperial Majesty (may our lives be his sacrifice!) and for the assurance of public security and the due enforcement of the laws regulating the internal order of the city of Ṭihrán, I announce for

Celebrations at the grave of 'Abbás Áqá
on the fortieth day after his death (Oct. 6, 1907). See p. 152

Constitutionalists in chains at the Bágh-i-Sháh
after the *Coup d'État* of June 23, 1908. See p. 209

the information of the public the matters hereinafter mentioned, together with the necessary general regulations which have been enacted.

"(1) The regulation of all the affairs and dispositions of the Capital is entrusted to the Officers and Cossacks of His Imperial Majesty's Brigade, the Gendarmerie, the regiments of Khalaj and Zarand, and the Police of the Department of Public Security.

"(2) Any persons transgressing the commands of the Law herein set forth, or failing in obedience thereto, will be prosecuted and punished with the utmost rigour. Persons suffering from tyranny or oppression of any kind are hereby permitted and empowered to submit their complaints and appeals to this Office, or to lay them before me personally.

"(3) Offenders proved guilty of acts of tyranny and oppression towards such complainants will be summarily punished, and the wrongs suffered by the latter will be righted, under the supervision of an Officer nominated by the Government. In cases of theft, assault, or contumacy, the victims of such acts must, on their occurrence, notify the Officer in command at the nearest guardhouse.

"(4) The prices of bread and meat must remain at the present rate. Should the normal price be raised, those responsible for such rise will be fined a sum of money double the amount of the difference between the normal price and the raised price at which they have sold.

"(5) Assemblies in the streets or open spaces of the city exceeding five persons, whether assembled to watch street-performances or to listen to speeches, will be dispersed by armed force.

"(6) Persons engaged in the sale of fire-arms or their appurtenances are hereby warned that from this date onwards they are rigorously prohibited from selling such to anyone without my permission. Permission to sell arms to persons who are in need of them will be granted by me only.

"(7) Seeing that the discharge of fire-arms in the town may give rise to the idea of some disturbance, [should such occur] a number of Cossacks will at once be despatched to that

place to put down the disturbance. If a gun be discharged by mistake, the offender will be imprisoned for a definite period. If a gun be fired at a thief by night, some of the Cossacks who are guarding the city will be detailed to enter the house and make the necessary investigations. Persons deliberately and wilfully discharging fire-arms will, when captured, be punished with the utmost rigour.

"(8) Should a gun be discharged from any house in the streets or quarters of the city in the direction of any street or place patrolled by the soldiers, who will be constantly on the move, that house will be destroyed and reduced to ruins by artillery and musketry, should it be clearly and certainly proved that ulterior motives prompted such discharge. In such cases the house will be destroyed and reduced to ruins with guns and cannons.

"(9) Persons who have been in the habit of depositing in the streets and thoroughfares loads of straw, fire-wood, planks and the like, are strictly forbidden to commit such acts in the future.

"(10) Carriages and droshkies must stand one behind the other on the right-hand side of the street. Should any dispute be witnessed between the drivers, they will be punished.

"(11) The duty of scavenging, watering and keeping in order the streets and thoroughfares is incumbent on the owners or tenants of the adjacent houses.

"(12) I desire all the inhabitants of Ṭihrán to assist me in supervising all matters connected with the maintenance of order in the city.

[Signed] Palkonik (Colonel) LIAKHOFF,
Officer in command of the mounted Cossack Brigade of His Imperial Majesty (may our lives be his sacrifice!)[1]."

In spite of its specious form, the stringency of this proclamation sufficiently accounts for the paralysis of all further activity (at any rate open activity) on the part of the Constitutionalists at Ṭihrán for the next twelve months, since

[1] Compare the translation of this document given at p. 159 of the Blue Book on Persia [Cd. 4581]. (Inclosure 4 in No. 211.)

Colonel V. Liakhoff

the right of meeting and free speech was effectually removed, the free press was destroyed, and the possession of arms or materials for the construction of barricades was rendered impossible.

Behold, then, Ṭihrán prostrate beneath the iron heel of Colonel Liakhoff and his Cossacks, despotism once more triumphant, the young Constitution crushed, the Press gagged, the popular leaders either violently slain (like Mírzá Jahángír Khán, the editor of the *Ṣúr-i-Isráfíl*, the great orator *Maliku'l-Mutakallimín*, and Ḥájji Mirzá Ibráhím), or in chains at the Bágh-i-Sháh (like those enumerated at p. 209 *supra*), or fugitives in the forests of Mázandarán (like Sayyid Muḥammad Riẓá, the editor of the *Musáwát*), or refugees at the British Legation (like Sayyid Taqí-záda). For the time being all hope of freedom and better government in Persia seemed to be at an end.

The prominent part taken in these events by Colonel Liakhoff and the other Russian officers of the Sháh's Cossack Brigade naturally gave rise to much criticism in European circles. The official defence, put forward on numerous occasions by Sir Edward Grey in the House of Commons, and reiterated by the *Times*, was that Colonel Liakhoff being in the Sháh's service, no responsibility for his actions lay on the Russian Government. As, however, when it was suggested to M. Izvolsky by Sir Arthur Nicholson, the British Ambassador at St Petersburg, on November 9, 1908, that these Russian officers "might be withdrawn for a time by their Government," this suggestion was declined, not on the ground that the Russian Government could not recall them, but that, in the existing circumstances, it would be "hazardous" to recall them[1], this contention can hardly be maintained, even if no credence be attached to the remarkable statements of M. Panoff, who, in the latter part of 1908, acted for a time as correspondent of the well-known Liberal Russian journal *Ryech*, and concerning whom, and whose "revelations," something must now be said.

M. Panoff, who wrote under the *nom de guerre* of "Tané," was by birth a Bulgarian, and is thus described by an observant

[1] See the Blue Book on Persia (No. 1, 1909: Cd. 4581), Nos. 299 and 305, pp. 205 and 206.

English resident at St Petersburg who met him there after his expulsion from Persia. "My personal impression of Panoff was not unfavourable. He was clearly something of an adventurer, a man of action and not a man of books, but it seemed to me that this was rather an advantage for a correspondent in the present situation in Persia. He had had an adventurous past; had been a bandsman in Macedonia: his father had died in a Turkish prison, and his brother and sister had been killed by the Turks in prison. Some of his statements on Persia were crude, and in his lecture in the Women's Club he certainly overdid the sensational side. Yet, so far as I could test his statements, he seemed to be remarkably well informed, and the editors of the *Ryech* declared they were thoroughly satisfied with him.... On the whole I was convinced that he was trustworthy, and am not yet convinced that he is not....It is clear that the [Russian] Government is prepared, when Panoff publishes documents incriminating the Russian agents in Ṭihrán, to publish directly or indirectly documents that may possibly compromise him. Perhaps it would be well to have this in view when you receive Panoff's pamphlet."

The pamphlet above mentioned has not, so far as I know, been published, but I received a type-written copy of it (in Russian) in the spring of 1909, and caused it to be translated into English. It is entitled "Russian *Agents Provocateurs* in Persia," and consists of six parts, viz. (1) a pamphlet or essay on Persia, especially its recent history and the causes of the Revolution; (2) the alleged Secret Reports of Colonel Liakhoff, of which further mention will shortly be made; (3) account of a conversation which took place between the author and M. Izvolsky, the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs, at St Petersburg in January, 1909; (4) the author's account of his expulsion from Persia in December, 1908, by M. Sablin, the Russian Chargé d'Affaires at Ṭihrán; (5) an exposure and denunciation of the proposed Persian loan; and (6) an account of the Sháh's ex-tutor, the notorious Jewish Russian agent Shapshál Khán. It is the second part of this work—the Liakhoff correspondence—with which we are here chiefly concerned, but something more must first be said about M. Panoff's adventures.

He appears to have gone to Ṭihrán soon after the *coup d'état*, since, in writing of his expulsion, which took place in December, 1908, he says, "When, six months ago, I went to Persia in the capacity of correspondent of a Russian progressive newspaper, I knew very well that no roses awaited me in the land of Írán. I did not in the least deceive myself with regard to the feelings likely to be aroused in Russian administrators, not excepting diplomatists, by a correspondent, especially a correspondent who wished to throw a dry light upon things, seeing them without prejudice through his own eyes." Notwithstanding these apprehensions, however, he was at first very well received by M. de Hartwig and the other members of the Russian Legation, and by Colonel Liakhoff; obtained by their means audiences with Muḥammad 'Alí Sháh and the *Ẓillu's-Sulṭán*, and was permitted to inspect the ruins of the bombarded House of Parliament. When, however, the number of the *Ryech* which contained his first letter, describing his conversation with Colonel Liakhoff, reached Ṭihrán, this initial amiability speedily gave place to an attitude of pronounced hostility. M. Panoff was branded as a Social Democrat, an Anarchist, or worse, and it was added that he, being no true Russian but a Bulgarian, "could not satisfactorily enter into the purposes and views of Russian diplomacy in Ṭihrán, and consequently was not in his right place." At the same time it was suggested to him that he should "share" his information with M. Passek, the Russian Consul, who would indicate to him "how and of what he might write in the Russian papers"; while Colonel Liakhoff offered to him, as an ex-officer, a commission in the Cossack Brigade.

Failing to achieve anything by these methods, Messrs de Hartwig, Baranovsky ("the first dragoman at the Legation, who, as a matter of fact, is everything in the Russian Mission"), and Liakhoff began to interfere with M. Panoff's correspondence, epistolary and telegraphic, and to put various obstacles in his way, while (at their instigation, as he asserts) sundry documents "bearing on the internal affairs of Persia, the activity of Colonel Liakhoff and the Russian Legation, and the [Russian] Discount and Loan Bank" were stolen from his room in the hotel. He was further warned that he would be expelled at twenty-four

hours' notice, and a special censorship was established over his telegrams by M. Baranovsky, who himself supplied news to the St Petersburg Telegraphic Agency, "which had latterly been systematically supplied with telegrams about attacks by *Fidá'ís* (National Volunteers) on Russian subjects, and the dangers to Russian interests which these attacks threatened."

About the middle of November, 1908, M. de Hartwig left Persia for St Petersburg, where he arrived on November 25, and M. Sablin became Chargé d'Affaires at the Russian Legation. Towards the middle of December the *Ryech* published a statement, on the authority of M. Panoff, to the effect that the Sháh had telegraphed to Prince *'Aynu'd-Dawla*, who was in command of the Royalist forces investing Tabríz, bidding him "to organize bands of *sarbázes* (soldiers) who, in the guise and under the flags of *fidá'ís* (National Volunteers), should make attacks on Russian subjects and foreigners in Ázarbáyján"—evidently with a view to giving a pretext for Russian intervention. On December 11, M. Panoff was summoned before Messrs Sablin and Baranovsky at the Russian Legation, and threatened with expulsion unless he revealed the name of his informants, and consented "to present Persian matters in a more reasonable light" and "renounce his intended revelations, which would be inconvenient to the Legation." As he refused to agree to this, he was expelled from Persia, by virtue of a Russian Consular regulation as to the expulsion of "undesirables," on December 15 or 16. The *Ryech*, for which he had acted as correspondent, had an article on this event on December 18 (5 old style) strongly denouncing the arbitrary action of the Russian Legation, and reference was made to the matter in several English newspapers[1]. Even the *Novoe Vremya*, reactionary as its views generally are, protested in its issue of January 19 (6 old style) against such high-handed proceedings on the part of Russian officials abroad[2].

[1] *e.g.* the *Morning Post* of Dec. 18, and the *Times*, *Daily News*, *Western Morning News*, etc. of Dec. 19. See also further notices in the *Times* of Dec. 25, the *Morning Post* of Dec. 23 and 25, the *Daily Telegraph* of Dec. 25, and the *Manchester Guardian* of Dec. 26, 1908.

[2] See the *Morning Post* for Jan. 20, 1909.

M. Panoff, on his expulsion from Persia, came to St Petersburg, where he foregathered with a somewhat mysterious personage named Mírzá Shaykh 'Alí, described in the *Morning Post*[1] as a *mujtahid* and a member of the Shí'ite Ecclesiastical Council of Najaf, concerning whom a somewhat violent controversy presently arose, the Russian reactionaries, followed by their English friends, declaring that he was not a *mujtahid* nor even a Persian, but a Tartar of Lankurán and a Russian subject. On the other hand, an English friend of mine at St Petersburg wrote of him as follows:—

"It was fortunate that I saw a good deal of him and that I happened to know enough Persian to talk with him independently of Panoff, otherwise I am afraid I should have begun to doubt very greatly. Last Wednesday (February 10) a statement appeared in the papers here to the effect that enquiries made in Najaf showed that no such *mujtahid* as Mírzá 'Alí was known there, that the only Mírzá 'Alí known was a Russian subject, a theological student from Lankurán. The inference was that the man who was here was an impostor. Later on I discovered that some one had been spreading this view amongst the Cadets (Constitutional Democrats) who sympathize with Persia, and then I learned that the person who had been doing so was M——, whom you know....As to Mírzá Shaykh 'Alí, after a lot of roundabout talk he said (1) that the Russian Consul in Najaf says that there is no such person: (2) that the son of the Mírzá at the Russian Legation in Ṭihrán, who is now studying in Moscow, and who knows all the *mujtahids* in Persia by name, declared on reading of Mírzá 'Alí in the papers that there is no such *mujtahid*: (3) that the chief dragoman of the Ṭihrán Legation, Batyushkoff (Baranovsky is only *locum tenens*), called on Mírzá 'Alí, found he could talk no Persian but only Arabic, and was insulted by Panoff. On this ground he declared that Mírzá Alí was an impostor. As to the incident with Batyushkoff, I happened...to witness it, and Panoff did certainly treat Batyushkoff strangely, to say the least of it. It was strange, too, that Mírzá 'Alí refused to talk Persian, but perhaps Panoff

[1] Jan. 22, 1909.

had told him not to do so, for fear of spies. That Mírzá 'Alí was a Persian I am perfectly sure. I tried to speak Turkish with him at first, but he answered very lamely, and I don't think he was merely pretending. Besides, he seemed to me to be a singularly intelligent and cultivated man. I talked with him about many things, and he was always ready to give me clear information. I cannot remember whether he actually said he was a *mujtahid* or not. He told me a great deal about Najaf: as to the *Áqás* ('Masters,' *i.e.* the great *mujtahids*) he said there were only four or five big ones (*e.g.* Mullá Kázim-i-Khurásání and some others) and that he was only a 'little' one. He also said that he taught Arabic in a *madrasa* at Najaf. His birthplace, he said, was Iṣfahán, and his pronunciation was that described in the grammars as the Iṣfahán pronunciation. He told me a great deal about Iṣfahán, and particularly about the Bakhtiyárís, in whom I was much interested. Altogether he made a very favourable impression....Hasan Mamedoff, the Muḥammadan deputy from Elizavetpol (Ganja), talked with Mírzá 'Alí a good deal. He ridicules the idea of his being a Lankurání, says he is certainly a Persian, and is convinced that he is a *mujtahid*, or at any rate a very learned theologian, because he put a number of thorny theological-legal questions to him, and received very satisfactory answers. He says he does not know who he (Mírzá 'Alí) is, but he seemed to be certain he was travelling under a false name for security's sake. If that is true the mystery is explained, but it would be useful if his real name could be made known now that he is safely out of the country. He told me he was going to Constantinople from here."

On the whole it seems pretty clear that Mírzá Shaykh 'Alí was a Persian and a man of learning, but not a *mujtahid* in the strict sense of the word, and that the name under which he passed was an assumed one. The matter would hardly merit so much notice but for the vigorous attempts made, not only in Russia, but in a certain section of the English Press, to make capital out of it to the detriment of the Persian Constitutionalists and their sympathizers. The three papers most conspicuous for this, as well as for other attempts to give currency in this

country to the views of the Russian reactionary party in regard to Persia, were the *Standard*, the *Outlook*, and the *Contemporary Review*, of which the two last mentioned appear, so far as foreign politics are concerned, to be practically the organs of that party in England[1]. The support given to the constitutional movement in Persia and the condemnation and practical excommunication of the Sháh by three at least of the chief *mujtahids* of Karbalá and Najaf are so well known that the views of lesser Shí'ite theologians are of comparatively small consequence.

To return to M. Panoff. He left St Petersburg for the Caucasus in the first half of February, 1909, and before long was reported as having joined the Persian Nationalists at Astarábád. About the middle of April reports reached St Petersburg, and were thence transmitted to this country, that the Turkmáns had captured and looted that town, and that Panoff had fled. On May 1 the *Daily Telegraph* had a letter from its special correspondent at St Petersburg dealing briefly with Panoff's history, and concluding with the following account of his supposed end:—

"A month later [after Jan. 18, the day on which the correspondent saw him and Mírzá Shaykh 'Alí at St Petersburg] Panoff, whose knowledge of the Persian language was very limited, emerged at the head of the rebel contingent waging war against the Sháh. Day by day his reputation as a Nationalist warrior grew and spread. He entered the city of Rasht at the head of the triumphant *fidá'ís*, and breathed military fire into his nondescript followers. Finally he captured Astarábád, and, learning that the Turkmáns were advancing, conceived the daring plan of an advance to attack and annihilate them.

"He accordingly set out for the district of Ramasha (?) at the head of 500 men. The Turkmáns, informed of his departure, entered the city of Astarábád and sacked it. Then Panoff, turning back by the shortest route, surprised the enemy, whom he completely surrounded. The fierce Turkmáns fought with the courage of desperation, but for nine mortal hours the event

[1] See especially the *Standard* for January 28, and February 2, 18, 22, and 23; the *Outlook* for April 17, May 1, May 15, May 22; and reviews of Foreign Affairs in the *Contemporary Review*, *passim*.

seemed doubtful. At last Panoff's partisans came to the end of their ammunition, and were severely defeated and hotly pursued.

"Panoff, bleeding from four wounds, was unable to seek safety in flight. Capture by the enemy might mean exquisite torture. Suicide, therefore, seemed the unique issue out of the difficulty, but he had only one bullet left. Turning to his friends he exclaimed: 'Comrades, love freedom as I have loved it; and I have loved it dearly. Farewell!' and, raising his revolver to his head, he blew out his brains.

"The tidings of the successful leader's death has produced widespread grief in revolutionary circles in Persia."

On May 12, however, the *Daily Telegraph's* romantic narrative was overthrown by an announcement in the *Evening Standard* (based on an article in the *Ryech*, for which M. Panoff had acted as correspondent) that Panoff had been arrested at Moscow for travelling with a false passport, and on June 5 the *Morning Post* published a message from its St Petersburg correspondent in which the following further particulars were given:—

"M. Panoff, a former correspondent of one of the Russian journals, who, after his expulsion, fought on the side of the Nationalists in Northern Persia, has been kept for over a fortnight in solitary confinement in the Secret Police Department at Moscow. No charge is made against him, but it is assumed that the ground of his arrest is the report that M. Panoff was on his way to Europe as an agent of the Persian Nationalists.

"It is conceivable that the Russian Government may have a reason for disapproving the actions of M. Panoff, but that fact alone would hardly seem to constitute sufficient legal ground for keeping a Bulgarian subject in prison without preferring a definite charge against him."

Two days later the same journal announced, on the authority of its St Petersburg correspondent, that M. Panoff had been sentenced to three months' imprisonment for making use of a false passport. That may have been the reason of his arrest and detention, but it is at least possible that his chief crime in the eyes of the Russian Government was his publication of the

four following documents, purporting to be four secret despatches of Colonel Liakhoff to the Chief of the Military Staff in the Caucasus.

Copies of four Secret Reports relating to the destruction of the Persian Parliament on June 23, 1908, alleged to have been sent by Colonel Liakhoff to head-quarters.

(Translated from the Russian.)

I.

"*Report No.* 59. *Secret.*

"TO THE GENERAL STAFF OF THE MILITARY DISTRICT OF THE CAUCASUS.

"TO THE QUARTERMASTER GENERAL.

"Your Excellency,

"On the 26th of May (June 8) H.M. the Sháh summoned me and the First Dragoman of the Legation to Bágh-i-Sháh. In an intimate conversation the Sháh expressed his agreement to our former proposals, of which I had the honour at the time to inform your Excellency to abolish the Constitution, disperse the *Majlis*, and, by means of a whole series of manœuvres, so as to escape the insistence of the European Powers, to return to the former absolute form of government. To which he added that in asking for a plan of further action he would request that there might be as little bloodshed as possible. To this I ventured to remark that in a contest bloodshed was unavoidable and indispensable.

"When we had returned to the town that evening, I and the first Dragoman drew up at the Legation a plan for further action against the nest of robbers that is here grandiloquently called a parliament. In this, as a basis for further action, the aim adopted was, up to the actual moment, to lull to sleep both the *Majlis* and its adherents on the one hand, and the European Legations on the other; then unexpectedly to bring about a collision, and, making use of our organised military force, to destroy the nest of these bribe-takers and kill all its defenders who should think of offering any resistance. Those who survive its destruction should be prosecuted by means of administrative order, and subjected to the very severest punishments.

"Knowing the local custom of all the authorities, not excepting the Sháh himself, in season and out of season to shove their noses into every arrangement, and thereby spoil things, we thought it expedient to insist that after the acceptance of the plan we had drawn up, I, as the chief person concerned, should be given full freedom of action, with the right not to submit to anybody's orders whatsoever from outside, no matter from whom they might emanate, until the task should be completely accomplished.

Although from the former orders and instructions of your Excellency the fashion of my action and the limits of my full powers are quite clear, yet I venture humbly to beg you to make clear to me the limits of active participation in the matter in hand, apart from the secret share which I shall take in bringing the matter about.

"When the plan of campaign which we have drawn up has been approved by the Minister and the Sháh, I shall have the honour of forwarding a copy to your Excellency without delay.

"Awaiting your commands,

COLONEL V. LIAKHOFF."

"May 27 (June 9), 1908,
Ṭihrán."

II.

"*Report No.* 60. *Secret.*

"TO THE GENERAL STAFF OF THE MILITARY DISTRICT OF THE CAUCASUS.

"TO THE QUARTERMASTER GENERAL.

"Your Excellency,

"The plan drawn up by myself and the First Dragoman of the Legation was approved by the Minister, after preliminary telegraphic communication with St Petersburg, almost without any objection being raised, with very unimportant modifications. As to the Sháh, he long hesitated, like a Persian, fearing the blood which must necessarily be shed, and began to propose some sort of half measures, compromises, etc. In view of this we were forced to bring into play the final decisive means. We announced that the plan had been approved by the Russian Government as the best for the purpose in the present condition of affairs, and that if the Sháh is not willing to agree to it, Russia will refuse him all support and disclaim all responsibility for whatever further may happen. The means were strongly effective and of course he agreed without delay, and granted complete liberty of action for carrying it into effect.

"The fundamental points of the plan are as follows:

(1) With the funds of the Legation and of the Sháh to bribe important members of the *Majlis* and the Ministers, so that at the last sittings they could carry out whatever policy is dictated to them.

(2) Up to the final moment, when all preparations have been completed, to keep up comparative friendliness with the *Majlis*, pretending that there is a desire to come to terms with it on a basis of mutual concessions, and with that purpose to enter upon negotiations.

(3) To attempt by bribery or other means to tempt out the armed men from the *Majlis*, the Mosque, and the adjacent buildings of the *Anjumans*.

(4) To endeavour to buy over the majority of the leaders of the great city *Anjumans*, so that on a given day they should not let out but keep in their members.

(5) On the day before, or in good time, to send out into the *Majlis* and the Sipahsálár Mosque disguised Cossacks to give an excuse for the bombardment by firing in the air, and afterwards to kill all the defenders to be found there.

(6) To take the most energetic measures in order that not a single malcontent should succeed in taking sanctuary in the European Legations, especially the British Legation.

(7) When all the preliminary preparations are completed, on a fixed day to surround the *Majlis* and adjacent buildings with Cossacks of the Brigade and Artillery, and to bombard it and kill all who resist.

(8) After the bombardment to give up the houses of eminent Constitutionalists and Deputies to be sacked by the soldiers and rabble.

(9) To arrest without delay eminent constitutional leaders, deputies, and partisans, and hang or exile them according to their social position and importance.

(10) To publish, for the tranquillizing of men's minds and for the Powers, a manifesto to say that the *Majlis* will be convoked a second time.

"The Sháh expressed his consent and preferred a wish that the Persian forces should take part, but I resisted categorically and obstinately, in view of the fact that this is just the most suitable moment for the Brigade to render real service and take the place that befits it in the life of the Persian State, and so render more easy the attainment of further aims.

"As to my direct share and active participation on the day of the bombardment, the Minister was against it, fearing the objections of the Powers. But I, keeping in view your Excellency's orders, and the circumstance that however much the Persian Officers may be devoted to Russia, still they remain Persians, and at the decisive moment may by some sentimentality or other spoil the whole thing, insisted on my own personal direction.

"I may confidently assure your Excellency that in the Brigade which is entrusted to me, both among the officers and the non-commissioned ranks, there is excellent discipline and devotion to the cause, and unless any conditions from outside interfere, I can answer for success.

"Awaiting your commands,

COLONEL V. LIAKHOFF."

"May 31 (June 13), 1908,
Ṭihrán."

III.

"*Report No.* 62. *Secret.*

"TO THE GENERAL STAFF OF THE MILITARY DISTRICT OF THE CAUCASUS.

"TO THE QUARTERMASTER GENERAL.

"Your Excellency,

"With regard to Your Excellency's enquiry as to the action of the Cossacks near the English Legation in not allowing any one to enter it, I have the honour to give the following explanation:

"From my former reports Your Excellency knows of the intention to surround all the Legations, with the object of preventing the public from entering them and taking sanctuary, and of my punctual execution of this plan. As to the special measures taken by me against the English Legation, the reason was as follows. On the 5th (18th) of June in the evening I was called up on the telephone to the Legation by the Minister, who informed me that, according to information received, the English Legation was in vague outlines guessing what was being prepared, and was intending to offer sanctuary to the malcontents, so as thereby to weaken the effects of our action. Accordingly he advised that more special measures should be taken against the British Legation than against the rest.

"As to the Minister having advised me (as reported) instead of surrounding the English Legation to surround the houses and shops of Russian subjects in the streets near by, and so to prevent access to the Legation, there was at the time no talk of this between us.

"Although I admit that this would have been wiser than what we did, since the final result would have been the same, and it would have deprived the English of a direct ground for protest, we did not adopt this course, not, I imagine, because I would not listen to advice, but simply because in the fever of work this combination came into nobody's head.

"Herewith I have the honour to forward to you a list of the officers who specially distinguished themselves and were thought worthy by me of being rewarded with Russian decorations.

"Awaiting your further orders,

COLONEL V. LIAKHOFF."

"June 12 (25), 1908,
Ṭihrán."

IV.

"*Report No.* 63. *Secret.*

"TO THE GENERAL STAFF OF THE MILITARY DISTRICT OF THE CAUCASUS.

"TO THE QUARTERMASTER GENERAL.

"Your Excellency,

"Before a group of Officers of the Brigade, devoted body and soul to Russia and the Idea, I read your Excellency's despatch to the effect that



The Bahāristán (House of Parliament) after the Bombardment of June 23, 1908

HIS IMPERIAL MAJESTY the Emperor thought fit with his own hands to trace on the telegraphic announcement from His Brilliancy the Viceroy (of the Caucasus) of the action of the Cossack Brigade against the revolting Parliament, 'Well done, Cossacks! Thanks to the brave officers!'

"Indescribable joy seized all of them, and the thunderous echoes of a mighty hurrah were long in falling silent. The enthusiasm of the officers simply beggars description.

"Thereupon it was resolved by the council of officers to ask me through your Excellency and His Brilliancy the Viceroy to offer at the feet of our idolised Monarch their genuine feelings of loyalty on the part of all the Officers of the Brigade, their burning desire to lay down their heads only at the command of the Most Puissant Ruler of Mighty Russia, and their readiness to sacrifice everything for the carrying out of the Monarch's Will.

"Made happy by the favour of the Highest,

COLONEL V. LIAKHOFF."

"June 15 (28), 1908,
Ṭihrán."

Now if these documents be genuine, they conclusively prove the hollowness of the official assurances given by the Russian Government to the British Foreign Office, and by the latter to the Parliament, Press and People of Great Britain, as to the complete innocence of the Russian Government of any share in or knowledge of Colonel Liakhoff's actions. Thus, on July 3, 1908, M. Izvolsky gave Sir Arthur Nicholson, the British Ambassador at St Petersburg (*Blue Book*, p. 138), "the most positive assurances that Colonel Liakhoff, in carrying out the Sháh's recent measures and assuming military command of Ṭihrán (if he had done so) *acted without the orders, knowledge or approval of the Imperial Government*"; Sir Edward Grey stated on July 9, in reply to a question by Mr H. F. B. Lynch, that "whatever action Colonel Liakhoff took in the emergency which arose the other day was taken independently of his Government"; while the *Times*, in a leading article published in its issue of September 17, though admitting ill-judged actions on the part of Russian agents in Persia, considered that "the statements made from time to time in Parliament by Sir Edward Grey have never left any room for doubt as to the absence of any serious difference of opinion between the British and Russian Governments in regard to the situation in Persia, and the equal determination of both Powers to abstain from all direct interference in her domestic affairs."

Again on October 15, 1908, the *Times*, commenting on the manifesto signed by two of the exiled Persian Deputies, Sayyid Taqí-záda and the *Mu'ázidu's-Salṭana* and published in its columns on the same day, while frankly admitting that "both in Ṭihrán and Tabríz Russian influence seems to have been exerted in unwise directions," and that "the stories of local intrigue and of intervention with reactionary intentions [by Russian agents in Persia] narrated in the manifesto appear to be by no means imaginary," held the view that "the Russian Foreign Office was equally guiltless [with the British] of the machinations ascribed to it by the politicians of Ṭihrán." A little later (Nov. 2), influenced, apparently, by Russian susceptibilities, as reflected by its St Petersburg correspondent, the *Times* began to scold the exiled Persian deputies and their English friends (or "advisers," as it chose to call them) for their apprehensions as to Russia's designs, and to characterise their statements as "Persian fairy-tales"; and from that time onwards until the capture of Ṭihrán and deposition of Muḥammad 'Alí Sháh by the Nationalists in the middle of July, 1909 (an event which falsified all the predictions of its very confident Special Correspondent, a gentleman conspicuous for his dislike of all constitutional movements in the East) it continued to show a marked hostility to the Persian Constitutionalists, and to treat them as it had treated the liberators of Italy sixty years ago, thus giving a stronger proof of its consistent sympathy with reaction than of its political foresight!

The genuineness of the alleged Secret Reports of Colonel Liakhoff cannot, however, be regarded as proven, and the fact that the scheme therein set forth for the destruction of the *Majlis* corresponds so very closely with the actual course of events may be regarded as a suspicious circumstance rather than an evidence of truth. The originals in Colonel Liakhoff's own handwriting, which M. Panoff asserted to be in his possession, have never, so far as I know, reached this country, and only two pieces of confirmatory evidence have as yet been forthcoming, viz. *first*, that two experts in the Russian language, one an Englishman and the other a Russian, who examined M. Panoff's memoir both observed that whereas M. Panoff's Russian was

very faulty, the language of the alleged Liakhoff documents was correct and appropriate, and couched in such a style as might be expected from a Russian Officer; *secondly*, that a Russian politician whose name is well known in this country, though it would be obviously imprudent to mention it, told an acquaintance of mine that he knew it to be true that the Tsar had in fact telegraphed his congratulations to Colonel Liakhoff on the destruction of the *Majlis*. Owing to the dualism, or even pluralism, which, as all observers agree, exists in the Russian administration, it is quite possible that Colonel Liakhoff received from high quarters incitements and encouragements of which M. Izvolsky had no knowledge, and indeed the allegation was that the colonel received his instructions from the chief of the Military Staff in the Caucasus, who in turn received his instructions from the reactionary Camarilla which surrounds the person of the Tsar. M. Panoff, of course, scouts the idea that Russia was not responsible for Colonel Liakhoff's actions.

"Colonel Liakhoff," he says, "is not in the least to be reckoned an officer in the Persian service: he wears Russian epaulettes, Russian uniform, is on the strength of the active Russian army, and gets his pay from the Russian Government; and the statements of certain organs of the Press that for the actions of Colonel Liakhoff the Russian Government is not responsible are an evident lie with a purpose. It is impossible to shut one's eyes to facts that clearly cry aloud. Colonel Liakhoff playing the part of commander of a district corps of police in Persia, executing the most horrible ferocities, is none the less, I repeat, carrying out the will of the Russian Government, but not in the least that of the Russian people." M. Panoff adds that M. de Hartwig was a notorious Anglophobe and a personal enemy of M. Izvolsky, so that he had a double motive for seeking to wreck the Anglo-Russian Agreement—"Izvolsky's pet child." He it was who extended to the arch-reactionary Amír Bahádur Jang the protection of the Russian Legation; who confirmed the scheme for the destruction of the *Majlis* drawn up by Messrs Liakhoff and Baranovsky; who encouraged Liakhoff to surround the British Legation with his Cossacks in order to prevent the hunted Constitutionalists from taking refuge there;

and who, while outwardly pretending to be on bad terms with Liakhoff, privately "declared to correspondents who interviewed him that the Colonel had acted excellently," only qualifying this statement by the remark that "he went a bit too far."

"Liakhoff," says M. Panoff a little lower, "does not subordinate himself even to the Sháh. There was an occasion when the Sháh demanded the surrender of a Cossack who had wounded General *Ṣaní'-i-Ḥaẓrat.* Liakhoff declared openly that he would not give him up, 'because he was not a Persian Cossack, but a Cossack of the Brigade.'" "With Liakhoff," he adds, a little further on, "in the capacity of school-instructor to the Brigade is one Popoff, a runaway coroner from Novocherkassk, who sends off his own and likewise Liakhoff's articles (which he signs) to the Caucasus papers, the *Golos Moskvy* ("Voice of Moscow"), *Golos Pravdy* ("Voice of Right"), and the St Petersburg *Vyēdomosti* (Gazette), praising loudly the actions of the gallant Colonel!" In conclusion M. Panoff makes a statement of which I have received independent confirmation, viz. that soon after the *coup d'état* the contract of the Cossack Brigade was renewed for a fresh period of twelve years, the number of Russian officers and non-commissioned officers being doubled. The fact that the old contract was on the point of expiring, and that it was quite certain that the National Assembly would never willingly consent to its renewal was stated by Sayyid Taqí-záda (whose statements I have always found to be correct) to have precipitated the *coup d'état* of June 23, 1908.

Here a few more particulars concerning the now notorious Cossack Brigade may appropriately be given. The text of the contract drawn up in 1882 between Mírzá Sa'íd Khán, the Persian Minister for Foreign Affairs, and the Russian Minister was published in No. 11 of the daily Ṭihrán *Ḥablu'l-Matín* (May 11, 1907) in the course of a leading article entitled:—

"*Who is the Palkonik* [i.e. *Colonel Liakhoff*], *and what is his work?*"

and opening with the apt quotation:—

مکن تغافل ازین بیشتر که میترسم
گمان کنند که این بنده بی خداوندست'

"Be not heedless any longer, for I am afraid
That men may imagine that this is a servant who has no master!"

The contract in question comprises eleven clauses, and is said to have remained the same, save for changes in the names, ever since. The contents are briefly as follows.

Clause 1.—Colonel Charkovsky is appointed by the General Staff of the Caucasus to succeed Colonel Doumendovich for a period of three years as military instructor of the Persian Cossacks. His duty is to train and drill the mounted troops assigned to him by the Persian Ministry of War in the same way as the Russian troops are trained and drilled.

Clause 2.—Colonel Charkovsky shall be aided in this work by 3 officers and 5 sergeants (*ouryádník*) similarly appointed by the General Staff of the Caucasus. The names of these persons shall be at once communicated by the Colonel to the Russian Legation at Ṭihrán, which in turn will communicate them to the Persian Government.

Clause 3.—The Persian Government undertakes to pay the Colonel a yearly salary of 2400 *túmáns*, or 24,000 francs, to be paid quarterly in advance, besides allowances for 5 horses. The other officers shall receive the same salaries which they received in the time of Colonel Doumendovich, while the sergeants shall receive 20 *túmáns* a month, or 240 *túmáns* a year.

Clause 4.—On the signing of this agreement, a sum of one hundred half-Imperials is to be placed at the disposal of Colonel Charkovsky for the expenses of his journey, and a sum of 75 half-Imperials is to be assigned to each of the new officers and of 24 half-Imperials to each of the sergeants for the same purpose.

Clause 5.—The salaries of the above-mentioned officers and sergeants are to be payable from the date of signature of this agreement.

Clause 6.—A sum of 400 *túmáns* (4000 francs), being an advance of two months' salary, is to be paid to Colonel Charkovsky on the signing of this agreement.

Clause 7.—In all matters connected with his service Colonel Charkovsky shall act in accordance with the instructions of the

Persian Ministry of War, to which he is subject; and this Ministry undertakes to pay him his salary.

Clause 8.—All travelling expenses incurred by Colonel Charkovsky in carrying out the orders of the Persian Government shall be defrayed by that Government.

Clause 9.—Colonel Charkovsky cannot abrogate or modify any of the provisions of this agreement, nor can he quit the service of the Persian Government before the conclusion of the period of three years mentioned in Clause 1. But should his health break down within this period, so that he is unable to perform his duties, the Persian Government shall accept his resignation. He shall also be allowed leave of absence for a period not exceeding three months should his health or private affairs require it, but in that case shall not be entitled to his salary or other allowances for this period. Similar conditions apply to the other Russian officers and sergeants employed by the Persian Government.

Clause 10.—The Persian Government undertakes, on the conclusion of the period of three years, to pay to Colonel Charkovsky and the other officers and sergeants the same sums for travelling expenses mentioned above in Clause 4. They shall be entitled to the same sums if this agreement be cancelled by desire of the Persian Government before the conclusion of that period.

Clause 11.—The above-mentioned officers and sergeants shall present themselves at Ṭihrán within two months and a half of their receiving, through the Russian Legation, the travelling allowances above mentioned.

The agreement is dated Ramaẓán 12, A.H. 1299 (= July 28, 1882).

In the succeeding number (No. 12) the *Ḥablu'l-Matín* comments vigorously on the evils of this arrangement, and on the dangerous extent to which the powers of the Russian commander of the Brigade have been allowed to grow since the time of the agreement of 1882.

The *Tamaddun* (No. 16) dated 2 Rabí' ii, A.H. 1325 (= May 15, 1907) supplements the above articles in the *Ḥablu'l-Matín* by publishing the budget of the Cossack Brigade for the pre-

ceding year, A.H. 1324 (= Feb. 25, 1906—Feb. 13, 1907), which is as follows:—

	Túmáns	*Túmáns*
Salary of the Russian Colonel	5,520	
" " " Major	2,760	
" two " Captains	4,600	
" {six sergeants (*qazzáq-báshí*) and farriers (*baytár*)}	3,312	
Total salaries of Russian officers	16,192	16,192
Total salaries of Persian officers		36,549
Pensioners		12,276
{Salaries of persons brought from abroad for service in the Brigade}		28,489
Wages of two quarter-masters		360
Wages of tailors, saddlers, etc. (6 persons)		560
Wages of 1500 privates at 22 *túmáns*		33,000
Officers' table expenses		5,412
Travelling allowances of privates		27,375
Fodder for Russian officers' horses		756
Fodder for 50 artillery horses		1,800
Fodder for privates' horses		36,000
Uniforms etc. for 1,500 privates		17,475
Light and fuel		1,950
(Russian) farriers' expenses		350
Hospital expenses		800
Repair of fire-arms, etc.		130
Various stores and necessaries		860
Repair of barracks etc.		2,000
Extraordinary incidental expenses		1,120
Office expenses		540
Shoeing horses (1,200 at 12 *qiráns*)		1,440
Disabled horses		240
Medicines for horses		120
Deduction for rejected horses at 5°/₀		300
" " (artillery) horses		750
Expenses in camp: officers' mess		600
Present to officer in charge of camp		100
Grant in aid to members of Brigade		1,058
Presents to privates on occasion of reviews, etc.		1,500
Total		230,102

In other words the Cossack Brigade, if this account be correct, costs Persia something like £46,000 a year, besides having played the chief part in the attempt to destroy Persia's newly-won liberties and to cast her back into her ancient thraldom.

According to No. 10 of the *Surúsh* (for October 13, 1909), the Brigade was originally instituted during the Russo-Turkish War of 1876 at the instigation of the Russian Government, which hoped to employ it against the Turks in certain contingencies. It says a good deal for the perspicacity of Sayyid Jamálu'd-Dín that he should have foreseen sixteen years beforehand that it would one day be employed against the Persians themselves[1]!

[1] See p. 26 *supra*, and note 1 *ad calc.*

CHAPTER VIII.

THE DEFENCE OF TABRÍZ.

(*First Period: June—December*, 1908.)

If the late *Majlis* had been as incompetent as certain influential organs of the British and Anglo-Indian Press asserted, Persia as a whole might have been expected to witness its destruction with indifference, and to return with complacency to the former state of things. Thus the *Times*, in a leading article published on June 25, two days after the catastrophe, described it as having "furnished a signal example of the inability of Orientals to assimilate the principles of self-government"; and as having "talked a great deal, but shewn little readiness to settle down to solid work." Again, on July 2, it declared that the *Majlis*, "in its late shape, needed drastic reform even more than did the Palace"; that "it had been delivered of a prodigious quantity of frothy rhetoric, but had displayed no constructive ability whatever"; and that it "systematically attempted to outstep its proper functions and to encroach upon those of the Crown." "Some of its chief members," it continued, "are charged, and apparently not without reason, with corruption, and one was believed to cherish dangerous ambitions. The free press in Persia, it is worth observing, proved to be as mischievous and as dangerous as it has proved to be in other Oriental lands. Above all the Parliament shewed itself unable to deal with that most formidable of all problems in times of disorder. It could not provide for the most elementary of the financial needs of the country. The situation, which has been bad for many years, grew steadily

worse. Amongst the liberties of which the people availed themselves most widely was that of refusing to pay taxes. Insecurity increased, trade languished, and disturbances were rife. The existence of a Royalist party became manifest, and the enthusiasm of the Nationalists grew cold." In this strain the *Times* continued to express itself at intervals during the succeeding twelve months; and though, in face of the Turkish Revolution of July 24, 1908, it had to qualify its views as to the "inability of Orientals to assimilate the principles of self-government" by a declaration (July 25, 1908) that "Turkey is, after all, far better qualified to receive the boon of free institutions and a free Press than the backward and comparatively isolated country of Persia," yet the tone which it adopted during the short-lived success of the Turkish counter-revolution of April 14, 1909, revealed a latent hostility to the Turkish Reformers quite in keeping with its attitude towards the Persian Constitutionalists.

The unique position which the *Times* still holds, and the semi-official character generally ascribed to it, especially abroad, makes it necessary to devote to its study, particularly on matters of foreign policy, a closer attention than is necessary in the case of lesser journals and periodicals in this country which adopted an attitude of more open hostility towards the Persian reformers. Of such were the *Standard*, which, on Jan. 28, 1909, made itself the mouthpiece of the views held by the most reactionary *camarilla* of the Russian Court; the *Outlook*, which re-echoed them, with some additional absurdities of its St Petersburg correspondent, in the following April; and the *Contemporary Review*, in which Dr E. J. Dillon, a graduate of the University of St Petersburg and ex-Professor of the University of Kharkoff, continued to regale his readers with similar stuff inspired from a similar source.

To what extent, then, we must enquire, are the criticisms of the *Times* justified by facts? And if they are not so justified, to what motive or motives must we ascribe them? The charges brought against the first National Assembly are briefly these: (1) that it showed much capacity for "frothy rhetoric," but "no constructive ability whatever": (2) that it "systematically attempted to outstrip its proper functions," and strove to become

an executive as well as a legislative body: (3) that some of its members were corrupt, and others moved by "dangerous ambitions": (4) that it failed to grapple with the urgent question of finance, or to maintain order: (5) that its incapacity cooled the enthusiasm of its supporters and recreated a Royalist party: (6) that the freedom of the Press which it permitted was fearfully abused: (7) that the *anjumans,* or political clubs, which were its chief support, consisted for the most part of violent and dangerous revolutionaries. These charges must now be briefly examined in detail.

(1) *Lack of Constructive Ability.*

It would appear sufficiently obvious that to clear the ground of ruins, *débris* and rubbish must be the necessary preliminary of any constructive effort. The Persian National Assembly, when it began its work, found itself confronted with disorders and abuses which had grown up for centuries and had finally become so acute as to goad even the patient people of Persia into that Revolution of which the Assembly was itself the outcome. Money was urgently required in every department, but even more urgent than the need for money was the necessity of safeguarding the independence of Persia, and of checking foreign control, which, as we have seen, had already assumed dangerous proportions. This foreign control was, as it were, personified by and embodied in M. Naus, the Belgian Director of Customs, who, unless common report grossly maligns him, had throughout been actuated rather by a desire to further his own interests than those of the nation which employed him, and who had disgusted the Persians by his arrogance and disregard for their feelings. Undoubtedly, therefore, the *Majlis* voiced the national demand and gave expression to the will of the people when it refused to ratify the proposed new Anglo-Russian Loan, and obtained, on Feb. 10, 1907, the dismissal of Messrs Naus and Priem. Having thus grappled successfully with a great national danger, the *Majlis* turned to those schemes of reform which will be discussed under the heads of Finance and *Anjumans.*

(2) *Attempt to usurp executive functions.*

From the tone adopted by the *Times* and other critics of the *Majlis*, one would suppose that that body had merely to agree on the legislative measures requisite for the welfare of the country and then to rest confident that they would be duly put in force by a loyal and efficient executive. Of course the actual state of the case was far otherwise, every effort being made by Muḥammad 'Alí Sháh and his supporters, Persian and foreign, to impede the work of the young Parliament, which, realizing that it was useless to make laws unless they were carried out, had to use its powers, as far as possible, in an executive as well as in a legislative sense. It is hardly fair of the *Times* to complain in one breath that the *Majlis* did nothing but talk, and in the next that, not content with talking, it also tried to act. Its attitude towards the *Majlis* exemplifies throughout the Persian proverb "*Kaj dár u ma-ríz*," "Hold [the cup] crooked, but don't spill [the liquor]."

(3) *Unworthiness of Members.*

Nobody would contend that all the members of the first *Majlis* were single-hearted patriots, caring nothing for their own interests, and animated by the sole desire to serve their country. To judge by the language habitually employed by the *Times*, and still more by its humbler and more unbridled congeners, this contention could hardly be maintained even in the case of the Parliament of Great Britain. Undoubtedly the *Majlis* contained corrupt members (some of whom could, if necessary, be named), while others may have harboured exaggerated personal ambitions, but the point is that whereas under the old *régime* it was hard to find an incorrupt office-holder, certainly a large proportion, and probably a majority, of the Deputies of the National Assembly were animated by a patriotism and public spirit which would have been creditable in the members of any Parliament, whether in Europe or America. More than this no reasonable person could expect, for if sudden conversions be rare in individuals they are necessarily much rarer in the case of

nations. A fairer way to put the question is: "Does history afford many instances of a nation making such conspicuous advances in public spirit and morality in so short a period as were made by the Persians during the period under discussion?" I venture to think that parallels will not easily be found.

(4) *National Finance and Public Order.*

As we have seen, the financial problem was the great problem by which the *Majlis* was confronted, and the scheme for dealing with it elaborated by the Finance Committee and embodied in the Budget brought forward in November, 1907, was one of the most notable achievements of the new Parliament. From time immemorial gross personal extravagance and the reckless enrichment of favourites and fief-holders for the most trivial services, or for no services at all, have characterized most rulers of Persia, and, in consequence of this continual demand for money for utterly unproductive purposes, the unhappy peasant's shoulders had to bear an ever-increasing burden, rendered more intolerable by the systematic peculation exercised by every one, from the highest to the lowest, concerned in the collection of the taxes. In theory the Sháh owned the people and the land: at best, they were his "flock" (*ra'iyyat*) and he their "shepherd" (*rá'í*): if he was a good king he contented himself with shearing them in moderation: if bad, he not only sheared them of their fleeces, but, as Mírzá Riẓá said in his cross-examination, stripped the flesh from their bones[1]. Since 1890, as we have seen, the rulers of Persia, too lazy to do the "stripping" themselves, had, for comparatively trivial cash payments, allowed foreign *concessionnaires* to share in the exploitation of the unhappy peasantry, and it was this innovation which had at last brought about a revolution which owed its success to the support of the powerful Shí'ite clergy, who, whatever their faults, are, like the Irish priests, a truly national class, sprung from the people and thoroughly in touch with the people. Had the revolution taken place before this era of concessions and foreign loans began, the task of the popular party would have been far

[1] See p. 71 *supra*.

easier, since their attempts at reform would not have been hampered to the same extent by foreign interests.

Roughly speaking, the state of things with which the new Finance Committee had to deal was as follows. Persia was divided for fiscal purposes into 340 divisions, each of which was assessed at a certain sum, and each of which had a separate register (*kitábcha*) kept by a special *mustawfí*. These *mustawfís*, at the head of whom was the *Mustawfí'l-Mamálik*, formed a special class of state accountants, whose system of keeping the records was extremely complicated and almost incomprehensible to those who lacked their special training. Each district was assessed at a certain sum, which the governor or officer responsible for the district was expected to remit every year to the capital. As governments were commonly sold to the highest bidder, and the taxes thus farmed out, the successful competitor for such a post had not only to collect the sum authorized by an old and obsolete assessment, but also to reimburse himself for the large sum he had expended in bribes, and likewise to lay up a provision for the future, since his tenure of office was precarious. He was also accompanied by a host of hangers-on, each of whom, according to his position, looked to make his harvest while the sun shone.

It is easy to see what abuses, and especially what cruel oppression of the peasantry, must necessarily result from such a system, and to what fearful leakage of revenue it must inevitably give rise, so that, as is commonly reported, of the money actually extracted from the people only about one-tenth actually reached the Treasury. On a system essentially rotten and unsound had been grafted numerous minor abuses, of which, apart from the monstrous sums absorbed by the Sháh, the Princes of the Royal Family, and various other nobles and great men, the chief were represented by the three terms (1) *Tuyúlát*, (2) *Tas'írát*, and (3) *Tafáwut-i-'amal*, about each of which a few words must be said.

(1) *Tuyúlát* (fief-holds). When the Sháh wished to reward some one for some real or fancied service, he often found it more convenient, instead of paying him in cash from the Treasury, to assign to him the revenues of some village or

district, from which the fief-holder naturally endeavoured to extract as much money as possible. Such village thus became provided with a new tyrant more ruthless than the Sháh himself.

(2) *Tas'írát* (monetary equivalent for payment in kind). In certain cases where payment was originally made in kind, such payment had been commuted into money, the estimate on which such commutation was based being invariably one unfavourable to the Treasury. The object of these payments in kind seems to have been to keep an ample supply of grain and other food-stuffs in the government stores or granaries, and so to prevent or check the creation of those "corners" in wheat, flour and the like known as *iḥtikár* or *anbár-dárí*. This object was defeated by the commutation in question.

(3) *Tafáwut-i-'amal* ("practical difference"). The land assessment being, as already said, old and obsolete, it often happened that the taxes which could be raised from a given district were either less or greater in amount than those originally contemplated. When the district had suffered deterioration, this "practical difference" was recognized, and the governor made a corresponding deduction from the amount at which it had originally been assessed, but in the contrary case he ignored the difference in remitting, but not in collecting. The difference which he pocketed in the latter case was known as *tafáwut-i-'amal*.

In addition to all this, all sorts of minor frauds were constantly perpetrated, and the relatives or friends of pensioners often continued to draw their pensions or prey on their fiefs long after they were dead.

The Finance Committee, which began its Herculæan labours on the *Nawrúz* or New Year's Day (March 21) of 1907, and presented its Budget to the *Majlis* in the following October, comprised 12 members, 5 from Ázarbáyján, 2 from Ṭihrán, 2 from Fárs, and one each from Kirmán, Khurásán and Hamadán. It was presided over by *Wuthúqu'd-Dawla*, and included Taqí-záda (to whom I am indebted for these particulars); *Mustasháru'd-Dawla*; Ḥájji Mírzá Áqá, known as Ḥusayn-záda; Ḥájji Mírzá Ibráhím; *Sharafu'd-Dawla*; *Ḥusámu'l-Islám*; *Mu'taminu'l-Mamálik* (an old man possessing an extraordinary

knowledge of the complicated details of Persian finance); and Mírzá 'Alí Khán *Adíb-í-Khalwat*, a young man of remarkable literary attainments. Acting on the advice of the wise and patriotic *Náṣiru'l-Mulk*, the Committee decided that it would be inexpedient to increase existing taxes or impose new ones, and impossible without time, money and the aid of foreign experts to attempt a reassessment of the land, and that consequently they must trust entirely to economies in order to obtain the much-needed surplus. For some years previously there had been an annual deficit of about three million *túmáns* (about £600,000) as follows:—

Annual expenditure	10,500,000	*túmáns.*
Annual revenue	7,500,000	„
Deficit	3,000,000	„

The Finance Committee worked at their task with the utmost diligence for six or seven months, observing no holidays, beginning their work daily at sunrise, not concluding it until three hours after sunset, and not leaving the building in which they sat during the whole day. Entry by entry they considered, discussed, and voted on the case of each pensioner and fief-holder, reducing or abolishing most of these pensions except in the case of the very poor and the really deserving. Some Princes of the Royal House, as already observed, enjoyed enormous allowances charged on the revenues, notably Muḥammad 'Alí Sháh's brother the *Shu'á'u's-Salṭana*, who had 115,000 *túmáns* (about £23,000) a year, and his uncle the *Ẓillu's-Sulṭán*, who had 75,000 *túmáns* (£15,000) a year. All these were reduced to a uniform yearly allowance of 12,000 *túmáns* (£2400) a year. Measures were also adopted to check the other abuses mentioned above, and to cause an appreciation of silver (for practically no gold circulates in Persia), and finally, by dint of these and other economies, a Budget was produced which converted the deficit of £570,000 into a surplus of £230,000, the total saving effected being some £800,000. Of this surplus £120,000 was assigned to the Sháh's Civil List, leaving a balance of £110,000 for other purposes. And if this Budget, as asserted by Mr David Fraser (afterwards special correspondent of the *Times* at Ṭihrán) at

a Meeting of the Central Asian Society held in London on November 11, 1908, to hear Taqí-záda's account of the situation in Persia, existed only on paper, and was never realized, the fault lay not with those who constructed it with such labour, but with those who prevented its provisions from being carried out. That it should cause dissatisfaction in many quarters, notably to the Sháh, the Princes of the Royal House, and to a crowd of parasites who had long lived and waxed fat on the abuses it strove to remedy, was natural enough; but Persia is not the only country where much-needed reform is impeded or prevented by vested interests. The radical antipathy of Muḥammad 'Alí Sháh and his reactionary supporters and advisers to any effective form of popular control was the rock on which not only the Budget, but also the projects for a National Bank and a National Army suffered shipwreck.

Of the measures designed to secure a more equitable collection of the revenues and to protect the tax-payer from the rapacity of the tax-collectors, something more remains to be said under the head of *Anjumans*.

(5) *Growing unpopularity of the Majlis.*

If the *Majlis* counted amongst its supporters persons who believed that its mere existence would prove a panacea for all the ills which Persia suffered, and would straightway convert it into an earthly Paradise, no doubt they must have been disappointed, but I have come across no evidence which would shew the existence in any considerable numbers of such a class. The feebler resistance shewn by the *Majlis* and its supporters on the occasion of the second *coup d'état* of June, 1908, as compared with that of December, 1907, was, as we have seen, due to quite different causes, while after that catastrophe the urgency with which almost every important provincial town in Persia, first Tabríz, then Ṭálish[1], Rasht and Iṣfahán, then Bandar-i-'Abbás and Bushire, demanded that the Constitution should be restored and the *Majlis* again convened, shews pretty clearly that the country as a whole was by no means inclined to regard either the one or the other as a failure

[1] The Ṭálish revolt, however, was caused by the Governor's unpopularity.

or a disappointment. As for the alleged growth of a Royalist party as a consequence of the supposed failure of the *Majlis* to effect any useful reforms, I doubt if anyone, no matter how well-informed, could mention a dozen Persians who conscientiously believed that the interests of their country would be served by the triumph of Muḥammad 'Alí Sháh over the National Assembly, or who failed to recognize the fact that his triumph meant simply the complete ascendency of Russia over Persia, and the destruction of every fragment of the liberties so hardly won. The Royalists, so far as I have been able to ascertain, and to the best of my belief, consisted of those whose fortunes were entirely bound up with those of the Sháh, those who flourished on the existing abuses, and those whose ambition saw in the Sháh's camp a better field for its exercise, or who were driven thither by personal jealousy or dislike of the popular leaders. To this last class belonged the most eminent—if not the only eminent—ecclesiastical reactionary, Shaykh Faẓlu'lláh, a man of remarkable learning and attainments, whose sad fate—of which, it is said, he himself acknowledged the justice—we must on this account deplore. He saw Sayyid 'Abdu'lláh and Sayyid Muḥammad, whom he regarded as much inferior to himself in learning, holding the highest places on the popular side, and thereat, prompted, as it would appear, by chagrin and jealousy, he cast in his fortune with the reactionary party, to whose service he prostrated his high attainments.

(6) *The Free Press.*

Before the granting of the Constitution in 1906 there existed in Persia no Press worthy of the name. Such papers as there were—the *Írán* ("Persia"), the *Sharaf* ("Honour"), the *Iṭṭilá'* ("Information"), etc. were lithographed sheets appearing at irregular intervals, and containing no news or observations of interest, but only panegyrics on various princes and governors, and assurances that everybody was contented and happy. A few good Persian newspapers (such as the *Akhtar*, or "Star," at Constantinople, the *Ḥablu'l-Matín* at Calcutta, and the *Thurayyá* and *Parvarish* at Cairo) were from time to time established

outside Persia, and enjoyed a certain circulation within its borders.

After the granting of the Constitution all this was changed. The *Majlis*, containing reports of the debates in the National Assembly, began to appear in November, 1906, and was followed a month later by the *Nidá-yi-Waṭan* ("Country's Call"), and these were reinforced in the following year by a number of daily, bi-weekly and weekly papers, of which the *Tamaddun* (Feb. 1907), the Ṭihrán *Ḥablu'l-Matín* (April, 1907), the *Ṣúr-i-Isráfil* (May, 1907), and the *Musáwát* (Oct. 1907) were, perhaps, the most notable. Soon every important town in Persia had its paper or papers, and the total number throughout the country did not fall far short of ninety or a hundred, most of the more important ones being printed. Amongst them were included a few comic and some illustrated papers. Mention should be made of a remarkable if somewhat libellous illustrated lithographed paper entitled *Ḥasharátu'l-Arẓ* ("Reptiles of the Earth") published at Tabríz, and containing biographical sketches of persons regarded as their country's enemies. After the *coup d'état* of June 23, 1908, all or nearly all of these papers were immediately suppressed, but on the abdication of Muḥammad 'Alí Sháh in July, 1909, several of them began to reappear, together with many new ones, of which the *'Írán-i-Naw* ("New Persia") is reckoned one of the best[1].

Evidently no one could claim to be conversant with the whole of this vast ephemeral literature, least of all a foreigner resident outside Persia, and I received regularly only some eight or nine of the more important papers, with occasional numbers of others containing articles of especial interest. So far as this basis affords ground for a general judgment, I cannot see that the *Times* has any sufficient reason for its sweeping assertions as to the mischievous character of the Persian Press, while on the other hand it reached, in many cases, a high level of excellence, most remarkable when we remember how new journalism was to Persia. So far as morality was concerned it was, on the whole, far less open to criticism than a certain portion of the

[1] Compare pp. 127–8 and 143 *ad calc.*, and, for the *Ḥasharátu'l-Arẓ*, pp. 116–7 *supra*.

European Press. Politically, no doubt, it was in some cases violent, and reference has already been made to the celebrated article directed against the Sháh which led to the suppression of the *Rúḥu'l-Qudus* ("Holy Spirit")[1], while even after the restoration of the Constitution the revived *Ḥablu'l-Matín* was suppressed, and its editor punished, for speaking slightingly of the Arabs as "lizard-eaters[2]," and so, as it was contended, disparaging Islám. A law for the better regulation of the Press was also one of the legislative measures which occupied the attention of the *Majlis*, and, as has been already mentioned, the Conciliation Committee formed in May, 1908, about a month before the *coup d'état*, did much to moderate the tone of the more violent organs of the Press[3].

(7) *The Anjumans.*

It has been already explained that the *anjumans* were of two kinds, the official and the non-official. The former were established by law, and were of three kinds, municipal (*baladí*), departmental (*wiláyatí*), and provincial (*ayálatí*). The latter were simply clubs or societies of persons having some common interest, local, political, philanthropic or other, and were sanctioned (subject to the special law regulating their conduct in the elaboration of which the *Majlis* was engaged) by the following article of the *Supplementary Laws* of October 7, 1907:—

"ARTICLE 21.—Societies (*anjumans*) and Associations (*ijtimá'át*) which are not productive of mischief to Religion or the State, and are not injurious to good order, are free throughout the whole Empire, but members of such *anjumans* must not carry arms, and must obey the regulations laid down by the law on this matter. Assemblies in the public thoroughfares and open spaces must likewise obey the police regulations."

It will thus be seen that a clear distinction must be made between the official Councils and the non-official Clubs, and, as Taqí-záda himself admitted, it is an unfortunate thing that the name of *anjuman* should be applied to both without distinction.

[1] See pp. 156 *et seqq.*, *supra*.
[2] *Súsmár-khúr*. The expression is Firdawsí's.
[3] See p. 197 *supra*.

The official *anjumans* formed an integral and essential part of the new scheme for giving the people a real and effective share in the government of the country, and amongst their functions were the supervision of the elections (*Electoral Law of Sept.* 9, 1906, Articles 9—11, 13, 14 etc.), the supervision of the collection of taxes, and the control of any arbitrary acts which might be attempted by governors accustomed to the exercise of the autocratic powers enjoyed by them under the old *régime*. They supplied, in short, the chief mechanism whereby it was hoped to relieve the taxpayer from the intolerable exactions of which we have already spoken.

As regards the unofficial *anjumans*, or clubs, we have seen that the earliest of them were of a local character, being, for instance, associations of Iṣfahánís or Tabrízís resident at the capital for watching the interests of their respective towns or provinces. Others were of an essentially political, and some few, perhaps, of an essentially revolutionary character. As we have seen, they played a great part in the history of this period, especially on the occasions of the two *coups d'état*, and constituted the back-bone, as it were, of the popular party. And again, after the disaster of June 23, 1908, it was they, when the National Assembly was no more, who organized the national resistance, rendered possible that combined effort which culminated in the deposition of Muḥammad 'Alí Sháh and the restoration of the Constitution, and, by the help of similar *anjumans* abroad, especially the *Anjuman-i-Sa'ádat* of Constantinople, kept foreign countries informed of the progress of events and helped to dispel the false news industriously circulated by certain interested persons.

The philanthropic work of the non-official *anjumans* must also be remembered; their relief of the sick and suffering poor, and most of all, perhaps, the night schools which they organized for the education of the humblest classes in the duties of citizenship and patriotism. In this task they were powerfully aided by such popular orators and lecturers as the late *Maliku'l-Mutakallimín* and Áqá Sayyid Jamál (both of whom, alas! were amongst the victims of the ex-Sháh's vengeance in June, 1908), who did not cease to impress upon them that, to escape

foreign intervention, it was absolutely essential that no foreign subject resident or travelling in Persia should suffer any kind of molestation or hurt. To their efforts was largely due the extraordinary immunity enjoyed by foreigners in Persia during this period of acute disturbance, amounting at times almost to civil war, and it is questionable whether history affords a parallel instance of such complete security of foreigners in a country passing through the throes of so momentous a revolution.

I have endeavoured to shew that the harshness of the criticisms passed by the *Times* on the first *Majlis* and its supporters is not justified by the facts of the case, and, seeing that no other newspaper in the world is at such pains to secure good foreign news, or is provided with so many efficient correspondents abroad, I can only ascribe its attitude to certain underlying prejudices or tendencies which coloured all the deductions drawn by its editors from the materials placed at their disposal. The old conception of the *Times*, still widely prevalent in foreign, and especially in distant foreign countries, as an unprejudiced, non-party organ, equally remarkable for the wealth and accuracy of its news, the moderation and fairness of its opinions, and the excellence of its literary style, can no longer be maintained so far as absence of prejudice and party bias are concerned. In a speech made at the *Encyclopædia Britannica* banquet on Nov. 21, 1902, an eminent member of its staff frankly expressed the aim which had dominated the editors of that monumental work as a determination "not to let those Whig dogs get the best of it," and this utterance, publicly made in the presence of representatives of both the (then Conservative) Government and the Opposition, is typical of its attitude alike on domestic and foreign questions, in both of which it is frankly, though generally not indecently, *tendencieux*. Its attitude towards Persia, which became much more hostile in the autumn of 1908 when the Persia Committee was formed and the talk of Russian intervention in Ázarbáyján became serious, was, so far as I can judge, determined not so much by the merits of the case as by the following political doctrines.

(1) That the fate of Persia was a matter of very little importance to Great Britain compared with the maintenance of

the Balance of Power in Europe; that to this end Russia's friendship was indispensable to us; and that therefore nothing must be said or done likely to wound Russian susceptibilities. So far was this principle carried that even the most stalwart admirers of the *Times* found the panegyrics on the virtues and high ideals of the Tsar published by it on the occasion of that monarch's visit to Cowes somewhat difficult to swallow.

(2) That, having regard to the "Nationalist" fermentations existing in Egypt and still more in India, it was inexpedient to countenance kindred movements even in independent Asiatic countries; and that, in order to strengthen the case against any extension of popular government in Egypt or India, and for the restriction of the freedom of the Press in those countries, it was desirable to maintain the doctrine that no Oriental nation was fit for self-government or a free press.

These two fixed ideas sufficiently account for the tone of most of the articles on Persian affairs which have appeared in the *Times* since October, 1908, with the exception of its constant advocacy of a foreign (*i.e.* Anglo-Russian) loan, and its continual scolding of the Persians for their unwillingness to incur further indebtedness to their "two powerful neighbours." To account for this attitude we must assume the existence of some third factor, of which the nature can be more easily conjectured than proved.

That the opinions of the *Times* as to the inefficiency and futility of the first *Majlis* and the unsuitability of popular government for Persia were not shared by the Persian people became clearly apparent as soon as they began to recover a little from the amazement and consternation produced by the *coup d'état* of June 23, 1908. Little by little almost all the important provincial towns rallied to the popular cause, and united against the perjured monarch who had solemnly sworn, on at least three or four separate occasions, "on the glorious Word of God, and by all that is most honoured in God's sight," to exert all his efforts "to preserve the independence of Persia, safeguard and protect the frontiers of the Kingdom and the rights of the People, observe the Fundamental Laws of the Persian Constitution, and rule in accordance with the established

laws of Sovereignty." But it was Tabríz, the second city of the Kingdom, the great industrial centre of the north-west, the Manchester of Persia, which best knew and least liked Muḥammad 'Alí Sháh, and best understood and most loved freedom and independence, which "kept the flag flying" for nearly ten months while Tihrán lay prostrate under the iron heel of Colonel Liakhoff and his Cossacks, and which, ere it finally succumbed to the stress of hunger, gave to Iṣfahán, Rasht and other cities the encouragement and the time which they needed to rally to the popular cause.

Of the history of the siege of Tabríz it is both impossible and unnecessary to write the details in this place; impossible because the materials for such a history are not yet available, though I understand that already a narrative of the siege has appeared in Persia; unnecessary, because we already possess the published accounts of three independent European witnesses of the earlier and later stages of these events. Of these three the first in point of time was Captain Lionel James, the *Times* correspondent, whose letters did so much to awaken interest in the defence of Tabríz in this country. He was unhappily withdrawn by the *Times* on October 5, 1908. Besides his letters in the *Times* he has several chapters on this subject in his book *By-ways and Bridle-paths*. The second witness was the French Captain Anginieur, who was at Tabríz from September 14 until October 7, 1908, and who published an illuminating account of his observations and reflections in *l'Asie Française* for January and February, 1909[1]. The third was Mr W. A. Moore, who went out as correspondent to the *Daily News*, *Daily Chronicle* and *Manchester Guardian* in January, 1909, and remained there until the end of the siege in April, 1909. As the blockade of Tabríz was completed shortly after his arrival, very few of his letters got through, but during the three months which he spent there he supplied the papers which he represented with some thirty telegrams, some of considerable length, which constitute a valuable source of information. The first of these appeared on January 21, the last on April 22.

[1] Pp. 11–16 and 44–46 of the first, and pp. 66–69 and 84–87 of the second. Captain Anginieur went from Tabríz to Ṭihrán, and left the latter city for Europe on Nov. 6, 1908.

Camp
Ajl Chay River
Qara Malik
Jamish-abad
Amir Khiz
Akhuni
Qara Agh
Kucha Bayh
Chahar Bakhsh
Khatib
Chahar Andab
Mihin
علامات مخصوصه
Endroits occupés par les royalistes
Bastions des royalistes
Bastions des nationalistes
Signe séparant les hommes occupés par les royalistes de ceux des nationalistes
Mosquées
Carvan Sraï
Boutiques
Rues
bain publics
Le cimetière
Jardins et champs
Endroits inhabitables


خریطهٔ شهر تبریز در حال انقلاب
غرهٔ شهر رمضان سنه ۱۳۲۶
LA CARTE DE TAURIS.
PENDANT LA, REVOL-
UTION. 27 SEPTEMBRE.
(1908)
Bagh-i-Misha
Maydan-chay River
Qurú-chay River
Khiyábán
Gardens
Bagh-i-Shimal
Yanuq
Camp Diwán
Bagh-i-Sáhib

Three periods may be distinguished in the struggle at Tabríz. *First*, a short period of street-fighting when the Constitutionalists under Sattár Khán and Báqir Khán held only one or two of the thirty quarters into which Tabríz is divided, notably that of Amír-Khíz situated by the river Áji Cháy on the north-west side of the city, and when, but for the gallantry displayed by Sattár Khán, the Royalists would have secured an early and complete triumph. *Secondly*, a period when the Royalists, expelled from the whole or the greater part of the town, were still unable to close the roads into Tabríz and to prevent the passage of food and letters. The road to Julfá and the Russian frontier remained open longest, and was still held by Sáttar Khán's men when Mr Moore passed along it in the latter half of January, 1909, but was finally closed about February 3, when the blockade of the city was completed. *Thirdly*, the period of the blockade, during the latter days of which famine stared the unhappy townsfolk in the face, and many died of starvation. The last desperate sortie was made on April 22, and four or five days later the Russian troops under General Znarsky opened the Julfá road, brought food into Tabríz, and raised the siege.

The fighting at Tabríz began on the very day of the *coup d'état*. On the preceding day (June 22, 1908) the *mujtahid* of Tabríz, Ḥájji Mírzá Ḥasan, the *Imám-Jum'a*, Ḥájji Mírzá 'Abdu'l-Karím, Mír Háshim, and other reactionary ecclesiastics, telegraphed to the Sháh denouncing the Constitution and encouraging him to destroy it. This action infuriated the Constitutionalists, and one of them fired at, but missed, Mír Háshim, and was at once seized and killed. Thereupon the reactionaries assembled in the Devechí (or Camel-men's) quarter, situated immediately to the north of the Amír Khíz quarter, and seized and killed several prominent Constitutionalists, while on the other hand a bomb was thrown at the house of the *mujtahid*, situated in the quarter of Chahár Manár, immediately to the east of Amír-Khíz. The fighting then became general, and at one time the Constitutionalists were so hard pressed, and so despaired of holding their own, that most of them, including Báqir Khán, hoisted the white flag as a token of surrender; but

Sattár Khán, with a few of his most stalwart followers, regained the lost ground, reanimated the drooping courage of his adherents, and succeeded in completely turning the fortunes of the struggle.

The second period of the siege, during which Sattár Khán held Tabríz and some at least of the roads leading into it, as well as certain other places in the neighbourhood, is, unfortunately, that for which we have at present the scantiest accounts, for from the departure of Captain Anginieur about the end of October, 1908, until the arrival of Mr Moore in the latter part of January, 1909, little direct news from Tabríz reached England. The successful revolution in Turkey in July, 1908, greatly encouraged the leaders of the Constitutional party in Persia[1], and henceforth the eyes of the Persians were turned not in fear but in hope towards their Western frontier, more especially when, in October, 1908, sinister rumours of a Russian advance "to restore order" in Ázarbáyján began to gain currency. The ancient hostility between Persia and Turkey, chiefly arising from the secular feud existing between the Shí'a and the Sunnís, and often utilized by European powers —especially Russia—for their own ends, had of late years been much mitigated, and, thanks to the teachings of Sayyid Jamálu'd-Dín and his successors (amongst whom the Prince Ḥájji Shaykhu'r-Ra'ís, author of the *Ittiḥádu'l-Islám*, or "Union of Islám," and other similar works, deserves especial mention), the two principal independent States of Islám were beginning to realize how much they had in common, both of fears and hopes. Whatever lands had during the last century or so been torn from Islám, the core—Persia, Turkey, Arabia and Afghánistán—remained untouched, but should Russia succeed in penetrating into Ázarbáyján, a wedge would be driven into this core which would render infinitely more precarious the continued independent existence of either Persia or Turkey. So, though the

[1] This news reached Tabríz on August 4 through the Ottoman Consul-General, and the town was at once placarded with a manifesto "to the effect that, unless they could obtain a satisfactory settlement before the arrival of a Governor-General with reinforcements, the Sultan would be as good a Sovereign as the Sháh." (*Blue Book* [Cd. 4581], No. 228, p. 177.)

Ázarbáyjánís had no desire to lose their Persian nationality and pass under Turkish rule, they would, alike on the ground of a common faith, a common tongue (for throughout Ázarbáyján a dialect of Turkish is the prevalent speech), and a certain community of disposition and desires, have greatly preferred Turkish to Russian rule, while it was obvious that Turkey's interests in the fate of Ázarbáyján were more vital than those of Russia. But Turkey, absorbed in her domestic affairs, had little thought to spare for Asiatic politics, though the sympathies of the "Young Turks" for their Persian comrades were freely manifested, while the action of Russia on the north-west frontier of Persia was anxiously watched.

The attitude of Russia, indeed, began to cause great anxiety in other quarters. The part played by Colonel Liakhoff and the other Russian officers of the Cossack Brigade in the *coup d'état*, and the entirely Russian modelling of the whole proceeding, were apparent from the first, and the fuller details received from correspondents and from the Persian refugees whose lives had been saved by the British Legation, in spite of Colonel Liakhoff's precautions, and who began to arrive in Europe during the late summer of 1908, only served to confirm the belief that the Russian Government, always and everywhere the ruthless foe of freedom, was determined to stamp out the Constitutional Movement in Persia, and to restore the autocratic power of Muḥammad 'Alí Sháh, who was commonly reported to have declared that he would rather be a Russian vassal with autocratic powers over his own people than the constitutional ruler of a free and independent nation. Evidence was produced at the time as to actions detrimental to the Persian Constitutionalists emanating not only from Colonel Liakhoff, but from M. de Hartwig, the Russian Minister at Ṭihrán, M. Pokhitanof, then Russian Consul-General at Tabríz, and other representatives of the Russian Government, and a considerable correspondence on the subject took place in the English papers. Characteristic of the attitude of the *Times*, which has been already discussed, was a leader on "Russia and the Persian Question" published in its issue of November 7, 1908, in which it scolded the Persian refugees and their English friends for casting doubt on Russia's

good faith, derided their apprehensions of Russian intervention in Ázarbáyján, and concluded by enunciating in the frankest manner its favourite doctrine that in speech and writing expediency rather than truth should be chiefly kept in view. "At this moment," it declared, "the Persian question should be considered, not in a local and sectional manner, but in its bearing upon far larger problems. Our correspondents should seek a wider horizon. They should try to realize that the growing friendship between Great Britain and Russia is a matter that may become of vital importance to the world, in view of the manner in which Germany is still pressing her utterly inadmissible claims upon France. This is not the time to foment and to pursue an agitation which concerns comparatively limited issues, and has a very small foundation in fact." Nowhere, perhaps, can we find a clearer confession on the part of the *Times* of the purely opportunist considerations which govern all its utterances.

It was in the latter part of October, 1908, when the defence of Tabríz was at its bravest, that ominous rumours of Russian intervention began to circulate. On October 19 the *Times* published a telegram from its St Petersburg correspondent describing the situation in Ázarbáyján as "hopeless without foreign intervention." On October 25 the *Sunday Times* published telegrams from Constantinople and Frankfurt o/M. stating that six infantry battalions of Russian troops with cavalry and artillery had, on Thursday, October 22, crossed the Araxes into Ázarbáyján, and on the same day a telegram was received at Cambridge from the Persian *Anjuman-i-Sa'ádat* at Constantinople, whence it had been despatched at 11.30 p.m. on October 24, of which the translation is as follows:—

"The following telegram has been received from Tabríz:—

"We have taken all measures for local security in this neighbourhood. Hitherto there has been no interference on the part of the Liberals [*i.e.* the so-called 'Nationalist' defenders of Tabríz] with the rights of a single foreign subject. Nevertheless our Northern Neighbour, in pursuit of her political intrigues, is pushing forward a number of soldiers. Make known the details, as political exigencies may require, in the proper quarters.

Sayyids and National Volunteers
of the Shuturbán (or Devechí) quarter of Tabríz

The Provincial Council has taken measures of urgency. Give information.

"ANJUMAN-I-SA'ÁDAT."

This news, which was repeated in numerous papers during the course of the next few days, and which, according to a telegram published in the *Times* of October 27, "had caused a certain uneasiness in [Turkish] official circles," where it was feared that "a foreign occupation of Ázarbáyján might compel the Ottoman Government to maintain strong forces over a considerable stretch of the frontier," was already known to the British Foreign Office on October 17, when Sir Edward Grey telegraphed to Sir Arthur Nicholson, the British Ambassador at St Petersburg, to say that it "would create a very bad impression here," and to ask "whether it would not be possible to induce the Russian Government not to intervene[1]?" In consequence, apparently, of the British representations, the Russian force which had been despatched was ordered on October 20[2] to remain at Russian Julfá and not to cross into Persian territory. As the ground of the proposed intervention it was officially stated that the Russian Consul at Tabríz "held the danger [to Europeans] to be serious and imminent[3]." Ten days later there was fresh talk of Russian intervention, this time on the new ground of "serious loss to Russian trade"—a flimsy pretext which, if generally admitted, would justify the neighbours of any country distressed by war or other calamity in invading her territories—but once again, on October 31, Sir Edward Grey's remonstrance[4] proved effective, and though the fear of Russian intervention was ever present with the Tabrízís and their friends, the danger was for the time averted.

It seems scarcely worth referring in detail to certain telegrams sent about the end of July, 1908, by the reactionary leaders at Tabríz to the Sháh and his Ministers. The signed and sealed originals of these telegrams fell into Sattár Khán's hands when he captured the telegraph-office, and photographs of them are in

[1] *Blue Book on Persia* [Cd. 4581], p. 192, No. 266.
[2] *Ibid.*, p. 194, Nos. 270, 271, and p. 200, No. 282.
[3] *Ibid.*, p. 193, No. 268.
[4] *Ibid.*, p. 202, Nos. 288, 289.

my possession, while a general account of their contents, and translations of the two most important ones, will be found at pp. 55–59 of the *Brief Narrative of Recent Events in Persia* which I published in January, 1909. The two important ones were from the Royalist general *Shujá'-Nizám* to the Minister of War and the Prime Minister. In the first he requested that, if the Sháh approved, "*instructions should be given by the Legation to the Consul-General to supply ten or twenty thousand cartridges*" to the Royalists, while in the second he acknowledged the receipt of the same. There can be little doubt which Legation and which Consul-General were intended.

It has been seen that the chief ground on which the Russians claimed the right to intervene was the alleged insecurity of the lives and property of European residents at Tabríz. To meet this allegation (the more dangerous at this time when almost all news from Tabríz came through Russian channels) Sattár Khán, who, notwithstanding his humble origin, was as remarkable for his prudence and foresight as for his courage and strategy, obtained from three of the chief European firms established in Tabríz certificates of their complete satisfaction with his administration, and the entire security which they enjoyed under the provisional "Nationalist" administration.

The first of these three documents is from Messrs Mossig and Schünemann ("Compagnie Allemande") of Berlin, Hamburg and Tabríz, and is undated. The translation runs as follows:—

"The notification of the Provincial Council sent from the office of that most honourable *Anjuman* has been duly received.

"We, the *Compagnie Allemande*, newly established here, are thus far most grateful to and perfectly satisfied with the agents of that most honourable *Anjuman*, who, during these great troubles which have prevailed in the city of Tabríz for the last four months, have shewn us nothing but kindness, and assured to us tranquillity and ease. We have written accounts of all that has happened to Europe, and will continue to do so in the future, and we shall ever be grateful for the honourable conduct of that noble body."

[Signed] Mossig and Schünemann.

The second certificate, bearing a date equivalent to November 8, 1908, is signed by the representative (name illegible) of Messrs Nearco Castello et Frères, and runs as follows:—

"I represent for the service of their high and desirable Excellencies the respected members of the most honourable Provincial Council of Ázarbáyján:—

"In accordance with the notification received by me this day [I declare that] from the beginning of the troubles in Ázarbáyján until now there has been no lack of respect and no act of aggression on the part of the National Volunteers (*mujáhidín*) or rifle-men or other partisans of the Constitution, and [that we have sustained] no sort of injury in property or person.

"Written for the information of your honourable minds. More than this would trouble you unnecessarily."

Nearco Castello et Frères.

Shawwál 13, A.H. 1326 (= November 8, 1908).

The third certificate, written on November 10, 1908, is from the Austrian *Société Anonyme de Commerce Oriental*, established at Vienna, with branches at Bucharest, Sofia, Philippopolis, Rustchuk, Varna, Cairo, Alexandria, Constantinople, Salonica, Smyrna, Trebizonde, Beyrout, Baghdad, Basra, Ṭihrán, Mashhad, Hamadán and Tabríz. After the usual preliminary formula it runs as follows:—

"Kind and considerate friends,

"We trust that you are and may be adorned with the ornament of health. To proceed. We have received the notification which you were so kind as to send. We are extremely grateful and sincerely thankful for the assistance rendered to us by your honourable members. From the very beginning of the Constitutional Movement you have, as occasion arose, scrupulously observed the rights of your friend, so that no loss or injury should befall us. More than this, when occasion arose in connection with the transport of merchandize, you have repeatedly incurred trouble in rendering effective assistance. Thanks be to God, in consequence of the favourable regards of your honourable members in respect to your friend, no annoyance has befallen us, for which we are extremely grateful and indebted

to the most honourable Provincial Council. We have sent some of these notifications to our own country. More would merely trouble you."

[Signed] B. Grunberg.

Shawwál 15, A.H. 1326 (= November 10, 1908).

Nothing could be greater than the contrast between the good conduct of the "Nationalist" defenders of Tabríz and the abominable behaviour of the Sháh's troops, which, according to Mr Stevens[1], "has been characterized throughout by 'atrocious acts' and indiscriminate looting." The so-called Royalist troops, indeed, consisted largely of Raḥím Khán's brigands of the Sháh-seven tribe; and the impossibility of placing any reliance on the Royalist promises (well illustrated by an incident which occurred on September 2, 1908, and of which an account will be found at pp. 186–7 of the Blue Book on Persia) rendered hopeless the attempts to bring about a pacific settlement which were made during August, though there was a cessation of actual hostilities between August 7 and September 6[2]. Prince *'Aynu'd-Dawla*, accompanied by the Sipahdár, arrived at Tabríz to take command of the besieging forces on August 20, but they effected nothing, and on October 9 sustained a considerable defeat at the hands of the Nationalists, who succeeded in "throwing the camp of *'Aynu'd-Dawla* into great confusion," and capturing the bridge over the Ájí Cháy from the Mákú cavalry[3].

A day or two later on October 11, "a body of some 400 Persian Cossacks left Tihrán for Tabríz taking four guns with them," and "accompanied by one or more Russian officers[4]." It was on the occasion of their departure from the capital that Colonel Liakhoff is reported to have addressed to them the following amazing harangue[5]:—

"Brave soldiers and Cossacks! Since the Cossack Brigade was first formed you have on many occasions shewn unparalleled

[1] *Blue Book* [Cd. 4581], No. 228, p. 177.

[2] *Ibid.*, p. 186, and p. 188 near the bottom.

[3] *Blue Book*, p. 191, No. 260.

[4] *Ibid.*, p. 192, No. 263.

[5] The only full report of this speech which I have seen was published in the Turkish Journal *Ṣabáḥ* (No. 6871) for Nov. 11, 1908, and from this the translation here given is made.

courage, and, in the highest degree, loyalty to the Sháh and your superiors. In recognition of this many of you have been honoured with decorations, gifts, and all sorts of other favours, *both from the Russian and from the Persian sovereigns.* Your attack on the Ṭihrán agitators assembled in the Parliament buildings and the Sipahsálár Mosque filled the world with amazement. A small Brigade was victorious in battle against the rebels, of whom you succeeded in destroying half, after which you reduced to ruins their accursed stronghold and successfully maintained your advantage. In this battle many of your comrades perished, but their death only served to strengthen your victorious renown.

"The Sháh's throne is in danger. The people of Tabríz, having collected together a mob of common folk, have seized the rifles and artillery of the Government. They have declared war against the Sháh, and refuse to obey his authority. They are striving to compel him again to accept a Constitution. This Constitution will limit and impair the rights and privileges of the Cossack Brigade, and will exercise control over your wages. The Constitution is your worst enemy. Against this enemy you must fight to the last drop of your blood. The Sháh has sent against Tabríz Bakhtiyárí, Siláḥkhúrí and other troops, all of whom have been worsted, so that they fled before even so timorous a foe as the Tabríz rebels. This need cause no astonishment, since they were wanting alike in order, discipline and obedience. As was seen when the Parliament was destroyed, they can only be employed for looting. They are a worthless lot.

"When I saw in how difficult a position the Sháh was placed, I offered him the services of the Cossack Brigade. I was firmly convinced that the Brigade would distinguish itself in battle, and that the mere sight of the Cossacks would fill the enemy with despair. This is not your first battle, for you have been engaged in other battles before now. You have proved your capacity in war. But in this war against a mob of cowardly rioters, the victory which you will secure will immortalize your name and fame, and will fill the whole world with astonishment. In order that you may not have to suffer any hardships on the

march or during the campaign, I have caused you to be provided with every sort of necessary provision. You must know that, should you return victorious, you will be overwhelmed with money and favours *both on the part of the Russian and the Persian sovereigns. Whatever wealth is contained within the walls of Tabríz, all shall be yours!*

"You must know that for you to conquer Tabríz is a matter of life and death. If you conquer, the Constitution will lapse. If its supporters win, the Brigade will be disbanded, and you and your wives and children will remain hungry. Do not forget this, and fight like lions. Either you or the Constitution!

"I was very desirous of accompanying you on this campaign, but the political conditions do not admit of this. But another Russian, Captain Ushakoff, is going. You must love him as you love me, and obey him as you obey me. Although I cannot be beside you, I shall always follow your doings from afar. Every one will receive a reward proportionate to his merits, but should anyone play the traitor he will be severely punished.

"However fierce the war may be, and however numerous the foe may be, rest assured that you will triumph. The Hidden Hand which has so often aided you will aid you in this campaign also, so that you shall not behold the face of defeat. Do not despair of it, or of God Almighty[1].

"Brave officers and Cossacks! May God grant you safety and a glorious victory!"

So these Cossacks also departed to strengthen the iron ring which was closing round the gallant city of Tabríz; but if in this war any achievements "filled the whole world with astonishment," or "immortalized the name and fame" of anyone, it was certainly not the achievements of the notorious Cossack Brigade.

[1] What is meant by "the Hidden Hand" in this sentence is not clear. I asked one of my Persian friends whether it referred to the Power of God or of Russia. He replied that it was purposely ambiguous, but the last words of the sentence would suggest that it denotes the latter.

CHAPTER IX.

THE FALL OF TABRÍZ AND THE RISING OF THE PROVINCES.

ON the last day of the year 1909, as I sit down to pen this retrospect of the momentous and unexpected events to which it has given birth in Persia, I am filled with a sense of profound thankfulness as I contrast the gloom which brooded over its earlier portion with the brighter hopes which mark its close. Many dangers and many anxious days lie without doubt before the new Persia, but since the year of despair which succeeded the *coup d'état* of June, 1908, it has at least been possible to hope that she may finally emerge, strengthened, purified and re-invigorated, from the ruins of the old *régime*, and may yet play in the future a part worthy of her long and glorious past.

In the period of gloom of which I have spoken, two Sundays stand out in my memory as conspicuous for their sombre misery; October 25, 1908, when the news (false, as it happily proved) reached us that Russian troops had crossed the Araxes and were marching on Tabríz; and April 25, 1909, exactly six months later, when the following telegram was received from Taqí-záda:—

"Consuls décidèrent ouvrir routes aide troupes russes. Craignons conséquence occupation russe. Prions faire démarches nécessaires. Télégraphiez immédiatement votre conseil.

Endjoumeni Ayaleti, Taghizadeh.

Tauris, 24 avril, 1909: 10.30 p.m."

Before speaking of the circumstances which brought about the state of things alluded to in this telegram, some retrospect of the progress of events outside Tabríz is necessary.

From Ṭihrán came little news calculated to encourage the Persian Constitutionalists and their sympathizers. England and Russia were urging the Sháh to grant some sort of Constitution in place of that which he had destroyed as the only possible means of establishing peace and order, while the Sháh continued to give evasive promises, which only assumed even the semblance of definiteness when he thought that he might succeed in obtaining a joint loan from the two Powers, for money was urgently needed not merely for the ordinary current expenses but also to prosecute the siege of Tabríz. The proposal for a joint loan of £400,000, rejected by the *Majlis* at the very beginning of its career, was revived again about a month after the *coup d'état*. Russia was eager to grant it, but England was unwilling, and was only prepared to consent on two conditions, viz.:—

(1) That the loan should not be employed for the suppression of the Constitution, but should be advanced in such a manner as will allow of its being used as a lever for supporting it.

(2) That the expenditure of the loan should be controlled by suitable guarantees[1].

The Sháh, in reply to an identical note[2] from the two Powers urging him strongly to convene the new *Majlis* on Nov. 14, 1908, sent on Sept. 18 a message to the following effect:—

"I am taking steps to form a *Majlis* in conformity with the requirements of the country and with religion, and such as not to lead to a recurrence of disorders, and I am thus fulfilling my promises. I hope that I shall be able to issue a Proclamation for the assembly of the *Majlis* on the date mentioned by the two Governments in their communication to me; but till after the restoration of order at Tabríz, when the Persian Government will have leisure to make the necessary arrangements, the Parliament will not open[3]."

Mr Marling, the British Chargé d'Affaires, seems at no time to have entertained much hope that any real reform would be

[1] *Blue Book* [Cd. 4581], p. 179, No. 234, dated Sept. 5, 1908.
[2] *Ibid.*, pp. 180–1, Nos. 238 and 239, dated Aug. 31 and Sept. 3, 1908.
[3] *Ibid.*, p. 182, No. 240.

effected under Muḥammad 'Alí Sháh's auspices. In a despatch of Sept. 10, 1908, he wrote[1]:—

"On the 1st instant he [M. Bizot, the Financial Adviser] obtained an audience with the Sháh, in which he intended to expose to his Majesty the scandalous way in which the country's revenues are being squandered, but the reception which he met with from the Sháh was cold, almost to discourtesy, and he thought it useless to carry out his intention.

"M. Bizot would have, I think, no difficulty in producing a statement of really urgent claims on the Treasury, such, for instance, as the arrears of salary due to the Persian Diplomatic and Consular Representatives abroad and to the Foreign Office officials. I venture to think, however, that, so long as the present camarilla under Amír Bahádur Jang[2] retains its power, we should refuse even this assistance, for the relief granted would merely mean that the small sums which are now secured for genuine public expenses would be embezzled. In these circumstances, I think it would be in the true interests of Persia that we should refuse to give them any financial assistance. So long as there is any prospect of screwing money out of the country so long the harpies about the Sháh will resist reform, whether as a condition of a loan or through the agency of the *Majlis*, and no more effective way of discouraging them occurs to me than that of cutting off every source of revenue which they can plunder."

At the end of September, 1908, the Sháh issued a Rescript concerning the restoration of constitutional government, which was described by M. Tcharykoff as "contradictory, obscure and ornate[3]," and which, according to Sir George Barclay, who had reached Ṭihrán to take up his new duties as British Minister on October 1, was "generally regarded as a mockery[4]." It was dated Sha'bán 27, A.H. 1326 (Sept. 24, 1908), and a translation of it will be found at p. 200 of the Blue Book so often cited in the foot-notes. Even these vague promises, however, the Sháh

[1] *Blue Book* [Cd. 4581], p. 188, No. 253.

[2] In the following despatch (No. 256) he is described by Mr Marling as "virtually dictator of Persia."

[3] *Blue Book* [Cd. 4581], No. 255, p. 190.

[4] *Ibid.*, No. 258.

was anxious to recall, and a sham demonstration against the Constitution organized by the reactionary party[1] at Bágh-i-Sháh on Nov. 7 afforded him an excuse to issue on Nov. 22 another Rescript cancelling the first and declaring flatly that he had "quite abandoned any idea of convoking a Parliament, as the *'ulamá* had declared that such an institution is contrary to Islám[2]." Thereupon the great *mujtahids* of Karbalá and Najaf, whose ecclesiastical status in Persia may be described as equivalent to that of archbishops in a Christian country, sent him "a very violently worded telegram...stating that his 'conduct wounds the heart of the believer and is an offence against the absent Imám,' and that they would 'leave no stone unturned to obtain a representative government,' and ending 'God has cursed the tyrants; you are victorious for the moment, but you may not remain so[3].'"

It is, indeed, difficult to exaggerate the services rendered by these great *mujtahids* to the Constitutional cause, in the support of which they were untiring, especially Ḥájji Mírzá Ḥusayn the son of Ḥájji Mírzá Khalíl, Mullá Muḥammad Kázim of Khurásán, and Mullá 'Abdu'lláh of Mázandarán, who, by letters, telegrams and manifestos, ceased not to encourage the Persian people in their struggle for freedom, and to neutralize the influence of those venal and reactionary ecclesiastics, such as Shaykh Faẓlu'lláh, Ḥájji Mírzá Ḥasan of Tabríz and a few others, who supported the Sháh in maintaining that representative government was incompatible with the spirit of Islám.

It is hard to account for the blind infatuation of Muḥammad 'Alí Sháh, unless we suppose that he was stiffened in his obstinate refusal of any sort of compromise or reform by some secret influence on which he believed that he could rely in any event. Never had he a better opportunity for making advantageous terms with his people than now, for Tabríz still stood alone in armed defence of the Constitution, and even after a notable success over the Royalists on October 12, 1908,

[1] Notably, Amír Bahádur Jang and the *Mushíru's-Salṭana*. See the *White Book* [Cd. 4733], No. 9, p. 3.

[2] *Blue Book* [Cd. 4581], pp. 208–9, Nos. 313 and 314.

[3] *Ibid.*, p. 210, No. 315.



Mullá Muḥammad Káẓim al-Khurásání. Ḥájji Mírzá Ḥusayn ibn Khalíl. Mullá ʻAbdu'lláh al-Mázandarání

THE THREE GREAT MUJTAHIDS WHO SUPPORTED THE NATIONAL CAUSE

which "placed the city in the undisputed possession of the Nationalists," they "addressed telegrams to the Sháh and the Minister for Foreign Affairs expressing their loyalty to His Majesty, and announcing to His Highness their intention to do all in their power to protect the interests of foreigners in the town[1]." A month later the situation was already less favourable to him, for Russian Foreign Policy, which ever reveals a certain dualism, took a turn for the better about the middle of November, 1908, when M. de Hartwig, to whose reactionary influence reference has been repeatedly made, was recalled from Persia, and M. Izvolsky declared that "he had made up his mind on two points, which were non-intervention and no support of the Sháh[2]." This was the more creditable to him because strong influences were working in favour of a "forward policy," probably the Russian Court, and certainly a considerable portion of the Russian Press, notably the *Novoe Vremya* and the *Bourse Gazette*, which latter demanded insistently that "Russian policy in Persia must become more energetic if Russia does not wish the opportunity to be taken advantage of by Turkey[3]." The publication of the Blue Book on Persia and its supplement, which carries the history of events down to May 10, 1909, has also made it clear that Sir Edward Grey's deeds were occasionally better than his words, which were, as a rule, little calculated to inspire much hope in the Persian Constitutionalists and their sympathizers.

The gallant rally made by Tabríz, notwithstanding the stalemate in which it seemed to end, undoubtedly saved the situation, for it gave time to the other cities of Persia, notably Iṣfahán and Rasht, to recover from the paralysis in which the *coup d'état* had for the moment plunged the whole nation outside the province of Ázarbáyján, while it rivetted the attention of Europe and convinced the western nations that the popular movement was no passing fancy but grim earnest. This conviction was greatly strengthened by the Persian refugees, who, in Constantinople, London, Paris, and other centres, succeeded by their speeches and writings in arousing widespread sympathy with and interest

[1] *Blue Book* [Cd. 4581], p. 211, No. 316.
[2] *Ibid.*, No. 319, p. 212.
[3] *Ibid.*, No. 320, p. 214.

in the struggles of their compatriots. In Constantinople, as we have seen, the *Anjuman-i-Sa'ádat* did much to co-ordinate and stimulate effort; in England the formation of the Persia Committee on October 30, 1908, was directly due to the energy and enthusiasm of Taqí-záda and his colleague the *Mu'ázidu's-Salṭana*, who arrived in this country during the month of September; in Paris the sustained endeavours of a larger circle of Persian residents and refugees led to the formation of the *Union Franco-Persane*, under the distinguished Presidency of M. Dieulafoy, on July 31, 1909; while at Yverdon in Switzerland the *Ṣúr-i-Isráfíl* was revived again for a while by its talented sub-editor Mírzá 'Alí Akbar Khán, better known by his *nom de guerre* of "*Dakhaw*" or "*Dih-Khudá*," one of those whose lives were saved by the British Legation in June, 1908[1].

Of the London "Persia Committee" (or rather Committees, for there are two, a Parliamentary and a non-Parliamentary) I should, being in some measure identified with it, prefer not to speak, were it not for the characteristically unfair description of it given by the *Times*, which, in a leader in its issue of Sept. 10, 1909, described it as consisting of "Radical politicians whose Platonic sympathies for Persian Constitutionalism are a convenient cloak for the Russophobia they have developed ever since a more liberal and conciliatory policy in St Petersburg has led to a more friendly understanding between Russia and their own country." Some allowance must no doubt be made for the chagrin experienced by the *Times* at the falsification of its confident prophecies as to the incapability of the Persian Nationalists to do anything for themselves, an attitude which it now sought to justify by the contention that "the Nationalists of pure Persian blood have seldom shewn much disposition to do battle for the constitutional principles which have warmed their eloquence to white heat," and that "those who have risked their lives have mostly been Caucasians and Turks, Arabs and Lurs, and other nomadic tribes of a more martial type than the average Persian": a statement which is at least no nearer the truth than it would be to say that few of the *Times* leader-writers are of pure English blood, and that

[1] *Blue Book* [Cd. 4581], No. 220, p. 171.

"those who have devoted their talents to its service have mostly been Scotchmen, Americans or Jews." Only a fit of bad temper can have caused the *Times* to forget that Russophobia in its most extreme and intense form was the creation of that great Conservative leader Lord Beaconsfield, or that neither to Lord Lamington, the distinguished President of the Persia Committee, nor to the Earl of Ronaldshay, nor even to Mr H. F. B. Lynch, against whom its fiercest wrath is directed, can its description fairly be applied. It is sad to see a paper once so generally regarded as fair and courteous reduced to writing such malicious nonsense as this.

On Nov. 19, 1908, the Sháh issued a fresh Rescript addressed to the Clergy, in which he declared that "having been convinced by them[1] that the institution of a *Majlis* is contrary to the laws of Islám...," he had "entirely given up this idea," and that "in future such a *Majlis* will not even be mentioned[1]." In consequence of a strongly-worded joint note from the representatives of England and Russia, this Rescript was suppressed shortly after its issue, and a fresh promise was made of "a *Majlis* which will suit the requirements of the Persian people, but will not cause anarchy and trouble in the country[2]." These constant evasions, shifts and prevarications only resulted in completely alienating from the Sháh not merely his own people but the foreign representatives whose efforts to bring about some sort of working compromise were constantly thwarted by his obstinacy and reckless disregard alike of promises and consequences.

Meanwhile, during the second half of November, 1908, the Tabríz Nationalists, in spite of the arrival of 300 Persian Cossacks and six guns to reinforce the besiegers, achieved several successes, capturing or winning over the towns of Marágha, Dilmán and Bínáb near Lake Urmiya[3]. Encouraged by this, and disgusted at the Sháh's conduct, the provinces began to stir, and Nationalist movements of different degrees manifested themselves at this time at Rasht and Astarábád on the Caspian littoral, at Mashhad in the north-east, and at Lár in the South, while it was deemed advisable to place Iṣfahán

[1] *White Book* [Cd. 4733], p. 8, Inclosure in No. 17.
[2] *Ibid.*, p. 10, Inclosure in No. 18. [3] *Ibid.*, p. 11, Inclosure in No. 19.

under martial law, and to conceal the Sháh's refusal to restore Constitutional Government.

The New Year (1909) opened with a violent agitation in Iṣfahán, caused primarily by the unpopularity of the Governor and the misconduct of the troops. A number of the townspeople took refuge in one of the Mosques, and others at the Russian Consulate[1]. Why the British Consul-General, Mr Grahame, refused to admit those who sought his protection[2], while a day or two later he received and sheltered the Governor, *Iqbálu'd-Dawla*, and his adherents[3] is a riddle which I have not yet been able to solve. It was by the help of the brave and hardy Bakhtiyárí tribesmen, led by *Ẓarghámu's-Salṭana*, that the Iṣfahánís had succeeded in ridding themselves of their tyrant, and by Jan. 5 *Ṣamṣámu's-Salṭana* himself with 1000 Bakhtiyáris was in possession of the city, and was guarding the foreign firms and maintaining order, while the town was quiet and the Sháh's soldiers (the primary source of disorder) dispersed[4]. The infatuated Sháh rejected the advice of the English and Russian representatives to appoint *Ṣamṣámu's-Salṭana* Governor of Iṣfahán, and resorted to the characteristic device of trying to sow dissension amongst the Bakhtiyárí chiefs, but without success[5]. *Ṣamṣámu's-Salṭana* continued to act with vigour and judgment. On Jan. 8 he ordered the Iṣfahánís to appoint within three days representatives for a local Constitutional Assembly, on pain of withdrawing his men and abandoning the city to the tender mercies of the Sháh and his soldiers[6], and three days later Mr Grahame reported that order was being maintained most satisfactorily in Iṣfahán, and that on Saturday a general assembly was held with a view to elections[7]. The Bakhtiyárí chief also sent to the *Farmán-farmá*, the new Governor nominated by the Sháh, a message described as "a frank avowal that he had espoused the Nationalist cause[8]."

This new and unexpected development in the situation,

[1] *White Book* [Cd. 4733], p. 16, No. 30, and p. 46, No 78.
[2] *Ibid.*, p. 30, under *Ispahán*, and p. 46, No. 78.
[3] *Ibid.*, p. 16, No. 31, and pp. 46–7, No. 78.
[4] *Ibid.*, p. 18, No. 35.
[5] *Ibid.*, pp. 18–19, Nos. 35, 37, 39 and 40.
[6] *Ibid.*, p. 20, No. 43.
[7] *Ibid.*, p. 22, No. 49.
[8] *Ibid.*, p. 21, No. 45.

Ṣamṣámu's-Salṭana (Bakhtiyárí)

Ẓarghámu's Salṭana (Bakhtiyárí)

THE BAKHTIYÁRÍ LIBERATORS OF IṢFAHÁN (JANUARY, 1909)

which was not unconnected with the journey to Paris and London of *Ṣamṣámu's-Salṭana's* elder brother, the now famous Nationalist hero *Sardár-i-As'ad*, and the consultations which took place between him and his compatriots in Europe, seems not to have been altogether pleasing to the Russian Government, and on Jan. 9 M. Izvolsky expressed the opinion "that something should be done to prevent the establishment of independent administrations at Tabríz and Iṣfahán[1]," to which, on Jan. 13, Sir Edward Grey replied with admirable firmness that "His Majesty's Government are opposed to any kind of intervention respecting the position in Tabríz or Iṣfahán," and that, "while any proposals emanating from the Russian Government will be most carefully considered by His Majesty's Government, they hold that to give the Sháh money would, in the present circumstances, be worse than futile, and would amount to intervention in Persia's internal affairs," since "it is probable that such money would be employed in the suppression of the national movement on behalf of a Constitution," and that "when once the money had been spent, the situation would be as bad as ever, even if not worse[2]." The Nationalists, having learnt that Russia was again contemplating a loan to the Sháh (£200,000 being the sum now named[3]), lodged vigorous remonstrances with the foreign representatives[4] and forwarded similar protests to the European Press.

The example of Iṣfahán was soon followed by Rasht, where, on Feb. 8, 1909, the Nationalists attacked the Governor's house and killed him, while his soldiers took refuge in the Russian Consulate[5]. The *Sipahdár-i-A'ẓam*, who some months before had been in command of the Sháh's troops before Tabríz, now joined the Nationalists, put himself at their head, organized a provisional government, and sent an expedition to Langarúd to establish a local Assembly there[6]. A few days later the Sháh's

[1] *White Book* [Cd. 4733], p. 20, No. 44. [2] *Ibid.*, p. 22, No. 52. Cf. p. 36, No. 62.
[3] *Ibid.*, pp. 39 and 41, Inclosure in No. 63.
[4] *Ibid.*, p. 42, No. 66, p. 45, No. 75, pp. 58–9, No. 109 and Inclosure.
[5] *Ibid.*, p. 44, Nos. 72 and 73, p. 58, Inclosure in No. 108. Of the leaders of the Rasht Nationalists, *Mu'izzu's-Sulṭán* and Karím Khán, something will be said in the final Notes.
[6] *Ibid.*, p. 50, Inclosure in No. 81, and p. 57, No. 108.

brother, Prince *Shu'á'u's-Saltana*, arrived at Rasht from Europe, and was compelled by the Nationalists to contribute £1000 to their funds before he was permitted to proceed to Ṭihrán[1].

Thus by the beginning of March, 1909, there were four great Nationalist centres, Tabríz, Rasht, Iṣfahán and Lár, in the N.W., N., Centre and S. of Persia, which, so far as the difficulties of communication allowed, were acting more or less in concert, and where, in strong contrast to those decreasing areas in which the Sháh's authority was maintained, decent order and security of life and property were guaranteed by provisional governments. Two dark clouds, however, hung on the horizon. On the one hand Russia began to move "a few troops" to Baku and to the frontier at Julfá, and despatched 50 more Cossacks to protect the Russian Consulate at Rasht[2], besides seizing at Baku 5,000,000 cartridges and a large number of rifles destined for that town[3], while a little later she increased her Consular Guards at Astarábád and Mashhad[4] and sent war-vessels to Anzalí and Bandar-i-Gaz, the ports of Rasht and Astarábád respectively[5]. And on the other hand it began to become daily more apparent that Tabríz, at the very moment when her example was being followed by Iṣfahán, Rasht, Shíráz, Hamadán, Mashhad, Astarábád, Bandar-i-'Abbás and Bushire, and when the hopes of the Nationalists were brightest, was in dire straits, though almost to the end this fact was kept, as far as possible, from the knowledge of her friends.

A certain discouragement and demoralization, common, I believe, in sieges where the civilian element enormously exceeds the military, especially when the defenders are only volunteers and armed civilians, seems to have affected the Tabrízís about January, 1909, and this probably accounts for the pessimistic tone of Mr Moore's articles, especially of two which he contributed on July 3 and 8, after his return to England, to the *Times* and the *Westminster Gazette*. His opinion is undoubtedly entitled to respectful consideration; and if at the end his personal gallantry, outrunning his discretion, impelled him to take up arms for the

[1] *White Book* [Cd. 4733], pp. 52 and 55, Nos. 87 and 96.
[2] *Ibid.*, p. 55, No. 97.
[3] *Ibid.*, p. 56, No. 102.
[4] *Ibid.*, p. 72, Nos. 147 and 148.
[5] *Ibid.*, p. 73, No. 151.

Dervishes in camp outside Iṣfahán, May—June, 1909

defence of the city, and so compelled the newspapers which he represented to break their agreement with him, just at the very time when his continued presence at Tabríz was so much to be desired, I for one cannot but admire the chivalry which inspired and the courage which characterized actions technically inadmissible, but in the circumstances hardly deserving of severe condemnation. In the city people were dying of starvation or subsisting on grass; surrounding it were Rahím Khán's savage tribesmen and *'Aynu'd-Dawla's* hardly less savage troops, who had been kept together thus long only by the prospects of loot, massacre and rapine; the Sháh thirsted for vengeance; no terms of capitulation were to be expected, or would have been observed even if promised; and in the villages adjacent to the town occupied by the Royalists were provisions to feed the starving inhabitants, if only they could be won by a courageous sortie. What wonder that Mr Moore, together with his less fortunate comrade, Mr Baskerville, a young American mission-teacher, who was killed in the last desperate sortie on April 21, yielded to the urgent entreaties of the Nationalist leaders and consented to join them in their forlorn hope? More to be regretted, as it seems to me, was the disparaging manner in which Mr Moore, after his return, spoke of his late comrades in arms, who sought, when all was over, to testify in every way their regard and gratitude; and in estimating the justice of his views we must not forget to take into consideration the testimony of Mr Wratislaw, the British Consul-General at Tabríz, who, in a despatch addressed to Sir George Barclay on March 7[1], wrote as follows:—

"On this as on all other occasions Sattár Khán shewed distinguished personal courage, but he exposes himself far more than should a commander on whose life the whole Nationalist cause in Tabríz depends. In the abortive attempt to open the Julfá road on the 22nd February he was for a time in the greatest danger, being left by the mass of his men with only a handful of Armenians in a critical position, from which he extricated himself with much difficulty. He also proved his

[1] *White Book* [Cd. 4733], No. 170, p. 81.

humanity on the 5th instant by interfering at some personal risk to save prisoners from the hands of an infuriated mob."

The progress of the siege of Tabríz during these last three months can be followed both in Mr Moore's 30 communications, ranging from Jan. 21 to April 22, and published simultaneously in the *Daily News*, *Daily Chronicle* and *Manchester Guardian*, and in the White Book [Cd. 4733], which covers the whole of this period. In brief the chronicle of the most important events is as follows:—

January, 1909. At the beginning of the month the Nationalists suffered a severe defeat at the hands of Ṣamad Khán the Governor of Marágha. On the 23rd they defeated a force of Mákú Kurds at Julfá, but the severe cold rendered operations difficult. (*White Book*, No. 79, p. 47.)

February. On the 5th the Nationalists lost some 50 men in a skirmish in which they drove back the Royalists to Sardarúd, but without gaining any material advantage. Tabríz was by this time "practically beleaguered." "No provisions," writes Mr Wratislaw, "can enter the town, the fruit-trees in the gardens are being cut down for fuel, and though there is at present a sufficient supply of corn for the food of the population, the pinch is being severely felt in various ways." Financial difficulties and some discontent amongst the mercantile classes caused further embarrassment. (*White Book*, No. 112, Inclosure, p. 63.) On Feb. 11 the Julfá road was blocked by the tribesmen of Qáradágh, and bread was scarce in the town. (*Ibid.*, No. 74.) On Feb. 15 Mr Wratislaw estimated the grain reserves as sufficient to feed the town for two months longer. (No. 82.) On Feb. 22 another vain attempt was made to relieve Marand and re-open the Julfá road, and three days later Súfiyán was occupied by the Royalists, while Mr Wratislaw now thought that Tabríz could only hold out for another month. (Nos. 89, 90, 92.) On Feb. 25 and 26 a determined attack on the town was made by Ṣamad Khán, which, however, was repulsed with heavy losses. (No. 170 and Inclosure.) On the 28th a baker was shot by order of Sattár Khán for selling flour at a higher price than that fixed by the *Anjuman*. (No. 170.)

March. On the 2nd Ṣamad Khán occupied Qára-Malik, a large village situated near to Tabríz on the East. On the 3rd the Indo-European telegraph line was cut by Raḥím Khán between Tabríz and Julfá, but, as the result of diplomatic pressure at Ṭihrán, it was finally repaired on the 19th. (No. 170.) On the 5th Marand and on the 15th Julfá were occupied by the Royalists (Nos. 105, 114, and 170, but see also 126), and on the former date Ṣamad Khán's troops occupied the suburb of Ḥukmábád, whence, however, they were expelled during the afternoon. "This assault," says Mr Wratislaw, "excited great apprehension in Tabríz, as Ḥukmábád is virtually part of the town, and the Royalists had not previously come so close or shewn such determination. A number of *mullás* joined the Nationalist forces in the defence, and though it is not to be expected that the reverend gentlemen did much execution, their presence certainly encouraged the fighting men." (No. 170, Inclosure.) On the 25th there was already very great suffering among the poorer classes of the town, and the last two mails from Europe had been stopped by Raḥím Khán, who threatened to shoot the next man who tried to bring in the mail. (Nos. 132, 133.) On the 28th it was thought "that in three weeks at most the provisions in Tabríz would be completely exhausted" (No. 137), and two days later several deaths from starvation were reported. (No. 142.)

To those who watched from afar, it seemed incomprehensible that no attempt to relieve Tabríz was made either from Iṣfahán or from Rasht, whether by a direct endeavour to raise the siege, or by a threatened advance on Ṭihrán, which might compel the Sháh to recall some at least of his troops to the capital. In Tabríz itself, so late as April 12, hope was entertained of relief from Salmás, whence a force of 3000 men was reported to be advancing (No. 165), but I cannot ascertain that there was any foundation for this belief, and at any rate no such attempt was made. And just about this time the Sháh's obstinacy was strengthened by the news of the short-lived counter-revolution in Constantinople, and he was less disposed than ever to make any concession or listen to any terms of compromise (No. 197), so that the negotiations opened by the besieged through

Thiqatu'l-Islám with the Royalist headquarters at Basminj, never very hopeful, no longer offered even a chance of success. Danger to the foreign residents at Tabríz began to be seriously apprehended, and the British representative was instructed, should necessity for action arise, "to insist on the Persian Government either allowing the foreigners in Tabríz to leave the town, or allowing sufficient supplies of food to enter it." (No. 182.) On April 16 the Persian Government "instructed *'Aynu'd-Dawla* to facilitate the departure of foreign subjects, to ensure their safety, and to suggest that they should now leave the town," but refused to allow the introduction of food. Both British and Russian subjects, however, expressed themselves as unwilling to leave Tabríz. (Nos. 188 and 190.) On April 18 Mr Wratislaw reported that the quantity of public food was much smaller than he had at first been given to understand, and that the situation of foreign residents was very critical; and he further mentioned certain proposals for an armistice for which the Provincial Council (*Anjuman*) begged the support of him and his Russian colleague, and of the two Legations. On April 19 there was "talk of a last attempt to break the blockade to-night" (the attempt, presumably, in which Mr Moore and Mr Baskerville took part, the latter with fatal results), while the British Government was contemplating the advisability of England and Russia "insisting on their Consuls leaving Tabríz and taking with them any other foreign subjects who might wish to leave the town," and the Russian Government of "threatening the Sháh that, unless certain quantities of food were admitted into Tabríz, they would themselves take steps to introduce the same, and would, if necessary, employ force to effect that object." (Nos. 202, 205, 199.) "Bread was very scarce to-day," Mr Wratislaw telegraphed on April 18, "and will be scarcer still to-morrow. The chief source of danger for the moment lies in the immense number of starving poor who may at any time rush the houses where they think food is likely to be found. There is at present little danger from the Nationalists themselves." (No. 200.)

On April 20 it was decided to send a Russian force to Tabríz "to facilitate the entry into the town of the necessary

provisions; to protect Consulates and foreign subjects; and to assist those who wish to leave the town to do so." (No. 207.) "It seems to me," said Sir Arthur Nicholson, "that it would be the Nationalists who would profit by the arrival of the Russian force, but I submit that the chief object to be kept in view is the safety of the Consuls, *even at the risk of the measures which circumstances have rendered necessary proving of benefit to the popular movement at Tabríz.*" (No. 208.) The Tabrízís have been charged with ingratitude for not recognizing more fully that they finally owed their safety to the arrival of the Russian troops, but since considerations for their safety, as clearly appears from the above words printed in italics, did not affect the decision as to the sending of these troops one way or the other, they had in fact no reason to be grateful to anyone but God, whose Providence ordained these means for their deliverance from death.

For two days longer it seemed as though, even at this eleventh hour, the Sháh might relent and Russian intervention might be avoided, for on the morning of April 20 he promised the British and Russian representatives to send telegraphic instructions to *'Aynu'd-Dawla* to permit the introduction of food into Tabríz until mid-day of the 26th, during which period hostilities should cease on both sides, and in consequence of this promise the Russian force was ordered on the following day not to cross the frontier. (Nos. 210, 215.) Whether the Sháh failed to send the promised instructions, or whether *'Aynu'd-Dawla* disregarded them, or whether they were intercepted on the way, is uncertain; but after the Nationalists had ceased fighting in consequence of the Consuls' representations, Ṣamad Khán's irregular troops attacked and occupied their important position at Khatíb (No. 228: compare, however, No. 235), while *'Aynu'd-Dawla* declined to give any facilities for the introduction of food into the town. On the same day the Russian force already stationed on the frontier, and consisting of four squadrons of Cossacks, three battalions of infantry, two batteries of artillery, and a company of sappers under the command of General Znarsky, received orders to advance on Tabríz, open the road, and bring in provisions, instructions being given to

the Commander not to undertake any administrative duties, and not to interfere in the struggle between the opposing parties. (Nos. 231, 232.) Two days later the Sháh, who professed himself "much hurt by the suspicion that he had not sent the promised instructions to his Generals," actually telegraphed to them "to facilitate the free introduction of provisions into the town, with no restrictions as to quantity or time," and "ordered a complete cessation of hostilities." (Nos. 242, 245.) His compliance came too late, for already the Russian force was advancing by forced marches on Tabríz, where it arrived on April 29.

Whatever the feelings of the Nationalist leaders may have been, there can be no doubt that to the bulk of the inhabitants, as to all others who contemplated with horror the prospect of the bloodshed and rapine which would have undoubtedly marked the entry of the Royalist troops into Tabríz, the arrival of the Russian force, with the consequent opening of the Julfá road and entrance of provisions for the starving people, was a welcome relief. The assurances given by the Russian Government that "the Imperial troops would only remain in Persian territory as long as might be necessary in order to guarantee completely the security of the lives and property of the Russian and foreign Consulates and their subjects" (No. 248) and "the orders given to the officer commanding the column to abstain from interference in the differences between the two contending parties at Tabríz, and in no wise to assume any administrative duties[1]" (No. 252) were eminently satisfactory, and it is not surprising that "Sattár Khán shewed himself well disposed towards them, and that they met with a good reception on the way." (No. 260.) He even called on the British Consul-

[1] It was believed that the Russians would not take advantage of their presence in Tabríz to molest any of their Armenian and Caucasian subjects who had joined the Persian Nationalists. This belief, however, proved unfounded. An unfortunate Armenian named Zorabian, a Russian subject, being assured that he ran no danger of arrest, decided to remain, and even fraternized with the Russian soldiers quartered near his house. But after a little while he was arrested, taken back to the Caucasus, tried for complicity in some former act of rebellion, and hanged at Erivan. He was described by one of his comrades in arms as one of the best and bravest of the National Volunteers.

general "to express his profound gratitude to Great Britain" and his confidence as to the future.

On the evening of April 29th 180 Russian soldiers reached the Ájí Bridge and on the following morning entered the town. (No. 263.) Four days later there were 269 soldiers in the town, while the total force in the neighbourhood amounted to 4000. At first the relations between them and the people appear to have been excellent, but later, owing to what even the *Times* described as the "tactlessness" of General Znarsky in handling a very delicate situation, these relations became, on the evidence not only of Persians but also of Russians, very much more strained; while the absence of any indications on the part of the Russian Government of any intention of removing or greatly reducing the force, even when the city had long resumed its normal condition, naturally gave rise to increasing uneasiness.

The complaints of the Tabrízís as to the "tactlessness" of the Russian troops were formulated in a little lithographed Persian pamphlet of 18 pages entitled *An Account of the aggressions of the Russian regular troops from the first day of their arrival, recorded without regard to chronological arrangement*, and dated the 12th of Jumádá i, A.H. 1327 (= June 1, 1909). The pamphlet is in the form of an open letter addressed to five residents at Ṭihrán, of whom four were Europeans, including General Houtum-Schindler, Mr David Fraser of the *Times*, and Mr Maloney, who was acting as occasional correspondent to the *Manchester Guardian* and other papers, and contained 36 complaints. As this pamphlet is in Persian, and is, moreover, scarce, curious and difficult to obtain, I think that a summary of its contents may not be unacceptable to the reader. After referring to the written assurances given on the 9th of Rabí' ii (= April 30, 1909) by the Russian Consul at Tabríz to the effect that the Russian soldiers would refrain from interference in internal affairs, treat the people well, and pay the fair market price for everything they took, and declaring themselves able to prove the truth of their allegations, the complainants proceed to state their grievances as follows.

(1) On the 4th of Rabí' ii (= April 25, 1909) three representatives of the Provincial Council (*Anjuman-i-Ayálatí*) went

to the British Consulate to ask that the entry of the Russian troops might be delayed for a few days until the result of negotiations with Tihrán then in progress should shew whether the need for their advent might not be averted. The Russian Consul, who was present, assured them that the troops would not enter the city, but, notwithstanding this assurance, on the day of their arrival nearly 200 of them entered it.

(2) On the evening of the 18th of Rabí' ii (= May 9) a stray shot fired in the air struck the hand of a Russian sentry who was posted on the roof of *Baṣíru's-Salṭana's* house. Thereupon the other soldiers began to fire in all directions, and a certain Ḥájji Muḥammad Ṣádiq, son of Karbalá'í Báqir, who was passing by the Gachín cemetery, was shot through the throat and died.

(3) On the 25th and 26th of Rabí' ii (= May 16 and 17) some Russian soldiers not in uniform and without their guns, but armed with daggers and pistols and dressed like *gens d'armes*, were seen standing outside the houses of Dr George and the Warden of the Castle (*Qal'a-Begi*), at the end of the Kúcha-i-Mustashár, and in other places.

(4) In Amír-Khíz and Rásta Kúcha some of the soldiers molested women, raising their veils and looking at their faces, a thing greatly repugnant to Muḥammadan custom and sentiment.

(5) On the 22nd of Rabí' ii (= May 13) a proclamation was issued by the Government ordering everyone carrying arms to lay them aside before noon, and forbidding anyone to appear armed in the streets. An hour and a half before noon the Russian soldiers began forcibly to disarm those whom they met carrying arms in the streets or *bázárs*, and to collect arms from the shops where they were exposed for sale.

(6) On the same day the Russian soldiers seized six guns, six revolvers and a dagger from the mounted Persian guard which had been appointed to accompany the pacificatory mission deputed by the *Anjuman* to proceed to Marand, Khúy, Salmás and Urmiya to tranquillize the inhabitants, and which was on the point of starting from the building where the *Anjuman* was sitting, although the Persian troopers held permits from the Russian Consul and from General Znarsky authorizing them to carry arms.

(7) On the same day about 100 cartridges were seized from Sayyid Muḥammad, a gun and a double-barrelled pistol from Áqá Buzurg, and a dagger from a broker named 'Ábidín in the *bázár*, and the last-named in particular was threatened with death if he refused to relinquish his dagger.

(8) On certain days Russian soldiers appeared in streets and quarters (such as Áqá-Ján-ábád) far removed from the quarters inhabited by Europeans, and through which they had no occasion to pass.

(9) On the night of the 19th of Rabí' ii (= May 10) large bodies of soldiers with search-lights patrolled the quarter of Armanistán, notwithstanding the presence in that quarter of a sufficient number of the city police.

(10) Soldiers while passing through the streets and *bázárs* constantly help themselves to eatables which take their fancy from grocers' and other shops, as happened, for instance, to Ḥusayn Baqqál, son of Karbalá'í Taqí in the quarter of Mihád-i-Mihín.

(11) On the 26th of Rabí' ii (= May 17) a squadron of Cossacks with a gun galloped so fiercely past the Gachín cemetery that they overthrew and trampled under their horses' feet an old dumb man, named Muḥammad 'Alí, son of Áqá 'Alí Beg, so that he now lies at death's door in the hospital.

(12) On the 24th of Rabí' ii (= May 15), by command of General Znarsky, soldiers entered the Khiyábán quarter, ascended on to the roofs of the houses, mounted a gun on the bake-house opposite Báqir Khán's house, placed two other guns in the street, and proceeded to destroy the barricades and other defences with pick-axes and dynamite. During these operations they also broke the telegraph wires.

(13) According to the report of the city guards, the soldiers also molest villagers entering the town, knock off their caps and make mockery of them.

(14) The Russian Consul announced in writing to the Government that two Persian subjects, *'Imádu'l-Islám* and *Intiẓámu'l-Mulk*, were officially placed under his protection, on account of their relationship to the Persian Minister at St Petersburg, who had asked that they might be so protected.

The persons in question were in no danger, and the Minister denied that he had made any such request.

(15) He similarly took under his protection *Navídu'l-Mulk* and his family, alleging that the Persian Minister for Foreign Affairs had requested the Russian representative at Ṭihrán to grant such protection. In reply to a telegraphic enquiry, *Sa'du'd-Dawla*, the Minister in question, replied that this request had been made long before, while fighting was going on inside the city and the conditions were entirely different.

(16) The Russian Consul demanded that the city authorities and Nationalist leaders should take the utmost care to guard and protect the villages of Básminj and Ni'mat-ábád and the fugitives from Tabríz who were in them, on the ground that part of the first-named village belonged to a Russian subject, and that the Russian Consul's country-house and garden were situated in the latter. No one was to be allowed to go armed to those two villages, nor were their inhabitants to be allowed to carry arms. The city Government would be held responsible for any breach of these regulations.

(17) The Russian Consul formally required from the Government an account of all stores and ammunition in their arsenal. After destroying the barricades and other defences (as mentioned in § 12 above), he demanded whether any were still left, and whether any guns, and, if so, how many had been removed to the citadel.

(18) On Thursday the 22nd of Rabí' ii (= May 13) the soldiers, without informing the Government or Police of the city, or the Russian Consul, began putting up telephone wires from their camp at the Ájí Bridge to the Russian Consulate. In the course of this operation they ascended by means of ladders on to the roofs of houses occupied by Muslims, frightening women and children, in order to erect the telephone poles.

(19) On the same day a Russian officer with some soldiers went to the Crown Prince's Palace, in which are situated the Government offices and the *Shamsu'l-'Imárat*, expelled the caretakers, and locked the doors. On complaints being made by the Government and the Provincial Council, they tendered an apology, saying that they only went to look at it. Four days

later they brought two taps which they wished to set over one of the gates of these same buildings, to indicate that they had been occupied.

(20) On the evening of the 19th (= May 10), or at an earlier date, the Consul promised that not more than the 179 Russian soldiers who had already arrived should enter the city. The *Anjuman* also received telegraphic assurances from Ṭihrán that the same promise had been transmitted through the Persian Minister at St Petersburg. Notwithstanding this, 25 more soldiers entered the city by night, and, uttering loud hurrahs, proceeded in a disorderly fashion through the streets and *bázárs* to the gardens of Shapshál Khán and of the Bank.

(21) Ever since their arrival the Russian soldiers have been engaged in taking measurements and making maps of the streets and quarters of the town. In the course of this occupation they have molested men and alarmed women. Although the Russian Consul in presence of the British Consul declared explicitly to the *Anjuman* that this surveying and map-making should stop, it still continues.

(22) In an official communication dated the 11th of Rabí' ii (= May 2) the Russian Consul informed the Government that General Znarsky and the other Russian officers had been instructed to acquaint themselves daily with the pass-word for each night, and forbidden to go about the city at night without it, in case they should be invited to spend the evening with friends in the city. But in a later communication of the 22nd (= May 13) he urgently requested the Government not to require the pass-word from the Russian officers and soldiers, and to leave the city gates open at night so that they might circulate as they wished without difficulty.

(23) On the same date (May 13) he further requested that no obstacles should be opposed to the passage through the streets and thoroughfares of the Russian soldiers, and that the people should stand aside to let them pass.

(24) Every few days the Russian troops, with bands playing, and accompanied in some cases by artillery, march through every quarter of the town, even the most remote, while every five days they change the soldiers stationed in the town, so that

every member of the Russian force comes to know every detail of the topography of the town.

(25) On the evening of the 25th of Rabí' ii (= May 16) a number of soldiers were stationed outside the house of the *Thiqatu'l-Islám*, and they searched all those who passed by even to their pockets.

(26) On the 10th of Rabí' ii (= May 1) Russian soldiers, by command of their officers, drove away the police and city guards stationed on the town side of the Ájí Bridge. And whereas at first they would not allow the Nationalist riflemen to cross the bridge, on the 18th of Rabí' ii (= May 9) they stopped the Nationalist leaders and troopers who were escorting a European friend out of the town some 200 yards short of the Bridge.

(27) Amongst other irregular and vexatious acts mention must be made of their interference with women, from whose faces they pluck aside the veil, even in the presence of the city police; of their riotous conduct in the quarter of Mihád-i-Mihín; of their seizure of tradesmen's goods without giving payment; of their entering houses (*e.g.* the house of Vartániyánus the Armenian) or knocking at their doors; of their striking school-children (*e.g.* Warrám, a pupil of the Laylábád College) with the butt ends of their guns; of their abuse of passers-by; of their preventing the passage of the same; and of their molestation of persons wearing medals bestowed on them for services rendered during the siege.

(28) Although the telephone service in Tabríz has for a long time been granted by the State to a Persian company, the Russians, without seeking permission from that Company, have set up a telephone of their own from the quarters of the Russian officers to the Russian Consulate, in doing which they have made use of the poles erected by the Company, whose property they have damaged and whose wires they have broken. Further, in an official communication dated the 22nd of Rabí' ii (= May 13) the Russian Consul bade the Government take all possible precautions for the protection of these Russian wires, which were guarded by Russian sentries.

(29) On the 27th of Rabí' ii (= May 18) soldiers stationed

at the Russian Club threatened a policeman named Ghulám who was on duty in the Kúcha-i-Mustashár, even menacing him with death if he passed along that street.

(30) On the 28th of Rabí' ii (= May 19) a Persian sentry, not carrying arms, went up on to the citadel to take a look round. Immediately a Russian officer in the Club made as though to fire at him, and afterwards sent a soldier to Ná'ib Muḥammad Ḥusayn, the commissioner of that quarter, to tell him that if anyone was seen again in that place, he would be shot.

(31) On the 16th of Rabí' ii (= May 7) two Russian officers and one soldier entered the citadel without permission, examined the guns and spat on one of them.

(32) Some of the soldiers occupying *Baṣíru's-Salṭana's* houses descended from the roof into the neighbouring house of Áramnáq Vartániyánus one night and carried off 19 poles. (Cf. § 27, *supra.*)

(33) On the occasion already mentioned (No. 2), when a Russian sentry on a roof was wounded in the hand by a stray shot fired in the darkness, and it was never ascertained who fired the shot or how the event came about, or even that the shot was not fired by a Russian, an ultimatum was presented to the town authorities by General Znarsky demanding the payment within 48 hours of a sum of 10,000 *túmáns* (about £2000) as compensation. Of this sum, with great difficulty, 3000 *túmáns* were collected by contributions from the inhabitants.

(34) Russian subjects were encouraged to take on lease, with a view to their protection, the properties of fugitive Royalists, such as the *Imám-Jum'a* and others, and to act, as it were, as their stewards.

(35) About the beginning of Jumádá i (about May 21) a quarrel arose between a certain Yúsuf of Ḥukmábád, a lieutenant in the town police, and a certain Ḥusayn. The latter fired a pistol, and the former, while endeavouring to arrest him, also fired several shots. The local Government, having investigated the case, found both men to blame, reprimanded them, exacted from Yúsuf a pledge that he would not in future molest

Ḥusayn, and forbade Ḥusayn to carry arms. Thereupon Ḥusayn went straight to the Russian Consul, where he remained that night. Next day he was taken to the Russian camp, where also he remained one night. Next morning he returned accompanied by a number of Russian soldiers with several guns. These surrounded the Ḥukmábád quarter, arrested Yúsuf with twelve other persons, though they offered no resistance and fired no shots, took them to the camp and there imprisoned them, and then looted and afterwards destroyed by means of artillery Yúsuf's house, besides looting the neighbouring houses and confiscating the guns of 18 of the city police who were on guard in that quarter. They also drove away with threats an inspector named Aḥmad Khán and a sergeant named Akbar who had come to investigate the matter, threatening to shoot them if they did not withdraw. Along with Yúsuf they also arrested and imprisoned an old man named Ḥájji Maḥmúd, who was seventy years of age.

(36) On Saturday the 9th of Jumádá i (= May 29) they arrested opposite the *Baṣíru's-Salṭana's* house, which was occupied by Russian soldiers, a certain Ḥájji Shaykh 'Alí Aṣghar, a preacher, who had spent more than ten years at Najaf, had resided nearly eight years in Tabríz, and was a member of the Provincial Council (*Anjuman*). Though he had done nothing to deserve arrest, they detained him that night in the guard-house and next day took him in the most ignominious manner to the Russian camp.

Many of these complaints may be regarded as of a trivial nature, and indeed I was assured on excellent English authority that the bombardment and destruction of the house in Ḥukmábád was the only grave misdeed of General Znarsky's soldiers; but it is quite clear that, to say the least of it, there was a good deal of bullying and rough horse-play on their part, and that they were at no pains to consider the feelings of the inhabitants. This appears very clearly from the following article contributed to the *Russkaye Slovo* (described by the friend who was good enough to communicate to me the translation as "a large Moscow paper, one of the wealthiest in Russia,

of the type of the *Daily Telegraph*") of May 12 (25), 1909, by the special correspondent of that paper in Tabríz. The translation runs as follows:—

"IN TABRÍZ.

(*From our Special Correspondent.*)

"Yesterday evening along narrow streets rattled and rumbled the Russian guns. It was after dark, and the way was lit by lanterns and torches. The bugler on the *Arg* (citadel) had long since blown the evening call, after which no one may go into the street unless he knows the pass-word. Tabríz was asleep. Only the *nazmiyya* (the police) slept on the crossings, leaning on their rifles....

"They brought in two guns and three quick-firers, sent three companies of soldiers (perhaps a few men short), and posted them at various points in the town. This morning the town was transformed into a military camp. Everywhere groups of soldiers, loaded waggons, green boxes: officers on horseback cantered up and down the streets.

"There were numbers of them before, and soldiers' waggons had before now been rumbling along the streets, but somehow it all looked different then. The soldiers laughed and joked with the Tatars[1], the Tatars sat on their carts. Now everything has an officially severe appearance. The soldiers have pulled themselves together, keep silence, refuse to engage in conversation. The Tatars look gloomy and turn their faces away.

"The time of peaceful intercourse between the Russian soldier and the Persian has come to an end. It seems as though anxious days were beginning.... All day long our sappers have been setting up telephones in the chief quarters, connecting the positions of the troops, the Russian buildings and the Consulates. For convenience' sake, and in order to economize wire, it was decided to take the line direct across the house-roofs, and at once misunderstandings arose. Wholly

[1] This is the correct form: "Tartar" arose from a desire to connect the terrible hordes of Chingíz Khán, Húlágú and "Tamerlane" (*Tímúr-i-Lang*="Limping Tímúr") with the infernal terrors of Tartarus. The name is applied by the Russians to the Ázarbáyjánís in the Caucasus.

disregarding the customs of the country, our men went so far as to climb into the women's courtyards, and orthodox Musulmán women saw '*giaours*[1]' in their *andarúns*[2], in the very holy of holies of their home, into which even a strange Musulmán dare not penetrate.

"In the afternoon when the Consul visited the *Anjuman* the representatives of the city asked him to request the troops to relieve the *andarúns* of soldiers' visits. So the telephone was taken along the streets, and the responsibility of seeing that the wire was kept intact was laid on the *Anjuman's* police.

"One of our officers said to me: 'I'm strict with them. Pointed to the wire and then drew my hand like that along his neck and said: "We'll choppee off *bashka*[3] if you no watch wire." He got a fright, sort of laughed quietly, then up with his rifle. "All right," he says, "if they touch wire I'll shoot." Now they all stand and keep guard over the wire.'

"Since early morning the whole town has been in a state of agitation, as though it were an ant-heap which had been disturbed. All faces are anxious and gloomy: the Tatars are going off somewhere in crowds, carrying weapons. I ask them, 'Whither away?' 'The Russians have ordered us to give up our arms: we're taking them to the *Arg* (citadel).'

"I go to the *bázár*. Half the shops that were trading so briskly yesterday are closed. A crowd stands around an armourer who deals in old Persian daggers and crooked swords, bought now only by Sayyids who wish to distinguish themselves at the festival of ...[4] What does it mean? It seems that the Russians have come and ordered the armourer to close his shop. The poor man with difficulty refrains from weeping.

[1] This word, familiarized to English readers by Lord Byron, is the Turkish form (*gyáwur*) of the West Persian *gawr* (pronounced like *Gower* in "Gower Street"), which appears to be a variation of *gabr* ("guebre" in Moore's *Lalla Rookh*), the contemptuous term applied by Persian Muslims to the Zoroastrians, equivalent to "heathen," "pagan."

[2] The "inner," or women's apartments, called *ḥarem* in Turkey, and *zanána* in India.

[3] Head.

[4] The translator has left a blank here. I suppose that the reference is to the Muḥarram mourning for Ḥusayn, the '*Áshúrá* or *Rúz-i-Qatl* in particular.

"'What have I done to you? I trade quietly, don't harm anyone, and sell my old weapons.'

"The Persians look on, plunged in gloomy silence, only from time to time sighing. One thinks of the Tatar in Gorky's play *In the Depths*. 'Where are you to go? Whom are you to tell?'

"Near the Russian Bank two soldiers are dragging along the *bázár* a huge Russian flag. They climb on to the roof and set the flag up over the *bázár*, like Englishmen when they discover a new island. Only the object in this case is not so much demonstrative as preventive and strategical. The soldiers have been told in the event of military operations being opened not to fire at those quarters over which the Russian flag waves.

"At a crossing of the ways stands the market crier (here all orders of the *Anjuman*, or Provincial Council, and the administration are published through criers) and shouts:—

"'By order of His Excellency *Ijlálu'l-Mulk*, I declare that from this hour onwards the carrying of arms in this quarter is prohibited. Give up all your arms in the *Arg* (citadel). Those who are caught with arms will be shot!'

"Poor *Ijlálu'l-Mulk*! He hit on this cruel measure in the hope of somewhat pacifying the Russians, who are so unmercifully strict with him. Yesterday he received a categorical demand, namely, to find and bring before the Russian Consul the man who on the evening of April 26 (May 9) wounded by a rifle-shot in the darkness rifleman Petrenko, who was on sentry duty on the roof of the barracks in Armanistán. *Ijlálu'l-Mulk* arrested seven men, but not one of them would admit that he had shot at Russians.

"Moreover the *Anjuman* has received an ultimatum: 'Pay as compensation for the wounding of rifleman Petrenko, who is now disabled, 10,000 *túmáns* (= about £2000).' All this was to be done within 48 hours, *i.e.* by the evening of the next day, otherwise special measures would be taken.

"Rifleman Petrenko is happily only slightly wounded in the right hand, and he is recovering. He is lying in the waiting-room of the Tabríz Road office, and chuckling with delight.

"'There I lived and lived in Russia, and was always poor. They drove me off to Persia, and now they tell me I'll get 20,000 roubles.'

"Twenty thousand he will not get. This sum, the Consul says, will be reduced, but ten thousand will certainly fall into Petrenko's pocket. But they will not find the culprit, because he is not to be found.

"A strange mysterious case! The Russian officers say, 'It was a *fidá'í*.' The *fidá'ís* say, 'It was a Caucasian revolutionary!' The Caucasians say, 'It was an *agent provocateur*!'

"It is an anxious time now in Tabríz! Involuntarily one starts at every sound and asks, 'Wasn't it a shot?' It is a bad business if it is a shot. After one shot there will be many shots. These are anxious days in Tabríz: one may expect the worst.

V. TARDOFF."

Let the reader compare this letter with the Persian complaints, and he will see how fully the testimony of this Russian journalist, so far as it goes, bears out the allegations of the Tabrízís. A second letter from the same correspondent, published in the same paper on May 27 (June 9), 1909, affords still further confirmation of what is alleged by the Persians as to the harsh and arrogant conduct of the Russian troops. Here it is:—

"RUSSIAN DAYS.

"As I write these lines, soldiers are shouting under my window and singing:—

'I took aim with my soldier's rifle,
And 'twas I who did load the gun.'

"They are walking about the town all day in small detachments. Officers prance to and fro, and swiftly gallop the Cossacks in their huge conical caps. But the thing one sees most frequently in the streets is the green soldier's waggon. They go about the *bázárs* and buy barley for the horses and provisions. It is always sufficiently difficult to move about in the *bázárs*, and indeed one can hardly turn: there is an indescribable jostling, a noisy, motley, gay confusion. Men, donkeys,

horses, dogs, camels are all mingled in one clamant excited mass. And now to this are added the soldiers with their clumsy waggons drawn by a pair of horses.

"The Consul advises the military authorities to hire porters, as it would be more convenient; but it appeared that no money had been allotted for this purpose. The crowd always gathers to gaze at the soldiers' waggons, and it cannot be said that the crowd is particularly well disposed towards our men.

"At first, when the troops were encamped at Ájí Cháy, and only came in small groups into the town for wood and bread, the relations were excellent. It is said that on the day of the troops' arrival the inhabitants, particularly in the poorer quarters, meeting the Russians warmly thanked them and called them saviours. And now, instead of strengthening and confirming the good feeling of the Tabrízís towards us, we have lost it as quickly as we gained it.

"The only part of our force that was posted in the town was a detachment of Rifle Chasseurs. One evening, April 26 (May 9), despite the *Anjuman's* and Sattár Khán's strict injunction not to fire even blank cartridge in the town, a shot was fired in the neighbourhood of the Chasseurs' barracks. A Chasseur on guard was wounded. From that moment everything changed. As you know, the *Anjuman* was asked to pay as compensation to the wounded chasseur for loss of the ability to work 10,000 *túmáns* (afterwards 3500 was the sum agreed upon) and to find the guilty person. For this 48 hours were given. It was declared that if the demand were not agreed to, 'measures would be taken.' This would not have mattered. The *Anjuman* would have bargained, and would have paid the money in good time. The administrative authorities, in the person of *Ijlálu'l-Mulk*, who was appointed [governor] by the *Anjuman*, and has been confirmed in office by the Government, would have sought out the culprits, and the unfortunate incident would have been closed.

"But unluckily, after having given the *Anjuman* 48 hours, our people at once made preparations in the event of its becoming necessary to 'take measures.' When I finished my last letter, guns were brought into the town and placed in the

Bank gardens, sappers began to lay a telephone line across the town, and at night with lantern in hand drew certain plans.

"All this alarmed the Tabrízís, and made them cautious. A wave of alienation arose between the inhabitants and the Russians. Then that everlasting eagerness of ours to finish what we have begun played its part. In none of the instructions to the troops is anything said about 'action.' On the contrary, complete non-intervention and perfect correctness are made obligatory. But what are you to do with men who are simply itching for a fight, even when they are in perfectly peaceful conditions? And when there is no hope of battle, they grow angry and irritable, and begin to display their nervousness.

"The case of the Chasseur sentinel immediately set their hearts aflame. 'Aha! Now it's going to begin!' some declared, 'We'll smash them up! Let the thing only begin!'

"But nothing has happened. Everything has been perfectly quiet. *Ijlálu'l-Mulk* ordered the arrest of seven men whom he suspected of complicity in the attack, and subjected them to 'examination with partiality[1].' For more than a week now these men have been tortured and tormented in truly Persian fashion. And they say that in a day or two one of them will confess. What such a confession secured by torture will be worth is another question....

"Seeing that nothing happened, our men grew bored, and began to seek amusement in whatever way they could. And now the Persians finally conceived a violent hatred for the Russians whom they had once so loved. Now this is not mere dislike, but a real animosity.

"Our men went in for sky-larking. A Muhammadan woman was walking along the street in her peculiar monastic costume. Every Persian would consider himself bound on meeting her to lower his eyes or turn slightly aside. But our soldiers determined to have a *tamáshá*. They surrounded the woman and peered under the net through the veil. 'Hey, mother,' they cried, 'Why do you cover your face?' The woman tried to pass them, but they laughed and prevented her. 'Hullo, chaps!

[1] "An old Russian phrase meaning torture." (Translator's note.)

What's the use of fooling? Off with her veil!' And in a twinkling a gallant young gentleman tore off the veil from the Persian woman. She cried, covered her face with her hands, so as not to see the *Úrús* (Russians), and the *Úrús* went into fits of laughter.

"'Allow me to introduce myself, my pretty maid! Welcome to our quarters! You'll be our guest, and we'll bring out the elderberry wine!'

"Tabríz lives on rumours and sensational stories, and the rumour of the incident with the Muhammadan woman at once flew around the whole quarter, and, passing from street to street, grew like a snowball. When it reaches the outskirts they'll be saying that the *Úrús* tore from the Muhammadan woman not her veil, but other parts of her dress, and insulted her, Heaven only knows how.

"Then, when the order was given to disarm [the population], the work was carried out with extraordinary energy. In vain did a Persian protest, 'I am taking my rifle to the fortress to hand it over there!' 'Never mind! Give it up here, or else...!' —a gesture, and the weapon was immediately surrendered.

"In the same way the police were disarmed, and the thing was done altogether absurdly. A policeman on duty is approached. 'What sort of rifle have you got?' The poor policeman with a good-humoured smile, shows the rifle.

"'Ah! A Russian three-liner! Where did you get it, you scum of the earth?'

"'It was given me from head-quarters.'

"'You lie, you villain! Your head-quarters can't have Russian three-liners. Give it up!'

"The *naẓmiyya* (policeman) tries to protest, and declares that no one but his authorities has any right to take away his arms. In one instance a *naẓmiyya* was struck in the face for protesting in this way.

"The soldiers and especially the officers know very well of course that nearly all the *naẓmiyya* and the greater number of the *fidá'ís* are armed with Russian three-liners. These rifles are contraband and have been imported in large quantities from the Caucasus throughout the revolution, just as cartridges have

been, and have been bought by the *Anjuman* and by individual horsemen for enormous sums. A three-liner costs here about 200 roubles. Moreover so-called 'sham three-liners' are in great vogue here—rifles made up of a locally manufactured barrel, a contraband Russian lock and other parts. These cost 75 roubles apiece and are very bad. There are besides many *berdankas* (old Caucasian rifles), Martinis, magazine-rifles, Mausers and old French and Austrian rifles here.

"The soldiers also carry on their sky-larking when making purchases in the *bázár*. A man buys a thing costing 10 *kopeks* (2½*d.*), and pays 2 *kopeks*. 'Take what you're given,' he says, 'or you'll get nothing at all!' It must be admitted, however, that the trades-people charge Russians terrible prices—about ten times the customary price.

"I enter the Bank and open the door into the vestibule. Whew! It smells like a third class waiting-room. It is frightfully close, and the air reeks of tobacco. On the floor, on bags, lie queer grey people. Ah! They are our soldiers, in dirty grey shirts, covered with dust. At first it is hard to distinguish them from the grey of the floor.

"I ask, 'Why are there so many here?' It appears they have come to occupy the Bank. Now there are sentinels everywhere. One night Russian troops even patrolled the town. One of the Armenian's *fidá'ís* told me, 'I came home about 11 o'clock. Suddenly I heard a shout—"Stop! Who goes there?" I stopped. They came up to me and set about searching me. It happened that the soldier who was to search me was an acquaintance. But two others were searched before I was. It is a great mistake of theirs to have begun with this. All very well if they chance upon an intelligent and self-restrained man, for he will keep quiet; but some wild Tatar, who doesn't understand anything, will imagine that they want to arrest him, and will whip out his revolver and kill someone. Why provoke such things?'

"When I had finished my business in the Bank, I went out into the courtyard. Over the roof of a neighbouring *bázár* waves a huge Russian flag. I smile and point upwards.

"'They've planted the Russian flag?'

"'Yes, Sir,' replied a strapping soldier; 'that means, I suppose, that the whole *passage*[1] will be ours.'

V. TARDOFF."

This is how it strikes a Russian. Could anything be more ridiculous, if it were not so cruelly unfair, than the attempts of the *Times* and its congeners to make out that the Persian mistrust of Russia is wilful and groundless?

[1] "The whole way, the whole line of march, perhaps, slightly extending the meaning, the whole country-side." (Translator's gloss.)

CHAPTER X.

THE NATIONALIST TRIUMPH, THE ABDICATION OF MUḤAMMAD 'ALÍ, AND THE RESTORATION OF THE CONSTITUTION.

THE resistance of Tabríz being at an end, it seemed for the moment that the Nationalist cause was lost, and that Muḥammad 'Alí Sháh, having been persuaded or compelled by England and Russia to convene a modified and probably emasculated National Assembly, of a much more complacent type than the last, would obtain a loan from the two Powers subject to conditions as to guarantees and advisers which would strike a deadly blow at the independence of Persia, even if they did not reduce it at once to a condition comparable to that of Egypt or Tunis. These forebodings were, however, falsified by the course of events, and once more, as so often in that land of surprises, it was the unexpected which happened.

The revolt of the provinces was, as we have seen, headed by the Bakhtiyáris at Iṣfahán on Jan. 2, 1909. Rasht followed suit on Feb. 8, Turbat-i-Ḥaydarí on March 14, Hamadán and Shíráz on March 25, the Gulf Ports of Bandar-i-'Abbás and Bushire about March 17, and Mashhad on April 6. These movements were not all of the same quality, for while some, such as those of Iṣfahán and Rasht, were orderly, purposeful and evidently carefully planned, others, such as those of Shíráz, Bushire and Taft, were of a more mixed character, and others again, such as the Kirmánsháh riots of March 27 and April 7, were mere disturbances such as have always been liable to occur in Persia when the central authority was weak. The Kirmánsháh riots were anti-Jewish, but even here a noticeable feature, characteristic of the new spirit of toleration and sense of

A Nationalist Council at Rasht

(The *Sipahdár* is the fourth from the left of those seated in the front row, and holds a stick in his hand)

common humanity, was the effort made by numerous Muslim citizens to save the lives of their Jewish neighbours and protect them from violence. Captain Haworth, the British Consul, was "much astonished by the practical sympathy shewn by the Muhammadans in sending food and covering to the Jews. He adds that many Jews owe their lives to Muhammadans, who, in some cases, actually stood armed in front of their Jewish friends until they could take them to their own houses[1]."

The movement on the capital began at Rasht, where the Nationalists had been reinforced by a considerable number of Caucasians, who, as described by Mr Churchill[2], succeeded in making their way thither by the Russian steamers without experiencing any serious difficulty, and in bringing their arms with them. On March 14 the road from Rasht to Ṭihrán was reported as held by the Rasht Nationalists to within 40 miles north of Qazwín, but Mr Churchill in his Memorandum of March 18 cited above[3], described them as holding about 100 miles of it, as far as Yúzbáshí-cháy. Thereafter their progress was for a while slower, and it was not till May 8 that their advanced posts were at Karanda, on the Ṭihrán side of Qazwín. Probably they were waiting for the advance of their comrades of Iṣfahán to begin, and this was apparently delayed by the negotiations necessary to unite all the Bakhtiyárí chiefs in one common endeavour, and to give time for the *Sardár-i-As'ad*, who had returned to his country from Paris by way of the Persian Gulf and Muḥammara, to bring further Bakhtiyárí reinforcements to Iṣfahán. At length on May 3 he and his brother the *Ṣamṣámu's-Salṭana* "telegraphed jointly to all the foreign Legations expressing their gratitude for the measures taken to save Tabríz, but asking at the same time that the Powers should now interfere no further in their internal affairs. They added, after protestations of loyalty to the Sháh, that they and all other Nationalists were about to march on the capital to force on His Majesty the fulfilment of pledges made to his people[4]."

Ten days earlier, on April 22, the representatives of Great Britain and Russia had presented to the Sháh a strongly-worded

[1] *White Book* [Cd. 4733], p. 126.
[2] *Ibid.*, Inclosure in No. 169, p. 80.
[3] *Ibid.*, No. 107, p. 57.
[4] *Ibid.*, No. 266, p. 117.

note, pointing out that, as a result of his persistent violation of his pledges, his refusal to listen to wise counsels of moderation, and his subserviency to the reactionary camarilla which surrounded him, "the situation had gone from bad to worse, and it was now difficult to point to any part of the country, except the capital, where the Central Government had any authority[1]." After enumerating the evils which had resulted from His Majesty's reckless and reactionary policy, declaring that their "sole desire was to see Persia emerge from the present deplorable crisis an independent, well-governed and prosperous nation," and expressing their belief "that there was still no reason to despair, provided the Sháh lost no time in abandoning the present deplorable methods of government, which, since the destruction of the *Majlis* in June, 1908, he had been following under the advice of men who had proved themselves the enemies of their country," they submitted to the Sháh a programme, declaring at the same time that, if he did not accept it in all its details, they would desist from giving further advice, leave him to his own resources, and neither give him, nor suffer their agents to give him, any support. This programme comprised five recommendations, and the bitter pill was sweetened by a final intimation that, should these be adopted, Russia would immediately advance a sum of £100,000, and England a like sum after the new National Assembly had approved the loan. The recommendations included the dismissal of Amír Bahádur Jang and *Mushíru's-Salṭana*; the re-establishment of a constitutional *régime*; the appointment of a Cabinet composed of persons worthy of confidence; the formation of a Council of the Empire representing the best elements of the different parties; the elaboration and promulgation of a new Electoral Law; the immediate proclamation of a general amnesty for all political offences, and of a guarantee of fair trial for all persons charged with offences against the common law; and the immediate fixing of dates for the Elections and for the convocation of the National Assembly, these dates to be at once made known throughout the country.

Finally on May 10 the Sháh gave way, promising the

[1] *White Book* [Cd. 4733], Inclosure in No. 285, pp. 129–130.

House of *'Adlu'l-Mulk* at Tabríz,
decorated in honour of the restoration of the Constitution

restoration of the old Constitution "without any alteration," elections as soon as the new Electoral Law had been promulgated, convocation of the new *Majlis* "in the same place as formerly" (*i.e.* in the Bahárístán) as soon as two-thirds of the deputies should be ready to take their seats, amnesty for all political offences, and permission to the exiles to return[1]. "Our consuls at the various centres of revolt," adds Sir George Barclay, "are being instructed to point out to the Nationalists that it is now their duty to do everything in their power to secure a reconciliation between the Popular party and the Sháh"; but Sir Edward Grey in a telegraphic despatch which either crossed this or was an answer to it instructed the British Minister that "if the Nationalists are not now satisfied with the tardy surrender of the Sháh, we cannot be responsible in any way," and that "in such a case your attitude should be one of strict neutrality, and any action which might be interpreted as intervention should be avoided[2]."

Meanwhile the Nationalist leaders, who, of course, had at this time no means of judging the intentions of England and Russia save by the external manifestations of their policy, declined to desist from their preparations for advancing upon the capital. They had had too much experience of the Sháh's incurable perfidy and vindictiveness to be disposed to trust him in the least degree, especially while the old reactionary gang and their instrument, the redoubtable Colonel Liakhoff, remained in his entourage, and they feared, no doubt, that they would never again be in so good a position to impose their will upon him. They were also profoundly alarmed at the prospect of his obtaining a fresh loan, which they were convinced would presently be used against the liberties for which they fought. Lastly, their suspicion of Russia's policy was ineradicable, nor, though it may have been exaggerated, can it be regarded as wholly groundless. Putting aside the part which, as they were convinced, Russian agents had played in the destruction of the first *Majlis* and the Constitution for which they were in arms, recent events gave them many grounds for mistrust. It was true that the advent of Russian

[1] *White Book* [Cd. 4733], No. 287, p. 130. [2] *Ibid.*, No. 286, p. 130.

troops had saved the lives of the inhabitants of Tabríz, but they had threatened to come to Tabríz six months earlier without better excuse than the disturbance to their trade which necessarily resulted from the existing state of Civil War. And having come they had behaved rather as an army of occupation in a conquered and subject country than as a simple relief expedition. Moreover, having captured Raḥím Khán, the arch-brigand whose unruly tribesmen constituted the chief source of danger to the lives and properties of the inhabitants of Tabríz, Persian and European alike, and against whose barbarous methods of warfare repeated protests had been made by the representatives of the Powers at Ṭihrán, the Russians contented themselves with exacting from him a large sum of money, and then set him free, whereby he was enabled to cause serious trouble later on. Further, in spite of the good order almost invariably maintained by the Nationalists when the control of affairs was in their hands, whenever a town or port within reach of the Russian Government declared for the popular cause, Russian troops or war-ships were in nearly every case despatched thither on the pretext of maintaining order or protecting lives which were not threatened. Thus at Astarábád the Russian Consular guard was increased by 25 men on March 31[1], only three days after it had declared for the Constitution[2]. On April 1 the Nationalists "arrested the *Kár-guzár*, who was suspected of having accompanied the Russian Consul to the Ja'far-Báy Turkmáns' camp to induce them to upset the local Assembly. The *Kár-guzár* was afterwards released through the intervention of the Russian Consul." "The latest news," adds the despatch in question, "is that the town is surrounded by Turkmáns, who are acting on the Sháh's behalf. Fighting is proceeding, and the Russian Consul has applied for troops to be sent in to Astarábád[2]." On April 7 a Russian gun-boat was sent to Bandar-i-Gaz, the port of Astarábád[3].

So again it was decided on March 3[4] to increase the Russian Consular guard at Rasht by 50 Cossacks, who apparently landed

[1] *White Book* [Cd. 4733], Inclosure in No. 147, p. 72.
[2] *Ibid.*, p. 124.
[3] *Ibid.*, No. 151, p. 73.
[4] *Ibid.*, No. 97, p. 55.

on March 20[1], while a Russian man-of-war and a gun-boat appeared off Anzalí, the port of Rasht, on or about April 7[2]. And again at Mashhad the Consular guard was increased (by what amount is not stated) on April 6[3]. And, to be brief, on July 17, four days after the combined Nationalist forces finally entered Ṭihrán, and the day after the abdication of Muḥammad 'Alí Sháh, the total number of Russian troops in North Persia was estimated at 6300, namely, 4000 at Tabríz, 1700 on the march to Qazwín, and 600 at Rasht, Astarábád, Mashhad and other places.

It is true that there was also, to a much more limited extent, British intervention in the South, but this was undertaken very unwillingly, and was rigorously limited both in extent and duration. Thus on March 18 a British gun-boat was sent to Bandar-i-'Abbás, but the instructions were that it "should only stay there if His Majesty's Consul considered that British subjects were in danger, and the blue-jackets should only be landed in case of extreme necessity[4]." On March 20 orders were also given for a gun-boat to proceed to Bushire "with instructions, in the event of disturbances arising, to give protection to all foreigners[5]." On April 9, in consequence of apprehensions aroused by the conduct of Sayyid Murtaẓá and the Tangistání riflemen whom he had brought into the town, the British Consul-General at Bushire was authorized to land a force of blue-jackets if necessary, but to notify the people that this step was only taken for the protection of British subjects and foreigners[6]. A day or two later 100 men were landed[7]. They were withdrawn on May 24, nor would Sir Edward Grey permit them to be used to expel Sayyid Murtaẓá, notwithstanding the representations of the British Consul-General at Bushire, who declared that his "mask of Nationalism was merely designed to cover his rapacious intentions," and that the leaders of both the Nationalists and the Royalists desired his

[1] *White Book* [Cd. 4733], No. 169, p. 79.
[2] *Ibid.*, No. 151, p. 73.
[3] *Ibid.*, No. 148, p. 72.
[4] *Ibid.*, p. 65, Nos. 116, 118.
[5] *Ibid.*, No. 125, p. 67.
[6] *Ibid.*, No. 159, p. 75.
[7] *Ibid.*, No. 164, p. 76. An account of their landing, written on April 17, was published in the *Standard* of May 8.

May 5 the Sháh "signed an Imperial rescript acknowledging that the disorderly condition of the country imposed the necessity of taking measures to reorganize the administration," "recognizing that this can only be secured through the constitutional principle," and "fixing July 19 for the election of a representative Assembly, for the formation of which electoral laws will soon be promulgated[1]." By the date fixed, however, Muḥammad 'Alí was no longer Sháh, and his capital was in the hands of the victorious Nationalists.

On the same day, May 5, news reached Ṭihrán that the northern army, or army of Rasht, had reached Qazwín; that there had been fighting; and that the Nationalists were now in possession of the town[1]. This army, which the *Times* of this period generally speaks of as "the revolutionaries" (since, apparently, it desired on the one hand to emphasize and even exaggerate the element of Caucasian and Armenian revolutionaries which it included, and on the other wished to depict the Bakhtiyáris as completely indifferent to the Constitution, and as actuated solely by tribal ambitions, innate love of fighting, and hatred of a dynasty at whose hands they had suffered much), was commanded by the *Sipahdár*, or Field-Marshal, Muḥammad Walí-Khán *Naṣru's-Salṭana*, of whom the following account (whence derived I know not) appeared in the *Yorkshire Daily Post* of Nov. 17, 1909:—"Though he is 65 he has the look and bearing of a man of 50. He has held many government appointments under different Sháhs, and though he became, so it is asserted, the richest man in Persia, there is no doubt that during his last governorship—that of the province of Gílán—he accomplished a good deal in the matter of road-making. Towards the end of the reign of Náṣiru'd-Dín Sháh he also did much as Controller of the National Mint to reorganize Persian coinage. His sympathies with the Liberal movement led him to resign his post of *Sipahdár* when sent by Muḥammad 'Alí Sháh against the rebels of Tabríz. It was in his old province of Gílán that he organized the force which eventually captured both Qazwín and Ṭihrán, thus procuring the dethronement of the monarch."

[1] *Times*, May 9.

Of the fighting at Qazwín on May 5 no detailed narrative seems to have reached this country, and for the chief particulars we are indebted to Reuter's able and fair-minded correspondent at Ṭihrán, according to whom the attacking force of Nationalists numbered 250. These suddenly entered the town on the night of May 4 and besieged the governor and garrison in the Government House, where they resisted till dawn. Twenty Royalists[1] and three Nationalists were killed, and a hundred Royalists surrendered[2]. Nationalist reinforcements were hourly expected from Rasht. Next day (May 6) a squadron of Persian Cossacks, with two Maxim guns, under the command of a Russian officer, Captain Zapolski, were sent out from the capital to guard the Karaj bridge, 30 miles west of Ṭihrán, and though the highest estimate of the numbers of the Nationalists did not then exceed 600, large numbers of them were reported 15 miles to the east of Qazwín[3]. An *attaché* from the Russian Legation was sent down to warn them against advancing further, and M. Sablin, the Russian Chargé d'Affaires, "telegraphed to the Consul at Rasht to demand from the *Sipahdár*, the supposed head of the Nationalist movement in Gílán, an explanation of the present action; to point out that if the revolutionaries are not recalled his government may be compelled to take steps in the matter; and that action of this kind interferes with the present endeavour of the Anglo-Russian representatives to obtain a settlement of the Constitutional Question." There was also a very distinct threat that, in case of non-compliance, a large number of Russian troops might be sent to "guard the Ṭihrán-Caspian road[4]." "Their appearance," adds the *Times* correspondent[5], "would signalize the speedy dis-

[1] Amongst these, according to the *Standard's* correspondent, was the reactionary *Shaykhu'l-Islám*. A certain Qásim Áqá, one of the Cossack Brigade who had taken a prominent part in the destruction of the *Majlis* on June 23, 1908, was also shot by the Nationalists on this occasion.

[2] According to the *Times* special correspondent, the bulk of the Royalist troops, numbering 550, on hearing of the Nationalist advance, quickly withdrew towards Hamadán without offering any resistance.

[3] *Times*, May 7.

[4] This intention on the part of the Russian Government was admitted by Sir E. Grey in reply to a question asked by Mr Ponsonby on May 11.

[5] *Times*, May 7.

Group of *Mujáhidín*, or National Volunteers, of Rasht

appearance of the revolutionaries, and thus it would seem possible that in addition to active intervention in favour of the Nationalists at Tabríz, we may be now on the eve of what would be tantamount to interference on behalf of the Sháh."

On May 9 Colonel Liakhoff, interviewed by the *Times* correspondent, stated that 750 Cossacks of the Brigade (including those already sent to Karaj), 5000 regular and tribal troops, and six modern quick-firing guns were available for the defence of Ṭihrán, and expressed the opinion "that the Brigade alone was sufficient to deal with any attack by Revolutionaries or Bakhtiyáris, singly or combined, provided that time was allowed for adequate preparations." The *Times* correspondent also gathered—what the *Times* had shewn itself very slow to admit—"that while the Russian officers are no longer on the active list of the Russian army, they are in effect completely under the control of the Russian Government, owing to the fact that their pensions and their prospect of future reinstatement *depend on their acting in accordance with the wishes of St Petersburg*[1]." It was also reported on the same authority that dissensions prevailed amongst the Bakhtiyárí Kháns, and that though the reports of their advance were persistent, no apparent preparations had been made. Reuter's correspondent added that the *Anjuman* of Tabríz was endeavouring to induce the leaders of the two Nationalist armies to accept the concessions made by the Sháh (who had at length consented to grant a general amnesty and to restore the former Constitution) and to desist from their advance.

The position of the Nationalist leaders was now undoubtedly one of extreme difficulty, for on the one hand they had had bitter experience of the Sháh's perfidy, and of the success with which he had hitherto evaded the pledges extracted from him, and it was clear that if they intended to appeal to force, they had no time to lose, and would find no better, and probably no other, opportunity than the present; while, on the other hand, should they continue their advance, they had to reckon with the displeasure of England and Russia and the possible armed intervention of the latter. That they hesitated in this momentous

[1] *Times*, May 10.

choice is likely enough, but there is no doubt that throughout they acted in complete accord both with one another and with the different Nationalist centres in and outside Persia. And it is probable that their mistrust of Russia was at this juncture increased by the complaints which were telegraphed from Tabríz about May 15 as to the arbitrary action of the Russians in that town[1], by the continued rumours of a Russian loan to the Sháh[2], and by a fresh Russian threat to occupy the Ástárá-Ardabíl road, apparently in consequence of a victory gained by the *Sipahdár's* troops over those of *Rashídu'l-Mulk*, the Governor of Ardabíl[3].

On May 12 the Persian correspondent of the *Times*, who had been to Qazwín to judge for himself of the forces and intentions of the Nationalists, returned to Ṭihrán and reported to his English colleague "the presence there of a large body of triumphant and determined men who declare their intention of marching on Ṭihrán in a few days. They are well-armed and well-mounted and possessed of plenty of money. Their commander and second in command, an Afghán, are now at Qazwín, and everything points to the possibility of early action. The Bakhtiyárís, who have assembled at Iṣfahán and number 3000, also declare their intention of marching on Ṭihrán[4]."

On May 17 the *Sipahdár*, according to Reuter's correspondent, formulated the Nationalist demands, of which the following were the most important:

(1) Evacuation of Persian territory by foreign troops.

(2) Royal Rescript declaring explicitly that the Sháh had restored the old Constitution in its entirety, *i.e.* the original Fundamental Law of December 30, 1906, comprising 51 Articles, together with the Supplement of October 7, 1907, comprising 107 Articles.

(3) Disarmament of the Sháh's irregular troops.

(4) Removal from the Court of Amír Bahádur Jang, *Mushíru's-Salṭana*, and other prominent reactionaries.

[1] Especially the disarming of the National Volunteers and the destruction of the barricades. See pp. 275 *et seqq. supra*.

[2] See *Times* of May 24.

[3] See the *Globe* of May 17 and the *Times* of May 18.

[4] *Times* of May 14.

Bakhtiyáris mustering in the *Maydán* at Iṣfahán
(May—June, 1909)

"These requirements," adds Reuter's correspondent, "are generally not considered unreasonable, although immediate compliance with them will be difficult to arrange." The *Times* correspondent, on the other hand, with his usual bias, described them as "preposterous," and added, "the sooner these gentry leave the country the better"; while in the same telegram he announced that the Bakhtiyáris were said to be disbanding and leaving Iṣfahán, and that the citizens of that town would be very glad when they were gone[1]. A week earlier (on May 20) the same authority reported Bakhtiyárí forces, said to number 1500 cavalry and 2500 infantry, moving northwards on Káshán, and royalist troops retreating towards the capital, but he assumed that the tribesmen were "coming to join the Royalists in the idea of acting against *Ṣamṣámu's-Salṭana* at Iṣfahán when the infantry have been armed[2]." He still refused to believe either in the solidarity of the Bakhtiyáris or the serious intentions of the *Sipahdár*.

Meanwhile the discussion of the terms of the proposed Russian loan continued without any agreement being arrived at; the leading Nationalists of Tabríz, Sattár Khán, Báqir Khán and Taqí-záda, as a protest against the harsh measures adopted by General Znarski, took refuge in the Turkish Consulate; and it was announced that "at present there was no question of reducing the numbers of the Russian expedition now camped outside Tabríz[3]."

The outlook at the beginning of June was characterized by the *Times* correspondent as "decidedly gloomy," chiefly on account of the reported seizure by Turkish regulars of part of the Urmiya-Salmás road, and of the anger aroused not only at Tabríz but also at Ṭihrán (and doubtless in other Persian towns) by the behaviour of the Russian military authorities at the former city. "Great bitterness," he said, "is being aroused among the Nationalists by the arbitrary behaviour of the Russian troops at Tabríz. Besides Sattár Khán and Báqir Khán[4]

[1] *Times* of May 27. [2] *Ibid.*, May 21.

[3] *Times* of May 28, and *Morning Post* of May 31.

[4] They telegraphed a protest to this country, which was published in the *Daily News* and *Manchester Guardian* of June 7.

several hundreds of *fidá'ís* have taken *bast* at the Turkish Consulate, presumably as a protest. This news is creating a great stir in Ṭihrán, and seriously threatens the progress which was being made towards the assembling of the *Majlis*. It seems very unfortunate that the heavy labour entailed upon the British and Russian Legations during the trying and anxious period of the last month should be jeopardized by tactless handling of the situation on the part of the military commander at Tabríz[1]." He also reported that "the Nationalist Emergency Committee, which has for some time worked satisfactorily with the Cabinet, dissolved to-day, apparently on the ground that Ministers do not comply with their reasonable demands," and that "the *Sipahdár* has evacuated Qazwín with all the revolutionaries, and has retired towards Rasht," declaring "his intention of keeping his force under arms until the *Majlis* meets." A few days later the same correspondent severely censured the protection accorded to the Persian Nationalist leaders by the Turkish Consul at Tabríz, and described his action as "an unnecessary piece of interference in a situation which does not primarily concern Turkey[2]," though it must be obvious to any fair-minded person that, apart from her natural sympathy with a neighbouring Muslim state just traversing a crisis singularly resembling that which she had so recently surmounted, it concerned her most vitally whether unaggressive Persia or aggressive Russia dominated her eastern frontier. All this time (June 1—20) the two questions of the new Russian loan and the new Electoral Law dragged on. As regards the former, the Persian Cabinet found the conditions attached to it too onerous on May 27, but were ready to sign them on June 17, when M. Sablin on his part demanded certain modifications; and though the agreement of the Russian Government was obtained on June 20, other and more exciting events happily caused the matter to be shelved for the time being. As regards the latter, the text of the Sháh's proclamation restoring the old Constitution, issued on May 15, was published in the English papers on June 2[3], and the draft of the new Electoral Law was com-

[1] *Times* of June 1. [2] *Ibid.*, June 9.
[3] *e.g.* the *Manchester Guardian*, *Financial News*, etc.

Constitutionalists in refuge at the Ottoman Embassy,
Ṭihrán, January, 1909

pleted on June 7, but three days later a "serious hitch" occurred[1], and it was not until June 17 that the Sháh "waived all objections" to it, and expressed "his readiness to sign it whenever the provinces had approved the terms[2]."

And now at last the Bakhtiyárís began to move. For some days previously to June 16 they had been reassembling at Iṣfahán, and on that day their leader, the *Sardár-i-As'ad*, "publicly stated that it was his intention to march on Ṭihrán in order to ensure the carrying into effect of the constitutional programme[3]." Next morning four of the leading Kháns with 800 men began to march northwards—an action which the *Times* correspondent considered to be "inexcusable." "Having bluffed for six months," he bitterly observes four days later, "and grievously disappointed the expectations of the Nationalists, they (the Bakhtiyárís) are now supposed to be marching on Ṭihrán at a moment when everything points to the early re-establishment of the constitutional *régime*. This step is probably a belated endeavour to 'maintain face' with the Nationalists; but it must not be ignored that the Bakhtiyárí movement has caused great consternation at Court, where formerly no apprehensions of Bakhtiyárí intentions were entertained. Frantic appeals are made to the Russian Legation for money in order to organize resistance, but the Russians decline to make any advance for expenditure on military operations[4]."

On June 23 the advanced guard of the Bakhtiyárís was reported to be at Qum, only 80 miles south of Ṭihrán, while Qazwín was again occupied by a large number of the *Sipahdár's* men, and the two forces "were in daily communication, and declared their intention of making a simultaneous march on Ṭihrán[5]." The British and Russian Consuls at Iṣfahán were at once instructed to follow the Bakhtiyárí force as speedily as possible and "jointly urge the leaders to refrain from complicating the situation, which promises satisfactorily for the re-establishment of the Constitution[6]." That same day the Electoral Law was signed by the Sháh, which act, if the Nationalists could

[1] *Times* of June 11.
[2] *Ibid.*, June 18.
[3] *Ibid.*
[4] *Ibid.*, June 22.
[5] *Ibid.*, June 24.
[6] *Ibid.*, June 25.

have trusted him, should have had a mollifying effect; while on June 21 a slight reduction had been effected in the Russian troops at Tabríz, which again might have reassured them but for the fact that the Russian Consular guard at Mashhad was almost simultaneously reinforced, and that in a conflict which had occurred there on June 23 the Russian Cossacks had shot down Nationalists at one of their barricades[1].

On June 25 the situation was more critical, and was described by the *Times* correspondent as "unintelligible, the only tangible feature of Persian opinion being the unanimous suspicion with which the presence of the Russian troops at Tabríz and Mashhad was regarded throughout the country." Mr Grahame, the British Consul at Iṣfahán, had reached Qum that morning, and had twice been fired at. A second detachment of Bakhtiyáris had started northwards, and a third was on the point of following, making a total of 2000 men and several guns, while the Persian Cossacks guarding the Karaj Bridge had been reinforced, owing to rumours that the *Sipahdár's* men had penetrated into the mountains to the north of Ṭihrán. In the capital *Sa'du'd-Dawla* had resigned the position of Prime Minister[2]; great excitement and nervousness prevailed; the more timorous were seeking shelter and protection, and, to add to the complexity of the situation, the *Ẓillu's-Sulṭán* was reported to have landed unexpectedly in Persia[3]. This last item, however, appears to have been untrue, or at any rate an anticipation of the truth, since that Prince's departure from Paris did not take place until July 1[4], and he did not land at Anzalí until August 5[5].

On June 27 the British Minister, Sir George Barclay, and the Russian *Chargé d'Affaires*, M. Sablin, went together to the telegraph-office at Qulhak, the summer quarters of the British Legation, and entered into direct communication with their

[1] Reuter's telegram in the *Evening Standard and St James's Gazette* of June 25. Compare the *Morning Post* and the *Times* of June 26, and the *Manchester Guardian* of June 28, where the Nationalist casualties were given as 130.

[2] He appears, however, to have withdrawn his resignation two days later. See *Times* of June 28.

[3] *Times* of June 26.

[4] *Siècle* of July 2.

[5] Reuter's telegram in the *Manchester Guardian* and *Morning Post* for August 6.

Bakhtiyárís mustering in the *Maydán* at Iṣfahán
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respective Consuls at Iṣfahán, who were then at Qum, to learn the result of their interviews with the *Sardár-i-As'ad*, and to transmit to him further and more impressive warnings. The *Sardár*, however, in spite of the warning "that his action was displeasing to the Powers, and was imperilling the cause he had at heart," was inflexible, merely replying "that he had certain demands to make which he would formulate after communication with the Nationalist centres[1]." The Electoral Law, though signed by the Sháh, remained unpromulgated. The Consuls, having failed in their persuasive efforts, turned back towards Iṣfahán on June 29, without having obtained any undertaking from the Bakhtiyárí leader, whose "vague and foolish language," again to quote the *Times* correspondent, "makes it difficult to believe in his serious intentions[2]." "It is hard to believe," he adds, "that there will be any fighting at Ṭihrán, but the general impression with regard to both the Bakhtiyáris and the revolutionáries [*i.e.* the army of Rasht] is that they cannot now decently avoid doing something."

On June 30 the Russian Government, with the knowledge of the British Government, ordered a considerable military force to assemble at Bákú, in order that they might proceed to Persia in certain contingencies. "The fact that orders have been given," says the *Times* correspondent at St Petersburg, "to assemble an expeditionary column at Bákú cannot fail to come to the knowledge of the Bakhtiyáris and to exercise a sobering influence. It is, at any rate, the expectation of such a result that appears chiefly to have led the Foreign Office to consent to military preparations. The *Novoe Vremya*, however, insists that energetic measures are indispensable. The *Ryech* goes to the other extreme, urging complete abstention. According to the *Bourse Gazette* the situation is complicated by Turkish intrigues at Urmiya[3]." In the same issue of the *Times* the special correspondent of that paper at Ṭihrán expressed deep commiseration for Colonel Liakhoff and his Russian colleagues because it was supposed "that the Russian Government disclaims all responsibility for their actions, and will treat them as

[1] *Times* of June 28. [2] *Ibid.*, June 30. [3] *Ibid.*, July 1.

scapegoats if they involve Russian policy," because the loyalty of their men was doubtful and the Sháh's support half-hearted, and because "in any encounter they will be the target at which every opponent will aim." Of the movements of the two Nationalist armies he could give no certain information, but the Royalist forces he estimated at 5000 ordinary Persian soldiers assembled round the Sháh's palace at Salṭanatábád, and some 1300 or 1350 Cossacks of the Brigade, of whom 800 under Colonel Liakhoff were in Ṭihrán, 350 under Captain Zapolski at the Karaj Bridge, 30 miles west of the capital, and 200 on the south road, watching for the approach of the Bakhtiyárís. The same issue of the *Times* contained a leader on the situation in Ṭihrán, which, after scolding the Bakhtiyárís with its usual arrogance, concluded as follows: "True friends of Persian Constitutionalism must earnestly share the hope, which seems to be cherished in St Petersburg[1], that the mere assemblage of Russian troops at Bákú may cause the Nationalists to halt before it is too late." Had the *Sardár-i-As'ad* and the *Sipahdár* enjoyed the privilege of reading the *Times* on the day of issue, they would certainly have recollected the tradition "Hearken to their advice and act contrary to it," and would have pursued no other line of conduct than they did.

On July 2 the Persian Premier was confident that there would be no conflict, though the *Sardár-i-As'ad* with 500 Bakhtiyárís was now advancing northwards from Qum, and the Royalist troops (1200 infantry, 300 cavalry and six guns) were retreating before them towards the capital[2]. On the evening of the following day the detachment of Persian Cossacks under Captain Zapolski, fearing to be outflanked by the *Sipahdár's* army, fell back from Karaj to Sháhábád[3], distant only some 16 miles from Ṭihrán to the west, where, early on the morning of July 4, the first skirmish between the opposing forces took place. The Royalist force, which consisted of 360 men of the Cossack Brigade, under Captain Zapolski, supported by two Russian non-commissioned officers, with two Creusot quick-

[1] That being, as the *Times* would, apparently, have us believe, the *qibla* to which "friends of ... Constitutionalism" would naturally turn for inspiration!

[2] *Times* of July 3.

[3] *Daily News* of July 5.

Muḥammad Walí Khán *Sipahdár-i-A'ẓam*

Ḥájji 'Alí-qulí Khán *Sardár-i-As'ad*
The Bakhtiyárí leader

firers and one maxim, lost one Persian officer and three men killed and two wounded, while the Nationalists lost twelve men[1]. The Cossacks, therefore, "heartened by their successful encounter[2]," celebrated their triumph by "tearing to pieces the bodies of some of the revolutionaries." "This," adds the *Times* correspondent, "together with the briskness of the fighting, suggests that the Brigade will, after all, not be found wanting in loyalty[3]." Evidently the *Times* correspondent's ideas as to the appropriate manifestations and proofs of loyalty belong to a quite archaic and heroic age!

Meanwhile the Diplomatists were not idle. Russia issued on July 3 a Note to the Powers which appeared in most of the papers of July 5, explaining the circumstances which had "unwillingly" compelled her to send more troops into Persia, "where they would only remain until the lives and property of the Russian and other foreign diplomatic representatives and subjects, and the safety of foreign institutions, seemed to be completely ensured." And on July 8 these troops, 1800 or 2000 in number, were already disembarking at Anzalí, while the advanced guard was already at Rasht. Three days later (on July 11) they were at Qazwín. At Ṭihrán also fresh efforts were being made by the British and Russian Legations to dissuade the Nationalists from advancing, and to warn them "that any further advance will indubitably be followed by foreign intervention[4]." At 2 a.m. on the morning of July 4 Mr George Churchill, the Oriental Secretary, and Major Stokes, the Military Attaché of the British Legation, were sent off, the former to the *Sardár-i-As'ad*, the latter to the *Sipahdár*, to exercise their powers of persuasion. Mr Churchill, accompanied by the Persian correspondent of the *Times*, returned to Ṭihrán at 10 p.m. on the same day. He had found the *Sardár-i-As'ad* with 1200 men and one mountain gun at Ribáṭ-Karím, to the south-west of the capital, and the Bakhtiyárí chieftain "listened to his representations seriously, but gave an indefinite reply[5]." Major Stokes and a representative of the Russian Legation

[1] *Times* of July 5. [2] *Ibid.*, July 6. [3] *Ibid.*, July 5.
[4] Reuter's telegram of July 4 from St Petersburg.
[5] *Times* of July 5.

arrived at Sháhábád while the skirmish mentioned above was still in progress, and, being fired at by the Cossacks, withdrew until the fighting was over and they were able to proceed to Karaj and submit to the *Sipahdár* the representations with which they were charged. In reply the *Sipahdár* put forward eight demands which he requested the envoys to transmit to the Sháh and the Legations, promising to allow two days' armistice for a reply, and not to resume hostilities until midday on Tuesday, July 6. These demands, omitting two minor points connected with the dismissal of various obnoxious Ministers and other officials, were[1]:—

(1) That the *Sipahdár* and the *Sardár-i-As'ad*, each accompanied by 150 of their men, should be permitted to enter Ṭihrán and remain there until satisfied with the working of the Constitution.

(2) That the present Cabinet should be dismissed, and that the new Ministers should be selected by the *Anjumans* throughout Persia.

(3) That all the armed forces of the country should be under the full and direct control of the Minister of War.

(4) That the Sháh's irregular troops should be disarmed.

(5) That Governors of provinces should be approved by the local *Anjumans*.

(6) That all Russian troops should be withdrawn from Persia.

"It is understood," added the *Times* correspondent, "that the Legations will reply that, owing to the unreasonable nature of some of the demands, they do not think it worth while to lay them before the Sháh." Reuter's correspondent, however, telegraphing on July 6, asserted that the British and Russian representatives had promised the *Sipahdár* to support two of his demands—those relating to the dismissal of prominent reactionaries and to the appointment of a new Minister of Telegraphs—but that his reply was "understood to be uncompromising in tenour, and may be interpreted as signifying his unshaken determination to continue his advance upon Ṭihrán."

[1] *Times* of July 6.

Bakhtiyáris in camp outside Iṣfahán, May—June, 1909

At this juncture the best friends of the Nationalists must have been very doubtful as to the wisdom of the bold move on which they were now evidently resolved, and it is to the credit of Mr Perceval Landon[1] that, though he declined to believe in the solidarity of the two Nationalist armies and the community of their aims, he realized the strength and courage of the Bakhtiyáris, and ventured, contrary to the prevailing opinion, to prophesy that neither England nor Russia would be able to stop them, and that "the end of the month will see a new *régime* in Írán." An Odessa paper—the *Listok*—also published on July 5 an interview with a Persian officer who "privately admitted that the position of the Sháh was desperate in the extreme, and that his deposition might be regarded as a foregone conclusion to the revolutionary concentration on Ṭihrán[2]." In St Petersburg it was believed that Russia would at any rate protect the person of the Sháh by offering him asylum in her Legation[3].

The armistice expired on July 7, on which date the two Legations had decided to hold no further communications with the Nationalist leaders, and "the Royalist troops (in Tihrán) had been reinforced by hundreds of hooligans, who were parading the streets carrying rifles," while "a regiment of soldiers was encamped in the central square of the city[4]." The *Times* correspondent visited both the Cossacks at Sháhábád and the Nationalists at Karaj, and interviewed the *Sipahdár*, who was not so simple as to expose his plans to one so unsympathetic, and left his interlocutor with the impression that nothing was decided. "The landing of the Russians," concluded the correspondent in question, "has thoroughly taken the wind out of the revolutionary sails, and while individuals talk wildly and foolishly about their intentions, the revolutionaries as a body appear to realize that the game is up[5]." A telegram from the *Times* correspondent at St Petersburg on the same date leads one to suspect that the transmission of messages to that city from Ṭihrán was in some way temporarily interrupted.

On July 8, according to Reuter's Ṭihrán correspondent, the

[1] *Daily Telegraph* of July 6. [2] *Ibid.* [3] *Ibid.*, July 7.
[4] Reuter's telegram from Ṭihrán of July 7. [5] *Times* of July 8.

Bakhtiyáris were within ten miles of Karaj, and expected to effect a junction with their allies that day. The British and Russian Consuls at Isfahán made an endeavour to dissuade *Samsámu's-Saltana* from sending the promised Bakhtiyárí reinforcements to his brother, the *Sardár-i-As'ad*; and the Sháh, whose confidence had been waning, plucked up courage on hearing of the arrival of the Russian force at Anzalí[1]. The following telegram was despatched from Tihrán by the agent of a well-known City firm, and was sent to the *Times*[2] for publication by Mr H. F. B. Lynch:—

"3000 Russian troops landed Anzalí for Tihrán, ostensibly to keep order, but everything is quiet and there is no danger in regard to Europeans."

On July 9 Reuter's special correspondent despatched the following message, which appeared in the *Westminster Gazette* of the next afternoon, from Tihrán:—

"It appears that early this morning, under cover of darkness, the *Sipahdár*, with the majority of his followers, left Karaj and moved in a southerly direction for the purpose, it is believed, of effecting a junction with the *Sardár-i-As'ad.*

"The Cossack force, which is at Sháhábád appears to have been reduced, a detachment doubtless having been sent to prevent an outflanking movement by the *Sipahdár* and the *Sardár-i-As'ad.*

"I was present this morning at 10.30 at Karaj, when the remainder of the Nationalist forces, about 300, evacuated the position near the Bridge and followed the road previously taken by the *Sipahdár.*

"The approach of the Nationalists towards Tihrán could plainly be seen from the main road by the Cossack scouts, who, on reporting the movement at Sháhábád, appeared to excite considerable commotion among the remaining Cossacks.

"The Nationalists declared their intention of entering Tihrán to-night or to-morrow. It is stated that the *Sipahdár* and *Sardár-i-As'ad* are at present at Yáftábád, which is about five miles west of Tihrán.

[1] *Morning Post* of July 9.

[2] Issue of July 10.

"Despite the exceptionally strong discouragements at Iṣfahán, *Ṣamṣámu's-Salṭana* this morning despatched about 600 Bakhtiyárí mounted rifles to participate in the operations against the Royalists.

"Though it is within the bounds of possibility that the Nationalists may endeavour to enter Ṭihrán to-night, Europeans are not exposed to any serious danger.

"To-day in the Baháristán garden, where the *Majlis* is situated, a Nationalist was shot dead by some roughs."

The *Times* correspondent described the military situation as "a Chinese puzzle of the first magnitude[1]."

On July 10 a considerable force of Royalist troops arrived from the south, and these were immediately ordered to the front[2], and on the following morning the fighting began in earnest at the village of Bádámak, some fifteen miles to the west of Ṭihrán. Here for the first time the United Nationalist forces (or rather, as subsequently transpired, a portion of them), and some 1200 Royalist troops, together with the Cossack Brigade and eight guns, found themselves face to face, while only 80 miles to the west was the Russian force which had landed on July 8 at Anzalí. Of this battle telegraphic accounts from the *Times* and Reuter's special correspondents appeared in the English papers of July 12, and a graphic and much more detailed account, written by the former on July 20 when the fighting was over, in the *Times* of August 18. The Nationalists occupied the village of Bádámak on the east bank of the Karaj river. Behind the village was a mass of trees, and in front of it a shrine, or *Imám-záda*, in which was placed one of the two mountain guns which the Nationalists had with them, the other being at the southern end of their position. Of the Royalist line the "loyal" Bakhtiyárí chief *Amír-i-Mufakhkham* and his men occupied the extreme left; next to him, apparently, was Major Blazenoff with 170 Persian Cossacks, who had first gone to the relief of the *Amír-i-Mufakhkham*; in the centre was Captain Zapolski with his men; and to the right Peribonozoff's force. "The Cossack front," says the *Times* correspondent,

[1] *Times* of July 10.

[2] *Ibid.*, Aug. 18.

"was imposing in length but very thin, while as reserve I could only see a single body of about 100 dismounted horsemen. It was supposed that the enemy numbered at least 2000 and possibly 3000. They were concentrated in a distance of no more than a mile, while the Royalist front extended in a semicircle that might have been ten miles in length, and contained probably no more than 1000 men. It looked as if the Nationalists might easily come out and break the line wherever they chose. To balance things, however, there were with the Cossacks the quick-firing guns and at least three maxims." The fighting which ensued appears to have been neither of a very deadly nor of a very decisive character. There was an advance by the Royalists, covered by their artillery, to within a comparatively short distance of the Nationalist position, and some spirited skirmishing in which the advantage seems to have been with the Royalists. At one time, says the *Times* correspondent, "it really began to look as if the whole of the Royalist force meant to meet this movement" (an attempt on the part of the Nationalists to seize a long ruined building 400 yards from a hillock which had been occupied by the Cossacks), "for there was a general advance, while a whole squadron shot out from the line and in widely extended order galloped for the ruined building. The Cossacks got there first, and the Nationalists were soon seen streaming back under heavy rifle fire. By this time the Creusot guns were far in front and a maxim had been sent for, so it really began to look as if the Royalists meant to close on the Nationalist position. At 5 o'clock, however, after a brief musketry duel, and some good shooting on the part of the little Nationalist gun, the Cossacks ceased fire and commenced to retire. At the time we could not understand why they failed to press their advantage, but next day we heard that it was because they had succeeded in effecting their object of relieving the Bakhtiyárí chief on the far left. It was on the whole a very interesting little fight, none the less pretty to watch because small damage was done on either side. It suggested that the Cossack Brigade was well in hand, without proving its quality as a fighting unit. As regards the Nationalists, they made no serious effort to counter the

demonstration, but their inaction, at the same time, left an impression of a want of determination which their subsequent behaviour completely belied."

Next day, July 12, there was a little skirmishing and some desultory artillery firing, but no serious engagement. That night, however, the Nationalists—or at any rate a considerable number of them—slipped quietly through the Royalist lines somewhere between Sháhábád and Yáftábád at a point supposed to be guarded by a body of irregular cavalry, who were either asleep or acting in collusion with them. Early next morning when the *Times* correspondent visited the Cossack officers he was met by the astonishing news that the *Sipahdár* himself with 300 men had slipped through in the night and was actually within the walls of Ṭihrán, which he had entered at 6.30 a.m. So quietly was the entry of the Nationalists effected that as the *Times* correspondent passed through the city gate the guards informed him "that the town was perfectly quiet, and laughed at the idea of the *Sipahdár* having arrived." Only when he had penetrated a mile further into the town did he see any signs of excitement, and then suddenly "he found himself in the thick of things all at once." "The gates into the *Túpkhána* (Artillery) Square were closed, and the sound of intermittent firing rose and fell in gusts," while "from the north of the town came the rattle of a continuous fusillade," and "nobody knew what had happened."

Of the events of that "day of all days," Tuesday, July 13, it is difficult from the published accounts at present available to form a coherent idea, because, so far as I know, the Nationalist plan and the details of its execution remain hitherto unexplained. The demonstration at Bádámak on the Karaj river was apparently a mere feint to engage the energies and distract the attention of the Royalists, while the bulk of the United Nationalist force took advantage of the delay to creep round amongst the hills to the north of Ṭihrán and quietly enter the unguarded, or almost unguarded, gates on that side. An excellent account of the events of those five days (July 13—17) appeared in the *Temps* of August 8, 1909, and thus does the correspondent of that paper describe what he saw on July 13.

"This morning at sunrise the advanced guard of the Nationalist troops, headed by the Bakhtiyáris, entered Tihrán by one of the north-west gates near the French Legation. Their forces, consisting of several thousand men only, met with no serious resistance. They immediately occupied the quarter in which the foreign Legations are situated, replaced the guards at the gates and the police by their own men, and organized patrols to maintain order. A little later a body of the National Volunteers, or *Mujáhidín*, entered with the *Sipahdár* by one of the southern gates, while the bulk of the army, commanded by Ḥájji 'Alí-qulí Khán the *Sardár-i-As'ad* remained at its head-quarters and did not enter the capital until the afternoon, in order to concentrate all its efforts on the point where the fiercest resistance should be encountered.

"The leaders proceeded to the Baháristán, the ruined seat of the former Parliament. There, in the midst of those ruins, the Nationalist troops desired to have their headquarters, and thence emanated the orders transmitted to town and province. In the village of Shimrán the news of the capture of Ṭihrán was known when the caravans of peasants were starting to sell their fruits and vegetables in the city. These peaceable villagers prudently remained at home.

"From the Sháh's camp at Salṭanatábád Royalist troops hastily set out to attack the Nationalists, while a few Europeans, attracted by curiosity, started for Ṭihrán, but soon returned, finding the road barred and the gates of the town shut. The French Minister, accompanied by his chief Dragoman, succeeded, however, in getting through, and, amidst a hail of bullets, these two traversed the streets in order to satisfy themselves that the lives and property of French subjects were not unduly imperilled, and to take such measures as would enable the French Legation, in case of need, to offer them an asylum. From the villages of Qulhak and Zarganda the noise of the battle could be heard, though no precise news was obtainable. In these villages reside most of the Europeans, and in them are situated the summer residences of the foreign Legations. Last year, almost at the same period, the Liberals and Nationalists fled thither for refuge; to-day it is the Princes and the Reactionaries."

1 Sulṭán 'Alí Áqá *Mír Panj* of Artillery
2 Mírzá 'Alí Akbar Khán *Sartíp*
3 Mírzá Áqá Khán (son-in-law of *Ẓarghámu's-Salṭana*)
4 Abu'l-Qásim Khán (son of the same; the Bakhtiyárí who headed the *coup de main* on Iṣfahán)

The five brothers—
5 *Munaẓẓamu'l-Mulk*
6 Ismá'íl Khán
7 Habíbu'lláh Khán
8 *Muntaẓamu'd-Dawla*
9 Ḥaydar-qulí Khán

10 *Ẓarghámu's-Salṭaná* 11 *Samiámu's-Salṭaná*

Bakhtiyárí Kháns with the guns, at Takht-i-Púlád outside Iṣfahán

(end of January or beginning of February, 1909)

Of the entry into the city of one division of the Nationalists the *Times* correspondent gives the following account:—

"At 6.30 a.m....the Nationalist forces had ridden quietly in by the Yúsufábád gate in the northern ramparts. They had found the gate open and unguarded, and had entered without firing a shot. Some of the bank officials out for a quiet morning ride had seen about 800 men, and had been told that others were following. So quietly was the entrance effected that an hour later, when the same officials were coming down to the bank, they actually met a Cossack patrol proceeding on its daily task of riding round the northern quarter of the town. The patrol marched along so quietly that these spectators supposed the men knew all about it. A volley sent them helter-skelter back to their quarters, and it is supposed that Colonel Liakhoff then for the first time heard what had happened."

Some further particulars of this day's fighting were contributed by Reuter's and the *Daily News'* special correspondent. According to him "the Yúsufábád gate was defended by armed roughs, who, after firing a few shots, dropped their rifles and bolted. The Dawlatábád gate was defended by soldiers, three of whom were killed, while the remainder surrendered. The *Sipahdár* and *Sardár-i-As'ad* entered the town amid loud shouts of 'Long live the Constitution!' The Nationalists exploded a bomb to mark the capture of the city. Reaching the guard-room in front of the British Legation, the invaders were fired on by soldiers, one Bakhtiyárí being killed and two Nationalists wounded. The wounded were taken to the British Legation and attended to. Three soldiers and two Persian Cossacks were taken and shot by the Nationalists. The remainder surrendered, were disarmed and set free."

By 12.40 p.m. "the northern part of the city was entirely in the hands of the Nationalists, who, with patrols, were keeping excellent order."..."Many soldiers and Cossacks," continued the message, "have deserted to the Nationalist side. It is believed that the Nationalists intend soon to attack in full force the square occupied by the Cossacks. The populace are enthusiastic, and, wearing red badges, are encouraging the Nationalist troops....The Nationalists have had few casualties."

About an hour later the same correspondent sent another message to say that firing still continued, that the Legations and Russian and British banks had not been interfered with, and that there was no danger, save from stray bullets, to the lives or property of Europeans. Close to the great square occupied by Colonel Liakhoff's Cossacks and besieged by the Nationalists the *employés* of the Indo-European Telegraph steadily pursued their work amidst the roar of guns and the flight of projectiles, while over Colonel Liakhoff's house hard by flew the Russian flag, and within it sat his brave wife, who preferred to be near her husband in the hour of danger rather than seek shelter elsewhere[1]. In a telegram despatched at 8 p.m. the *Times* correspondent, who was "bottled up in the neighbourhood of Gun Square" (*Maydán-i-Túp-khána*), at last spoke handsomely of the Nationalists for whom he had hitherto expressed such contempt. "Events to-day," he said, "caused extraordinary surprise except to the initiated few[2]. After the fighting which occurred outside Ṭihrán it was not supposed possible that the Nationalist forces could have entered the city without at first fighting a successful general engagement. Their sudden move, however, which was cleverly conceived and brilliantly executed, enabled them to get through without firing a shot. They have been enthusiastically received by the people in those parts of the town which they now occupy, and some 3000 of the people are said to be enrolled and armed by them." The last message despatched that day at 10 p.m. by the same correspondent stated that there had just been a heavy burst of firing in the Gun Square.

[1] It is worth calling attention to a character-sketch of Colonel Liakhoff by a young Irish correspondent, Mr. J. M. Hone, who had returned from Persia before these events took place. This sketch appeared in the *Morning Leader* of July 14, 1909.

[2] The *Daily Telegraph*, whose correspondent spoke very handsomely of the Nationalists, wrote on July 14 of "the inevitable occupation of Ṭihrán by the insurgents," and, as we have already seen, it had already recognized, more fully than almost any other English paper, the formidable nature of the Bakhtiyárí army. The statement made on July 13 by Dr Isma'íl Khán, the representative of the Persian Nationalists then resident in London, which was published in the *Standard* of July 14, shows that he, and no doubt the Persian Nationalist centres throughout Europe, had a very clear idea of what was happening.

All next day (Wednesday, July 14) the fighting continued in the centre of the city, where the Cossack Brigade still held its ground, and where, over Colonel Liakhoff's house, the Russian flag still flew, despite the protest addressed to the Russian and British Legations by the Nationalist leaders, who complained that, despite their desire to respect that flag, Cossacks stationed under the roof which it protected were firing upon them. The Sháh's troops advanced from Salṭanatábád to a range of hills situated about three miles to the north-east of the city, and began to bombard the Bahárístán and other points occupied by the Nationalists, but without much effect. The number of Nationalists occupying the town was estimated at about 2500, including 500 more Bakhtiyáris who arrived during the morning. Sir George Barclay and M. Sablin again visited the Sháh and urged him to suspend the bombardment and endeavour to come to terms with the Nationalists, but he rejected this proposal. Later in the day Colonel Liakhoff wrote to the *Sipahdár* proposing terms of capitulation, and offering, "in exchange for assurances that the Cossack Brigade would be permitted to serve under a Constitutional Government, to surrender their arms, the Russian officers retiring from the conflict altogether[1]." "Colonel Liakhoff's proposals," said the *Times* correspondent, "were not unnatural in view of the difficult position of the Brigade, but in the light of the situation elsewhere they are inexplicable. There are some 300 Cossacks with artillery under Russian officers in the line taken up by the Royal troops north of the town. The Sháh can hardly agree to the disappearance of this important section of his defence, nor, having regard to the fact that several of the city gates are still in possession of the Royalists, is he likely to approve of the surrender of the main body of the Brigade." Although the *Sipahdár* agreed to the proposals, the negotiations, which were chiefly conducted by M. Evreinoff, Secretary of the Russian Legation[2], hung fire, and the day closed with "heavy firing and the prospect of another noisy night." To the conduct of the Nationalists the *Times* correspondent again bore handsome testimony. "Their behaviour," he telegraphed on the night of July 14, "has been

[1] *Times* of July 15. [2] *Standard* of July 16.

irreproachable. Order has been maintained in those parts of the town which they occupy, they have shewn mercy to their prisoners, and altogether they evince a laudable desire to carry out their plans in a civilized manner. Their peaceful declarations with regard to the Sháh and the Cossacks cannot, of course, be altogether trusted, for the language of subordinates differs greatly from that of the leaders." The correspondent of the *Temps* already cited bears similar testimony to their clemency. An attack on the north-east gate by the Sháh's troops was repulsed with heavy loss[1].

On Thursday, July 15, the Nationalists captured the South Gate (? that of Sháh 'Abdu'l-'Aẓím) and two large guns; the Cossack Brigade still held out in the central square; and desultory firing continued all day[1]. The *Sardár-i-As'ad*, interviewed by Reuter's correspondent at the Bahárístán, which was still the target of the Sháh's artillery, appeared cheerful and confident, and expressed the hope that the Russian troops would not interfere to prevent the Nationalists from completing their victory. No definite arrangement for the surrender of the Brigade had been arrived at. The *Times* correspondent in the morning visited the *Sardár-i-As'ad* and the *Sipahdár* in the Bahárístán, and made them a handsome apology for the contemptuous manner in which he had hitherto spoken of them and their followers. They "accepted his excuses most gracefully," and assured him on their honour that neither they nor any of the Bakhtiyáris had designs on the throne. His estimate of the total casualties on both sides was under a hundred[2], and he added that the only European hurt was a Hungarian, who was hit by a spent bullet. Concerning the negotiations which still continued between Colonel Liakhoff and the Nationalist leaders the fullest account is given by Reuter's correspondent[3]. The terms suggested by the Colonel had been accepted by the *Sipahdár*, but the former, while agreeing that his Cossacks

[1] Reuter's telegram of July 15. See also the *Standard* of July 16, from which it would appear that the Sháh's troops actually entered the town, but were driven back by the Bakhtiyáris and their maxim gun.

[2] See, however, note 1 on p. 322.

[3] See the *Manchester Guardian* for July 16.

should not fire except upon disbanded soldiers engaged in looting, provided that the Nationalists did not fire upon his men, intimated that the decision as to surrender did not depend on himself alone. In the afternoon he again wrote to the *Sipahdár*, complaining that the Cossack quarters were still under fire from the Nationalists. To this the *Sipahdár* replied that, notwithstanding yesterday's agreement, his men had been fired at by the Cossacks, and that consequently they had retaliated in kind, but that he was still prepared to observe the agreement if the other side would also observe it.

The end came on Friday, July 16, when, at 8.30 a.m. Muḥammad 'Alí Sháh, with some 500 of his soldiers and attendants, including the notorious reactionary Amír Bahádur Jang, took refuge in the Russian Legation at Zarganda, and thus *ipso facto* abdicated his throne, though he was not formally deposed until late that night. He had already decided on this step, in case he should be worsted in the struggle, on the day when the Nationalists entered Ṭihrán, and had obtained the necessary promise of hospitality from the Russian Legation. On his arrival he was installed in the Minister's house, over which the Russian and British flags were placed, and which was guarded by Russian Cossacks and Indian *suwárs*. Shortly afterwards a meeting between Colonel Liakhoff and the Nationalist leaders was arranged by the Dragomans of the two Legations. The terms already agreed upon were accepted, the Sháh's abdication having left Colonel Liakhoff free to act as he thought best. In the afternoon, accompanied by an escort of his Cossacks, he met the *Sardár-i-As'ad*, also accompanied by an escort of his men, at the Imperial Bank of Persia[1], whence he was escorted by the Nationalists to the Bahárístán. There the two *quondam* enemies were received with acclamation, and the Colonel formally accepted service under the new Government, and agreed to act in future under the direct orders of the *Sipahdár*, who had been chosen Minister of War. It was decided that the

[1] An unfortunate incident, resulting in the death of a Sayyid, took place at the moment of Colonel Liakhoff's emergence from the square. Happily the serious consequences to which it might have given rise were averted by Colonel Liakhoff's presence of mind. See the *Times* of July 17.

Cossacks of the Brigade should not be disbanded, and should receive back their arms after they had laid them down in token of submission; and that they should be immediately employed in policing the town (to which, naturally, most of the Nationalist warriors were strangers), and in checking looting and disorder. This step was applauded as wise and conciliatory, and the *Daily Telegraph* correspondent declared that "the behaviour of the Revolutionaries was absolutely correct," that "they were perfectly capable of maintaining order," and that "all were full of praise for their wisdom in preventing complications." At 5 p.m. fighting had ceased, save for desultory firing by a few of the Sháh's Bakhtiyáris who occupied positions near the British Legation.

Late in the evening an extraordinary meeting of the National Council, consisting of the Nationalist leaders, the chief *mujtahids* and notables, and as many Members of the former *Majlis* as were available, met at the Bahárístán, and formally deposed Muḥammad 'Alí, choosing as his successor to the throne his little son Sulṭán Aḥmad Mírzá the Crown Prince, a boy only twelve or thirteen years of age, under the regency of the aged and trusted *'Aẓudu'l-Mulk*, the head of the Qájár family.

Thus ended a Revolution comparable in many respects to that which had taken place a year before in the sister state of Turkey. Both these Revolutions happened in the month of July by our reckoning, and by the reckoning of the Muslims in the later days of the month of the second Jumádá (A.H. 1326 and 1327 respectively), which is followed by the month of Rajab, thus giving a strange and new force to the well-known tradition:—

العجب ثمّ العجب بين جمادى و رجب

"*Wonder and again wonder between Jumádá and Rajab!*"

In the blood of her children Persia paid the lesser price, for according to the most careful estimate which I have seen[1] "the killed and wounded" (*i.e.* during the five days' fighting at Ṭihrán in July, 1909) "probably numbered about 500," though

[1] By Dr Joseph Scott in the *British Medical Journal* of Aug. 13, 1909.

"the exact facts will never be known, as many of the dead were thrown into the nearest pit or eaten by dogs." Yet in Persia both the issues at stake and the difficulties to be overcome were greater, for not only the cause of Freedom and Reform but the independence of the country hung in the balance, while the ever-present fear of foreign intervention, greatest on the very eve of victory, might well have paralysed statesmen and soldiers more experienced than those to whose hands were entrusted the fortunes of the Persian Constitution.

CHAPTER XI.

THE ACCESSION OF SULṬÁN AḤMAD SHÁH, AND THE CONVOCATION OF THE SECOND *MAJLIS*.

It remains to chronicle briefly the steps taken by the new Government to establish and consolidate its authority, the arrangements made with regard to the deposed monarch, the coronation of his son and successor, the election and convocation of the new National Assembly, and the difficulties against which it still has to contend.

The National Council, or Emergency Committee, having decided to depose Muḥammad 'Alí and place on the throne his little son Aḥmad, telegraphed[1] to the British and Russian representatives to request that a deputation might be permitted to wait on the ex-Sháh and inform him of their decision. To this proposal, however, he declined to assent[2]: they had overcome him, and he would have to abandon not only his throne but his country. He would get the best terms he could from them, but otherwise he had no desire to have more to do with them than he could help. It was at first reported[3] that his *quondam* tutor and evil genius, Shapshál, the Russian Karaim Jew, had placed at his disposal a castle in the Crimea, that the new Government had offered him a pension of £5000 a year, and that he would start on August 2; but various difficulties arose, there were differences as to the Crown jewels, the pension was deemed inadequate, the ex-Sháh had contracted many debts and mortgages on his estates, and in short the delays seemed interminable and the obstacles insuperable ere a final settlement

[1] July 16. [2] July 17. [3] July 27.

Sulṭán Aḥmad Sháh,
succeeded to the Throne of Persia, July 18, 1909

'Aẓudu'l-Mulk, the Regent

was reached on September 7. On August 4 the Government had already trebled their original offer, and were prepared to pay the ex-Sháh a pension of £15,000 a year on condition of his handing over to them the jewels specified in an inventory which they had prepared, and stating what he had done with any which should be missing. But there arose fresh difficulties concerning his enormous private debts, amounting to some £400,000, three-quarters of which had been borrowed by him from the Russian Bank before he came to the throne, and the remaining quarter from other sources, foreign and Persian, since his accession. Much of this money had been raised by mortgages to the Russian Bank on his private estates in Ázarbáyján, and the new Government, being anxious to prevent these estates from falling into the hands of Russian agents, proposed to take over the ex-Sháh's liabilities and increase his yearly pension to £18,000 on condition that he should cede to them the control of these estates and liquidate all arrears of payment[1]. The ex-Sháh still continued to raise difficulties about his estates, and about the Crown jewels, both of which he was most unwilling to surrender, and he even telegraphed personally to the Tsar to demand protection of his rights[2]. It appeared, however, from the reports of the British and Russian Consuls-General at Tabríz, that the estates were in reality worth far less than the ex-Sháh and the Russian Bank asserted[3], and thereupon "the Russian Government immediately waived its objection to pressure being put on Muḥammad 'Alí in regard to the financial settlement[4]," and he was informed "that the proposed arrangement," fixing his pension at 100,000 *túmáns* (£16,666) a year, "was entirely to his advantage." And so at last the protocol[5] embodying these terms was signed on Sept. 7, and two days later Muḥammad 'Alí, accompanied by his wife, his four younger children, and a certain number of his adherents and retainers, left the shelter of the Russian Legation at Zarganda and started on his journey to Russia. "Weak and foolish as many of his recent

[1] *Times* and Reuter's special correspondent, Aug. 17.

[2] *Times*, Sept. 2. [3] *Ibid.*, Aug. 27. [4] *Ibid.*, Sept. 2.

[5] The principal articles of this protocol were communicated to the Press by Reuter's special correspondent on Sept. 11.

actions have been," says the *Times* correspondent, "he did not forget his dignity, and in his farewell with Sir George Barclay, whom he believes to be the principal instrument of his downfall, he gravely thanked the British representative for the trouble he had taken on his behalf[1]." His journey to the Caspian was very leisurely, but at last, about the 1st of October, he left the Persian shore, it may be hoped for ever. A special train consisting of nine carriages conveyed the ex-Sháh, his harem of ten women, and his companions and attendants, numbering some forty persons, from Bákú, where he was met by a Russian Court Chamberlain, to Odessa[2], where a fine house, luxuriously fitted, was provided for his residence[3]. There he still resides, interesting himself in the life, industries and amusements of that busy sea-port[4]; and it may be hoped that the clause in the protocol rendering him liable to deprivation of his pension in case it shall at any time be proved to the satisfaction of the British and Russian representatives in Persia that he is intriguing against the new Government of his country[5], may prevent him from ever again becoming a danger to the land which he did so much to ruin.

The new boy-king Aḥmad Sháh, accompanied by his Russian tutor, M. Smirnoff, and escorted by Russian and Persian Cossacks and Indian *suwárs*, proceeded on July 18 from Zarganda to Salṭanatábád and was there acclaimed by the Regent, the aged *'Aẓudu'l-Mulk*, and representatives of the National Council[6]. The poor child wept bitterly at having to leave his father and mother, and the parting, graphically described by the *Times* correspondent in his telegrams of that evening, seems to have been an affecting one; but he met the Deputation bravely, and in reply to the hope expressed by them that he would be a good King, he replied, "Please God, I will." On July 20 he entered Ṭihrán, where he was enthusiastically received, and the city was illuminated that night in his honour, while telegrams of congratulation were received from the Turkish Parliament and from the Persian colony at Calcutta. Next day he held

[1] *Times* of Sept. 10. [2] *Standard* of Sept. 29. [3] *Ibid.*, Sept. 21.
[4] *Ibid.*, Nov. 20. [5] *Times* of Aug. 18.
[6] Reuter's telegram of July 18.

his first *darbár*, or reception, at the Palace of Shamsu'l-'Imára, and a day or two later the new *régime* was formally recognized by England and Russia. Throughout the provinces, and especially at Tabríz, the news was received with enthusiasm, and on August 1 the Diplomatic Corps were presented to the little Sháh[1], who seems to have borne himself with that dignity which Persian boys of noble family are so well able to assume, though once or twice his heart appears to have failed him, and it was reported that he had tried to escape from his palace, and had on one occasion even threatened to commit suicide.

The National Council also proceeded at once to the nomination of a Cabinet, with the *Sipahdár* as Minister of War, the *Sardár-i-As'ad* as Minister of the Interior, the Nawwáb Mírzá Ḥusayn-qulí Khán (a staunch patriot, who was educated in England, and was for many years attached to the Persian Legation in London) as Minister of Foreign Affairs[2], *Mushíru'd-Dawla* as Minister of Justice, and the *Ḥakímu'l-Mulk* as Minister of Public Instruction. The police were placed under the control of Ephraim Sa'íd, a Turkish Armenian, one of the chiefs of the Caucasian contingent, who at once applied himself with energy to putting a stop to the looting by disbanded Royalist soldiers which still continued[3]. These were speedily disarmed without much difficulty, though some of the Royalist Bakhtiyárís, reinforced by a few Silaḥkhúrís and others, continued for a while to hold out near Salṭanatábád, refusing to surrender their guns and rifles[4]. *'Aynu'd-Dawla* was appointed Governor of Fárs (though a few days later, owing to a strong protest by Taqízáda, this appointment was cancelled), and *Mukhbiru's-Salṭana* of Ázarbáyján[5], while *Náṣiru'l-Mulk*, who had been in Europe since the beginning of 1908, and who had hitherto, in spite of many urgent demands, declined to return to Persia, telegraphed

[1] His first formal audience to the foreign representatives was given on Sept. 13, his twelfth birthday. See the *Times* of Sept. 15.

[2] He was, however, replaced in this office on Sept. 27 by 'Alá'u-s-Salṭana (formerly Persian Minister in London) who had held the same office at the time of the *coup d'état*, but has just been re-appointed (July 26, 1910).

[3] *Daily Telegraph* correspondent in issue of July 20.

[4] *Ibid.*, July 21.

[5] He arrived at Tabríz on Aug. 21.

his intention of returning at once[1]. At this juncture, too, the *Times* correspondent sent a really handsome testimonial to the Nationalist leaders of whom he had till lately entertained so poor an opinion. In the course of a long telegram dated July 20 he said:—

"The present performances (of the Nationalists), however, throw the past vacillation into the shade, and we are concerned to-day with a situation which promises more hopefully for Persia than any that could ever have been brought about by foreign advice or agency. The shadow of intervention has long been spreading over the Persian sky, and the day seemed nigh when the shadow must have been followed by something which would cripple Persian independence. Nothing but Persian activity would save the situation. At the psychological moment that activity successfully asserted itself; the direction of events has been taken out of foreign hands, and it rests once more where it ought to rest—with the Persians themselves.....

"Persia's future henceforth rests with the Persians. They have effected a brilliant *coup*, they have behaved with wisdom and moderation at an intoxicating moment, and they have a clear run to the goal of their ambition. The reactionary power is broken, and must remain in the dust while the Nationalists are firm and careful. Everybody in Persia who takes any interest in politics is with them, and it would seem as if they can have no enemies but those of their own making. Tact and magnanimity have distinguished their actions since their moment of triumph, and there is nothing left to the foreigner but to congratulate and wish success to the new venture.

"Both Great Britain and Russia have been disturbed by what seemed an imperious necessity to interfere; but they are now thankful to withdraw and let the Persians work out their own salvation. The course which Persia must steer henceforth is beset with rocks and shoals, but while there are men at the Persian helm who have their country's welfare at heart there will always be hope."

[1] He reached Ṭihrán on Oct. 28. See *Times* of Oct. 29, and, for a handsome tribute to the "yeoman service" he had rendered by his wise counsels to the new *régime*, the same journal for Nov. 15.

No testimony could be stronger than this, because, as we have seen, the *Times* special correspondent had neither much sympathy with, nor much belief in, the Persian Nationalists until the moment of their unforeseen triumph; but it does not stand alone, and a fortnight later we find the correspondent of the *Daily Telegraph* (August 4) writing with no less admiration of "the clear heads of the statesmen now at the helm and their ability to steer the ship of state safely through troublous seas."

In the matter of reprisals against those who had most strenuously supported the ex-Sháh in his reactionary policy, and had most persistently striven to destroy the Constitution, the Persian reformers shewed more clemency than the "Young Turks" had shewn after the counter-revolution of the preceding April. On July 26 a special Court[1] was instituted to try political offenders, but it only sat for ten or eleven days, and only condemned to death five or six of the most conspicuous reactionaries. The first two offenders brought before it were the *Ṣaní'-i-Ḥaẓrat*, a superintendent of the Arsenal, who had taken a prominent part in the abortive *coup d'état* of December, 1907, and the *Mufákhiru'l-Mulk*, Vice-Governor of Ṭihrán, and once Minister of Commerce, both of whom were found guilty of instigating the murder of four Constitutionalists who were in sanctuary at Sháh 'Abdu'l-'Aẓím on March 23, 1909[2], and both of whom were condemned to death, the sentences being carried out on the evening of July 29. *Mufákhiru'l-Mulk*, who was shot, had been a refugee at the Russian Legation, and it was feared that this fact must give rise to complications, but it appeared that he had left the shelter of the Legation of his own accord, and the demand that a representative of the Legation should be present at his trial only arrived after his execution.

A much greater sensation was caused by the trial and execution of the prominent reactionary *mujtahid* Shaykh Faẓlu'lláh, a man of great learning and authority, who, whether from genuine

[1] This Court was called *Maḥkama-i-Qaẓáwat-i-'Áli* (the Supreme Court of Judicature) and (in the case of Shaykh Faẓlu'lláh's trial, at any rate) consisted of ten members, whose names will be found in the note on this event at the end of the book.

[2] See *White Book* [Cd. 4733], pp. 68, (Nos. 131, 134), 87–88 (No. 175 and Inclosures), etc.

conviction or from jealousy of the Sayyids Muḥammad and 'Abdu'lláh, the leading members of the clergy who had espoused the popular cause at Ṭihrán, had constituted himself the heart and soul of the Reaction. He was condemned to death by hanging, not, however, on political grounds, but as having sanctioned the murders at Sháh 'Abdu'l-'Aẓím to which reference was made in the last paragraph; and the document sanctioning these murders and sealed with his seal was produced in court. He was publicly hanged on the evening of Saturday, July 31, in the *Maydán-i-Túp-khána*, or "Gun Square," in presence of a vast multitude, some of whom seemed to have behaved in a manner little suited to the gravity of the occasion. Before his death he kissed the rope and acknowledged the justice of his sentence[1]. An officer of Artillery who took a leading part in the bombardment of the *Majlis* on June 23, 1908, but whose name I have not been able to ascertain, was hanged on the following evening.

Lastly on Sunday, August 8, Mír Háshim, the notorious Tabríz reactionary, was arrested with his brother as he was endeavouring to escape to Mázandarán. Both were publicly hanged, one in the morning and one in the evening of the following day. A placard specifying Mír Háshim's crimes was attached to his body, which was allowed to remain suspended for twenty-four hours. A sum of about £1000 which was found in his possession was confiscated by the Government. These six executions seem to have been all that took place as a result of the revolution[2]. Of the other leaders of the Reaction several accompanied the ex-Sháh into exile. Of these were the Amír Bahádur Jang, the *Muwaqqaru's-Salṭana*, the *Mujallalu's-Sulṭán*, and *Sa'du'd-Dawla*, the last of whom I met in Paris in December, 1909. He had played a varied part in events,

[1] *Times* of Aug 2. This statement is denied on good authority. See the note at the end of the book.

[2] In the *Contemporary Review* for October, 1909, pp. 508–510, that doughty champion of "Holy Russia," Dr E. J. Dillon, gives a characteristically unfair account of these executions, with many gruesome details not to be found elsewhere. It is curious to find this loyal apologist for the Russian Government, whose daily increasing roll of courts-martial and summary executions called forth so vehement a protest from Count Tolstoy and Prince Krapotkin, protesting so vehemently against the execution of five or six men of whom three at least were condemned for inciting to murder.

and at one time had the reputation of being, together with *Náṣiru'l-Mulk*, one of the most capable Ministers with Liberal tendencies.

Other prominent reactionaries or persons believed to cherish dangerous ambitions were compelled to pay heavy fines and to leave the country. Chief amongst these was the Prince *Ẓillu's-Sulṭán*, son of Náṣiru'd-Dín Sháh and elder brother of Muẓaffaru'd-Dín Sháh. In 1887, when I was in Persia, he governed most of the southern provinces, and had a well-equipped and formidable little army at Iṣfahán. He was at that time known as an Anglophil, and as one of the "strongest" and most cruel governors in the country[1].

In the early spring of 1888 he came to Ṭihrán to pay a visit to his father Náṣiru'd-Dín Sháh, who, suspicious, as it would appear, of his growing power, and fearing that he had designs on the Throne, kept him for some time practically a prisoner on parole, dismissed several of his Ministers, disbanded his army, and deprived him of almost all his governments except Iṣfahán itself. Russian intrigue was suspected as having compassed the Prince's disgrace, for, as has been said, he was reputed an Anglophil, and had just received a decoration from the British Government. After the Anglo-Russian *entente* and the *coup d'état* of June, 1908, the two Powers combined to bring about his departure from Persia, with safeguards for his life and property[2], after his house in Ṭihrán had been bombarded by Colonel Liakhoff, although Mr Marling was so convinced that disorders in his province, Fárs, were certain to break out on his dismissal and departure that he urged, on July 5, 1908, the retention of the escort sent to the British Consulate at Shíráz[3], which "the energy displayed by him" three weeks before "had reduced to order" and rendered "perfectly tranquil[4]."

Now when the *Ẓillu's-Sulṭán*, being then at Vienna[5], heard

[1] Compare pp. 196–7 *supra*, and the observations there made on Dr E. J. Dillon's inconsistent presentations of his character.

[2] *Blue Book* [Cd. 4581], pp. 124 (No. 123), 125 (No. 126), 126 (Nos. 127–128), 127 (Nos. 131, 133), 136 (No. 165), etc.

[3] *Ibid.*, p. 138 (No. 173).

[4] *Ibid.*, p. 142 (No. 176), dated June 18, 1908. *Cf.* p. 163 of the same, also p. 184.

[5] The *Temps* of July 21, 1909.

of the deposition of his nephew Muḥammed 'Alí, he decided to return to Persia, hoping, presumably, to profit by the situation, and he actually landed at Anzalí on August 5, in spite of a warning from England and Russia that he would forfeit their protection if he re-entered his country. He was arrested almost immediately by the Government, detained at Rasht, and informed that his liberty would not be restored to him until he paid a fine, or ransom, of £100,000[1]. This demand for a while he strenuously resisted, but ultimately, on Sept. 25, he paid over in cash 100,000 *túmáns* (£16,666) to the Government agents, and left Anzalí for Europe on the following day, having given a promise to remit another 200,000 *túmáns* (£33,332), the balance of the ransom finally agreed upon, within four months. In December, 1909, he was, and very likely still is, in Paris[2].

On August 7, the day on which the *Ẓillu's-Sulṭán* was arrested, the brave and upright Tabríz deputy, Sayyid Taqízáda, made a triumphal entry into Ṭihrán escorted by large numbers of Nationalists. A year before he had left the shelter of the British Legation under a guarantee of personal safety provided that he remained in exile for a year and a half[3]. He arrived in England towards the end of September, 1908, practically penniless, having been robbed of the little money he had, as well as of certain important papers, during his passage through Russian territory. I was fortunate enough to be able to obtain for him some little employment in the Cambridge University Library during the autumn of that year, and thus for several weeks enjoyed daily conversations with him and his friend and partner Mírzá Muḥammad 'Alí Khán. All that I saw of him only served to confirm and deepen the favourable impression already produced by the reports of common friends. He struck me as a man equally remarkable for his high-minded disinterestedness, his honesty, his veracity, and his courage. I never knew him make a rash or reckless statement, and even those of his assertions which seemed at first most incredible were, I think,

[1] *Times* of Aug. 11.

[2] I learn that he spent last Winter and Spring (1909–1910) at Nice.

[3] The ex-Sháh originally demanded that he should be exiled for ten years. See the *Blue Book* [Cd. 4581], No. 220, p. 171.

in every case subsequently proved true by independent evidence. He was a clear and forcible speaker in Persian, arranging his subject-matter well, and it was always a pleasure to me to translate for him at the meetings he addressed in London and at Cambridge. While Tabríz was making its heroic defence, two months before the blockade was established, his friends in that town wrote to him repeatedly, urging him to join them, and, having weighed carefully the services he could hope to render to his country there and here respectively, without for a moment taking into consideration the grave danger he incurred by returning, he decided to respond to their call, and left Cambridge for Tabríz, which he reached with much difficulty and risk, at the end of November, 1908, knowing well what would be his fate should the city unhappily fall into the hands of the Royalists. He well deserved the great reception accorded to him at Ṭihrán, which, twelve days after his arrival, elected him, together with two other old friends of mine, the Nawwáb Mírzá Ḥusayn-qulí Khán and Ḥájji Mírzá 'Abdu'l-Ḥusayn Khán *Waḥídu'l-Mulk* (the Persian correspondent of the *Times*), amongst the fifteen members who were to represent the capital in the new Parliament. And while the living heroes of the struggle were thus honoured, the dead were not forgotten, and the tomb of Mírzá Ibráhím Áqá, another Tabríz deputy of the late *Majlis* who fell a victim to the *coup d'état* of June, 1908, was strewn with flowers and illuminated with candles[1].

The free Press, which rose and fell with the first *Majlis*, revived again with the triumph of the Nationalists. Even before that triumph the *Ḥablu'l-Matín* began to appear again at Rasht when that city declared for the Constitution. The eighth number of the Rasht issue appeared on April 15, 1909, and the fifty-fourth on July 9. These are the only numbers of this later issue which I possess, but on the triumph of the Nationalists the paper followed them to Ṭihrán. Soon after this, however, the editor, Sayyid Ḥasan, in consequence of an article in which he spoke regretfully of the pre-Muhammadan days of Persia and

[1] See an interesting account of the capture of Ṭihrán and succeeding events by Sayyid Ḥusayn of Tajrísh, which appeared in Nos. 10 and 11 of the *Chihra-numá* (Sept. 14 and 29, 1909).

slightingly of the Arabs (whom, in Firdawsí's words, he described as "lizard-eaters"), was arrested, tried, and sentenced to a term of imprisonment, in spite of the conspicuous services which he and his brother (the *Mu'ayyidu'l-Islám*, editor of the much older Calcutta *Ḥablu'l-Matín*) had rendered to the popular cause[1]. Of the former newspapers the *Majlis* was also revived on July 21, 1909, between which date and Dec. 21 fifty numbers have been issued. The *Tamaddun* reappeared on August 4, being published thrice a week, on Tuesdays, Thursdays and Saturdays. The *Nidá-yi-Waṭan* was revived on the same day as the *Majlis*, viz. July 21, 1909. Of the new papers which appeared the *Írán-i-Naw* ("New Persia") and the *Sharq* ("East") were the most important. The first number of the former appeared on August 24, 1909, and the latter about the middle of September. Mention should also be made of the *Surúsh*, a Persian newspaper started at Constantinople on June 30, 1909.

The elections in the first degree at Ṭihrán were concluded on August 17, and on the same day a Directory of twenty members, including the two Nationalist Generals, the *Sipahdár* and the *Sardár-i-As'ad*, was constituted with extensive powers of control[2]. They began auspiciously by discovering in the Treasury a hoard of gold *túmáns* equivalent in value to about £20,000[3]. On September 1 a general amnesty was proclaimed, from which, however, certain exceptions were made—notably the Amír Bahádur Jang, *Sa'du'd-Dawla* (whom I met in Paris on December 18, 1909), and the *Mushíru's-Salṭana*[4]. Of these three persons the first and second had sought refuge at the Russian Legation, and the third at the Turkish Embassy. On September 13 the Directory above mentioned was increased in size to forty members, while, owing to the establishment of more normal conditions since the departure of the ex-Sháh, its func-

[1] See an excellent letter in the *Standard* of Nov. 15, 1909, from the Ṭihrán correspondent of that paper, and also a letter on the Persian Press from the special correspondent of the *Times*, which appeared in the issue of Oct. 29, 1909.

[2] Reuter's telegram of Aug. 17 from Ṭihrán.

[3] *Ibid.*, and *Times* of Aug. 18.

[4] Reuter's Special Correspondent.

tions were restricted to those of an advisory Council[1]. By October 10 half the elections throughout the country had taken place[2], and by October 28 no less than 64 of the new Deputies were in Ṭihrán—three more than the minimum required for a quorum—but their certificates of election had to undergo a careful scrutiny[3], and it was not until November 15 that the solemn opening of the new Parliament took place.

Seventeen stormy months, during which again and again hope seemed dead and further striving useless, had passed over Persia since the destruction of the first National Assembly when the second was formally opened by the young Sháh in presence of some sixty-five of the newly-elected Deputies, and a large number of the princes, clergy, nobles and officials[4]. Admission was not granted to the general public, but the town, and especially the Parliament buildings, were richly decorated, and throughout the land there were illuminations and public rejoicings. After the Deputies had taken their places, the members of the Cabinet arrived in rapid succession, to wit, the *Sipahdár*, Chief Minister and Minister of War; the *Sardár-i-As'ad*, Minister of the Interior; the *Mustawfi'l-Mamálik*, Minister of Finance; *Wuthúqu'd-Dawla*, Minister of Justice; the *Sardár-i-Manṣúr*, Minister of Posts and Telegraphs; *Ṣani'u'd-Dawla*, Minister of Public Instruction; and *'Alá'u's-Salṭana*, Minister of Foreign Affairs. Of the princes and notables some thirty-three were present, including *'Aynu'd-Dawla*, *Nayyiru'd-Dawla*, *Niẓámu's-Salṭana*, *Iqbálu'd-Dawla*, *'Alá'u'd-Dawla*, the *Farmán-farmá*, *Ẓarghámu's-Salṭana*, *Mu'tamad-i-Kháqán*, besides the Governor and Deputy-Governor of Ṭihrán, the Mayor, and some sixteen officers of the army. The foreign Legations were represented by some forty persons, the Merchants by twenty-two, and the Clergy, or *'ulamá*, by twenty-nine, including the two great ecclesiastical leaders Sayyid 'Abdu'lláh, and Sayyid Muḥammad. The *mujáhidín*[5], or National Volunteers,

[1] *Times* of Sept. 14. [2] *Ibid.*, Oct. 11. [3] *Ibid.*, Oct. 29.

[4] The following particulars are taken from the special supplement of the *Sharq* published on the following day, Tuesday, Dhu'l-Qa'dá 2, A.H. 1327 (=Nov. 15, 1909).

[5] *À propos* of this word, attention should be called to an extraordinary blunder of the *Times* correspondent, who evidently confounded it with another derivative of the

were represented by Mírzá 'Alí Muḥammad Khán and others. Certain places were reserved for the ladies connected with the various Legations.

When all had taken their allotted places, a blare of trumpets and loud cries of *Khabar dár!* ("Look out!") announced the arrival of the young Sháh, who was accompanied by the *Walí-'ahd*, or Crown Prince; the aged Regent, *'Aẓudu'l-Mulk*; and the Princes *I'tiẓádu's-Salṭana* and Náṣiru'd-Dín Mírzá. As soon as these had entered and taken their places, the speech from the Throne, of which a translation follows, was read out by the *Sipahdár*.

"*In the Name of God, exalted is His Glorious State.*

"In the Name of God, the Giver of Freedom, and by the occult regard of His Holiness the Imám of the Age, the National Consultative Assembly is auspiciously and happily opened. The protected realms of Persia have silently and steadfastly survived long ages, and especially this last critical epoch, until at length the Nation, constrained by intellectual progress and mental evolution, was compelled to traverse this revolutionary cycle. In the course of three years, passing through this great crisis, it has overcome the inevitable initial obstacles. Thanks be to God, all has ended well, and behold, to-day, with the utmost satisfaction and delight, we see opened this Assembly of the People's representatives, the first National Parliament of this great Empire—the outcome of the well-nigh insupportable sufferings of a whole people—won by the courage and endeavours of the people themselves, and the help of Persia's well wishers.

"We hope that Our trusted representatives will continue, with that supreme endeavour and sincerity of purpose—that same zeal and activity—which has brought the kingdom to this

same root, *mujtahid*, which is applied to the higher ecclesiastics of the Shí'a. Thus in his telegram of Oct. 10, 1909, under the heading "Discontent among the Priests," he says that a number of the *mujtahidín* "assembled to discuss their grievances," and that "the questions at issue appear to be the carrying of arms, the reduction of their numbers, and the arrears of pay." See also his telegrams of Oct. 12 and 13, and p. 165, n. 2 *supra*.

happy state, to discharge their sacred obligations with the utmost attention and the most minute care and circumspection, even as Our Government will devote its utmost endeavours and most strenuous efforts to assure the security and good order of Our realm, and to promote its advance in civilization.

"We rejoice exceedingly that the new progressive Government has won the approbation of the people, and has assured general tranquillity and confidence, and that sundry trifling disturbances which have been provoked in certain districts by certain evilly-disposed persons, fearful of the consequences of their own actions, are on the point of being suppressed. These disturbances Our Government is firmly resolved to terminate.

"We are happy to state that our cordial relations with friendly Foreign Powers continue unimpaired. We are grateful for their favourable disposition towards the advancement of the new *régime*, and we hope for its continuance and consolidation.

"The anxiety and disquietude which possess Our minds in consequence of the presence of foreign troops on Persian soil will, as We are quite confident, in view of the favourable progress of friendly representations, the explicit promises [which We have received], and the good result [of negotiations now in progress], be shortly removed.

"In order to lay the foundations of reforms in Our Realm, and to create a well-organized administration, the Representatives of the Nation and Ministers of the Crown must in the first place gradually concentrate their attention on the reorganization of the different departments of the State and the ordering of their formation according to the principles which prevail in civilised countries, and especially on important reforms in the Finances of the State, the assuring of public order and security, and the safeguarding of the roads and highways according to the detailed programme of urgent and necessary measures of reform which Our Cabinet will submit to the Assembly, in order that they may, with all possible expedition, give effect to Our good intentions and the National aspirations, all of which will conduce to the comfort of Our people and the strengthening of the Constitution, which is in conformity with the Spirit of Islám.

"We pray that God will assist the Deputies and Representatives of the People, and will vouchsafe to the Nation increased honour, independence and happiness."

The Speech concluded amidst loud acclamations of "Long live Sulṭán Aḥmad Sháh!" "Long may the Supreme National Council endure!" "Long live the Cabinet of Ministers!" as the boy-king left the Bahárístán, now risen like the phœnix from the ruins to which Colonel Liakhoff's artillery had reduced it. In that memorable gathering were present most of those who had wrought so manfully for the freedom of their country, but others there were who would have most rejoiced to see that day, but whose bodily eyes a premature and cruel death had closed. Of these were Ḥájji Mírzá Ibráhím, one of the Deputies for Ázarbáyján in the first *Majlis*, who was murdered by his captors on the day of the *coup d'état*; the great orator *Maliku'l-Mutakallimín*, and the editor of the *Ṣúr-i-Isráfíl*, Mírzá Jahángír Khán, strangled by the deposed monarch Muḥammad 'Alí at the Bágh-i-Sháh on the ensuing day; the *Qáẓí-i-'Adliyya*, one of Sayyid Jamálu'd-Dín's special disciples, who died in chains in the same place; and Áqá Sayyid Jamál, whose word was so potent with the people that his voice also must needs be choked by those to whom free speech was an abomination.

"From every corner of the National Council-chamber," says the writer from whom the above particulars are derived, "we heard the words, 'Remorse is the tyrant's lot, while he who was steadfast in his troth and laid down his life in the way of Freedom lives for ever.' As for those zealous patriots who sacrificed their lives, or who have not yet escaped from their sufferings, their names are recorded in the Book of Humanity, Fraternity, Equality and Freedom. As for those who strove with insolence to bar the road of Justice and Liberty, they did but make known in the lowest degree the quality of their manhood, and will speedily behold the retribution merited by their corrupt intentions, even to the lowest depths which their wickedness implies.

"Behold, the people of Persia, after suffering many troubles, have attained their hopes and desires. They must know that

evil-doers must needs be fearful and the virtuous hopeful of every Nation which seeks to advance and to attain the highest degrees of civilization. The intoxication of ignorance is worse than any intoxication; heedlessness bears in its bosom manifold hurts. In these days, apparently, the solver of all difficulties is money or power; but in the absence of one or both of these, only resolution, determination and union is needed [to secure success].

"Long live Freedom! Down with dissension!"

Dissension is, indeed, one of the greatest dangers which threatens Persia. With all their individual virtues and talents, the Persians, but for this fatal tendency to quarrel with one another, and so to play into the hands of their enemies, would never as a nation have fallen so low as they fell before the Revolution of which we have attempted to trace the history. Of this Revolution the most remarkable feature—the element which falsified the forecasts and upset the calculations of all observers—was the true patriotic feeling—the power of combined action and personal sacrifice—which so unexpectedly developed itself in a people whose weak points are mercilessly exposed, though unfairly exaggerated, in Morier's *Hajji Baba*, whence most Englishmen derive their ideas of the Persian character. That this power of sinking personal feelings, interests and ambitions in a single-hearted desire to promote the National welfare should continue and increase is the most important internal condition of Persia's salvation.

There is, however, an external condition which is at least as essential, and that is that Persia should not be hampered and thwarted in her struggle by her two powerful neighbours, England and Russia. It seems so clearly to England's own interest (quite apart from any sentiment with which her traditional love of Liberty and sympathy with a brave struggle against great odds might be expected to inspire her) that a strong and well-governed Persia should be interposed between her Indian frontiers and the frontiers of the Russian Empire that she is not, I think, seriously suspected by most Persians of harbouring sinister designs on the integrity and in-

dependence of their country[1]. Apart from the sending of gunboats to certain ports in the Persian Gulf, notably Bushire and Bandar-i-'Abbás, on certain occasions already mentioned when disturbances seemed possible, the despatch on July 25 of 40 Sepoys of the Indian army and a Maxim gun, taken from the Residency guard at Bushire, to reinforce the Consular guard at Shíráz[2] is, so far as I know, the only instance of any act of armed intervention in Persia on the part of England during this period.

But as regards Russia the case is different. The greatest admirers of the Russian Government can hardly maintain seriously that it encourages freedom or desires popular government as we understand these things; or that it is unaggressive or unambitious; or that it has always shewn an extreme scrupulousness in the observance of its promises and in respect for the frontiers of its weaker neighbours. That M. Izvolsky desires the maintenance of a good understanding with England, and has shewn himself anxious to consider English susceptibilities in Persia, is shewn by the correspondence published in the Blue Books, and is proved amongst other things by the abandonment of the proposed Russian expedition to Tabríz in October, 1908 (in deference, as it would appear, to Sir Edward Grey's warning that "it would produce a very bad impression in this country"), and by the recall of certain Russian officials and representatives who were most closely identified with reactionary sympathies and an aggressive forward policy in Persia. Conspicuous amongst these was M. de Hartwig, sometime Russian Minister at Ṭihrán, who was recalled thence on November 15, 1908, and was succeeded first by M. Sablin as Chargé d'Affaires, and later by M. Poklevski-Koziell, who is credited with liberal sympathies and friendly feelings towards England, and who arrived at Ṭihrán as the

[1] The extraordinary and inexplicable complaisance with which the British Government continues to regard the prolonged presence and aggressive conduct of the Russian troops in northern Persia is, however, gradually leading the Persians to regard England also as utterly indifferent, if not actively hostile, to their independence. See a letter on "England and Islám" which I contributed to the *Manchester Guardian* of July 22, 1910.

[2] *Times* of July 26, 1909.

new Minister on September 24, 1909. Conspicuous also was M. Pokhitanoff, sometime Russian Consul at Tabríz, whose actions certainly tended to prevent any peaceful solution of the Tabríz imbroglio, and who was suspected of actively supporting the reactionary party. He was replaced by M. Miller, who, so far as one can ascertain, shewed a desire to co-operate as far as possible with his English colleague, and, as far as lay in his power, to restrain the arbitrary conduct of General Znarsky after the arrival of the Russian relief force in April, 1909. Nor must it be forgotten that, contrary, as I freely admit, to my fears and expectations, and contrary to the expectations of almost every newspaper or politician in this country, whether they sympathized with, or were hostile or indifferent to the cause of Persian freedom and independence, at the supreme moment when the United National forces, taking their courage in both hands, were struggling for the mastery, M. Sablin, having full power to invoke the intervention of the Russian force encamped only 80 miles off at Qazwín, and thus dashing from the lips of the Persian people the cup of victory which they were about to drain, held his hand, and that two or three days after the deposition of Muḥammad 'Alí, according to a Central News telegram from Odessa dated July 19, 1909, the advance of these troops beyond Qazwín was countermanded. And lastly Colonel Liakhoff, who, though probably neither much worse nor much better than the average Cossack officer, was associated in the minds of the Persian people with the events of the bitterest day in the three years' struggle, was recalled to Russia on August 4, 1909, and, in spite of the official statement published in the *Novoe Vremya* two days earlier[1], did not, and apparently will not, return to Persia, and it may be hoped that he will remain at Byelostok, and will not again be in a position to promote the accomplishment of his own pessimistic forecasts of the future of Persia[2].

Yet, in spite of all this, the declaration of the *Times* special

[1] See the *Times* of August 3.

[2] See the interviews with him published by the St Petersburg correspondent of the *Standard* (Sept. 1 and 4) and the *Times* (Sept. 13). Also the *Morning Post* of Aug. 18.

correspondent in his telegram of June 25, 1909, that the chief "feature of Persian opinion is the unanimous suspicion with which the presence of the Russian troops at Tabríz and Mashhad is regarded throughout the country" is as true now as it was then, notwithstanding the strenuous efforts made after Muḥammad 'Alí's deposition by the National Council or Directory to check Russophobia "by pointing out (to the provincial *anjumans*) the danger of thoughtless demonstrations against a friendly Power from which the Government had repeated assurances of non-intervention in the internal affairs of the country," in which assurances it had "implicit confidence[1]." If this "implicit confidence" is not shared by the bulk of the Persian people, Russia should not blame them, but rather the wide divergence which exists between her promises and her performances, the arrogant behaviour of her troops on Persian soil, and the almost unanimous belief of her own Press, both Reactionary and Liberal, that these troops, notwithstanding all assurances to the contrary, will remain in Persia until doomsday, unless some superior force expels them. Nor are the Persians alone in their mistrust of Russia's intentions, as is clearly shewn by the following letters, dated July 8 and July 10, 1909, written from Rasht by a non-official English resident in Persia about the arrival of the Russian troops in that place.

"Eighteen hundred Russian Cossacks have been landed at Anzalí, and more are to follow. Persians have come to me with tears in their eyes. They ask why, after all their successful efforts to protect the persons and property of Europeans, they should be subjected to this further humiliation. The *bázárs* are all closed, and instructions have been given that, when the barbarians from the North pass through, no one is to appear in the streets, and not a word is to be spoken.

"It is said that the Cossacks will proceed to Ṭihrán, where a certain number will be told off for the protection of each Legation. If this be true, is it not a degradation for the British Legation to be 'protected' by people who are far less friendly disposed towards Britain, and who are really lower in the scale of civilization, than the unfortunate Ṭihránís?

[1] See *Daily Telegraph*, July 22, 1909.

"Mashhad is in an awful state. I passed through last April, on my way here from Sístán. The town was then quiet, and there was no ill-feeling against Europeans. You will have seen from the papers the result of the entry of the Russian troops. I once told the Consul-General (British) that I would rather die than be protected by Russians. He was very much annoyed.

"The Nationalists looked to England, but they are completely bewildered by the policy of 'Kow-tow' (excuse the colloquialism) to Russia.

"The British Vice-Consul here had no official news of the landing of the Cossacks. Considering that the British and Russians are supposed to be working in harmony, it is, to say the least, surprising that his Russian colleague sent him no communications on the subject.

"Some time ago the Vice-Consul was informed by a telegram *en clair* that despatches had been sent to the Russian Consul, and that he (the British Consul) was to go to the Russian for instructions as to the policy to follow!

"The Nationalists here are going to send another appeal to the different European Governments. They despair of an answer, for hitherto none has been vouchsafed. However, I cited the parable of the widow and the unjust judge. If only they can be induced not to give up hope, surely their prayers must be listened to.

"They experience great difficulty in getting telegrams through, the Telegraph Office in Ṭihrán being still in the hands of the *Dawlat*[1].

"One Englishman said to me, 'Could not the *Times* be stirred up to write the *truth* on the state of affairs in Persia?' I have written, but I do not know if anything will come of it.

"There is no question of difference of opinion between Englishmen who *know* the Persians. Cannot public opinion at home be roused, or is England still so obsessed by the fear of Germany that she must stoop to bargain with so horrible a Government as the Russian?

[1] "Government," *i.e.* the adherents of the now deposed Sháh, Muḥammad 'Alí.

"Will you accept my apologies and forgive me for writing? I should not have ventured to trouble you had I not known the cause to be good."

In his second letter, written from Anzalí, the port of Rasht, two days later, the same correspondent says:—

"You will be sorry to hear that matters are going from bad to worse. Six hundred and twenty-five Cossacks left here for Rasht very early yesterday morning. A crowd of Rashtís went out, unarmed, to protest against their coming. They are now, I believe, at the Russian Consulate in Rasht awaiting the artillery and infantry. At present Russian infantry are being landed. The population of Anzalí has gone across to protest.

"The local Director of Customs, Monsieur Constant, was not informed by the Russian Consul that troops were to be landed. As he had no authorisation to let them enter, he refused to let them land on the Customs Quay. They went to the 'Kavkaz and Mercur'[1]. He followed to see what they were doing. This led to a long official report, in which the officer commanding the Cossacks complained that 'l'individu cracha *démonstrativement* dans la direction des pieds d'un des cosaques.' He demanded an apology, which, needless to say, was not forthcoming. I am taking copies of this correspondence.

"Furthermore a certain M. Ivanoff of the Russian Legation expostulated with M. Constant, saying, 'Voyons, pourquoi demandez-vous des autorisations pour laisser passer des armes? *Puisque nous occupons*, ce n'est pas nécessaire.'

"The blood of every decent-minded European, whether he be English, French, Belgian or American, is boiling. This is no exaggeration. Does the Government at home realize what is happening? Can nothing be done to prevent this tyranny? The Cossacks, when they entered the harbour, came in with flags flying and music playing.

"To-day the infantry landed with fixed bayonets. I hear that 300 Cossacks have been sent to Mashhad. This is

[1] *i.e.* the quay of the Russian Company which owns the steamers plying on the Caspian.

scandalous. I know the Mashhadís well, and if there have been disturbances, the present Russian Consul, Prince Wabija, has created them to serve his own selfish ends. May the bloodshed be on his head!...[1]

"If Britain does nothing, Persian opinion will turn against her. And what effect will this have on our sixty-two million Muhammadan subjects?

"You may be surprised to hear that, although I could scarcely admire Russians, I was more or less of a Russophil six months ago!"

For obvious reasons I cannot mention the name of the writer of this letter, with whom I am personally unacquainted, and who wrote to me of his own initiative, knowing the interest I took in Persia. Such letters—and I have received others of the same sort, couched in even stronger language—carry more conviction than the communications of professional correspondents, who must needs write something, and whose writings may be *tendencieux*. Unhappily in a case like this it is often impossible to publish the strongest evidence in one's hands, and hardly ever possible to indicate its source. It is very difficult to produce absolute proof of events happening in a distant country when powerful interests are concerned in keeping them secret. On July 13, 1909, in reply to a question by Mr Flynn, Sir Edward Grey admitted that there were about 4000 Russian troops at Tabríz, 1700 between Rasht and Qazwín, and some 600 more in other places in the North of Persia, besides the ordinary Consular guards; that they were stationed at these various places for the protection of foreign lives and property from the possibility of danger, and that they would be withdrawn as soon as that possibility no longer exists. The terms in which the condition is expressed are unhappily chosen, for, if they are intended literally, is there any inhabited spot in this world of which it can be said that there is "no *possibility* of danger to life or property?" But if they are not to be taken literally—if by "*possibility*" we are to understand "*reasonable probability*"—

[1] Here follows a criticism of another Consular official, which I think it better to omit.

then it may fairly be asked whether there are any grounds whatever for apprehending such danger, and whether, on the other hand, dangers which did not before exist are not actually created by the presence of these Russian troops on Persian soil? We have quoted the evidence of the correspondent of a Russian paper to prove how arbitrary and exasperating has been the conduct of the Russian troops at Tabríz, and of an independent English observer as to their behaviour at Anzalí, Rasht and Mashhad. Let us now cite the testimony of a correspondent of the French paper, *le Siècle*, as to their more recent conduct at Qazwín. Writing from Ṭihrán on January 11, 1910, this correspondent says:—

"The conduct of the Russian troops throughout almost the whole region of North Persia becomes more and more intolerable, and grievously offends the patriotic and religious sentiments of the people. The drunkenness of these soldiers and their openly proclaimed contempt for the Muhammadan religion are the characteristics which evoke this movement of reprobation.

"It is now asserted that the aim of the Russians is nothing else than to foment disorder where it does not at present exist, in order to establish themselves in the country and remain there as long as possible. Any other view would be opposed to the actual evidence.

"*Arrogance of the Russian troops.*

"Here, then, are some significant facts.

"Some days ago, at Qazwín, several Russian soldiers, their stomachs surcharged with vodka, spread terror through the streets of the town, scandalizing the inhabitants and maltreating women and children, while a Russian officer, instead of striving to restrain his subordinates, wounded three passers-by, and insulted the police who had intervened. After this noble exploit the soldiers, filled with fury, set fire to a grocer's shop.

"Two days later, again at Qazwín, the Russian soldiers entered the *bázárs*, stole 80 loaves of sugar, beat the police, and, strange to relate, took advantage of the right of exterritoriality to return to their quarters without being in any way troubled by

their officers. Other soldiers publicly tortured a child without any reason and fractured its skull.

"When, in consequence of these excesses, the Governor of the town of Qazwín addressed a letter to the Russian Consul to lay before him these facts, the letter was returned without an answer, the Consul in his arrogance supposing that it did not behove him to examine a complaint directed against Russian soldiers.

"*The Russian authorities and the brigands.*

"On the other hand the Russians residing in the province of Gílán, where the frontier is reduced to a theoretic line, take advantage of this facility to invoke upon Persian territory a band of Russian ne'er-do-wells, in order that they may sow trouble and terror wherever they can. When the local authorities intervene, the promoters of disorder receive these malefactors into their houses, and, profiting by their rights of exterritoriality, prevent the police from arresting them. Thus they have every facility for giving them refuge and subsequently letting them go to resume their agitation.

"The great friendship openly shewn by the Russian Consulate at Tabríz towards the notorious brigand Raḥím Khán is well known, and to such a point was it carried that Russian officers were photographed in his company, holding his hand. This incident occurred a little while before Raḥím Khán came to attack and lay in ruins the town of Ardabíl, where he ruthlessly massacred even women and children. When the Persian Government succeeded in restoring order in Ardabíl, Raḥím Khán fled into the district of Qará-dágh, of which he is a native. The Russian agents, in order to minimize the success gained by the cause of order, and to keep in touch with Raḥím Khán, who was so useful to them, now propose to send 50 Cossacks into the Qará-dágh district on the pretext (which deceives no one) of informing themselves as to the state of that region.

"In the province of Mázandarán the Russian Consular Agent has presented to the Persian Governor a demand for

compensation unsupported by details, threatening to send soldiers if satisfaction is not voluntarily given.

"*Popular discontent.*

"The Persian Government continues to protest to the Russian Legation at Ṭihrán, but the promises freely made by the Minister of that Power produce no visible results. But is this diplomatist himself sufficiently powerful to make the Russian officers and soldiers, whose reprehensible actions can only wound the susceptibilities of the Persians and excite the national sentiment against Russia, listen to reason?

"Notwithstanding the failure of these attempts, the Persian Government has not for an instant departed from its spirit of moderation in the demands which it has been compelled to address to the representative of Russia.

"If the dislike of the Persian people towards Russia continues daily to increase, not less is the disillusion of European residents in Persia regarding her great and powerful neighbour. The Europeans alone still refused to recognize the true character of the designs entertained by Russian agents against the integrity of Persia; to-day they have clear proofs that these agents pursue no other object than to foment troubles in order to perpetuate the Russian occupation of Persian territory.

"Henceforth the presence of Russian troops in Persia can only transform order into disorder, and render more difficult the task of the new Government, which is doing its utmost to re-establish the disturbed equilibrium and restore peace in the country. Their mere presence, moreover, is in flagrant contradiction to Russia's solemn promises of non-intervention, and to the formal assurances on this matter which she has given to Europe."

A year has now (July, 1910) elapsed since the new Constitutional Government of Persia has been established, and during that time its unremitting efforts to restore and maintain order, and to guarantee security of person and property to all, have compelled the admiration of even the least sympathetic observers. Its difficulties—especially its financial difficulties—

have been enormous; for aid in these difficulties it is bidden to turn to England and Russia, and to no other quarter; and Russia, apparently, demands as one of the guarantees for a loan the formation of a gendarmerie, officered, at any rate in the "Russian Sphere" (*i.e.* in much the largest and most important part of Persia), by Russians! Putting aside altogether Russia's actions previous to the deposition of Muḥammad 'Alí and the restoration of the Constitution, have her actions since that date been calculated to inspire in the minds of the Persians any confidence in the benevolent intentions which she continues to profess? Of 6300 Russian soldiers sent into Persia last year on various pretexts, there are still, so far as can be ascertained, some 3000 still remaining, viz. 1000 at Tabríz, no longer encamped outside the town, but in the *Bágh-i-Shimál*, or "North Garden," within the walls; 500 at different places between Anzalí and Qazwín; 500 in Qazwín itself; 300 in Khurásán; an uncertain number at Astarábád and Urmiya; and 500 at Ardabíl, besides an additional 50 Cossacks sent to Ahar in Qará-dágh in January, 1910, "to investigate the situation." Add to all this the arrogant and high-handed behaviour of these troops at Rasht, Qazwín and Tabríz; the fact that at the latter place they are reported to be building a church, making Russian flags to the number of three or four hundred, and, generally speaking, shewing every sign of having "come to stay"; and their extremely ambiguous relations with that notorious brigand and arch-disturber of the peace Raḥím Khán, and later with Dáráb Mírzá, a Russianized Persian Prince who, being an officer in a Russian regiment quartered at Qazwín, went to Zanján to foment reactionary disturbances, and was nominally "arrested," but in reality rescued, by Russian soldiers, who, while returning to Qazwín with him, came into conflict with a body of Persian troops, fired upon them, and killed two, including 'Alí Khán, their commanding officer. Is it to be wondered at that the Persians "hesitate," as a French journal expresses it, "to put their heads in the noose," or that they declare that "they would rather die" than have as the chief military force in the country a gendarmerie under the command of Russian officers, or, in other words, a greatly magnified Cossack Brigade

controlled by a score of Liakhoffs? It would be better by far that they should seek a defensive alliance with Turkey, shift the seat of Government to Iṣfahán, the old capital of the glorious Ṣafawí days, and, even at the cost of losing territory in the North, seek to maintain a free and independent, though mutilated, Persia, rather than they should allow the whole country to sink into the miserable position of a Russian protectorate.

So many unexpected things have happened in Persia and Turkey in the last few years, and so many confident prophecies have been falsified, that it would be rash to hazard any definite forecast. My own belief is that if Persia had in her treasury the sums of money wasted—or worse than wasted—by three successive Sháhs in the last twenty years, and could really count on the benevolent neutrality of her "two powerful neighbours" for a period of, say, ten or twenty years, she would prove herself equal to the great task of reconstruction and reform which lies before her. But these are two big "ifs." Yet, even as things are, there is more ground for hope than there was eighteen months, or even a year, ago. The crisis is over, and the patient, though very weak, is convalescent. Russia *may* mean to deal fairly with her still helpless neighbour, or, if not, circumstances, internal or external, are conceivable which might alter any sinister designs cherished by the party of reaction at home and rash adventure abroad which seems so often to dominate her policy. So to the Persians we can only say, in the words of Sa'dí:—

أَلَا لَا تَحْزَنَنَّ أَخَا ٱلْبَلِيَّهْ ، فَلِلرَّحْمٰنِ أَلْطَافٌ خَفِيَّهْ ،

"Despair not, O afflicted one: who knows
What hidden mercies God may yet disclose?"

MY TASK IS **D**ONE: **C**OMPUTE THE **C**URRENT YEAR,
CASTING THE **V**OWE**L**S[1], FROM FI**V**E **L**ETTERS HERE.
(MDCCCLLVV =
MDCCCCX.)

[1] *i.e.* computing all the letters having numerical values in these two lines (MDCLV) except I, which occurs thrice.

APPENDIX A.

THE BASES OF THE PERSIAN CONSTITUTION, NAMELY,

1. THE *FARMÂN* OF AUGUST 5, 1906.
2. THE ELECTORAL LAW OF SEPTEMBER 9, 1906.
3. THE FUNDAMENTAL LAWS OF DECEMBER 30, 1906.
4. THE SUPPLEMENTARY FUNDAMENTAL LAWS OF OCTOBER 7, 1907.
5. THE NEW ELECTORAL LAW OF JULY 1, 1909.

1. THE *FARMÁN* (ROYAL PROCLAMATION) OF AUGUST 5, 1906.

Farmán of the late Sháh, Muẓaffaru'd-Dín Sháh the Great (may God make luminous his Proof!), dated 14 *Jumáda ii,* A.H. 1324 (=*August* 5, A.D. 1906).

To the Right Honourable His Excellency the Prime Minister.

WHEREAS God Most High (glorious is His State!) hath entrusted to Our hands the direction of the progress and prosperity of the well-protected realms of Persia, and hath constituted Our Royal Personage the Guardian of the Rights of all the people of Persia and of all our loyal subjects—

THEREFORE on this occasion, our Royal and Imperial judgement has decided, for the peace and tranquillity of all the people of Persia, and for the strengthening and consolidation of the foundations of the State, that such reforms as are this day required in the different departments of the State and of the Empire shall be effected; and we do enact that an Assembly of delegates elected by the Princes, the Doctors of Divinity (*'ulamá*), the Qájár family, the nobles and notables, the landowners, the merchants and the guilds shall be formed and constituted, by election of the classes above mentioned, in the capital Ṭihrán; which Assembly shall carry out the requisite deliberations and investigations on all necessary subjects connected with important affairs of the State and Empire and the public interests; and shall render the necessary help and assistance to our Cabinet of Ministers in such reforms as are designed to promote the happiness and well-being of Persia; and shall, with complete confidence and security, through the instrumentality of the first Lord of the State, submit [their proposals to Us], so that these, having been duly ratified by Us, may be carried into effect. It is evident that, in accordance with this August Rescript, you will arrange and prepare a code of regulations and provisions governing this Assembly,

and likewise the ways and means necessary to its formation, so that, by the help of God Most High this Assembly may be inaugurated and may take in hand the necessary reforms.

We likewise enact that you should publish and proclaim the text of this August Rescript, so that all the people of Persia, being duly informed of our good intentions, all of which regard the progress of the Government and People of Persia, may, with tranquil minds, engage in prayer for Us.

Given [under Our hand] in the Ṣáḥib-Qirániyya Palace on the fourteenth of Jumádá the Second in the eleventh year of Our Reign (= August 5, 1906).

In New Electoral
law it changed for better

2. THE ELECTORAL LAW OF SEPTEMBER 9, 1906.

Regulations for the Elections to the National Assembly, dated Monday, Rajab 20, A.H. 1324 (= *Sept.* 9, A.D. 1906).

The Regulations for the Elections to the National Consultative Assembly [to be convened] in accordance with the August Rescript of His Imperial Majesty [Muẓaffaru'd-Dín Sháh], may God immortalize his reign, issued on the 14th of Jumáda ii, A.H. 1324 (= August 5, A.D. 1906) are as follows.

FIRST SECTION.

Rules governing the Elections.

ART. 1. The electors of the nation in the well-protected realms of Persia in the Provinces and Departments shall be of the following classes: (i) Princes and the Qájár tribe: (ii) Doctors of Divinity and Students: (iii) Nobles and Notables: (iv) Merchants: (v) Landed proprietors and peasants: (vi) Trade-guilds.

Note 1. The tribes in each province are reckoned as forming part of the inhabitants of that province, and have the right to elect, subject to the established conditions.

Note 2. By "landed proprietor" is meant the owner of an estate, and by "peasant" the tiller of the soil.

ART. 2. The electors shall possess the following qualifications: (i) their age must not fall short of 25 years: (ii) they must be Persian subjects: (iii) they must be known in the locality: (iv) the landed proprietors and peasants amongst them must possess property of the value of at least one thousand *túmáns* (=about £200): (v) the merchants amongst them must have a definite office and business: (vi) the members

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of trade-guilds amongst them must belong to a recognized guild, must be engaged in a definite craft or trade, and must be in possession of a shop of which the rent corresponds with the average rents of the locality.

ART. 3. The persons who are entirely deprived of electoral rights are as follows: (i) women: (ii) persons not within years of discretion, and those who stand in need of a legal guardian: (iii) foreigners: (iv) persons whose age falls short of twenty-five years: (v) persons notorious for mischievous opinions: (vi) bankrupts who have failed to prove that they were not fraudulent: (vii) murderers, thieves, criminals, and persons who have undergone punishment according to the Islamic Law, as well as persons suspected of murder or theft, and the like, who have not legally exculpated themselves: (viii) persons actually serving in the land or sea forces.

The persons who are conditionally deprived of electoral rights are as follows: (i) governors, and assistant governors, within the area of their governments: (ii) those employed in the military or police within the area of their appointments.

ART. 4. Those elected must possess the following qualifications: (i) they must speak Persian: (ii) they must be able to read and write Persian: (iii) they must be Persian subjects of Persian extraction: (iv) they must be locally known: (v) they must not be in government employment: (vi) their age must be not less than thirty or more than seventy: (vii) they must have some insight into affairs of State.

ART. 5. Those persons who are debarred from being elected are: (i) women: (ii) foreign subjects: (iii) those who are actually serving in the land or sea forces: (iv) fraudulent bankrupts: (v) persons who have been guilty of murder or theft; criminals; persons who have undergone punishment conformably with the Islamic Law; and persons suspected of murder, theft and the like, who have not legally exculpated themselves: (vi) those whose age falls short of thirty: (vii) those who are notorious for evil doctrine, or who live in open sin.

ART. 6. The number of persons elected by the people in the different parts of Persia shall correspond with the total number of the inhabitants of that locality. In each province (*ayálat*) six or twelve persons shall be elected in accordance with the following table, save in the case of Ṭihrán, when the number of those elected shall be as follows: (i) Princes and members of the Qájár family, 4: (ii) doctors

of Divinity and students, 4: (iii) merchants, 10: (iv) land-owners and peasants, 10: (v) trade-guilds, 32 in all, one from each guild.

In other provinces and departments the numbers shall be as follows: (i) Ázarbáyján, 12: (ii) Khurásán, Sístán, Turbat, Turshíz, Qúchán, Bujnúrd, Sháhrúd and Bisṭám, 12: (iii) Gílán and Ṭálish, 6: (iv) Mázandarán, Tunkábun, Astarábád, Fírúzkúh and Damáwand, 6: (v) Khamsa, Qazwín, Simnán and Dámghán, 6: (vi) Kirmán and Balúchistán, 6: (vii) Fárs and the Persian Gulf Ports, 12: (viii) 'Arabistán, Luristán and Burújird, 6: (ix) Kirmánsháhán and Garrús, 6: (x) Kurdistán and Hamadán, 6: (xi) Iṣfahán, Yazd, Káshán, Qum and Sáwa, 12: (xii) 'Iráq, Malá'ir, Túy Sirkán, Niháwand, Kamra, Gulpáyagán and Khwánsár, 6.

ART. 7. Each elector has one vote and can only vote in one class.

ART. 8. The number of those elected to the National Consultative Assembly throughout the whole well-protected realms of Persia shall not exceed two hundred. In the individual towns of each province each class shall assemble separately, elect one representative, and send him to the chief town of that province. The delegates so elected must reside in the town for which they are elected, or in the environs of that town. Three delegates thus elected in the individual towns of the provinces shall assemble in the chief town of the province, and shall elect members for the National Consultative Assembly according to the number specified in the above table for each province, so that they may present themselves to the National Consultative Assembly, and, during the period of their appointment, may discharge their duty and function, which is to guard the rights of the Government and the Nation.

The electors are not absolutely compelled to elect [a deputy] out of their own class or guild.

ART. 9. In every place where elections are carried out, a Council (*anjuman*) shall be formed of well-known local representatives of the six classes of electors to supervise the elections. This Council shall be under the temporary supervision of the Governor or Deputy-Governor of that place. In this way two Councils shall be formed, one local and one provincial, the former in each of the individual towns in the province, the latter in the chief town of the province.

ART. 10. Complaints in connection with the elections shall not interfere with the carrying out of the elections; that is to say, the

Councils mentioned above in Art. 9 shall investigate such complaints without suspending the elections.

ART. 11. Should anyone complain of the local Council, he shall refer his complaint to the provincial Council, and if his application be without effect, it shall be referred to the National Consultative Assembly.

ART. 12. If any Member of the National Consultative Assembly should resign or die, and if more than six months intervene before the next [general] elections, the Members of the Assembly shall elect [in his place] one from his province.

ART. 13. The local and provincial Councils shall send the names of the electors and the elected of each department to the Record Office (*daftar-khána*) of the National Consultative Assembly, where their names shall be arranged in alphabetical order, and shall be printed and published for the information of the public. So likewise, after the conclusion of the elections, the local Council shall, within the space of one week, communicate the result of the election to the provincial Council.

ART. 14. Those elected in the individual towns of the province must be provided with a certificate from the local Council; and in like manner those elected in the chief towns of the provinces must be provided with a certificate from the provincial Council, which they must produce in the National Consultative Assembly.

ART. 15. The election of the persons designated shall be by a majority of votes.

ART. 16. After the election of the Members of the National Consultative Assembly, the names of those elected shall be recorded in the Registry of the Assembly, and shall be announced in the newspapers.

ART. 17. The National Assembly of Electors shall be established in all towns where there is a resident Governor, which are divided into two categories. The local Governor, having regard to local requirements, is empowered to fix the place of the Court of Electors.

ART. 18. The time and place of the election must be made known to all the people one month beforehand by the local government, by means of printed leaflets and other suitable channels of advertisement.

ART. 19. Those elected to represent the Capital and the various provinces shall proceed to Ṭihrán as quickly as possible. Since those elected in the provinces must be elected in accordance with the Regulations, and since consequently some considerable time will necessarily elapse before they can present themselves, therefore the representatives of Ṭihrán shall be elected, and the Assembly constituted immediately, so that it may proceed to discharge its functions until the provincial representatives shall present themselves, nor shall the delay in the arrival of these latter cause the Assembly to be inactive.

ART. 20. The living expenses and annual allowance of the Members of the National Consultative Assembly depends on the determination and sanction of the Assembly itself.

ART. 21. The period for which the National Representatives are appointed shall be two years, after which period fresh elections shall take place throughout the whole of Persia.

ART. 22. Complaints regarding the Assembly and its Members respecting the carrying out of the Elections, etc., must, in so far as they refer to the Assembly, be submitted in writing to the President of the Assembly, so that the subject of complaint may be investigated in the National Consultative Assembly and judgement thereon delivered.

ART. 23. No Member of the Assembly can be arrested or detained on any pretext without the permission of the Assembly, unless he shall publicly commit some crime or misdemeanour.

All written or spoken statements of Members of the Assembly on the affairs of the Government and the Nation shall be free, except in cases where such writings or statements of any Member shall be contrary to the public good, and, according to the enactments of the Most Luminous Law [of Islám] shall deserve punishment. In such cases, by permission of the Assembly, persons of this description shall be brought before the Court of Cassation.

ART. 24. Government officials and employés of government offices who are elected in a representative capacity as members of the Assembly shall quit their previous service, and while employed in this capacity shall have no right to intervene or concern themselves in their former office or in any other [similar] service, otherwise their representative function and membership shall be null and void.

SECOND SECTION.

The conduct of the Election and registration of votes, and the conditions thereof.

ART. 25. The election of Members of the National Consultative Assembly in the Capital, and in the towns of large, moderate or small size, will take place in the presence of the Governor, or Deputy-Governor, under the supervision of the Council (*anjuman*) mentioned in Art. 9.

ART. 26. Election shall be by votes, and by absolute or relative majority. In case of an equality of votes, the determination of the elected [candidate] shall be effected by a [second] voting.

ART. 27. The Polling day for the Election of Members to the Assembly and the recording of votes shall, in whatever year it takes place, be on a Friday[1], with due observance of the following arrangements.

First, the voting shall take place in the presence of the Governor, the local Council and the electors who are present.

Secondly, for the organization of the electoral court the Councils (*anjumans*) mentioned in Art. 9 shall be responsible.

Thirdly, the voting-paper shall be of white paper having no sign.

Fourthly, each of the voters shall inscribe his vote on this voting-paper outside [*i.e.* before he enters] the Court of Electors, and shall give it, closed up, to one of the members of the above-mentioned Council who shall be designated [for that purpose], who, in the presence of all, shall throw it into the ballet-box.

Fifthly, one of the Members of the Council (*anjuman*) mentioned in Art. 9 shall compare the names of those voting with a list furnished to him.

ART. 28. Before the votes are taken, one of the Members of the Council shall lock the ballet-box, which shall be sealed by two others, while another Member of the Council shall take charge of the key.

ART. 29. After the voting has been concluded, the lid of the box shall be opened, the voting-papers shall be counted in the presence of all, and the majority and minority shall be verified by the list [of

[1] Friday is chosen because in Persia, as in other Muhammadan countries, it is a general holiday.

persons entitled to vote], while several of those present shall, under the supervision of the Council, and in the presence of all, set themselves to work out the result of the voting.

ART. 30. Voting-papers on which nothing is written, or which bear illegible inscriptions, or which fail to specify clearly the name of the Candidate voted for, or on which the voter has inscribed his own name, shall not be taken into account, but shall be noted in the minutes. Thereafter the result of the election shall be proclaimed in a loud voice, and shall be declared by the president of the Court of Electors.

ART. 31. Should the number of Members elected by the people exceed the number fixed upon, those persons will be regarded as elected who possess seniority of age. Otherwise, should the occasion allow, the votes will be recounted. If, after the votes have been recounted, it appears that the number of voting-papers exceeds the number of electors, the election shall be regarded as null and void, and a fresh election shall be held.

ART. 32. The Members elected for Ṭihrán shall choose from amongst themselves one President, two Vice-presidents, and four Secretaries, and the Assembly shall then be opened under the Honorary Presidency of His Imperial and Most Sacred Majesty (may God immortalize his reign!).

ART. 33. The President, the two Vice-presidents, and the Secretaries of the National Consultative Assembly shall, with the approval of the Members of the Assembly, be changed once a year. In renewing the election of the persons above-mentioned, it is understood that regard shall always be paid to the majority of votes of the Assembly.

Dated the 19*th of the month of Rajab*, A.H. 1324
(= *Sept.* 8, A.D. 1906).

"*In the Name of God, the Merciful, the Forgiving.*

"To the Right Honourable the *Ṣadr-i-A'ẓam* (*Prime Minister*).

"These Regulations are correct.

Rajab 20, A.H. 1324 (= *Sept.* 9, A.D. 1906).

[Place of the Royal Signature.]

3. THE FUNDAMENTAL LAWS OF DECEMBER 30, 1906.

The Fundamental Law of Persia, promulgated in the reign of the late Muẓaffaru'd-Dín Sháh, and ratified by him on Dhu'l-Qa'da 14, A.H. 1324 (= *December* 30, 1906).

In the Name of God the Merciful, the Forgiving.

WHEREAS in accordance with the Imperial *Farmán* dated the fourteenth of Jumáda the Second, A.H. 1324 (= August 5, 1906), a command was issued for the establishment of a National Council, to promote the progress and happiness of our Kingdom and people, strengthen the foundations of our Government, and give effect to the enactments of the Sacred Law of His Holiness the Prophet,

AND WHEREAS, by virtue of the fundamental principle [therein laid down], we have conferred on each individual of the people of our realm, for the amending and superintending of the affairs of the commonwealth, according to their degrees, the right to participate in choosing and appointing the Members of this Assembly by popular election,

THEREFORE the National Consultative Assembly is now opened, in accordance with our Sacred Command; and we do define as follows the principles and articles of the Fundamental Law regulating the aforesaid National Council, which Law comprises the duties and functions of the above-mentioned Assembly, its limitations, and its relations with the various departments of the State.

On the Constitution of the Assembly.

ART. 1. The National Consultative Assembly is founded and established in conformity with the *Farmán*, founded on justice, dated the fourteenth of the Second Jumádá, A.H. 1324 (= Aug. 5, 1906).

ART. 2. The National Consultative Assembly represents the whole of the people of Persia, who [thus] participate in the economic and political affairs of the country.

ART. 3. The National Consultative Assembly shall consist of the Members elected in Ṭihrán and the provinces, and shall be held in Ṭihrán.

ART. 4. The number of elected Members has been fixed, in accordance with the Electoral Law separately promulgated, at one hundred and sixty-two, but in case of necessity the number above-mentioned may be increased to two hundred.

ART. 5. The Members shall be elected for two whole years. This period shall begin on the day when all the representatives from the provinces shall have arrived in Ṭihrán. On the conclusion of this period of two years, fresh representatives shall be elected, but the people shall have the option of re-electing any of their former representatives whom they wish and with whom they are satisfied.

ART. 6. The Members elected to represent Ṭihrán shall, so soon as they meet, have the right to constitute the Assembly, and to begin their discussions and deliberations. During the period preceding the arrival of the provincial delegates, their decisions shall depend for their validity and due execution on the majority [by which they are carried].

ART. 7. On the opening of the debates, at least two thirds of the Members of the Assembly shall be present, and, when the vote is taken, at least three quarters. A majority shall be obtained only when more than half of those present in the Assembly record their votes.

ART. 8. The periods of session and recess of the National Consultative Assembly shall be determined by the Assembly itself, in accordance with such internal regulations as itself shall formulate. After the summer recess, the Assembly must continue open and in session from the fourteenth day of the Balance (Oct. 7), which corresponds with the festival of the opening of the First Assembly.

ART. 9. The National Consultative Assembly can sit on occasions of extraordinary public holidays.

ART. 10. On the opening of the Assembly, an Address shall be presented by it to His Imperial Majesty, and it shall afterwards have the honour of receiving an answer from that Royal and August quarter.

ART. 11. Members of the Assembly, on taking their seats, shall take and subscribe to the following form of oath:

(*Form of the Oath.*)

"We the undersigned take God to witness, and swear on the Qur'án, that, so long as the rights of the Assembly and its Members are observed and respected, in conformity with these Regulations, we will, so far as possible, discharge, with the utmost truth, uprightness, diligence and endeavour, the duties confided to us; that we will act loyally and truthfully towards our just and honoured Sovereign, commit no treason in respect of either the foundations of the Throne or the Rights of the People, and will consider only the advantage and well-being of Persia."

ART. 12. No one, on any pretext or excuse, shall have any right, without the knowledge and approval of the National Consultative Assembly, to molest its Members. Even in case of the Members committing some crime or misdemeanour, and being arrested *flagrante delicto*, any punishment inflicted upon him must be with the cognizance of the Assembly.

ART. 13. The deliberations of the National Consultative Assembly, in order that effect may be given to their results, must be public. According to the Internal Regulations of the Assembly, journalists and spectators have the right to be present and listen, but not to speak. Newspapers may print and publish all the debates of the Assembly, provided they do not change or pervert their meaning, so that the public may be informed of the subjects of discussion and the detail of what takes place. Everyone, subject to his paying due regard to the public good, may discuss them in the public Press, so that no matter may be veiled or hidden from any person. Therefore all newspapers, provided that their contents be not injurious to any one of the fundamental principles of the Government or the Nation, are authorized and allowed to print and publish all matters advantageous to the public interest, such as the debates of the Assembly, and the opinions of the people on these debates. But if anyone, actuated by interested motives, shall print in the newspapers or in other publications anything contrary to what has been mentioned, or inspired by slander or calumny, he will render himself liable to cross-examination, judgement and punishment, according to law.

ART. 14. The National Consultative Assembly shall organize and

arrange, in accordance with separate and distinct Regulations called "the Internal Code of Rules," its own affairs, such as the election of a President, Vice-presidents, Secretaries, and other officers, the arrangements of the debates and divisions, etc.

On the Duties of the Assembly and its Limitations and Rights.

ART. 15. The National Consultative Assembly has the right in all questions to propose any measure which it regards as conducive to the well-being of the Government and the People, after due discussion and deliberation thereof in all sincerity and truth; and, having due regard to the majority of votes, to submit such measure, in complete confidence and security, after it has received the approval of the Senate, by means of the First Minister of the State, so that it may receive the Royal Approval and be duly carried out.

ART. 16. All laws necessary to strengthen the foundations of the State and Throne and to set in order the affairs of the Realm and the establishment of the Ministries, must be submitted for approval to the National Consultative Assembly.

ART. 17. The National Consultative Assembly shall, when occasion arises, bring forward such measures as shall be necessary for the creation, modification, completion or abrogation of any Law, and, subject to the approval of the Senate, shall submit it for the Royal Sanction, so that due effect may thereafter be given to it.

ART. 18. The regulation of all financial matters, the construction and regulation of the Budget, all changes in fiscal arrangements, the acceptance or rejection of all incidental and subordinate expenditure, as also the new Inspectorships [of Finance] which will be founded by the Government, shall be subject to the approval of the Assembly.

ART. 19. The Assembly has the right, after the Senate has given its approval, to demand from the Ministers of State that effect shall be given to the measures thus approved for the reform of the finances and the facilitation of co-operation between the different departments of the Government by division of the departments and provinces of Persia and their governments.

ART. 20. The Budget of each Ministry shall be concluded during the latter half of each year for the following year, and shall be ready fifteen days before the Festival of the Nawrúz[1].

ART. 21. Should it at any time be necessary to introduce, modify or abrogate any Fundamental Law regulating the [functions of the] Ministries, such change shall be made only with the approval of the Assembly, irrespective of whether the necessity for such action has been declared by the Assembly or enunciated by the responsible Ministers.

ART. 22. Any proposal to transfer or sell any portion of the [National] resources, or of the control exercised by the Government or the Throne, or to effect any change in the boundaries and frontiers of the Kingdom, shall be subject to the approval of the National Consultative Assembly.

ART. 23. Without the approval of the National Council, no concession for the formation of any public Company of any sort shall, under any plea soever, be granted by the State.

ART. 24. The conclusion of treaties and covenants, the granting of commercial, industrial, agricultural and other concessions, irrespective of whether they be to Persian or foreign subjects, shall be subject to the approval of the National Consultative Assembly, with the exception of treaties which, for reasons of State and the public advantage, must be kept secret.

ART. 25. State loans, under whatever title, whether internal or external, must be contracted only with the cognizance and approval of the National Consultative Assembly.

ART. 26. The construction of railroads or *chaussées*, at the expense of the Government, or of any Company, whether Persian or foreign, depends on the approval of the National Consultative Assembly.

ART. 27. Wherever the Assembly observes any defect in the laws, or any neglect in giving effect to them, it shall notify the same to the Minister responsible for that department, who shall furnish all necessary explanations.

ART. 28. Should any Minister, acting under misapprehension, issue on the Royal Authority, whether in writing or by word of mouth, orders conflicting with one of the laws which have been enacted and

[1] The *Nawrúz*, or Persian New Year's Day, falls about March 21 in each year.

have received the Royal Sanction, he shall admit his negligence and lack of attention, and shall, according to the Law, be personally responsible to His Imperial and Most Sacred Majesty.

ART. 29. Should a Minister fail to give a satisfactory account of any affair conformably to the laws which have received the Royal Sanction, and should it appear in his case that a violation of such law has been committed, or that he has transgressed the limits imposed [on him], the Assembly shall demand his dismissal from the Royal Presence, and should his treason be clearly established in the Court of Cassation, he shall not again be employed in the service of the State.

ART. 30. The Assembly shall, at any time when it considers it necessary, have the right to make direct representations to the Royal Presence by means of a Committee consisting of the President and six of its Members chosen by the Six Classes. This Committee must ask permission, and the appointment of a time for approaching the Royal Presence through the Master of the Ceremonies (*Wazír-i-Darbár*).

ART. 31. Ministers have the right to be present at the Sessions of the National Consultative Assembly, to sit in the places appointed for them, and to listen to the debates of the Assembly. If they consider it necessary, they may ask the President of the Assembly for permission to speak, and may give such explanations as may be necessary for purposes of discussion and investigation.

On the representation of affairs to the National Consultative Assembly.

ART. 32. Any individual may submit in writing to the Petition Department of the Archives of the Assembly a statement of his own case, or of any criticisms or complaints. If the matter concerns the Assembly itself, it will give him a satisfactory answer; but if it concerns one of the Ministries, it will refer it to that Ministry, which will enquire into the matter and return a sufficient answer.

ART. 33. New laws which are needed shall be drafted and revised in the Ministries which are respectively responsible, and shall then be laid before the Assembly by the responsible Ministers, or by the Prime Minister. After being approved by the Assembly, and ratified by the Royal Signature, they shall be duly put into force.

ART. 34. The President of the Assembly can, in case of necessity, either personally, or on the demand of ten Members of the Assembly,

hold a private conference, consisting of a selected number of Members of the Assembly, with any Minister, from which private meeting newspaper correspondents and spectators shall be excluded, and at which other Members of the Assembly shall not have the right to be present. The result of the deliberations of such secret conference shall, however, only be confirmed when it has been deliberated in the said conference in presence of three quarters of those selected [to serve on it], and carried by a majority of votes. Should the proposition [in question] not be accepted in the private conference, it shall not be brought forward in the Assembly, but shall be passed over in silence.

ART. 35. If such private conference shall have been held at the demand of the President of the Assembly, he has the right to inform the public of so much of the deliberations as he shall deem expedient; but if the private conference has been held at the demand of a Minister, the disclosure of the deliberations depends on the permission of that Minister.

ART. 36. Any Minister can withdraw any matter which he has proposed to the Assembly at any point in the discussion, unless his statement has been made at the instance of the Assembly, in which case the withdrawal of the matter depends on the consent of the Assembly.

ART. 37. If a measure introduced by any Minister is not accepted by the Assembly, it shall be returned supplemented by the observations of the Assembly; and the responsible Minister, after rejecting or accepting the criticisms of the Assembly, can propose the aforesaid measure a second time to the Assembly.

ART. 38. The Members of the National Consultative Assembly must clearly and plainly signify their rejection or acceptance of measures, and no one has the right to persuade or threaten them in recording their votes. The signification by the Members of the Assembly of such rejection or acceptance must be effected in such manner that newspaper correspondents and spectators also may perceive it, that is to say their intention must be signified by some outward sign such as [the employment of] blue and white voting-papers, or the like.

The proposal of measures on the part of the Assembly.

ART. 39. Whenever any measure is proposed on the part of one of the Members of the Assembly, it can only be discussed when at

least fifteen Members of the Assembly shall approve the discussion of that measure. In such case the proposal in question shall be forwarded in writing to the President of the Assembly, who has the right to arrange that it shall be subjected to a preliminary investigation in a Committee of Enquiry.

ART. 40. On the occasion of the discussion and investigation of such measure as is mentioned in Art. 39, whether in the Assembly or in the Committee of Enquiry, notice shall be given by the Assembly to the responsible Minister, if any, concerned in the measure, that if possible he himself, or, if not, his Assistant Minister, shall be present in the Assembly, so that the debate may take place in the presence of one or other of them.

The draft of the [proposed] measure, with its additions, must be sent from ten days to a month before the time (with the exception of matters added at the last moment) to the responsible Minister; and so likewise the day of its discussion must be determined beforehand. After the measure has been discussed in the presence of the responsible Minister, and in case it should, by a majority of votes, receive the approval of the Assembly, it shall be officially transmitted in writing to the responsible Minister, so that he may take the necessary steps [to put it in force].

ART. 41. If the responsible Minister cannot, for any reason, agree with the Assembly about a measure proposed by it, he must offer his excuses to it and give it satisfaction.

ART. 42. Should the National Consultative Assembly demand explanations on any matter from the responsible Minister, the Minister in question must give an answer, which answer must not be postponed unnecessarily or without plausible reason, save in the case of secret measures, the secrecy of which for some definite period is to the advantage of the State and the People. In such cases, on the lapse of the definite period the responsible Minister is bound to disclose this measure in the Assembly.

On the Conditions regulating the formation of the Senate.

ART. 43. There shall be constituted another Assembly, entitled the Senate, consisting of sixty Members, the sessions of which, after its constitution, shall be complementary to the sessions of the National Consultative Assembly.

ART. 44. The Regulations of the Senate must be approved by the National Consultative Assembly.

ART. 45. The Members of this Assembly shall be chosen from amongst the well-informed, discerning, pious and respected persons of the Realm. Thirty of them shall be nominated on the part of His Imperial Majesty (fifteen of the people of Ṭihrán, and fifteen of the people of the Provinces), and thirty by the Nation (fifteen elected by the people of Ṭihrán, and fifteen by the people of the Provinces).

ART. 46. After the constitution of the Senate, all proposals must be approved by both Assemblies. If those proposals shall have been originated in the Senate, or by the Cabinet of Ministers, they must first be amended and corrected in the Senate and accepted by a majority of votes, and must then be approved by the National Consultative Assembly. But proposals brought forward by the National Consultative Assembly must, on the contrary, go from this Assembly to the Senate, except in the case of financial matters, which belong exclusively to the National Consultative Assembly. The decision of the Assembly, in respect to the above-mentioned proposals, shall be made known to the Senate, so that it in turn may communicate its observations to the National Assembly, but the latter, after due discussion, is free to accept or reject these observations of the Senate.

ART. 47. So long as the Senate has not been convoked, proposals shall, after being approved by the National Consultative Assembly, receive the Royal assent, and shall then have the force of Law.

ART. 48. If any proposal, after undergoing criticism and revision in the Senate, be referred by a Minister to the National Consultative Assembly, and be not accepted, such disputed proposal shall, in case of its being of importance, be reconsidered by a third Assembly composed of Members of the Senate and Members of the National Consultative Assembly elected in equal moieties by Members of the two Assemblies. The decision of this [third] Assembly shall be read out in the National Council. If it be then accepted, well and good. If not, a full account of the matter shall be submitted to the Royal Presence, and should the Royal judgement support the view of the National Consultative Assembly, it shall become effective; but if not, orders will be issued for a fresh discussion and investigation. If again no agreement of opinion results, and the Senate, by a majority of two thirds, approves the dissolution of the National Consultative Assembly, this approval

being separately affirmed by the Cabinet of Ministers, then the Imperial Command will be issued for the dissolution of the National Consultative Assembly, and at the same time orders shall be given for the holding of fresh elections, the people, however, having the right to re-elect their former representatives.

ART. 49. The new representatives of Ṭihrán must present themselves within the space of one month, and the representatives of the provinces within the space of three months. When the representatives of the Capital are present, the Assembly shall be opened, and shall begin its labours, but they shall not discuss disputed proposals until the provincial representatives shall arrive. If, after the arrival of all its Members, the new Assembly shall by a clear majority confirm the first decision, His Most Sacred and Imperial Majesty shall approve that decision of the National Consultative Assembly, and shall order it to be carried into effect.

ART. 50. In each electoral period, which consists of two years, orders for the renewal of representatives shall not be given more than once.

ART. 51. It is agreed that the kings of our successors and posterity shall regard as a duty of their sovereign state and an obligation incumbent upon them the maintenance of these laws and principles, which we have established and put into force for the strengthening of the edifice of the State, the consolidation of the foundations of the Throne, the superintendence of the machinery of Justice, and the tranquillity of the Nation.

Dhu'l-Qa'da 14, A.H. 1324
(= December 30, 1906).

"These Fundamental Laws of the National Consultative Assembly and the Senate, containing fifty-one Articles, are correct.

"Dhu'l-Qa'da 14, A.H. 1324"
(= December 30, 1906).

[Underneath the concluding words is the signature of the late Sháh, Muẓaffaru'd-Dín, and on the back of the page are the seals of the then Crown Prince or *Walí-'ahd* (the deposed Sháh, Muḥammad 'Alí), and of the late *Mushíru'd-Dawla.*]

4. THE SUPPLEMENTARY FUNDAMENTAL LAWS OF OCTOBER 7, 1907.

The original Fundamental Law, containing 51 *Articles, was promulgated on Dhu'l-Qa'da* 14, A.H. 1324 (= *Dec.* 30, 1906) *by the late Muẓaffaru'd-Dín Sháh. The following supplementary laws were ratified by his successor, the now deposed Sháh, Muḥammad 'Ali, on Sha'bán* 29, A.H. 1325 (= *Oct.* 7, 1907).

In the Name of God the Merciful, the Forgiving.

The Articles added to complete the Fundamental Laws of the Persian Constitution ratified by the late Sháhinsháh of blessed memory, Muẓaffaru'd-Dín Sháh Qájár (may God illuminate his resting-place!) are as follows.

General Dispositions.

ART. 1. The official religion of Persia is Islám, according to the orthodox Já'farí doctrine of the *Ithna 'Ashariyya* (Church of the Twelve Imáms), which faith[1] the Sháh of Persia must profess and promote.

ART. 2. At no time must any legal enactment of the Sacred National Consultative Assembly, established by the favour and assistance of His Holiness the Imám of the Age (may God hasten his glad Advent!)[2], the favour of His Majesty the Sháhinsháh of Islám (may God immortalize his reign!), the care of the Proofs of Islám[3] (may

[1] The Shi'ite form of Islám includes the "Church of the Twelve" (*Ithná 'ashariyya*) and the "Church of the Seven" (*Sab'iyya*). Both agree as to the sequence of their Imáms down to the sixth, Ja'far aṣ-Ṣádiq (from whom the epithet "*Ja'farí*" is derived), but diverge from this point. Both are regarded as heterodox by the Sunnís, but the "Church of the Twelve" is orthodox in Persia.

[2] *I.e.* the Twelfth Imám, or Imám Mahdí, who is believed to have disappeared in the year A.H. 260 (= A.D. 873–4) and who is expected to return at the end of time, "to fill the earth with justice after it has been filled with iniquity."

[3] *I.e.* the *'ulamá*, or doctors of theology, especially the *mujtahids*.

God multiply the like of them!), and the whole people of the Persian nation, be at variance with the sacred principles of Islám or the laws established by His Holiness the Best of Mankind[1] (on whom and on whose household be the Blessings of God and His Peace!).

It is hereby declared that it is for the learned doctors of theology (the *'ulamá*)—may God prolong the blessing of their existence!—to determine whether such laws as may be proposed are or are not conformable to the principles of Islám; and it is therefore officially enacted that there shall at all times exist a Committee composed of not less than five *mujtahids* or other devout theologians, cognizant also of the requirements of the age, [which committee shall be elected] in this manner. The *'ulamá* and Proofs of Islám shall present to the National Consultative Assembly the names of twenty of the *'ulamá* possessing the attributes mentioned above; and the Members of the National Consultative Assembly shall, either by unanimous acclamation, or by vote, designate five or more of these, according to the exigencies of the time, and recognize these as Members, so that they may carefully discuss and consider all matters proposed in the Assembly, and reject and repudiate, wholly or in part, any such proposal which is at variance with the Sacred Laws of Islám, so that it shall not obtain the title of legality. In such matters the decision of this Ecclesiastical Committee shall be followed and obeyed, and this article shall continue unchanged until the appearance of His Holiness the Proof of the Age (may God hasten his glad Advent!)[2].

ART. 3. The frontiers, provinces, departments and districts of the Persian Empire cannot be altered save in accordance with the Law.

ART. 4. The capital of Persia is Ṭihrán.

ART. 5. The official colours of the Persian flag are green, white and red, with the emblem of the Lion and the Sun.

ART. 6. The lives and property of foreign subjects residing on Persian soil are guaranteed and protected, save in such contingencies as the laws of the land shall except.

ART. 7. The principles of the Constitution cannot be suspended either wholly or in part.

[1] *I.e.* the Prophet Muḥammad.

[2] *I.e.* until the Imám Mahdí shall return and establish the reign of perfect Justice.

Rights of the Persian Nation.

ART. 8. The people of the Persian Empire are to enjoy equal rights before the Law.

ART. 9. All individuals are protected and safeguarded in respect to their lives, property, homes, and honour, from every kind of interference, and none shall molest them save in such case and in such way as the laws of the land shall determine.

ART. 10. No one can be summarily arrested, save *flagrante delicto* in the commission of some crime or misdemeanour, except on the written authority of the President of the Tribunal of Justice, given in conformity with the Law. Even in such case the accused must immediately, or at latest in the course of the next twenty-four hours, be informed and notified of the nature of his offence.

ART. 11. No one can be forcibly removed from the tribunal which is entitled to give judgement on his case to another tribunal.

ART. 12. No punishment can be decreed or executed save in conformity with the Law.

ART. 13. Every person's house and dwelling is protected and safeguarded, and no dwelling-place may be entered save in such case and in such way as the Law has decreed.

ART. 14. No Persian can be exiled from the country, or prevented from residing in any part thereof, or compelled to reside in any specified part thereof, save in such cases as the Law may explicitly determine.

ART. 15. No property shall be removed from the control of its owner save by legal sanction, and then only after its fair value has been determined and paid.

ART. 16. The confiscation of the property or possessions of any person under the title of punishment or retribution is forbidden, save in conformity with the Law.

ART. 17. To deprive owners or possessors of the properties or possessions controlled by them on any pretext whatever is forbidden, save in conformity with the Law.

ART. 18. The acquisition and study of all sciences, arts and crafts is free, save in the case of such as may be forbidden by the ecclesiastical law.

ART. 19. The foundation of schools at the expense of the government and the nation, and compulsory instruction, must be regulated by the Ministry of Sciences and Arts, and all schools and colleges must be under the supreme control and supervision of that Ministry.

ART. 20. All publications, except heretical books and matters hurtful to the perspicuous religion [of Islám] are free, and are exempt from the censorship. If, however, anything should be discovered in them contrary to the Press law, the publisher or writer is liable to punishment according to that law. If the writer be known, and be resident in Persia, then the publisher, printer and distributor shall not be liable to prosecution.

ART. 21. Societies (*anjumans*) and associations (*ijtimá'át*) which are not productive of mischief to Religion or the State, and are not injurious to good order, are free throughout the whole Empire, but members of such associations must not carry arms, and must obey the regulations laid down by the Law on this matter. Assemblies in the public thoroughfares and open spaces must likewise obey the police regulations.

ART. 22. Correspondence passing through the post is safeguarded and exempt from seizure or examination, save in such exceptional cases as the Law lays down.

ART. 23. It is forbidden to disclose or detain telegraphic correspondence without the express permission of the owner, save in such cases as the Law lays down.

ART. 24. Foreign subjects may become naturalized as Persian subjects, but their acceptance or continuance as such, or their deprivation of this status, is in accordance with a separate law.

ART. 25. No special authorization is required to proceed against government officials in respect of shortcomings connected with the discharge of their public functions, save in the case of Ministers, in whose case the special laws on this subject must be observed.

Powers of the Realm.

ART. 26. The powers of the realm are all derived from the people; and the Fundamental Law regulates the employment of those powers.

ART. 27. The powers of the Realm are divided into three categories.

First, the legislative power, which is specially concerned with the making or amelioration of laws. This power is derived from His Imperial Majesty, the National Consultative Assembly, and the Senate, of which three sources each has the right to introduce laws, provided that the continuance thereof be dependent on their not being at variance with the standards of the ecclesiastical law, and on their approval by the Members of the two Assemblies, and the Royal ratification. The enacting and approval of laws connected with the revenue and expenditure of the kingdom are, however, specially assigned to the National Consultative Assembly. The explanation and interpretation of the laws are, moreover, amongst the special functions of the above-mentioned Assembly.

Second, the judicial power, by which is meant the determining of rights. This power belongs exclusively to the ecclesiastical tribunals in matters connected with the ecclesiastical law, and to the civil tribunals in matters connected with ordinary law.

Third, the executive power, which appertains to the King, that is to say, the laws and ordinances are carried out by the Ministers and State officials in the august name of His Imperial Majesty in such manner as the Law defines.

ART. 28. The three powers above mentioned shall ever remain distinct and separate from one another.

ART. 29. The special interests of each province, department and district shall be arranged and regulated, in accordance with special laws on this subject, by provincial and departmental councils (*anjumans*).

Rights of Members of the Assembly.

ART. 30. The deputies of the National Consultative Assembly and of the Senate represent the whole nation, and not only the particular classes, provinces, departments or districts which have elected them.

ART. 31. One person cannot at one and the same time enjoy membership of both Assemblies.

ART. 32. As soon as any deputy accepts any lucrative employment in the service of one of the departments of the government, he ceases

to be a member of the Assembly, and his re-acceptance as a member of the Assembly depends on his resigning such government appointment, and being re-elected by the people.

ART. 33. Each of the two Assemblies has the right to investigate and examine every affair of state.

ART. 34. The deliberations of the Senate are ineffective when the National Consultative Assembly is not in session.

Rights of the Persian Throne.

ART. 35. The sovereignty is a trust confided (as a Divine gift) by the people to the person of the King.

ART. 36. The constitutional Monarchy of Persia is vested in the person of His Imperial Majesty Sulṭán Muḥammad 'Alí Sháh Qájár (may God prolong his sovereignty!) and in his heirs, generation after generation.

ART. 37. The succession to the Throne, in case of there being more than one son, passes to the eldest son of the King whose mother is a Princess and of Persian race. In case the King should have no male issue, the eldest male of the Royal Family who is next of kin shall rank next in succession to the Throne. If, however, in the case supposed above, male heirs should subsequently be born to the King, the succession will *de jure* revert to such heir.

ART. 38. In case of the decease of the Sovereign, the Crown Prince can only undertake in person the functions of the Throne provided that he has attained the age of eighteen years. If he has not reached this age, a Regent shall be chosen with the sanction and approval of the National Consultative Assembly and the Senate, until such time as the Crown Prince shall attain this age.

ART. 39. No King can ascend the Throne unless, before his coronation, he appear before the National Consultative Assembly, in presence of the Members of this Assembly and of the Senate, and of the Cabinet of Ministers, and repeat the following oath:

"I take to witness the Almighty and Most High God, on the glorious Word of God, and by all that is most honoured in God's sight, and do hereby swear that I will exert all my efforts to preserve the independence of Persia, safeguard and protect the frontiers of my

Kingdom and the rights of my People, observe the Fundamental Laws of the Persian Constitution, rule in accordance with the established laws of Sovereignty, endeavour to promote the Ja'farí doctrine of the Church of the Twelve Imáms, and will in all my deeds and actions consider God Most Glorious as present and watching me. I further ask aid from God, from Whom alone aid is derived, and seek help from the holy spirits of the Saints of Islám to render service to the advancement of Persia."

ART. 40. So in like manner no one who is chosen as Regent can enter upon his functions unless and until he repeats the above oath.

ART. 41. In the event of the King's decease, the National Consultative Assembly and the Senate must of necessity meet, and such meeting must not be postponed later than ten days after the date of the King's decease.

ART. 42. If the mandate of the deputies of either or both of the Assemblies shall have expired during the period of the late King's life, and the new deputies shall not yet have been elected at the time of his decease, the deputies of the late Parliament shall reassemble, and the two Assemblies shall be reconstituted.

ART. 43. The King cannot, without the consent and approval of the National Consultative Assembly and the Senate, undertake the government of any other kingdom.

ART. 44. The person of the King is exempted from responsibility. The Ministers of State are responsible to both Chambers in all matters.

ART. 45. The decrees and rescripts of the King relating to affairs of State can only be carried out when they are countersigned by the responsible Minister, who is also responsible for the authenticity of such decree or rescript.

ART. 46. The appointment and dismissal of Ministers is effected by virtue of the Royal Decree of the King.

ART. 47. The granting of military rank, decorations and other honorary distinctions shall be effected with due regard to the special law referring to the person of the King.

ART. 48. The choice of officials as heads of the various government departments, whether internal or foreign, subject to the approval of the

responsible Minister, is the King's right, save in such cases as are specifically excepted by the Law; but the appointment of other officials does not lie with the King, save in such cases as are explicitly provided for by the Law.

ART. 49. The issue of decrees and orders for giving effect to the laws is the King's right, provided that under no circumstances shall he postpone or suspend the carrying out of such laws.

ART. 50. The supreme command of all the forces, military and naval, is vested in the person of the King.

ART. 51. The declaration of war and the conclusion of peace are vested in the King.

ART. 52. The treaties which, conformably to article 24 of the Fundamental Law promulgated on Dhu'l-Qa'da 14, A.H. 1324 (= December 30, 1906), must remain secret, shall be communicated by the King, with the necessary explanations, to the National Consultative Assembly and the Senate after the disappearance of the reasons which necessitated such secrecy, as soon as the public interests and security shall require it.

ART. 53. The secret clauses of a treaty cannot in any case annul the public clauses of the same.

ART. 54. The King can convoke in extraordinary session the National Consultative Assembly and the Senate.

ART. 55. The minting of coin, subject to conformity with the Law, is in the name of the King.

ART. 56. The expenses and disbursements of the Court shall be determined by law.

ART. 57. The Royal prerogatives and powers are only those explicitly mentioned in the present Constitutional Law.

Concerning the Ministers.

ART. 58. No one can attain the rank of Minister unless he be a Musulmán by religion, a Persian by birth, and a Persian subject.

ART. 59. Princes in the first degree, that is to say the sons, brothers and paternal uncles of the reigning King, cannot be chosen as Ministers.

ART. 60. Ministers are responsible to the two Chambers, and must, in case of their presence being required by either Chamber, appear before it, and must observe the limitations of their responsibility in all such matters as are committed to their charge.

ART. 61. Ministers, besides being individually responsible for the affairs specially appertaining to their own Ministry, are also collectively responsible to the two Chambers for one another's actions in affairs of a more general character.

ART. 62. The number of Ministers shall be defined by law, according to the requirements of the time.

ART. 63. The honorary title of Minister is entirely abolished.

ART. 64. Ministers cannot divest themselves of their responsibility by pleading verbal or written orders from the King.

ART. 65. The National Consultative Assembly, or the Senate, can call Ministers to account or bring them to trial.

ART. 66. The Law shall determine the responsibility of Ministers and the punishments to which they are liable.

ART. 67. If the National Consultative Assembly or the Senate shall, by an absolute majority, declare itself dissatisfied with the Cabinet, or with one particular Minister, that Cabinet or Minister shall resign their or his ministerial functions.

ART. 68. Ministers may not accept a salaried office other than their own.

ART. 69. The National Consultative Assembly or the Senate shall declare the delinquencies of Ministers in the presence of the Court of Cassation, and the said Court, all the members of the tribunals comprised in it being present, will pronounce judgement, save in cases when the accusation and prosecution refer to the Minister in his private capacity, and are outside the scope of the functions of government entrusted to him in his ministerial capacity.

(N.B. So long as the Court of Cassation is not established, a Commission chosen from the Members of the two Chambers in equal moieties shall discharge the function of that Court.)

ART. 70. The determination of the delinquencies of Ministers, and of the punishments to which they are liable, in case they incur

the suspicion of the National Consultative Assembly or of the Senate, or expose themselves to personal accusations on the part of their opponents in the affairs of their department, will be regulated by a special law.

Powers of the Tribunals of Justice.

ART. 71. The Supreme Ministry of Justice and the judicial tribunals are the places officially destined for the redress of public grievances, while judgement in all matters falling within the scope of the Ecclesiastical Law is vested in just *mujtahids* possessing the necessary qualifications.

ART. 72. Disputes connected with political rights belong to the judicial tribunals, save in such cases as the Law shall except.

ART. 73. The establishment of civil tribunals depends on the authority of the Law, and no one, on any title or pretext, may establish any tribunal contrary to its provisions.

ART. 74. No tribunal can be constituted save by the authority of the Law.

ART. 75. In the whole Kingdom there shall be only one Court of Cassation for civil cases, and that in the capital; and this Court shall not deal with any case of first instance, except in cases in which Ministers are concerned.

ART. 76. All proceedings of tribunals shall be public, save in cases where such publicity would be injurious to public order or contrary to public morality. In such cases, the tribunal must declare the necessity of sitting *clausis foribus*.

ART. 77. In cases of political or press offences, where it is desirable that the proceedings should be private, this must be agreed to by all the members of the tribunal.

ART. 78. The decisions and sentences emanating from the tribunals must be reasoned and supported by proof, and must contain the articles of the Law in accordance with which judgement has been given, and they must be read publicly.

ART. 79. In cases of political and press offences, a jury must be present in the tribunals.

ART. 80. The presidents and members of the judicial tribunals shall be chosen in such manner as the laws of justice determine, and shall be appointed by Royal Decree.

ART. 81. No judge of a judicial tribunal can be temporarily or permanently transferred from his office unless he be brought to judgement and his offence be proved, save in the case of his voluntary resignation.

ART. 82. The functions of a judge of a judicial tribunal cannot be changed save by his own consent.

ART. 83. The appointment of the Public Prosecutor is within the competence of the King, supported by the approval of the ecclesiastical judge.

ART. 84. The appointment of the members of the judicial tribunals shall be determined in accordance with the Law.

ART. 85. The presidents of the judicial tribunals cannot accept salaried posts under government, unless they undertake such service without recompense, always provided that [in this case also] there be no contravention of the Law.

ART. 86. In every provincial capital there shall be established a Court of Appeal for dealing with judicial matters in such wise as is explicitly set forth in the laws concerning the administration of justice.

ART. 87. Military tribunals shall be established throughout the whole Kingdom according to special laws.

ART. 88. Arbitration in cases of dispute as to the limitations of the functions and duties of the different departments of government shall, agreeably to the provisions of the Law, be referred to the Court of Cassation.

ART. 89. The Court of Cassation and other tribunals will only give effect to public, provincial, departmental and municipal orders and bye-laws when these are in conformity with the Law.

Provincial and Departmental Councils (anjumans).

ART. 90. Throughout the whole empire provincial and departmental councils (*anjumans*) shall be established in accordance with special regulations. The fundamental laws regulating such assemblies are as follows.

ART. 91. The members of the provincial and departmental councils shall be elected immediately by the people, according to the regulations governing provincial and departmental councils.

ART. 92. The provincial and departmental councils are free to exercise complete supervision over all reforms connected with the public interest, always provided that they observe the limitations prescribed by the Law.

ART. 93. An account of the expenditure and income of every kind of the provinces and departments shall be printed and published by the instrumentality of the provincial and departmental councils.

Concerning the Finances.

ART. 94. No tax shall be established save in accordance with the Law.

ART. 95. The Law will specify the cases in which exemption from the payment of taxes can be claimed.

ART. 96. The National Consultative Assembly shall each year by a majority of votes fix and approve the Budget.

ART. 97. In the matter of taxes there shall be no distinction or difference amongst the individuals who compose the nation.

ART. 98. Reduction of or exemption from taxes is regulated by a special law.

ART. 99. Save in such cases as are explicitly excepted by Law, nothing can on any pretext be demanded from the people save under the categories of state, provincial, departmental and municipal taxes.

ART. 100. No order for the payment of any allowance or gratuity can be made on the Treasury save in accordance with the Law.

ART. 101. The National Consultative Assembly shall appoint the members of the Financial Commission for such period as may be determined by the Law.

ART. 102. The Financial Commission is appointed to inspect and analyse the accounts of the Department of Finance and to liquidate the accounts of all debtors and creditors of the Treasury. It is especially deputed to see that no item of expenditure fixed in the Budget exceeds

the amount specified, or is changed or altered, and that each item is expended in the proper manner. It shall likewise inspect and analyse the different accounts of all the departments of State, collect the documentary proofs of the expenditure indicated in such accounts, and submit to the National Consultative Assembly a complete statement of the accounts of the Kingdom, accompanied by its own observations.

ART. 103. The institution and organization of this commission shall be in accordance with the Law.

The Army.

ART. 104. The Law determines the manner of recruiting the troops, and the duties and rights of the military, as well as their promotion, are regulated by the Law.

ART. 105. The military expenditure shall be approved every year by the National Consultative Assembly.

ART. 106. No foreign troops may be employed in the service of the State, nor may they remain in or pass through any part of the Kingdom save in accordance with the Law.

ART. 107. The military cannot be deprived of their rights, ranks or functions save in accordance with the Law.

(*Copy of the august Imperial Rescript.*)

"*In the Name of God, blessed and exalted is He.*

"The complementary provisions of the Fundamental Code of Laws have been perused and are correct. Please God, our Royal Person will observe and regard all of them. Our sons and successors also will, please God, confirm these sacred laws and principles.

29 *Sha'bán*, A.H. 1325, *in the Year of the Sheep* (قوی ییل)
(= Oct. 7, 1907),

In the Royal Palace of Ṭihrán."

5. THE NEW ELECTORAL LAW OF JULY 1, 1909

(*promulgated on the twelfth of Jumádá* ii, A.H. 1327).

PREAMBLE.

WHEREAS, in accordance with the requirements of the time, certain articles of the Regulations for the election of Members to the National Consultative Assembly were seen to need alteration, agreeably to the Command, irresistible as Fate, of His Most Sacred Royal and Imperial Majesty (may God immortalize his dominion and rule) a Commission was formed of well-wishers to the Nation in co-operation with members of the [former] National Assembly, comprising twenty members and deciding by a majority of votes, to construct a new Electoral Law.

And whereas attention had been directed to four articles in the Fundamental Law having reference to the matter of the Elections, the modification of which articles was inconsistent with the principles above-mentioned, in order to remove this difficulty the above-mentioned Commission, with the concurrence of the well-wishers of the more important provinces of Persia, submitted the more important articles of the Electoral Law which it had drawn up to the chief centres of the kingdom, and delegated their powers in this matter to the Ázarbáyján centre. The most competent members of that important centre approved the modification of the four articles above-mentioned, and further added remarks on other material points. Thereafter, having due regard to the observations of the Ázarbáyján centre, this Electoral Law was written and codified, subject to this provision, that after the National Assembly shall have been auspiciously opened, it shall, conformably to the option assigned to it by the Fundamental Laws, exercise its discretion as to the confirmation, rejection or emendation of each article of the Electoral Law.

In the Name of God, the Merciful, the Forgiving.

Section I.

The number of the National Representatives, and their division according to Provinces and Departments.

Art. 1. The number of the National Representatives for the National Consultative Assembly is fixed at one hundred and twenty.

Art. 2. The assignment of the National Representatives proportionally to the estimated population of the provinces and the importance of the locality is in accordance with the explanatory table appended to the Electoral Law.

Art. 3. Since, by reason of the absence of the necessary appliances, the places of election will be only in the large cities and smaller towns, no mention has been made in this Electoral Law of most of the districts and tribes whereof the centre of government lacks the qualities of a town. Yet notwithstanding this, the inhabitants of such districts and tribal areas in each department, subject to their possessing the specified qualifications, are entitled to proceed to one of the towns of that department and take part in the elections.

Section II.

Qualifications of Electors.

Art. 4. The electors shall be persons possessing the following qualifications:

(i) They must be Persian subjects.

(ii) They must be at least twenty years of age.

(iii) They must be locally known, and, if not natives of or settlers in the district, they must have been domiciled in the electoral centre or in its dependencies for at least six months before the election.

(iv) They must possess property to the extent of 250 *túmáns* (£50) at least, or must pay at least 10 *túmáns* (£2) in taxes, or must be in receipt of a yearly income or earnings amounting to at least 50 *túmáns* (£10).

Art. 5. The following are absolutely disqualified from electoral functions:

(i) Women.

(ii) Persons not of full understanding, or such as are legally in the hands of guardians.

(iii) Foreign subjects.

(iv) Persons whose apostasy from the orthodox religion of Islám has been established in the presence of a duly qualified representative of the Holy Law.

(v) Persons under twenty years of age. reduced age

(vi) Fraudulent bankrupts.

(vii) Persons who have been guilty of murder or theft, criminals liable to punishment according to the laws of Islám, and persons suspected of murder, theft and the like who have not succeeded in legally establishing their innocence.

(viii) Members of the naval and military forces actually engaged in service.

ART. 6. Persons provisionally deprived of electoral rights are:

(i) Governors and Assistant-governors within their own command and jurisdiction.

(ii) Employés of the gendarmerie and police forces within the district of their employment.

SECTION III.

Qualifications of Candidates for Election.

ART. 7. Candidates for Election must possess the following qualities and status:

(i) They must profess the Faith of His Holiness Muḥammad the son of 'Abdu'lláh, unless they represent the Christian, Zoroastrian, or Jewish communities, in which case also they must be sound in their respective beliefs.

(ii) They must be Persian subjects.

(iii) They must at least be able to read and write Persian to an adequate degree.

(iv) They must be locally known.

(v) They must possess some knowledge of affairs of State.

(vi) They must have the reputation of being trustworthy and upright.

(vii) Their age must not fall short of thirty, nor exceed seventy.

no change

ART. 8. Persons disqualified for election are:

(i) Princes in the first degree, that is to say the sons, brothers, and paternal uncles of the King.

(ii) Women.

(iii) Foreign subjects.

(iv) Members of the military and naval forces actually in service.

(v) Persons employed in the service of the State, unless they resign their offices during the period for which they act as representatives.

(vi) Fraudulent bankrupts.

(vii) Persons who have committed murder or theft, and other criminals deserving punishment according to the Law of Islám, as well as persons reputed guilty of murder, theft, etc., who have not legally established their innocence.

(viii) Persons whose age falls short of thirty or exceeds seventy years.

(ix) Persons whose apostasy from the orthodox faith of Islám shall have been established in the presence of a duly qualified Ecclesiastical Judge, and those who live in open sin.

SECTION IV.

Formation of the Council of Supervision.

ART. 9. In every electoral centre there shall be temporarily formed a committee named the "Council of Supervision" (*Anjuman-i-Nazárat*) which shall superintend and be responsible for the correctness of the Elections.

ART. 10. In places where, in conformity with the Law, there exists a Provincial or Departmental Council, this Council of Supervision shall consist of three members of such Provincial or Departmental Council and four persons generally respected in the locality, under the presidency of the Governor. These four persons shall be appointed, subject to the approval of the Governor, by the Provincial or Departmental Council from outside its members.

ART. 11. In places where no Provincial or Departmental Council has yet been formed in conformity with the Law, the Council of Super-

vision shall consist of the Governor, the acting governor (*Kár-guzár*), one well-known local ecclesiastical authority, one Prince, two notables, and two merchants of repute. (In any place where one of the persons above-mentioned is not to be found, one of the notables or merchants shall be elected in his place.)

ART. 12. In large towns the Council of Supervision may form separate branches in each quarter, consisting of the *Kad-khudá* and five trustworthy inhabitants of the quarter, to give out the voting papers.

ART. 13. The Council of Supervision shall from its own members elect one or two secretaries.

ART. 14. The Council of Supervision shall be dissolved one week after the conclusion of the elections.

SECTION V.

Method of Election.

ART. 15. The elections throughout the whole of Persia shall be in two degrees.

Definition (i).—What is meant by election in two degrees is that first of all in the quarters of one city, or in the towns of one Electoral Division they shall elect a fixed number [of persons] who shall be called "the Elected." After this the persons thus elected in the first degree shall meet in the centre of the Electoral Division and shall in turn elect from amongst themselves the requisite number. The persons thus elected in the second degree shall be the representatives.

Definition (ii).—What is meant by an Electoral Division is those portions of the Kingdom which, according to the schedule set forth in these Regulations, conjointly elect one or more persons and send them directly as Members to the National Consultative Assembly, irrespective of whether such division be under one or several governments. The centre of the division is that point where the elections in the second degree of the division take place.

ART. 16. The elections in the first and second degrees will in general be multiple elections, save in places which, according to the schedule of the Regulations, have only the right to elect one person. In such cases single election will be practised.

Definition.—What is meant by "multiple elections" is that each of the electors records on his voting paper the names of persons corresponding in number with the total number of members [assigned for the representation of that place]. What is meant by "single elections" is that each one of the electors writes on his voting paper the name of one person only.

ART. 17. Elections in the first degree shall be by relative majority, and elections in the second degree by absolute majority.

Definition.—What is meant by "absolute majority" is that more than half the voters vote for one person.

ART. 18. In the elections in the first degree those persons who obtain an absolute majority relatively to the total number of electors in that electoral district are dispensed from election in the second degree, and are accepted as members of the National Consultative Assembly.

ART. 19. In the elections in the second degree if, on the first and second occasions, an absolute majority be not obtained for any person, on the third occasion that person shall be deemed elected on his relative majority.

ART. 20. In case of an equality of votes between two or more persons, if the election of one of them be necessary, that one shall be determined by vote.

ART. 21. In elections of the first degree, the number of those elected in each Electoral Division shall be three times the number of the representatives fixed for the Division according to Article 2.

ART. 22. In the Electoral Division of Ṭihrán the elections in the first degree shall be conducted from five quarters, each of which is under the control of a *Kad-khudá*, according to such apportionment as shall be determined by the Council of Supervision.

ART. 23. In the Electoral Divisions of the Provinces and Departments the elections of the first degree shall be conducted by relative majority in all the towns of each Division. Thereafter those elected in the first degree shall assemble at such time as the Central Council of Supervision shall determine at the Divisional Centre, and shall collectively choose, by absolute majority, representatives from amongst their number, according to the number assigned in conformity with Article 2 to that Division.

ART. 24. The five principal nomad tribes, namely the Sháh-savans of Ázarbáyján, the Bakhtiyárís, the Qashqá'ís, the 'Five Tribes' of Fárs, and the Turkmáns, shall each send directly one representative to be a member of the National Consultative Assembly. The tribal elections also shall be in two degrees, but the Ministry of the Interior shall determine the number of those elected in the first degree by each tribe, and the Electoral Centre of the second degree. In this case the elections in the Second Degree shall be by votes.

ART. 25. In case those persons elected by the component towns shall not present themselves at the Centre of that Division at the time fixed for their appearance by the Central Council of Supervision, the right of election shall lapse in their case for that [electoral] cycle, and those who present themselves at the appointed time shall choose the representatives of that Division from amongst their number.

ART. 26. No one of the electors has the right to vote more than once, save in cases where a new election shall be necessary.

ART. 27. In the first degree the electors are not absolutely compelled to elect from those resident in their own quarter.

SECTION VI.

Issue of the voting papers to determine the Electors.

ART. 28. The Council of Supervision shall prepare and publish from five to fifteen days before the day fixed for the election, according to the importance of the place, a proclamation.

ART. 29. The above-mentioned proclamation shall include the following matters:

(i) The qualifications of the electors and the elected.

(ii) The place and times at which the Council of Supervision, or [local] branch thereof, will distribute the voting papers.

(iii) The place and times at which the Council of Supervision will be prepared to receive the votes.

(iv) The number of representatives whom the voters are entitled to choose.

ART. 30. If those persons who possess the qualifications of electors do not claim their voting papers within the period fixed by the Council of Supervision for claiming them, their right of election for that cycle lapses.

ART. 31. The voting paper given to each of the electors shall contain the following particulars:

(i) Number and date.

(ii) Name of the holder and his father.

(iii) Occupation and abode.

(iv) Time and place at which the holder must present himself to record his vote.

(v) Hour of opening and closing of the poll.

(vi) Seals or signatures of the members of the Council of Supervision.

ART. 32. The Council of Supervision, or the [local] branch thereof, shall record in the special register [set apart for that purpose] all the voting papers issued by it in order of their numbers.

SECTION VII.

Concerning the taking and counting of the votes, and the determination of those elected.

ART. 33. The period for taking the votes shall be from one to three days, according to the importance of the place, as shall be determined by the Council of Supervision.

ART. 34. After the lapse of the period fixed by the Council of Supervision for taking the votes, no voting paper shall be received from anyone.

ART. 35. The voting must be secret, and therefore the voter, before entering the polling booth, must write the name or names of the candidate or candidates for whom he votes, without any further indication, on a piece of white paper, which he must roll up and bring with him.

ART. 36. After the arrival of the members of the Council of Supervision and the opening of the poll at such time as has been announced, the President of the Council of Supervision, before beginning to take the votes, shall open the box appointed for receiving the votes in the presence of the members of the Council and such of the voters as may be present, and shall shew that it is empty.

ART. 37. Each of the voters on arriving at the polling booth shall quietly give his voting paper to one of the members [of the Council of Supervision] designated for this purpose.

ART. 38. The receiver of the voting paper shall read out its number aloud, in order that the Secretary of the Council may find and mark it off in the register for recording votes. After thus marking off the number, the receiver shall cancel that voting paper and restore it to its owner, and shall place his vote, without looking at it, in the ballot box. In case of circumstances which shall necessitate a fresh election, voters shall keep their cancelled voting papers.

ART. 39. Voters after recording their votes and receiving back their cancelled voting paper shall, in case of over-crowding, disorder or confusion [in the polling booth], withdraw, at the command of the President, from the polling booth.

ART. 40. In places where the election is not concluded in one day, all the members [of the Council of Supervision] shall, at the close of that day's session, seal up the ballot box with all necessary precautions, and on the next day the same members shall reopen it.

ART. 41. After the announcement of the conclusion of the poll, the President of the Council [of Supervision] shall empty the ballot box in the presence of the other members [of the Council] and of those present, and shall order the votes to be counted.

ART. 42. One of the members [of the Council] shall count the voting papers and compare their numbers with the list of voters the number of whose voting papers has been marked off in the register of votes. In case of any excess of voting papers, a deduction shall be made from the total corresponding to this excess, which shall thus be annulled, and the result shall be recorded in the report of the Council.

ART. 43. One of the members shall read out the voting papers aloud one by one, while another member hands them to him, and three others record on a large sheet of paper the names in the order in which they are read out.

ART. 44. In case more or fewer than the allotted number of names shall have been written on the voting papers, the electoral act shall not be considered null and void. In the former case the superfluous names shall be omitted at the end [of the list or the voting paper].

ART. 45. Such voting papers as shall be blank or illegible, or which do not clearly specify the candidate voted for, or which are signed by the voter, or which consist of more than one paper, shall not

be counted, but shall be attached just as they are to the Report of the Council.

ART. 46. Immediately after the counting and calculation of the votes, the President shall announce the result aloud and destroy the voting papers, except such as are mentioned in the preceding article, which are to be attached to the Report of the Council.

ART. 47. The Secretary shall write out three copies of the Report of the polling, and cause them to be signed by the members of the Council of Supervision. Of these one copy shall be sent to the Government, another copy through the Government to the National Consultative Assembly, and a third copy, together with the register recording the votes, to the Provincial or Departmental Council of the centre of that Electoral District.

ART. 48. Persons not provided with voting papers have no right to enter the polling booth.

ART. 49. It is strictly forbidden that any one carrying arms should enter the polling booth.

ART. 50. After the conclusion of the elections, the names of those elected in the first and second degree shall be announced in the newspapers by the local governor.

ART. 51. Candidates elected in the smaller towns must be provided with a certificate of election (*i'tibár-náma*) signed by the local Council of Supervision, and must shew it to the central Council of Supervision. So likewise those representatives who are elected in the centre of the Electoral District as Members of the National Consultative Assembly must be provided with a certificate of election signed by the Central Council of Supervision, which they must hand over to the Registry of the National Consultative Assembly.

SECTION VIII.

On complaints in reference to the Elections.

ART. 52. If at the time of the elections any voter or candidate has any complaint or objection to make in regard to the election, this shall not hinder the completion of the election, but an account of such complaint must be inserted in the Report of the Polls.

ART. 53. Complaints and objections concerning the elections must be made known to the Council of Supervision within a week after the

conclusion of the elections, so that the Council may investigate and decide them, and append its conclusion to the Report of the Polls.

ART. 54. If those who have complaints to make about the elections are not satisfied with the decision of the Council of Supervision, they may submit their complaints to the National Consultative Assembly within the first month after the opening of that Assembly, and the decision of the Assembly shall be final. (Complaints referring to elections taking place after the opening of the National Consultative Assembly must reach the Assembly within the first month after such election has taken place.)

ART. 55. Should any candidate or representative be elected by means of bribes or threats, the election of such candidate or representative shall, after the charge has been proved to the Council of Supervision or the National Consultative Assembly, be null and void, and he shall further be subject to such penalties as the Law shall determine in his case.

ART. 56. Those persons who have the right to vote are entitled to raise objections to the elections.

SECTION IX.

On various matters.

ART. 57. As soon as half the representatives of the people plus one, that is to say 61 [successful candidates], shall reach Ṭihrán, the National Assembly shall be opened, and the decision of a majority of them shall be valid and effective.

ART. 58. The beginning of a [new] electoral period shall be two years after the day on which the National Consultative Assembly shall be opened.

ART. 59. At the conclusion of such period of two years the Representatives must be elected again. Constituents have the right to re-elect any Representative whom they wish.

ART. 60. The confirmation of Members of the National Consultative Assembly depends on the designation and approval of that Assembly.

ART. 61. The travelling expenses of those elected in the first and second degree, both for going and returning, shall be paid by the

Government of each place, with the concurrence of the Council of Supervision, at the rate of five *qráns* a parasang, in addition to five *túmáns* (= 50 *qráns*, or about £1) for the expenses of remaining five days in the District Centre.

ART. 62. If a Member of the National Consultative Assembly shall resign or die, and if more than three months remain before the conclusion of the Electoral Period, the National Assembly shall, by an absolute majority, elect another to take his place.

ART. 63. In Ṭihrán ten days after these Regulations have received the sanction of the Imperial Autograph, and in the Provinces five days after the arrival of the said Regulations, the Council of Supervision shall be constituted and the elections shall begin.

(Signatures of the Members of the Commission for drafting the Electoral Regulations)—

Farmán-farma.
Mushíru'd-Dawla.
Mu'tamanu'l-Mulk.
Mustawfi'l-Mamálik.
Ṣaní'u'd-Dawla.
Mukhbiru'l-Mulk.
Mu'ínu'd-Dawla.
Muhandisu'l-Mamálik.
Mustasháru'd-Dawla.
Ḥájji Sayyid Naṣru'lláh.
Asadu'lláh Mírzá.
Ḥusayn-quli Khán Nawwáb.
Mustasháru's-Sulṭán.
Káshifu's-Salṭana.
Naẓmu'd-Dawla.
Amín-i-Darbár.

[Here follows the table of the Electoral Districts and their representation. This table is arranged in six columns, shewing (i) the names of the Electoral Districts; (ii) the Centre of each District; (iii) the number of Representatives which each is entitled to send to the National

Assembly; (iv) the number of Candidates elected "in the first degree," which is always (except in the case of the nomad tribes, where it is not specified, being left to the determination of the Minister of the Interior) thrice as many as the number of Representatives finally chosen; (v) the polling places of elections in the first degree in each Electoral District; and (vi) the number of persons elected in the first degree in each, or in other words the number of members contributed by each to the Electoral College of the District, which in turn chooses one-third of its number as Representatives in the National Assembly. These particulars, which I have not thought it necessary to preserve in tabular form, are as follows:]

1. *Ṭihrán and Dependencies* (centre, Ṭihrán) has 5 polling places, *viz.* the Dawlat, Sanglach and Shahr-i-Naw, 'Úd-láján, Chála-maydán and Bázár quarters, which together elect 45 Representatives "in the first degree," of whom 15 (one-third) finally represent the district in the National Assembly. The apportionment of these 45 amongst the five parishes or quarters is not specified, being left to the determination of the Council of Supervision.

2. *Ázarbáyján* (centre, Tabríz) has 19 polling places, *viz.* Tabríz (26), Urmiya (5), Khúy (4), Dílmaqán (1), Mákú (1), Marágha (2), Bínáb (1), Mayán-i-Dú-Áb (1), Sáwujbulágh (2), Dihkhwáraqán (1), Marand (1), Ahar (2), Ardabíl (4), Mishgín (1), Ástárá (1), Khalkhál (1), Saráb (1), Mayánaj (1), Ṣá'in-Qal'a (1): total 57 Representatives "in the first degree," of whom 19 (one-third) finally represent the district in the National Assembly.

3. The *Sháh-savan* tribe sends one Representative to the Assembly. The remaining details are left to the decision of the Minister of the Interior.

4. *Khurásán* (centre, Mashhad) has 12 polling places, *viz.* Mashhad (12), Qúchán (3), Bujnúrd (2), Dara-Juz (1), Jám and Bákharz (1), Níshápúr (3), Sabzawár (4), Khwáf (1), Turshíz (1), Turbat-i-Ḥaydarí (3), Tún (1), Ṭabas (1): total, 33, of whom 11 finally represent the district.

5. *Sístán and Qá'inát* (centre, Birjand) has only 2 polling places, *viz.* Nuṣrat-ábád in Sístán (1) and Birjand (2): total, 3, of whom one finally represents the district.

6. *Fárs* (centre, Shíráz) has 10 polling places, *viz.* Shíráz (10), Kázarún (2), Bahbahán (3), Níríz (1), Ábáda (1), Lár (3), Fasá (1),

Jahrum (1), Galla-dár (1), Dárábjird (1): total, 24, of whom 8 finally represent the district.

7. The *Qashqá'í* tribe sends one Representative to the Assembly. The details are left to the Minister of the Interior.

8. The Five Tribes (*Ílát-i-khamsa*) also send one Representative.

9. The Gulf Port and Islands (*Banádir u Jazá'ir*), with Bushire (Abú Shahr) for their centre, have 5 polling places, *viz.* Bushire (2), Burázján, Dashtí and Tangistán (1), Bandar-i-'Abbás (1), Bandar-i-Khamír and the Islands (1), and Bandar-i-Linga (1): total, 6, of whom 2 finally represent the district.

10. *Kirmán* (centre, Kirmán) has 7 polling places, *viz.* Kirmán (8), Rafsinján (2), Sa'íd-ábád and Sírján (1), Khabíṣ (1), Ráwar (1), Zarand (1), Aqṭá' wa Afshá (1): total, 15, of whom 5 finally represent the district.

11. *Balúchistán*, *Bam* and *Narmáshír* (centre, Bam) have only 2 polling places, Bam (2) and Balúchistán (1), and only one Member finally represents the district.

12. *Astarábád* (one polling place at Astarábád) elects 3 candidates, of whom one finally represents the district.

13. The *Turkmán* tribe sends one Representative to the Assembly.

14. *Isfahán* (centre Iṣfahán) has 5 polling places, *viz.* Iṣfahán (5), Qumishah (1), Najaf-ábád (1), Quhpáya (1), and Ardistán (1): total, 9, of whom 3 finally represent the district.

15. The *Bakhtiyárí* tribe sends one Representative to the Assembly.

16. *Burújird* (one polling place at Burújird) elects 6 candidates, of whom 2 finally represent the district.

17. *Khamsa* and *Ṭárum* (centre, Zanján) have 3 polling places, *viz.* Zanján (4), Abhar (1) and Ṭárum (1): total, 6, of whom 2 finally represent the district.

18. *Sáwa* and *Zarand* (centre, Sáwa) have only 2 polling places, *viz.* Sáwa (2) and Zarand (1): total, 3, of whom one finally represents the district.

19. *Sháhrúd* and *Bisṭám* (centre, Sháhrúd) have only two polling places, *viz.* Sháhrúd (2) and Bisṭám (1): total, 3, of whom one finally represents the district.

20. *'Iráq* (centre, Sulṭán-ábád) has 3 polling places, *viz.* Sulṭán-ábád (4), Áshtiyán (1) and Tafrish (1): total, 6, of whom 2 finally represent the district.

21. *'Arabistán* (centre, Shúshtar), has 4 polling places, *viz.* Shúshtar (2), Dizfúl (3), Muḥammara wa 'Ashá'ir (3), Bandar-i-Náṣirí (1): total, 9, of whom 3 finally represent the district.

22. *Fírúz-kúh* (1) and *Damáwand* (2): total, 3, of whom one finally represents the district.

23. *Qazwín* (centre, Qazwín) has 4 polling places, *viz.* Qazwín (3), Ṭárum-i-Suflá (1), Kharaqán (1), and Ṭálaqán (1): total, 6, of whom 2 finally represent the district.

24. *Qum* chooses 3 candidates, of whom one represents the district.

25. *Káshán* (4), *Júshqán* (1) and *Naṭanz* (1): total, 6, of whom 2 represent the district.

26. *Kurdistán* (centre, Sinandij) has 5 polling places, *viz.* Sinandij (4), Saqaz (2), Bána (1), Úrámán (1) and Maríwán (1): total, 9, of whom 3 represent the district.

27. *Kirmánsháhán* (centre, Kirmánsháh) has 3 polling places, *viz.* Kirmánsháh (6), Sunqur (2) and Kangáwar (1): total, 9, of whom 3 finally represent the district.

28. *Garrús* (centre, Bíjár) elects 3 candidates, of whom one represents the district.

29. *Gulpáyagán* (2), *Khwánsár* (1), *Kamra* (1) and the *Maḥallát* and other districts (2) elect 6 candidates, of whom 2 finally represent the district.

30. *Gílán* and *Ṭawálish* ("the Ṭálishes": centre, Rasht) has 8 polling places, *viz.* Rasht (6), Anzalí (2), Láhíján (2), Rúdbár and Daylamán (1), Langarúd (1), Fúman (1), Gurgán-rúd (1), and Ṭálish and Dúláb (1): total, 15, of whom 5 finally represent the district.

31. *Luristán* (centre, Khurram-ábád) has two polling places, Khurram-ábád (4) and Pusht-i-Kúh (2): total, 6, of whom 2 represent the district.

32. *Mázandarán*, *Tunkábun* and *Sawád-Kúh* (centre, Sárí), has 8 polling places, *viz.* Sárí (2), Bárfurúsh (3), Ámul (1), Tunkábun (2), Sawád-Kúh (1), Ashraf (1), Mashhad-i-Sar (1), and Núr (1): total, 12, of whom 4 finally represent the district.

33. *Maláyir*, *Niháwand* and *Túysirkán* (centre, Dawlat-ábád) have 3 polling places, Dawlat-ábád (3), Niháwand (2) and Túysirkán (1): total, 6, of whom 2 finally represent the district.

34. *Hamadán* (5) and *Asad-ábád* (1): total, 6, of whom 2 represent the district.

35. *Yazd* and its dependencies (centre, Yazd) has 5 polling places, *viz.* Yazd (4), Ná'ín (2), Shahr-i-Bábak (1), Ardakán (1) and 'Aqdá (1): total, 9, of whom 3 finally represent the district.

36. Finally the Armenians, "Chaldaeans" (*i.e.* Nestorian Christians), Zoroastrians and Jews have each one Representative.

TOTAL NUMBER OF REPRESENTATIVES = 120.

(*Translation of Imperial Rescript concluding and confirming the above.*)

"*In His Name, Blessed and Exalted is He!*

"To *Sa'du'd-Dawla*, Chief Minister.

"Excellency,

"The Regulations for the Election of Deputies drawn up agreeably to Our Supreme Will by the Special Commission, and comprising sixty-three articles, are correct. Cause them at once to be printed and circulated, and let the Minister for the Interior immediately take the necessary steps to prepare for the elections at Ṭihrán and in the Provinces.

"12 Jumádá ii, A.H. 1327 (= July 1, A.D. 1909).

[Signed] "Muḥammad 'Alí Sháh Qájár."

NOTES

(*For most of the following notes I am indebted to my learned friend Mírzá Muhammad ibn 'Abdu'l-Wahháb of Qazwín, who was kind enough to read the proofs of this book as it passed through the press. These notes are distinguished by the letters "M. M." placed after them. The* "Memorandum on Sayyid Jamálu'd-Dín" *I owe to Mr Wilfrid Scawen Blunt, while I have added some further notes myself from information collected from various sources while the book was being printed.*)

NOTE 1 (*on Chapter I*). SAYYID JAMÁLU'D-DÍN.

Mr Wilfrid Scawen Blunt writes (May 27, 1909):

"I knew Sayyid Jamálu'd-Dín well, and saw much of him in the years 1883, 1884 and 1885. The first time I met him was in London in the spring of 1883. He had just landed from America, where he had sojourned for some months after his expulsion from India, with a view to obtaining American naturalisation. Later, in the month of September in the same year, we met again at Paris. He was living then in the company of certain Egyptian refugees of my acquaintance, and I was anxious to see him in order to consult him about a visit I intended making to India, as I wished to obtain introductions from him to some of the principal Indian Muslims, the object of my visit being to ascertain their condition as a community, and their relations with the rest of Islám and with the Reform Movement. I find the following note regarding him in my diary of the time:

"'*Sept.* 3, 1883. Ṣábúnjí [my private secretary] came in with Shaykh Jamálu'd-Dín. When I saw him in London in the spring he wore his Shaykh's dress. Now he has clothes of the Stambouli cut, which sit, however, not badly upon him. He has learned a few words of French, but is otherwise unchanged. Our talk was of India, and of my being able to get the real confidence of the Muslims there. He said that my being an Englishman would make this very difficult, for all who had anything to lose were in terror of the Government, which had its spies everywhere. He himself had been kept almost a prisoner in his house, and had left India through fear of worse. Any Shaykh who gained notoriety in India was tracked and bullied, and, if he persisted in an independent course, was sent on some charge or other to the Andaman Islands. People, he said, would not understand that I wished them well, and would be too prudent to talk. The poorer people might [do so, but] not the Shaykhs or the Princes. He thought

Ḥaydarábád would be my best point, as there were refugees there from every province in India, and they were less afraid of the English Government. He said he would write me some private letters to explain my position, and [would also write] to the editors of some Muhammadan newspapers. I told him what the political position (in England) was, and how necessary it seemed to me to be that the Muslims should shew that they joined with the Hindoos in supporting the Ripon policy. All depended on the Indians shewing a united front. He said that they might have courage if it could be proved to them that there were people in England who sympathised with them; but they only saw the officials "who never smiled when they spoke to them."

"'*Sept.* 14, 1883. Jamálu'd-Dín, Sanna ("Abú Naḍḍára") and Ṣábúnjí came to breakfast, and we stayed talking all day. The Shaykh brought with him letters which he had written...and which may be of great value. He told us some interesting particulars as to his own people and family, repudiates the idea of the Afgháns being a Semitic people, and says that, on the contrary, they are Aryans, like the inhabitants of Northern India. But his own family is Arabian, and they have always preserved in it the tradition of the Arabic language, which he speaks with great perfection. He also discoursed on history. I read them my poem *The Wind and the Whirlwind*, which Ṣábúnjí translated to the Shaykh. He said that if he had been told that there was in the world an Englishman who really sympathised with the misfortunes of India, he would not believe it.' [*N.B.* He began a translation of it, which I have somewhere amongst my papers, if I could find it.]

"The letters which the Shaykh gave me proved of the greatest possible use to me. I found him held everywhere in India in the highest esteem, and I was received as few Englishmen have been for his sake. At Calcutta there were a number of young Muslim students who were entirely devoted to his Pan-Islamic doctrines of liberal reform, and the same was the case in others of the chief cities of Northern India. He was a whole-hearted opponent of English rule, but at the same time without the smallest fanatical prejudice, and would have welcomed honest terms of accommodation with England, had he believed such to be obtainable. This was proved to me later on my return to Europe in 1884.

"I found him again at Paris that spring, living with my friend Shaykh Muḥammad 'Abduh in a little room some eight feet square at the top of a house in the Rue de Seize, which served them as the office of the Arabic newspaper they were editing—the 'Indissoluble Link' [*Le Lien Indissoluble, al-'Urwatu'l-Wuthqá*]. He was delighted at the success of my Indian journey, and urged me to further exertions in the cause of Islám. It was a moment of great excitement both in England and at Cairo, in connection with General Gordon's mission to Khartoum, and I sought his advice and help as to the possibility of sending a mission of peace to the Mahdí, with whom he was more or less in communication, and his intervention to effect Gordon's withdrawal. He expressed his willingness to help in such a project, if he could be

assured of the *bona fides* of our Foreign Office, and on my arrival in London I put myself in communication with Gladstone about it. Gladstone, I believe, would have willingly availed himself of his assistance, and the matter even went so far as to be laid before the Cabinet. But a peaceable issue was not in the designs of the Foreign Office, and the offer was rejected.

"In the following year, 1885, Gladstone having gone out of office, and Lord Randolph Churchill, with whom I was friendly, having become Secretary of State for India, I got Jamálu'd-Dín to come over to England to see him, in order to discuss the terms of a possible accord between England and Islám. He remained with me as a guest for over three months, partly at Crabbet, partly in London, when I came to know him very intimately. I introduced him to several of my political friends, notably Churchill and Drummond Wolff, and I have interesting notes of his conversations at my house with both of them. At one time it was arranged that he should accompany Wolff to Constantinople on his special mission to the Sulṭán, with a view to his exercising his influence with the Pan-Islamic *entourage* of 'Abdu'l-Ḥamíd in favour of a settlement which should include the evacuation of Egypt, and an English alliance against Russia with Turkey, Persia and Afghánistán. Unfortunately Wolff at the last moment suffered himself to be dissuaded from taking the Sayyid with him, and I attribute (in part at least) to this change of mind the difficulties he met with in his mission, and its ultimate failure. The Sayyid was greatly offended at being thus thrown over, for his ticket to Constantinople had been already taken; and, after lingering on for some weeks in London, he ultimately left in dudgeon for Moscow, where he made acquaintance with Katkoff and threw himself into the opposite camp, that of the advocates of a Russo-Turkish alliance against England[1].

"I lost sight of Sayyid Jamálu'd-Dín for several years, but in 1893 I found him established at Constantinople as a prime favourite with Sulṭán 'Abdu'l-Ḥamíd, one of his pensioners at the *Musáfir-khána* [guest house] at Nishán-Tásh, just outside the Yildiz garden-wall. Only a few days before my arrival he had brought himself into prominent notice at one of the Court ceremonies connected with the *Bayrám* festival. A court official had sought to turn him back, but, with the independence which had always been his characteristic, he had insisted that he had a right as an *'álim* [doctor of theology] and a *sayyid* [descendant of the Prophet] to a place of equality with anyone there, and had forced his way forward. This had attracted the attention of the Sultan, who had called him up and made him stand next him behind the imperial chair, 'nearer even than the chief Eunuch.' This, I say, was very characteristic of him, for he had a democratic contempt of official pretensions, and had asserted himself in much the same way many years before with the then *Shaykhu'l-Islám*, on the occasion of his first visit to Constantinople, and with a like result. Nevertheless,

[1] Some particulars concerning this secret mission to Russia are given on pp. 103–105 of the Introduction to the *History of the Awakening of the Persians*. He seems to have met M. de Giers, M. Zinovieff, and Madame Novikoff.

though in high favour in 1893, he was under that close surveillance to which 'Abdu'l-Ḥamíd subjected all his guests.

"On the occasion of my first visit to him at the *Musáfir-khána* I had my daughter with me, and he was delighted to see us. The rooms he occupied were handsome ones, and he was sitting surrounded by his friends, men for the most part of the learned class. He rose with great alacrity to receive us, kissed me on both cheeks, made my daughter sit in an arm-chair of ceremony, and gave us tea and coffee, entertaining us the while with animated talk in the mixture of Arabic and French he had always used with us. He talked very freely on all matters, his other guests, I think, knowing only Turkish. The next day he returned our visit at our hotel in Pera. He was very anxious that I should see the Sulṭán, and I regret that I missed the opportunity. But audiences at that time needed much manœuvring with court officials, and much waiting, and I could not remain on at Constantinople, being on my way through from Egypt to England. On the occasion of a second visit I paid him, he told me much that was interesting of his position in that strange world of Yildiz, where he was half guest, half prisoner. He was happy in it at the time, for the favour he enjoyed gave him influence and did not set a seal upon his mouth. He was always a free speaker.

"I am glad to have seen him then, for later he fell upon less fortunate days, and, through the intrigues of Shaykh Abu'l-Hudá [the late Sulṭán's astrologer], who regarded him with jealousy, the Sulṭán's favour was withdrawn. Nevertheless he continued to reside at Nishán-Tásh to the end. I have little doubt in my own mind that he was privy to the assassination of the Sháh (I mean that his violent words led to its being undertaken by one of his Persian disciples), for Jamálu'd-Dín was no milk-and-water revolutionist. Also I am not disinclined to believe the story of his fatal illness having been the result of poison. He had many enemies, and he had become an encumbrance to 'Abdu'l-Ḥamíd. Be that as it may, his last days were sad ones. According to Shaykh Muḥammad 'Abduh, who told me of it at the time, his fall from favour with the Sulṭán had caused his former friends to avoid him, and he found himself gradually deserted by his fellow-residents in the *Musáfir-khána*, and died in the arms of a single devoted servant, and that servant a Christian."

Note 2 (*on p.* 20). Ḥájji Sayyáḥ, Furúghí and I'timádu's-Salṭana.

Ḥájji Sayyáḥ-i-Maḥallátí is, or was until lately, the tutor of the young Sháh (Sulṭán Aḥmad), while his brother Mírzá Ja'far is teacher of Persian in the University of Moscow.

Mírzá Muḥammad Ḥusayn of Iṣfahán, with the poetical *nom de guerre* of *Furúghí*, and the title of *Zuká'u'l-Mulk* (now borne by his son Mírzá Muḥammad 'Alí Khán, secretary to the *Majlis*), was during the reign of Muzaffaru'd-Dín Sháh the proprietor and editor of the

Tarbiyat, one of the best Persian newspapers of that period, and was accounted one of the most talented poets and writers of his time. He was on friendly terms both with Sayyid Jamálu'd-Dín and Prince Malkom Khán, and was in consequence imprisoned by the *Amínu's-Sulṭán*. He died not long before the *coup d'état* of June, 1908.

Muḥammad Ḥasan Khán *I'timádu's-Salṭana* was the son of Ḥajji 'Alí Khán *Ḥájibu'd-Dawla*, the notorious *farrásh-báshí* and chief executioner of Náṣiru'd-Dín Sháh, who achieved an unenviable notoriety in connection with the persecution of the Bábís in 1850–1852, and the destruction of his benefactor Mírzá Taqí Khán *Amír-i-Kabír*. (See vol. ii of my *Traveller's Narrative*, p. 52, n. 1, and the references to Watson and Polak there given, and pp. 256–8 of my *New History*.) Although Sayyid Jamálu'd-Dín apparently thought highly of the *I'timádu's-Salṭana*, in the opinion of others he was a charlatan and a scoundrel, ignorant, illiterate and pretentious[1]. He could not even spell decently, and the works published in his name were written by men of learning acting under compulsion and prompted by fear of his malice. (*M. M.*)

Note 3 (*on p.* 34). M. Antoine Kitábjí.

M. Antoine Kitábjí was born at Constantinople in 1843, and died in Italy, at Leghorn, in 1902. He was presented to Náṣiru'd-Dín Sháh in 1878, entered the service of the Persian Government in 1879, and in 1894 left Persia to become Counsellor of the Persian Legation at Brussels. For this information I am indebted to his son Dr P. Kitábjí, whose intelligence impressed me very favourably. Another son, Edward, shewed great kindness to the Persian refugees who came to London after the *coup d'état* of June, 1908.

Note 4 (*on p.* 78). Mírzá Aḥmad of Kirmán and Sayyid Ḥasan.

Ḥájji Mírzá Aḥmad of Kirmán was, like Ḥájji Shaykh Aḥmad "*Ráḥí*" of Kirmán (from whom he must be carefully distinguished), an Azalí Bábí, and his companion to whom allusion is here made was almost certainly Sayyid Ḥasan, known as *Ṣáḥibu'z-Zamání* on account of his claim to be the expected Mahdí. In consequence of the disturbance created by their propaganda at Hamadán, they were both arrested and imprisoned at Ṭihrán. There Mírzá Aḥmad died of dysentery, but Sayyid Ḥasan was released by the influence of his uncle the *Mushíru's-Salṭana*, afterwards the reactionary Premier of Muḥammad 'Ali Sháh. He was a man of considerable ability and scholarship, but very eccentric and something of a libertine. He is still living. (*M. M.*)

[1] Cf. p. 92 *supra*, lines 21 and 22, from which it appears that Mírza Riẓá of Kirmán shared this opinion.

NOTE 5 (*on p.* 79). ḤÁJJI SHAYKH HÁDÍ NAJM-ÁBÁDÍ.

Ḥájji Shaykh Hádí Najm-ábádí was one of the most celebrated of the *'ulamá* of Tihrán, and the services which he rendered to the cause of liberty in Persia were almost if not quite equal to those of Sayyid Jamálu'd-Dín, for he was a *mujtahid* of the first rank and enjoyed the confidence of gentle and simple. He was absolutely incorruptible, and never accepted a penny from anyone. Every afternoon he used to sit on the ground outside his house (*cf.* p. 79, lines 30–31), where he received people of all classes and all faiths, statesmen and scholars, princes and poets, Sunnís, Shí'ís, Bábís, Armenians, Jews, 'Alí-Iláhís, etc., with all of whom he discussed all sorts of topics with the utmost freedom. Though a *mujtahid*, he was at heart a free-thinker, and used to cast doubts into men's minds and destroy their belief in popular superstitions, and he was instrumental in "awakening" a large proportion of those who afterwards became the champions of Persia's liberties. The Ḥájji Mírzá Aḥmad-i-Kirmání and Sayyid Ḥasan *Ṣáḥibu'z-Zamání* mentioned in the last note were amongst his disciples, as well as many prominent Constitutionalists of the present time. Sayyid Muḥammad Ṭabáṭabá'í was originally his disciple, but afterwards denounced his opinions as heretical to his father Sayyid Ṣádiq, who publicly banned him as an infidel. This denunciation, however, so far from injuring him, actually added to his prestige and increased the number of his disciples and admirers. Not only princes like the *Ná'ibu's-Salṭana* and ministers like the *Amínu's-Sulṭán* came to visit him, but even Náṣiru'd-Dín Sháh himself, and he received them all, without any attempt at ostentation, outside his house in Ḥasan-ábád, making no difference between the humblest and the highest. Only in the case of the Sháh he rose up to receive him, a concession he would make to no one else. On one occasion the *Niẓámu's-Salṭana* (then Minister of Finance, afterwards Premier) came to see him, and found him as usual sitting on the sand outside his house, surrounded by his disciples. In response to the Minister's respectful bow, Shaykh Hádí merely said, "Upon thee be peace!" The Minister then sat down on the bare earth about a yard off him, and he, without rising or moving, merely ejaculated, "*Yá Alláh!*" Then he called to the owner of a neighbouring coffee-house, a certain Sayyid of parts who was one of his intimates, to bring tea and a *qalyán*, as was his wont when his guests desired refreshments; and a common *qalyán* and a cup of the most ordinary tea were brought. The *Niẓámu's-Salṭana* thereupon asked permission to have the utensils for making and serving tea brought from his own house, to which Shaykh Hádí replied, "Do as you like," and forthwith a silver urn and beautiful tea-service and the finest of *qalyáns* were brought by the Minister's servants from his house.

Shaykh Hádí had several sons, Mírzá Mahdí, now in the Ministry of Justice, and Hájji Shaykh Taqí, a *mujtahid*, whose son, Shaykh Muḥsin, was a prominent Constitutionalist, who took refuge in the British Legation after the *coup d'état*, afterwards fled to the Caucasus, and, after the deposition of Muḥammad 'Alí and the restoration of the

Constitution, was a member of the Directory (*Hay'at-i-'Áliya*). These sons he compelled to earn their livelihood by humble and laborious trades. Mírzá Mahdí kept a druggist's shop, and, when he went to buy sugar and tea or the like in the *bázár*, his father would not allow him to hire a porter to carry his parcels, but insisted on his carrying them himself, so that, notwithstanding his distinguished position as a theologian and scholar, he was often to be seen toiling along with a heavy sack on his shoulders, breathless and perspiring, the cynosure of every eye. So likewise Shaykh Hádí compelled one of his most accomplished pupils, Sayyid Aḥmad, to serve at a coffee-house known as *Qahwa-khána-i-Qaṣr*, between Ṭihrán and Shimrán, where he waited on the customers at a remuneration of thirty *Sháhís* (about sixpence) a day. He was once found by one of his friends lying utterly exhausted on the floor of the college founded by his master, Shaykh Hádí, not having eaten anything for 24 hours, because his master said he must earn money before he could eat, and he himself was unwilling to abandon his studies to look for work, and had not a single penny in his possession. One day a certain Ḥusayn Khán, called *Tiryáki* because of his opium-smoking habits, came to Shaykh Hádí, complaining that he had had no opium for two days, and begged for five *sháhís* to buy some. Shaykh Hádí not only refused to give him any money himself, but prevented the *Sardár-i-Mukarram* from giving him any, saying that it was unlawful to help one who spent his money on opium. So Ḥusayn Khán went out cursing Shaykh Hádí and saying, "May God increase thy punishment in both worlds, since thou wilt neither give me money thyself nor let anyone else give it to me, though I am dying for want of opium!" Shaykh Hádí died in the early part of Muẓaffaru'd-Dín's reign. (*M. M.*)

Note 6 (*on p.* 88). The Amíriyya Palace.

The Amíriyya garden and palace, situated near the *Bágh-i-Sháh*, not far from the Race-course or *Maydán-i-Asp-dawání*, was built by the *Ná'ibu's-Salṭana*, Kámrán Mírzá, one of the sons of Náṣiru'd-Dín Sháh, and is one of the finest and most beautiful gardens in Ṭihrán. (*M. M.*)

Note 7 (*on p.* 92). Shamsu'l-'Ulamá and Amínu'ẓ-Ẓarb.

The proper name of the *Shamsu'l-'Ulamá* is Shaykh Muḥammad Mahdí of 'Abdu'r-Rabb-ábád near Qazwín. He is one of the most accomplished scholars in Persia. Some account of him is given on pp. 169–170 of the *I'timádu's-Salṭana's Kitábu'l-Ma'áthir wa'l-Áthár*. He was appointed by Náṣiru'd-Dín Sháh to collaborate with Shaykh 'Abdu'l-Wahháb, the father of Mírzá Muḥammad, in the preparation of the *Náma-i-Dánishwarán* ("Book of the Learned"), under the supervision of the *I'timádu's-Salṭana* (see Note 2, p. 405 *supra*).

The Ḥájji Muḥammad Ḥasan to whom reference is here made (line 30) bore the title of *Amínu'ẓ-Ẓarb*, like his son, Ḥájji Ḥusayn Áqá, who

was Vice-President of the first *Majlis*, and one of the richest men in Persia. Sayyid Jamálu'd-Dín while in Ṭihrán stayed in his house.

The *Shamsu'l-'Ulamá* was a great friend of the reactionary ecclesiastic Shaykh Faẓlu'lláh-i-Núrí (who was afterwards hanged on July 31, 1909), and deemed it prudent to remain concealed in his house after the Constitution was restored in July 1909. He was protected, however, by Ḥájji Sayyid Naṣru'lláh Akhawí, Vice-President of the second *Majlis*, who kept him from being molested by the National Volunteers. He was second to none in Persia in his knowledge of Persian and Arabic history and literature, and contributed several valuable notes to the text of the *Marzubán-náma*, edited by Mírzá Muḥammad in the "Gibb Memorial" series, of which it constitutes vol. viii. He is now about sixty years of age. (*M. M.*)

Note 8 (*on p.* 93). Execution of Mírzá Riẓá of Kirmán.

The *History of the Awakening of the Persians* (pp. 153–156), after reproducing almost verbatim the account of Mírzá Riẓá's interrogation here translated from the *Ṣúr-i-Isráfíl*, gives an account of his last days and execution, of which the gist is as follows. He shewed a brave front until the last, and neither threats nor persuasion would induce him to admit that he had any accomplices. He was publicly hanged early on the morning of Thursday the 2nd of Rabí' i (= August 11, 1896) in the *Maydán-i-Mashq*, or "Drill Square," at Ṭihrán, in the presence of a great concourse of people. He was confined on the previous night in the Cossack Barracks (*Qazzáq-khána*), and was accompanied to the place of execution by the *Shujá'u's-Salṭana*, son of the *Sardár-i-Kull*, and sundry kinsmen of the *Amínu's-Sulṭán*. It was said that Mírzá Riẓá hoped until the last that the *Amínu's-Sulṭán* would deliver him from death, and that when he saw the gallows and realized that he was to die, he tried to speak to the people, but his voice was drowned by the music of a military band. On the 12th of Rabí' ii, A.H. 1314 (= Sept. 20, 1896) a few of his friends, such as Mírzá Ḥasan-i-Kirmání, Shaykh Muḥammad 'Alí-i-Dizfúlí and some of the relatives and disciples of Ḥájji Shaykh Hádí-i-Najm-ábádí (see Note 5 *supra*) met at the house of the last-mentioned to celebrate, as is the custom in Persia, the fortieth day after Mírzá Riẓá's death, and to pray God's forgiveness for him. And again on the first anniversary of his death, called by the Persians *Sál-i-Mayyit*, Shaykh Hádí held a similar celebration in his honour, to which he invited only the *Amínu'd-Dawla* and one other. On this occasion Shaykh Hádí himself prepared the food, which was of the simplest kind—rice, oil, syrup and bread,—and after they had eaten, they again united in craving God's Mercy for Mírzá Riẓá. It was after and apparently in consequence of this that the *Amínu'd-Dawla* founded the *Rushdiyya* and other schools for the better education of the youth of Persia.

NOTE 9 (*on pp.* 93–96). SHAYKH AḤMAD "RÚḤÍ" OF KIRMÁN AND HIS TWO COMPANIONS.

In the *History of the Awakening of the Persians* (pp. 6–13 of the Introduction) a good many particulars are given concerning these three unfortunate associates of Sayyid Jamálu'd-Dín.

Mírzá Áqá Khán, whose proper name was 'Abdu'l-Ḥusayn, was the son of Mírzá 'Abdu'r-Raḥím of Bardasír near Kirmán, and was born in A.H. 1270 (= A.D. 1853–4). He studied Mathematics, the Natural Sciences and Philosophy, and acquired Turkish, French and some English. In A.H. 1303 (= A.D. 1885–6) he left Kirmán for Iṣfahán on account of the tyranny of the governor, Sulṭán 'Abdu'l-Ḥamíd Mírzá *Náṣiru'd-Dawla*. At Iṣfahán he was well received by the *Ẓillu's-Sulṭán* (Mas'úd Mírzá), who wished to retain him in his service; but he, disliking a courtier's life, went to Ṭihrán and thence soon afterwards proceeded to Constantinople with Shaykh Aḥmad "Rúḥí" of Kirmán. There he was for some time on the staff of the Persian newspaper *Akhtar* ("the Star"), and became acquainted with Sayyid Jamálu'd-Dín, with whom he worked for the awakening of the Persians and the promotion of Pan-Islamism. He composed a prose history entitled *A'ína-i-Sikandarí* ("the Mirror of Alexander"), and another in verse, in the metre of the *Sháh-náma*, entitled *Náma-i-Bástán* ("the Book of the Ancients"). The latter he completed in A.H. 1313 (= A.D. 1895–6) while he was in prison at Trebizonde, as he states in the concluding verses. Two years later, after the author's death, the *Farmán-farmá* caused this poem to be printed, with the omission of certain passages which he considered dangerous, and the addition of a supplement written by another Shaykh Aḥmad of Kirmán known as *Adíb*, and this book he entitled *Sálíriyya*. The author of the *Awakening* gives long extracts from the suppressed portions of the poem on pp. 244–264 of his Introduction, and in these Mírzá Áqá Khán speaks freely of his Pan-Islamic ideals and his dislike of Náṣiru'd-Dín Sháh. The following passage (pp. 256 *et seqq.*), which is typical, may serve as a sample:—

تو تا باشی ای خسرو نامور مرنجان کسی‌را که دارد هنر'
بویژه که باشد ز روشن دلی بجان دوستدار نبیّ و علی'
یکی نامداری ز ایران منم که خو کرده در جنگ شیران تنم'
قلم دارم و علم و فرهنگ و رای' نژاد بزرگان و فرّ هُمای'
بگاهی که آمد تمیزم پدید' روانم بدانش همی بُد کلید'
ز گیتی نجستم بجز راستی' نگشتم بگِردِ کم و کاستی'
همه خیر اسلامیان خواستم' دلم‌را بنیکی بیاراستم'

همی خواستم تاکه اسلامیان، بوحدت ببندند یکسر میان،
همه دوستی با هم افزون کنند، ز دل کین دیرینه بیرون کنند،
۱۰ مر اسلامیان‌را فزاید شرف، نفاق و جدائی شود بر طرف،
در اسلام آید بفرّ حمید، یکی اتّحاد سیاسی پدید،
شود ترك ایران و ایران چو ترك، نماند دوئی در شهان سترك،
همان نیز دانندگان عراق، بسلطان اعظم کنند اتّفاق،
ز دلها زدایند این کینه زود، نگویند سُنّی و شیعی که بود،
۱۰ و زان پس بگیرند گیتی بزور، ز جان مخالف بر آرند شور،
ابا چند آزاده مرد گزین، نبشتیم بس نامهای متین،
روانه نمودیم سوی عراق، که بر خیزد از عالم دین نفاق،
بنیروی دادار جان آفرین، همه بر نهادند امضا برین،
ببخشید حسنِ اثر نامه‌ها، که خام و نپخته نبُد خامه‌ها،
۲۰ سپاسم ز یزدان پیروزگر، که این نخل امّید شد بارور،
نوشتند ز ایران و هم از عراق، که از دل بشستیم گرد نفاق،
همه جان فدای شریعت کنیم، بسلطان اسلام بیعت کنیم،
گذاریم قانونِ بیگانگی، بگیریم آئینِ فرزانگی،
ازین پس همه کفر سازیم پست، بیاریم گیتی سراسر بدست،
۲۰ کسی از سلاطین اسلامیان، ز عبّاسیان تا بعثمانیان،
ز سامانی و غزنی و دیلمی، ز سلجوق و خوارزمی و فاطمی،
ز صدر سلف تا بگاه خلف، موفّق نگردید بر این شرف،
مگر اندر این عصر کآمد پدید، چنین طرح محکم ز رای سدید،
گرت زین بد آمد گناهِ منست، که این شیوه آئین و راهِ منست،
۳۰ برین زاده‌ام هم برین بگذرم، وزین فخر بر چرخ ساید سرم،
اگر شاه‌را بود حسّی نهان، مرا ساختی بی نیاز از جهان،
و گر از مسلمانیش بود بهر، بنیکی مرا شهره کردی بدهر،
چو در خون او جوهرِ شرك بود، ز توحید اسلام خشمش فزود،
پشیزی به از شهریاری چنین، که نه کیش دارد نه آئین و دین،

۳۰ مرا بیم دادی که در اردبیل، تنم را بزنجیر بندی چو پیل،
ز کشتن نترسم که آزاده‌ام، ز مادر همی مرگ‌را زاده‌ام،
کسی بی زمانه بگیتی نمُرد، بمرد آنکه نامِ بزرگی نبُرد،
نمیرم ازین پس که من زنده‌ام، که این طرح توحید افگنده‌ام،
بگوش از سروشم بسی مژده‌هاست، دلم گنج گوهر قلم اژدهاست،
۴۰ پس از مردنم هست پایندگی، که جاوید باشد مرا زندگی،
نصیب من آباد تحسین بود، تُرا بهره همواره نفرین بود،
پس از من بگویند نام آوران، سرایند با یکدگر مهتران،
که کرمانی راد پاکی نهاد، همه داد مردی و دانش بداد،
پس از سیزده قرن پُر اختلاف، نمودار کرد او رهِ ائتلاف،
۴۰ بتوحید دعوت کرد از دوئی، بپیچید از کژّی و جادوئی،
مرا آید از مشتری آفرین، که بودم فداکار دین مُبین،
درودم ز مینو رسانند حور، هم از آسمانم فشانند نور،
بدوزخ بمانی تو تیره‌روان، همت لعنت آید ز پیر و جوان،
نشینند و گویند پیران راد، بنیکی نیارند نام تو یاد،
۵۰ که شه ناصر الدّین بُدی یارِ کُفر، از او گرم گردید بازارِ کفر،
کسانیکه توحید دین خواستند، بدین مقصدِ قدس بر خاستند،
بیآزرد و افسرد و از خود براند، بگیتی بجز نام زشتی نخواند،
تو ای شه چنین راهِ دین سَد مکن، بخیره همی نام خود بد مکن،
که ناگه بر آری دلم را ز جای، همه دودمانت بر آرم ز پای،
۵۵ بگویم سخنهای نا گفتنی، بسُنبم گهرهای نا سُفتنی،
که چون بود بیخ و تبار قَجَر، چگونه بشام آوریدند سر،
بتاتار بهر چه آمیختند، ز شام از برای چه بگریختند،
مرا هست تاریخی اندر اُروپ، بقوّت فزونتر ز توپ کروپ،
مبادا که آن نامه افشان شود، که بیخ و تبارت پریشان شود،
۶۰ همان به که خاموش سازی مرا، ز کینه فراموش سازی مرا،

(*Translation.*)

"So long as thou livest, O renowned King[1], vex not one who has talent,
Especially if, through the illumination of his heart, he be the devoted adherent of the Prophet and 'Alí.
I am a man of renown from Persia, who have trained myself to do battle with lions.
I possess an eloquent pen, knowledge, culture, judgement, noble blood and the virtue of the Phoenix[2].
5 When I reached years of discretion my spirit was a key to knowledge.
From the world I sought nothing but Truth: I had no dealings with error and defect.
I desired all good for the Muslims, I adorned my heart with virtue.
I desired that the Muslims might with one accord gird up their loins in unity,
Might increase friendship with one another, might expel ancient animosity from their hearts,
10 So that honour might increase to them, and that enmity and dissension might be set aside,
And that, under the auspices of [Sulṭán 'Abdu'l-]Ḥamíd, a political union might be effected in Islám,
So that Turk should be Persian, and Persian like Turk, and that duality might no longer remain in these great rulers,
And that in like manner the learned doctors of 'Iráq[3] should agree in [recognizing] the [Sulṭán as] sovereign supreme,
And should swiftly cleanse their hearts of this animosity, and should no longer talk of who was Sunní and who Shí'í,
15 So that thereafter they should take the world by strength, and confound the souls of their opponents.
To several well-chosen and virtuous men we wrote many well-renowned letters[4];
We sent them off to 'Iráq, so that dissension might depart from the realm of Religion.
By the strength of God, the Creator of the Soul, all set their seals thereto.
The letters produced a good effect, for the pens [which wrote them] were neither raw nor inexperienced.
20 I praise God the Victorious that this palm of hope proved fruitful.
From Persia and from 'Iráq they wrote, 'We have washed from our hearts the dust of dissension:
'We will all sacrifice our lives for the Holy Law, we will all swear allegiance to the King of Islám:

[1] Sulṭán 'Abdu'l-Ḥamíd is addressed.
[2] *Humá*, the mythical bird whose shadow makes royal (*humáyún*) all on whom it falls.
[3] *i.e.* the *mujtahids* of Karbalá and Najaf, the spiritual heads of the Shí'a.
[4] This alludes to the writer's correspondence with the *mujtahids* of Karbalá and Najaf: cf. p. 64 *supra*.

'We will forsake the law of estrangement, and will adopt the practice of wisdom:
'Henceforth we will lay low unbelief, and will obtain possession of the world from end to end.
25 'None of the Kings of the Muslims, whether of the 'Abbásids or of the Ottomans,
'Sámání, Ghaznawí or Daylamí, Seljúq, Khwárazmsháhí or Fáṭimid,
'From the first predecessor until the present successor, has been enabled to [achieve] this honour,
'Until this age, when, through well-founded judgement, such firm foundation appeared.'
If this misliketh thee, it is my fault, for this practice is my way and custom.
30 Herein was I born, and herein shall I pass away, and through pride in this [achievement] my head touches heaven.
Did the Sháh [Náṣiru'd-Dín] possess spiritual perception he would have made me independent of the world,
And had he any portion in the faith of Islám, he would have made me celebrated throughout the world for my good deed.
But since the essence of unbelief was in his blood, his wrath was kindled at the unification of Islám.
A farthing is better than such a king, who has neither law, nor faith nor religion!
35 Thou didst threaten to bind my body with chains in Ardabíl as though I were a rogue-elephant.
I fear not to be slain, being noble: I was born to die, even from my mother's womb.
No one in the world dies until his time is come: he is dead who takes not with him the name of greatness.
Henceforth I shall not die, being alive, since I have laid the foundations of this unification.
Many a message of joy reaches my ears from the Archangel: my heart is the treasury of pearls and my pen the dragon.
40 After my death is immortality, for Eternal Life is mine.
My portion shall for ever be praise, while thy portion shall for ever be execration.
After me men of renown shall say, and the great ones shall cry to one another:
'The noble and pure-hearted Kirmání rendered full account of his courage and learning;
'After thirteen centuries full of strife, he pointed out the road of reconciliation:
45 'He summoned [the Muslims] from duality to unity: he turned [them] from crookedness and witchcraft!'
Applause shall be heaped upon me from [the planet] Jupiter, because I sacrificed myself for the Luminous Faith.
The *Ḥúrís* shower praise upon me from the Spirit-land, and scatter light upon me from Heaven.

But thou, O dark-souled [tyrant], shalt dwell in Hell, and curses shall fall upon thee from old and young.
Virtuous elders shall sit and talk, but shall not mention thy name for good.
50 [Rather will they say] 'Náṣiru'd-Dín Sháh was the friend of infidelity, and through him the market of infidelity became brisk.
'Those who desired the unity of the Faith, and who exerted themselves for this sacred end,
'He afflicted, discouraged and drove from before him, and called them by none but evil names in the world.'
O King, bar not thus the Path of Religion, do not vainly give thyself a bad name;
Else suddenly thou wilt move my heart, and I will overthrow all thy household,
55 Will utter words better unsaid, and will pierce pearls[1] better unpierced,
[Telling] of what sort was the root and race of the Qájárs, and how they betook themselves to Syria,
And how they mingled with the Mongols, and why they fled from Syria.
I have a history in Europe greater in strength than Krupp guns:
Beware lest that history be published, and thy root and race be disgraced!
60 It is better that thou should'st silence me, and cause me to forget thy malice."

Ḥájji Shaykh Aḥmad "Rúḥí" of Kirmán was the second son of the late *Shaykhu'l-'Ulamá* Mullá Muḥammad Ja'far[2], and was born about A.H. 1272 (=A.D. 1855–6). "Rúḥí" was the *nom de guerre* under which he wrote poetry, and he was an eloquent preacher as well as a man of learning. He left Kirmán for Iṣfahán with his friend Mírzá Áqá Khán in A.H. 1302 (= A.D. 1884–5). Thence they went to Ṭihrán, where Shaykh Aḥmad lectured for a while on the exegesis of the *Qur'án*. Thence they went to Rasht, where they were for a while the guests of the Governor *Mu'ayyidu'd-Dawla*, who, however, dismissed them on learning that Náṣiru'd-Dín Sháh regarded them with disfavour. There-

[1] "To pierce pearls" is a metaphorical expression meaning to indite verses.

[2] Mullá Muḥammad Ja'far was a distinguished theologian and one of the early promoters of the Liberal Movement in Persia, and lived to the age of seventy years. Early in the reign of Náṣiru'd-Dín Sháh he was imprisoned on suspicion of being a Bábí by Khán Bábá Khán the governor of Kirmán. He died in A.H. 1311 (=A.D. 1893–4). His eldest son Shaykh Mahdí *Baḥru'l-'Ulúm* was one of the representatives of Kirmán in the first *Majlis* and of Bam in the second. The second son was Shaykh Aḥmad, the subject of this note. The third was Shaykh Maḥmúd *Afzalu'l-Mulk*, who went to Constantinople and there became one of Sayyid Jamálu'd-Dín's intimate disciples. On the arrest of his brother he set out, by the Sayyid's instructions, to try to release him and his companions, but the assassination of Náṣiru'd-Dín Sháh and the subsequent fate of his brother compelled him to hide for a while until finally he returned to Kirmán. The fourth son, Shaykh Abu'l-Qásim, is mentioned in the cross-examination of Mírzá Riẓá (p. 63 *supra*), and a little further on in this note. He is now at Kirmán.

upon they proceeded to Constantinople, where Shaykh Aḥmad learned Ottoman Turkish, English and French, and earned his living by teaching languages and translating. He made the pilgrimage to Mecca, and on his return thence spent some time at Aleppo before returning to Constantinople, where he was introduced by Mírzá Áqá Khán to Mírzá Ḥasan Khán *Khabíru'l-Mulk*, who was Persian Consul-General. These three, prompted by Sayyid Jamálu'd-Dín, began to carry on an active Pan-Islamic propaganda, and wrote many letters to the Shí'ite *'ulamá* of Persia, Karbalá and Najaf. Shaykh Aḥmad even caused a seal to be made for himself bearing the following inscription:

داعی اتّحاد اسلامم' احمد روحی آمده نامم'

'*I am the Propagandist of Pan-Islamism: Aḥmad-i-Rúḥí is my name.*'

The *Amínu's-Sulṭán*, greatly annoyed by their activity, endeavoured to secure their arrest, and sent instructions in this sense to Mírzá Maḥmúd Khán *'Alá'u'l-Mulk*, who was at that time Persian Ambassador at the Turkish capital, and who in A.H. 1312 (=A.D. 1894–5) succeeded in inducing the Ottoman Government to exile the three friends to Trebizonde, on the ground that they were dangerous and seditious persons, and had helped to foment the recent Armenian disturbances, besides corresponding with the *'ulamá* of Persia. They were still in prison at Trebizonde when Mírzá Riẓá of Kirmán, who left Constantinople in Jan. 1896 (see p. 63 *supra*), after their exile, shot Náṣiru'd-Dín Sháh on May 1 of the same year; and as he was known to be acquainted with them, and had succeeded in obtaining his passport by pretending to be the servant of Shaykh Abu'l-Qásim, the brother of Shaykh Aḥmad, and had visited them in prison when he passed through Trebizonde, they were suspected of complicity in the assassination, and their extradition was demanded and obtained by the Persian from the Ottoman Government. At the frontier the Turkish guard handed them over to Rustam Khán, who had been deputed to receive them, and who conducted them to Tabríz, where they were secretly butchered by command of the *Amínu's-Sulṭán* on the afternoon of Ṣafar 6, A.H. 1314 (= July 17, 1896) in the *Bágh-i-Shimál* ("North Garden") in the presence of Muḥammad 'Alí Mírzá, then Crown Prince. The skins of their heads were removed, stuffed with straw, and sent to Ṭihrán to the *Amínu's-Sulṭán*. Further details of their arrest and execution are given in the *History of the Awakening of the Persians* on the authority of Mírzá Ṣáliḥ Khán *Wazír-i-Akram*, and Mírzá Maḥmúd Khán *'Alá'u'l-Mulk*, both of whom were interviewed on this subject by the author of the aforesaid work.

NOTE 10 (*on p.* 98). CHARACTERS OF MUẒAFFARU'D-DÍN SHÁH AND OF THE AMÍNU'D-DAWLA.

In the Introduction to the *Awakening of Persia* (pp. 163–169) some account is given not only of the reign but of the character of Muẓaffaru'd-Dín Sháh. He was born in A.H. 1269 (= A.D. 1852–3),

and had six sons and sixteen daughters. He was reputed to have liberal inclinations, but was much under the influence of Russia. He promoted the publication of a newspaper called the *Akhbár-i-Náṣirí* in Tabríz, and used to receive Prince Malkom Khán's *Qánún*, of which the circulation was forbidden in Persia. Considerable hopes were aroused in the hearts of the reformers by his dismissal of Mírzá 'Alí Aṣghar Khán *Amínu's-Sulṭán* and appointment of Mírzá 'Alí Khán *Amínu'd-Dawla* to succeed him in A.H. 1315 (= 1897–8), by his establishment of schools and colleges on modern lines, and by other indications of a desire for progress, but their hopes were soon disappointed by the banishment of the latter and the reinstatement of the former Minister. The return to power of the *Amínu's-Sulṭán* was soon followed by the first Russian Loan of A.H. 1317 (= A.D. 1899–1900), which Prince *Arfa'u'd-Dawla* (until the spring of 1910 Persian Ambassador at Constantinople) was instrumental in negotiating. This, and the Sháh's journey to Europe in A.H. 1318 (1900–1901), with its useless extravagance, caused much discontent, and there were disturbances in Ṭihrán, ostensibly directed against the Governor *Áṣafu'd-Dawla*, but really against the incompetence and inefficiency of the Government. The proceeds of the second Russian Loan of A.H. 1319 (= A.D. 1901–2) were similarly squandered in the Sháh's European tour of the following year. The growing discontent was increased by the death, at Rasht, of Mírzá Maḥmúd Khán *Ḥakímu'l-Mulk*, who was believed to have been poisoned by the *Amínu's-Sulṭán*, and in Jumádá ii, A.H. 1321 (= Sept. 1903) the latter was excommunicated by the clergy and compelled to flee from Persia, and was succeeded as Prime Minister by Prince *'Aynu'd Dawla*, who at first shewed liberal tendencies, and permitted the *Ḥablu'l-Matín*, a notable Persian newspaper printed at Calcutta, to circulate in Persia. In A.H. 1323 (= A.D. 1905–6), in the middle of the Russo-Japanese war, the Sháh visited Europe for the third time, leaving his son the Crown Prince (afterwards Sháh) Muḥammad 'Alí Mírzá to act as Regent during his absence. In A.H. 1324 (= A.D. 1906–7) there was talk of a joint Anglo-Russian Loan (called by our author "the fourth loan," for he believes that a third secret loan was negotiated with Russia in the preceding year), but this, as described at pp. 124–5 and 235 of the text, was inhibited by the *Majlis*. Muẓaffaru'd-Dín Sháh is described by our author as simple-minded, easily persuaded, undecided and changeable, fond of buffoonery, and entirely in the hands of his corrupt courtiers, "who," says our author, "appear to have been selected from the most low-born, mean-spirited, ill-educated and immoral" elements of the nation. The Sháh himself was utterly ignorant and illiterate, knowing nothing of either history or politics, and utterly devoid of prudence, judgement or foresight. Government and other important offices were openly sold by auction, and the Royal Signature lost all credit. He was a devout spectator of the Muḥarram mournings and *ta'ziyas* (Passion-plays), had some knowledge of gunnery, and was passionately fond of cats. Unlike his father, he was averse from violence, bloodshed and cruelty, but he suffered both his relations

and foreign concession-hunters to exploit Persia to a degree hitherto unknown.

The *Amínu'd-Dawla* (Ḥájji Mírzá 'Alí Khán) is regarded by the author of the *Awakening* as one of the pioneers of the reformers. He was born in A.H. 1260 (= A.D. 1844) at Ṭihrán, and was the son of Mírzá Muḥammad Khán *Majdu'l-Mulk*. He was first employed in secretarial work in the Palace, and in A.H. 1290 (= A.D. 1873–4) received the title of *Amínu'l-Mulk* and the office of Chief Secretary. He reorganized the postal service and so greatly increased its efficiency that a letter would go from Ṭihrán to Kirmán or *vice versâ* in seven or eight days, and an answer to it would be received in fifteen days, while after his administration was ended eight days grew to twenty, and fifteen to forty or fifty. He also greatly ameliorated the position of the post-office *employés*. In A.H. 1295 (= A.D. 1878) he was sent on a special mission to Italy to condole with King Humbert on the death of his father, Victor Emmanuel, and to congratulate him on his accession. In A.H. 1297 (= A.D. 1880) he was placed in control of the *Awqáf*, or Religious Endowments, and two years later (in 1882) received the title of *Amínu'd-Dawla* by which he is best known. In A.H. 1304 (= A.D. 1886–7) he became President of the Council of Ministers. He accompanied Náṣiru'd-Dín Sháh on his journeys to Europe. For a while the ascendancy of his rival the *Amínu's-Sulṭán* obliged him to withdraw from public life, but in A.H. 1313 (= A.D. 1895–6) he was made *wazír* to the Governor of Ázarbáyján (the Crown Prince), and the progress made by the inhabitants of that province, thanks to which they are now reputed the most enlightened and public-spirited of the people of Persia, was largely due to his beneficent influence. In A.H. 1314 (= A.D. 1896–7) he was summoned to Ṭihrán by Muẓaffaru'd-Dín Sháh, who had just succeeded to the throne, and in the following year he was made Prime Minister, and specially charged to promote public instruction according to a scheme which he had drawn up in the reign of Náṣiru'd-Dín Sháh. It was then that the *Anjuman-i-Ma'árif*, or Academy, was founded, and also the Rushdiyya College, to the expenses of which he contributed 12,000 *túmáns* (£2,400) out of his own pocket. He also gave greater freedom to the Press, and—unhappily—introduced the Belgian "organizers" into the customs. Aided by the *Náṣiru'l-Mulk* he also set himself to reform various fiscal abuses. His reforms, however, alarmed the Court, who saw their own interest threatened, and, headed by Mírzá Muḥsin Khán *Mushíru'd-Dawla* they succeeded in arousing Muẓaffaru'd-Dín's suspicions, making use especially to this end of the *Amínu'd-Dawla's* proposal to fix the Sháh's Civil List, and to conciliate Turkey by recognizing the Sultan as Caliph and Commander of the Faithful. The *Amínu'd-Dawla* was in consequence dismissed, and retired to a place called Lasht-Nishá, situated some 15 miles from Rasht, where he occupied himself in agriculture and in composing various political treatises, until his death in A.H. 1322 (= A.D. 1904). He left one son—the present *Amínu'd-Dawla*—and two daughters. His two chief aims were to regulate the finances of the country and establish a regular Budget; and to put an

end to bribery, corruption and peculation. The history of Muẓaffaru'd-Dín Sháh's reign is mainly the history of the struggle between him and the *Amínu's-Sulṭán* and their respective parties.

Note 11 (*on p.* 103). The Qiwámu'd-Dawla.

Mírzá Muḥammad confirms my conjecture in line 18:

"Yes," he writes, "it was the *Qiwámu'd-Dawla.* I myself was at the time at Shimírán (Shimrán) when they arrested him, and saw them carry him in chains mounted on a mule to Ṭihrán, through which he was paraded before being consigned to prison. After a while he was released and retired to his property in 'Iráq." (*M. M.*)

Note 12 (*on p.* 105). Shapshál Khán.

The Russian tutor of Muḥammad 'Alí Mírzá here alluded to is the notorious Shapshál, a Karaite Jew of the Crimea, to whom M. Panoff consecrates a short chapter of his unpublished work. Of this chapter the following extracts may serve as a specimen:

"It is true, Mr Shapshál, no revolutionary in Persia would 'paint you black,' not because you are worthy of white, but simply because there is no black colour in the world which it would be any good to smear you with. I believe that the reactionaries kept as clear of you as the Devil of incense, because you were more reactionary than any of the reactionaries.

"Eight years you were tutor to the Sháh, and in what did you tutor him? He hardly knows two words of Russian. Day and night you endeavoured to impress upon him the conviction that a Constitution implies the complete abolition of the Sháh, and that he should combat it with all his strength....For 'tutoring' you received 16,000 roubles a year; for 'preparing' the Sháh, I do not know how much!...

"I hope, Mr Shapshál, you have not forgotten the scandal about the construction of the Julfá-Tabríz road. If you have forgotten, I am ready to remind you publicly in a Court of Law. Incontrovertible proof of what I said above will be the fact that on a salary of 16,000 roubles a year you managed in eight years to acquire an estate in Ázarbáyján worth 300,000, and also put a round sum of 580,000 roubles into a Bank which I am ready to indicate....

"Your quarrel with the Amír Bahádur Jang was a mere theatrical display, designed merely to throw dust in people's eyes. It was by the direction of the Persian Reaction, the Sháh, and the Government in whose service you are a secret agent, that you came clandestinely to Europe to prepare the ground for the Persian loan by which only the triumph of Reaction in the country can be secured, and an opportunity afforded for the veiled occupation of Persia. To my very deep grief I think that you have succeeded in playing your shameful part, and that you are now singing in St Petersburg the finale of your air. Here

Shapshál Khán

Sa'du'd-Dawla

you are obtaining the public guarantee for the loan which in essence has long been granted in secret. Your article and your attempt to whitewash yourself and the Sháh are only the two last chords, so that Russian public opinion may have nothing against so shameful a transaction as lending money to a hangman. But, Mr Shapshál, your trouble is quite unnecessary, since Russia is at present passing through a period when no one takes any account of her public opinion, and you can boldly ignore it....

"Recognizing clearly that it is necessary to make someone or other responsible for all that has happened, you put the whole blame upon Amír Bahádur Jang. To all that you have written about him I am ready to subscribe with both hands, and I could even add something to it; but only on the immutable condition that you should consent to admit that he was merely a simple tool in your hands, and that you were the evil genius inspiring him, so that, for all the evil deeds he committed, the responsibility rests on you and the Legation in whose hands you in your turn are a pliant tool.

"You speak of a revolution in Persia; you make a great mistake, Mr Shapshál: in Persia there is no revolution, only a united people, fighting like one man for the most moderate constitutional rights....

"Mr Shapshál, thanks to his superabundant audacity and incapacity, explicitly declares that at the time of the *coup d'état* 'hardly anyone' (in another place 'no one') was killed. To say nothing of the five or six hundred Persians killed by the machine-guns of the Cossacks under the command of Colonel Liakhoff, I venture to put to him this one question. Does this 'no one' take account of the *Maliku'l-Mutakallimín* and Jahángír Khán, whose brutal punishment was personally directed by you and Colonel Liakhoff, while the Sháh stood on a balcony and admired your artistic tortures? Do you remember how, as you went away, you spat on the corpse mutilated by tortures and said, 'One dog the less?'"

At the end of the type-written chapter the following postscript is added in manuscript:

"The article was finished when there appeared a telegram to say that the well-known Persian public man Shapshál had been received by the Emperor.

"In Russia hitherto friendship with spies and *agents provocateurs* has been kept up by the Directors of the Police Department and the Ministry of the Interior. Now the Emperor himself has begun. There is a fine departure!"

The following particulars about Shapshál I owe to an English correspondent long resident in Russia and well acquainted with current events there.

"Shapshál is a Karaite Jew. His relatives are proprietors of a well-known tobacconist firm. I know no details of his early life, except that he was a pupil at a private grammar-school in St Petersburg (Gurevich's), and that he completed a course at the Oriental Faculty in the St Petersburg University. It is very probable that he was intended for the Consular Service, since most of the students of the Oriental Faculty

ith a view to entering either the Consular or the Diplomatic . Shapshál is said to be very intelligent, and to have a good edge of Persian, Turkish and Arabic. At present (Nov. 28, 1909) living quietly on his estate near Theodosia in the Crimea."

NOTE 13 (*on p.* 116). THE ANJUMAN-I-MAKHFÍ.

The author of the *Awakening*, Mírzá Muḥammad *Náẓimu'l-Islám*, claims to have been one of the founders of the *Anjuman-i-Makhfí* or "Secret Society," of several *séances* of which he gives, at the beginning of vol. i. of his history, a very full report. He gives Thursday, 18 Dhu'l-Ḥijja, A.H. 1322 (= Feb. 23, 1905) as the date of its first meeting. Amongst those present were Mírzá Aḥmad-i-Kirmání *Dhu'r-Riyásatayn*, Shaykh Muḥammad *Faylasúf* ("the Philosopher") of Shíráz, Sayyid Burhán-i-Khalkhálí, and Shaykh Ḥusayn-'Alí Bahbahání. Sayyid Muḥammad-i-Ṭabáṭabá'í was also one of the promoters of the Society.

NOTE 14 (*on p.* 131). THE SIPAHSÁLÁR.

An account of the *Sipahsálár* (Ḥájji Mírzá Ḥusayn Khán *Mushíru'd-Dawla*) is given at pp. 170–184 of the Introduction to the *Awakening*. He was educated at the *Dáru'l-Funún*, or University of Ṭihrán; entered the Government service in A.H. 1255 (= A.D. 1839–40), and, after acting as Consul-general at Bombay and Tiflis, received the title of *Mushíru'd-Dawla* in A.H. 1279 (= A.D. 1862–3), and shortly afterwards was made Persian Ambassador at Constantinople. In A.H. 1287 (= A.D. 1870) he met Náṣiru'd-Dín Sháh at the Holy Places of Karbalá and Najaf, and in the following year returned with him to Ṭihrán and was made Minister of Justice, to which the supervision of the *Awqáf* (Religious Endowments) was afterwards added. His tendency to introduce European institutions into Persia led to his excommunication by the *mullás* (headed by Ḥájji Mullá 'Alí and Sayyid Ṣáliḥ the Arab), and the Shah (with whom he was returning from Europe) was obliged to divest him of his other posts and make him Governor of Rasht. In A.H. 1291 (= A.D. 1874–5) he was reinstated, and made Minister for Foreign Affairs with the title of *Sipahsálár-i-A'ẓam*. It was by his influence that Malkom Khán was brought back to Persia, but suspicion was aroused by the foundation of the Masonic Lodge (*Farámúsh-khána*), and Malkom Khán was consequently sent to represent Persia in London. The *Sipahsálár* attempted several important reforms in the organization of the Government, but again incurred the Sháh's displeasure, was banished to Mashhad (nominally as Governor of Khurásán), and there died suddenly (as is commonly believed of poison) in A.H. 1298 (= A.D. 1881). Náṣiru'd-Dín Sháh composed the following chronogram on his death:

سپهسالار صد حیف از جهان رفت، چو تیری کو نیآید از جهان رفت،
پی تأریخ فوتش گفت ناصر، سپهسالار صد حیف از جهان رفت،

The *Sipahsálár* is credited by the author of the *Awakening* with almost prophetic gifts, since he is reported to have expressed the hope that the Mosque and Bahárístán which he had built might one day serve to harbour the representatives of the Nation, and even to have declared that he built them to that end.

NOTE 15 (*on p.* 137). FATWÁ ON THE RIGHTS OF ZOROASTRIANS.

Quite recently the great *mujtahids* of Karbalá and Najaf were asked to give a *fatwá*, or formal legal decision, as to the rights of the Zoroastrian community in Persia. The text (in facsimile) is given on the next page (422), while the translation of the request and the reply are as follows:

(TRANSLATION.)

"*He is God, exalted is His Glorious State.*

"O Proof of Islám! What say you on the question of the infliction of vexations and humiliations on the Zoroastrian community which is under the protection of Islám and subject to Islám? It is requested of your Sacred Presence that you will write the answer to this question in the margin in your own honourable handwriting, and will seal it with your auspicious seal.

"Peace be upon you, and the Mercy of God, and His Blessings.

"The sinful Ḥajji Shaykh Ḥasan of Tabríz.

"The tenth of Ṣafar the Victorious in the year 1328 of the Flight" (= Feb. 21, 1910).

(*FATWÁ.*)

"*In the Name of God, the Merciful, the Compassionate.*

"To vex and humiliate the Zoroastrian Community or other non-Muslims who are under the protection of Islám is unlawful, and it is obligatory on all Muslims duly to observe the injunctions of His Holiness the Seal of the Prophets respecting their good treatment, the winning of their affections, and the guarding of their lives, honour and possessions, nor should they swerve by so much as a hair's breadth from this, please God Almighty.

"From the humblest, the sinful
Muḥammad Káẓim al-Khurásání."

"*In the Name of God, exalted is HE.*

"The matter is as hath been written [above].

"Written by 'Abdu'lláh al-Mázandarání."

The same great *mujtahid*, Mullá Muḥammad Káẓim of Khurásán, on April 22, 1909, addressed to the Persia Committee the following letter of thanks, which seems to me worthy to be perpetuated as a striking proof of the broader outlook now taken by the supreme spiritual heads of the Shí'a. (Facsimile of letter on p. 423.)



Facsimile of *Fatwá* on rights of Zoroastrians.



Facsimile of Letter to Persia Committee.

(TRANSLATION.)

"*May it be honoured by* [reaching] *the presence of the respected Members of the Persia Committee of London* (*may their fair endeavours be manifolded!*)

"I inform and notify the respected body of the Persia Committee of London, especially the officers and active members thereof, that the good tidings of the extraordinary efforts of those friends of the human race have afforded immeasurable comfort to our hearts, distressed and distracted by the cruel deeds of certain barbarians of our country. We are extremely grateful for the wise measures adopted by that political group, and are greatly rejoiced that this respected Committee has participated in the tribulations of us Persians, and devotes its time to the advancement and emancipation of its fellow-creatures. It is evident that the dictates of humanity impose such obligations of help and assistance on those who have graduated in the School of Humanity.

'*Part of one body is each mother's son,*
Since in created substance all are one.
Then if one member be by Fate distrest
How can repose remain unto the rest?'[1]

"We are convinced that the judicious exertions of your Committee will succeed in removing the various misfortunes with which Persia is afflicted.

"Meanwhile I trust that, in gratitude for the security which you enjoy under the shelter of the Constitution of your glorious Empire, you will not forget the sorely-afflicted people of Persia.

"Peace be upon you, and the Mercy of God, and His Blessings.

"The humble and unworthy

"MUḤAMMAD ḲÁZIM AL-KHURÁSÁNÍ.

"4 Rabí' ii, A.H. 1327" (= April 22, 1909).

NOTE 16 (*on p.* 168). ATTITUDE OF BAHÁ'ÍS TOWARDS PERSIAN POLITICS.

The attitude adopted by the Bábí, or rather the Bahá'í, leaders towards the Constitutional Movement in Persia is a matter on which I have not been able to satisfy myself. I have heard three views advanced, the first by a brilliant English diplomatist who has generally shewn an unusual understanding of and sympathy with the Persians; the second by a singularly sympathetic and discerning journalist who spent a considerable time in Persia; the third by a captain of the National Volunteers who was a fugitive in England after the *coup d'état* of June, 1908. These divergent views are briefly as follows:

(1) That 'Abbás Efendi (or 'Abdu'l-Bahá, as he is now generally called) strictly enjoined on his followers that they should refrain from

[1] These well-known verses are from the *Gulistán* of Sa'dí.

taking any part whatsoever in the struggle, *firstly* because their aims should be wholly spiritual, not political, and *secondly* because their support of the Constitution, if it became known, would tend to prejudice it in the eyes of the orthodox Shí'a, and especially the *mullás*.

(2) That not only the Constitutional Movement in Persia, but the general awakening of Asia, was the direct outcome of this new spiritual force known as Bábíism or Baháism.

(3) That the Bahá'ís were opposed to the Constitution, and continued until the end to encourage and support the Sháh, partly because they thought he would eventually triumph and were anxious to win his favour; partly because they hated the *mujtahids* and *mullás*, who, as we have seen, generally supported the popular party; and partly because of their gratitude to Russia, who had shewn them various favours, and had allowed them to make 'Ishq-ábád (Askabad) one of their principal centres, and to build there one of their few existing places of worship.

I am not sure which of these three theories is the true one, but I have often asked this question of my Persian friends: "If a convinced and enthusiastic Bahá'í had the choice of seeing Persia a strong and independent country with Islám as the established religion, or a Russian province with Bahá'ism as the established religion, which would he choose?" In almost all cases the answer has been that he would choose the second alternative. The very universalism of Baháism does not tend to encourage a passionate patriotism, and the following is a well-known utterance of Bahá'u'lláh:

لَيْسَ ٱلْفَخْرُ لِمَنْ يُحِبُّ ٱلْوَطَنَ بَلْ لِمَنْ يُحِبُّ ٱلْعَالَمَ

"*Pride is not for him who loves his country, but for him who loves the* [whole] *world*"—an admirable sentiment, but not, perhaps, one which is likely to be of service to the Persians in this crisis of their history.

Fortunately some positive evidence as to the attitude enjoined by 'Abdu'l-Bahá on his followers is afforded by a series of letters (ten in number) written by him to various Bahá'ís and communicated to me by M. Hippolyte Dreyfus, whose works on Bábí and Bahá'í theology are so well and so favourably known. From these it appears:

(1) That the "Yaḥyá'ís" (*i.e.* the followers of Mírzá Yaḥyá *Ṣubḥ-i-Azal*) had put it about that the Bahá'ís were supporters of the Sháh and opponents of the Constitution.

(2) That as a matter of fact the attitude enjoined on and adopted by the Bahá'ís was one of complete abstention from politics.

(3) That the persecutions which they had endured at the hands of certain reactionary *mullás* shewed that they were not regarded as friends of the Reaction.

The letters are too long to translate in full, and, moreover, repeat themselves to a certain extent, but the following extracts will suffice to give an idea of their purport.

(۱)

در خصوص مداخلهٔ دول متجاوره در امور ایران مرقوم نموده بودید، بکرّات و مرّات از کلك میثاق صادر که باید دولت و ملّت مانند شهد و شیر آمیخته گردد و الّا میدان جولان دیگران گردد و هر دو طرف پشیمان شوند ولی هیهات هیهات طرفَیْن استماع ننمودند و کاررا باین مرکز پر خطر رساندند،

1. *Addressed to Muḥammad 'Alí Khán of Ṭihrán.*

"As regards what you wrote touching the intervention in the affairs of Persia of the neighbouring States, time upon time it hath been declared by the Pen of the Covenant that the Government (*Dawlat*) and the People (*Millat*) should mix together like honey and milk, else the field will be open for the manœuvres of others, and both parties will regret it. But alas! the two parties would not give ear, but have brought matters to this perilous pitch!"

(۲)

و امّا قضیّهٔ بدخواهان یحیائیها که یاران‌را بهواخواهی دولت نسبت میدهند حقیقت حال یقین است که واضح و آشکار گردد و نامه‌هائیکه بجناب حاجی میرزا عبد الله صحیح‌فروش در این پُست ارسال میگردد ملاحظه نمایند، مارا بهیچ طرفی تعلّقی نه، نه طرفدار دولت قاهره‌ایم نه هم افکار ملّت باهره، از جمیع نزاعها در کناریم و خیرخواه عموم و تضرّع و دعا بدرگاه خدا کنیم که این دو عنصر محترم‌را با یکدیگر آمیزش دهد بقسمیکه عنصر واحد گردند و سبب عزّت و ترقّی و بزرگواری دولت و ملّت شوند، الحمد لله بفضل حقّ با جمیع فرق عالم بصلح و آشتی کوشیم و محبّت و دوستی نمائیم و خیرخواهی و راستی طلبیم و در این سبیل جانفشانی نمائیم...،

2. *Addressed to "Ibn Abhar" at Ṭihrán.*

"As to the matter of our ill-wishers amongst the Yaḥyá'ís [*i.e.* the Azalís], who accuse the Friends [*i.e.* the Bahá'ís] of sympathy with the Court [or Government, *Dawlat*], it is certain that the truth of the case

will become plain and evident, and you should peruse the letters sent by this post to Mírzá 'Abdu'lláh *Ṣaḥíḥ-furúsh*. We have no connection with any party: we are neither partisans of the Victorious Government nor do we share the opinions of the Glorious People. We stand aside from all strifes, wish well to all, and offer our prayers and supplications at the Throne of God that He will reconcile these two honourable elements with one another, so that they may become one element, and may work together for the glory and advancement of both Government and People. Praise be to God, by God's Grace we strive to be at peace and on friendly terms with all parties in the world; we shew friendship and affection [to all], seek after righteousness, and spend ourselves in this Path."

(۳)

مرقوم نموده بودید که در حبل المتین مطبوع در رشت مرقوم شده بود که بهائیان طرفدار استبدادند و در زنجان بجهت دولت اعانت جمع نموده‌اند، باید یکی از احباب در روزنامهٔ دیگر مرقوم نماید یا در میان خلق شیوع دهند که این افترا از حضرات بابیهای یحیائی در حقّ بهائیانست زیرا این نفوس دشمن بهائیانند، بهائیان‌را مقصد اصلاح عالم است که در بین جمیع ملل و دول اصلاح گردد نزاع و جدال نماند جنگ و قتال منسوخ شود لهذا بجان و دل شتابند و بکوشند و جانفشانی نمایند که دولت و ملّت بلکه طوائف و ملل بیکدیگر التیام یابند و صلح و آشتی در میان آید، لهذا در اینگونه منازعات دخلی ندارند و برهان واضح و دلیل ساطع بر کذب قایل که مجال تردّد نمیگذارد فتوای مجتهد ملّا حسن تبریزی بر قتل بهائیان و اعلانات افترائیّهٔ مجتهد میرزا فضل الله نوری و سیّد علی اکبر که در جمیع کوچه و بازار طهران بر دیوار الصاق شد ولی حضرات بابی یحیائی که دشمن بهائیانند و خودرا در پرده مستور میدارند بملّتیان گویند که بهائیان طرفدار دولتند و بدولتیان مینمایند که بهائیان جانفشان ملّتند تا هر دو طرف‌را بر بهائیان بر انگیزانند و دشمن کنند و خود درآن بین نفوسی‌را صید نمایند، اینست حقیقت حال، پس لازم است که نفوس با انصاف همین مسئلهٔ اعانت در زنجان‌را تحقیق

نمایند اگر از بهائیان چنین چیزی صدور یافته آمنّا و صدقنا،
سبحانك هذا بهتانٌ عظیم، از بدایت انقلاب متمادیًا مرقوم گشت
که باید احبّای الهی از این غوغا و ضوضا و جدال و نزاع کناره
گیرند و در اصلاح بین دولت و ملّت کوشند و جانفشانی نمایند
تا دولت و ملّت مانند شیر و شکر بیکدیگر آمیخته گردد و صلاح
و نجاح بدون اصلاح ممتنع و محال، حال چون آنچه بدخواهان
افترا بزنند یاران سکوت مینمایند لهذا دشمنان بجسارت تامّ هر
روزی بهتانی زنند و علیك البهآء الابهی ع . ع .

3. *Addressed to Ḥájji Mírzá 'Abdu'lláh Ṣaḥíḥ-furúsh.*

"You wrote that it had been stated in the *Ḥablu'l-Matín* published at Rasht that the Bahá'ís were partisans of the Autocracy, and at Zanján had collected aid for the Royalist Cause. One of the 'Friends' must write to some other newspaper, or it must be spread abroad amongst the people, that this is a calumny concerning the Bahá'ís [emanating] from the Yaḥyá'í [*i.e.* Azalí] Bábís, for these men are the enemies of the Bahá'ís. The aim of the Bahá'ís is the reformation of the world, so that amongst all these nations and governments a reconciliation may be effected and strife and war may be abolished. Therefore they hasten onward with heart and soul and spend themselves that perchance the Court and the Nation, nay, [all] parties and peoples, may be united to one another, and that peace and reconciliation may enter in. Hence they have no part in such quarrels. And a clear proof and conclusive argument as to the falsity of the accuser, which leaves no opening for doubt, is the decree of the *mujtahid* Mullá Ḥasan of Tabríz for the slaughter of the Bahá'ís, and also the slanderous proclamations of the *mujtahid* Mírzá Faḍlu'lláh of Núr and Sayyid 'Alí Akbar, which were posted on the walls in all the streets and *bázárs* of Ṭihrán. But the Yaḥyá'í [*i.e.* Azalí] Bábís, who are the enemies of the Bahá'ís, and who keep themselves in concealment, tell the Nationalists that the Bahá'ís are the partisans of the Court, while telling the Royalists that they are ready to lay down their lives for the Nation, in order to stir up both sides against the Bahá'ís and make them their enemies, that perchance they may seduce certain souls on either side. This is the truth of the matter; therefore it behoves that some just men should investigate the question of the [alleged] help [given to the Royalists] at Zanján. If such a thing hath been done by the Bahá'ís we will believe and admit [the charge]. Glory be to God! This is an awful calumny! From the very beginning of the Revolution it was constantly enjoined that the Friends of God should stand aside from this strife and struggle and war and contest, and should seek to reconcile the Court and the Nation, and should spend themselves so that Court and Nation should

mix with one another like milk and honey: for safety and success are unattainable and impossible without [such] reconciliation. Now when they who wish us ill utter calumnies, the 'Friends' are silent, wherefore these our foes each day boldly enunciate some [new] slander.

"Upon thee be the Most Splendid Splendour (*al-Bahá'u'l-Abhá*). *'A. 'A.*" (*i.e.* 'Abbás 'Abdu'l-Bahá).

Space will not allow the citation of further extracts. One of the remaining letters is addressed to "the Friends of God" in Bákú, and here also emphasis is laid on the enmity of Shaykh Faẓlu'lláh and Sayyid 'Alí of Yazd, and their assertions that the Bahá'ís supported and had even originated the Constitutional Movement, in reply to which 'Abbás Efendi says that the Bahá'ís were absolutely forbidden to discuss political matters in their assemblies, and were told to regard "the differences and strife now existing in Persia as like children's toys, having no importance," and an appeal is made to the judgement of European and American investigators of the Bahá'í doctrines and ethics. In a fifth letter, again addressed to "Ibn Abhar," he is bidden to recommend the Bahá'ís "every night and day to concern themselves with that which will conduce to the Eternal Glory of Persia"—*i.e.*, apparently, the diffusion of the Bahá'í faith. The remaining letters contain nothing worthy of special note.

This much at least seems clear, that from the Bahá'ís little active support or sympathy can be expected by the Persian Nationalists, while certainly in the past (as in the case of Shaykh Aḥmad "Rúḥí" of Kirmán) and probably in the present the Azalís have identified themselves to a much larger extent with the popular cause.

Note 17 (*on p.* 195). A Russian view of British Foreign Policy.

As an example of the cynical interpretation which Russians have put on England's motives in concluding the Anglo-Russian Agreement, I may cite the following passage from an article on "New Persia and her opponents," by a writer who uses the *nom de guerre* of "M. Pavlovich," which appeared in the *Sovremenny Mir* ("The Modern World") for February, 1909. The correspondent to whom I am indebted for the communication of this translation describes this magazine as "probably the most widely read of the Russian monthlies," and says that it is edited by Social-Democrats. The writer says:

"The chief danger to the new Persia consists not so much in the resistance of the Court Camarilla and the army to the emancipatory movement as in the ambiguous policy of the two neighbouring States, Russia and England. Until the recent Russo-Japanese war Persia was beset by the fear of inevitable subjection to Russia. The shadow of the great Northern Empire day by day spread farther and farther over the land of the King of kings. It seemed as though nothing could save Persia from the fate of Khiva, Bukhárá and Khokand. The Russo-Japanese war checked Russia's southward movement. Persia breathed

a sigh of relief, but soon a new danger appeared. When the powerful Northern Eagle let the prey fall from his claws, the British Lion seized the opportunity and laid his paw on the provinces thus freed from Russian influences. At the opening of the *Majlis* the President delivered a speech to the representative of Great Britain in the course of which he said:

"'Permit me to relate a parable. A horse was fleeing from the pursuit of a wild beast. A man passed by and said to the horse, "I will mount you, if you wish it, and bring you out to a world where no beast of prey can reach you." The horse obeyed, and was saved from his enemy, but alas! the rider who had saved him refused to dismount, and is sitting on his back to the present day. It is the ardent desire of all Persia, and we beg you to inform the British nation of this, that the rider should dismount.'

"England knew very well that once a National consciousness was awakened she could not long retain her provisional hegemony over Persia. Furthermore she feared for her control over India, and was desirous of checking the powerful German '*Drang nach Osten*,' the movement towards Asia Minor and Central Asia, which was certain to be intensified when the Baghdad Railway was completed. Accordingly she concluded an Agreement with Russia and yielded the latter a lion's share, for she surrendered to her the protectorate over the richest and most populous provinces of Persia, retaining the smallest portion for herself. By giving to Russia, by the Convention of August 31, 1907, the chief part of Persia with the capital, Ṭihrán, and the towns of Iṣfahán, Rasht, Tabríz and Mashhad, the centres of the emancipatory movement, the British Government treacherously washes its hands once and for all of the duty of defending the Persian Constitutional Movement, which at one moment it stimulated and supported, and leaves the Constitutional Party to its fate. For those who have penetrated into the essence of this Treaty there is nothing very surprising in the subsequent attitude of the English Government to the Persian question. On the one hand it was compelled to take into account English public opinion and the representatives of the Special Committee on Persian affairs which was peculiarly interested in Anglo-Persian trade. At the same time it acted under the influence of the Bureaucracy of Hindustán and that section of the Plutocracy of Finance and the Stock Exchange which is anxious at any cost to maintain the old order in India. The British Government therefore plays an extremely ambiguous game in regard to Persia. Though publicly professing sympathy for the Persian Constitution, England is now, as a matter of fact, an enemy of the Persian emancipatory movement. It is a truism that Governments are not impelled by sentimental motives either in their internal or their foreign policy. England supported the Constitutional Movement in Northern Persia so long as it saw in it a means of combating Russian influence. But at the same time England actively supported the Reaction in the Southern Provinces along the Indian frontier, and rendered aid in various forms to the satraps who were opposing the emancipatory movement there. By

giving up all Northern Persia to Russia, and retaining under her own protection merely the two poor provinces of Sístán and Makrán, which are strategically extremely important, since they guard the way to the Indian frontier and the Gulf of 'Ummán, England shews that the Persian Question, as such, does not interest her, and that in the Anglo-Russian Convention she is primarily interested in the question of the defence of her Indian Empire. The Treaty of Aug. 31, 1907, means the death of English commercial influence in Northern Persia, and if, so long ago as 1906, the British Consul-General in Iṣfahán reported a decline in British trade during 1905, and attributed this to the competition of Russian wares, which are more cheaply and more expeditiously transported, it is certain that now that Russia has been allowed to establish a Protectorate over the wealthiest part of Persia, she will be commercially and economically absolute in the country, and that England simply cannot dream of competing with her successfully.

"The motives which led the ruling classes of England to consent to such a bargain must certainly have been very serious. The *Times* dots its i's and expresses itself very clearly on this question.

"'Our political interests in Persia,' it says, 'are bound up with the question of the defence of India. Hitherto the real danger of Russian expansion lay in the fact that Russia might, by way of Persia and Sístán, reach Balúchistán and our Indian frontier, and then by some strategical road slip past our great defensive position on the North-West frontier. The fact that we have secured from Russia a pledge to refrain from intervention in these regions is sufficient compensation for our abandonment of equal rights with Russia in those provinces which are, as a matter of fact, in her hands.'

"Thus it is considerations connected with the security of India against attack from without, and, of course, the maintenance of 'internal order,' which was seriously menaced by the growth of the Constitutional Movement in Persia, that cause the ruling classes in England to pursue an ambiguous policy in regard to the Persian Constitution.

"New Persia cannot expect European Governments to help her. She will receive no help from the English *bourgeoisie*, nor from the ruling classes of any other country, say Austria, for instance, from whom the Persian Constitutionalists at one time naïvely hoped to receive aid. The foremost representatives of Persian society are becoming daily more and more convinced of the hostile, or at any rate absolutely indifferent, attitude of the ruling classes of Europe to the Persian Constitution. Many Persians are now, therefore, addressing their protests against the English and Russian Governments not to European Parliaments and Ministers, but to the masses of Europe. Persian Constitutionalists send telegrams to Jaurès requesting him to direct the attention of the European proletariat to the state of affairs in Persia."

Note 18 (*on p.* 198). The Mujallalu's-Sulṭán.

A little before the death of Muẓaffaru'd-Dín Sháh and the accession of Muḥammad 'Alí, the *Mujallalu's-Sulṭán* (a title which means "glorified by the King") was in Paris. He is described by one of his countrymen who is a friend of mine as repulsive, utterly illiterate and ignorant, and corrupt and immoral in the most extreme degree. He bade my informant "pray for the speedy death of Muẓaffaru'd-Dín Sháh," "so that," said he, "I may make you the *Iqbálu'd-Dawla*" ("Fortune of the State"). He squandered some 30,000 francs in Paris and then disappeared. A little later my informant was amazed to see in the papers that he was actually back in Persia, and in high favour at the Court of Muḥammad 'Alí. Then he realized what that Court was like, and became convinced that "in Persia (unlike England, perhaps) in nobility, attainments, virtue, knowledge and culture the middle classes are infinitely superior to the upper classes," who, he considered, were hopelessly rotten and should be displaced to make room for their less aristocratic but infinitely more capable and virtuous countrymen. (*M. M.*)

Note 19 (*on pp.* 221–225). Original Texts of the Liakhoff Documents.

Since the argument for the genuineness of the alleged Liakhoff documents turns partly on the style of the Reports themselves, and since a judgement on this is only possible to those who are well acquainted with the Russian language (of whom, unhappily, I am not one), it seems desirable to give here the original texts, as cited in M. Panoff's unpublished work. They are as follows:

Секретное.

Рапортъ
No. 59.

ВЪ ГЛАВНЫЙ ШТАБЪ КАВКАЗСКАГО ВОЕННАГО ОКРУГА.

Генералу Квартирмейстеру.

Ваше Превосходительство!

26-го Мая. Его Величество Шахъ потребовалъ меня и перваго драгомана миссіи въ Бегешахъ.

Въ интимной бесѣдѣ Шахъ изъявилъ согласіе на наши прежнія предложенія, о чемъ я имѣлъ честь своевременно донести Вашему Превосходительству, упразднить конституцію, разогнать Меджлисъ и путемъ нѣлаго ряда маневровъ, дабы избѣжать настояній европейскихъ державъ вернуться къ прежнему абсолютическому образу правленія. Причемъ онъ добавилъ, что прося планъ дальнѣйшихъ дѣйствій, просилъ бы, что бы какъ можно меньше крови лилось бы. На это я осмѣлился замѣтить, что въ борьбѣ неминуема и необходима кровь.

Вернувшись въ городъ въ тотъ же вечеръ, въ миссіи мною и первымъ драгоманомъ былъ составленъ планъ для дальнѣйшихъ дѣйствій, противъ воровского гнѣзда, котораго здѣсь высокопарно называютъ парламентомъ. Причемъ за основу нашихъ дальнѣйшихъ дѣйствій была принята цѣль: до поры до времени усыплять какъ Меджлисъ и ихъ сторонниковъ такъ и европейскія миссіи, потомъ ненадѣйно вызвать столкновеніе и пользуясь превосходствомъ своей военной организованной силы разрушить гнѣздо этихъ взяточниковъ и перебить всѣхъ защитниковъ, задумавшихся бы такъ или иначе сопротивляться. Оставшихся же въ живыхъ послѣ разгрома преслѣдовать мѣрами административнаго порядка, примѣняя самыя строгія наказанія. Зная мѣстный обычай всѣхъ властей не исключая и самого Шаха кстати и не кстати носъ совать во всякое распоряженіе и этимъ портить дѣло, мы нашли за удобное выставить требованіе, чтобы послѣ утвержденія выработаннаго нами плана мнѣ, какъ главному лицу въ дѣлѣ, была дана полная свобода въ дѣйствіяхъ, съ правомъ не подчиняться чьимъ либо побочнымъ приказаніямъ отъ кого бы это ни исходило, пока задача цѣликомъ не будетъ выполнена.

Хотя изъ прежнихъ приказаній и инструкцій Вашего Превосходительства образъ моихъ дѣйствій и границы полномочій вполнѣ ясны, но осмѣливаюсь покорнѣйше просить указать мнѣ границы явнаго активнаго выступленія въ данномъ дѣлѣ, помимо тайнаго участія, которое я приму въ осуществленіи дѣла.

По одобреніи плана кампаніи, выработаннаго нами, Посланникомъ и Шахомъ буду имѣть честь копію немедленно препроводить Вашему Превосходительству.

Въ ожиданіи Вашихъ приказаній,
Полковникъ В. Ляховъ.

27-го Мая 1908 года. г. Тегеранъ.

Секретное.

Рапортъ
No. 60.

ВЪ ГЛАВНЫЙ ШТАБЪ КАВКАЗСКАГО ВОЕННАГО ОКРУГА.

Генералу Квартирмейстеру.

Ваше Превосходительство!

Проектъ выработанный мною и первымъ драгоманомъ миссіи былъ одобренъ г. Посланникомъ, по предварительному телеграфному сношенію съ Петербургомъ, почти безъ возраженій, съ весьма незначительными поправками. Что же касается Шаха, то онъ долго колебался, какъ персъ, боясь той крови, которая необходимо должна была пролиться и началъ предлагать какіе то полумѣры, компромисы и т. д.

Въ виду чего мы принуждены были пустить въ ходъ послѣднее рѣшительное средство. Мы высказали, что проектъ одобренъ рус-

скимъ правительствомъ, какъ самая цѣлесообразная при настоящихъ сложившихся условіяхъ и если Шахъ не захочетъ согласится, то Россія отказывается отъ всякой поддержки ему и слагаетъ отвѣтственность за дальнѣйшее, что можетъ случиться. Средство было изъ сильнодѣйствующихъ и понятно онъ немедленно согласился и далъ полную свободу дѣйствія для осуществленія.

Основныя положенія проекта слѣдующія:

1. Средствами миссіи и шахскими подкупать видныхъ членовъ Меджлиса и министровъ, дабы они въ послѣднихъ засѣданіяхъ проводили бы политику какую имъ продиктуютъ.

2. Съ Меджлисомъ до поры до времени, пока всѣ приготовленія будутъ окончены, поддерживать относительную дружбу, дѣлая видъ, что желаютъ съ нимъ примириться, на правѣ взаимныхъ уступокъ, для каковой цѣли войти въ переговоры.

3. Постараться подкупомъ ли, другими ли способами, выманить вооруженныхъ людей изъ Меджлиса, мечети и ближайшихъ зданій анджуменовъ.....

4. Постараться подкупить большинство главарей большихъ городскихъ анджуменовъ, дабы они въ извѣстный день не выпускали бы, задержали бы своихъ членовъ.

5. Наканунѣ или заблаговременно выслать въ Меджлисъ и мечеть Сапахсаларъ переодѣтыхъ казаковъ, которые бы дали поводъ къ бомбардировкѣ выстрѣлами въ воздухъ, а потомъ перебили бы всѣхъ защитниковъ, находившихся тамъ.

6. Принять самыя энергичныя мѣры, дабы въ европейскія миссіи не попался бы ни одинъ недовольный въ бестъ, особенно въ англійскую.

7. Когда всѣ предварительныя приготовленія будутъ закончены, въ опредѣленный день окружить Меджлисъ и ближайшія зданія анджуменовъ казаками бригады и артилеріей и бомбардировать, перебить всѣхъ сопротивляющихся.

8. Послѣ бомбардировки дома видныхъ конституціоналистовъ и депутатовъ дать на разграбленіе войскамъ и черни.

9. Видныхъ конституціонныхъ дѣятелей, депутатовъ, сторонниковъ немедленно арестовать, вѣшать и ссылать въ ссылку смотря по общественному положенію и по значенію.

10. Издать, для успокоенія умовъ и для державъ, манифестъ, якобы Меджлисъ вторично будетъ созванъ.

Шахъ изъявивъ свое согласіе, высказалъ желаніе чтобы и персидскія войска приняли бы участіе, но я категорически и упорно воспротивился, въ виду того, что это самый подходящій моментъ когда бригада можетъ выслужиться и занять подобающее ей мѣсто въ персидской государственной жизни и такимъ образомъ облегчить достиженіе будущихъ цѣлей.

Что же касается моего непосредственнаго участія и активнаго выступленія въ день бомбардировки, то г. Посланникъ лично былъ противъ этого, опасаясь возраженія со стороны державъ. Но я имѣя въ виду приказанія Вашего Превосходительства и обстоятельство, что персидскіе офицеры какъ бы то ни было преданы Россіи, всетаки остаются персами и въ рѣшительную минуту какими-нибудь санти-

ментальностями могутъ портить дѣло, настоялъ на моемъ личномъ руководствѣ.

Смѣло могу подтвердить Вашему Превосходительству, что во ввѣренной мнѣ бригадѣ, какъ среди офицеровъ, такъ и нижнихъ чиновъ царитъ отличная дисциплина и преданность дѣлу и если не помѣшаютъ какія-либо побочныя условія объ успѣхѣ могу ручаться.

Въ ожиданіи Вашихъ приказаній,
Полковникъ В. Ляховъ.

31-го Мая 1908 г. г. Тегеранъ.

Секретное.

Рапортъ
No. 62.

ВЪ ГЛАВНЫЙ ШТАБЪ КАВКАЗСКАГО ВОЕННАГО ОКРУГА.

Генералу Квартирмейстеру.

Ваше Превосходительство!

Относительно запроса Вашего Превосходительства о дѣйствіяхъ казаковъ близь англійской миссіи, непозволявшихъ войти туда никому, имѣю честь дать слѣдующее объясненіе.

Изъ предыдущихъ моихъ рапортовъ Вашему Превосходительству извѣстно о намѣреніи оцѣпить всѣ миссіи съ цѣлью воспретить публикѣ войти туда и сѣсть въ бестъ по пунктуальномъ исполненіи мною этого плана. Что же касается исключительныхъ мѣръ, принятыхъ мною противъ англійской миссіи, то причина ихъ такова: 5-го вечеромъ я по телефону былъ вызванъ въ миссію г. Посланникомъ, который сообщилъ, что по полученнымъ свѣдѣніямъ, англійская миссія въ смутныхъ чертахъ догадывается о готовящемся и намѣрена недовольныхъ принять въ бестъ, дабы этимъ ослабить результаты нашихъ дѣйствій, — потому совѣтовалъ бы противъ англійской миссіи принять болѣе исключительныя мѣры, чѣмъ противъ другихъ.

А о томъ, что якобы г. Посланникъ совѣтовалъ мнѣ вмѣсто англійской миссіи окружить дома и магазины русско-подданныхъ на близлежащихъ улицахъ и тѣмъ воспрепятствовать доступъ къ миссіи, между нами тогда не было и разговора.

Хотя сознаюсь — это было бы болѣе раціонально, чѣмъ мы сдѣлали, такъ какъ въ концѣ концовъ, давая тѣ же результаты лишилъ бы англичанъ прямого повода къ протесту, но какъ я полагаю мы не воспользовались этимъ не потому, что я не хотѣлъ послѣдовать совѣту, а просто потому что въ горячкѣ работы эта комбинація никому въ голову не пришла. При семъ имѣю честь препроводить списокъ офицеровъ, особенно отличившихся и мною удостоенныхъ награжденія русскими орденами.

Въ ожиданіи дальнѣйшихъ приказаній, Полковникъ В. Ляховъ.

12-го Іюня 1908 года. гор. Тегеранъ.

Секретное.

Рапортъ
No. 63.

ВЪ ГЛАВНЫЙ ШТАБЪ КАВКАЗСКАГО ВОЕННАГО ОКРУГА.

Генералу Квартирмейстеру.

Ваше Превосходительство!

Мною, предъ группою преданныхъ Россіи и идеи, душою и тѣломъ офицеровъ бригады, былъ прочтенъ приказъ Вашего Превосходительства, что Его Императорскому Величеству Государю Императору благоугодно было собственноручно начертать на телеграфическомъ донесеніи Его Сіятельства Намѣстника о дѣйствіяхъ козачьей бригады противъ мятежнаго парламента: "молодцы казаки, спасибо храбрецамъ офицерамъ."

Неописуемая радость овладѣла всѣми и громовые раскаты мощнаго ура долго не смолкали. Энтузіазмъ офицеровъ просто не поддается описанію.

Тамъ же совѣтомъ офицеровъ было рѣшено просить меня, дабы я черезъ Ваше Превосходительство и Его Сіятельство Намѣстника искреннія вѣрноподданическія чувства всѣхъ офицеровъ бригады, ихъ горячее желаніе сложить головы только по приказанію Державнѣйшаго Вождя могущественной Россіи, ихъ готовность жертвовать всѣмъ для осуществленія Монаршей воли, принести къ стопамъ обожаемаго Монарха.

Осчастливленный милостью Высочайшей,

Полк. В. Ляховъ.

15-го Іюня 1908 года. г. Тегеранъ.

Note 20 (*on p.* 267). The Moving Spirits of the Rasht rising.

As stated in a note at the foot of p. 267, the moving spirits of the rising at Rasht were the *Mu'izzu's-Sulṭán* and his brother Karím Khán, of whom the latter visited Western Europe twice in the course of the last two years. Karím Khán spent some 20,000 roubles (= £2000) out of his private estate in preparing for this venture, and, with certain trusty comrades, made five journeys to Tiflis and other parts of the Caucasus to obtain the necessary arms and ammunition, with which he returned in disguise by mountain paths and unfrequented tracks. On one occasion (about March, 1909: see the *White Book* on Persia, p. 56, No. 102) the Russians seized five million cartridges and a large number of rifles which he was bringing to Persia, together with nine of his comrades, whose fate is still unknown. For three months he and his brother harboured in their spacious house some seventy *mujáhidín* or National Volunteers. On the day fixed for the attempt to seize Rasht

Mu'izzu's-Sulṭán, entitled *Sardár-i-Muḥiy*

Yeprem (or Ephraim) Khán

TWO OF THE LEADERS OF THE RASHT ARMY

they bade one another an affectionate farewell, little expecting to see another sunrise, and went forth on their desperate, but, as it happened, successful venture. (See also the *White Book* on Persia, pp. 58 and 79–80.) It is generally supposed, and apparently with good reason, that the *Sipahdár* in reality played a very subordinate and by no means eager part in the Rasht revolution, and was mainly used by the bolder and more energetic spirits as a figure-head, or "*ma-tars*," as the Persians say. Nor is he now (July, 1910) regarded as a convinced and steadfast Nationalist, but rather as an Opportunist. Hence he does not command the confidence of his fellow-countrymen in anything like the same degree as the *Sardár-i-As'ad*. I am informed on good Persian authority that the advance of the army of Rasht on the capital was throughout really directed by the above-mentioned *Mu'izzu's-Sulṭán*, the cousin of the *Sardár-i-Manṣúr*. Under him were the following commanders:

(1) Ḥájji Mírzá Músá Khán *Mír-panj*, who, in conjunction with Ṣamad Khán *Mumtázu's-Sulṭana* (the Persian Minister at Paris, and one of the most enlightened, far-sighted and patriotic of contemporary Persian statesmen), represented Persia at the funeral of the late King Edward the Seventh. Músá Khán is the brother of the present *Ḥakímu'l-Mulk*, and is noted for his courage. He was wounded at Bádámak, and later came to Paris to have the bullet extracted. He was in command of 500 men.

(2) Mírzá Ḥasan Khán *'Amídu's-Sulṭán*, brother of the *Mu'izzu's-Sulṭán* and Mírzá Karím Khán already mentioned, and cousin of the *Sardár-i-Manṣúr*. He also was in command of 500 men.

(3) Mírzá 'Alí Khán *Muntaṣiru'd-Dawla*, the *aide-de-camp* of the *Sipahdár*. He was in command of 200 men.

(4) Mírzá 'Alí Khán *Sálár-i-Fátiḥ*, Colonel, of Kajúr. He was in command of about 80 men.

(5) Mírzá Ḥasan of Qazwín, son of the *Shaykhu'l-Islám* who was killed when Qazwín was taken by the Nationalists. He was in command of about 80 men.

(6) Mírzá Ghaffár Khán of Qazwín, who came to England after the *coup d'état*, as mentioned on p. 166, n. 1 *ad calc.* He was in command of about 150 men. His portrait faces p. 166 *supra*.

(7) Asadu'lláh Khán of Ṭihrán, *Mír-panj*, in command of 150 men.

(8) Monsieur Yeprem (or Ephrem) the Armenian, who has recently rendered such signal services to Persia in suppressing the marauding and reactionary Sháh-sevens at Ardabíl and in Qarája-dágh. He commanded some 120 men.

(9) Ḥusayn Beg, son of Shaykh Ḥasan, the Persian lecturer at Cambridge, and Maḥmúd, in joint command of some 60 men.

(10) Válíkoff the Georgian, in command of some 80 men. He, however, with seven or eight others, turned back from Qazwín and did not take part in the attack on Ṭihrán.

The *Mu'izzu's-Sulṭán's* proper name is 'Abdu'l-Ḥusayn Khán, and he is now entitled *Sardár-i-Muḥíy*.

The above particulars were derived from Ḥájji Músá Khán *Mír-*

Panj and Karím Khán, who communicated them to my friend Mírzá Muḥammad, by whom in turn they were transmitted to me. Músá Khán, who came to Paris to undergo an operation for the removal of the bullets wherewith he was wounded at the battle of Bádámak, subsequently communicated to Mírzá Muḥammad a somewhat lengthy account of the advance of the Army of Rasht on Ṭihrán. As it is too long to quote in full, I must content myself with a summary of its more important contents, premising that its value is in some degree impaired by the complete absence of dates.

In this narrative also the *Sipahdár* is represented not only as a mere figure-head, but as a very half-hearted supporter of the Cause, and it is even implied that he and his retainer the *Muntaṣiru'd-Dawla* endeavoured rather to check than to encourage the advance. The three active commanders, who throughout were in perfect accord, were Músá Khán, the *Mu'izzu's-Sulṭán* and Mírzá Muḥammad 'Alí Khán. When they finally decided to leave Qazwín and march on Ṭihrán, the *Sipahdár* wished to halt at a village belonging to him situated only one parasang from the former town, but the others insisted on pushing on to Qishláq, six parasangs distant, and thence advanced to Yengí Imám, where they halted for a few days, partly to allow the rear-guard to come up, but chiefly because it was reported that a delegation including the *'Aẓudu'l-Mulk* and other influential persons had started from Ṭihrán with powers to negotiate with them, and they did not wish to do anything which might prejudice the success of these negotiations. But this report turned out to be devoid of foundation. They therefore decided, notwithstanding the *Sipahdár's* opposition, to continue their advance.

By this time the Cossacks and some other Royalist troops had occupied the bridge over the Karaj, a strong position, where a small force could easily bar the way to a much larger body of troops, since the river and the mountains left no other passage. Six hundred Cossacks, with eight guns, held the bridge, while some two hundred men had been set to guard those spots where the river might possibly be forded. The *Sipahdár* was opposed to any attack on this position, and advised a long detour to Shahriyár, distant some seven parasangs, and thence by Sháh 'Abdu'l-'Aẓím to Ṭihrán; but the other chiefs rejected this advice, being afraid to leave this force of Cossacks in their rear, lest they should be caught between two Royalist forces and utterly destroyed. They also recognized that the capture of Karaj would be almost equivalent to the capture of Ṭihrán, of which it was, as it were, the key. They therefore spent that night in making all their dispositions and plans, and it was settled that Músá Khán and Yeprem Khán with their men, who were the most courageous and trustworthy, should form the vanguard, but that, even if they were successful in taking Karaj, they should on no account pursue the Cossacks beyond that place. During their halt at Karaj they had acquired a good knowledge of the surrounding country, and in particular had received information from the villagers (whose hearts they had won by good treatment, while the Royalist troops, on the contrary, had irritated them by vexatious exactions) of a mountain path, practicable only for

pedestrians, which would lead them to a higher level than the hill occupied by the Cossacks.

When the advance began, Yeprem Khán with his men took this path, Músá Khán was to endeavour to outflank and get behind the Cossacks, Asadu'lláh Khán *Sartíp* occupied the gardens of Karaj, Mírzá 'Alí Khán *Sartíp* was to attack in front, Ḥájji Mírzá Ḥasan-i-Qazwíní *Shaykhu'l-Islám* on the right, and *'Amídu's-Sulṭán* on the left. Their movements were attentively watched by the Russian officers of the Cossack Brigade through their field-glasses.

On the approach of the Nationalists, the Cossacks fired several volleys and then retreated. Mírzá 'Alí Khán's detachment, in spite of their instructions to the contrary, pursued them, seeing which Músá Khán and Yeprem Khán descended from the hills with their men to stop them and prevent an engagement if possible, and if not to render them assistance.

The Cossacks, on reaching Sháhábád, turned and began to fire on their pursuers, who numbered only about 150 men. The engagement which ensued lasted from about 7 p.m. that night until 8 a.m. next morning. The Nationalists had three 7-centimetre guns, two with Músá Khán and one with Yeprem Khán. The remainder of the Nationalist forces, seeing the Cossacks retreat, halted where they were, as had been agreed, not realizing that their comrades were engaged with the enemy.

The Cossacks occupied a stone caravansaray, and on this the Nationalists advanced until they were so near that they could hear the Cossacks talking and bidding one another not to waste cartridges, since the supply was almost exhausted. But at this juncture reinforcements reached them from Ṭihrán, bringing fresh stores of ammunition, whereupon the Cossack fire again became heavy, and Músá Khán was twice struck by shrapnel, once in each leg. He nevertheless continued to fight, and did not suffer his injuries to become known to his followers, lest they should be discouraged. The Nationalists, who had been in the saddle for nearly twenty-four hours, now began to fall back on Karaj, having lost three men killed (two Musulmáns and one Armenian) and eight wounded (four Musulmáns and four Armenians). The Cossack losses were estimated by them at forty-six wounded and two waggon-loads of dead. Yeprem Khán's men were obliged to leave their gun, owing to the restiveness of the mule which should have dragged it out of action. The *Sipahdár* arrived from Yengí Imám just as the retreating Nationalists re-entered it with their wounded commander.

At this juncture a message came from the *Sardár-i-As'ad* that the two armies should effect a junction at 'Alí Shahbáz, which was occupied by some of the Royalist Bakhtiyárís. Here a most untoward incident took place. Some of the Royalist Bakhtiyárís, having disguised themselves as Nationalists, advanced towards the *mujáhidín* of Rasht with shouts of "Long live the Constitution! Long live the *Sipahdár* and the *Sardár-i-As'ad*!" The *mujáhidín*, supposing them to be friends, suffered them to enter their ranks, whereupon they began to fire their guns and to wrest from the *mujáhidín* their weapons. They were soon

overpowered and put to flight, after several had been killed; but when the *Sardár-i-As'ad's* Bakhtiyáris approached with the same shouts, the *mujáhidín*, thinking that the same trick was about to be repeated, opened fire on them, and killed seventeen, including the *Sardár-i-As'ad's* nephew, before they discovered their mistake.

In the engagement with the Royalists which ensued, and which lasted until sunset, the combined Nationalist forces lost 65 men killed and 40 and odd wounded, while the Royalist losses were estimated at 200 killed and an unknown number of wounded. That night the *Sardár-i-As'ad* and the *Sipahdár* with a portion of the combined forces advanced on Ṭihrán, while the rest, some 600 in number, remained with the *Mu'izzu's-Sulṭán* and Mírzá Muḥammad 'Alí Khán at 'Alí Shahbáz.

Next day the Royalists [at Sháhábád], finding the Nationalist camp at Bádámak deserted and abandoned, fell to looting it, but while they were so employed they received a message bidding them return at once to the capital. When the rear-guard of the Nationalists reached Ṭihrán, Muḥammad 'Alí had already taken refuge in the Russian Legation and abdicated his throne.

Note 21 (*on p.* 269). Mr H. C. Baskerville.

The following particulars concerning the unfortunate Mr Baskerville were kindly furnished to me, in a letter dated April 8, 1910, by Mr W. A. Shedd, his countryman and fellow-worker.

"Mr Baskerville (Howard C. Baskerville) was a graduate of Princeton University (B.A., Class of 1907) who was teacher in Science and English in the Memorial Boys' School at Tabríz, connected with the American Presbyterian Mission in that city. He came from America under contract for two years' work in the School. As a teacher he was successful, and his earnest, sincere and manly character gained the respect of everyone. In the School were naturally young Persians of the progressive class, and one of the Persian teachers was Mírzá Ḥusayn Sharíf-záda, who became one of the most trusted and best of the Nationalist leaders in Tabríz. Sometime during 1908 he was assassinated in the streets of Tabríz by some men of the opposite party. These circumstances, as well as the inevitable sympathy of a young and enthusiastic American with the popular cause, led him to take an interest in the movement, and also made him acquainted with the leaders. Finally he felt it his duty to give up his mission work, offer his resignation, and throw in his lot with the Nationalist forces. About the same time, but I believe independently, Mr Moore, the London Telegraph [*sic*] Correspondent, joined these forces. Each was given a force of men to drill. I believe that Mr Baskerville (and I think Mr Moore also) advised sorties when Sattár Khán did not feel ready. Finally he insisted on one, apparently for political rather than strategic reasons, when it did not meet with their approval. However Baskerville set out on what was a hopeless adventure. At least those who have seen the place and the disposition

Sattár Khán
The Defender of Tabríz

Raḥím Khán Qarája-Dághí,
one of the besiegers of Tabríz, fraternizing with the Russian officials. See p. 347

of the mud walls in the neighbourhood so describe it. Most of his men failed him, Sattár Khán was not ready with the support he had promised to bring, and Baskerville was killed. His funeral was made the occasion of a great demonstration. I think that there is no doubt but that these two foreigners helped to dissuade the Nationalists from some rash projects, such as attacks on foreigners. He was disappointed in Sattár Khán, whom, indeed, success seems to have ruined, or he was already in a bad way before he became prominent....I think that there is no doubt whatever of Mr Baskerville's worthiness to be ranked as a martyr, perhaps the more so as he found a good deal to disappoint him and still held on. The Mission, of course, is precluded by its position from espousing a political cause, and Mr Baskerville's act was a private one."

NOTE 22 (*on p.* 269). SATTÁR KHÁN.

From information supplied to me from several trustworthy sources since my account of the siege of Tabríz was in print, I fear there is no doubt that Sattár Khán deteriorated sadly during the latter part of the siege and afterwards. The following is from a correspondent in whose judgement I have great confidence, and who was well placed for forming an opinion. I quote it with great regret, but since the aim of the historian should be the truth only, I feel that I have no right to suppress it.

"With regard to Sattár Khán, I hope you will be moderate in your praises of him in your Constitutional History. I went to Tabríz a fervent admirer of Sattár, and I came away with another lost illusion. Sattár is an illiterate, ignorant Qará-dághí horse-dealer, who has no more idea of what a Constitution means than Raḥím Khán. He was a sort of *lúṭí* in Tabríz, and had enrolled himself amongst the *fidá'ís* before the *coup d'état* of June, 1908. When the fighting began in Tabríz, he shewed considerable courage, and a certain spirit of leadership which enabled him to assert his supremacy over the *lúṭís* of his quarter. He has something in him of a Claude Duval, a chivalrous brigand, not without a love of theatrical effects. This character undoubtedly led him to act well in adversity, and, as much as anyone, I am ready to acknowledge the great debt Persians owe to him. It is a strange story, the struggle at Tabríz during the summer of 1908. Within three weeks after the *coup d'état* all was practically over. The Nationalists had surrendered; Báqir Khán, who is a cowardly bully, had hung a Russian flag over his house; and Raḥím Khán was in possession of the town. Sattár Khán, with about 200 horsemen, still held out. The revolting cruelty of the Qará-dághís forced the townsmen to take up arms again, and Raḥím Khán was driven out. Then Sattár Khán shewed himself at his best. Of course he was largely helped by the Caucasians, to whose greater skill in war he generally deferred, but it would be idle to deny that he himself shewed great courage, moderation and skill in conducting what seemed to be a hopeless fight. His followers besought him not to expose himself, representing that his death would mean the

collapse of the Constitutional cause. He declined to listen to their arguments, and replied that he did not understand such subtleties, and that his place was in the firing line. His conduct then was not without a simple grandeur, which won him the sympathies of the Europeans in Tabríz. His love of theatrical effect was, of course, in some degree responsible for his conduct, which, however, was admirable. It was his steadiness and cheerful assurance which largely contributed to the saving of Tabríz. 'God is on our side,' he used to say, and perhaps half believed it. You know the story of that successful resistance, the repulse of that furious attack of the Mákú Kurds, the grim resistance against which the general attack of the Royalist forces failed hopelessly, and the final sortie over the Ájí Bridge in the night, resulting in the rout of the besieging army. That moment was the apogee of Sattár Khán. Had he fallen then he would have left a glorious name in history. But success spoiled him. He began to rob inoffensive citizens; his house was full of spoils; eleven stolen pianos decorated his drawing-room; he took to heavy drinking; he took unto himself many wives; he was no longer seen in the firing rank, but rested on his laurels in slothful ease. Moore has probably told you the pitiful story of the second siege. Once or twice Sattár shewed some of his old spirit. Once, when in a sortie towards Alvar he was abandoned by most of his followers, and yet held his own with admirable coolness, conducting the retreat with perfect mastership. Again when Ṣamad Khán attacked and was almost successful, Sattár Khán came out and stayed the rout, changing defeat into victory. But these were only expiring flashes. I will not linger on the final stages of his demoralization. After the siege his behaviour was disgraceful, and he and Baqír Khán were largely responsible for the prolonged stay of the Russian troops. His conduct at Ardabíl was despicable, and was mainly responsible for the rebellion of the Sháh-sevens, whose chiefs had come into Ardabíl to tender their submission. Sattár, in a drunken fit, insulted them in the coarsest language. Furious at this treatment by a man whom they looked on as a plebeian, they left the town and joined Raḥím Khán. Sattár then ignobly abandoned the unfortunate town to its fate and fled to Tabríz. There he grossly insulted *Mukhbiru's-Salṭana*, and made the government of Tabríz almost impossible. I was in Tabríz during all this time, and I can assure you that all the better Constitutionalists were furious with Sattár and longed for his removal.

"I think that the above is a fair description of Sattár, and I know that Taqí-záda, for instance, agrees with it. Other Nationalists who were in Tabríz during the period in which Sattár consistently obstructed *Mukhbiru's-Salṭana's* government would give a less favourable description. But then, in their natural resentment against Sattár's unpatriotic attitude and terrorizing system in the town, they forget the real services he rendered during the first siege.

"I have tried to be impartial, and I cannot admit either that Sattár is undeserving of praise, or that he merits the title of 'the Persian Garibaldi.'"

NOTE 23 (*on pp.* 306, 307 *etc.*). PERSIA AND THE "TIMES."

The marked hostility of the *Times* correspondent towards the Persian Nationalists, of which so many instances have been given in these pages, naturally aroused great feeling on their side against him and his paper. In No. 169 of the *Írán-i-Naw* (April 4, 1910) there appeared a translation of a letter written by that correspondent on Feb. 5, and published in the *Times* of Feb. 28, 1910, under the heading of "Persia: the Distrust of Russia." To the translation of that letter the *Írán-i-Naw*, which was evidently much annoyed by the assertion that "it was controlled by Armenians and Russians from the Caucasus," appends the following observations:

"It is very strange that, in pursuit of a purely European aim, the *Times* is ready to advance its objects even at the cost of trampling under foot those laudable qualities for which it was once especially renowned.

"In adapting its utterances to those of the *Novoe Vremya* in order to further the alliance desired by Sir Edward Grey and M. Izvolsky, the *Times* has so far forgotten not only that love of liberty for which the English were formerly so famous, but also a reputation for truthfulness which had almost passed into a proverb, that it is ready to lower its standard of distinction and gentlemanly conduct in order to confuse Persian public opinion by accusing one of the chief Persian newspapers of being 'controlled by Russians from the Caucasus.' If the allusion in this poisonous allegation is to one of the writers on our staff, who is a Persian by birth, but whose ancestors inhabited the Caucasus, where he also naturally grew up, and who, impelled by patriotism, has returned to his original home, then it is an astonishing thing that the respected correspondent should see fit, without further enquiry, to send such information to his paper.

"Now as to Armenians being members of our staff, it is evident, however much the *Times* may boast of 'international' and 'cosmopolitan' sentiments, what poison of prejudice is mingled with its conceptions of us. For in any country which reckons Armenians amongst its children it is possible that an Armenian may be placed at the head of a paper, though as a matter of fact this statement of the *Times* is false, for we have no Armenian on our editorial staff.

"Before its present correspondent the *Times* maintained in Persia a correspondent whose prejudiced writings rendered a greater service to Russia than Liakhoff and Shapshál.

"A credible witness related as follows: 'When the Nationalist forces reached Ṭihrán I met three persons mourning and sorrowful, first Liakhoff, second *Sa'du'd-Dawla*, and third Mr David Fraser. The last was the most disturbed: he was wringing his hands and saying, "No, it is impossible! This is some rascally trick! One Russian is equal to five hundred revolutionaries. I am disgraced in the eyes of the readers of the *Times*. Moreover I have wagered a large sum of

money, and now I shall lose it!"' It is obvious that, in comparison with Mr Fraser, the present correspondent of the *Times* is a cause of thankfulness!..."

NOTE 24 (*on pp.* 329 *et seqq.*). EXECUTION OF SHAYKH FAẒLU'LLÁH.

Mírzá Muḥammad writes: "According to the statements of a number of trustworthy persons who were present at the execution of Shaykh Faẓlu'lláh, the story of his kissing the rope is false. He only said, 'On the Day of Judgement these men [*i.e.* my judges and executioners] will have to answer to me for this. Neither was I a "reactionary," nor were Sayyid 'Abdu'lláh [Bahbahání] and Sayyid Muḥammad [Ṭabáṭabá'í] "constitutionalists": it was merely that they wished to excel me, and I them, and there was no question of "reactionary" or "constitutional" principles.' At the last moment he is said to have recited this verse:

اگر بار گران بودیم رفتیم' اگر نامهربان بودیم رفتیم'

'"*If we were a heavy burden, we are gone;*
If we were unkind, we are gone."'

Then, without shewing any emotion or fear, he said to the executioners who were waiting to accomplish their task, 'Do your work!' He was hanged in his turban and cloak (*'abá*), but was only suspended for about ten minutes, when his body was let down and given to his relatives. His eldest son, Mírzá Mahdí (of whose conduct the most charitable explanation is that he was insane) stood at the foot of the gallows, reviling his father, and urging the National Volunteers (*mujáhidín*) to bring this sad business to a speedy end.

"I myself studied for a year or two with Shaykh Faẓlu'lláh, and for four years taught Arabic to his two sons Ẓiyá'u'd-Dín and Ḥájji Mírzá Hádí. I know all of them well: they were good and kind-hearted gentlemen, and I can only attribute Shaykh Faẓlu'lláh's sad end to bad fortune and an evil destiny.

"The members of the Supreme Court of Judicature (*Maḥkama-i-Qaẓáwat-i-'Áli*) which tried and condemned Shaykh Faẓlu'lláh were as follows:

(1) Shaykh Ibráhím-i-Zanjání, Deputy for Zanján.
(2) Mírzá Muḥammad, editor of the newspaper *Naját*.
(3) Ja'far-qulí Khán the Bakhtiyárí.
(4) Sayyid Muḥammad, entitled *Imám-záda*, the present *Imám-Jum'a*, son of the late *Imám-Jum'a*.
(5) The *I'tilá'u'l-Mulk*, now attached to the Persian Embassy at Constantinople.
(6) Ja'far-qulí Khán, one of the Persian residents in Constantinople.
(7) Ḥájji Mírzá 'Abdu'l-Ḥusayn Khán of Káshán, entitled *Waḥídu'l-Mulk*.
(8) The *Yamín-i-Niẓám*.

(9) Mírzá 'Alí Muḥammad Khán, National Volunteer.
(10) Aḥmad 'Alí Khán, National Volunteer.

"The *I'tilá'u'l-Mulk* himself communicated to me the names of the members of this Court when he was in Paris three or four months ago, and I took them down in writing at the time." (*M. M.*)

NOTE 25 (*on p.* 330). THE FATE OF CERTAIN PROMINENT REACTIONARIES, ESPECIALLY THE MUWAQQARU'S-SALṬANA.

"The *Mushíru's-Salṭana* and Kámrán Mírzá *Ná'ibu's-Salṭana* did not leave the country with Muḥammad 'Alí Mírzá [the ex-Sháh], but remained in Ṭihrán. Kámrán Mírzá put himself under Russian protection and is still in Ṭihrán. The *Mushíru's-Salṭana* appears to have ransomed himself for some 60,000 *túmáns* (£12,000), and is also still in Ṭihrán. The *Mujallalu's-Sulṭán* and *Muwaqqaru's-Salṭana* accompanied the deposed Sháh. The former is still in Vienna with the *Amír Bahádur Jang*: the latter returned to Persia, was arrested, and was hanged on January 27, 1910, at Ṭihrán." (*M. M.*)

The following account of the *Muwaqqaru's-Salṭana's* examination at the Ministry of Police appeared in the *Írán-i-Naw* of Jan. 30, 1910, No. 120.

(*Translation.*)

"After the *Muwaqqaru's-Salṭana* had been subjected to a searching examination in the First Division of the Criminal Court of the Supreme Ministry of Justice, in the presence of an impartial Commission, and had been condemned to death, five hours after sunset on the evening of Thursday, Muḥarram 15 [A.H. 1328 = Jan. 27, 1910] he was brought to the Ministry of Police. On the morning of that Thursday he was conducted to the examination room, where certain further investigations were carried out. In reply, he first made sundry irrelevant statements having no connection with the questions put to him, and, even when threatened, continued to make various unprofitable statements, until finally, three hours before sunset, in the presence of *Iqtidáru'd-Dawla*, the representative of the Government, *Niẓámu's-Sulṭán*, Sardár Yaḥyá, *Mir'átu's-Sulṭán*, Chief of the Investigation Department, and *Wuthúq-i-Niẓám*, he made the following declaration. Some of the matters disclosed by him, having regard to the gravity of the affair, are better kept secret, but we shall insert so much as is permissible, while the conclusion will naturally be made known at the proper time.

"First of all the *Muwaqqaru's-Salṭana* himself asked of those of the Commission who were present, 'If I tell you what I know, and you convey it to the people, is it possible that my crime should be overlooked, and that I should not be put to death, but that my punishment should be mitigated?'

"'If you tell the whole truth,' was the answer, 'the noble Persian people will certainly mitigate your punishment.'

"'Then,' he proceeded, 'I swear by God's Word that I will tell you

what I know without one falsehood, and you shall communicate it to the people.'

"At this juncture one of the examiners sat down behind the door of the room and took down verbally what he said.

"The *Muwaqqaru's-Salṭana* then continued as follows:

"'When we left Ṭihrán, in consequence of the promises given to the Sháh by Prince *Mu'ayyidu's-Salṭana* (who had said to him, "I will not allow you to go to Russia: do you only linger somewhat on the road, and I will work for you") the Sháh made very slow and deliberate progress from stage to stage, expecting that news would reach him of disturbances in the provinces, and enquiring every day by telephone from the capital as to the conditions prevailing there. The Amír Bahádur Jang had also assured the Sháh that he had written to *Iqbálu's-Salṭana*, Raḥím Khán and *Shujá'u'd-Dawla* to create disturbances in their districts, and to declare that they would not suffer the Sháh to go to Europe. The Sháh himself, moreover, while on the road had requested the Russian Cossack officers to induce the Persian Cossacks at Qazwín to stop his advance, while on the same day the Cossacks at Ṭihrán should create a disturbance there, declaring that they would not suffer the Sháh to leave Persia. The Sháh's own intention, however, was that at Qazwín he, with the Amír Bahádur Jang and some of his other companions, should mount mares and should swiftly flee to the Khamsa tribesmen whom the Amír Bahádur had promised to provide, while these should be reinforced by the horsemen of the *Iqbálu's-Salṭana* and Raḥím Khán, who should prevent his departure. When news of the arrest of *Mu'ayyidu's-Salṭana* reached the Sháh, he still did not despair, saying, "This matter will be effected at Rasht," and adding that the chief *mujtahid* of that town was one of his own men, and that he would surely be ready to create a disturbance there.

"'Thus it was that we proceeded to Rasht, where one or two persons visited the Legation (*sic*), and brought letters from Khamsa, which were conveyed to the Sháh by the Amír Bahádur Jang, but I did not gather what they were about. When we reached Anzalí, however, he sent for me and said, "The time is now come for you to render me a service." I replied, "What shall I do?" He said, "You must go as an envoy from me to a certain person who is one of ourselves." "Who and where is that person," I replied, "and what shall I say to him?" "That person," answered the Sháh, "is *Iqbálu's-Salṭana* of Mákú. All you have to do is to find him and say, 'Now is the time for your service. Although I have 20,000 *fidá'ís* (devoted adherents), yet it is of you that I ask help. All the towns, moreover, are awaiting news of me.' Do not, however, tell him that I have been forcibly expelled from Ṭihrán, nor that they overcame me by force. Say, 'He himself deemed it expedient to go to Russia, settle his affairs there, and return, and now he relies on the help of you, his faithful and loyal servants.'"

"'To this I replied, "When the *Iqbálu's-Salṭana* and Raḥím Khán see me in this garb, they will not recognize me, nor pay any attention to my words. It would be better, therefore, that you should put it in writing."

"'"Nay," said he, "for should I write anything, and should you perhaps be captured on the way, such writing may be a source of danger for you. But I will give you a sign which shall suffice to identify you when I write in my own hand."

"'"Very well," I replied, "but I need some money for current expenses."

"'"You know perfectly well," he answered, "that I have not brought such money with me, but I will give you a little to enable you to reach him. Once there, he will give you whatever is necessary. As for the sign, it is this which I now tell you, and do not forget it. Say to him, 'The sign is this, that you wrote to me that I should give my daughter in marriage to your son. And I am writing in my own hand by means of *Iqbálu's-Salṭana* that when the matter is finished I will give [you] Tabríz. As for the person of whom you wrote that he betrayed my Government in the war at Tabríz, I will punish him severely. On the arrival of *Muwaqqaru's-Salṭana* you must act on any instructions which reach you in writing.'"

"'After thus concluding the discussion, the Sháh went into the *andarún* (women's apartments) and sent out to me 75 *túmáns* in cash, with this message: "By thy life I swear that I have sold several guns in Anzalí, and that this is part of the money obtained by this sale. Be content, so far as possible, with this money, and betake thyself whither thou art sent."

"'After receiving the money I reflected a little, and came to the conclusion that, with so small a sum at my disposal, it would be the height of folly for me to court death. So I said to the Amír Bahádur Jang, "The Sháh instructs me thus. What is your opinion?" He replied, "Do not take a penny of this money. There is no necessity for you to go, for during the time we were at Zarganda[1] I sent several messengers to arrange this matter, and news from them should reach us in the course of the next two or three days. Should it be necessary you will go later."

"'Thus it was that I did not again enter the Sháh's presence. We started for the Caucasus, and on arriving there Muḥammad 'Alí Mírzá had a secret conclave with some Caucasians, of whom the chief was Salím Beg, the Amír Bahádur Jang being also present. I supposed that the message of which the latter had spoken was about to reach me, and that during these two or three days these had brought the news. After half an hour Salím Beg came out, holding a bundle of papers in his hand, and went away with the Caucasians who accompanied him. The Amír Bahádur Jang was sent after me. I asked him what was the cause of the secret conclave. He replied, "The Sháh has written some telegrams and is sending them by means of these people to the Russian Prime Minister, so that he may enter into correspondence with him." I suspect, however, that these papers were not telegrams.

"'At all events I left the Sháh there, and set out for Paris with the Amír Bahádur Jang, *Mujallalu's-Sulṭán* and *Arshadu'd-Dawla*. In one

[1] The summer residence of the Russian Legation.

of the stages on the way thither I quarrelled one night with *Mujallalu's-Sulṭán* over a game of dice at a hotel. He became very abusive and boxed my ears. I struck him and abused him. From that night onwards I was naturally on bad terms with him. His companions took his part and gave me a good, sound thrashing. Next day I parted from them and proceeded to Paris.... '

"It was at this point that the prisoner made certain disclosures which we deem it inexpedient to divulge. Even at the foot of the gallows certain further questions were put to him and certain answers were given by him which it is our duty for the present not to disclose."

The execution of this unfortunate man was carried out in the most barbarous manner, and created a very painful impression. It is much to be regretted that the otherwise admirable record of the Constitutionalists should have been defaced by such cruelty, or at any rate such culpable negligence.

END OF THE NOTES.